SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 1 of 68
Cang vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 105308 September
25, 1998
Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; The established rule is that the statute
in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court.Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As
such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September
25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 91.
Civil Law; Adoption; The written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.It is thus evident that
notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the
natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
Same; Same; Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.During the pendency of the
petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended
the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code
provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for
adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of
age or over; (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted children,
ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The
illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if
living with said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if
any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Italics supplied)
Same; Same; The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if
the parent has abandoned the child.As clearly inferred from the foregoing
provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable
for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child
or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may
acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the
parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges
facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural
aspect of adoption.
Same; Same; Allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even
absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court
with jurisdiction.The allegations of abandonment in the petition for
adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested
the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his
natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the
adoption of their minor children.
Same; Same; The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a
preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront.In cases where
the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was
not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor
natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition
for adoption be considered on its merits.
Same; Same; Meaning of Abandonment.In its ordinary sense, the word
abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The
dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The
emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus
put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely,
with intent never to resume or claim ones rights or interests. In reference to
abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe their children.
Same; Same; Same; Physical estrangement alone, without financial and
moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.In the instant case,
records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled purpose
to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the
United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication
with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Same; Same; Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply
because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than
his natural parent.In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental
authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 2 of 68
child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in
David v. Court of Appeals, the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate
child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of
to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child
opted to go with his mother.
Same; Same; In awarding custody, the court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.The transfer of custody over the
children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of
necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing
the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: . . . in
case of legal separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the court. In awarding custody, the court shall
take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
Same; Same; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may
not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Same; Divorce; A divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of
the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State
policy.As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has
ruled in Tenchavez v. Escao that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after
the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is
contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as
regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
divorce has no legal effect.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Although the Court is not a trier of facts, it has the
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it
finds that these do not conform to the evidence on record.As a rule,
factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court.
This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. However, although this
Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to
the evidence on record.
Same; Same; Exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.In Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that
factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 HERBERT
CANG, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? The
answer to this interesting query, certainly not one of first impression, would
have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence, but
also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of
adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, 2 in
Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, "In the Matter of the Petition for
Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed
Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano,
petitioners."
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on
January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973;
Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January
3, 1981.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 3 of 68
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the
Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband's alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a
petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite 3 with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu 4 which rendered a
decision 5 approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to "live separately and apart or from bed and board." They
further agreed:
(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly
support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date
of the filing of the complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the net
proceeds of the house and lot jointly owned by the parties situated at
Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any
contract or agreement with any person or persons, natural or
juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any
undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husband's consent
as the parties are by this agreement legally separated; 6
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from
Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada.
Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the
three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving "rights of visitation at all
reasonable times and places" to petitioner. 7
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized
American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never
remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic
earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month 8 a portion of which was remitted
to the Philippines for his children's expenses and another, deposited in the
bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of
Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the
three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to
his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that
her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her
in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United
States to attend to a family business, "leaving the children would be a
problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad;" and
that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights" over the children
for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any
contract without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the
United States and had been transferring from one place to another to
avoid detection by Immigration authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned
to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although
private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially
capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too meager"
compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him
of his parental authority over his beloved children."
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to
reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred
to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private
respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect,
relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should
be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver
custody over the minors to petitioner.
On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued
a decree of adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the
minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the
petitioner-spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is
hereby granted and approved. These children shall henceforth be
known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D. Clavano and
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 4 of 68
Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of
Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties
as though they were in fact the legitimate children of the
petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the
children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a
copy of this Decree of Adoption for registration purposes.SO
ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was "impelled" by these reasons:
(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed "close filial ties
with the Clavano family, especially their maternal uncle," petitioner
Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their
printing press, real estate business, export business and gasoline
station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had
substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed
"Menchu," approved of the adoption because of her heart ailment,
near-fatal accident in 1981, and the fact that she could not provide
them a secure and happy future as she "travels a lot."
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual
direction as they would go to church together and had sent the
children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted
by the Clavanos Keith had testified and expressed the wish to be
adopted by the Clavanos while the two younger ones were observed
by the court to have "snuggled" close to Ronald even though their
natural mother was around.
On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to
rest on "a very shaky foundation" because of its findings that:
(1) Petitioner was "morally unfit to be the father of his children" on
account of his being "an improvident father of his family" and an
"undisguised Lothario." This conclusion is based on the testimony of
his alleged paramour, mother of his two sons and close friend of Anna
Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and petitioner lived as husband
and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao, Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of
"comparatively recent dates" were "attempts at verisimilitude" as
these were joint deposits the authenticity of which could not be
verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioner's claim, the possibility of his reconciliation
with Anna Marie was "dim if not nil" because it was petitioner who
"devised, engineered and executed the divorce proceedings at the
Nevada Washoe County court."
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner "is now an alien
from the standpoint of Philippine laws" and therefore, how his "new
attachments and loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an
open question."
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social
Worker in her Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:
Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children.
And abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified
by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic)
adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P. 161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]).
Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the
consent of the parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag, 141 Cal. 403, 74
P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Gal. 469,63 P. 736, 82 Am. St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing
R.C.L.; Seibert, 170 Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Steams v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349; 97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v.
Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564; Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo, 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.) 9
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred
in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they
were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He
asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to
divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written
consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 5 of 68

Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the Acct. No. Date Opened Balance Name of Bank
petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study
report required by law.
1) 118-606437-4 July 23, 1985 $5,018.50 Great Western Savings,
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:
Oct. 29, 1987 Daly City, Cal., U.S.A.
Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural
parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the 2) 73-166-8 March 5, 1986 3,129.00 Matewan National Bank
consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary
(Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs. Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344).
Oct. 26, 1987 of Williamson, West
The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be considered
as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment
connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental Virginia, U.S.A.
duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, or the neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe 3) 564-146883 December 31, 1986 2,622.19 Security Pacific National
their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the
parent's presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary Oct. 29, 1987 Bank, Daly City, Cal.,
affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion
of the first error. U.S.A.

Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the
children and has in fact even maintained bank accounts in their names.
His duty to provide support comes from two judicial pronouncements.
The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra, obliges him to pay the
children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the divorce
decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay
monthly support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not
submitted any evidence to show compliance with the decision in JD-101
CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45)
drawn in the children's names totalling $2,126.98. The last remittance
was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support
commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of
October 6, 1987, oppositor should have made 53 remittances of
$150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No other remittances were shown to
have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of this date,
oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce
decree. And since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707
CEB, the inevitable conclusion is oppositor had not really been
performing his duties as a father, contrary to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three
accounts in different banks, as follows
The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositor's name
as trustee for Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively.
In other words, the accounts are operated and the amounts
withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said that they
belong to the minors. The second is an "or" account, in the names of
Herbert Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the
Philippines, said account is operable only by oppositor and the funds
withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his
offer of evidence "the aim and purpose of providing for a better future
and security of his family." 10
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He
emphasized that the decree of legal separation was not based on the merits
of the case as it was based on a manifestation amounting to a compromise
agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and his wife agreed upon
the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact that
prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioner's
parents. Moreover, he alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he
and his wife initiated the "joint complaint" for divorce.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 6 of 68
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his
children was belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil
Case No. JD-707. He took exception to the appellate court's findings that as
an American citizen he could no longer lay claim to custody over his children
because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he "is still a father
to his children." As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another
woman, he had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and
the instant adoption case. Neither was it true that Wilma Soco was a
neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue
City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of
Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not
have been given weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for
adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother of Ronald, came to know her and went
to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a witness for monetary
considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of the
Clavanos to claim that they could love the children much more than he
could. 11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before
this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it
did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and
Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or, over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the
Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement
agency under whose care the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the
following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after
receiving counselling and appropriate social services from the
Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a duly
licensed child-placement agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly
licensed child-placement agency under whose care and legal
custody the child may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court. 12 As such, when private
respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the
applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the
Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect.
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads:
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parent or parents;
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 7 of 68

(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting
parents, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
(Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the
amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Notably, such requirement
is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:
Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition
a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen
years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse,
if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if the child
is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or benevolent
society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum,
home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate
and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption
shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was
attached to the petition for adoption. Petitioner's consent, as the natural
father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father as follows:
3. That the children's mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO,
has given her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of
Consent, Annex "A". Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14
years of age appears on page 2 of this petition; However, the father of
the children, Herbert Cang, had already left his wife and children and
had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox copy of the
DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of Nevada,
U.S.A. (Annex "B") which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long
after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal
immigrant. 15
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent
the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with
jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of
the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence 16 dispense
with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.

As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because
of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had
adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child 13 or that such parent
abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an
is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction
adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of the oppositor
over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to
abandon his child may the petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with
the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
Thus, the Court declared: As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this
Court. 17 This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 18 However,
. . . . The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to
although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and
adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it that these do not
petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which
conform to the evidence on record. 19
may give information to those interested, than that it should be
formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a
petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court has held that the exceptions to the
adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may
jurisdiction. 14 not be reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 8 of 68
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different
conclusion 21 on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his
children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to
forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea
of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with
which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's
rights or interests. 22 In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent,
the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." 23
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters
and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their
whims.
Petitioner's testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence
consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and
children:
1. Exh. 1 a 4-page updated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to
"Dear Bert" on a C. Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated
therein that it had been "a long time since the last time you've heard from me
excluding that of the phone conversation we've had." She discussed
petitioner's intention to buy a motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension
over risks that could be engendered by Keith's use of it. She said that in the
"last phone conversation" she had with petitioner on the birthday of "Ma," she
forgot to tell petitioner that Keith's voice had changed; he had become a
"bagito" or a teen-ager with many "fans" who sent him Valentine's cards. She
told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative "almost dalaga" who
could carry on a conversation with her angkong and how pretty she was in
white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores de Mayo after
she had prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she was
worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved
clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy was
smart for his age and "quite spoiled" being the youngest of the children in
Lahug. Joeton was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would
sleep anytime. She admitted having said so much about the children-because
they might not have informed petitioner of "some happenings and spices of
life" about themselves. She said that it was "just very exciting to know how
they've grown up and very pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different
characters." She ended the letter with the hope that petitioner was "at the
best of health." After extending her regards "to all," she signed her name after
the word "Love." This letter was mailed on July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner
whose address was P.O. Box 2445, Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of "a
note from Menchu" on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that "we" wrote
to petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when
petitioner "called up last time." She told him how Joeton would grab the phone
from Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to order. Charmaine,
who was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioner's call because
she also wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner
that Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her
walking shorts and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids
were growing up and so were their needs. She told petitioner to be "very
fatherly" about the children's needs because those were expensive here. For
herself, Anna Marie asked for a subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines
and that whatever expenses he would incur, she would "replace" these. As a
postscript, she told petitioner that Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored "Sperry
topsider shoes."
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 9 of 68
Dear Herbert, Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a
wonderful one. By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. It's nice to
be thought of at X'mas. Thanks again.
4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano,
Inc. addressed to "Dear Dad." Keith told his father that they tried to tell their
mother "to stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes start(s)" on
June 16. He informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that,
about the motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it and
"we'll see what you're (sic) decision will be." He asked for chocolates, nuts,
basketball shirt and shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for
outing and perfume. He told petitioner that they had been going to Labug with
their mother picking them up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or
dinner. From her aerobics, his mother would go for them in Lahug at about
9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the evening. He wished his father "luck and the best of
health" and that they prayed for him and their other relatives. The letter was
ended with "Love Keith."
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the
Christmas card "with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00" and the "card of Joeton with
$5.00 inside." He told petitioner the amounts following his father's instructions
and promise to send money through the mail. He asked his father to address
his letter directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He
informed petitioner of activities during the Christmas season that they
enjoyed eating, playing and giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him
of his daily schedule and that their mother had been closely supervising them,
instructing them to fold their blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed
petitioner that Joeton had become very smart while Charmaine, who was also
smart, was very demanding of their mother. Because their mother was leaving
for the United States on February 5, they would be missing her like they were
missing petitioner. He asked for his "things" and $200.00. He told petitioner
more anecdotes about Joeton like he would make the sign of the cross even
when they would pass by the Iglesia ni Cristo church and his insistence that
Aquino was not dead because he had seen him on the betamax machine. For
Keith, Charmaine had become "very maldita" who was not always satisfied
with her dolls and things but Joeton was full of surprises. He ended the letter
with "Love your son, Keith." The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-
D).
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the
bathing suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and
$50.00. She reminded him of her birthday on January 23 when she would turn
9 years old. She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet
was IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January
9 although Keith's classes had started on January 6. They would feel sad again
because Mommy would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep
writing them. She signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they
had not been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to
Manila they went to Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for
one week. He informed him that he got "honors," Charmaine was 7th in her
class and Joeton had excellent grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred
Heart soon and he was glad they would be together in that school. He asked
for his "reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked
for a motorbike and dollars that he could save. He told petitioner that he was
saving the money he had been sending them. He said he missed petitioner
and wished him the best. He added that petitioner should call them on
Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the
latter. She asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the school
and "something else." She, promised not to spend so much and to save some.
She said she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said "hi!" to petitioner.
After ending the letter with "Love, Joeton and Charmaine," she asked for her
prize for her grades as she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been
writing him; that he would like to have some money but he would save them;
that he learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not around; that
he would be going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his Mommy
had just arrived Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the "official altar
boy." He asked petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told
petitioner that he was saving some in the bank and he was proud because he
was the only one in his group who saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton
had become naughty and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by
petitioner. He advised petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and
asked for a pair of topsider shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he
was a member of the basketball team and that his mom would drive for his
group. He asked him to call them often like the father of Ana Christie and to
write them when he would call so that they could wait for it. He informed
petitioner that they had all grown bigger and heavier. He hoped petitioner
would be happy with the letter that had taken him so long to write because he
did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him perfume
(Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy
something for Mommy.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 10 of 68
11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card "For My Wonderful Father" dated October 8,
1984 from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with the year '83
written on the upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith,
Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even
when their Mom "was there" where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith
asked petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to buy him
a motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He
informed petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but
their grades were all good with Joeton receiving "stars" for excellence. Keith
wanted a bow and arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that
petitioner would come and visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date
January 1986. Keith told his father that they had received the package that the
latter sent them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not
Charmaine and Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery
items, toys and more clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled
shoes and a dress to match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would
make her look sexy. He intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and
that he was already ashamed to be asking for things to buy in the grocery
even though his mother had told him not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in
the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption,
he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. 25 Exhibits 24 to 45
are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising
why the courts below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence
on financial support but also the emotional exchange of sentiments between
petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below emphasized the
meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as
regards the bank deposits, these were "withdrawable by him alone." Simply
put, the courts below attached a high premium to the prospective adopters'
financial status but totally brushed aside the possible repercussion of the
adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt.
However, his seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his
testimony is contradicted by his feelings towards his father as revealed in
his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that Keith's
testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption
that would certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the
capability of his father to sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents' emotional attachment to the
children. This is hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives,
the children were used to their presence. Such attachment had persisted
and certainly, the young ones' act of snuggling close to private respondent
Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their
father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could
not but come to their succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick
and private respondent Ronald spent for his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be
entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child a larger
measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court
of Appeals, 26 the Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child to his
mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his
affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted
to go with his mother. The Court said:
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private
respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that
petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children
according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir 27 where the Court was confronted with the issue of
whether to award custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster
mother, this Court said:
This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived
mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable
memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not
take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even
at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that
afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of
satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her
dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the
relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial.
If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had
done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they
have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss,
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 11 of 68
and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into
their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never
counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her
associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh
and blood count. . . . .
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court stated that "(I)n ascertaining the
welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations." Thus, in awarding
custody of the child to the father, the Court said:
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least,
her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a
mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as
a, result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While
the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and
pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering,
pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child
which is the paramount consideration. (Emphasis supplied) 29
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration
were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic
approach to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional,
psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. 30 The
conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs
more evidentiary support other than his inability to provide them the
material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There
should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his
children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to
adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that
petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and
his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to
their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their
daily activities, problems and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond
petitioner's "meager" financial support to ferret out other indications on
whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his family. The omission of said
courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the process
of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father.
To our consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the
welfare of the children was not exactly the "paramount consideration" that
impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the
children in the country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a
problem that would naturally hamper her job-seeking abroad. In other
words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her because
Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children. 31 In his
testimony, private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out
of the country for two years and came home twice or three times, 32 thereby
manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left her children to the care
of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children when
he went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons,
the situation worsened. The Clavano family must have realized this. Hence,
when the family first discussed the adoption of the children, they decided
that the prospective adopter should be Anna Marie's brother Jose. However,
because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the task
upon private respondents. 33
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A
businessman, private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu
and Manila while his wife, private respondent Maria Clara, is an international
flight stewardess. 34 Moreover, private respondent Ronald claimed that he
could "take care of the children while their parents are away," 35 thereby
indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the
children's surname changed to Clavano for the reason that he wanted to
take them to the United States as it would be difficult for them to get a visa
if their surname were different from his. 36 To be sure, he also testified that
he wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken
home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent
Ronald, his sister Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the
inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to keep the children away from
their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption was
allegedly the state of Anna Marie's health she was a victim of an almost
fatal accident and suffers from a heart ailment. However, she herself
admitted that her health condition was not that serious as she could still
take care of the children. 37 An eloquent evidence of her ability to physically
care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los
Angeles 38 she could not have been employed if her health were
endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos' attempt at depriving
petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 12 of 68
he was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her
children would "never be at ease with the wife of their father." 39
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a
womanizer and father to the sons of Wilma Soco. 40As to whether he was
telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine society, being comparatively
conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in orientation, it does
not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the
baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the
Court place a premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between
siring children and parenting them. Nonetheless, the actuality that
petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient
basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit
father. 41 Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a
"bad" husband does not necessarily make a "bad" father. That a husband is
not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to
deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the
children. 42 Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children
when he took the trouble of sending a telegram 43 to the lower court
expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning
about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify
about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in
the United States. 44
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by
the agreement with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an
illegal alien in the United States. As such, he could not have procured
gainful employment. Private respondents failed to refute petitioner's
testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal
home, 45 pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal
separation case. Hence, it can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of
the sale redounded to the benefit of his family, particularly his children. The
proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to show that
thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent
his family money, no matter how "meager."
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the
rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective.
The Court's position, should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to
extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. 46 The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard
to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 47
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents' reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie
which became the basis of the decree of legal separation. According to
private respondents' counsel, 48 the authority given to Anna Marie by that
decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was "all
embracing" 49 and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the
adoption. This conclusion is however, anchored on the wrong premise that
the authority given to the innocent spouse to enter into contracts that
obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as
devoid of a legal basis as private respondents' apparent reliance on the
decree of legal separation for doing away with petitioner's consent to the
adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the
decree of legal separation did not, of necessity; deprive petitioner of
parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption.
Article 213 of the Family Code states: ". . . in case of legal separation of
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the court." In awarding custody, the court shall take into account "all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit."
If should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent
spouse the "exercise" of parental authority. Having custody of the child, the
innocent spouse shall implement the sum of parental rights with respect to
his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to the child's
services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and religion. 50
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority,
the joint exercise of which is vested by the law upon the parents, 51 as
. . . a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as
the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses.
As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of
rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare
of the minor."
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 13 of 68
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been
completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of
custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case. To reiterate, that award
was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of the
spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a
compromise, 53 there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that
petitioner was such an irresponsible person that he should be deprived of
custody of his children or that there are grounds under the law that could
deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation case, the
court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna
Marie back to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna
Marie's motion for reconsideration thereon. The Clavano family also
vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner, such that
the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them. 54
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child
only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal
separation case. In the instant case for adoption, the issue is whether or not
petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his
consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the
effects of a decree of adoption. 55 But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated
earlier, the finding of the courts below on the issue of petitioner's
abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled
in Tenchavez v. Escao 56 that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after
the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is
contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as
regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of
established customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of
Appeals, 57 a case involving the visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over
his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:
Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care
for their children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest
and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and
feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law not
the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and
imminent threat to the well being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code,
there has been a pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption
proceedings, not so much on the need of childless couples for a child, as on
the paramount interest, of a child who needs the love and care of parents.
After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code,
the discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043
on Intercountry,
Adoption 58 and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the
domestic adoption of Filipino children. 59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as
the following policies in the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998":
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security
towards the full and harmonious development of his/her personality. 60
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child,
his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the
tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the
Child. 61
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 14 of 68

(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological
parent(s). 62
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to
comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to instant case are the
following provisions:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . .
. to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child,
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights
recognized in the present Convention. 63

States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one
or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both
parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best
interests. 64

A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to
maintain on a regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal
relations and direct contacts with both parents . . . 65

States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide
direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent
with the evolving capacities of the child. 66
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the
domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all
actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however,
to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or
parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--
vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they
must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and
Charmaine are now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching
eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall be endowed with the
discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best
interests regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that
the petition for adoption was filed. 67 Said petition must be denied as it was
filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Vda. de. Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 772, G.R. No. 135216
August 19, 1999
Evidence; Best and Secondary Evidence; Authentication and Proof of
Evidence; Public and Private Documents; If the original writing has been lost
or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and
loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy
or recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses.It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses. Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror,
secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of a document may be proven by
the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and
recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the
parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. Truly, the execution
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 15 of 68
of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties;
or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that [t]he loss may be shown by
any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made,
in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to
find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary
evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact
of marriage.In the present case, due execution was established by the
testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony,
and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was
shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidencetestimonial and documentarymay be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificates; Failure to send a copy of a marriage
certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.Respondent
Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to
1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in
the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). He finds it quite bizarre
for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage.
On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place,
failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not
invalidate the marriage. In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this
charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; This jurisprudential attitude towards
marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based
on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Given the undisputed, even accepted, fact that Dr. Jacob and
petitioner lived together as husband and wife, we find that the presumption
of marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Trial Courts; Finality of Findings of Fact; As a rule, factual findings of the trial
court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts except
when it failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion.As a rule, the factual findings of the trial
court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note
telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule,
however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge
Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two
expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court failed to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. Hence, the
present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law
may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.
Same; Same; Adoption; The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon
the person claiming such relationship.The burden of proof in establishing
adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent
Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows
that the alleged adoption is a sham.
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob,petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher
of "Balalong," respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other
than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due
execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of
marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage
contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998,
and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 16 of 68
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it
being more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the
challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon,
Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto.2
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of
[herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa
Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract"
excluded under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh.
B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the
issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction
earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of
deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for
the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage
Contract between herself and the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted
son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July
1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur,
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil.1wphi1.nt
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v.
Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to
intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as
Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa
and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a
complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83)
questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and
deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of
deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and
Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros,
Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy
of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when
Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of
the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed
Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the
execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by
the solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy
of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry
of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed
his "thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975
(date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between
appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 17 of 68
or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as
husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary
signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was
logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances
of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never
mentioned that he allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to
Mr. Jose Centenera for registration". And as admitted by appellant at the
trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at
the date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the
face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin
Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera.
This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the
Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage
entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage
was allegedly solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in
Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein
Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of
Judge Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's
signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of
Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember
the facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago
when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and
was suffering from "glaucoma".
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the
authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI
Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He
pointed out irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the
"standard" signature" and concluded that the questioned and the standard
signatures "JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature,
appellee presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination
made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui
who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive
of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report,
Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious
habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between
the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded that the
signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting
the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the
findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the
challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-
appellee sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of
deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as
spurious and non-existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this
wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract,
Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the
contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be
set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage
contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 18 of 68

admissible other than the original document itself, except in the relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness
following cases: of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court
will not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial
court in determining qualifications of this case.
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. When the original supported by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, weight and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent
copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect on
appeal especially when established by unrebutted testimony and
documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may
be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due
execution of the document and subsequent loss of the original instrument Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before
evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the this Court.6
document and subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such The Issues
document.
In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three resolution of this Court:
(3) copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the
introduction of secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructed a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob
contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
of the loss of the original document.
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E.
With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Jacob.7
Moya in the questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor
of Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of
clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that
Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his regular The Court's Ruling
duties.
The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondents
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was
adoption has not been sufficiently established.
subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates
the possibility of forgery of Judge Moya's signature. The value of the opinion
of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between First Issue: Validity of Marriage
genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape
notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis, Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a
the assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding. 8 Aware of this
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 19 of 68
fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage
between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there
was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. 9 We cannot sustain
this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void
because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced,
because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article
76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the
effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot
be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror,
secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when
they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr.
Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the
wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding
had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time
requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent
authorization issued by the Archbishop through his vicar general and
chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino ordaining that the union between Dr.
Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book
of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the
circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they
have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez
v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:
. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol
evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court
confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the
contents, . . . which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when
the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not
dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a
matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis,
necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony
or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its
authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital
of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the
document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the
weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such
evidence. (emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on
this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said
that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence."17
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized
the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof. 18 The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or
by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document
lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has]
indeed [been] lost."19
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown
by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana,
as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant,
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 20 of 68
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage
contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been
obtained.20 Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the
reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is
not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by
any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held: [A]lthough a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of
marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because
of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial
evidence in its place.25
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry
pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). 26 He finds it
quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering
their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In
the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record
purposes does not invalidate the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not
the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil
registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29
Presumption in Favor of Marriage Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage." Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 32 Given
the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived
together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage
was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue: Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that
the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the
Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the
regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to
the testimony of respondents handwriting expert, for "the assessment of
the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the
trial court . . . "35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded
great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs
indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not
applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not
the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus,
the Court examined the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 21 of 68
trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion." 36 Hence, the present case is
an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed
in petitions under Rule 45.37
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature
on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this
matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for
Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and
brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. 38 Respondent Pilapil
justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition was
ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the
signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof: 39
Q. What was you[r] response, sir? A: I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's
testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition,
Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he
answered the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.40
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was
unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in
the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall
whether you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature
appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature
reading Jose[;] I cant make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is
not my signature.41
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he
positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not
discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the
newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a
document shown to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason and the respondent
has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI
Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your
examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and
the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the
same person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail,
the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural
pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as
the capital letter "J".43
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having
been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was
recognized even by Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio
Pagui.44
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 22 of 68

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged
Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge
Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused
pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was
assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no
indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the
documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. 46 In the
same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management 47 in Manila and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, 48 issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr.
Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged
adoption of respondent.49

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa
Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and
declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is
DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. Melo,
Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 23 of 68
Republic vs. Hernandez, 253 SCRA 509, G.R. No. 117209 February 9,
1996
Adoption; Evidence; Factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently
buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and
are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.It has been said all
too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when
sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high
respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court. Accordingly, we
fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below
granting the petition for adoption.
Same; Names; While the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of
the adopter is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of
adoption, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian
name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil
register.Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree
of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the
adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of
adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact,
even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or proper name,
also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it
was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof,
premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a
decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a
petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
Same; Same; Change of Name; Civil Register; The name of the adoptee as
recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in
the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as
recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal
name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of
the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make
its decree recording such change.
Same; Same; Same; Actions; If a change in ones name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.The official name of a person whose birth is
registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in
ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying
with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition for change of name is an independent
and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of
rulesa fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding.A
petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it
cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a
mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available
under our remedial law system.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.The Solicitor General
correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it
seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which taken together
cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in
form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order
therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for
adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding
petition for the latter relief at law.
Actions; Joinder of Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; By a
joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant
the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.By a joinder
of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the
uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union
of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis
of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff
may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for Joinder of Causes of Action.While
joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant,
Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in
one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not
violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 24 of 68
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same
nature and character.
Same; Same; Same; While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many
separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in
the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved,
subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties.The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of
causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably
be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not
succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing
a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of
causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity
between them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate
claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the
problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject
always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
Same; Same; Same; Adoption; Change of Name; Petitions for adoption and
change of name have no relation to each other, nor are they of the same
nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact
or lawin short, they do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual
unity demanded to sanction their joinder under the Rules.Turning now to
the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition
against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, we do
not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any
common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their
joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of
conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
Same; Same; Same; The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which
underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed
to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and
dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively
settled by having just one judicial proceeding.It furthermore cannot be
said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete
determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption
and change the name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the
subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect
to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding
multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of
causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also
present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously
and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not
to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are
unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
Same; Same; Same; Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in
situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error
in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with
the Rules.The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception
from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general,
and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents
and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert
the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt
at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Same; Same; Same; Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justiceit cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules
have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may
be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is
important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not
intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide
for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and
manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a
judge whose authority they acknowledge. It cannot be overemphasized that
procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the
Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.
Same; Same; Same; The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court
and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy which can in no
wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by
parties to an action for their singular convenience.The danger wrought by
non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with
the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the
questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and
makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to
the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court
and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy. They are matters
of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by
agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular
convenience.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 25 of 68
Names; A persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is
known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of
the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him
it is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have
a name.It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name
is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of
an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or
family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals.
The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.
Same; Civil Register; The official name of a person is that given him in the
civil register.By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be
entered in the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him
in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the
name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the
same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory
restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
Same; Same; Actions; Change of Name; The only way that the name of a
person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and the only name that may be
changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.By reason
thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is
through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the
Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that
may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As
earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem,
impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the
requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential,
and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Grounds Warranting a Change of Name.
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Baptism; A name given to a person in the church
records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the communitywhen at
variance with that entered in the civil registeris unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name.Contrarily, a petition for change of name
grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under which
he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the
use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a
condition sine qua non to a change of name. Neither does the fact that the
petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it
constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of
name. A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by
which he is known in the communitywhen at variance with that entered in
the civil registeris unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Adoption; Parent and Child; While the right of a
natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected
under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an
adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most
noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably con-sidered.While the right of a natural
parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the
law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child
by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble
intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently
cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the
adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does
not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore,
factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and
symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court. Republic vs. Hernandez,
253 SCRA 509, G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN
MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 26 of 68
REGALADO, J.:
Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994 1 in JDRC Case No. 2964.
Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement
the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his
adoption.
The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p
petition 2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging
therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for
adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well
as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the
aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private
respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said minor adoptee
to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at
private respondents' residence. 3
At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the
relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal
opposition dated May 3, 1995, 4 petitioner reiterated its objection to the
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a
single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and
pursued as two separate proceedings.
After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the
trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all
legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his
natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as
Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson
and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of the petition on March 10,
1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it
shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103,
respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of
birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to
the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its appropriate
action consisten(t) herewith. 5
At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by
petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor.
The records show that the latter have commendably established their
qualifications under the law to be adopters, 6and have amply complied with
the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, 7 with the findings
of the trial court being recited thus:
To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court
dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. "A") was
published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila
Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. "B" to "E" and
submarkings). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor
derogatory record (Exhs. "K" to "V"); and are physically fit to be the
adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. "W"). Their qualification to
become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social
Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through Social Worker Luz
Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly
individuals. They are found physically healthy; mentally fit, spiritually and
financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph.
"Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They
unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready
and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure home life.
"Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of
the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His
stay with the Munsons during the six months trial custody period has
resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 27 of 68
"We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin
Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized." 8
It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower
court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are
accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this
Court. 9Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order
of the court below granting the petition, for adoption.
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized
mainly as follows. (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the
prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor
adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there
was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the
given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both
reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority to change the giver or
proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be
instituted separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements
therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99
of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code
in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must
correspondingly be complied with. 10
A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws
and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for
change of name. 11 Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is
the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal
name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be
instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied. 12
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule
2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules
against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two
separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the
conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the
court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. 13
Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding
change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a
system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of
justice. 14 Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal
construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the
adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the
instant proceeding. 15
On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that -
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome
to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights
have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous
observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
is indubitably for the purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither
State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the
petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of
discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a
year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any
contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be
deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said
cha(n)ge of name. It stands to reason that there is no way that the state
or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin
Earl's first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of
petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published
together with the petition for adoption. 16
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
effects of adoption:
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 28 of 68
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall
terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the
spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over
the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other
blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which
is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed
for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding,
such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in
this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in
the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same, 17 and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as
recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal
name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of
the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make
its decree recording such change. 18
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is
the name appearing therein. If a change in one's name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional
trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name
resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the
petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the
change of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date
and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General
or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at
such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the
allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the
change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as
prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the
civil registrar of the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. 19 It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules.
A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.
The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, 20 all of which
taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of
imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive
joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on
the pronouncements in Briz vs. Brit, et al. 21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et
al. 22 is misplaced. A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of
causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called for.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 29 of 68
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is
meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action;
the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. 23 It is the
union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the
basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A
plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 24
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not
required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not
mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the
causes of action arose from the same factual setting and might under
applicable joinder rules be joined. 25 Modern statutes and rules governing
joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without
prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are
liberally construed. 26
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party
litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be
joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will
not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same
nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting
in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite
the disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be
construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice
to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should
be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the
same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made
effectual as far as practicable, 27 with the end in view of promoting the
efficient administration of justice. 28
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to
encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving
a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal
or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. 29While
the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may
have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented
and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the
restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.
Unlimited joinder is not authorized. 30
Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with
the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and
joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems
presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. 32
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of
name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they
present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant
their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test
of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General -
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each
other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws and
rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for
adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopter's
fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly
(Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is
looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting
the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
. . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately
assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other. 33
The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder may
be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and
conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section
5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out
in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 30 of 68
of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not
arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent
in an adoption proceeding is the proposed adopter's fitness and
qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only
prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the
change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency
of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first
name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter
was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can
connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought
in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz
vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases,
the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced.
In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an absentee is
obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of
conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship
was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land
subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the
commonality of relationship which stands out in both cases does not
characterize the present action for adoption and change of name. Thus
the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions
was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an
automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further
proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead
additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of the
controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all
the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they
are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met. 34
It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will
make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the
coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one
petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in
form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the
adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the
rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are
intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which
can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one
judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or
corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken
up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35
the Court clarified the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action:
The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule,
as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which
compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at one
and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the
plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several causes of action
although they may be included in one of the classes specified. This,
therefore, leaves it to the plaintiff's option whether the causes of
action shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference
may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file
another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action within
the prescriptive period therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the
Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for
change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and
adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert
the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt
at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike
would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice
requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 36 It has long been recognized
that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch
of judicial business. 37
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be
ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important
in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to
hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system
under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 31 of 68
the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose
authority they acknowledge. 38
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own
wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to
be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness,
caprice, or whimsicality. 39 We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot
vs. CA, et al. that: 40
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law
and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As
a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is
equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights,
be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most
persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. . . . While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the
Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of
the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the
court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to
suspend the operation of the rules. 41
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put
to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to
his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would
justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that
stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case,
considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice
and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its
citizens.
The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of
or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the
proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to
the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place,
such questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure
laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of
public policy. 42 They are matters of public order and interest which can in no
wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by
parties to an action for their singular convenience. 43
In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness in the
application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the
appropriate proceeding:
. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or
misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the
application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at
achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his
prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law
and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition
for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the
only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the
adoptee's baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been
known since he came to live with private respondents. 45
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon
the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first
name as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 32 of 68
designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he
lives. This largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the
child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as
adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select
the first name of their adopted child. 46
The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on
this point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the
first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the
child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other
purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a
woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the
minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for
adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth. 47
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated
ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word
or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of
an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or
family name. The giver or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals.
The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law. 48
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil
register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register.
That is his name in the eyes of the law. 49 And once the name of a person is
officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that
identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on
the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. 50
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court. 51 For purposes of an application for change of name under Article
376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only
name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is
essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. 52
It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege,
not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which
has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name
and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person
can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or
that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register,
he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which
may justify such change. 53
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being
sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. 54
Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was
baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he
used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. 55 For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a
change of name. 56 Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using
a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. 57 A name given to
a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which be is known in the
community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is
unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. 58
The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such
rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 33 of 68
to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had
been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private
respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and
known by his family, relatives and friends from, the time he came to live
with private respondents. 59 Apart from suffusing their pleadings with
sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a
change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents.
The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been
struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the
adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in
the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always
been frowned upon. 60
The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his
assailed order that -
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name
given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed
by law. . . .
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for
identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions of
giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of
their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein
enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case
at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the
change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of
adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.
Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his
surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption.
He adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him
embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a
suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing
in a Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and
that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought.
This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as
a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given
name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at
issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that
purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to
reinforce the imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the
legally prescribed procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child
is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one
wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his natural parent,
and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by
the adoptive parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural
parents have the right to freely select and give the child's first name for
every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A.,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition,
page 721). In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private
respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name
the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had already been
exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred
such right by law, hence, the right assertes by private respondents herein
remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It
is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling
grounds. 61
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to
the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, 62 should be understood in its proper context. It should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the
proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has
theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the
purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This
effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain
unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an
appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 34 of 68
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive
parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the
adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or
include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of
concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to, private respondents' privilege to legally change the
proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is
exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the
grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional
requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced
therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge
is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall
henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change
thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the
order is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 99, G.R. No. 103695 March
15, 1996
Adoption; Actions; Jurisdiction; The court acquired jurisdiction over the
petition for adoption even if the given name of the child to be adopted was
published as Michael instead of Midael, which is the name appearing in
the birth certificatechanging the name of the child from Midael to
Michael cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be
read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone.The present case is
different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought
to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of
the letters ch for the letter d, so that what appears as Midael as given
name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error
is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child from Midael C.
Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because
both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma)
and tone (tono, tunog, himig). The purpose of the publication requirement
is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can
make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of
notice in this case.
Same; Change of Name; Rule 108, Rules of Court; It is error to grant a
prayer for correction of the given name of the child in a petition for adoption
if there was no compliance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Courtthe
decision, insofar as it orders the correction of name, is void and without
force or effect.With regard to the second assignment of error in the
petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in
granting private respondents prayer for the correction of the name of the
child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not
complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the
correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect.
Same; Same; Same; Art. 412, Civil Code; Indeed, it has been the uniform
ruling of the Supreme Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code covers those
harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
clearly misspelled.The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108
to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of
persons. Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of
the Civil Codeto implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of
Court of 1964covers those harmless and innocuous changes, such as
correction of a name that is clearly misspelled.
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Civil Registrar; The local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
registry.The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case
much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; A notice made pursuant to a
petition for adoption, where only the prayer for adoption is stated and no
mention is made of the prayer for correction of name in the civil registry
deprives the civil registrar of notice and of the opportunity to be heard.
While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the
petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice
only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was
mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry
was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice
and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 35 of 68
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P.
CARANTO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of
Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, granting private
respondents' petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the
correction of the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael."
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents
spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael
C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private
respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private
respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon
stayed with them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed
that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all
intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child;
and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the
petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as
"MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."
The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice
thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province
of Cavite and by service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare
and Development and the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction
of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although
the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could
not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the
correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondent Zenaida
Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor
testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the
minor, being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the
child.
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the
opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies
only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It
cited Rule 108, 1, which provides that any person interested in an act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto." It held that the correction of
names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108,
2 as "entries subject to cancellation or correction." According to the trial
court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to
prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the herein petition
and declaring that:
1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by and
option of petitioners Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
2. Henceforth, the minor's name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his
original name of Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his
record of birth;
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is
hereby directed to accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate
of said minor; and
4. This judgment shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing
of the herein petition.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
contention that the correction of names cannot be effected in the same
proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption because in
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 36 of 68
the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of
Live Birth.
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz
v. Republic, 2 invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because
that case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to
require the petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of name
would entail "additional time and expenses for them as well as for the
Government and the Courts."
Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to
comment. Despite opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any
comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the private respondents' petition for adoption. Petitioner's contention is
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor
child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. 3 There the petition for
adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal
name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the record of
birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a "substantial defect in
the petition and the published order of hearing." Indeed there was a
question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well
be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would
indicate.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the
name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves
merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what
appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor
General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of
the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly
cause any confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced
with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." The purpose
of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any
objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has
been served by publication of notice in this case.
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for
adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming
the decision of the trial court, correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that
both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private
respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil
registry.
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of
the minor, is void and without force or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only
to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108,
2 plainly states:
2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name." Indeed, it
has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code to
implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of Court in 1964 covers
"those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that
is clearly misspelled." 4 Thus, in Yu v. Republic 5 it was held that "to change
"Sincio" to "Sencio" which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel
"i" in the first name into the vowel "e" amounts merely to the righting of a
clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 6 it was held that "the change of
petitioner's name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo
is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is
appropriate."
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now 3 of this Rule
provides:
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 37 of 68

3 Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in SO ORDERED.

the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the

proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. 7 As he was not impleaded in this case
much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. 8

Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required
by Rule 108, 4 which reads:

4. Notice and publication. Upon filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the
petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice
only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was
mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry
was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice
and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an

indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as
the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction
both as to party and as to the subject matter. 9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order
to the local civil registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the
birth certificate of the child. In other respects relating to the adoption of
Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 38 of 68
Reyes vs. Mauricio, 636 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 175080 November 24,
2010
Remedial Law; Appeals; In a petition for review under Rule 45, only
questions of law may be raised.In the main, Eugenio insists that no
tenancy relationship existed between him and Godofredo. This is a question
of fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be raised.
Absent any of the obtaining exceptions to this rule, the findings of facts of
the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on this Court.
Tenancy Relations; Agrarian Reform Law; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines; Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by Expiration of Period.Assuming that the leasehold contract
between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be
extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract; or
by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
x x x Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian
Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides: SEC. 10. Agricultural
Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.The
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Civil Law; Filiation; Filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.It is settled law
that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo
M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus: The
legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The contest of
the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170
and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to
impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Same; Adoption; Adoption cannot be made subject to a collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made
subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,482 SCRA 520 (2006), this
Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate. Furthermore, in
Austria v. Reyes, 31 SCRA 754 (1970), the Court declared that the legality of
the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action
brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
G.R. No. 175080 November 24, 2010
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA.
GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S.
REYES, Petitioners,
vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.
MAURICIO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this petition is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 10
August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148, affirming the Decision dated 7 July
1998 and Resolution dated 28 September 2004 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand five hundred
twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled
TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes,
siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by
virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of
his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now
deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for
annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and
Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their
peaceful possession with damages.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 39 of 68
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo
Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio
through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until
his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and
introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a
residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud,
deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation
of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to
eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by
Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never
appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the
contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio
took undue advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence
and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering
it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal
means to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed
for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio
to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of
damages.2During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed
between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy
agreement.3
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
respondents. He clarified that Godofredos occupation of the subject
premises was based on the formers mere tolerance and accommodation.
Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to
sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a
relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was
fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received
P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the
Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the
principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over
which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that
Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. 4
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial
Adjudicator5 concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful
possession of the subject land. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes and
order is hereby issued:
1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;
2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein plaintiff
Librada Mauricio over the subject landholding;
3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein defendant;
4. No pronouncement as to costs.6
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB,
namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the parties;
and (2) whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid
and enforceable. The DARAB held that the Mauricios are former tenants of
Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia,
Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the
law, they were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations"
of their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding
tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB banked on the Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor
of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the DARAB
declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the
Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter into such
a contract.7
Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB
on 28 September 2004.8
Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute
Librada, who died during the pendency of the case. 9 On 10 August 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It
sustained the factual findings of the DARAB with respect to the tenancy
relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the
Kasunduan.10
Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no
tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that
the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between
Godofredo and Susana in 1993 giving the former the right to occupy and
cultivate the subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having
been entered into without his knowledge and consent. Eugenio further
asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 40 of 68
leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo and Eugenio with respect
to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of the Court of
Appeals in concluding that a tenancy relationship existed between the
parties despite the absence of some of the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship such as personal cultivation and the subject land being
agricultural. Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered
into between him and Librada wherein the latter agreed to vacate the
subject property, in that it was voluntarily entered into and the contents
thereof were mutually understood by the parties.11
In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for
failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its
challenged decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues
raised as factual. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration by
Eugenio, this Court reinstated the petition and required respondent Leonida
to comment on the petition.12
In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because
the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of
facts.13
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between
him and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the province of this
Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which
only questions of law may be raised.14 Absent any of the obtaining
exceptions15 to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as
affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on
this Court.
The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo
and the Mauricios came about, thus:
This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that
the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the herein Defendant-
Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit "H" which is the Tax Declaration of the
property in controversy proves that upon the death of the parents of
Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their extra-
judicial partition/settlement and this property was initially under the
ownership of the appellants sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes until the
same property was finally acquired/transferred in the name of Respondent-
Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the Mauricios are
really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed the Leasehold
Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the property and to
prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest of
Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes. x x x. The "Kasunduang Buwisan sa
Sakahan" alleging that their tenancy relationship began in the year 1973
and their agreement as to the rental shall remain until further revised.16
This is a contest of "Kasunduans." Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of
tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.
Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since
1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa
Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana which
reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the subject land. On the other hand,
Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and presented another Kasunduan
executed between him and Librada on 28 September 1994 which effectively
terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter allegedly agreed to vacate
the subject premises in exchange of monetary considerations.
This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its
disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
x x x Insofar as this "Kasunduan" is concerned, and after reading the
transcript of the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this Board is
convinced that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her from
the farmholding but that Librada Mauricio wanted to return the money she
received because the contents of the document was never explained to her
being illiterate who cannot even read or write. This Board is even further
convinced after reading the transcript of the testimonies that while the
document was allegedly signed by the parties in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the
same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila, thus, the Notary
Public was not in a position to explain much less ascertain the veracity of
the contents of the alleged "Kasunduan" as to whether or not Plaintiff-
Appellee Librada Mauricio had really understood the contents thereof. This
Board further adheres to the principle that it cannot substitute its own
evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses with that of the personal
evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the case at bar, had the best
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness Librada Mauricio while
testifying on the circumstances relevant to the execution of the alleged
"Kasunduan." Furthermore, this Board adheres to the principle that in all
contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, mental
weakness or other handicap, the courts (and in the case at bar, this Board)
must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In the case at
bar, Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither
read nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark.17
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 41 of 68
Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this
Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as
affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the
opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the
witness stand.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is
void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a
tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or
period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of
legal possession of the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or
the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides:
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. The tenancy relationship is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or
incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate
farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the
agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the
parties, and the sale or alienation of the land does not of themselves
extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation
to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall
likewise assume his rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of
the Philippines) likewise provides:
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of
Period, etc. The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not
be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor. (Emphasis supplied)
As an incidental issue, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed
by Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered
moot with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio
contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not
a legal heir.18
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio
cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition.19
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. 20 Well-known
civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is
rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained
thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of
the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170
and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to
impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.21
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 22 the
Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral
attack.23
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made
subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, 24 this Court reiterated that
adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement
of a decedents estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court
declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to
collateral attack.27
Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of
Leonida from the case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that supposedly
favors petitioners cause.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10 August 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 42 of 68

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 43 of 68
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia,
454 SCRA 541
Parents and Children; Adoption; Names; It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.For all practical and
legal purposes, a mans name is the designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as
the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.
Same; Same; Same; The name of an individual has two partsthe given or
proper name and the surname or family name; The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law.The name of an individual has two parts: (1)
the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to
distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent
to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child,
but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Adoption is defined as the process
of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a legitimate child; The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights
of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No.
8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, secures
these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Same; Same; Same; An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.Being a legitimate
child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother,
as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is
a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.It is a settled rule that adoption statutes,
being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted
child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 10 of the Civil Code which presumes in
the interpretation of application of law that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail was intended to strengthen the determination of
the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by
some way of interpreting the law. Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides
that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it
may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, the Court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA
GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 44 of 68
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers surname, and
that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner,
and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to
maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this
petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the
petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present
constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35
of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth,
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be
the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for
6
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child
may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is
only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as
middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a
part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should
not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia"
(her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with
petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name,
the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains
to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and
needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship
with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law For all practical and legal purposes, a
man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 45 of 68
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or
dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every
person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is
that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons
and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of
a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or
the mothers surname shall be added.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 46 of 68
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of
the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as
his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by
the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers
surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason
he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but
that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the
mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of
the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is
up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the
child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of
the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited
the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since
the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice
Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is
David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be
modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use
the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the
mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that
they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since
in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they
like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the
Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall
bear the surname of the adopters."13Again, it is silent whether he can use a
middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.14
The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not
to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 47 of 68
act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United
Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is
geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is
a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of
her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and
Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee
remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in
the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed,
they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it
may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers
surname "GARCIA" as her middle name. Let the corresponding entry of her
correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.SO ORDERED.
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim, 588
SCRA 98, G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
Adoption; Husband and Wife; Husband and wife must jointly adopt.It is
undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being
joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the
trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex.
The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May
Adopt.The following may adopt: x x x Husband and wife shall jointly adopt,
except in the following cases: x x x The use of the word shall in the above-
quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 48 of 68
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself,
without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying
the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under
any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to
be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner.
And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
Same; Same; Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8552); A
foreigner adopting together with his or her Philippine spouse must meet the
qualifications set forth in Republic Act No. 8552, and the requirements on
residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot be
waived.The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter
the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements
on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or
of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Same; Effects; Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the
adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights of a legitimate child.Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1)
sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except
when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the
adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and
adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to
choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter
and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore, even
if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered
a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimatechild such
as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other
successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to
the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled such as support and successional rights.
Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; While the Court is not
unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion
of the welfare of the children, regrettably, the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.We
are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration.
They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we have
ruled in Republic v. Vergara (270 SCRA 206 [1997]): We are not unmindful of
the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare
of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also
be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the
fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the
trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear
and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended,
we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. Petitioner,
being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have
jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own
legislation to suit petitioner.
Same; Husband and Wife; Dissolution of Marriage; The filing of a case for
dissolution of the marriage between the spouses is of no momentit is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage; Since, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, the petitioner was married, joint adoption
with the husband is mandatory.Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that
subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to
petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a
case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling
above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 49 of 68
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that
they were the childrens parents. The children 2 were named Michelle P. Lim
(Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven
days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners
clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in
all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial
court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the
time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced
by their Affidavits of Consent.7Michael also gave his consent to his adoption
as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8 Petitioners husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and
the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The DSWD issued a
similar Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion
was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial
court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 50 of 68
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or
not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because
it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest
and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal
maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues
that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time
the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the
age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and
legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with
the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the
adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for
Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the
legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the
guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the
illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 51 of 68
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried
at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since
the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without
joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in
Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of
petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter
the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is,
when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age 16 emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. 17 However,
parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article
V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V - EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent
is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s)
and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate
sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end,
the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s)
and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her
biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the
rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father
and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 52 of 68

adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
benefits to which biological parents are entitled 20 such as support21 and mandatory.
successional rights.22
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the SO ORDERED.
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child
in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 23 But, as we
have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be
construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and
less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love,
care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not
in a position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case
at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without
violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our
own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show

that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a
case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between

petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 53 of 68
Nery vs. Sampana, 734 SCRA 486, A.C. No. 10196 September 9,
2014
Attorney-Client Relationship; Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.Acceptance
of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty
of fidelity to the clients cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the
court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair. Thus, the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly states: CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold
in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule
16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x. CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Civil Law; Adoption; The alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is waived.Under the
Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of
the aliens qualification to adopt is waived.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client
and of the public confidence in the legal profession.Having no valid reason
not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status
of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed
the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter
entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the
Codes mandate to deliver the clients funds upon demand. A lawyers
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the
legal profession.
A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A.
SAMPANA, Respondent.
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty.
Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption
despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that the petition
was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010, 1 Nery alleged that in June
2008, she engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her
marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for
annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana.
As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they
could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a
blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption.
Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00
on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and
(c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer asked for receipts
since she trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he
already filed the petition for adoption and it was already published.
Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the
hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5
March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked why she did
not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was
no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana
told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about
the status of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such
petition filed in the court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met
Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him.
Sampana agreed, but said that he would deduct the filing fee
worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted,
since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly
demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from Sampana, but
the demands were left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid
C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file
his answer to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory
conference. Thus, both parties were directed to submit their position papers.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 54 of 68
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011, 5 Sampana
argued that Nerys allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated.
However, Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for
both cases of annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that
he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil
status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being
adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the [alien] adopter would be
married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien]
could be possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents,
including the marriage contracts and the certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery
furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana
alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because
he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for
adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding
for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the
annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case,
Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting
his legal services and actual expenses.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found
Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed
the petition for adoption and for failing to file the petition despite receiving
his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera recommended a penalty of
three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquieras report and
recommendation, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent is guilty of malpractice by his failure to file a petition for adoption
and made complainant believe that he filed the petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio
Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months
and ORDERED to RETURN to complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within thirty days from receipt of notice. 7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as
to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the dutyof fidelity to the clients cause. 8 Every
case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of importance.9 A lawyer also owes it to the court,
their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.10 Thus, the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client thatmay come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when
due or upon demand. x x x.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee"
for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he
unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty
of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampanas proffered excuse of
waiting for the certification before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. Inhis position paper, he suggested to Nery that if
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 55 of 68
the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended
adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision,
which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is waived.11
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition.1wphi1 He then conceded
that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily,
Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted tohim. He even kept the
money given him, in violation of the Codes mandate to deliver the clients
funds upon demand. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds
held by him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client
and of the public confidence in the legal profession.12
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v.
Sampana,13 we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to
his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a
repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render
any legal service after receiving the filing and partial service fee.
Considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings
of this Court, we deem it proper to increase the penalty for Sampanas
malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to
suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of
law for THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar
act shall be dealt with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from
the time of his receipt of the full amount of money on 17 November 2008
until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully
paid.
Castro vs. Gregorio, 738 SCRA 415, G.R. No. 188801 October 15,
2014
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; The remedy of
annulment of judgment will only be available if the ordinary remedies of
new trial, ul judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if the ordinary
remedappeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.Under Rule 47, Section 1 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the Court of
Appeals to annies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there
are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of:
extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four (4) years from discovery, and
lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only
two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic
fraud, which must be brought four (4) years from discovery, and lack of
jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the parties.
Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is [that which] prevents a party from
having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which]
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured. The grant of adoption over respondents
should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic
fraud.
Civil Law; Adoption; The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the
father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children.It is settled that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. As Jose filed the petition for adoption on
August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which applies over the
proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of
a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also
the consent of his legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he
seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock.
Same; Same; As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption; The law provides for several exceptions to the general
rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children
born out of wedlock.As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a
joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition
for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009): The use of the word
shall in the above quoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 56 of 68
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several exceptions to
the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeksto adopt his or her
own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.
Same; Civil Procedure; Adoption; Service of Summons; Personal Service of
Summons; Personal service of summons should have been effected on the
spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are
protected.For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required
by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been
effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive
notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot
be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Extrinsic Fraud;
Prescription; An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be
brought within four (4) years from discovery.In People v. Court of Appeals
and Socorro Florece, 660 SCRA 323 (2011): Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false
promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge
of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat. (Emphasis
supplied) An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought
within four years from discovery. Petitioners alleged that they were made
aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18,
2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When fraud is employed by a party precisely to
prevent the participation of any other interested party, then the fraud is
extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of
forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.When fraud is
employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other
interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of
whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or
perjured testimony during the trial. Joses actions prevented Rosario and
Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had
Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Joses petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary
requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that
because of Joses acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under
fraudulent circumstances.
Civil Law; Adoption; Domestic Adoption Act of 1993 (R.A. No. 8552); Republic
Act (RA) No. 8552 fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption
decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.The
law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its provisions.
Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552: ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.(a) The
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)
at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any person who shall
commit any of the following acts: (i) obtaining consent for an adoption
through coercion, undue influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or
other similar acts; (ii) noncompliance with the procedures and safeguards
provided by the law for adoption; or (iii) subjecting or exposing the child to
be adopted to danger, abuse, or exploitation. (b) Any person who shall
cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a child under the name(s) of a
person(s) who is not his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation
of birth, and shall be punished by prisin mayor in its medium period and a
fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Joses death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his
criminal liabilities. Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision
on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been
obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of
Republic Act No. 8552 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by
the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law
other than the annulment of the judgment.
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M.
CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M.
CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a
showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural
devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a
child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must be
personally notified through personal service of summons. It is not enough
that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted
respondents' decree of adoption.3
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 57 of 68
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio (Jd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G.
Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario)
and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also
known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname,
"Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag
City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose
Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease
and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of
months because of the incompatibilities between them.4
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to
Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for
about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose
would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual
tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen
(15) years despite their separation(.)"6
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio
(Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the
time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare
Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family,
being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report
mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not
produce any children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with
Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on
August 1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for Adoption,"
the social welfare officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not
able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of his
2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to
legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in his
custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having ruled
that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person
including the government which was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.
Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
years.22She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial
support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and
alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's
knowledge and consent.23 She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the
trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.24
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies being
remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that
he always offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also alleged that he
adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He
denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He
also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He
alleged that his income had been diminished because several properties
had to be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He then implored the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and
equity."27
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.28
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina's adoption.29
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption
sometime in 2005.30They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent, marked
by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed
and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as
the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that
one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in another set of
National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be Larry, Jose's
driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and
Larry who were married at the time of their birth.34
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 58 of 68
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and
Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit
provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . .
should be personally notified of the hearing."35
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by
[Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children]
to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its
hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained
"finality and immutability."37
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.38
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July
10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying
the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by
Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates
presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were
concealed from them.42
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and
misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice,
and non-inclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the adoption of
illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also
the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent
was never secured from Joanne.44
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not
have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply
protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General
through the deputized public prosecutor."45
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through
publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the
world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged fraud
was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic fraud but
intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment.47 They also
argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is an
action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the state.48
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an
action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be
available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."49
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and
only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be annulled
was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet,
the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily
and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds
for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of
the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment,
final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards
the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified
in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 59 of 68
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the
court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to
the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights
and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud,
which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction,
which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.52
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the nature
of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the
parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or [that
which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured."54
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court
did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable
decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court
of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the
proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the
petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which
applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first
obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out
of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must
file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock.
In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose
to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent
to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be
considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given
notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a
reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they
are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly
counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval
of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is
hereby required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 60 of 68
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other
children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care,
as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that
she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her
written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court
that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being
notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the
adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic
Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on
the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne
of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may have
been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic
fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such
as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a
compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis
supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within
four years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware of
the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is
within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to any
of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and
Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were
born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of
Paraaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave due course
to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident
of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report that he was
a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to secure
birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry
as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent
certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married
on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the
mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and
Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their father
was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to
the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support of his
petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of Rosario
to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be fraudulent.75
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in
approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as
intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured
testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however,
that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either present at
the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair
and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or
things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and
determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic
fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 61 of 68

modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed,
forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court
testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic
fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of
any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed
to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can
be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court
granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of
by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law
other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the
love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her
birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support from her
father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical
degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is
now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are
poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc.
No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.

(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence,
fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the
law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his

criminal liabilities.78Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision
on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been
obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 62 of 68
Bartolome vs. Social Security System, 740 SCRA 78,
Administrative Agencies; Appeals; Generally, findings of fact by
administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters
falling under their jurisdiction. However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner Cornelios
death certificate. Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that
Johns adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3)
years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained
finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly
proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
Administrative Regulations; Administrative regulations must always be in
harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.This
Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, 559 SCRA 160 (2008) that: As we have previously declared,
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and
it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations
must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of
the basic law. (Emphasis supplied) Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule
XV of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is patently a
wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167(j) of the
Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase dependent parents to refer to
legitimate parents.
Dependent Parents; Words and Phrases; Plainly, dependent parents are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who
are in need of support or assistance.The term parents in the phrase
dependent parents in the aforequoted Article 167(j) of the Labor Code is
used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly
limited to legitimate parents as what the ECC did. The phrase dependent
parents should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not
distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, dependent parents are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who
are in need of support or assistance.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; As jurisprudence
elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective. The concept of equal protection, however, does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
Legitimate Parents; Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
legitimate parents pertain to those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the Employees Compensation Program (ECP).
Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that legitimate parents
pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled
under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification
was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its
boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceaseds
legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to
parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as Johns secondary
beneficiary. True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2)
years old, petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However,
lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios
death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of
age. Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,
who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed
away?
Civil Law; Adoption; Succession; Biological Parents; It is apparent that the
biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child
who was the subject of adoption.It is apparent that the biological parents
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 63 of 68
retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis
the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain
rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the
event of the untimely passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent. We
cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance
at a better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from
him by deaths cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life
might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find
himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelios death at the time
of Johns minority resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental
authority over the adopted child.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the
March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome
v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring
that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by
Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since
February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's
Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008,
an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the
Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the
SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner,
denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim
because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he
was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you
submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioners entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD
626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were
adopted by their great grandfather, petitioners grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the
Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of
adoption attained finality.8Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither,
the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary
even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC
ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that
beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent
parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall
be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent
children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 64 of 68
Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. This
Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate
parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr.
Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas
the legitimate parent of the deceased.
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of
the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this
case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the
beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the
deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise
denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims
of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
course/denying petitioners otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration. 11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of
the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the
benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners claim
for death benefits is that eventhough she is Johns biological mother, it was
allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive.
As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the
legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify
the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such
proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to
be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being
the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is
indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her
status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by
law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is
still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling
under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner Cornelios
death certificate.13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father
died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the
decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. 15 As such, it
was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary
to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
death benefits claim in view of Johns work-related demise. The pertinent
provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended,
which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context
indicates otherwise:
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 65 of 68
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no
other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income
benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC
"[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and
the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System,"
the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary,
and determined atthe time of employees death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the
employees death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural
children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of
age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable
of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or
acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there
are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged
natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without
substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular
support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried,
not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of
age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto
physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.
(Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that
she is no longer the deceaseds legitimate parent, as required by the
implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the
relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status
of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation
deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the
Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an
unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art.
167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision.
Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis
supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or
expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 66 of 68
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two
will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved
by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by
it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it
should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as
the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda.
That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a
more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any
rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to
use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word
collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive
or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case
at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in
the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be
taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate
parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should,
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether
by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not
distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or
assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress
did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate
parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply
said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which
the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
"dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an
affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for
the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from
claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD
626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. 18 In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate
against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 67 of 68
by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents
miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not
germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government
concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the
rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on
the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the
policy of PD 626 that employees and their dependents may promptly
secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death
- will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly
interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the
legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to
strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule
XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted
rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for
and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the
exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed
Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still
claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
"legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat
the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code
provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the commission
properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify
as Johns secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old,
petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was
that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in
the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise,
taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the
adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the
biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No.
855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption]
is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if
known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the
adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations
of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
(emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
restoration of custody is concerned.1wphi1 The manner herein of
terminating the adopters parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between
the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender
age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA
8552 was enacted after Cornelios death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in
the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the
factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the
catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24 wherein the
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to
justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that
someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or
her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a
parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind,
in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could
reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the
adoptees biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental
authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and
the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the
 SPECPRO CIAR ADOPTION CASES Page 68 of 68
biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted,
as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be
governed by the following rules:
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the
other half, by the adopters;
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the
rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still
attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations,
which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the
untimely passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life
under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by deaths
cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might have been
better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in
the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelios death at the time of Johnsminority
resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental authority over the
adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners
dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence
submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to Johns
adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright
future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to
Cornelios adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and
John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their
residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in Johns Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss
of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is Johns known address as per the ECCs assailed
Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her
claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the
ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been restored
parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same,
and that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social
Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related
deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who
are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate
act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a
way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence
of circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns minority, the
restoration ofpetitioners parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a
beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death
benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal
basis. Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner
of the right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a
dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under
the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of
the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits
due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.