ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO v.

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007, CORONA, J.

The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth

attendant by examining the genitals of the infant. Without a law recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex at the time of birth is
immutable, if not attended by error.

Facts:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a Filipino, was born male per his birth
certificate. Feeling trapped inside a mans body, he underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand and transformed himself into a
woman. Since then, Rommel lived as a female and is in fact engaged to his
American fianc. To allow him to marry his fianc under Philippine law,
Rommel filed a petition to change his name from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,
and his sex from male to female.

Issue:

Whether or not Rommel can change his sex from male to female
by law or equity.

Ruling:

No. Under the Civil Register Law (Act 3753), a birth certificate, which
includes a declaration of a persons sex, is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Since there is no law legally recognizing
sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

The change cannot also be granted even on the grounds of equity,

since the changes would have serious and wide-ranging consequences.
Marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female. Changing Rommels sex in his birth certificate will substantially
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013, MENDOZA, J.

For consent to be valid, it must be freely given, i.e. real in the sense
that it is not vitiated, and conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act of marriage.

Facts:

Liberty D. Albios, a Filipina, paid Daniel Lee Fringer, an American,

$2,000.00 for the latter to marry Liberty for purposes of immigration. In
2004, Liberty and Daniel were married out of jest. Immediately after the
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife. However,
Libertys immigration application was denied. In 2006, Liberty filed a Petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Daniel on the ground that they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations.
Issue:

Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of

acquiring American citizenship and in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab
initio on the ground of lack of consent.

Ruling:

No. For consent to be valid, it must be freely given. A "freely given"

consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, and must also be
conscious or intelligent, in the sense that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.

Here, Liberty and Daniels freely given consent is best evidenced by

their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal.

In any case, so long as all the essential and formal requisites

prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid, notwithstanding the
possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together.
ZENAIDA S. BESO v. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
velez
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.

Facts:

Juan Daguman, MCTC Judge of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan_Pagsanjan,

Samar, solemnized the marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso to Bernardito
Yman, on August 28, 1987, at the Judges residence in Calbayog City, Samar.
Respondent alleged that was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the
marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "an overseas worker,
who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention
under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further averred that in
solemnizing the marriage in question, "he believed in good faith that by
doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not
be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage between Beso and Yman conducted

outside the judges jurisdiction is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. A marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom

only (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article
29; or (3) upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to
this effect. None of these instances was present in this case. Considering
that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.