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3. ALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA (inadmissibility of recorded telephone conversations)

G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:

1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
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However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.

Note:
Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an
interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is one that does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be decided upon. An order granting or denying an
application for preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not
appealable.Instead, the proper remedy is to file a Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition
under Rule 65.

Interlocutory
Provisional; interim; temporary; not final; that which intervenes between the beginning and the
end of a lawsuit or proceeding to either decide a particular point or matter that is not the final
issue of the entire controversy or prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of the lawsuit.

Interlocutory actions are taken by courts when a Question of Law must be answered by an
appellate court before a trial may proceed or to prevent irreparable harm from occurring to a
person or property during the pendency of a lawsuit or proceeding. Generally, courts are
reluctant to make interlocutory orders unless the circumstances surrounding the case are serious
and require timely action.

Interlocutory appeals are restricted by state and federal appellate courts because courts do not
want piecemeal litigation. Appeals courts generally review only cases that have reached final
judgment in the trial courts. When a court administrator enters final judgment, this certifies that
the trial court has ended its review of the case and jurisdiction shifts to the appellate court.

Interlocutory appeals are typically permitted when the trial judge certifies to the appellate court
in an interlocutory order that an important question of law is in doubt and that it will
substantially affect the final result of the case. Judicial economy then dictates that the court
resolve the issue rather than subject the parties to a trial that may be reversed on an appeal
from a final judgment.

Appellate courts have the discretion to review interlocutory orders. The federal courts of appeal
are governed by the Interlocutory Appeals Act (28 U.S.C.A. 1292). This act grants discretion to
the courts of appeal to review interlocutory orders in civil cases where the district judge states in
the order that a controlling question of law is in doubt and that the immediate resolution of the
issue will materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation. State appellate courts are
governed by statutes and court rules of appellate procedure regarding the review of interlocutory
orders.When an appellate court reviews an interlocutory order, its decision on the matters
contained in the order is final. The court enters an interlocutory judgment, which makes that part
of the case final. Therefore, if a case proceeds to trial after an interlocutory judgment is entered,
and an appeal from the trial court judgment follows, the matters decided by the interlocutory
judgment cannot be reviewed by the court again.
Interlocutory orders may be issued in a Divorce proceeding to prevent injury or irreparable harm
during the pendency of the lawsuit. For example, an interlocutory order may require one spouse
to pay the other spouse a designated weekly sum for support, pending a decision on Alimony
and Child Support. This prevents the spouse and children from being without income during the
action.
Courts may also issue interlocutory orders where property is about to be sold or forfeited and a
lawsuit has been filed seeking to stop the action. In this type of case, a court will enter an
interlocutory Injunction, preventing the transfer of property until it has made a final decision. To
do otherwise would cause irreparable harm and would complicate legal title to the property if the
person contesting the transfer ultimately prevailed.
Thus, though the courts value finality in most proceedings, interlocutory orders and appeals are
available to protect important rights and to enhance judicial economy.

MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN FACT, MARYCRIS V.

BALDEVIA VS. JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS AND COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 185595, January
09, 2013.
(THE LAWYER'S POST).

This Court has laid down the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
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x x x A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants
is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment
once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and
executory.

xxxx

Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task
of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
interlocutory e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting
a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting
or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things,
etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.1
[Emphasis supplied]

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the
term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of
the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal
assets.

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente litewhich may be
availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order.2

On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders3 which shall govern
the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders for spousal
support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure, protection and
administration of common property.

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed
orders pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce support which was granted, and to
her own motion to increase support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the ruling on
support in arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for
reimbursement/payment under the May 19, 1998 Order and related orders were in the nature of
final orders assailable by ordinary appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1
and 4 of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court can apply only prospectively. Thus, from the moment the
accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which the amounts were made
payable by private respondent have ceased to be provisional and have become final.

We disagree.

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end
of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole
controversy.4 An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered
final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage
of the same action.5 Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not
dependent on compliance or non- compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner
suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed
orders.
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Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which
may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein
pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They
are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of
the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon
the result of the main action.6 The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but
an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Moreover, private respondents obligation to give monthly support in the amount fixed by the
RTC in the assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what transpired in the early
stage of the proceedings when the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court and
ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply with the order granting support pendente
lite.7 A few years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce support while petitioner filed
her own motion to increase the same, and in addition sought spousal support and support in
arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character of the order granting support pendente
lite. Petitioners theory that the assailed orders have ceased to be provisional due to the
arrearages incurred by private respondent is therefore untenable.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from
interlocutory orders is not allowed. Said provision reads:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless
the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied.)

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning
the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioners appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.

5. People vs. Navarro admissibility of a recorded altercation between the accused

and the deceased

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to the police
station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At
the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was
hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted
the victim to fell and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim
who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in
evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at
the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which
was taken without the knowledge of the two.
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of
the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications

(Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted
sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended
party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and
must immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The
exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed
that he had no intent to kill the latter.

6. Ganaan vs IAC Listening to conversation via telephone extension is not punishable

under RA No. 4200

Gaanan vs IAC

GR L69809, October 16, 1986

Statutory Construction, Criminal Law

Facts:

Montebon filed a direct assault case against Leonardo Lanconico, which he later decided to
withdraw. His lawyer was Atty. Pintor, who called Lanconico initially to inform him about his
clients proposal to withdraw the complaint. Lanconico then requested Atty. Gaanan, another
lawyer, to secretly listen to the conversation through a telephone extension. When Atty. Pintor
called again to discuss the terms, Atty. Gaanan heard the former enumerate the conditions which
later served as the basis of a robbery/extortion case against him. Atty. Pintor and Lanconico
agreed that the former himself will receive an amount of money at a certain place. Atty. Pintor
was arrested by the time he received the money.

Lanconico filed a case of robbery/extortion against Atty. Pintor, with an attached affidavit of Atty.
Gaanan stating what he heard. Atty. Pintor in turn charged the two with violation of the Anti
-Wiretapping law for listening to the telephone conversation without his consent.

Lanconico's Contention:

Pintor's Argument:

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under RA
4200

Held:

No. A rule in statutory construction states that in order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts.

The phrase device or arrangement in Section 1, although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone.
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Hence, an extension telephone is not in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in RA 4200 because its use cannot be deemed as tapping the wire
or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that
purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.

Second, penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt
such as in this case, the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension
telephone. ##

Gaanan v IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebonoffered to withdraw the complaint
for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was
heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to
personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently
arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to
the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and
Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

The lower courtfound both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act,
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

Held:
No, An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a
rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favour of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an
extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must
be construed as not including an extension telephone. The mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of
similar nature.
The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16,
1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation
of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

7. People vs Laguio (inadmissibility of evidence due to infirmity of an arrest)

PEOPLE VS LAGUIO JR.

FACTS: Lawrence Wang was acquitted on 3 different cases filed against him (dangerous drugs
act, illegal possession of firearms and comelec gun ban) after his demurrer to evidence
(inadmissibility of the evidence) was granted due to the illegal/unlawful arrest, search and
seizure that was conducted by the police officers contending that he was arrested in flagrante
delicto but the defense further presented that respondent did not do any overt act to make him
be subject to a warrantless arrest under the exceptions in section 5 of rule 113.

ISSUE: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case
despite the absence of a WOA and/or SW.

HELD:
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the
warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an
incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
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search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to
conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently
committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a
warrant of arrest.

Section 5, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had just been committed;
(c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending.

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section
5 to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious
behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to
enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be
owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there
can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is
settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise
in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.