Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and

regulations to carry out its mandate.

The issuance of the circular was an exercise of a quasi-legislative function as
such, prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process,
are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained.
As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law.
the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the prerogative of the
appointing authority.
The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not a quasi-
judicial, issuance.
quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great
branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as
elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events
or facts that have to be established or ascertained.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
[17]
They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
order for such rule or regulation to be valid.
In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must
prevail.
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law.
The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned
was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative
agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving
specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative
agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The
courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function,
the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. It is axiomatic that an administrative
agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is
to enforce it.
Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided in the law
authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one that is applied
retroactively.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power
of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power
to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law.
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata
But where between the first case wherein Judgment is rendered and the second case
wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no identity
of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely
involved therein.
Indeed, the rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on
substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority.
It is well-settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be
binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the records of
the case.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven, official duty is
presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly
conducted.
The Supreme Court stressed that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules
governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof
is sufficient.
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply
to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a
legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
character.
It is important to distinguish between these two powers of administrative bodies
because there are certain rules and principles in administrative law, which apply to one
but not to the other. Thus, the requirements of due process (notice & hearing) apply
when the administrative body is exercising quasi-judicial functions because such power
includes the determination of rights and obligations. On the other hand, there is
generally no need of prior notice & hearing in the exercise of quasi-legislative power.
Likewise the prior exhaustion of remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction do not
apply in quasi-legislative processes, and only in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions.
And finally, a body exercising quasi-judicial functions is considered equivalent to a
regional trial court. Hence, one can seek relief from its judgment by appealing to the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on the mode of appeal. A body
exercising quasi-legislative functions is not considered equivalent to a court. Hence, one
can resort to the regional trial court to obtain relief.
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of
the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is
failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to
not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the
President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.

appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available
to the petitioner.
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof
is filed within such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained,
save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

When a party fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, a premature resort to the
courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.
Factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction, or grave
abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials.
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially
provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not
necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable.
Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the
Rules of Court are still available
Section 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. (n)
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must
allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a
matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its
forum.
Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, but may likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the
proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules
of procedure and evidence.
The respondent Commission is n estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice were Advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or
ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for
recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her
favor wold be accepted by the Commission.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute but admits of
exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the question is purely legal, such as the
one presented in the case at bar.
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this
requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually
disapproved by him.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, suchas when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or
where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive.
Primary jurisdiction involves matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though
the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented
here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for
their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are
within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are
subject to certain exceptions, to wit:

where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction;
where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant;
where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive;
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by
the courts of justice;
where judicial intervention is urgent;
where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage;
where the controverted acts violate due process;
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot;
where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
where strong public interest is involved; and
in quo warranto proceedings.