General

Philosophy

Essay Questions and

Reading Lists

Peter J. King
e-mail: peter.king@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
 General Reading
Simon Blackburn Think
L. Bonjour The Structure of Empirical Knowledge
Brian Carr Metaphysics: An Introduction
Roderick M. Chisholm On Metaphysics
Earl Conee & Theodore Sider Riddles of Existence
Jonathan Dancy Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology
Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics
Michael J. Loux Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduction
P. Moser, D. Mulder,
& J.D. Trout The Theory of Knowledge: a Thematic Introduction
Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy

Frequently-Cited Collections
Referred to by editors names (and, where necessary, year of publication) only:

L. Alcoff Epistemology: the Big Questions

Sven Bernecker & Fred Dretske Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology
Stuart C. Brown Reason and Religion
Steven M. Cahn & David Shatz Contemporary Philosophy of Religion
Jonathan Dancy Perceptual Knowledge
Michael Huemer Epistemology: Contemporary Readings
Peter van Inwagen &
Dean W. Zimmerman Metaphysics: the Big Questions
Basil Mitchell The Philosophy of Religion
T.V. Morris The Concept of God
G.S. Pappas & M. Swain Essays on Knowledge and Justification
A. Phillips Griffiths Knowledge and Belief
Eleonore Stump &
Michael J. Murray Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions

Journals
A.P.Q. American Philosophical Quarterly
I.J.Rel. International Journal of Religion
J.H.P. Journal of the History of Philosophy)
J.Phil. Journal of Philosophy
P.A.S. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
P.A.S.S. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume
P.B.A. Proceedings of the British Academy
Phil.Q. Philosophical Quarterly
Phil.Rev. Philosophical Review
Stud.Leib. Studia Leibnitiana
 Some notes on writing essays
HILOSOPHY is like mathematics in that you cant just set down your answer you have to show how you

P got there. A common fault in philosophy essays is that the writer is in such a hurry to get her ideas down
to attack a hated position, to state an attractive theory that she forgets to argue. Without arguments,
all you have is a set of opinions, however interesting; with arguments, you have philosophy. With good
arguments, you have good philosophy.
TRUCTURE. But perhaps the most common cause of problems with essays (apart from the amount of work

S put into them) is poor structure. A badly structured essay doesnt only make it difficult for the reader to
follow what youre saying it can make it difficult for you to keep track of what youre saying, leading
to repetition, contradiction, and irrelevance. Make an essay plan before you start writing, and try to stick to it.
It shouldnt be too detailed, otherwise itll be too rigid; most, if not all, plans will fall into three parts, including
an introduction to and explanation of the problems, a discussion of the main arguments, and some sort of
conclusion. Whatever your position, be sure to treat the positions with which you disagree as fully and
sympathetically as possible before you start to criticise them; apart from anything else this will help you to avoid
knocking down straw men. Dont strive too hard for originality and new ideas; these will come (if they do) as
you think and write about other peoples ideas and arguments. If you do come up with what you think is an
original idea or argument, dont be too protective towards it; be at least as critical of it as you would be of anyone
elses.
RITICAL APPARATUS. All quotations should be given references clear and detailed enough to allow the

C reader to go straight to the original source. This will normally involve author, title, and page number; in
the case of historical or translated works, you should be sure to give the edition youre using, and if
possible use a standard reference system (often found in the margins or at the top of each page). If youre unsure,
check to see how other authors do it, or ask me. Never use other writers words or even ideas without
acknowledgment (see under plagiarism below). Details should be given in a separate bibliography; the reference
in the text is to author and page.
ANGUAGE. Clarity and precision often depend upon careful use of language and this includes spelling

L and grammar. Dont underestimate the problems caused by misspelling (the differences between intention
and intension, or ingenious and ingenuous, are more important than the single letters involved). This
is even more true of grammar and punctuation. Keep your language simple: dont use three syllables where one
will do, or had it not been written by him instead of if he hadnt written it. Make sure that quotations fit into
their new contexts (avoid, for example, Descartes said that I can be certain; write either Descartes said: I
can be certain or Descartes said that he could be certain).
LAGIARISM. Your essays must be your own work. The reading is there to guide you, to suggest avenues

P of thought, to offer explanations of difficult arguments or ideas; it is not there to be repeated parrot-fashion.
If you need to quote from another writer, mark the quotation clearly (see above, under Critical apparatus)
but again, dont overdo it.
RACTICAL MATTERS. N.B.: occasionally I give more than one essay question; these are alternatives, so

P choose one. Dont read too much (or, of course, too little); three or four items from the relevant reading
list is usually about right (one introductory or general work, and two or three others). If you want to (or
have to) go outside the reading I suggest, talk to me about it; too often I find that essays have suffered because
students have depended upon what are frankly bad and misleading books. If you use a word-processor (and Id
advise it), use the spell-checker, but dont rely upon it; read through (preferably aloud) what youve written, at
least once. Dont bother with grammar-checkers Ive yet to see one that works properly.
 Scepticism
What is the sceptical challenge? Is Putnams reply to the sceptic satisfactory?

A.J. Ayer The Problem of Knowledge chapter 2

A. Brueckner Brains in a vat (J.Phil. 83, 1986)
Thompson Clarke The legacy of scepticism (J.Phil., 1972)
John Cottingham Descartes chapter 2
K. DeRose &
T. Warfield [edd] Skepticism: a Contemporary Reader
Ren Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy Meditation I
G. Forbes Realism and skepticism: brains in a vat revisited (J.Phil. 92, 1995; & in DeRose & Warfield)
G.E. Moore Proof of an external world (extract in Huemer)
Robert Nozick Knowledge and scepticism (in his Philosophical Explanations, pp 16771;
also reprinted in Jonathan Dancy [ed.], Perceptual Knowledge, pp 2942)
Hilary Putnam Brains in a vat (in his Reason, Truth, and History chapter 1; also reprinted
in Huemer, and in Bernecker & Dretske)
Ernest Sosa Putnams pragmatic realism (J. Phil. 90, 1993)
Barry Stroud The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism chapters 1 & 2
Peter Unger A defence of scepticism (Phil.Rev., 1971; also in Pappas & Swain)
Bernard Williams Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry chapter 2
Crispin Wright On Putnams proof that we are not brains in a vat (P.A.S. 92, 19912)

Questions you might consider

Is it a condition of my knowing that I am in Oxford that I know that I am not a brain in a vat in some laboratory
somewhere? What is the purpose of the sceptical arguments? Does it make sense to ask Am I dreaming?

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 Knowledge
Do Gettier-style counter-examples challenge the definition of knowledge as justified true belief?

A.J. Ayer The Problem of Knowledge chapter 1

L. BonJour Externalist theories of empirical knowledge (in Bernecker & Dretske])
Jonathan Dancy Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology chaps 2 & 3
Edmund Gettier Is justified true belief knowledge? (Analysis, 1963, pp 12123; also in
Huemer, and in Bernecker & Dretske, and in Phillips Griffiths)
Alvin Goldman A causal theory of knowing (J.Phil., 1967; also in Pappas & Swain)
What is justified belief? (in Alcoff)
David Hume Enquiry passim, and especially sections IV, V, IX, XI
Treatise I,iii,710 and Appendix (pages 623633)
Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations chapter 3 (selections in Dancy)
H.A. Prichard Knowing and believing (extract, in Griffiths, from his Knowing and Believing)

Questions you might consider

Does S know that p if and only if the fact that p is causally connected with Ss believing that p? Does Nozick's analysis
deal with Gettier cases? Are there better approaches? What is Nozick's analysis? Do we need to use Nozick's notion of
tracking the truth in explaining what knowledge is?

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 The Problem of Evil
a) Could a god have created beings who had free will but never went wrong?
b) Might this be the best of all possible worlds? Would the problem of evil be solved if it were?

M. McCord Adams Horrendous evils and the goodness of god (PASS LXIII, 1989; & in Stump &
Murray)
Robert M. Adams Must god create the best? (Phil.Rev. 81:3, 1972; & in Morris)
Paul Draper Pain and pleasure: an evidential problem for theists (Nos 23, 1989; & in Stump &
Murray)
John Hick An Irenan theodicy (in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Davis; &
in Stump & Murray)
God and the Universe of Faiths papers 4 & 5
Peter van Inwagen The magnitude, duration, and distribution of evil: a theodicy (in Philosophical Topics
16, 1988; & in Stump & Murray)
Anthony Kenny The God of the Philosophers chapter 7 (& in Morris as The definition of
omnipotence)
Peter J. King The problem of evil (Philosophical Writings 9, 1998)
J.L. Mackie Evil and omnipotence (Mind 64, 1955; & in Mitchell)
William E. Mann Gods freedom, human freedom, and gods responsibility for sin (in Divine & Human
Action, ed. Thomas V. Morris)
T.V. Morris Duty and divine goodness (A.P.Q. 21:3, 1984; & in Morris)
Michael J. Murray Coercion and the hiddenness of god (A.P.Q. 30, 1993; & in Stump & Murray)
Alvin Plantinga The free will defence (in Philosophy in America, ed. Black, & in Mitchell)
On being evidentially challenged (in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. Howard-
Snyder, & in Stump & Murray)
Quentin Smith & L. Nathan
Oaklander Time, Change, and Freedom dialogue 10
Eleonore Stump The problem of evil (Faith and Philosophy 2, 1985; & in Stump & Murray)
Richard Swinburne The problem of evil (in Brown, & in Cahn & Shatz)
Natural evil and the possibility of knowledge (in Stump & Murray)
John Wisdom God and evil (Mind 44, 1935)

Questions you might consider

This is a topic in which its easy to get lost; try to stick to a couple of the main defences against the problem of evil (or even
just to the free-will defence), rather than trying to cover all the different approaches in turn.
Any willingness to discard or significantly weaken one of the main traditional attributes of god (omniscience,
omnipotence, benevolence, or rle [as creator or actor] in the world) defuses the problem, so its definitely not (at least not
simply) an argument against the existence of god.
Note that, though the problem arises in its most acute form, only for a rather specific notion of god the Judo-
Christian notion (since the Holocaust it has become an important question in Jewish thought), it is of interest to members
of most of not all religious traditions. Ive included in the reading list some papers and books concerning non-Judo-
Christian discussions, but dont get too side-tracked by the specifics of any one approach or religious context; the issues
with which were concerned are at a high level of abstraction, and your discussion should stay at that level as far as
possible.

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 Induction
Has anyone proved to your satisfaction that induction is rational or that it is not rational?

A.J. Ayer The Central Questions of Philosophy chapter 7

Probability and Evidence chapter 1, sect. 1
Simon Blackburn Reason and Prediction chapter 4
Spreading the Word pp 6982
A.F. Chalmers What Is This Thing Called Science? chapter 2
Paul Edwards Bertrand Russells doubts about induction (in A. Flew [ed.], Logic and Language, First
Series)
David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding sect. IV pt ii, and sect. V pt i
Nelson Goodman The new riddle of induction (in his Fact, Fiction and Forecast chap. III; also in
Huemer)
J.L. Mackie A defence of induction (in MacDonald [ed.] Perception and Identity (see also see Ayer's
reply)
D.H. Mellor The warrant of induction (in his Matters of Metaphysics)
Bertrand Russell The Problems of Philosophy chapter 6 (also in R. Swinburne [ed.], The Justification
of Induction)
P.F. Strawson Introduction to Logical Theory chapter 9, pp 233263, especially p.248
Barry Stroud Hume chapter 3, especially pp 5067

Questions you might consider

Humes solution to his philosophical sceptical doubts about arguments from experience involves the idea of custom and
habit. In what sense is this a solution?
Can we solve the problem of induction by:
i) saying rational procedures are those we call rational;
ii) saying this is how we are going to proceed anyway;
iii) talking about natural selection;
iv) anything else?

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 Freedom and Determinism
Is freedom (or free will) compatible with determinism?

A.J. Ayer Freedom and necessity (in his Philosophical Essays; also in Watson)
Paul Edwards Hard and soft determinism (in Hook [ed.] Determinism and Freedom)
Philippa Foot Free will as involving determinism (Phil.Rev., 1957; also in B. Berofsky [ed.], Free Will
and Determinism)
H. Frankfurt Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility (J.Phil., vol. 66, 1969, pp 829839; also
in Watson)
Jonathan Glover Responsibility especially chapter 2
Stuart Hampshire Freedom of mind (in his Freedom of Mind and Other Essays)
Ted Honderich How Free Are You?
David Hume An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding sect. VIII
Peter van Inwagen The mystery of metaphysical freedom (in van Inwagen & Zimmerman)
Thomas Nagel Freedom (in Watson)
Timothy OConnor The agent as cause (in van Inwagen & Zimmerman)
P.F. Strawson Freedom and resentment (in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays; also in
Watson)
Barry Stroud Hume chapter VII, pp 141154
Gary Watson [ed.] Free Will Introduction (2nd edition, 2003)

Questions you might consider

If free will is not compatible with determinism, what would it be? How, for example, would one explain free actions?
What, if anything, has predictability to do with freedom (note that the weather is fairly unpredictable)? I could have done
otherwise if I had chosen otherwise but could I have chosen otherwise?

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 Mind and Body
Is the mind distinct from body?

David Armstrong A Materialist Theory of the Mind chapters 12

Peter Carruthers The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction chapter 2
Andrea Christofidou Descartes dualism: correcting some misconceptions (J.H.P., vol. XXXIX, no. 2, April
2001)
David Chalmers The Conscious Mind especially chapter 4, but passim
John Cottingham Descartes chapter 5
Ren Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy Meditation VI (especially AT VII 78 & 81)
Second Set of Replies (AT VII 161170)
Third Set of Objections and Replies (AT VII 1727)
Fourth Set of Objections (AT VII 197205)
Fourth Set of Replies (AT VII 21931 & 288)
Fifth Set of Objections (AT VII 33445)
Fifth Set of Replies (AT VII 38890)
Principles of Philosophy Part I (5162)
Owen Flanagan Consciousness Reconsidered chapter 6
W.D. Hart The Engines of the Soul passim
Colin McGinn The Problem of Consciousness chapter 1
Karl Popper &
John C. Eccles The Self and Its Brain passim
Karl Popper Knowledge and the BodyMind Problem especially chapter 5
Gilbert Ryle The Concept of Mind chapter 1
P.F. Strawson Self, mind, and body (in his Freedom and Resentment; and in David Rosenthal [ed.], The
Nature of Mind chapter 5)1
Bernard Williams Descartes chapters 4

Questions you might consider

What is meant by real distinction? Could there be a mind without a body? According to Descartes I am not merely
present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship (AT VII 81). What does this mean?

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 Personal Identity
What is it that makes a person at two different times one and the same person?

Joseph Butler Of Personal Identity (in John Perry [ed.], Personal Identity (University of California
Press, 1975)
David Hume Treatise of Human Nature Bk.I, iv, 6 and Appendix
John Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II, chapter 27
Thomas Reid Of Identity and Of Mr Lockes Account of Our Personal Identity (both in Perry [ed.])
Peter Carruthers Introducing Persons (Croom Helm, 1986) see especially Part Two, section 3
E.J. Lowe Locke on Human Understanding (Routledge, 1995) chapter 5
Thomas Nagel Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness (in his Mortal Questions (CUP, 1979))
Derek Parfit Why Our Identity is Not What Matters (extracts from his Reasons and Persons reprinted
in Raymond Martin and John Barresi [edd], Personal Identity (Blackwell, 2003))
Bernard Williams The Self and the Future (in his Problems of the Self (CUP, 1973); reprinted in Perry
[ed.]; also in Martin and Barresi [edd])
P. Snowdon Persons, Animals, and Ourselves (in Christopher Gill [ed.], The Person and the Human
Mind (OUP, 1990))

Questions you might consider

What is personal identity? Am I in a better position to judge of my identity than anyone else is? Are our intuitions about
puzzle cases of any relevance to determining the criteria of personal identity?

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