DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH V.

CAAMPOSANO
J. PANGANIBAN

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the
disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its
face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions.
While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or
group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered
and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the
bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure
is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.

FACTS:
1. Rs are former employees of the DOH-NCR
2. They held various positions as follows: Priscilla B. Camposano (hereinafter
Camposano) was the Finance and Management Officer II, Imelda Q. Agusin
(hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and Enrique L. Perez (hereinafter Perez)
was the Acting Supply Officer III
3. 5-15-96: Some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH
Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting
Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of an alleged
anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with
Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996
4. Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-respondents
5. Thereafter, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the [respondents]
and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019.
6. On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative
Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the
administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed
to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on
October 26, 1996
7. The PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH after the investigation, it
issued a resolution on January 23, 1998 respondents found GUILTY;
recommendation: PENALTY OF DISMISSAL
8. FVR: adopted the commissions recommendation, issued an AO which ordered for the
dismissal of respondents
9. SOH issued an order executing the recommendation of the the Commission MR
denied
10. Rs filed their appeal with the CSC. The appeal was denied by the CSC on May 21,
1999. Horacio Cabrera filed a separate appeal with the CSC which was denied on
August 17, 1999. [Respondents] motion for reconsideration was denied on September
30, 1999. While Cabreras motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000.
[Respondents], however, received the resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration on November 2001. Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to [the
CA] the CSCs resolutions ahead of [respondents]. The petition of Cabrera was granted
[by the CA] in a decision dated October 15, 2001
11. Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC (Civil Service Commission) of their appeal,
respondents brought the matter to the CA held that the PCAGCs jurisdiction over
administrative complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the
 Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover,
in simply and completely relying on the PCAGCs findings, the secretary of health
failed to comply with administrative due process
12. Hence, this petition

WON THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PCAGC DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO
INVESTIGATE THE ANOMALOUS TRANSACTION INVOLVING THE Rs?
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: claim that the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction over them,
because they were not presidential appointees
1. YES
2. EO 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints
against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a
cursory reading of its provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to
investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees.
3. In its Preamble, specifically in its Whereas clauses, the EO specifically tasked [the
PCAGC] to x x x investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption
x x x.
4. Section 3 states that the Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative
complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against
presidential appointees x x x
5. The Court notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO
151. The investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated
October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G.
Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique L. Perez.
6. The Committee was directed by AO 298 to follow the procedure prescribed under
Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended. It was tasked to
forward to the Disciplining Authority the entire records of the case, together with its
findings and recommendations, as well as the draft decision for the approval of the
President.
7. The Chief Executives power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive
Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law
8. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is
not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting
the inquiry.
9. Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases involving non-
presidential appointees was rectified in Executive Order No. 12, which created the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Non-presidential appointees who may
have acted in conspiracy, or who may have been involved with a presidential
appointee, may now be investigated by the PAGC
WON THE CA ERRED IN ONCLUDINGG THAT THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND
DECIDE WAS RELINQUISHED BY THE SOH AND THAT THE SOH MERELY PERFORMED
A MECHANICAL ACT WHEN SHE ORDERED THE DISMISSAL OF Rs FROM
GOVERNMENT SEVICE?
1. YES
2. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and
employees under the formers jurisdiction the health secretary had disciplinary
authority over respondents
3. Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the
jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint
4. While the Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he
nonetheless recognized the health secretarys disciplinary authority over
respondents when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against them for the
secretarys appropriate action
5. As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may
utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a
decision may be based
a. In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to
investigate to the PCAGC
6. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee
created under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative
sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations
and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose
sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due
process prior to imposing penalties.
7. Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following
cardinal principles
8. The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the
present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite (The CA correctly ruled
that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretarys
Order dismissing the respondents) is equally evident from the health secretarys
Order dismissing the respondents
9. Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide
what action should be taken against officials and employees who have been
administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of the
disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the
law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence
gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation,
and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.
a. In the present case, the health secretarys two-page Order dismissing
respondents pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to
Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V.
Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctors case. He even noted a violation
that had not been considered by the PCAGC
b. On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly
relied on the dispositive portion of the Commissions Resolution. She even
misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to
Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
i. She improperly relied on the Presidents findings in AO 390 which,
however, pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr.
Majarais, not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive
recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents belonged
to the health secretary, who should have followed the manner in which
the President had rendered his action on the recommendation
ii. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should
have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the
 controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their
dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so
desired.

WON THE CA ERRED IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT AN EXHAUSTIVE INVESTIGATION

WAS ALREADY CONDUCTED BY THE PCAGC WHICH RESULTED IN THE FINDING THAT
THE ANOMALOUS CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF MEDICINES WITHOUT THE
REQUIRED PUBLIC BIDDING IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL?
1. Inasmuch as the health secretarys twin Orders were patently void for want of due
process, the CA did not err in refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGCs (or the Ad
Hoc Committees) recommendations. Such a discussion should have been made by
the health secretary before it could be passed upon by the CA.
2. In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that
respondents are guilty of the charges and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from
the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of
respondents, but solely due process
3. In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does not justify
the means. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is
first observed. This is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

DISPOSITION: The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in the sense that
the authority of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under Administrative Order 298
is SUSTAINED. Being violative of administrative due process, the May 8, 1998 and the June 5,
1998 Orders of the health secretary are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this
case be REMANDED to the Department of Health, so that proper steps can be taken to
correct the due-process errors pointed out in this Decision