Special Proceedings

Case Digests
Monday Class, 7:30-9:30
Atty. Victor Carlo Antonio Cayco
 Rule 72-90

Canonizado, Edwin Jr.

Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad Sagalongos-San Luis

514 SCRA 294

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luiss dad) contracted
three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his
dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their Felicisimos conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed
that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry
her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate Felicidads bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this
would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimos
estate.

HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,

U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

De Leon, Rowel T.

G.R. No. 177099 June 8, 2011

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,

vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.

FACTS:
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate leaving 2 parcels of lands and improvements in Pasay City,
Joaquin contracted 2 marriages during his lifetime, Eduardo, his son in his second
marriage, was named by the RTC as administrator for the whole estate of the Land.
RTC issued the order of partition in favor of the heirs of Joaquin of which Eduardo was
also included, however Eduardo filed a motion for reconsideration, and an appeal
afterwards, both them alleging that the Court erred in declaring that the bulk of the
realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia and not to the
marriage with his manager as a consequence thereof the Heirs of the 1st Marriage was
awarded with more property.
He also alleged that the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was
not vested with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which
properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.

ISSEU:
Whether or not RTC as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same

HELD:
Yes RTC had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership.
SC held that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties
are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle
the estate of Joaquin.

Diwa, Leonardo II B.
2014-0523

Suntay III vs. Cojuanco-Suntay

(G. R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012, Perez J.)
Facts:

Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was

survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three
legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico and Cristina only child,
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. After Cristinas death,
respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabelas petition for letters
of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of
Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of her parents
marriage being declared null and void.

Undaunted, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his
behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III
filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedents intestate estate. On appeal by
certiorari, the Supreme Court in an earlier case reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court.

Issue:

Whether Emilio III is better qualified to act as administrator of the estate than Isabel

Held:

No. Isabel is better qualified to act as administrator of the estate than Emilio III. The
general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted, If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next
of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c)
If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the

appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an
administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence. The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrators interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule
78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the
alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.

In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedents estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate,
but an interest therein greater than any other candidate. The collected teaching is that
mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs
nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in
Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one
to be appointed as administrator.

Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely
to the sound discretion of the Courts and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case. Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabel and her siblings apparent greater
interest in the estate of Cristina. These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of
the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other.

The evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of
the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as
administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.

Name: Jose D. Dula II

Case Title: Lee vs. RTC of Quezon City/G.R. No. 146006/February 23, 2004/J.
Corona

Facts: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance
Company, Inc. on 1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez owned
ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock. On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died.
He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose
and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private
respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel
and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).
Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of
the estate of their father which included 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International
Life Insurance Company, representing 50.725% of the companys outstanding capital
stock. Juliana (wife) and Jose (legit child) sold 1,014 and 1,011 shares respectively to
FLAG. The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr.
Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate among themselves. This was the basis of the
number of shares separately sold by them. The lower court declared the shares of stock as
null and void. CA affirmed.
Meanwhile, the FLAG-controlled board of directors, increased the
authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling
interest Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, in the insurance company. Enderes filed an action at the
SEC. The SEC hearing officer dismissed the case acknowledging the jurisdiction of the
civil courts. Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary of Philinterlife
ignored the orders nullifying the sales of the shares of stock.

Issue: Whether or not the sale of the shares of stock of Philinterlife is void.

Ruling: YES. Our jurisprudence is clear that:

(1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir
pending final adjudication requires court approval and
(2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate
court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
 An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under NCC 533 which provides that possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after
final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or
legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell
his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital
stock, approved on the vote of petitioners non-existent shareholdings and obviously
calculated to make it difficult for Dr. Ortaezs estate to reassume its controlling interest
in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.

Rolan Jeff A. Lancion

[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and

FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose
Diesel Tractor.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors.
 A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with
the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was
pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the
said decedent.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
WON the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs, thus no need for the
probate court to approve the joint agreement on the ground that the heirs partitioned the
tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto.

Held
A probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased,
to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered.
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated.
The three (3) subject tractors being the subject of any partition among the heirs is
not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.
SC found that finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently
shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank
to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.

EDGARDO S. MIMAY JR. SPECIAL

PROCEEDINGS
2015-0194

ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES namely ESTELA,

ERIBERTO and VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA
SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO
MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO BRIONES
 namely: SILVERIO BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BINIFACIO CABAHUG JR.,
ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES,
FUGURACION MEDALLE and MERCEDES LAGBAS
G.R. NO. 150175 FEBRUARY 5, 2007

DOCTRINE: The settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in

rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the
date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the
whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioners were the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones while respondents were
the heirs of the late Maximino Briones. Maximino married Donata but their union did not
produce any children. When Maximino died in 1952, Donata instituted intestate
proceedings to settle her husband's estate in CFI Cebu City. The court issued Letters of
Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino's properties.
Subsequently, CFI also issued an order awarding ownership of real estate properties to
Donata which she filed at the Registry of Deeds. Thus, new TCT's were issued covering
the real estate properties in her name.

When Donata died on 1977, Erlinda, one of her nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband
was appointed as administrators of Donata's intestate estate.

On 1985, Silverio Briones, nephew of Maximino, filed a petition with the RTC for
letters of Administration for the Intestate estate of Maximino which was later on granted
by the RTC. RTC likewise allowed Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino's properties.
Gregorio (Erlinda's Husband) filed a motion to set aside order claiming that the said
properties were already under his and his wife's administration as part of the intestate
estate of Donate. For this reason, the Letter of Administration issued to Silverio was set
aside by the RTC.

On 1987, the Heirs of Maximino filed a complaint with the RTC against the heirs
of Donata for the partition, annulment and recovery of possession of real property. The
Complaint was later on amended alleging that Donata, as administratrix, through fraud
and misrepresentation, in breach of trust and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering the properties under her name.
 RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Maximino and ordered Erlinda to reconvey the
real estate properties to the heirs of Maximino. The heirs of Donata appealed the case to
the CA but the Appellate Court affirmed the ruling made by the RTC. SC reversed the
decision rendered by the CA and the RTC. Thus, Respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court.

The main contention of respondents was that since the CFI Order was based on
Donata's fraudulent misrepresentation that she was Maximino's sole heir, it being void,
such order does not produce any legal effect.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

WON the CFI order declaring Donata to be the sole heir of Maximino was valid
despite Donata's alleged misrepresentation. YES

RULING OF THE CASE

The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate
estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was
established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New
Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud
or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued,
declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making
Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties,
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no
basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximinoin Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same
should have been dismissed.

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given
personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the
settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the
publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the
hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of
the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the
purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of
the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or
creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made.

This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate
proceedings instituted by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its
earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge conducted the proceedings enjoys
the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of
publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to
show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in
newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of
compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why
Maximinos siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings
of their brother.

Moreover, even if Donata's allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir does
constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15
January 1960, considering the nature of intestate proceedings as being in rem and the
disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise
of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in
Special Proceedings No. 928-R.

Mitmug, Abdul Najib B.

Sabidong vs Solas
A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013

Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of

land, designated as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated
at Jaro, Iloilo City. The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the
said Hodges Estate, as the other half-portion was occupied by Priscila Saplagio. In 1983
ejectment suit however Saplagio was ordered to vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to
her.
In 1984, respondent who was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City
Offered to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The Administratrix of the Hodges
Estate rejected respondents because the actual occupant of Lot 12 manifested their
intention to buy it. He was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase
Lot 11 "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them which the
respondent immediately made.
The probate court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special Proceedings No.
1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad,
Administratrix"), approved the offer upon the courts observation that the occupants of
the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they are occupying
up to this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in
favor of the x x x offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x".
Consequently the title of the lot was transferred to the respondent. Later on a writ of
demolition was issued by the probate court in favor of respondent and against all adverse
occupants of Lot 11.
In 1999, a complaint was initiated against the respondent in the Supreme Court alleging
the prohibition for court personnel to buy properties in litigation. The complaint likewise
alleged that the respondent committed deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse
of authority. It was alleged that complainant and his family were made to believe by the
respondent that he is the representative of the Estate. The complainant relied on the
representations of the respondent that he was authorized to facilitate the sale, with more
reason that respondent represented himself as the City Sheriff;

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is prohibited to purchase the property subject of probate.

Held:
NO. For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.34 Where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the
Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long
become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property is no longer "in
litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge.36 A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be
subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered
to the heirs entitled to receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to show that Sp.
Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated
at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21,
1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491
(5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not
violate the rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was
then pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.

NONATO, Peter Emil P.

2015-0392

Aranas vs Mercado,

G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

Facts: Emigdio Mercado died intestate and survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado, and their five children. He inherited and acquired real properties during his
lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation. He assigned his real
properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property to
such corporation. Thelma, his daughter, filed in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City a
petition for the appointment of Teresita, his second wife, as the administrator of
Emigdios estate. Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio. Claiming that
Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory. Teresita, joined by other heirs
of Emigdio, contended that one of the real properties had already been sold and came into
the possession to Mervir Realty. Hence, such property should not be included in the
inventory.

Issue: Whether or not, the other properties which were sold to the corporation should be
included in the inventory.

Ruling: Yes, the property sold to the corporation should be included in the inventory.
The Rules of Court provides that within three months after his appointment, every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the
real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. For the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong
to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity, which is the corporation in the given facts.
Furthermore, while it is true that the probate Court does not have the jurisdiction to
resolve issue of ownership because it has limited jurisdiction only with respect to
settlement of estate, it can resolve the question of ownership only for inventory purpose.

Te, Mark Anthony E.

SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG v. MA. GRACIA RIOZA PLAZO

G.R. No. 187524
August 05, 2015

Facts:

On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rioza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe
Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.

Respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-
heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold the subject
properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now
deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and
consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing
respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which,
however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and
Benita from a bank. When respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered
that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-

judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita.
They filed their complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant
thereto.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations and he also presented an Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale
which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the
spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale
whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.
 On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties
to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities and the Extra-Judicial Settlement
was notarized by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it
was executed. The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein
was left blank, and the typewritten name "Pedro Rioza, Husband" on the left side of the
document was not signed The trial court also observed that both documents were never
presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and that the titles to the
subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and his second wife Benita. In
addition, the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties were not even
presented as witnesses who supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the
documents of conveyance. On the basis thereof, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the nature and extent of the interests of the parties thereon, may
fall under an action for settlement of estate.

Ruling:

Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action

pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the
nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement of
estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on
the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.

It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if
testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or
refuses the trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court.29 An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of
Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his
estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition
without submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment
of an administrator by the court.30 The reason is that where the deceased dies without
pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which
they are immediately entitled.31redarclaw
 In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that
Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any pending obligations. Thus,
contrary to petitioner'.s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit
me subject properties of the estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate
estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially.

The instant petition is denied.

Rule 91

Vito, Michael Allan Poe C. Special Proceedings

Student No. 2014-0009 Monday Class 7:30-9:30 pm

Castorio Alvarico vs. Amelita L. Sola G.R. No. 138953. June 6, 2002
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Facts:

Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of
land in favor of Fermina Lopez. Lopez then executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and
Transfer of Rights over the land in favor of Amelita Sola.

In 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting
the amendment of the application from Lopez to Sola. In 1994, Alvarico claimed that
Lopez donated the land to him and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the
same.

Sola maintained that the donation to Alvarico is void because Lopez was no longer the
owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to him since the property was
already been transferred to her.

During trial, Sola submitted a copy of Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights
over the property dated 1983 executed by Fermina in her favor, and a certification from
the municipal treasurer that she had been declaring the land as her and her husbands
property for tax purposes since 1993.

Alvarico presented a Deed of Donation dated January 4, 1984, showing that the lot was
given to him by Lopez and he immediately took possession in 1985 and continues in
possession up to the present. He also claimed that Sola was in bad faith because he was
first in material possession in good faith.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Alvarico declaring he lawfully owned the land and
the defendant, Sola, was directed to reconvey the same to the former. Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Who between Alvarico and Sola has a better claim to the land?

Ruling:
Sola has a better tile to the land. The execution of public documents, Affidavits of
Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is
required to assail and controvert them. It is undisputed that original certificate of title was
issued in 1989 in favor of Sola. It requires more than bare allegation to defeat the Title
which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title,
once registered, serves as notice to the whole world.

Even assuming that Sola acquired title to the disputed land in bad faith, only the State can
institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Alvarico has no
standing at all to question the validity of Solas title. It follows that he cannot recover the
property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof. A
private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the
basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain.

GLAESAN ADRIANO

G.R. No. 172720, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015

ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
BORROMEO, respondents
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.

FACTS

On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent No. 586681 over a
piece of agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-9053. On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory
period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos. Eusebio Borromeo died on
January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly told his wife,
Norberta Borromeo,3 and his children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo Maltos and have
the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within the
five-year prohibitory period. On June 23, 1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children
(heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance of Title
against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 946. Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos
Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the sale was made in good faith and that in
purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo's title. Further, the parties were
in pari delicto. Since the sale was made during the five-year prohibitory period, the land
would revert to the public domain and the proper party to institute reversion proceedings
was the Office of the Solicitor General. The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also
filed an Answer, arguing that the deed of sale was presented for Registration after the
five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part to register the deed. The
heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid defense because the
prohibitory period appeared on the face of the title of the property.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late Eusebio Borromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property within the prohibitory period is valid
or binding.

HELD

1.

The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under homestead or free patent
is provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, which states:

SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent
or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date
of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance1 of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any
debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or
corporations.
The main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of homestead is to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State has given to him so
he may have a place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and a useful
member of the society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that the conservation of a family
home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster, families as the
foundation of society, and thus promote general welfare. . . .

Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its violation gives rise to
the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land and its improvements to the
government at the instance of the latter. The provision that "nor shall they become liable
to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to that expiration of the five-year period"
is mandatory and any sale made in violation of such provision is void and produces no
effect whatsoever, just like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not within the
competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve.

In this case, Section 10187 of the Public Land Act is applicable since title already vested
in Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the
sale was made within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient cause to
revert the property in favor of the state. However, this court cannot declare reversion of
the property in favor of the state in view of the limitation imposed by Section 101 that an
action for reversion must first be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General.

2.

The doctrine of in pari delicto non orituractio is inapplicable when public policy will be
violated. The in pari delicto rule is provided under Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil
Code. Article 1411 pertains to acts that constitute criminal offenses, while Article 1412
pertains to acts that do not These provisions state:

ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto,
they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the
provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime
shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.

This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; but the innocent one
may claim what he has given, and shall not be bound to comply with his promise.

ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he
has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's
undertaking;cralawlawlibrary

(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has
given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfilment of what has been promised him.
The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any
obligation to comply with his promise.

The case under consideration comes within the exception above adverted to. Here
appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was done in violation of the law.
Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-
interest has carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality, but because
the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land, public policy requires that she, as
heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for
her home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated.
This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter
away what public policy by law seeks to preserve." We are, therefore, constrained to hold
that appellee can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental
aim of our homestead law.

As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now arises as to who between the
parties have a better right to possess the subject parcel of land. This issue was addressed
in Santos:

What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the better entitled to the
possession of the land while the government does not take steps to assert its title to the
homestead. Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the purchase
price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the purchaser is no more entitled
to keep the land than any intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their right to
remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee and, therefore, they
should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee during and until the
government takes steps toward its reversion to the State. Hence, the Court of Appeals did
not err in ruling that while there is yet no action for reversion filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the property should be conveyed by petitioners to respondents.

With respect to Appellees' claim for the reimbursement of the improvements on the land
in question, they are hereby declared to have lost and forfeited the value of the necessary
improvements that they made thereon in the same manner that Appellants should lose the
value of the products gathered by the Appellees from the said land. We are constrained to
hold that the heirs of the homesteader should be declared to have lost and forfeited the
value of the products gathered from the land, and so should the defendants lose the value
of the necessary improvements that they have made thereon.

Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public Land Act:

SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of Commonwealth of the
Philippines.

The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of
to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. The general rule is
that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic, and the Office of the Solicitor General
is the proper party to file an action for reversion. The objective of an action for reversion
of public land is the cancellation of the certificate of title an|l the resulting reversion of
the land covered by the title to the State| This is why an action for reversion is oftentimes
designated asj an annulment suit or a cancellation suit. Since an action for reversion
presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action
be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-interest.

There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not automatic. Section 29 of
the Public Land Act provides:

SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the purchaser, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may convey or encumber his
rights to any person, corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act to
purchase agricultural public lands, provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not
affect any right or interest of the Government in the land: And provided, further, That the
transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due and payable. Any sale
and encumbrance made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition
and reverting the property and all rights to the State, and all payments on the purchase
price theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited. After the sale has been
approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire agricultural public lands under
the provisions of this Act, provided he has the necessary qualifications.

In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio Borromeo.
This shows that he already had title to the property when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo
Maltos. Thus, Section 101 of the Public Land Act applies. Wherefore, the petition is
denied.
 Rules 92-97

ANDAYA-BORJA, CATHERINE MAE B. 2014-0319

G. R. No. 147148. January 13, 2003

PILAR Y. GOYENA, petitioner vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.
Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.

Facts: Respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a Petition For Letters Of

Guardianship over the person and properties of her sister Julieta who, for the most part
during the years 1995 and 1996, has been a patient in the Makati Medical Center where
she is under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a mini-stroke which she
suffered in the United States in early 1995. Petitioner, Julietas close friend and
companion of more than 60 years, filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of
guardianship. She asserts that the petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta
Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to
take charge of her person/property and that respondent is not fit to be appointed as the
guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests are antagonistic. Also, petitioner has
interposed her objection to the appointment of respondent as guardian because she thinks
that the latter dislikes her. The trial court found Julieta incompetent and incapable of
taking care of herself and her property and appointed respondent as guardian of her
person and properties, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that
respondent is suitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta.

Ruling: No. In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the
judge who deals directly with the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has
exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to
the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action
should not be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there
existed a rift between the two which amounts to antagonistic interests. No inference as to
the existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta can thus be made.
Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is
to take control of Julieta's properties and use them for her own benefit is purely
speculative and finds no support from the records.

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That
respondent removed Julieta from the Makati Medical Center where she was confined
after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given
the observation by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still placed
under the care of doctors after she checked out and was returned to the hospital when she
suffered another stroke.

Likewise, petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian
before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked by
respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as
guardian.

Accordingly, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby dismissed.

Babalcon, Gee Colleen D.

2014-0549

Caiza vs CA
GR No. 110427 February 24, 1997
 NARVASA, C.J.:

Facts:

Carmen Caiza was adjudged incompetent because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo
A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Caiza was the
owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. Later, she commenced a suit in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said
premises through her legal guardian, Amparo.

Out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses to temporarily reside in her
house, rent-free but because of an urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, she, through her guardian, had asked the Estradas verbally and in
writing to vacate the house. However, they had refused to do so.

The Estradas insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer;
they argue that since possession of the house had not been obtained by them by any
"contract, express or implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere
demand (and hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could
the suit against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been
occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Caiza, which
"occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner
Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is
beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Caiza later on died and was substituted as plaintiff by her legal guardian.

Issue:

Whether or not Amparo as legal guardian had the authority to bring the action and
to continuously represent Caiza even after her death.

Ruling:
Yes. She was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. By that appointment, it became
Evangelista's right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's
property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right
to possession or control of his property during her incompetency.That right to manage the
ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from
anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose.

Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:

"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. A

guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the
income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon
being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary
to such maintenance."

Bertumen, Yzabel Eden M. || 2013-0493

G.R. No. 194366

October 10, 2012

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-

CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D.
ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA IBRAHIM UY,

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Anunciacion Neri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely: Eutropia
and Victoria and second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia,
Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties located in Samal, Davao del
Norte.
In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural
guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on
7/7/1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter,
conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the
homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale
for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to
include Eutropia and Victoria additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived
of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, has the power to dispose or encumber the property of the minor?

RULING:
All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second
marriages and consequently, they are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant
to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs
of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were
admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them. While the
settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the properties made by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid
but only with respect to their proportionate shares. With respect to Rosa and Douglas who
were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian
and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction.
However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed
with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares
in the estate of their mother. Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the
property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of
disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority
is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of
court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of
the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and
shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may,
however, appoint another suitable persons.
Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such
power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards property and even then
only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by
the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children
without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403 (1) of the Civil
Code.
However, records show that Napoleon and Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In their Joint-Affidavit and Manifestation before
the RTC, they both confirmed, respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in 1979. The ratification
thus purged all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the
conveyance of Rosas 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouse Uy. The same,
however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

BORDEOS, MARY-ANN C.

NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA

G.R. No. 184528
April 25, 2012

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings, which
dismissed Nilo Oropesas, petitioner, petition for guardianship over the properties of his
father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as
guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. In the said
petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on
April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and such
has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent)
was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to
manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his
girlfriend.

Cirilo Oropesa filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his
(ever caring and loving) son. During trial, petitioner presented his evidence, which
consists of his, his sister, and respondents former nurses testimony.

After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his written
formal offer of evidence. Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare
that petitioner has waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since
they were not formally offered; To expunge the documents of the petitioner from records;
and to grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evidence. A subsequent Demurrer
was filed and was granted. Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner and
appealed the case to Court of appeals but failed. Hence this petition to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who should be
placed under guardianship?

Ruling:

No. The petition is without merit. Under the rules, incompetent includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf
and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age,
disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
Finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence. Nilo lacks material evidence to support his claims that his father is incompetent
due to his alleged deteriorating medical and metal condition. The only medical document
presented report of neuropsychological screening proves that he is indeed competent to
run his personal affairs.

Rule 98

CAIDO, CARLA YESHABETH P.

 G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, NESTOR C. KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-
PANLILIO, and NAPOLEON O. GARCIA, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial institution and
the official depository of the Philippines. Respondents are the officers and representatives
of Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation incorporated
under Philippine law and engaged in the construction business. On several occasions
respondents executed in favor of LBP trust receipts to secure the purchase of contruction
materials that they will nedd in their construction projects. The trust receipts matured and
ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or even the
materials subject of the trust receipts. After several demands ACDC failed to act
accordingly, consequently LBP filed a complaint for Estafa or violation of Art. 315 , par
1(b) of the RPC in relation to PD 115, against the respondent officers of ADC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the disputed transaction is a trust receipt or a loan?

RULING

The the transaction is one of a trust receipt. There are two obligations in a trust receipt
transaction. The first is covered by the provision that refers to money under the obligation
to deliver it (entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold. The second is covered by
the provision referring to merchandise received under the obligation to return it
(devolvera) to the owner. Thus, under the Trust Receipts Law intent to defraud is
presumed when (1) the entrustee fails to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods
covered by the trust receipt to the entruster; or (2) when the entrustee fails to return the
goods under trust, if they are not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipts. In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in
the alternative the return of the proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the
goods, whether raw or processed. When both parties enter into an agreement knowing
that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any
fault on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section
13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the
return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This transaction becomes a mere loan where
the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered." Under this provision, we can examine the contemporaneous actions of the
parties rather than rely purely on the trust receipts that they signed in order to understand
the transaction through their intent. We note in this regard that at the onset of these
transactions, LBP knew that ACDC was in the construction business and that the
materials that it sought to buy under the letters of credit were to be used for the following
projects: the Metro Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition Project LBP
had in fact authorized the delivery of the materials on the construction sites for these
projects, as seen in the letters of credit it attached to its complaint. Clearly, they were
aware of the fact that there was no way they could recover the buildings or constructions
for which the materials subject of the alleged trust receipts had been used. Notably,
despite the allegations in the affidavit-complaint wherein LBP sought the return of the
construction materials, its demand letter dated May 4, 1999 sought the payment of the
balance but failed to ask, as an alternative, for the return of the construction materials or
the buildings where these materials had been used.

The fact that LBP had knowingly authorized the delivery of construction materials to a
construction site of two government projects, as well as unspecified construction sites,
repudiates the idea that LBP intended to be the owner of those construction materials. As
a government financial institution, LBP should have been aware that the materials were
to be used for the construction of an immovable property, as well as a property of the
public domain. As an immovable property, the ownership of whatever was constructed
with those materials would presumably belong to the owner of the land, under Article 445
of the Civil Code

Even if we consider the vague possibility that the materials, consisting of cement, bolts
and reinforcing steel bars, would be used for the construction of a movable property, the
ownership of these properties would still pertain to the government and not remain with
the bank as they would be classified as property of the public domain, which is defined
by the Civil Code. In contrast with the present situation, it is fundamental in a trust
receipt transaction that the person who advanced payment for the merchandise becomes
the absolute owner of said merchandise and continues as owner until he or she is paid in
full, or if the goods had already been sold, the proceeds should be turned over to him or
to her. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the January 20, 2005
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76588. No costs.
 Rules 99-100

DAMOCLES, MARIEGLO G.

CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 105308
September 25, 1998

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari over the Decision of CA affirming
the decree of adoption issued by the RTC of Cebu for the adoption of minors Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang.

Minors parents are Hebert Cang (Petitioner) and Anna Marie Clavano. Anna Marie
subsequently filed for legal separation which was granted. Petitioner then left for the
United States. Petitioner sought a divorce decree there, and was granted. Petitioner
thereafter took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. Later
on, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in the U.S., Petitioner
remitted money to the Philippines for his minor children.

Meanwhile, Spouses Clavano, here in the Philippines, filed a Special Proceedings for the
Adoption of the three (3) minor Cang children before the RTC of Cebu. 14 year old
Keith, as well as the mother Anna Marie, consented to the said adoption and alleged that
Petitioner abandoned them and forfeited already his parental rights over their children.
Anna Marie consented to the adoption of her children to her relatives because she would
go to U.S. as well, to find a job and live there.

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. He alleged that although he has only meager
finance compared to Spouses Clavano, he cannot allow anybody to strip him of his
parental authority.

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Petitioner moved to reacquire custody
over his children alleging that Anna had gone to the US thereby leaving custody to their
children to Spouses Clavano (Private Respondents). Such petition was granted and the
Trial Court ordered that the custody of the minor children should be transferred to their
father.

Later on, the the Petition for Adoption was granted.

Issue: Whether adoption should be granted?

Held: No. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.

The General Rule under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that:

The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption.

The exception of this rule is that the requirement of written consent can be dispensed
with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly
intemperate.

In the instant case, records disclose that Petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to constitute abandonment.

While admittedly, Petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the US, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through telephone calls and
letters. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

De Guzman, Joey Albert P.

[G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of

Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL,
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F.
TRIVINO as publisher of Balalong, respondents.

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, the petitioner herein, Tomasa Vda. De Jacob, claimed to be the
surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special
Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed
Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee, the private
respondents herein, Pedro Pilapil, on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted
son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued
by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa
vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to
intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased estate as Alfredos adopted son and as
his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant
Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83)
questioning appellees claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The lower court as well as the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the private respondent declaring that the Order dated
July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA to be genuine and
that the private respondent was the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and that the reconstructed Marriage Contract presented by the petitioner was
spurious and non-existent. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the

Issue: Whether or not Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob

Ruling: No. At the trial of this case at present, two expert witnesses were presented, one
for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents
expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. Judge Moya could not
recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the
signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his. The fact that he had
glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time,
he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense
counsel, he even read a document shown to him. The Court find no reason to disregard
and the respondent has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document
Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared that the questioned and the standard
signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same person. Other
considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he
did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court
were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted
that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders;
yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, no proof was
presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau
of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been
adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged
adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person
claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham. Thus, the Petition is
granted and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside.
The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E.
Jacob was recognized and declared valid and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro
Pilapil is declared nonexistent.

Kirstie Mae Dianne V. Diaz, 2011-0155

Republic vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996
MENDOZA, J.

Facts:

On September 2, 1988, Spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto filed a petition
for adoption of minor Midael C. Mazon, before the Regional Trial Court in Cavite City
Branch XVI.

In their petition, Spouses Carato alleged that Midael C. Mazon had been living with them
since he was seven years old. They further alleged that when they got married on January
19, 1986, Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody.

In the petition, they prayed that after hearing, a judgment be rendered:

a) Declaring the Michael C. Mazon their child for all intents and purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the
first name which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to MICHAEL.

The case was set for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice thereof by publication
and by service of the Order upon the DSWD and Office of the Solicitor General.

The OSG opposed the petition insofar as the correction of name of Midael was
concerned. According to the OSG, although the change in the name sought was clerical,
the petition was basically for adoption and not for correction of entry under Rule 108.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption and prayer of Spouses Caranto to change the
name of the child from Midael to Michael. The RTC ruled that Rule 108, contrary to the
claim of the OSG, was only applicable to concerns related to civil status of persons.

Issue:
Whether or not change of name falls under Rule 108 (Correction of Entry).

Ruling:

Yes. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, change of name falls under Rule 108. Section 2
(o) of the said rule states:

"Entries subject to cancellation or correction. xxx (o) changes of name."

Clearly, Rule 108 does not only concern civil status of persons but also concern changes
of name.
This also means that the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the
correction of entry, was void. This is so because the Local Civil Registrar, an
indespensable party in proceedings falling under Rule 108, was not notified. Section 3 of
the said Rule states:

3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Furthermore, the decision of the RTC was void also on the ground that the supposed
Petition for Correction of Entry (change of name) was not published. Meaning, the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Inocencio, Mary Frances D.

Nery v. Atty. Sampana (A.C. No.10196; September 9,2014; Carpio, Acting C.J.)

Facts:

Melody Nery engaged the services of Atty. Glicerio Sampana for the annulment of her
marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was
granted and Nery paid Php 200,000.00 for Sampanas services. For the adoption case,
respondent asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her
alien adopter. Sampana also gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they
would use for her adoption. Thereafter, he was paid in installment in the amount of Php
100,000.00.

Sampana made Nery believe that a petition for her adoption was filed and that the hearing
was already set. However, when Nery inquired about the status of her petition for
adoption from the court (Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan), she discovered that no such
petition was filed. Consequently, Nery asked for reimbursement, to which Sampana
agreed but claimed a deduction of Php 12,000.00 for filing fees. However, Nery claimed
the full amount since no petition was filed.

A disbarment complaint was filed. However, Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to
the filing of the petition for adoption, but after investigation, the IBP found Sampana
guilty of malpractice.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice.

(2) Whether or not an alien adopter can adopt petitioner.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and
gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Sampana admitted that he received
"one package fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee,
he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due
diligence and candor to his client.

(2) Yes. He suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close
relative, the intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act, the
alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt is waived.

Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery
of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the
petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He
even kept the money given him, in violation of the Codes mandate to deliver the clients
funds upon demand. Thus, the Court suspended Atty. Sampana from the practice of law
for 3 years.

Langkuno,Raisa

Castro vs Gregorio
GR No.188801 15 October 2014

Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which
denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs decree of
adoption.

Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Joses alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death
after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta
Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria
Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that
Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosarios
housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the
TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose
had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she
single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of
adopting Larrys two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and
consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to
Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children thats why he adopted them. Later on
Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Reginas adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosarios affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Reginas birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of
NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are
not actually Joses illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry
who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption,
it ruled that there is no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of
the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein
and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for
annulment of judgment.

Issues:
Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?

Decision:

The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud
was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the
trial.

Joses actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to
contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court
would have hesitated to grant Joses petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Joses
acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec.
7, RA 8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks
to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is
not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her
spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained
legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopters children if they are 10 years old
or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the
proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

Linda, Karen Claudine M.

Bartolome vs. Social Security System, 740 SCRA 78 , November 12, 2014
VELASCO, JR.,J.:

FACTS:
John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the governments Employees
Compensation Program (ECP).

Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns
biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits with the SSS.

However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the parent
of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victims great grandfather,
 therefore Bernardina cannot be considered as Johns beneficiary because she is not the
deceaseds legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however, already died on October 26,
1987, less than three years since the decree of Johns adoption became final.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the interpretation of the ECC stating that only legitimate parents may
benefit from compensation is correct.

2. Whether or not Petitioner qualifies as a dependent parent notwithstanding her son's

adoption by someone else.

HELD:
1. No. The term parents in the phrase dependent parents in the aforequoted Article
167(j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to legitimate parents as what the ECC did. The phrase dependent
parents should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and
whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not
distinguish. Plainly, dependent parents are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that legitimate parents pertain to those
who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in
the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor
Code provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the commission properly
equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as Johns secondary
beneficiary. True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old,
petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one
key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive
parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age. Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into
account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted
child if the adopter passed away?

2. Yes. It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights
of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from
the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation,
so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent.
We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance at a better
life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by deaths cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might have been better off not being
adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelios death at the time of Johns minority resulted in the restoration of petitioners
parental authority over the adopted child.

Rule 102

Maria Cristina Lopez

2012-0112

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30
years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo,
Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano
lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo
City.

In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months
in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his
husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by

which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86
years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental
capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against
his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of
a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other process.

ROLINDA G. LUMANLAN

G.R. No. 148468 January 28, 2003

Atty. Edward Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Division)

Facts:

Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these are: 1. A petition for
certiorari assailing the resolutions of the Third division of the Sandiganbayan denying his
petition for bail, motion for reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas
Corpus.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former President Joseph
Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada among others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of
Trustees and legal counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on
behalf of the said foundation, millions of pesos coming from illegal activities.

The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before the
Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was issued. Upon learning of the said warrant he
voluntarily surrendered to the PNP. Petitioner, thereafter, file an Urgent Motion for Bail
but such motion is opposed by the prosecution for the reason that petitioner should be
arraign first before he can avail of Bail. Later on Petitioner simultaneously filed a motion
to quash. The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings filed by
petitioner and the prosecution.

Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the prosecution
have waived their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; the
prosecution launched an endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the
conduct of the bail hearings; and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence
of his guilt. For the said reasons, he is still being deprived of his liberty. Petitioner also
cited Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court held that habeas corpus extends
to instances where detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted?

Ruling:

No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. General rule applies.
Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting ones right to bail.
It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant
bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an
application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.

Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this case because petitioners restraint of liberty did
not become arbitrary. His application for bail has yet to commence (to be heard).

The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned solely to the
Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution because he himself is partly to be blamed (his
actions caused delay too.

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
jurisdiction to do so.

In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the
person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this
writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers
of form and procedural mazes.

PINEDA, Alexis Anne U

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE v. RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA

G.R. No. 210636; July 28, 2014

FACTS:
Raquel filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus
directing petitioner Hazelina to produce before the court respondent's biological daughter,
minor Criselda, and to return to her the custody over the child which was granted by the
court. But, despite diligent efforts and several attempts, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in
personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before
the RTC-Quezon City but was dismissed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus
petition before RTC-Caloocan. Thereafter, respondent filed a criminal case for
kidnapping against petitioner and her counsel.
Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-
Caloocan, which was granted. The Alias Writ was served upon petitioner at the Office of
the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City during the preliminary investigation of the
kidnapping case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition
filed by respondent.
Whether the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in Quezon City where petitioner was
served a copy is enforceable.
Whether or not RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and
the person of Criselda.

HELD:
YES, the RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding. A
verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be
filed with the Family Court. However, the petition may be filed with the regular
court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court, provided,
however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as
its presiding judge returns to duty. The petition may also be filed with the
appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
YES. The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be
enforceable in the judicial region where they belong. In the case at bar, respondent
filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City
and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the
RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner
resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
As regards petitioners assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to
state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition.
As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a
summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
 Pua, Ma. Angelie Erika V.

In The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas Corpus Of Datukan Malang Salibo,
Datukan Malang Salibo
v.
Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, BJMP Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City
And All Other Persons Acting On His Behalf And/Or Having Custody Of Datukan
Malang Salibo

G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015

Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending
warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan
Malang Salibo learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his
name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes
and other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi
Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained
him. He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the CA, maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued
the writ, making it returnable to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the
trial court granted Salibos petition and ordered his immediate release from detention.

On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ
of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibos proper remedy, according to the CA, should
have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.

On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision
before the CA. Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to
hear the Wardens Return, the RTCs ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and
hence, it should have been appealed directly before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
HELD: Yes, habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously
being illegally detained.

First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based
on the evidence presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he could not have been
Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging
him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court.

Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the presence
of authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense and the
police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed.
Further, Salibo was not an escape prisoner. This only means that the police officers have
deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

H. Change of Name vs. Correction/ Cancellation of Entries, as amended R.A.

9048 and 10172 (Rule 103 vs. Rule 108)

Roxas, Rose Ann Claire B. -2012-0031

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child,
CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the RTC of Quezon
City dismissing motu propio the petition for Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries
in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian.
Petitioner seeks to correct in the birth cert. of her son the following:
The surname Borbon should be changed to Eleosida (since the parents were never
married; the child is illegitimate and, therefore, should follow the mothers surname;
The date of the wedding should be blank;
Petitioners name should be Ma. Lourdes Eleosida (instead of Borbon).
No opposition was made to this petition.
RTC, however, dismissed it on the basis that only clerical errors (CLERICAL ERRORS)
of a harmless and innocuous nature like misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc.
may be subject of judicial order authorizing changes or corrections and not as may affect
the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the person (substantial/material change/error)
involved.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether changes or corrections which are substantial may be subject of a judicial
proceeding.

Decision: Yes, Court find merit in the petition.

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be
summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to
be adopted is adversary. (Note: CLERICAL -SUMMARY; SUBSTANTIAL-
ADVERSARIAL)
If all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 (Notice and publication [especially])
(Note: Adversarial) have been followed, it was therefore error for the trial court to
dismiss the petition motu propio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to
support her petition (and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to
oppose the same).

MARIANE JOY C. SAGSAGAT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO I. KHO, ET. AL

G.R No. 170340, JUNE 29,2007
CARPIO MORALES, J.

FACTS:
Carlito Kho and his family applied for the correction of various details in their birth
certificate. Carlito petitioned for 1) change of citizenship of his mother from Chinese to
Filipino; 2) delete John from his name; 3) delete the word married opposite the
date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in
the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy, Nona and Heddy Moira.
The petition from a non-adversarial nature of the change is premised on RA 9048, which
allows first name and nickname in the birth certificates without judicial order. The
Municipal officer approved the change. The Solicitor General objected to the correction
on the ground that the correction is not merely clerical but requires an adversarial
proceeding. The Court of Appeals favored with Kho.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Khos request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an
adversarial proceeding.

RULING:
It cannot be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of
Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the married status of
Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the
date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship
and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his sibllings parents were married
alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate. with significant implications on
their successional and other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an
adversary proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of RA 9048 known as An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without
Need of Judicial Order. has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial
precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil
registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate
adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil
register is satisfied.

Sison, Yolanda C.
2014-0108

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/

CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN WANG, to be amended/corrected as
JULIAN LIN WANG vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR
G.R. No. 159966. 30 March 2005. Tinga, J.
Facts

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang (herein referred to as Julian) was born out of wedlock. In
1998, his parents, Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang got married, and thereafter
executed a Deed of Legitimation, as a result thereto, petitioners name was changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Anna Lisa and Sing-Foe plan to stay in Singapore for a long time to send Julian to school
together with his sister, Wang Mei Jasmine. Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that
Julian will be discriminated because of his current registered name which carries a
middle name. Also, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they
do not have the letter R, but if there is, they pronounced it as L. Hence, on 22 September
2002, petitioner Julian, represented by his mother, filed a petition for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name.

The trial court held that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition,
that Julian will be discriminated when he study in Singapore because of his middle name,
did not fall within the grounds recognized by law; the same is merely for the convenience
of the child. To grant such petition would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or
application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law, which is controlling.
Further stated, Article 174 of the Family Code provides that, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this
right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor.

Trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration; hence, petitioner filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. Petitioner pointed out that the middle name Carulasan will cause
him undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an
obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community.

Issue

Whether the petitioner shall be allowed to drop his middle name anchored on
grounds of convenience?
Ruling
No. The Court affirmed the decision rendered by the trial court.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right; as such, before a
person can be authorized to change his name either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show reasonable cause or compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

In addition, petitioner must not only show proper reasons, but also the fact that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of
name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need
only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is involved
is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.

ZAGADA, MAUREEN D.

G.R. No. 181174.December 4, 2009.*

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE
ANN T. BRAZA, petitioners, vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN
TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and
LUCILLE C. TITULAR, respondents.

CARPIO-MORALES,J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. During the wake of
Pablo, who died in a vehicular accident, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick
Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of
Pablo. Stated in Patricks birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros
Occidental that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on
January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage
of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina
likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were
married in 1998.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patricks
birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. They
contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent
marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of a
valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.

ISSUE: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in
an action to correct entries in the civil registrar?
HELD:
No. Under Rule 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on
legitimacy and filiations. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry.
The Petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition
should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Glaesan Adriano

G.R. NO. 166676, SEPTEMBER 12, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner VERSUS JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN, respondent
PONENTE: J. QUISIMBING

FACTS:
The following facts were presented by the respondent to the RTC:
(a) She was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as female in the Certificate of
Live birth.
(b) While growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics because of CAH,
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics.
(c) Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH and the latter issued a medical certificate. Such
document testified respondents claim.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling had been filed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male under Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

No. The trial court did not err in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate
of respondent. The court considered the unique circumstance in this case where nature
had taken its course.

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of
respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to
a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.

Vito, Michael Allan Poe C. Special Proceedings

Student No. 2014-0009 Monday Class 7:30-9:30 pm

Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy

 G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
Ponente: Diosdado M. Peralta (Associate Justice)

Facts:

Dr, Norma Lugsanay Uy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter
of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is
"Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S.
Lugsanay. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her
siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.

Dr. Uy sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those
pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She also sought the correction
allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood, including
her legal documents such as passport and school and professional records.

RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and
setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis
Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
respondent.

CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondents failure to implead
other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case
for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by
serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City
Prosecutors Office.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition on the sole ground that the petition is
dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties. It assailed that the changes are
obviously not mere clerical as they affects her rights and obligations in this country and
these changes are clearly substantial.

Issue:
Whether or not failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be
cured by the publication of the notice of hearing?

Ruling:
No. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. Section 3 of Rule 108 states that when
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation
and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts
with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

The subject matter of the petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. Supreme Court adheres to the principle that substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected
by the entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set
open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching.

ANDAYA-BORJA, CATHERINE MAE B. 2014-0319

G.R. No. 197174. September 10, 2014

FRANCLER P. ONDE, petitioner vs. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL

REGISTRATION OF LAS PIAS CITY, respondent.

Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live
birth before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las
Pias City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his
parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that
his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is
Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. The RTC dismissed the petition and ruled that
the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and
would affect petitioners status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction
in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under
RA 9048.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of entries.

Ruling: No. We agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother
as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under RA
9048. Indeed, under Section 1 of RA 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a
civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned
city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by
RA 10172, states that No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname, the day and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently
clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

We also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioners birth
certificate that his parents were married to "not married" is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his
legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. Substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceedings.
This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. We also
stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register must
implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar but also all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction. This is
required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in his new petition,
petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial
correction he is seeking will also affect them.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders of the RTC, Branch 201,
Las Pias City. The dismissal ordered by the RTC is, however, declared to be without
prejudice.

Prerogative Writs

Te, Mark Anthony E.

Daniel Masangkay Tapuz v. Hon. Judge Elmo Del Rosario

G.R No. 182484
June 17, 2007

Facts:

The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint
for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about 120.
The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners
of the disputed land; (2) they were the disputed lands prior possessors when the
petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with
unidentified persons entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the
private respondents permission and against the objections of the private respondents
security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially
claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the
contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents
certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents
favor, finding prior possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC. On appeal, Judge Marin
granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent Judge del
Rosario after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the
other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners MR and to Defer

Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent
Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented
fifteen (15) days after the Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily
demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual
possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory
Injunction and Order of Demolition in CA.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.

ISSUE:

W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper

HELD:

No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for
certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same
material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and
deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies,
for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the Writ must
be supported by justifying allegations of fact.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of
physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating
to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the
occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of
armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably,
none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right
to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated,
any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has
already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the
writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not
also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing
more than the fishing expedition that this Court in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In
these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data
is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.

Sison, Yolanda C.
2014-0108

Infant JULIAN YUSA y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA

YUSA y CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY SIGUE, Atty. SALLY ESCUTIN, VILMA
CABRERA and CELIA YANGCO
G.R. No. 193652. 5 August 2014. Villarama, Jr., J.
Facts

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (herein referred to as Christina) had an amorous
relationship with Gicano Constantino III (herein referred to as Marcelino), and
eventually became pregnant without the benefit of marriage. Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion; and to avoid placing her family in a
potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son, she intended to
have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon, for
brevity). After giving birth to Baby Julian, Christina surrendered him by way of a Deed
of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD. Not long after, Marcelino suffered heart attack
and died. During the wake, Christina disclosed to the family of Marcelino the birth of
Baby Julian and the fact that she gave him up for adoption. The said family vowed to
help Christina recover and raise the baby.

Christina wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the suspension of Baby Julians adoption
proceedings. However, DSWD had already issued a Certificate declaring Baby Julian as
Legally Available for Adoption, he was matched with spouses Vergel and Filomina
Medina; and thereafter, supervised trial custody commenced. The Certificate
abovementioned had attained finality and, in effect, Christinas parental authority was
terminated and Baby Julian is effectively made a ward of the State. DSWD, in response
to the letter, informed petitioner that they were no longer in the position to stop the
adoption process, and Christina lost her right to reacquire her parental authority over
Baby Julian or halt the adoption process since the reglementary period for the said action
had already lapsed under Sec. 7 of RA No. 9523.

Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo, seeking to obtain custody
of Baby Julian from respondents. Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of
Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by herein respondents; that the latter
"blackmail" her into surrendering custody of her child to the DSWD, and utilized an
invalid Certificate of Availability for Adoption to misrepresent that all legal requisites for
adoption of the minor child had been complied with. As such, respondents had acted
beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby depriving her of her custodial rights and
parental authority over him.

Initially, the trial court affirmed the remedy availed of by petitioner and issued a Writ of
Amparo, commanding respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at the scheduled
hearing, to which they refused to comply. However, the court, later on, dismissed the
petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo, on ground that the same it is not the proper
remedy to regain custody of the child. The court held that Christina should have filed
either (a) civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule
on Custody of Minors; or (b) Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors, in case there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a
minor who has been illegally detained by another, either as a principal or ancillary
remedy.

Issue

Whether a petition for a Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child?

Ruling

No. The Court held that the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," as such, it is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof.

In relation thereto, "enforced disappearance" is characterized by an arrest, detention or

abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however,
the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby
Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses; she even admitted in her petition for
review on certiorari that the respondent presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the
hearing. There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the
Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied

MARIANE JOY C. SAGSAGAT

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE
WRIT OF HABES DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, ET. AL.
GR NO. 189155 SEPTEMBER 7, 2010
PEREZ, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. She enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group BAYAN-USA. Petitioner together with her
companions decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Paolo in La Paz, Tarlac after doing
survey work. 15 heavily armed men forcibly entered and barged inside the house. The
armed men were all in civilian clothes and wearing bonnets with the exception of their
leader. Petitioner and her companions were abducted by the armed men.
Petioner was detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-
New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). Petitioner was escorted to a room that she believed was
a cell. From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and
landing and some construction bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the military
camp of Fort Magsaysay. Petitioner was interrogated for 5 straight days coupled with
torture.
Petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City but the
abductors gave the petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, an email address with
password, and other things. She was also sternly warned not to report the incident or
something will happen to her and her family.
After her release, petitioner seek sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the
suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist
movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military
and police hierarchy as respondents on the belief that it was government agents who were
behind her abduction and torture.

ISSUES:
Amparo
1. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility invoked by the petitioner in
impleading the public respondents is proper in her amparo petition.
2. Whether the totality of evidence proves that the respondents were her abductors or that
she was detained in Fort Magsaysay.
3. Whether the prayer to inspect Fort Magsaysay is correct.
Habeas Data
1. Whether or not the grant of Habeas Data by the Court of Appeals is correct.
RULING:
Amparo
1. No. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability. Command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal
liability. whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators. Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding.
2. Direct evidence of identity is accorded more weight than circumstantial evidence in
amparo proceedings. Given that the identities of the men in the cartographic sketches
were not identified as belonging to the military or public officials, they cannot be held
liable. Roxas is just a sojourner in the Philippines and not even a citizen so the Court
cant rely on her inference that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay merely because the
distance from Mr. Paolos house to where they were taken felt like the distance between
the house and Fort Magsaysay.
3. It is a rule in amparo proceedings that a place inspected must at least be identified with
clarity and precision and that the allegations be sufficient in themselves to make a prima
facies case. Since it was not proven that Fort Magsaysay was indeed the place where
abductees were taken, an order to inspect it would tantamount to fishing expedition for
evidence. Thus, prayer to inspect Fort Magsaysay is hereby denied.
Habeas Data
1. No. Habeas data is conceptualized as a judicial remedy for enforcing a right to privacy,
most especially the right to information, privacy of individuals. It operates to protect a
persons right to control information regarding himself particularly in the instances where
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends. The indispensable element is a showing, at least substantially, that a violation or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security has happened which
the petitioner has failed to do. There is no evidence that any of the public respondents
have violated or threatened a right to privacy of the petitioner. There wasnt even
evidence that they had access to the photos and videos. The grant of habeas data by the
CA has no legal basis.

Diwa, Leonardo II B.
2014-0523

Burgos vs. Esperon

(G.R. 178497, February 4, 2014, Brion, J.)

Facts:

These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Courts directly commissioned agency,
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos abduction
with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. This
referral was necessary as the investigation by the Philippine National PoliceCriminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNPCIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Provost Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation had been less than
complete. In all of them, there were significant lapses in the handling of the investigation.
In particular, we highlighted the PNPCIDGs failure to identify the cartographic
sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on
their interview with the eyewitnesses to the abduction.

Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded
that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the
totality of the evidence supports the petitioners allegation that the military was involved
in the enforced disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey Cabintoys positive
identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached him and told him
not to interfere because the man being arrested had been under surveillance for drugs; he
also remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga the face he identified in the pictures because he
resembles his friend Raven. The CA also held that Lt. Baliagas alibi and corroborative
evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoys positive identification, considering especially the
absence of any indication that he was impelled by hatred or any improper motive to
testify against Lt. Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the
AFP and the PNP were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.

Issue:
Whether the Petitioner can request for another writ
Held:
No. the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude in crafting
remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the nature of
the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant
remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations
already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a
victim of enforced disappearance.
The petitioners request for the reissuance of the writ and for the rehearing of the case by
the CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of: (1) the ongoing investigation
being conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR investigation directed by the
Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation directed by the CA.
The ROLE of the Supreme Court in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine
whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or
accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.

As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
present case with the CAs final determination of the persons responsible and accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action
against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are
already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.

Bertumen, Yzabel Eden M. || 2013-0493

G.R. No. 199199

August 27, 2013

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON,
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES
 BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF
SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M.
AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL
SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE

REYES, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant
Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog, filed a petition for
continuing mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. The
petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they
protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global
Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot
Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the
southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological
foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and
confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground
settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned
that the mining operators did not have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon
Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale
mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the
people of Matnog; and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, and the Local Government Code. Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1)
the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining
operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a temporary environment
protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the
rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore,
among others.

The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being
the designated environmental court. In the Order dated September 16, 2011, the case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:
 Whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that there is no final court
decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act, on which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus.

RULING:
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. Now cast in stone under
Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than
that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which
are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section
4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due
course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be
applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with
the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under
Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation,
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series
of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping.

On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as
well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the
petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand,
necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting
an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis
for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its
officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another
from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government
agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such
duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or
violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.

The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to
compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The petition should
mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein. The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing

any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or
series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is
fully satisfied.

The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.

Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon
full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall
be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented,
the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as
it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision."

Roxas, Rose Ann Claire B. -2012-0031

Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769

J. Carpio-Morales

Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an
administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over
her safety. She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due
process. She wrote a letter stating that:
It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. She added, instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management
action would be a punitive one. She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company
didnt respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to meralcos
omission of provding her with details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted
a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures
for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition
wasnt in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys
person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed

Ratio:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party
Its a forum for enforcing ones right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a
response to killings and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her
employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondents right to privacy. Respondent even said that the
letters were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to
references to real intent of management.
 BORDEOS, MARY ANN C.

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

Facts:

In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan
alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law
partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latters condominium, rested for a
while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital
camera was missing. On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latters office
regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera
involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to
return the camera, but to no avail. During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed
Lees head against a wall inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized
the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a
criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct
before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lees acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons
of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life,
liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a
writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.

Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce
Ilagans digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and
copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date
of receipt thereof.

In her Verified Return dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the
memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that
she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She
also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under
disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to discover the
subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee
contended that Ilagans petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be
dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against
Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or
storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.

The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagans favor.
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data
in favor of Ilagan.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the
writ of habeas data now stands as a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home,
and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the
petition sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he manner the right to privacy is violated
or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party. In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports
a privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he fears would somehow find
its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption he failed to
explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty
or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between ones privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either
account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
 As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that
Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagans
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude that Lee was going to use the subject video in order to
achieve unlawful ends. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the
glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

Pua, Ma. Angelie Erika V.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al.

v.
SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al.
G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

Villarama, J.

FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and
to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of
call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu
Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of

the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude
as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

HELD: Yes, petitioners have legal standing. As reiterated by the Supreme Court in many
cases, locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls
for more than just a generalized grievance. However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which Supreme Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., Supreme Court recognized the
public right of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. It declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution
for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to
exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners, who were minors,
in Oposa, Supreme Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to
sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their
own and future generations.

Name: Jose D. Dula II

Case Title: HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon.
Teodoro Casino, et al. G.R. No. 207257/February 3, 2015/J. Del Castillo

Facts: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental

Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be
implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on
the ground that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is
implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules
governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.
 The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated
the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity
of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ
of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.
Issues: Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan; and
Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling: Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact
and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the
extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because
such writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental
damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities
in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities,
but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the
defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation
of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the
perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

PINEDA, Alexis Anne U.

CASE: Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy,
et.al. (G.R. No. 180771 and 181527)
DATE: 21 April 2015
PONENTE: J. Leonardo-De Castro

FACTS
On 13 June 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the Department of
Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-
102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX).
The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in Taon
Strait was conducted.
On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX converted GSEC-102 to Service Contract No.
46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 sqm. offshore the Taon Strait.
From 9-18 May 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around Taon Strait,
including a multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kms. to
determine the areas underwater composition.
During the 2nd sub-phase of the project, JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well.
Since the same was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguisan and Pinamungajan
where the Taon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements under Presidential
Decree No. 1586 (PD 1586), entitled Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and For Other
Purposes.
On 31 January 2007, the Protected Area Management Board (PAMB) of the Taon Strait
issued Resolution No. 2007-01 where it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination
commissioned by JAPEX, and favourably recommended the approval of the latters
application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 6 March 2007, DENR-EMB Region VII granted an ECC to DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Taon Strait.
From 16 November 2007 to 8 February 2008, JAPEX drilled an exploratory well with a
depth of 3,150 meters near Pinamungajan town.
On 17 December 2007, two separate original petitions were filed commonly seeking that
the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 are the Resident Marine Mammals which inhibit
the waters in and around the Taon Strait, joined by Stewards Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection.
Also impleaded as unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In G.R. No. 181527, the petitioners are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization established for
the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII and representatives of the
subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu. Their
contentions are:
A study made after the seismic survey showed that there is a drastic reduce in fish catch
by 50-70% attributable to the destruction of the payao or the artificial reef.
The ECC obtained by the respondents is invalid because there is no public consultations
and discussions prior to its issuance.
SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
considering that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms,
conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction
FIDEC alleges that it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius
from the point where the oilrig was located, an area grated than the 1.5-kilometer radius
exclusion zone stated in the Initial Environmental Examination
The respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, DOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Taon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Services, Inc. (SOS) as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX. Their counter-allegations
are:
The Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the
petition.
SC-46 is constitutional.
The ECC was legally issued.
The case is moot and academic since SC-46 is mutually terminated on 21 June 2008.

ISSUES

WON the case is moot and academic

WON Petitioners have a legal standing
WON SC-46 is unconstitutional

RULING

No. The Court makes clear that the moot and academic principle is not a magic formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Despite the termination of
SC-46, the Court deems it necessary to resolve the consolidated petitions as it falls within
the exceptions. Both petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the
environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the publics interest, and
the respondents contested actions are capable of repetition.

Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more
liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
citizen suit, and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental laws on the principle that humans are stewards of nature:
Section 5. Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations
under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an
order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed
for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within
fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected baragngays
copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions. (Emphasis supplied)

Although the petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure
may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective,
the SC had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the SC allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

It is also worth noting that the Stewards in the present case are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species.

Yes. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part:

The President may enter into agreement with foreign-owned corporations

involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphases supplied)
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87) or the
Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. Although the Court finds that PD 87 is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other
conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that the Congress be notified
of such contract, renders it null and void.

SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed by the DOE through its then
Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor
alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract.

Service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence,
safeguards were out in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously
observed and likewise eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and
agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of the service
contracts herself.

Even under the provisions of PD 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the Presidents approval for the execution of any contract under said statute.

The SC likewise ruled on the legality of SC-46 vis--vis other pertinent laws to serve as a
guide for the Government when executing service contracts.

Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Taon Strait is an environmentally critical

area, having been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the
scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured
after undergoing an Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) to determine the effects of
such activity on its ecological system.

Public respondents admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to
the 2nd sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of the exploration well. This
means that no environmental impact evaluation was done when the seismic surveys were
conducted. Unless the seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Taon
Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of NIPAS Act and Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1586.

While PD 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically
allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Taon Strait, no energy resource
exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.