De Guzman v. CA
A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the
Facts:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings those that he
gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent
would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered, charging fee lower than
the commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with
respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the
cargo. Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked
along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner
argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, which it
failed to do. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable
for force majeure. The trial court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 also
carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general
public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court that private respondent is
properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional
rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation
was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his
customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here.
Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."
The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting
causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary
diligence on the part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as
a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold that the
occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier
and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not
made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for
acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with
the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. V. CA Et Al. (1991) Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril to a passenger while
he is attempting to board the same
FACTS:
Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa
Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa) Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger and is entitled all
the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alighted
Duty extends to boarding and alighting
Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward
GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his
Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and
any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before bringing
the carrier
Pedro to Lepanto Hospital where he expired
EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of Pedro Cudiamat
the Civil Code
Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the
Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition = patent and
co. and the supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at large
incontrovertible proof of their negligence
RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his death
Hospital was in Bunk 56
but still ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to
CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory damages
alight and deliver a refrigerator
and cost of the suit
In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings

ISSUE:

W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore

HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders (EVEN when moving as
long as it is still slow in motion)
 CEBU SALVAGE CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE HOME ASSURANCE
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Petitioner Cebu Salvage Corp. (as carrier) and Maria Cristina ChemicalsIndustries, Inc.
[MCCII] (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter where petitioner was to load 800-
1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board M/T Espiritu Santo for transport and discharge from
NegrosOccidental to Misamis Oriental, to consignee Ferrochrome Phils., Inc.-However, the shipment
never reached its destination because the vesselsank resulting in the total loss of the cargo.- M C I I f i l e d a
c l a i m f o r t h e l o s s o f t h e s h i p m e n t w i t h i t s i n s u r e r, respondent Philippine Home Assurance
Corp.-Respondent paid the claim and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII,after which it filed a
case against petitioner for reimbursement of the amount it paid MCCII.-TC and CA: ordered petitioner to
pay respondent.
3. In this case, Petitioner was the one which contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It had control
over what vessel it would use. The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to consummate the
contract of carriage didnt negate its character and duties as common carrier. The bill of lading issued by ALS
was just a receipt to evidence the fact that the goods have been received for transportation. It is true that a
billof lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the parties but it cannot prevail over the
express provision of the voyage charter. The voyage charter stipulated that cargo insurance was for the
charterers account. This just means that the charterer would have the goods insured. It couldnt
exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage.
MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for reimbursement for its loss.
To permit a common carrier toescape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport would
derogate from the carriers duty of extraordinary diligence.

ISSUE:

Can a carrier may be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting from the sinking of a ship it doesnt own?

RULING:

YES. Petitioner argues the agreement was just a contract of hire where MCCII hired the vessel from its owner,
ALS Timber. Since it wasnt the owner of the vessel, it didnt have control and supervision over it and its crew. Thus,it
shouldnt be held liable.

1.Petitioner and MCCII entered into a voyage charter, a.k.a contract of affreightment where the ship was
leased for a single voyage for theconveyance of the goods, in consideration of the payment of freight.Under
a voyage charter, the shipowner retains possession, command andnavigation of the ship, the charterer/freighter
just has the use of the spacein the vessel in return for his payment of freight. An owner who
retainspossession of the ship remains liable as carrier and must answer forloss or non-delivery of the
goods received for transportation.

2. The agreement parties signed was a contract of carriage under which the petitioner was a common carrier .
From the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to the circumstances of each case . In
case of loss of the goods, the common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove the causes under Art. 1734 CC
or that they observed extraordinary diligence.
 MYC-AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, vs. CALDO, et al.
FACTS:
In 1971, a Toyota truck owned by MYC and operated by Ceferino Arevalo hit a jeepney owned by
Nicanor Silla and operated by Alfredo Rodolfo. There were 15 passengers inside the jeepney while it
was parked. The accident caused the death of seven persons, three of which are passengers. The other
passengers suffered various injuries on the different parts of their bodies. The jeepney and the wall
fence were also damaged.
The owner of the wall fence, the victimes, and the heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for
damages against MYC, Arevalo, and Katigbak, MYCs general manager.
MYC admitted ownership of the Toyota truck but alleged that the same, together with nine (9)
other units were leased to the Jaguar Transportation, Inc., and that Arevalo and Katigbak were not its
employees. It file a third-party complaint against Jaguar.
Jaguar defended that its liability is only secondary. It filed a fourth-party complaint against Federal
Insurance Company, Inc.
The lower court ruled in favor of the complainants, ordering MYC and Arevalo to jointly and
severally pay them damages, attorneys fees, and costs of the suit. It likewise dismissed the third-party
and fourth-party complaints. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in toto. MYC elevated the case
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N Jaguar should be considered as the true owner of the Toyota truck, making it liable to the
victims
RULING: NO.
It is undisputed that the registered owner of the Toyota truck is MYC. As held in Vargas vs.
Langcay, 6 SCRA 174, "[t]he registered owner/operator of a passenger vehicle is jointly and severally
hable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries
(or death) sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of a vehicle
is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicles as regards the public and third
persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation,
so that, in contemplation of law, such owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered merely as his agent."