APPLICATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN VIETNAM WAR

Introduction

1. Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, military struggle fought in
Vietnam from 1959 to 1975, involving the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation
Front (NLF) in conflict with United States forces and the South Vietnamese army. From
1946 until 1954, the Vietnamese had struggled for their independence from France during
the First Indochina War. At the end of this war, the country was temporarily divided into
North and South Vietnam. North Vietnam came under the control of Vietnamese
Communists who had opposed France and who aimed for a unified Vietnam under
Communist rule. The South was controlled by non-Communist Vietnamese.

2. The United States became involved in Vietnam because American policymakers

believed that if the entire country fell under a Communist government, Communism would
spread throughout Southeast Asia. This belief was known as the domino theory. The U.S.
government, therefore, helped to create the anti-Communist South Vietnamese
government.

3. In 1965 the United States sent in troops to prevent the South Vietnamese
government from collapsing. Ultimately, however, the United States failed to achieve its
goal, and in 1975 Vietnam was reunified under Communist control; in 1976 it officially
became the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. During the conflict, approximately 3.2 million
Vietnamese were killed, in addition to another 1.5 million to 2 million Lao and Cambodians
who were drawn into the war. Nearly 58,000 Americans lost their lives.

4. Conduct of Unconventional Warfare (UCW) simultaneously with Conventional

Operation has become an accepted method for waging a war in our Army. Such a war
requires long term planning, sound professional knowledge and command capability of the
highest order. The whole nation with all available resources needs to operate together to
achieve the common goal; to upkeep the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.
Vietnam War is a great milestone in the history of this concept which inspires a country like
ours to fight against numerically superior forces in terms of technology and manpower.

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Aim

3. The aim of this paper is to apprise you about the application of unconventional
warfare in Vietnam War.

Scope

4. The presentation will unfold under the fol sequence:

a. Background of war.
b. Belligerents.
c. Strategy.
d. Organization of forces.
e. Tactics followed by Vietminh Guerillas.
f. Evaluation of imp battles.
g. Logistic system.
j. Lesson learned.
k. Integration of the concept in our doctrine.
l. Conclusion.

Background of War

5. Between 1955 and 1960, the North Vietnamese with the assistance of the southern
communist Vietcong, tried to take over the government in South Vietnam, and in November
1963 President Diem was overthrown and executed. The following year, the North
Vietnamese began a massive drive to conquer the whole country aided by China and
Russia.

6. Fearing a communist takeover of the entire region, the United States grew more and
more wary of the progress of Ho Chi Minh and the Vietcong. Communism had become the
evil menace in the United States and with expansion of Soviet rule into Eastern Europe,
Korea and Cuba, the Americans were bent on stopping communism from spreading any
further.
7. Most American wars have obvious starting points or precipitating causes: the Battles
of Lexington and Concord in 1775, the capture of Fort Sumter in 1861, the attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, for example.

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But there was no fixed beginning for the U.S. war in Vietnam. The United States entered
that war incrementally, in a series of steps between 1950 and 1965. In May 1950, President
Harry S. Truman authorized a modest program of economic and military aid to the French,
who were fighting to retain control of their Indochina colony, including Laos and Cambodia
as well as Vietnam. When the Vietnamese Nationalist (and Communist-led) Vietminh army
defeated French forces at Dien bien phu in 1954, the French were compelled to accede to
the creation of a Communist Vietnam north of the 17th parallel while leaving a non-
Communist entity south of that line. The United States refused to accept the arrangement.
The administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower undertook instead to build a nation
from the spurious political entity that was South Vietnam by fabricating a government there,
taking over control from the French, dispatching military
advisers to train a South Vietnamese army, and
unleashing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to
conduct psychological warfare against the North.

8. President John F. Kennedy rounded another

turning point in early 1961, when he secretly sent 400
Special Operations Forces-trained (Green Beret) soldiers
to teach the South Vietnamese how to fight what was
called counterinsurgency war against Communist
guerrillas in South Vietnam. When Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, there
were more than 16,000 U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam, and more than 100
Americans had been killed. Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, committed the
United States most fully to the war. In August 1964, he secured from Congress a functional
(not actual) declaration of war: the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Then, in February and March
1965, Johnson authorized the sustained bombing, by U.S. aircraft, of targets north of the
17th parallel, and on 8 March dispatched 3,500 Marines to South Vietnam. Legal
declaration or no, the United States was now at war.

9. As the United States went to war in 1965, a few voices were raised in dissent. Within
the Johnson administration, Undersecretary of State George Ball warned that the South
Vietnamese government was a functional nonentity and simply could not be sustained by
the United States, even with a major effort. Antiwar protest groups formed on many of the
nation's campuses; in June, the leftist organization Students for a Democratic Society
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decided to make the war its principal target. But major dissent would not begin until 1966 or
later. By and large in 1965, Americans supported the administration's claim that it was
fighting to stop communism in Southeast Asia, or people simply shrugged and went about
their daily lives, unaware that this gradually escalating war would tear American society
apart.

10. Belligerents.

a. Anti-Communist Group.

(1) South Vietnam.

(2) United States.
(3) South Korea.
(4) Australia.
(5) Philippines.
(4) New Zealand.
(5) Thailand.

b. Communist Group.

(1) North Vietnam.

(2) Viet Cong.
(3) People's Republic of China.
(4) Soviet Union.
(5) North Korea.

Strategy

11. US Strategy. When Johnson began bombing North Vietnam and sent the Marines to
South Vietnam in early 1965, he had every intention of fighting a limited war. He and his
advisers worried that too lavish a use of U.S. firepower might prompt the Chinese to enter
the conflict. It was not expected that the North Vietnamese and the NLF would hold out long

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against the American military. And yet U.S. policymakers never managed to fit military
strategy to U.S. goals in Vietnam. Massive bombing had little effect against a decentralized
economy like North Vietnam's. Kennedy had favored counterinsurgency warfare in the
South Vietnamese countryside, and Johnson endorsed this strategy, but the political side of
counterinsurgency--the effort to win the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese peasantry--
was at best underdeveloped and probably doomed. Presidents proved reluctant to mobilize
American society to the extent the generals thought necessary to defeat the enemy.

12. North Vietnam Strategy. The Vietcong in the Vietnam War used a fighting style
called guerrilla warfare. The main force Vietcong soldiers were full-time soldiers. They
would be used to fight over a wide area. Regional forces were also full- time soldiers. They
only served within their area they wouldnt really leave their stations. If it was necessary
smaller units, they would join up to make a bigger units for bigger attacks on the American
troops. If the American troops pressured the Vietcong to much, they who break down into
smaller units and scatter to same where safe. The Vietcong main troops thought they were
all professional soldiers and the local Vietcong soldiers were not that confident about
themselves. Recruits were young teenagers, many of them were motivated to fight by
idealism, but others were pressures or were shamed into joining the military. Guerrillas
were given only basic training. If they were recruited by the main force however, they could
receive advanced training. There were many different hiding places for the platoon leaders
and his squad for weapons and radio training. In the mid-1960s, most of the Vietcong main
soldiers had Chinese versions of the Russian AK-47 submachine gun. The heavy machine
guns were used for defense against American helicopters. For destroying vehicles or
bunkers, the Vietcong army would use rocket propelled grenades. The Vietcong army also
had weapons like booby traps and mines which were homemade in the villages. December
of 1965, the Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership wanted a change in the
fighting style so the war in South Vietnam could be fought easier.

Organization of Forces

13. The formation of the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) lies in the
communist dominated resistance to the French - the Viet Minh. The expulsion of the French
had still left a clandestine organization behind in the South, reinforced by thousands of

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Southerners that had gone North after the communist victory . This clandestine organization
initially focused on political organization and propaganda, and came under heavy pressure
by the Diem regime. Diem was an implacable enemy of the Communists and his nationalist
credentials were comparatively clean, but he had inherited a very fragile situation. From the
beginning he faced the threat of military coups, thrusting criminal gangs, a weak
bureaucracy and army, and fierce factional fighting within South Vietnam between not only
political factions, but religious groups (Buddhists and Catholics) as well.

14. Nevertheless Diem caused substantial early damage to the Communist apparatus.
Some of his authoritarian methods and nepotism however alienated a variety of groups in
South Vietnamese society. Diem's "Denounce Communism" campaign for example,
indiscriminately persecuted and alienated numerous civilians (including people who helped
the anti-French resistance) who may not have had strong links or sympathies with
Communism. Diem's coldness towards Buddhist sensibilities in some areas also
aggravated an already shaky situation.

15. Diem's successful campaign provoked increasing assistance from the Communist
North to the clandestine southern formations. As early as 1959, the Central Committee of
the Party had issued a resolution to pursue armed struggle. Thousands of regroupees were

Rein filtrated south, and a special unit was also set up, the 559th Transport Group, to
establish way-stations, trails, and supply caches for the movement of fighting men and
material into the zone of conflict. In 1960 the Central Committee formed the National
Liberation Front (NLF). Its military wing was officially called the People's Liberation Armed
Forces (PLAF) but became more popularly known as the Viet Cong (VC). The NLF/VC took
in not just armed guerrillas but served as a broad front for a variety of groups opposed to
Diem. The North stiffened the early NLF effort in four ways:

a. Sending thousands of northern cadres into the south as leaders and trainers,
sometimes aggravating a regional culture clash within revolutionary ranks.

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 b. Standardizing the polyglot VC inventory of fighting arms, including rifles (the
AK-47) and machine guns using a common caliber round. Other excellent arms
included the RPG-2 and various recoilless rifles.

c. Organization of VC units into larger formations, from battalions to regiments,

to the first VC division, the famous 9th VC.

d. Deployment of NVA regulars to build up logistical networks for later infiltration,

(the 559th Transport Group) and insertion of complete regular units such as the
325th Division in remote border areas.

Tactics Followed by Vietminh Guerilla

17. The Vietcong.

a. The Vietnamese Communists, or Vietcong, were the military branch of the

National Liberation Front (NLF), and were commanded by the Central Office for
South Vietnam, which was located near the Cambodian border. For arms,
ammunition and special equipment, the Vietcong depended on the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Other needs were met inside South Vietnam.

b. Main force Vietcong units were uniformed, full-time soldiers, and were used to
launch large scale offensives over a wide area. Regional forces were also full-time,
but operated only within their own districts. When necessary, small regional units
would unite for large scale attacks. If enemy pressure became too great, they would
break down into smaller units and scatter.

c. Unlike the main troops, who saw themselves as professional soldiers, local
Vietcong groups tended to be far less confident. For the most part, recruits were
young teenagers, and while many were motivated by idealism, others had been
pressured or shamed into joining. They also harbored real doubts about their ability
to fight heavily armed and well-trained American soldiers.

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d. Initially, local guerrillas were given only a basic minimum of infantry training,
but if they were recruited to a main force unit, they could receive up to a month of
advanced instruction. Additionally, there were dozens of hidden centers all over
South Vietnam for squad and platoon leader, weapons and radio training. To ensure
that the guerrillas understood why they were fighting, all training courses included
political instruction.

e. By the mid-1960s, most main force Vietcong troops were armed with Chinese
versions of the Russian AK-47 submachine gun. They also used a range of effective
Soviet and Chinese light and medium machine guns, and infrequently, heavy
machine guns. In particular, heavy machine guns were valued for defense against
American helicopters.

f. For destroying armored vehicles or bunkers, the Vietcong had highly effective
rocket propelled grenades and recoilless rifles. Mortars were also available in large
numbers and had the advantage of being very easy to transport.

g. Many weapons, including booby traps and mines, were homemade in villages.
The materials ranged from scavenged tin can to discarded wire, but the most
important ingredients were provided by the enemy. In a year, dud American bombs
could leave more than 20,000 tons of explosives scattered around the Vietnamese
countryside. After air-raids, volunteers retrieved the duds and the dangerous
business of creating new weapons began.

h. Local forces also designed primitive weapons, some designed to frighten

intruders, but others were extremely dangerous. "Punji traps" -- sharp spikes hidden
in pits could easily disable an enemy soldier. Punjis were often deliberately
contaminated to increase the risk of infection.

j. In December 1965, Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese leadership

ordered a change in a way the war in the South was to be fought. From now on, the
Vietcong would avoid pitched battles with the Americans unless the odds were
clearly in their favor. There would be more hit and run attacks and ambushes. To
counter the American build-up, Vietcong recruitment would be stepped up and more
North Vietnamese Army troops would be infiltrated into South Vietnam.

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 k. The Vietcong, following the example of Chinese guerillas before them, had
always given the highest priority to creating safe base areas. They were training
grounds, logistics centers and headquarters. They also offered secure sanctuaries
for times when the war might go badly.

l. Hiding the base areas had always been a high priority for the Vietcong. Now,
with American spotter planes everywhere, it was more vital than ever to protect
them. In remote swamps or forests, there were few problems, but nearer the capital,
it was much more difficult. The answer was to build enormous systems of
underground tunnels.

m. The orders coming from NLF headquarters were absolutely clear. Tunnels
were not to be treated as mere shelters. They were fighting bases capable of
providing continuous support for troops. Even if a village was in enemy hands, the
NLF beneath were still able to conduct offensive operations.

n. There were complexes big and small scattered across the country. Each
villager in a NLF area had to dig three feet of tunnel a day. There was even a
standard handbook specifying how tunnels were to be built. The biggest tunnel
systems were in the Iron Triangle and the Cu Chi District.

Evaluation of Imp Battles

18. Battle of Dien Bien Fu. After the 2nd World War France and United States
entered into a new conflict with Vietnam which was the longest battle. The most padative
event of this conflict was the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The battle of Dien Bien Phu occupies
an important place in the history of modern warfare because it ultimately made the French
colonies a hopeless case in Indo-China and marked the beginning of the Vietnam War. The
great battle was fought from 13 March to 07 May in 1954. Dien Bien Phu was a blocking
position of the French. The occupation and the fortification of the valley of Nam Yum at Dien
Bien Phu, by the French Airborne Forces was regarded by many western military experts as
an ideal Blocking position against Viet Minh Forces from Laos. No one could believe that
Vietnamese would be able to amass such a large number of troops with medium artillery
through the hilly jungle where there was no major roads/tracks available. The Viet Minh

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Army not only brought this huge forces and equipment through such a difficult terrain but
also ensured that these large forces and their guns were supplied with the logistic
throughout the battle. The vacuum created between the withdrawal of the defeated
Japanese and the return of the French colonial rules provided an ideal ground for the Viet
Minh to prepare for an offensive, which culminated in this great battle at Dien Bien Phu. It
made a deceive contribution to the great success of the Geneva Conference which restored
peace in Indo-China on the basis of respect for the national sovereignty, independence,
unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam and its two friendly countries, Cambodia and Laos.
The importance of this historical battle, particularly in our context has led to increased
studies and deliberations on the subject and as result most of us today posses some idea
about this battle

19. Tet Offn. U.S. troops had been in Vietnam for three years before the Tet
Offensive, and most of the fighting they had encountered were small skirmishes involving
guerilla tactics. Although the U.S. had more aircraft, better weapons, and hundreds of
thousands of trained soldiers, they were stuck in a stalemate against the Communist forces
in North Vietnam and the guerilla forces in South Vietnam (known as the Viet Cong). The
United States was discovering that traditional warfare tactics did not necessarily work well
in the jungle against the guerilla warfare tactics they were facing.In early 1968, General Vo
Nguyen Giap, the man in charge of North Vietnam's army, believed itwas time for the North
Vietnamese to make a major surprise attack on South Vietnam. After coordinating with the
Viet Cong and moving troops and supplies into position, the Communists made a
diversionary attack against the American base at KheSanh on January 21, 1968.On
January 30, 1968, the real Tet Offensive began. Early in the morning, North Vietnamese
troops and Viet Cong forces attacked both towns and cities in South Vietnam, breaking the
ceasefire that had been called for the Vietnamese holiday of Tet (the lunar new year).The
Communists attacked around 100 major cities and towns in South Vietnam. The size and
ferocity of the attack surprised both the Americans and the South Vietnamese, but they
fought back. The Communists, who had hoped for an uprising from the populous in support
of their actions, met heavy resistance instead.In some towns and cities, the Communists
were repelled quickly, within hours. In others, it took weeks of fighting. In Saigon, the
Communists succeeded in occupying the U.S. embassy, once thought impregnable, for
eight hours before they were overtaken by U.S. soldiers. It took about two weeks for U.S.
troops and South Vietnamese forces to regain control of Saigon; it took them nearly a

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month to retake the city of Hue. In military terms, the United States was the victor of the Tet
Offensive for the Communists did not succeed in maintaining control over any part of South
Vietnam.

20. Massacre at HUE. The Hue Massacres the name given to the summary executions
and mass killings perpetrated by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army during their
capture, occupation and later withdrawal from the city of Hue during the Tet Offensive,
considered one of the longest and bloodiest battles of the War. During the months and
years that followed the Battle of Hue, which began on January 31, 1968, and lasted a total
of 28 days, dozens of mass graves were discovered in and around Hue. The estimated
death toll was between 2,800 to 6,000 civilians and prisoners of war were buried. Victims
were found bound, tortured, and sometimes apparently alive. A number of U.S. and South
Vietnamese authorities as well a number of journalists who investigated the events took the
discoveries, along with other evidence, as proof that a large-scale atrocity had been carried
out in and around Hue during its four-week occupation. The killings were perceived as part
of a large-scale purge of a whole social stratum, including anyone friendly to American
forces in the region.

21. Battle of SAIGON. The Battle of Saigon, fought during the Tet Offensive of the
Vietnam War, was the coordinated attack by communist forces, including both the North
Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong, against Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. In 1968
the communists launched the Tet Offensive. They attacked South Vietnam from all sides,
largely by undercover Vietcong guerrillas. Saigon was the main focal point of this offensive,
but a total takeover of the capital, by military units, was not intended or feasible. They rather
had six main targets in the city which 35 battalions of Vietcong were to attack and capture:
the headquarters of the ARVN, the Independence Palace, the US Embassy, Saigon, the
Tan Son Nhut air base, the Long Binh Naval Headquarters.

Logistic System

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22. The logistic system of Viet Cong and the Vietnamese army was well coordinated
method for their fighting forces. This logistics organization contributed to the defeat of their
American and South Vietnamese (GVN/Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN))
opponents during Vietnam War).

23. VC/NVA logistics were marked by austerity, but sufficient supplies, equipment and
material were on hand to furnish final victory. Consumption levels were much less than
those of their American/ARVN opponents. It is estimated that a VC/NVA division in the
south typically required only 3 tons of supplies per day. Total requirements to run North
Vietnam's overall war machine were comparatively small, an estimated 6,000 tons annually
in 1967, well below port and rail capacity. US Intelligence estimates of all Communist non-
food requirements in the South averaged about 15 tons per day (or 1.5 to 3 ounces per
man) in low intensity periods. In 1968 with the Tet Offensive and other major operations,
these numbers surged but still weighed in at a modest daily 120 tons. By contrast a single
US heavy combat division required about 5 times this amount. The problem was not the
total incoming quantity but moving material up the Ho Chi Minh trail and other transmission
paths, to the point of battle operations.

24. Soviet and china support. Communist bloc support was vital for prosecution of the
war in the South. North Vietnam had relatively little industrial base. The gap was filled
primarily by China and Russia. The Soviet Union was the largest supplier of war aid,
furnishing most fuel, munitions, and heavy equipment, including advanced air defense
systems. China made significant contributions in medicines, hospital care, training facilities,
foodstuffs, and infantry weapons.

25. Since China bordered Vietnam, it was an immensely important conduit of material on
land, although the Soviets also delivered some of its aid by sea. Soviet aid outstripped that
of China, averaging over half a billion dollars per year in the later stages of the war, with
some $700 million in 1967 alone. China provided an estimated 150 million to 200 million
annually, along with such in-kind aid as the deployment of thousands of troops in road and

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railway construction in the border provinces. China also provided radar stations and
airfields where North Vietnamese aircraft could marshal for attack, or flee to when in trouble
against American air forces. These airbases were off-limits to American retaliation.

26. The railway network in the Chinese provinces bordering North Vietnam was of vital
importance in importing war material. American rules of engagement forbid strikes against
this network for fear of provoking Chinese intervention. Thousands of Chinese troops (the
PLA's 1st and 2nd Divisions) made important contributions to Hanoi's war effort- building or

Repairing hundreds of miles of track and numerous other facilities such as bridges, tunnels,
stations and marshaling yards. Chinese troops also built bunkers and other fortifications,
and manned dozens of anti-aircraft batteries. In all, some 320,000 Chinese soldiers served
in Vietnam during the war.

27. By 1969 the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a sophisticated logistical web with paved roads,
truck parks, maintenance and supply depots, and well organized and defended terminuses
and bases, moving thousands of men per month into the battle zone. A fuel pipeline
complete with pumping stations was even in place by 1969, and this was to multiply,
together with other installations such as missile batteries, as the conflict extended. The
need for massive amounts of construction hand-labor actually decreased on the Trail as
heavy equipment like bulldozers and rock crushers were deployed, and both miles of road
built and truck traffic expanded. By war's end almost a million soldiers had made the trip
down the Trail, and tens of thousands of tons were being transported annually.

28. Civilian labor was crucial to VC/NVA success, and was deployed in building
fortifications, transporting supplies and equipment, prepositioning material in readiness for
an operation, and general construction such as road repair. Labor was recruited primarily by
impressments / draft, or as a way to pay off VC taxes, although volunteers motivated by
ideology also took part. Twelve to sixteen hours of work per day were expected of laborers.
Civilians undertook various pledges as directed by the regime (the "three readies", the
"three responsibilities" among others,) as part of a high mobilization of the population for
total war in the North and areas controlled by the VC/NVA in the South. Load bearing by
porters was greatly enhanced by the use of ingenious "steel horses" - bicycles specially

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 modified by widening the handlebars, strengthening the suspensions and adding cargo
pallets. Guided by two men, the specially modified bikes could move 300-400 pounds,
several times that of a single porter. Older men made up many of the long-term laborers as
those younger were drawn off into combat and female labor was used extensively in a wide
range of logistics tasks.

29. The bulk of VC/NVA foodstuffs was procured within South Vietnam via purchase,
taxation on peasants in controlled areas, and personal farming by troops in remote areas.
Households in areas under VC control were required to keep a certain minimum supply of
rice on hand, and a large number of secret caches and supply dumps honeycombed the
countryside. Food, along with almost any other item, was also obtained on Saigon's thriving
black market. These included large quantities of American food aid to South Vietnam, a
phenomenon sometimes observed by US troops that found enemy supply caches Ironically,
even the remnants of American airstrikes were pressed into food production. US patrols
encountered numerous B-52 bomb craters used as fish and duck ponds by Communist
troops.

30. Medical supplies used on the battlefield came from several sources, including Soviet
bloc and Chinese shipments and humanitarian donations earmarked for civilian use from
neutral countries, including Scandinavian nations. Medical care like other aspects of the
logistical system was austere, and field hospitals, whether in caves, underground bunkers
or jungle huts usually suffered shortages. A one day supply of medicines was usually kept
on hand, with the rest hidden off-site until needed. About 7% of a typical VC/NVA division's
manpower was made up of medical personnel.

Lesson Learned

31. From Vietnam war following lessons can be brought out:

a. A Good Cause. A colonized and suppressed one of people once awaken

up through mass indictor, nation under a dynamic leadership and once united in the
struggle to fight for their independence, has the full power to defeat the strong and
aggressive army of a colonial power. The Vietnamese people's war of liberation
proved that an insufficiently equipped people's army could, for a good cause, with

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appropriate strategy and tactics create the condition needed to defeat an well-
equipped and organized Army.

b. Need for Secured L of C. An army fighting far away from her bases needs to
secure her L of C in order to sustain the operations. The Viet Minh accomplished the
prodigious feats of transportation, whereas the French failed to secure their air
routes, which was the only means of supplying reinforcement and equipment to the
front.

c. Need for Good Intelligence. Without intelligence, commanders are no

good than a blind man. A continuous feedback of intelligence, based on correct
information is essential to influence the battle in the right direction. The French due
to lack of this support failed miserably to collect information about the Viet Minh
activities.

d. Flexibility in Planning. It refers to the ability of a commander to alter his

plan to conform to changing situation and to meet the unexpected. That pays
dividend and has been amply proved by General Giap. He changed his tactics,
human waver attack to trench warfare when he found that the former tactics caused
much casualties to his force.

e. Conventional Method is Necessary for Decisive Result. We find that

VPA, which was basically trained for fighting unconventional war, had adopted
conventional methods and tactics for decisive victory at Dien Bien Phu. This
particular lesson has special bearing in our context. In the event of a war, our forces
may have to resort to unconventional methods at a certain stage but that should only
be adopted as a temporary means. The ultimate phase should always be adopting a
conventional and unconventional method, the blended state of these two.

g. Popular Support. For collecting information, dispatching messages, and

above all to fight a battle particularly popular support is required.

h. Friendly Help. Poor nation alone can not fight and win in the battle
without the help of friendly forces. Viet Minh could not have defeated the French
without the help of China and Russia.

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 j. Dynamic Leadership. Above all, only a single minded and dynamic
leadership can ensure the victory in a complex situation like vietnam war.

Integration of the Concept in our Doctrine

32. The concepts of employment of UCW Forces out lined in the" Draft Operations of
War "are challenging and demands adequate attention for getting desired EndState. The
salient aspects of UCW Forces are: the UCW does not mean aimless fighting by a loose
confederate of a handful of guerrilla bands. They will fight within the framework an effective
chain of command throughout the length and depth of the battle field.

33. UCW at the Geographic and Climatic Context of Bangladesh.

a. Geography. Bangladesh and Vietnam geographical condition differs in

many ways. The physiographic structure of Bangladesh is characterized by two
distinctive features: a broad deltaic plain subject to frequent flooding, and a small
hilly region crossed by swiftly flowing rivers.. On the contrary, Vietnam had tropical
lowlands, hills, densely forested highlands and deltas are some of the major
geographical features. At the beginning of Vietnam War, it had 80% of her land
covered with dense forest and at present Bangladesh has roughly 10.3 % of forest
while total land mass (bforest.gov.bd, 2010). The country having an area of 144,000
square kilometres, she is bordered on the west, north, and east by a 2,400-kilometer
land frontier with India and, in the southeast, by a short land and water frontier (193
kilometers) with Burma. On the south is a highly irregular deltaic coastline of about
600 kilometers, fissured by many rivers and streams flowing into the Bay of Bengal.
On the other hand, Vietnam had long borders with China, Cambodia and Laos - all
sympathetic to the North Vietnamese and was opposing US involvement. As such
the UCW force of Bangladesh will not be able exploit the geographical advantages
as the VC and NVA forces enjoyed. Moreover smaller coastline and almost singular
border with India may pose difficulty while seeking external support from friendly
countries.

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 b. Climate. The climate of Bangladesh is not as suitable as Vietnam for
conducting GW. Except for a limited period, the climate is very suitable for
conventional military operations for rest of the year. Bangladesh has a monsoon
period of four months (June to September). On the other hand Vietnam had a
climate dominated by two rainy seasons covering the entire year. As such the climate
of Bangladesh may favour the UCW for a limited period of 4-5 months only
(bmd.gov.bd, 2010). Rest of the time the invaders will have no significant difficulty in
mobility with regards to weather condition.

c. Urbanization of Bangladesh and Its Effect on UCW. In the 1960s South

Vietnam had more than 90% people living in the rural areas and villages. Those rural
areas and hamlets provided shelter and bases for the Vietnamese guerrillas.
Bangladesh, urban areas are increasing in size and intensity rapidly. From 1981 to
2006 the urban population of Bangladesh increased from 13.54 million to 39.71
million (Jahan & Maniruzzaman, 2007, p.5). Increased urbanization will have
significant effect on UCW which is likely to be build-up area biased. The urban
population projection in Bangladesh is given below.
Serial Census Total National Total Urban Urban Population as Annual
Year Population Population Percentage of Total Urban
(Millions) (Millions) Population (Level of Growth
Urbanization) (Percent)
1. 1981 90.0 13.5 15.1 10.3
2. 1985 100.0 17.5 17.4 6.5
3. 1990 113.7 22.9 20.1 5.4
4. 1995 126.8 29.4 23.2 5.0
5. 2000 141.1 37.3 26.4 4.8
6. 2005 155.8 46.4 29.8 4.4
7. 2010 170.5 56.8 33.3 4.0
8. 2015 184.6 67.9 36.8 3.6

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(Source: World Bank, Bangladesh Economic and
Social Development Prospects, Volume. III, Report
Number 5407, April 1995, p-126, Table 9.8)

Therefore, unlike the VC guerrillas, UCW forces of

Bangladesh are likely to be devoid of the shelters
of the villages. They will have to operate from and
within the city and town areas. Well developed
road network will also give access to the invaders
into remote villages and bordering areas of
Bangladesh.

34. UCW at the Demographic Context of Bangladesh.

a. Demographically Bangladesh is less diverse than Vietnam as it was in the Vietnam

War period. Recent (20072010) estimates of Bangladesh's population ranges from
150 to 164 million. It is also the most densely populated country in the world. The
overwhelming majority of Bangladeshis are ethnic Bengalis, comprising 98% of the
population. The remainder are mostly Biharis and indigenous tribal groups. There is
also a small but growing population of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar around
Cox's Bazaar, which Bangladesh seeks to repatriate to Myanmar. The indigenous
tribal peoples are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the southeast with
some groups scattered in Mymensingh, Sylhet, and Rajshahi region. There are
thirteen tribal groups located in this region.

b. The main religion practiced in Bangladesh is Islam (89.7%), but a significant

minority adheres to Hinduism (9.2%) and others (1.1%). Taking the Liberation War of
1971 context into consideration and being less diverse with common ideological
belief Bangladesh is in an advantageous position than that of Vietnamese was while
conducting a Total Peoples war. However, learning from the history, the tribal people
in the south-east part of the country may pose some non-cooperation with the UCW
Force as they did in the liberation war. Without that exception, entire population of
Bangladesh would be favorable for conducting an UCW.

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35. Organizational Structure and C2 System.

a. The then North Vietnam and Bangladesh have the dissimilarities in the
political and the government system. For Vietnam it was a communist dominated
country and contrarily Bangladesh has been a democratic country. The communist
party leaders established a parallel political command structure to control the VC and
NVA actions. The military leaders were responsible for conducting the operations
only. In the democratic context of Bangladesh there is no involvement of party
representatives at any level of the armed forces. It follows anwell established chain
of command through the military leaders and commanders. As such the political
command structure is not applicable for Bangladesh to undertake the UCW.

b. In fact, the Communist North Vietnamese fought the war with two forces. One
is conventional or regular army of North Vietnam and the other was the
unconventional guerrilla force comprised of the communist segment of peoples of
South Vietnam. These two forces had their independent command structure and the
supreme control and coordination was exercised by the Central Re-unification
Department under the Northern Lao Dong Party (Hanoi). Bangladesh Ansar and
VDP force will be the core element of UCW forces of Bangladesh (Draft GSTP
Blending UCW with CW, 2004, p.5-1). Unlike the North Vietnamese concept of C2,
the UCW has been placed under command to the armed forces of Bangladesh.
Organogram of UCW Force is given at Annex G. However the Ansar and VDP
organization has got similarities with the organization of the VC forces. Putting the
UCW Force directly under command to the Armed Forces might curb the initiative of
such a big volume of force. As such, separate UCW Command Structure can be
formed which will receive its directives directly from Joint Command Centre (JCC) in
the war time and from Armed Forces Division (AFD) in peace time. The existing
command structure of Ansar and VDP can be utilized with necessary modification.
The existing command structure is given in Figure 10 (Islam, 2010). In that way
during the blending period of UCW with CW, the regular forces can concentrate with
their own operation while the UCW will be operating separately. However, the
synergy of actions will be achieved through coordination at JCC, AHQ, Division HQ
and Brigade HQ level.

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36. Small Unit Structure. In the UCF force organization, under a UWF company, a
section is the smallest unit structure. It is composed of seven men, among which one is the
section commander (refer to Annex G). For various administrative reasons the members of
these sections are not permanent. As such the cohesion and command environment within
the section is very fluid. As discussed in previous chapter, in VC and the NVA Company, a
section is further sub divided into Three Man Military Cell which have many benefits during
peace and in combat. Similarly, for Bangladesh, the UWF sections can be further divided
into Three Men Cell to have better cohesion. For this purpose necessary modification can
also be done in the organizational structure. This small unit structure system of VC units
can equally be applied in units of Bangladesh Army as well.

37. IED Experts or Sappers. In the present context of UCW sappers are
invaluable for an inferior force. With adequate knowledge on IED, sappers seize the
freedom of movement of invaders. Present insurgency in Iraq war and in Afghanistan is a
classic example in this regard. In Vietnam War the NVA sappers played similar role, and
often their operation extended up to independent sapper raid and sapper attacks. With
the urbanization and FIBUA concept in vogue, such sapper force could be even more
effective while conducting UCW in Bangladesh. In the organogram of UWF Company there
are only three Explosive Group each with two persons. There is no provision of separate
sapper units. As such every UWF Coy can have one sapper platoon each with necessary
training on explosive handling, IED and sapper tactics. On the other hand, the Assault
Pioneer Platoon on an infantry battalion of Bangladesh Army can be beefed up and one
sapper section can be included with every support platoon. Since in the Total Peoples War
phase, all the units irrespective of type and role, will switch to UCW role; therefore all the
units should have adequate men trained as sappers.

38. Force Generation and Recruitment. North Vietnamese communist government

executed a Military Draft for recruiting fighters for the NVA. On the other hand, in South
Vietnam, the VC fighters were recruited by the party cadres exploiting their grievances,
weakness, ideologies and sometimes by intimidation. On the contrary Bangladesh already
have a large number of Ansar and VDP members exceeding 5.6 million (Table 3), recruited
mostly on voluntary basis. However they are yet to be fully organized into the structure of
UWF Companies. The process has started under the supervision of the
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 State of Manpower of Ansar and VDP

Serial Type of Force Strength

Ansar
Bn Ansar (36x404) 14,544
Female Bn Ansar (02408) 816
UZ Female Ansar Pl (50732) 16,224
UZ Male Ansar Coy (507100) 50,700
Union Ansar Pl (448432) 1,43,488
Ward Ansar Pl (205832) 65,856
VDP
Union LdrMale (14484) 4484
Union LdrFemale (14484) 4484
VDP MemberMale (8731932) 27,94,208
VDP MemberFemale (87319 32) 27,94,208
TDP MemberMale (71832) 22,976
TDP MemberFemale (68132) 21,792
Total 56,42,152

(Source: Presentation by Director General Ansar& VDP at Defence Services Command and
Staff College on April 20, 2010)

Formation according to the instruction given by the AHQ (AHQ General Staff Branch,
Military Operations Directorate letter number 130/1/9/Planning date: 15 February 2009
Enclosure. However there are no clear directives as to how the recruitment will be done

21
once the war breaks out. Like the North Vietnamese a need for military draft can be
considered if the situation demands. The UCW Force and doctrine is not yet legitimized by
National Parliament. The Constitution of Bangladesh (Chapter IV) only recognizes the Army,
Navy and Air Force as the defence service. According to Geneva Convention the fighting
forces of the two warring countries has to be a statutory body of that country. As such the
UCW Force of Bangladesh needs to be ratified by the National Parliament to legalize the
recruitment and employment in the war according to the Geneva Convention III (12 August
1949) (Quamruzzaman. 2010).

39. Training of UCW Forces.

a. Training requirements for the UCW force of Bangladesh will be as good as the
VC and the NVA recruits. A training guideline for the UCW force is outline by the
AHQ in 2009 (Enclosure 1). This training guideline does not focus on the urban
guerrilla tactics which is a demand of the time. Training for UCW Forces can be
devised as per the geographic and demographic character of any given area keeping
the characteristics of modern warfare in focus. For example, the UCW forces of Hill
District may be given training with special focus on jungle guerrilla tactics and the
UCW Forces of Dhaka district may be trained on urban guerrilla tactics. As per the
opinion of the Director Operations and Planning of Armed Forces Division there is
also a dire need for training and exercise of the command control chain of the UCW
of Bangladesh. A Command Post Exercise was planned in this regard which yet to
be materialized (Quamruzzaman. 2010). As such besides recruiting, an elaborate
training plan and exercise must be planned immediately.

b. The task and employment of the Bangladesh Army has widened and
diversified over the years. Yet the primary and most important task remains the
same, i.e. to safe guard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Thus
far all of our thinking, planning and training for this task has been based on
conventional methods of warfare. The planning directives/operational plans have not
yet catered for the blending of conventional and unconventional warfare (UW)
though in the context of Bangladesh it is presently thought to be of immense
importance.

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 c. Considering our geo-political realities, economy and other factors it is
assumed that in any future war we would adopt the concept of defensive strategy
with options available for limited offensive. This would be planned to cause maximum
attrition to the enemy before he contacts the main defence and at the same time
defending own territory against stronger/larger force with all available resources.
Besides, we would also aim at protecting our centre of gravity (CG) and hitting the
enemys one. The enemys likely Centre of gravity is his armed forces and civil
population's feelings about the operation. Our aim is to cause maximum casualties
within his armed forces and taking the battle into his territory to cause disruption and
panic within the civil population and thus force him to reconsider his actions.

Conclusion

40. Bangladesh has Chosen UCW as new means and appliance for future war. Its model
is shaped from guerrilla warfare and our liberation war. The history says guerrilla warfare
require external support. Insufficient preparation and errors in execution may lead to
unnecessary losses of blood and resources. The regular force is unsuitable to conduct
unorthodox warfare. Vietnam war is the classic example for employment unconventional
warfare which is the inspiration for our country.The prime task of the conventional forces is
to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. The geo-political realities
and the economy of the country do not permit maintaining a large conventional force for this
purpose yet, the requirement of maintaining the security of the country remains in question.

41. In modern days, the concept of conducting deep operations is a must in dealing with
a superior enemy. For conducting such operations, special equipment like aircraft, long
range artillery, missile systems and information technologies are essential elements. But a
country like Bangladesh cannot afford to have this type of equipment in near future. To
overcome this deficiency we need to look for other options, like blending of conventional
and unconventional forces. Integration of these two types of forces can pay a dividend in
achieving the national end state.

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42. In the history of warfare there are many examples of blending conventional with the
unconventional forces. Among these the wars in Vietnam, Bangladesh and Afghanistan are
the classic examples of these types. Well-organized US force with sophisticated equipment
could not withstand the cumulative outcome of Vietnamese conventional and
unconventional forces' operations during the Vietnam War. The Russians had to surrender
to the defeat caused by the Afghan Mujahedeens during the Afghan war. During the war of
liberation it was the combined effort of the MuktiBahini and the joint forces, which liberated
Bangladesh within shortest possible time.

43. The terrain configuration of Bangladesh and its weather effect pose considerable
difficulties in carrying out a set pattern of prolonged conventional operation. The terrain is
mostly suitable for the conduct of unconventional operations yet it offers the conduct of
limited conventional operations. The marshes, rivers, green hills and forests offer a
considerable restriction on large-scale conventional forces maneuver. But these can be of
significant importance to the conventional forces operations if the operation of
unconventional forces can be blended together. Any aggression directed toward
Bangladesh is likely to be initiated from our neighbors having common land and maritime
boundaries. The future aggressions are likely to be more violent in nature. We have to fight
from a disadvantageous footing in terms of quality and quantity of war machines. Blending
of conventional with unconventional forces is likely to induce hope instead of fighting
hopelessly out numbered.

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