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ROMMEL G. MUOZ vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 170678, July 17, 2006

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order filed by petitioner Rommel G. Muoz assailing the Resolution[1] dated December 15, 2005
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPC No. 04-124 which affirmed the Resolution[2] dated October
25, 2004 of the COMELEC First Division granting the petition of private respondent Carlos Irwin G. Baldo, Jr. to annul
petitioners proclamation as mayor of Camalig, Albay.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor of Camalig, Albay in the May 10, 2004 election.[3] At
6:00 oclock in the evening of May 10, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) convened and canvassed the
election returns (ER).[4]

On May 11, 2004, the lawyers of private respondent objected to the inclusion of the 26 ERs from various precincts
based on the following grounds: 1) eight ERs lack inner seal; 2) seven ERs lack material data; 3) one ER lack
signatures; 4) four ERs lack signatures and thumbmarks of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors on the
envelope containing them; 5) one ER lack the name and signature of the poll clerk on the second page thereof; 6) one
ER lack the number of votes in words and figures; and 7) four ERs were allegedly prepared under intimidation.[5]

On May 13, 2004, the MBC denied the objections and ruled to include the objected ERs in the canvass. Private
respondent appealed the said ruling to the COMELEC on May 18, 2004 and was docketed as SPC No. 04-087 and
raffled to the COMELEC First Division.[6]
Despite the pendency of the appeal, petitioner was proclaimed on May 19, 2004 by the MBC as the winning candidate
for mayor of Camalig, Albay.[7]

On May 21, 2004, private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of the petitioner for
being premature and illegal. The case was docketed as SPC No. 04-124 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division.[8]
On October 25, 2004, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution in SPC No. 04-124 granting the petition to
annul the proclamation. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) hereby GRANTS the Petition. The proclamation
of x x x ROMMEL MUOZ as winning candidate for mayor of Camalig, Albay is ANNULLED for having been made in an
irregular proceeding and for being precipitate and premature.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[10] was denied for lack of merit by the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated
December 15, 2005, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc hereby DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration filed by x x
x Muoz for lack of merit. Accordingly, the ANNULMENT and SETTING ASIDE, by the First Division, of the proclamation of
x x x ROMMEL MUOZ as the duly elected Mayor is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Regional Election Director of Region V, Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., is hereby DIRECTED to constitute a new
Municipal Board of Canvassers from among the Election Officers in the Region.

Accordingly, the new Municipal Board of Canvassers of Camalig, Albay is hereby DIRECTED to:

a) RECONVENE, and after due notice to all parties/candidates concerned,

b) RE-CANVASS all the election returns of Camalig, Albay, and on the basis thereof,

c) PREPARE a new Certificate of Canvass, and forthwith

d) PROCLAIM the winning candidates for Mayoralty position.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence, petitioner files the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

On January 17, 2006, the Court issued a temporary restraining order effective immediately and ordered the COMELEC
to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing the December 15, 2005 Resolution in SPC No. 04-124.[12]

Petitioner relies on the following grounds in support of his petition:

I

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THE PUBLIC [RESPONDENT] COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DENYING FOR LACK OF MERIT PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE 25 OCTOBER [2004] RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS FIRST DIVISION, FOR
BEING CONTRARY TO LAW, RULES AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE;

II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE PROCLAMATION OF
PETITIONER AS DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF CAMALIG, ALBAY WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING THE PENDING APPEAL FIRST
INITIATED, SPC 04-87;

III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
OF CAMALIG, ALBAY, TO RECONVENE AND RE-CANVASS ALL ELECTION RESULTS OF CAMALIG, ALBAY, FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]

The foregoing issues may be summarized into two: 1) whether or not the COMELEC First Division committed grave
abuse of discretion when it decided only the Petition to Annul Proclamation despite the agreement of the parties to
consolidate private respondents appeal from the ruling of the MBC since both cases were raffled to the same Division
and the issue in the latter case was connected to, if not determinative of, the merits of the former case; and 2)
whether or not the COMELEC En Banc correctly ordered the new MBC to re-canvass all the ERs and to proclaim the
winner on the basis thereof despite the pendency of the appeal with the First Division.

The petition is partly granted.

Anent the first issue, we find no merit in petitioners contention.

While Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that when an action or proceeding involves a
question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be
consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number, however, this rule is only permissive, not
mandatory. We have consistently held that the term may is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an
option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he
chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto,[14] which in this case require that
the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions of law and fact.

In the case at bar, the consolidation of SPC No. 04-087 with SPC No. 04-124 is inappropriate as they do not involve
similar questions of law and fact. SPC No. 04-087 assails the inclusion of the 26 ERs by the MBC on the ground that
these were incomplete, contained material defects and were prepared under intimidation, issues which are proper for
a pre-proclamation controversy under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the
other hand, SPC No. 04-124 is a petition for the annulment of petitioners proclamation for allegedly being prematurely
done, in violation of Section 36(i) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669[15] which instructs the board of canvassers not
proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections
brought to it on appeal by the losing party; [a]ny proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless
the contested returns/certificates will not affect the results of the elections. In fine, SPC No. 04-087 pertains to the
preparation of the ERs which is a pre-proclamation controversy, while SPC No. 04-124 refers to the conduct of the MBC
in proclaiming the petitioner without authority of the COMELEC.

Mere pendency of the two cases before the same division of the COMELEC is not a ground for their outright
consolidation. The discretion to consolidate cases may be exercised only when the conditions are present. In any
event, the records are bereft of evidence that the parties agreed to consolidate the two cases or that the COMELEC
First Division had granted the same.

Further, we find that the COMELEC First Division correctly annulled the proclamation of the petitioner. Time and again,
this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made.[16] At the time the proclamation was made, the COMELEC First Division had
not yet resolved SPC No. 04-087. Pursuant to Section 36(i) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669, which finds basis in
Section 20(i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166,[17] the MBC should not have proclaimed petitioner as the winning
candidate absent the authorization from the COMELEC. Any proclamation made under such circumstances is void ab
initio.[18]

We likewise do not agree with petitioners contention that the proclamation was valid as the contested ERs will not
affect the results of the election.

Section 20(i) of R.A. No. 7166 reads:

Sec. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.

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xxxx

(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the
latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation
hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.
(Emphasis supplied)

The phrase results of the election is not statutorily defined. However, it had been jurisprudentially explained in Lucero
v. Commission on Elections[19] to mean:

[T]he net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading
candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct
where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect the result of the election.[20]

Although the Lucero case involves a failure of election, the definition of results of election applies to the disposition of
contested election returns under Section 20(i) of R.A. No. 7166. In both situations, the law endeavors to determine the
will of the people in an expeditious manner in that if the total number of votes in the precinct where there is a failure
of election or in case of the contested ERs, is less than the lead of a candidate over his closest rival, the results of the
election would not be adversely affected. Hence, a proclamation may be made because the winning candidate can be
ascertained. Otherwise, a special election must be held or an authorization of the COMELEC is necessary after ruling
on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party in order to determine the will of the electorate.
Proclamation made in violation of the rules is void ab initio as it would be based on an incomplete canvass of votes. It
is well settled that an incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A
canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and
omits none.[21]

In the case at bar, petitioner obtained a margin of 762 votes over the private respondent based on the canvass of the
uncontested ERs whereas the total number of votes in the 26 contested ERs is 5,178, which is higher than the 762-
lead of the petitioner over the private respondent. Clearly, the results of the election would be adversely affected by
the uncanvassed returns.

As aptly held by the COMELEC First Division:

The votes obtained by petitioner and private respondent tallied in the contested election returns can not be the basis
of the partial proclamation. The objected election returns cannot be considered, even provisionally, as the true and
final result of the elections in the contested precincts. The possibility remains, remote thought (sic) it may be that they
could be excluded and the results reflected therein disregarded. The contested election returns involved 5,178 votes
as this is the number of voters who actually voted in the precincts covered by the objections. The lead of [petitioner]
over [private respondent] as shown in the uncontested returns was less than this number. Clearly, the results of the
elections could be adversely affected by the uncanvassed returns. Truly, the Board erred in its perception that its
partial proclamation was warranted.[22]

While the COMELEC En Banc correctly affirmed the October 25, 2004 Resolution of its First Division in SPC 04-124
insofar as it annulled petitioners proclamation, however, we find that it exceeded its authority and thus gravely abused
its discretion when it ordered the new MBC to re-canvass all ERs even before its First Division could decide on SPC No.
04-087 filed by private respondent assailing the ruling of the MBC to include the 26 contested ERs in the canvass.

Section 3 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall
be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.

In Sarmiento v. Commission on Elections[23] and Zarate v. Commission on Elections,[24] the Court similarly held that
election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission, and that the Commission, sitting en
banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

Thus, in Acosta v. Commission on Elections,[25] the Court held that the COMELEC En Banc violated the foregoing
Constitutional mandate when it affirmed the trial courts decision that was not the subject of the special civil action
before it, but of the appeal filed by therein petitioner, which was still undocketed at the time and the parties have not
yet submitted any evidence in relation thereto.

Clearly, by ordering the re-canvass of all the ERs in SPC No. 04-124, the COMELEC En Banc in effect rendered a
decision on the merits of SPC No. 04-087, which up to the present is still pending before its First Division, in violation of
the rule that it does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation

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controversies, at the first instance. As the proclamation of the winning candidate has been delayed for more than two
years now due to these cases, the COMELEC First Division is directed to expeditiously resolve SPC No. 04-087, which is
summary in nature.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The December 15, 2005 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc in SPC No. 04-124 which affirmed the annulment and setting aside by its First Division of the
proclamation of petitioner Rommel G. Muoz as Mayor of Camalig, Albay for being premature, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the order to constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers to re-canvass all the election returns
of Camalig, Albay; to prepare a new Certificate of Canvass; and to declare the winning candidate for mayoralty position
is SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issued on
January 17, 2006 is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), vs

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (ICC), G.R. No. 141667, July 17, 2006

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic, through the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Amended Decision[1] dated
September 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA), setting aside the orders dated June 4, 1996 and June 25, 1997 of the
NTC insofar as said orders required respondent International Communications Corporation (ICC) to pay the amount of
P1,190,750.50 by way of permit fee as a condition for the grant of a provisional authority to operate an international
telecommunications leased circuit service, and the Resolution[2] dated January 24, 2000, denying NTC's motion for
reconsideration.

There is no dispute as to the facts:

On April 4, 1995, respondent ICC, holder of a legislative franchise under Republic Act (RA) No. 7633 to operate
domestic telecommunications, filed with the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
to install, operate, and maintain an international telecommunications leased circuit service between the Philippines
and other countries, and to charge rates therefor, with provisional authority for the purpose.

In an Order[3] dated June 4, 1996, the NTC approved the application for a provisional authority subject, among others,
to the condition:

2. That applicant [ICC] shall pay a permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.00, in accordance with section 40(g) of the
Public Service Act,[4] as amended;

Respondent ICC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order insofar as the same required the payment of a
permit fee. In a subsequent Order dated June 25, 1997, the NTC denied the motion.
Therefrom, ICC went to the CA on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, questioning the NTC's imposition against it of a permit fee of P1,190,750.50 as a condition for
the grant of the provisional authority applied for.

In its original decision[5] dated January 29, 1999, the CA ruled in favor of the NTC whose challenged orders were
sustained, and accordingly denied ICC's certiorari petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. In view thereof, the assailed orders dated 4 June 1996 and 25 June
1997, requiring the payment of permit fees in the amount of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos (P1,190,750.50) as a condition for the grant of a Provisional Authority to operate an
International Circuit service, are hereby AFFIRMED. ACCORDINGLY, the International Communications Corporation is
hereby ordered to pay the amount of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos
(P1,190,750.50) to the National Telecommunications Commission.

SO ORDERED.

In time, ICC moved for a reconsideration. This time, the CA, in its Amended Decision dated September 30, 1999,
reversed itself, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 29 January
1999 including the imposition by the public respondent of permit fees with respect to [ICCs] international leased circuit
service is hereby REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the questioned orders dated 04 June 1996
and 25 June 1997, insofar as they impose upon petitioner ICC the payment of the amount of One Million One Hundred
Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and Fifty Centavos (P1,190,750.50) by way of permit fees as a condition for the

Page5
grant of a provisional authority to operate an International Leased Circuit Service. No costs.

SO ORDERED. (Word in bracket added).

Petitioner NTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in its equally challenged
Resolution dated January 24, 2000. Hence, NTC's present recourse claiming that the CA erred in ruling that:

1. NTC has arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity;

2. Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act has been amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925;[6]

3. The imposition of permit fees is no longer authorized by R.A. 7925; and

4. The imposed permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.50 for respondent's provisional authority is
exorbitant.

Before addressing the issues raised, we shall first dwell on the procedural matter raised by respondent ICC, namely,
that the present petition should be dismissed outright for having been filed out of time. It is respondent's posture that
petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed with the CA vis-a-vis the latter's Amended Decision is a pro forma motion
and, therefore, did not toll the running of the reglementary period to come to this Court via this petition for review.

Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a recourse to this Court by way of a petition for review must be filed
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. While a motion for
reconsideration ordinarily tolls the period for appeal, one that fails to point out the findings or conclusions which were
supposedly contrary to law or the evidence does not have such
an effect on the reglementary period as it is merely a pro forma motion.[7]

In arguing for the outright dismissal of this petition, respondent ICC claims that the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner NTC in connection with the CAs Amended Decision failed to point out specifically the findings or conclusions
of the CA which were supposedly contrary to law. Respondent contends that the issues raised by the petitioner in its
motion for reconsideration were mere reiterations of the same issues which had already been considered and passed
upon by the CA when it promulgated its Amended Decision. On this premise, respondent maintains that petitioners
aforementioned motion for reconsideration is a mere pro forma motion that did not toll the period for filing the present
petition.

Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for reconsideration reiterates issues already passed upon
by the court does not, by itself, make it a pro forma motion.[8] Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration
is addressed is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or
evidence; and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion for
reconsideration may not discuss those issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing
party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial.[9]
Where there is no apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, courts should be slow in declaring outright a motion for
reconsideration as pro forma. The doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movant's
valuable right to appeal. Hence, if petitioner's motion for reconsideration was indeed pro forma, it would still be in the
interest of justice to review the Amended Decision a quo on the merits, rather than to abort the appeal due to a
technicality, especially where, as here, the industry involved (telecommunications) is vested with public interest. All
the more so given that the instant petition raises some arguments that are well-worth resolving for future reference.

This brings us to the substantive merits of the petition.

In its Amended Decision, the CA ruled that petitioner NTC had arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity, which it
is not authorized to do. Petitioner disagreed, contending the fee in question is not in the nature of a tax, but is merely
a regulatory measure.

Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act provides:

Sec. 40. The Commission is authorized and ordered to charge and collect from any public service or applicant, as the
case may be, the following fees as reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of
the public services:
xx xxx xxx
g) For each permit, authorizing the increase in equipment, the installation of new units or authorizing the increase of
capacity, or the extension of means or general extensions in the services, twenty centavos for each one hundred
pesos or fraction of the additional capital necessary to carry out the permit. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act is not a tax measure but a simple regulatory provision for the collection

Page6
of fees imposed pursuant to the exercise of the States police power. A tax is imposed under the taxing power of
government principally for the purpose of raising revenues. The law in question, however, merely authorizes and
requires the collection of fees for the reimbursement of the Commission's expenses in the authorization, supervision
and/or regulation of public services. There can be no doubt then that petitioner NTC is authorized to collect such fees.
However, the amount thereof must be reasonably related to the cost of such supervision and/or regulation.[10]

Petitioner NTC also assails the CA's ruling that Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act had been amended by Section
5(g) of R.A. No. 7925, which reads:

Sec. 5. Responsibilities of the National Telecommunications Commission. - The National Telecommunications

Commission (Commission) shall be the principal administrator of this Act and as such shall take the necessary
measures to implement the policies and objectives set forth in this Act. Accordingly, in addition to its existing
functions, the Commission shall be responsible for the following:
xxx xxx xxx
g) In the exercise of its regulatory powers, continue to impose such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover
reasonable costs and expenses for the regulation and supervision of the operations of telecommunications entities.
(Emphasis supplied)

The CA ratiocinated that while Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act (CA 146, as amended), supra, allowed NTC to
impose fees as reimbursement of its expenses related to, among other things, the authorization of public services,
Section 5(g), above, of R.A. No. 7921 no longer speaks of authorization but only of regulation and supervision. To the
CA, the omission by Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 of the word authorization found in Section 40(g) of the Public Service
Act, as amended, meant that the fees which NTC may impose are only for reimbursement of its expenses for regulation
and supervision but no longer for authorization purposes.

We find, however, that NTC is correct in saying that there is no showing of legislative intent to repeal, even impliedly,
Section 40(g), supra, of the Public Service Act, as amended. An implied repeal is predicated on a substantial conflict
between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.
[11] The two laws must be absolutely incompatible such that they cannot be made to stand together.[12]

Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes or provisions, should endeavor to reconcile the
same instead of declaring outright the validity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise
policy is for the judge to harmonize such statutes or provisions if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally
the handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to
a coordinate department of the government. It is this
policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.
[13]

It is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed
unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent with each other that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature
cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws
and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-existence.[14]

Here, there does not even appear to be a conflict between Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act, as amended, and
Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925. In fact, the latter provision directs petitioner NTC to continue to impose such fees and
charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for the regulation and supervision of
telecommunications entities. The absence alone of the word authorization in Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 cannot be
construed to mean that petitioner NTC had thus been deprived of the power to collect such fees. As pointed out by the
petitioner, the words authorization, supervision and/or regulation used in Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act are
not distinct and completely separable concepts which may be taken singly or piecemeal. Taken in their entirety, they
are the quintessence of the Commission's regulatory functions, and must go hand-in-hand with one another. In
petitioner's own words, [t]he Commission authorizes, supervises and regulates telecommunications entities and these
functions... cannot be considered singly without destroying the whole concept of the Commission's regulatory
functions.[15] Hence, petitioner NTC is correct in asserting that the passage of R.A. 7925 did not bring with it the
abolition of permit fees.

However, while petitioner had made some valid points of argument, its position must, of necessity, crumble on the
fourth issue raised in its petition. Petitioner itself admits that the fees imposed are precisely regulatory and supervision
fees, and not taxes. This necessarily implies, however, that such fees must be commensurate to the costs and
expenses involved in discharging its supervisory and regulatory functions. In the words of Section 40(g) of the Public
Service Act itself, the fees and charges which petitioner NTC is authorized to collect from any public service or
applicant are limited to the reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or regulation of public
services. It is difficult to comprehend how the cost of licensing, regulating, and surveillance could amount to
P1,190,750.50. The CA was correct in finding the amount imposed as permit fee exorbitant and in complete disregard

Page7
of the basic limitation that the fee should be at least approximately commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself
admits that it had imposed the maximum amount possible under the Public Service Act, as amended. That is hardly
taking into consideration the actual costs of fulfilling its regulatory and supervisory functions.

Independent of the above, there is one basic consideration for the dismissal of this petition, about which petitioner NTC
did not bother to comment at all. We refer to the fact that, as respondent ICC aptly observed, the principal ground
given by the CA in striking down the imposition of the P1,190,750.50 fee is that respondent ICC is entitled to the
benefits of the so-called parity clause embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, to wit:
Section 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. - Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or
immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously
granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such
franchises x x x.

In this connection, it is significant to note that the subsequent congressional franchise granted to the Domestic
Satellite Corporation under Presidential Decree No. 947, states:

Section 6. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the grantee shall pay to the Republic of the
Philippines during the life of this franchise a tax of one-half percent of gross earnings derived by the grantee from its
operation under this franchise and which originate from the Philippines. Such tax shall be due and payable annually
within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts by the Commission on Audit as prescribed in Section 11
hereof and shall be in lieu of all taxes, assessments, charges, fees, or levies of any kind, nature, or description levied,
established or collected by any municipal, provincial, or national authority x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The CA was correct in ruling that the above-quoted provision is, by law, considered as ipso facto part of ICC's franchise
due to the parity clause embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925. Accordingly, respondent ICC cannot be made subject
to the payment of the subject fees because its payment of the franchise tax is in lieu of all other taxes and fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Amended Decision and Resolution of the CA are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076 (January 13, 2009)

FACTS
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing, and using PLDT's international
long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing and completing international
long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the
local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen
from them using their own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are
personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.

ISSUE
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft

HELD
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.

Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:

a) There be taking of Personal Property;

b) Said Personal Property belongs to another;
c) Taking be done with Intent to Gain;
d) Taking be done without the owners consent;
e) No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force upon things

Personal Property anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in Real Property

Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's
definition of real and personal property. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft (*US v Carlos; US v Tambunting; US v Genato*), so
long as the same is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be subject to appropriation.

Page8
Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems Forces of Nature which are brought under the control of science, as Personal
Property.

The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science can be achieved by tampering with
any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature
from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.

In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to
PLDTs telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using
PLDTs facilities constitute Subtraction.

Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is capable of appropriation, and not
included in the enumeration of real properties.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal property which can be the
object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under the said
article.

While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be considered as personal property,
the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT
merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications
infrastructure and facilities.

Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken
without its consent.

What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the
unlawful taking of the telephone services & businesses.

The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the theft were services and
business of the offended party.

People vs. Mejeca, GR 146425, November 21, 2002

Facts:
Proculo Mejeca et al were convicted with the crime of robbery and homicide. Because of the aggravating circumstance
of the use of unlicensed firearm, among others, trial court sentenced them to the penalty of death.

Issue:
WON the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm was properly appreciated in sentencing Mejeca et
al to a penalty of death.

Held:
No.

The second element to establish the crime of illegal possession of firearm is the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the guns did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. Thus, it bears
stressing that the essence of the crime penalized under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, is primarily the accuseds lack of
license or permit to carry or possess the firearm, as possession by itself is not prohibited by law. As such, it is the duty
of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, either the
testimony of a representative of or a certification from the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Office
attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element. There, likewise, has been no such proof to show the existence of such element herein.

Thus, penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Parayno vs Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao
petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to another
location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of
Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or
transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is

Page9
a blatant violation and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6,
Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church, the distances are less than
100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio
City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed
(sic) to each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay
always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose
residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the
RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the mentioned law but is under Sec 21.
Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was an invalid
exercise of the latters police powers

HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec 44. The
Counsel in fact admitted that : That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling station as defined in
Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as differently defined under Article 42 of the said
official zoning code;
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making them. hence,
because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not
insist that gasoline service station under Section 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Section 21.
Indeed, the activities undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace those in a gas filling
station.
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the
closure/transfer of petitioners gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact
measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law
and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are
met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to
the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it
maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and
church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance
was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that
respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioners business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily
abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible
only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons
and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again
note: Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life and property is more perceived
than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander..recommended to build such buildings after conform (sic)
all the requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is in the heart of
the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the
same is within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No.
50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP., G.R. No. 152640,
June 15, 2006

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) seeking the nullification of the Decision and Resolution, dated November 23, 2001 and March 7, 2002,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, entitled Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) v. DAR.

The controversy involves a parcel of land owned by respondent PHILCOMSAT situated within the area which had been
declared a security zone under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, entitled Declaring
the Area within a Radius of Three Kilometers surrounding the Satellite Earth Station in Baras, Rizal, a Security Zone.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Page10
PHILCOMSAT is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, where its Philippine Space
Communications Center (PSCC) is located. The PSCC, which principally consists of herein respondents satellite earth
station, serves as the communications gateway of the Philippines to more than two-thirds of the world. Incidentally,
the property had been planted with fruit trees, rice and corn by farmers occupying the surrounding areas of the PSCC.

On April 30, 1982, P.D. No. 1845 was promulgated. This decree was amended on July 29, 1982 by P.D. No. 1848,
Section 1 of which states:

Section 1. Declaration of Security Zone. The entire area surrounding the satellite earth station in Sitio San Miguel,
Barrio Pinugay, Municipality of Baras, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, within a radius of three kilometers, more or
less, from the main satellite earth station, the metes and bounds of such area to be determined by the Minister of
National Defense, is hereby declared a security zone. For this purpose, and in the interest of national security, ingress
to and egress from the security zone as well as occupancy of portions thereof shall be controlled and regulated,
without prejudice to the payments of just compensation to persons whose rights of ownership may be injuriously
affected thereby x x x.

The three-kilometer security zone covers an area of 5,654 hectares, which includes the 700 hectares owned by
PHILCOMSAT that is being subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)[1] of the government.
Also included within this three-kilometer radius is the 1.5 kilometers radius from the antenna wherein local harmful
Radio Frequency Interference resulting from ignition systems, motor starters, high voltage discharges, and the like, is
captured and amplified which can hamper telecommunications services.[2]

Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated the Revised Rules and Regulations to Implement
P.D. No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In view of
this, the metes and bounds of PHILCOMSATs satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal, were delineated.

In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in
question shall be placed under CARPs compulsory acquisition scheme.

On January 28, 1994, PHILCOMSAT wrote to DAR seeking an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage,
insisting that the land will be utilized for the expansion of its operations, and for the following reasons:[3]

1) The land is being used for national defense in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 which
provides:

Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. -- Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found necessary for parks,
wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national
defense x x x, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
2) The company should be free from harmful Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) to maintain highest service
reliability;
3) Compliance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D.1848, stating the vitality of the PSCC
in the security system within the purview of national defense; and,
4) The development of the area, in response to the Philippines plan to launch its own national satellite and to
address the massive telecommunications build-up in the Asia-Pacific Region.[4]

Respondents application for exemption from CARP coverage was evaluated by DAR. During the pendency of the
application, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, in a letter dated March 21, 1994, suggested that respondent enter
into a usufructuary agreement with the occupants of the subject property until such time that it will have to use the
property for its planned expansion. The occupants, however, refused to enter into such an agreement.[5]

Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanay, Rizal, in its Resolution No. 65-94 that was endorsed to DAR, moved for
the coverage of the 700-hectare PHILCOMSAT property within the security zone under CARP. The Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer of Teresa, Rizal further opined that subjecting the surrounding agricultural area within the security zone
under CARP will not be detrimental to the operations of PHILCOMSAT.[6]

On May 25, 1998, an Order was issued by then Secretary Garilao rejecting PHILCOMSATs application for exemption
from CARP, citing three main reasons:
1) The occupants in the area can be considered as bona fide tenants of the registered owner before
PHILCOMSAT acquired the same for its projected expansion of operations as they have been tilling said area for several
years;
2) Said occupants had been identified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) as potential CARP
beneficiaries when the land was placed under the compulsory acquisition scheme; and,
3) The term security zone is not embraced within the definition of lands used for national defense under
Section 10 of R. A. No. 6657.[7]
Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied, PHILCOMSAT filed a Petition for Review with

Page11
the Court of Appeals.
Granting said petition, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dated 25 May 1998 issued by
respondent Department of Agrarian Reform as well as the Resolution dated 31 January 2000 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the said Order are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered, declaring
the subject landholdings of petitioner situated at Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, exempted from the CARP coverage, considering
that it was declared a security zone under P.D. [No.] 1845, as revised by P.D. [No.] 1848.
SO ORDERED.[8]

A motion for reconsideration of the above decision was filed by DAR but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals
in its Resolution, dated March 7, 2002.[9]

Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT R.A. NO. 6657 (COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW OF 1988) AND P.D. NO. 1848, WHICH DECLARED THE SUBJECT LANDHOLDING AS A SECURITY ZONE,
CANNOT, IN EFFECT, CO-EXIST WITH EACH OTHER;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE STATUTORY RULE GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON
DEROGANT; AND,
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS EXEMPT FROM THE
COVERAGE OF CARP.
Thus, the main issue in this case is whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a
security zone under P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to CARP.

P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988. The same was issued in 1982 pursuant to an exigency to create a security zone in the
surrounding areas of PHILCOMSATs satellite earth station in order to ensure its security and uninterrupted operation
considering the vital role of the earth station in the countrys telecommunications and national development. Thus, P.D.
No. 1845 provides:

WHEREAS, the only earth station in the Philippines for world satellite telecommunications is located in a remote and
sparsely populated place in sitio San Miguel, Barrio Pinugay, Municipality of Baras, Province of Rizal;

WHEREAS, the said earth station is vital to the existence and maintenance of satellite telecommunications between
the Philippines and most countries of the world and plays an invaluable role in the sustenance and development of our
political, economic, commercial, and social life;
WHEREAS, in view of its location, it would be easy for saboteurs or criminal elements to destroy or cause damage to
the said earth station thereby paralyzing the system and curtailing momentous public service; and

WHEREAS, to protect and insure the safety and uninterrupted operation of this modern media of international
communications, it is necessary to establish a security zone all around the said earth station.

P.D. No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 1845, subjected the security zone to the authority of the Ministry of National
Defense, consequently conferring on the Minister of National Defense the power and authority to determine who can
occupy the areas within the security zone, and how the lands shall be utilized, to wit:

SEC. 3. -- Occupation by Owner. Owners of land within the security zone and/or their bona fide tenants, lessees, or
agents can occupy or continue to occupy their respective lands or areas therein subject to prior written permission or
authority of the Minister of National Defense.

SEC 4. -- In cases where an owner or a bona fide occupant is, in the determination of the Minister of National Defense,
not entitled to an occupancy permit, he shall have the option of demanding payment of just compensation for his
property rights, or to sell such rights to any person qualified to own or occupy such property.

SEC. 5. -- The Armed Forces of the Philippines may, thru negotiation or expropriation, acquire ownership of any land or
area located or situated within the zone.

The law, in effect, by declaring the area a security zone, has granted to the Ministry of National Defense the control
and administration of the same. As a rule, where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred.[10]
Upon the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which became effective on July 15, 1988, all public and

Page12
private agricultural lands,[11] and other lands of public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, were declared subject to its coverage.[12]
The area in question which is included within the security zone is agricultural. It has been planted with different crops
and fruit trees by its occupants, and has been found by DAR to be suitable for agriculture.
The area, however, should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated
earlier, declared the area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense.

It is evident from the very wording of the law that the government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSATs
operations to national security, thereby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and even
anticipated disruption. Thus, every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it
grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.
[13]

In this regard, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals when it stated that:

The subject property is clearly within the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, in accordance with
Chapter II, section 4(d) thereof, had it not been decreed by P.D. No. 1845 that it is a security zone. The very purpose by
which P.D. No. 1845 was passed declaring the area within a radius of three kilometers surrounding the satellite earth
station in Baras, Rizal a security zone is to protect and insure the safety and uninterrupted operation of the modern
media of international communications in the said property, as indicated in the whereas clause of said law. Thus, to
subject said security zone to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government would negate the very
purpose by which P.D. 1845, as revised by P.D. 1848, was decreed. These laws have never been repealed.

P.D. 1848 is also specific in that occupation of the area, either by the owners or their bona fide tenants, require a prior
written permission or authority from the Ministry of the National Defense, now Department of National Defense. It is
therefore the Department of National Defense which will determine [x x x] who can occupy the subject property, and
not the Department of Agrarian Reform. To subject the property in question to agrarian reform is indirectly giving the
Department of Agrarian Reform authority to determine [x x x] who can occupy the property, in violation of the
mandate of P.D. 1848.
We find it not necessary to determine whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for
national defense, to be exempted from the coverage of R.A. 6657. The law which decreed the areas a security zone is
very clear in its purpose. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specifically designed for the said case must prevail over the other (Lapid v. Court of
Appeals, 334 SCRA 738).[14]

Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No. 6657,[15] as amended, provides that lands actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt from the coverage of the
Act. The determination as to whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national
defense usually entails a finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve into considering that, subject to certain
exceptions, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to review only errors
of law.[16] Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously be denied that the act of
securing a vital communication facilities is an act of national defense. Hence, the law, by segregating an area for
purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435,
dated

November 23, 2001 and March 7, 2002, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SONIA MACEDA ALIAS SONIALITA MACEDA AND GEMMA MACEDA-MACATANGAY, Petitioners, v.

ENCARNACION DE GUZMAN VDA. DE MACATANGAY, G.R. NO. 164947, January 31, 2006

Petitioner Sonia Maceda (Sonia) and Bonifacio Macatangay (Macatangay) contracted marriage on July 26, 1964.1 The
union bore one child, petitioner Gemma Macatangay (Gemma), on March 27, 1965.2

The couple separated not long after the marriage.

In 1967, the couple executed a Kasunduan3 whereby they agreed to live separately.
Macatangay soon lived with Carmen Jaraza (Carmen).

Page13
After the death on December 7, 1998 of Macatangay who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) or on
December 14, 1998, his common-law wife Carmen filed a death benefit application before the SSS Lucena Branch. The
SSS denied4 her application, it ruling that it is Macatangay's wife who is his primary beneficiary.

On January 9, 1999, petitioner Sonia filed before the SSS a death benefit application.

Macatangay's children with his common-law wife Carmen, namely Jay, Elena, and Joel, aged 27, 31, and 29 years old,
respectively, also filed in 19995 separate applications for death benefits following the SSS' denial of their mother's
application.

On September 10, 1999, the SSS denied Macatangay's illegitimate children's claim on the ground that under Republic
Act 8282, "THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1997," it is the dependent spouse, until he or she remarries, who is the
primary beneficiary of the deceased member.6

Petitioner Sonia's application for death benefit was approved on December 20, 1999. She received a lump sum amount
of P33,000 representing "pensions" 7 from the SSS.

On February 22, 2000, Macatangay's mother, herein respondent Encarnacion de Guzman, filed a petition before the
Social Security Commission (SSC) in Makati City8 against herein petitioners Sonia and Gemma, for the grant to her of
social security benefits, she claiming that her son designated her and his three illegitimate children as his beneficiaries
under the SSS;9 she was made to sign a document regarding the distribution of benefits of Macatangay by SSS Lucena
Branch Chief Atty. Corazon M. Villamayor who, however, did not furnish her a copy thereof nor inform her of its
nature;10 and after she signed the document, the three illegitimate children received notices denying their application
for death benefits.11

The SSS office in Quezon City filed a petition-in-intervention in the petition filed by respondent before the SSC in
Makati City.12

In her position paper, respondent contended as follows:

[I]n the present case, the agreement of the spouses to live separately four (4) months after their marriage and which
agreement was finally made in writing before the Barangay will unquestionably show that Sonia or Sonialita Maceda
was not dependent upon the late member for support and therefore cannot be considered as his primary beneficiary
under the aforesaid law. Said agreement, though proscribed by law by reasons of public policy, was a mutual
agreement short of a court decree for legal separation and will not in any way change the fact that the two lived
separately. This under any circumstances will dispute the presumption of the dependency for support arising from the
legitimacy of the marital union as reasoned out by the SSS in their Petition for Intervention.13 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioners, on the other hand, hinged their claim on Section 8(e) and (k) of The Social Security Act of 1997. Thus they
argued:

Section 8 (e) and (k) of Republic Act 8282 is crystal clear on who should be Bonifacio De Guzman Macatangay's
beneficiary, thus:

(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:

(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;

(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and
has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a
minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally, and

(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.

(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member; Provided, That the
dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally
adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent
(100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the second beneficiaries of the member.
In the absence of all the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
(Underscoring and emphasis in the original)14

As for the SSS, it argued that:

 Page14
[T]o be considered dependent for support, a surviving spouse of a member must only show that she is entitle[d] for
support from the member by virtue of a valid marriage. The surviving spouse is not required to show that he/she
actually received support from the member during his/her lifetime. Her dependency for support is actually presumed
from the legitimacy of the marital union.15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

The SSC, taking the Kasunduan16 as proof that Sonia was no longer dependent for support on Bonifacio,17 and
declaring that the SSS Lucena Branch acted in good faith in granting the benefits to Sonia, granted respondent's
petition by Resolution of November 14, 2001.18 It accordingly disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Commission hereby orders respondent Sonia (Sonialita) Macatangay to refund
the monthly pensions paid to her by mistake and for the SSS to collect the same immediately upon receipt hereof.

Meanwhile, the System is ordered to grant the SS lump sum death benefits of member Bonifacio Macatangay to
designated beneficiaries Encarnacion Macatangay, Elena, Joel, and Jay Macatangay, subject to existing rules and
regulations.

SO ORDERED.19 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration20 of the SSC Resolution was denied by Order of August 14, 2002.21

Petitioners thereupon filed a Petition for Review, 22 docketed as CA G.R. No. 73038, before the Court of Appeals which
dismissed it outright, by the present challenged Resolution of October 21, 2002,23 on the following procedural
grounds:

A perusal of the petition however shows that there was no written explanation as to why respondents were not
personally served copies of the petition as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Also, the petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto (i.e.,
position papers filed by the parties before the SSC, motion to dismiss filed by petitioner before the SSC) as required
under Section 6, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finally, petitioner's counsel failed to comply with the requirements under Bar Matter No. 287 which requires that "all
lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings, motions and papers signed and filed by them the number and date of their
official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the
current year x x x." In the instant petition, Atty. Calayan failed to indicate the number and date of the official receipt
evidencing payment of IBP dues.24 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Via an Omnibus Motion,25 petitioners prayed the Court of Appeals to (a) RECONSIDER its Resolution dated October 21,
2002 dismissing the Petition for Review; and (b) ADMIT the thereto attached certified true copies of the parties'
Position Papers and the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss filed with the SSC,26 the Certificate of Life Membership of their
counsel Atty. Ronaldo Antonio Calayan,27 and the Official Receipt showing said counsel's payment of lifetime
membership fee to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.28

The Court of Appeals, finding no substantial compliance by petitioners with the requirement in Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading:

Section 11. Priorities in Modes of Service and Filing ' Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and
other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other
modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of
this rule may cause to consider the paper as not filed., denied the Omnibus Motion by Resolution of August 4, 2004.29

Hence, the present Petition for Review30 faulting the appellate court as follows:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN STRICTLY ADHERING TO TECHNICALITIES, RATHER THAN IN
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE, IN THE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1997 RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING IN THIS PETITION FIND SUPPORT IN DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN
FAVOR OF THE REVERSAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION UNDER REVIEW.31 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioners posit that they complied substantially with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

Sonia's affidavit of service clearly shows the impracticability of personal service of copies of the petition to the adverse
parties. Manifest in the same affidavit is the intervenor Social Security System's address in Quezon City; that of the
private respondent's lawyer in Lopez, Quezon, and that of Social Security Commission in Makati City. Sonia's counsel's
address is Lucena City. The distance between these addresses, it is most respectfully submitted as a matter of judicial
notice, may be construed as more than competent indicia as to why Sonia resorted to service by mail.32 (Underscoring

Page15
supplied)cralawlibrary

And they cite jurisprudence calling for a liberal interpretation of the Rules in the interest of substantial justice,33
specifically Barnes v. Reyes34 which classifies Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules as a directory, rather than a mandatory,
rule.

The petition is meritorious.

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,35 this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a
pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or
filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the
practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving
or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare,
for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before
claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or
other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service
whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not
filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why
personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability
of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal
service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth,
whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal
service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,
which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally
applied Section 11 of Rule 13:37

As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally
whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering
the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by
registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was
not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may",
signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not
filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice,
rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.38 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

In the case at bar, the address of respondent's counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia's counsel's is Lucena
City.39 Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City.40 Such distance makes personal service impracticable.
As in Musa v. Amor,41 a written explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals,42 liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where,
among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed."

Without preempting the findings of the Court of Appeals on the merits of petitioners' petition in CA G.R. No. 73038, if
petitioners' allegations of fact and of law therein are true and the outright dismissal of their petition is upheld without
giving them the opportunity to prove their allegations, petitioner Sonia would be deprived of her rightful death benefits
just because

of the Kasunduan she forged with her husband Macatangay which contract is, in the first place, unlawful.43 The
resulting injustice would not be commensurate to petitioners' counsel's "thoughtlessness" in not explaining why
respondents were not personally served copies of the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2002 and August 4,

Page16
2004 in CA G.R. No. 73038 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to take appropriate action on
petitioner's Petition for Review in light of the foregoing discussions.

SO ORDERED.

EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. and TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., v.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 135992, January 31, 2006

On July 23, 2004, the Court promulgated its Decision in the above-captioned case with the following dispositive
portion:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Order of the National
Telecommunications Commissions dated November 10, 1997 in NTC Case No. 96-195 is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:

Respondent International Communication Corporation, in accordance with Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93, is
required to:

(1) Deposit in escrow in a reputable bank 20% of the investment required for the first two years of the implementation
of the proposed project; andcralawlibrary

(2) Post a performance bond equivalent to 10% of the investment required for the first two years of the approved
project but not to exceed P500 Million. within such period to be determined by the National Telecommunications
Commission.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.1

Respondent now seeks a partial reconsideration of the portion of the Court's decision requiring it to make a 20%
escrow deposit and to post a 10% performance bond. Respondent claims that Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93, which
required the foregoing amounts, pertains only to applications filed under Executive Order No. 109 (E.O. No. 109) and
not to applications voluntarily filed. In its Manifestation in support of the motion for partial reconsideration, respondent
attached a letter from Deputy Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Kathleen G. Heceta, of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), stating thus:

xxx

Please be informed that the escrow deposit and performance bond were required to public telecommunications entities
to ensure that the mandated installation of local exchange lines are installed within three (3) years pursuant to EO 109
and RA 7925. Since your company has already complied with its obligation by the installation of more than 300,000
lines in Quezon City, Malabon City and Valenzuela City in the National Capital Region and Region V in early 1997, the
escrow deposit and performance bond were not required in your subsequent authorizations.2

In a Resolution dated October 4, 2004, the Court required petitioners and the NTC to file their respective comments on
the motion.3

Subsequently, in its Manifestation/Comment filed on January 11, 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
behalf of the NTC, likewise referred to the same letter of OIC Heceta and declared that it fully agrees with respondent
that the escrow deposit and performance bond are not required in subsequent authorizations for additional/new areas
outside its original roll-out obligation under the Service Area Scheme of E.O. No. 109.

Petitioners did not file any comment and it was only after the Court issued a show cause and compliance Resolution on
October 19, 2005 that petitioners manifested in their Entry of Special Appearance, Manifestation and Compliance
dated November 25, 2005 that they have no further comments on respondent's motion for partial reconsideration.4

The Court has observed in its Decision that Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 is silent as to whether the posting of an
escrow deposit and performance bond is a condition sine qua non for the grant of a provisional authority. The NTC,
through the OSG, explicitly clarified, which was not disputed by petitioners, that the escrow deposit and performance
bond are not required in subsequent authorizations for additional/new areas outside its original roll-out obligation
under E.O. No. 109. The OSG agreed with respondent's stance that since the provisional authority in this case involves
a voluntary application not covered by the original service areas created by the NTC under E.O. No. 109, then it is not
subject to the posting of an escrow deposit and performance bond as required by E.O. No. 109, but only to the
conditions provided in the provisional authority. Further, the OSG adapted the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals on

Page17
this matter, i.e., respondent was not subjected to the foregoing escrow deposit and performance bond requirement
because the landline obligation is already outside its original roll-out commitment under E.O. No. 109.5

The NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and
technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives,6 is in the best position to
interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to
the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.7

In City Government of Makati v. Civil Service Commission,8 the Court cited cases where the interpretation of a
particular administrative agency of a certain rule was adhered to, viz.:

As properly noted, CSC was only interpreting its own rules on leave of absence and not a statutory provision in coming
up with this uniform rule. Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other agency has the power to interpret its own rules and any
phrase contained in them with its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. As observed in
West Texas Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Panhandle & S.F. Railing Co. -

xxx

This principle is not new to us. In Geukeko v. Araneta this Court upheld the interpretation of the Department of
Agriculture and Commerce of its own rules of procedure in suspending the period of appeal even if such action was
nowhere stated therein. We said -

xxx

x x x It must be remembered that Lands Administrative Order No. 6 is in the nature of procedural rules promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the power bestowed on said administrative agency to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the proper discharge and management of the functions imposed by
law upon said office. x x x x Recognizing the existence of such rule-making authority, what is the weight of an
interpretation given by an administrative agency to its own rules or regulations? Authorities sustain the doctrine that
the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by
the Court construing such rule or regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless it appears to be clearly
unreasonable or arbitrary (42 Am. Jur. 431). It has also been said that:

xxx

The same precept was enunciated in Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization where we upheld the action of the
Commission on Audit (COA) in validating the sale of Petron Corporation to Aramco Overseas Corporation on the basis
of COA's interpretation of its own circular that set bidding and audit guidelines on the disposal of government assets'

The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by government offices and
corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own
rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer
(underscoring supplied).

Given the greater weight accorded to an agency's interpretation of its own rules than to its understanding of the
statute it seeks to implement, we simply cannot set aside the former on the same grounds as we would overturn the
latter. More specifically, in cases where the dispute concerns the interpretation by an agency of its own rules, we
should apply only these standards: "Whether the delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was within that
delegation; and if so, whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test." An affirmative answer in each
of these questions should caution us from discarding the agency's interpretation of its own rules. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary

Thus, the Court holds that the interpretation of the NTC that Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 regarding the escrow
deposit and performance bond shall pertain only to a local exchange operator's original roll-out obligation under E.O.
No. 109, and not to roll-out obligations made under subsequent or voluntary applications outside E.O. No. 109, should
be sustained.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court's Decision dated July 23,
2004 is AMENDED, the dispositive portion of which should read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Order of the National Telecommunications
Commission dated November 10, 1997 in NTC Case No. 96-195 is AFFIRMED.

thereby deleting the order requiring respondent to make a 20% escrow deposit and to post a 10% performance bond.
SO ORDERED.

Page18
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Azucena Reyes, GR No. 159694, January 27, 2006

In 1993, Maria Tancino died leaving behind an estate worth P32 million. In 1997, a tax audit was conducted on the
estate. Meanwhile, the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 was passed. Eventually in 1998, the estate was
issued a final assessment notice (FAN) demanding the estate to pay P14.9 million in taxes inclusive of surcharge and
interest; the estates liability was based on Section 229 of the [old] Tax Code. Azucena Reyes, one of the heirs,
protested the FAN. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) nevertheless issued a warrant of distraint and/or levy.
Reyes again protested the warrant but in March 1999, she offered a compromise and was willing to pay P1 million in
taxes. Her offer was denied. She continued to work on another compromise but was eventually denied. The case
reached the Court of Tax Appeals where Reyes was also denied. In the Court of Appeals, Reyes received a favorable
judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the formal assessment notice is valid.

HELD: No. The NIRC of 1997 was already in effect when the FAN was issued. Under Section 228 of the NIRC, taxpayers
shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made: otherwise, the assessment shall
be void. In the case at bar, the FAN merely stated the amount of liability to be shouldered by the estate and the law
upon which such liability is based. However, the estate was not informed in writing of the facts on which the
assessment of estate taxes had been made. The estate was merely informed of the findings of the CIR. Section 228 of
the NIRC being remedial in nature can be applied retroactively even though the tax investigation was conducted prior
to the laws passage. Consequently, the invalid FAN cannot be a basis of a compromise, any proceeding emanating
from the invalid FAN is void including the issuance of the warrant of distraint and/or levy.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs THE CITY ASSESSOR OF ILOILO CITY, G.R. No. 147192, June
27, 2006

Assailed in this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision[1] and resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing a petition for annulment of judgment[3] filed by petitioner, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), in Cadastral Case No. 84 and another unnumbered cadastral case decided by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branches 36 and 31, of Iloilo City, respectively.
In the two cadastral cases, private respondent Rosalina Francisco petitioned for the issuance of new transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) in her name over two parcels of land, to wit:

TCT No. 41681

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 6, Block 2, of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-184005 being a portion of Lot 2214-B,
Jaro Cadastre, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 8 situated in the District of Jaro, Iloilo City, Island of Panay, registered in the
name of GSIS c/o Baldomero Dagdag, of legal age, Filipino citizen and resident of Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines on June
28, 1991.

TCT No. 48580

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 22, Block 2, of the Subdivision Record No. 8 situated in the District of Jaro, Iloilo City,
Island of Panay, registered in the name of GSIS c/o Rodolfo Ceres, of legal age, Filipino Citizen and a resident of Iloilo
City, Philippines, with an area of Two Hundred Ninety Four (294) square meters, more or less.

Private respondent Francisco purchased the subject properties in the auction sales held for the satisfaction of
delinquent real property taxes. After the lapse of the one-year redemption period and the failure of the registered
owner or any interested person to redeem the properties, the Iloilo City Treasurer issued the corresponding final bill of
sale to private respondent. The sales were later on duly annotated on the certificates of title on file with the Register of
Deeds. However, the final bill of sale could not be registered because the owners duplicate certificate of title was
unavailable at that time.

To effect registration in her name, private respondent instituted separate petitions for the entry of title in her name
over the two lots with the RTCs of Iloilo City. Both petitions were unopposed.

Finding merit in her petitions, the RTCs, in separate orders issued on separate dates, directed the issuance of new
duplicate TCTs. The dispositive portion of the April 29, 1993 order of RTC Branch 36 in Cadastral Case No. 84 read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo is hereby ordered to issue new owners
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41681 in the name of GSIS c/o Baldomero Dagdag, upon payment of
the required legal fees. Accordingly, the lost copy of the subject title is hereby declared as NULL and VOID.[4]
On the other hand, RTC Branch 31 also issued an order, dated November 8, 1994, in the other (unnumbered) cadastral

Page19
case, the dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the Register of Deeds, City of Iloilo is hereby directed to issue a new owners duplicate
certificate of Title No. T-48580 in the name of the G.S.I.S. C/O RODOLFO CERES, the registered owner, basing the same
on the Original Certificate of Title found intact and existing in the Office of the Register of Deeds and the latter to
cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-48580 together with the encumbrances therein and to issue a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in the name of ROSALINA FRANCISCO of legal age, single, Filipino Citizen and resident of Brgy. Tacas,
Jaro, Iloilo City, Philippines. The owners duplicate certificate of title No. T-48580 which was not surrendered is hereby
declared null and void.[5]

No appeal was made from both orders of the courts a quo, hence, they became final and executory.

In a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court, petitioner, as the alleged previous owner of the parcels of land
sold at public auction, assailed the orders of the RTCs of Iloilo City before the CA. It claimed that the assessment of real
property taxes on it (GSIS) was void since, under its charter (RA 8291), it was exempt from all forms of taxes (including
real property taxes on the properties held by it) that were due to the local governments where such properties were
located. Furthermore, it claimed that the proceedings in the assessment and levy of said taxes, as well as the sale of
the properties at public auction, were held without notice to it, hence, its right to due process was violated.
The appellate court gave no credence to the arguments of petitioner and dismissed its petition. According to the CA,
the exemption of GSIS under its charter was not applicable pursuant to Section 234(a) of RA 7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Under that law, the tax-exempt status of GSIS cannot be invoked where
the actual use or beneficial ownership of the properties under its title has been conveyed to another person.[6] The CA
added that there was also no basis for GSISs claim that it was denied due process.[7]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA, hence, it brought this case to us via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In this petition, petitioner essentially faults the CA for ruling that its properties were not exempt from all forms of taxes
under its charter (RA 8291) and that the proceedings on the assessment and levy of its properties were legal.

In support of its position, petitioner points to Section 39 of RA 8291 which reads:

Section 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared that the actuarial solvency of the funds
of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that the contribution rates are necessary to sustain the
benefits under this Act shall be kept low as possible in order not to burden the member of the GSIS and their
employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution
rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its
assets, revenues, including all accruals thereto, and benefits paid shall be exempt from all taxes, assessment fees,
charges or duties of all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any
assessment against the GSIS as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid. Consequently, all laws,
ordinances, regulations, issuances, opinions, or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are hereby
deemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.

xxx xxx xxx

The funds and/or properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding to the benefits
under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts,
quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all
financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by
his exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or
otherwise, is in favor of GSIS.[8] (italics supplied)

We find no reversible error in the decision and resolution of the CA.

Even if the charter of the GSIS generally exempts it from tax liabilities, the prescription is not so encompassing as to
make the tax exemption applicable to the properties in dispute here.

In the early case of City of Baguio v. Busuego,[9] we held that the tax-exempt status of the GSIS could not prevent the
accrual of the real estate tax liability on properties transferred by it to a private buyer through a contract to sell. In the
present case, GSIS had already conveyed the properties to private persons thus making them subject to assessment
and payment of real property taxes.[10] The alienation of the properties sold by GSIS was the proximate cause and
necessary consequence of the delinquent taxes due.
The doctrine laid down in City of Baguio is reflected in Section 234 (a) of the LGC,[11] which states:

Section 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial

Page20
use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, however, claims that RA 8291, which took effect in 1997, abrogated Section 234 (a) of the LGC of 1991.

We disagree.

The abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be assumed; the intention to revoke must be clear and manifest.[12] RA 8291
made no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of RA 7160, particularly Section 234 (a) thereof.

Repeal by implication in this case is not at all convincing either. To bring about an implied repeal, the two laws must be
absolutely incompatible. They must be clearly repugnant in a way that the later law (RA 8291) cannot exist without
nullifying the prior law (RA 7160).[13]

Indeed, there is nothing in RA 8291 which abrogates, expressly or impliedly, that particular provision of the LGC. The
two statutes are not inconsistent on that specific point, let alone so irreconcilable as to compel us to uphold one and
strike down the other.

The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that will form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.[14] The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not
to have enacted conflicting laws.[15] Thus, the legislature cannot be presumed to have intended Section 234 (a) to run
counter to Section 39 of RA 8291.

This conclusion is buttressed by the Courts 2003 decision in National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan[16]
where we declared that the tax provisions of the LGC were the most significant provisions therein insofar as they
removed the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national government (like petitioner) from the
coverage of local taxation. In that case, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) claimed that it was an
instrumentality of the government exempt under its charter from paying franchise tax. The Court overruled NPC and
upheld the right of respondent city government to impose the franchise tax on its privilege to transact business in its
area.
Again, in the 2004 case of Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System,[17] the Court declared that any
interpretation that gave Section 39 an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS assets and properties from legal
processes was unwarranted. These processes included the levy and garnishment of its assets for taxes or claims
enforced against it. The Court there ruled that the exemption under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter should be read
consistently with its avowed purpose the maintenance of its actuarial solvency to finance the retirement, disability and
life insurance benefits of its members. The Court meant that the tax-exempt properties and assets of GSIS referred to
those that remained at its disposal and use, either for investment or for income-generating purposes. Properties whose
actual and beneficial use had been transferred to private taxable persons, for consideration or otherwise, were
excluded and were thus taxable.

In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos,[18] the Court ruled that the exemption of a government-
owned or controlled corporation from taxes and other charges was not absolute and could be withdrawn, as in fact
certain provisions of the LGC, including Section 234 (a), were deemed to have expressly withdrawn the tax-exempt
privilege of petitioner as a government-owned corporation.

Lastly, even if we were to construe that RA 8291 abrogated Section 234(a) of the LGC, still it cannot be made to apply
retroactively without impairing the vested rights of private respondent. The appellate court thus correctly stated:

xxx it has been the courts consistent ruling that a repealing statute must not interfere with vested rights or impair the
obligation of contracts; that if any other construction is possible, the act should not be construed so as to affect rights
which have vested under the old law. Private respondent[s], we reiterate, have become the private owner[s] of the
properties in question in the regular course of proceedings established by law, and after the decisions granting such
rights have become final and executory. The enactment of the new GSIS Charter cannot be applied in a retroactive
manner as to divest the private respondent[s] of [their] ownership.[19] (citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

TWIN ACE HOLDINGS CORPORATION vs RUFINA AND COMPANY, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006

From the records, it appears that on 3 December 1991, Twin Ace Holdings Corporation (Twin Ace) filed a Complaint[1]
for recovery of possession of personal property, permanent injunction and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of replevin, temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction against Rufina and Company (Rufina).
As alleged in the complaint, Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines

Page21
and liquor under the name and style Tanduay Distillers. It has registered its mark of ownership of its bottles with the
Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer under Republic Act No. 623. In the conduct of its business, it
sells its products to the public excluding the bottles. It makes substantial investments in brand new bottles which it
buys from glass factories and which they use for about five times in order to recover the cost of acquisition. Twin Ace
thus retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over again as containers for its products.
On the other hand, Rufina is engaged in the production, extraction, fermentation and manufacture of patis and other
food seasonings and is engaged in the buying and selling of all kinds of foods, merchandise and products for domestic
use or for export to other countries. In producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as containers bottles
owned by Twin Ace without any authority or permission from the latter. In the process, Rufina is unduly benefited from
the use of the bottles.

Upon the posting of Twin Ace of the required bond, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26, issued an Order
dated 5 February 1992 granting the application for the issuance of a writ of replevin.[2] Upon the implementation of
the said writ, Deputy Sheriff Amado P. Sevilla was able to seize a total of 26,241 empty bottles marked TANDUAY
DISTILLERY, INC.,[3] at the address of Rufina.

In its Answer with counter-application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina claimed that the marked bottles it
used as containers for its products were purchased from junk dealers; hence, it became the owner thereof.

After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision dated 20 May 1995 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant as follows:

a) dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;

b) dissolving the order of replevin;
c) ordering the plaintiff to return 26,241 bottles to the defendant in the place where the bottles were seized at the
expense of the plaintiff within 48 hours from receipt hereof;
d) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P100,000.00 as actual damages sustained by the latter to be
taken from the replevin bond;
e) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P1,000,000.00 as damages for besmirched reputation;
f) ordering the plaintiff to pay the sum of P100,00.00 as nominal damages;
g) ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fee; and
h) ordering the plaintiff to pay the cost of the suit.[4]

Twin Ace appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 September 2002, the appellate court rendered its decision[5]
modifying the decision of the trial court as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision dated May 20, 1995 of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, in Civil Case No. 92-59862 is MODIFIED, in that the award of damages, except nominal damages, and attorneys
fees is DELETED for lack of legal and factual basis. The award of nominal damages is reduced to P50,000.00. In all
other respects, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.

Costs against plaintiff-appellant.[6]

A motion for reconsideration dated 19 October 2002[7] filed by Twin Ace was denied in a resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 September 2003.[8] Hence, this Petition for Review.

For resolution are the following issues:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT RUFINA IS NOT COVERED WITHIN THE
EXEMPTION PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF R.A. 623, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 5700.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES AGAINST PETITIONER TWIN ACE
CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS THE ONE WHOSE RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED OR INVADED BY RESPONDENT RUFINA.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER AS OWNER OF THE SUBJECT BOTTLES
IS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR ITS UNAUTHORIZED USE BY RESPONDENT RUFINA.[9]
Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 623,[10] as amended by Republic Act No. 5700,[11] is quoted hereunder for
clarity:

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler, or seller, who has
successfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section, to fill
such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers so marked or
stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or
not to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or drain pipes, foundation pipes, for any other purpose than that
registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more

Page22
than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more than one year or both.

Sec. 3. The use by any person other than the registered manufacturer, bottler or seller, without written permission of
the latter of any such bottle, cask, barrel, keg, box, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar
containers, or the possession thereof without written permission of the manufacturer, by any junk dealer or dealer in
casks, barrels, kegs, boxes, steel cylinders, tanks, flasks, accumulators, or other similar containers, the same being
duly marked or stamped and registered as herein provided, shall give rise to a prima facie presumption that such use
or possession is unlawful.[12]

Sec. 4. The criminal action provided in this Act shall in no way affect any civil action to which the registered
manufacturer, bottler, or seller, may be entitled by law or contract.

Sec. 5. No action shall be brought under this Act against any person to whom the registered manufacturer, bottler, or
seller, has transferred by way of sale, any of the containers herein referred to, but the sale of the beverage contained
in the said containers shall not include the sale of the containers unless specifically so provided.

Sec. 6. The provisions of this Act shall not be interpreted as prohibiting the use of bottles as containers for sisi,
bagoong, patis, and similar native products.[13]

In sum, Twin Ace asserts that the provision under the law affords protection only to small scale
producers/manufacturers who do not have the capacity to buy new bottles for use in their products and cannot extend
to Rufina which had unequivocably admitted in its Answer[14] and affirmed in the decision of the trial court that it is
engaged, on a large scale basis, in the production and manufacture of food seasonings.

For its part, Rufina counters that the law did not really distinguish between large scale manufacturers and small time
producers.
The petition is not meritorious.

The earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[15] applies to the present petition. In said case,
Twin Ace filed a Complaint for Replevin against Lorenzana Food Corporation to recover three hundred eighty thousand
bottles allegedly owned by Twin Ace but detained and used by Lorenzana Food Corporation as containers for its native
products without its express permission, in violation of the law. In that case, this Court acknowledged that the
exemption under the law is unqualified as the law did not make a distinction that it only applies to small scale
industries but not to large scale manufacturers. Thus, even if the court in said case held that the exemption is
primarily meant to give protection to small scale industries, it did not qualify that the protection therein was intended
and limited only to such. The Court held:

Petitioner itself alleges that respondent LORENZANA uses the subject 350 ml., 375 ml. and 750 ml. bottles as
containers for processed foods and other related products such as patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and other food
seasonings. Hence, Sec. 6 squarely applies in private respondents favor. Obviously, the contention of TWIN ACE that
the exemption refers only to criminal liability but not to civil liability is without merit. It is inconceivable that an act
specifically allowed by law, in other words legal, can be the subject of injunctive relief and damages. Besides, the
interpretation offered by petitioner defeats the very purpose for which the exemption was provided.

Republic Act No. 623, An Act to Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and
Other Similar Containers, as amended by RA No. 5700, was meant to protect the intellectual property rights of the
registrants of the containers and prevent unfair trade practices and fraud on the public. However, the exemption
granted in Sec. 6 thereof was deemed extremely necessary to provide assistance and incentive to the backyard,
cottage and small-scale manufacturers of indigenous native products such as patis, sisi and toyo who do not have the
capital to buy brand new bottles as containers nor afford to pass the added cost to the majority of poor Filipinos who
use the products as their daily condiments or viands. If the contention of petitioner is accepted, i.e., to construe the
exemption as to apply to criminal liability only but not to civil liability, the very purpose for which the exemption was
granted will be defeated. None of the small-scale manufacturers of the indigenous native products protected would
possibly wish to use the registered bottles if they are vulnerable to civil suits. The effect is a virtual elimination of the
clear and unqualified exemption embodied in Sec. 6. It is worthy to note that House Bill No. 20585 was completely
rejected because it sought to expressly and directly eliminate that which petitioner indirectly proposes to do with this
petition.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)

It is worth noting that Lorenzana Food Corporation which prevailed in the case filed by Twin Ace against it is certainly
not a small scale industry. Just like Rufina, Lorenzana Food Corporation also manufactures and exports processed foods
and other related products, e.g., patis, toyo, bagoong, vinegar and other food seasonings.

It is a basic rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no
room for construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application.[17]
Notably, attempts to amend the protection afforded by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 623, by giving protection only to

Page23
small scale manufacturers or those with a capitalization of five hundred thousand pesos or less (P500,000.00), through
then House Bill No. 20585,[18] and subsequently through House Bill No. 30400,[19] proved unsuccessful as the
amendment proposed in both Bills was never passed.
In view of these considerations, we find and so hold that the exemption contained in Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 623
applies to all manufacturers of sisi, bagoong, patis and similar native products without distinction or qualification as to
whether they are small, medium or large scale.
On the issue of nominal damages, Article 2222 of the Civil Code[20] states that the court may award nominal damages
in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157,[21] or in every other case where any property
right has been invaded.[22] Nominal damages are given in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him.[23] In another case,[24] this Court held that when plaintiff suffers some species of injury not
enough to warrant an award of actual damages, the court may award nominal damages. Considering the foregoing, we
find that the award of nominal damages to Rufina in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is reasonable,
warranted and justified.

As to the third issue, Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a party praying for the
recovery of possession of personal property must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts that he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof.[25] It must be borne in mind that replevin is a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the
right of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the
object sought to be replevied.[26] Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for
replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be
issued.[27] In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the possession of the bottles in question and
consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it of due compensation. As stated by the court in the earlier
case of Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals[28]:
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Sec. 5 of RA No. 623 to support its claim of continuing ownership over the subject
bottles. In United States v. Manuel [7 Phil. 221 (1906)] we held that since the purchaser at his discretion could either
retain or return the bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a sale of the bottles when the purchaser actually
exercised that discretion and decided not to return them to the vendor. We also take judicial notice of the standard
practice today that the cost of the container is included in the selling price of the product such that the buyer of liquor
or any such product from any store is not required to return the bottle nor is the liquor placed in a plastic container
that possession of the bottle is retained by the store.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the decision dated 27
September 2002 and resolution dated 29 September 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52852, both of the Court of Appeals are
Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent
to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and
three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the

Page24
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the
first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August
5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the
political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of
political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.

Lambino Vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17
of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of
Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

1. Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.

3. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Groups petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples
initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the
nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that
the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging
of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to
be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Orceo VS COMELEC, GR 190779, March 26, 2010

FACTS:

Page25
Petitioner prays that the Court render a decision as follows:
(1) Annulling Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it includesairsoft guns and their replicas/imitations within the meaning of
firearm, and declaring the Resolution as invalid;
(2) ordering the COMELEC to desist from further implementing Resolution No. 8714 insofar as airsoft gunsand their
replicas/imitations are concerned;
(3) ordering the COMELEC to amend Resolution No. 8714 by removing airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations within
the meaning of firearm; and
(4) ordering the COMELEC to issue a Resolution directingthe Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine NationalPolice
and other law enforcement agencies deputized by theCOMELEC to desist from further enforcing Resolution No.8714
insofar as airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are concerned.
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bondingmoments among family members. Families are entitled to
protection by the society and the State under the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights. They are free to choose
andenjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. Thus,
petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not inaccordance with the State policies in these constitutional
provisions:
(1) Art. II, Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. x x x(2) Art. XV, Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino familyas the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shallstrengthen its solidarity and actively promote its totaldevelopment.(3) Art. II, Sec. 17.
The State shall give priority to x x xsports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation anddevelopment.

COMELECs response: We adhere to theaforementioned state policies, but even constitutionalfreedoms are not
absolute, and they may be abridged tosome extent to serve appropriate and importantinterests.

ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion inincluding airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term
firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.

PROVISIONS:
Resolution No. 8714 is
entitled Rules and Regulations on the:(1) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and
(2) Employment, Availment or Engagement of the Services of Security Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election
Period for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. It contains the implementingrules and regulations of Sec. 32
(Who May Bear Firearms) andSection 33 (Security Personnel and Bodyguards) of RepublicAct (R.A.) No. 7166,
entitledAn Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.

RULING+RATIO:

NO. The Court holds that the COMELEC did notgravely abuse its discretion in including airsoft guns andAirguns in the
term firearm in Resolution
No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The
COMELECs intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the termfirearm and their resultant coverage by the election gun
ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear,intimidation or terror during the election period. An
ordinarycitizen may not be able to distinguish between a real gun andan airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a
voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun,which is sought to be averted. Ultimately,
the objective is toensure the holding of free.However, the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are
excluded from the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714.

DISPOSITION:
1. PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the exclusion of replicas and imitations of airsoft guns from the term firearm is
concerned. Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and air guns are hereby declared excluded from the term firearm
in Resolution No. 8714.2. The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft guns from the term firearm in
Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft guns and airguns are covered by the gun ban during theelection period

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at

Page26
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position
of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most
senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010
and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could
have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications
for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an
insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is
prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed
of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the

Page27
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every
part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section
16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Teofilo Martinez vs. People, GR No. 132852, May 31, 2000

FACTS:
Teofilo Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed a motion to
be allowed to litigate as pauper. However, this was denied by the trial court and prompted petitioner to go to the Court
of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders. Later on, petitioner also filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper attaching thereto affidavits by himself and two disinterested persons of his
eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate court subsequently issued a resolution denying the motion and directing
the petitioner to pay the proper docketing fees within five (5) days from notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but this was also denied by the appellate court. Petitioner then filed a manifestation through his
counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required "under protest" and that the money was advanced by his
counsel. The transmittal was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the motion to litigate as pauper. In
the assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to pay the
required docket fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the required docket fee. In the
second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion on the ground that it was short of 150.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as
pauper litigant?

RULING:
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court held that a motion to
litigate as indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for
review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with the
Bill of Rights, which decrees that "free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance
shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." A perusal of the records shows that petitioner complied with
all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as pauper. The affidavits executed by
himself and two other disinterested persons were enough to convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as
indigent. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to
allow the petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he paid.

SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE, G.R. No. 79974, December 17 1987

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Officeof Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the Deptof Budget from disbursing payments for Misons salaries
and emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reasonof its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other
hand, respondents maintain the constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the(CA). It is
apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officerswhom the president shall appoint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, without
submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of
the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, officers

Page28
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.

Oposa vs Factoran, GR No. 101083, July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations
yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that they have a
clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he
holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony
of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.

Manahan vs ECC, G.R. No. L-44899, April 22, 1981

FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' CompensationCommission in ECC Case No. 0070 (Nazario
Manahan, Jr., deceased), entitled "Maria Manahan,Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System, (Las Pias
Municipal High School).GSIS denied the claim for death benefit. The claimant, petitioner herein, Maria E. Manahan, is
thewidow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of "Enteric Fever" while employed as classroom teacher in Las Pias

Page29
Municipal High School, Las Pias Rizal, on May 8, 1975. In a letter dated June 19,1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a
finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr., typhoidfever, is not an occupational disease. The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on theground that the deceased, Nazario Manahan, Jr., was in perfect health when admitted
to the serviceand such ailment was attributable to his employment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner thru his mother is entitled to death benefits

HELD:
Yes.
It is not improbable that the deceased might have contracted the illnessduring those rare moments that he was away
from his family. I was a medically accepted principlethat enteric fever is caused by salmonella organisms which are
acquired by ingestion of contaminated food or drinks. Contamination of food or water may come from the excretion of
animals such as rodents flies, or human beings who are sick or who are carriers, or infection inmeat of animals as
food. Meat, milk and eggs are the foods most frequently involved in thetransmission of this type of species, since the
organism may multiply even before ingestion. ..."These findings of the respondent Commission lead to the conclusion
that the risk of contracting thefatal illness was increased by the decedent's working condition.

Decision of ECC is set aside and the GSIS is ordered (1)

To pay the petitioner the amount of SIXTHOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as death compensation benefit; (2)To pay the
petitioner theamount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorney's fees; (3)To reimburse the petitioner expenses
incurred for medical services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased NazarioManahan, Jr., duly supported by
proper receipts; and (4)To pay administrative fees.

Tantuico, Jr. vs Hon. Eufemio Domingo, G.R. No. 96422, February 28, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement.
He obtained the clearance applied for. The clearance had all the required signatures and bore a certification that
petitioner was cleared from money, property and/or other accountabilities by this Commission. Petitioner argues that
notwithstanding the clearances previously issued (by COA), and respondent Chairmans certification that petitioner
had been cleared of money and property accountability, respondent Chairman still refuses to release the remaining
half of his retirement benefits a purely ministerial act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioners retirement benefits is valid.

HELD:

NO. Petition was granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioners retirement
benefits in full and his monthly pensions.

RATIO:

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor General and the Chairman or Any
Member of the Commission of Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under
Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, the benefits granted thereunder shall not be subject, among others, to
attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.

Well settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to
provide for the retirees sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood.

Philacor Credit Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 169899. February 6, 2013.

Facts:
Both courts held that petitioner Philacor Credit Corporation (Philacor), as an assignee of promissory notes, is liable for
deficiency documentary stamp tax (DST) on (1) the issuance of promissory notes; and (2) the assignment of
promissory notes for the fiscal year ended 1993.Philacor is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of retail
financing. A prospective buyer of a home appliance with neither cash nor any credit card may purchase appliances
on installment basis from an appliance dealer. After Philacor conducts a credit investigation and approves the buyers
application, the buyer executes a unilateral promissory note in favor of the appliance dealer. Pursuant to Letter of
Authority No. 17107, Revenue Officer Celestino Mejia examined Philacors books of accounts and other accounting

Page30
records for the fiscal year August 1, 1992 to July 31, 1993. Philacor received tentative computations of deficiency taxes
for this year. Philacors Finance Manager, contested the tentative computations of deficiency taxes (totaling
P20,037,013.83) through a letter dated April 17, 1995.Philacor protested the PANs, with a request for reconsideration
and reinvestigation. It alleged that the assessed deficiency income tax was erroneously computed when it failed to
take into account the reversing entries of the revenue accounts and income adjustments, such as repossessions, write-
offs and legal accounts. Similarly, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) failed to take into account the reversing entries
of repossessions, legal accounts, and write-offs when it computed the percentage tax; thus, the total income reported,
that the BIR arrived at, was not equal to the actual receipts of payment from the customers. As for thedeficiency DST,
Philacor claims that the accredited appliance dealers were required by law to affix the documentary stamps on all
promissory notes purchased until the enactment of Republic Act No. 7660, otherwise known as An Act Rationalizing
Further the Structure and Administration of the Documentary Stamp Tax, which took effect on January 15, 1994. In
addition, Philacor filed, on the following day, a supplemental protest, arguing that the assessments were void for
failure to state the law and the facts on which they were based.CTA Division rendered decision. It concluded that
Philacor failed to declare part of its income, making it liable for deficiency income tax and percentage tax. However, it
also found that the Commissioner of Internal

Revenue (CIR) erred in his analysis of the entries in Philacors books thereby considerably reducing Philacors liability
to a deficiency income tax of P1, 757,262.47 and a deficiency percentage tax of P613, 987.86. The CTA also ruled that
Philacor is liable for the DST on the issuance of the promissory notes and their subsequent transfer or assignment.
Noting that Philacor failed to prove that the DST on its promissory notes had been paid for these two transactions, the
CTA held Philacor liable for deficiency DST of P673, 633.88.

Issue:
WON Philacor is liable for the DST on the issuance of the PN.

Ruling:

Under Section 173 of the National Internal Revenue Code, the persons primarily liable for the payment of DST are the
persons (1) making; (2) signing; (3) issuing; (4) accepting; or (5) transferring the taxable documents, instruments or
papers. Should these parties be exempted from paying tax, the other party who is not exempt would then be liable. In
this case, petitioner Philacor is engaged in the business of retail financing. Through retail financing, a prospective
buyer of home appliance may purchase an appliance on installment by executing a unilateral promissory note in favor
of the appliance dealer, and the same promissory note is assigned by the appliance dealer to Philacor. Thus, under this
arrangement, Philacor did not make, sign, issue, accept or transfer the promissory notes. It is the buyer of the
appliances who made, signed and issued the documents subject to tax while it is the appliance dealer who transferred
these documents to Philacor which likewise indisputably received or accepted them. Acceptance, however, is an act
that is not even applicable to promissory notes, but only to bills of exchange. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,
the act of acceptance refers solely to bills of exchange. In a ruling adopted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as early
as 1995, acceptance has been defined as having reference to incoming foreign bills of exchange which are accepted
in the Philippines by the drawees thereof, and not as referring to the common usage of the word as in receiving. Thus,
a party to a taxable transaction who accepts any documents or instruments in the plain and ordinary meaning does
not become primarily liable for the tax.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. A. D. GUERRERO, Special Administrator, in substitution of

NATHANIEL I. GUNN, as Administrator of the Estate of the late PAUL I. GUNN, G.R. No. L-20942, 1967-09-
22

A novel question, one of importance and significance, is before this Court in this petition for the review of a decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals. For the first time, the Ordinance appended to the Constitution calls for interpretation, having
been invoked to justify a claim for refund of taxes by the estate of an American national, who in his life-time was
engaged in the air transportation business. More specifically, the issue is whether or not Section 142 of the National
Internal Revenue Code allowing Filipinos a refund of 50 percentum of the specific tax paid on aviation oil, could be
availed of by citizens of the United States and all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by them in view of their privilege under the Ordinance to operate public utilities "in the same manner as to,
and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations owned or
controlled by citizens of the Philippines." 1

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, now petitioner before this Court, denied the claim for refund in the sum of
P2,441.93 filed by the administrator of the estate of Paul I. Gunn, thereafter substituted by the present respondent A.
D. Guerrero as special administrator under the above section of the National Internal Revenue Code. 2 The deceased
operated an air transportation business under the business name and style of Philippine Aviation Development; his
estate, it was claimed, "was entitled to the same rights and privileges as Filipino citizens operating public utilities
including privileges in the matter of taxation." The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed, ruling that such
partial exemption from the gasoline tax was not included under the terms of the Ordinance and that in accordance
with the statute, to be entitled to its benefits, there must be a showing that the United States of which the deceased
was a citizen granted a similar exemption to Filipinos. The refund as already noted was denied. The matter was

Page31
brought to the Court of Tax Appeals on a stipulation of facts, no additional evidence being introduced. Viewing the
Ordinance differently, it "ordered the petitioner to refund to the respondent the sum of P2,441.93 representing 50% of
the specific taxes paid on 61,048.19 liters of gasoline actually used in aviation during the period from October 3, 1956
up to May 31, 1957." Not satisfied with the above decision, petitioner appealed.

We sustain the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; accordingly, the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed. To the extent that
a refund is allowable, there is in reality a tax exemption. The rule applied with undeviating rigidity in the Philippines is
that for a tax exemption to exist, it must be so categorically declared in words that admit of no doubt. No such
language may be found in the Ordinance. It furnishes no support, whether express or implied, to the claim of
respondent Administrator for a refund.

From 1906, in Catholic Church vs. Hastings 3 to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of
Customs, 4 it has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never
presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on
exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris. 5 The state of the law
on the subject was aptly summarized in the Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. by Justice Sanchez thus: "The drive of
petitioner's argument is that marketing of its gasoline product 'is corollary to or incidental to its industrial operations.'
But this contention runs smack against the familiar rules that exemption from taxation is not favored, and that
exemptions in tax statutes are never presumed. Which are but statements in adherence to the ancient rule that
exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. Tested by this precept, we cannot indulge in expansive construction and write into the law an exemption not
therein set forth. Rather, we go by the reasonable assumption that where the State has granted in express terms
certain exemptions, those are the exemptions to be considered, and no more . . . ."

In addition to Justice Tracey, who first spoke for this Court in the Hastings case in announcing "the cardinal rule of
American jurisprudence that exemption from taxation not being favored," and therefore "must be strictly construed"
against the taxpayer, two other noted American jurists, Moreland and Street, who likewise served this Court with
distinction, reiterated the doctrine in terms even more emphatic. According to Justice Moreland: "Even though the
complaint in this regard were well founded, it would have little bearing on the result of the litigation when we take into
consideration the universal rule that he who claims an exemption from his share of the common burden of taxation
must justify his claim by showing that the Legislature intended to exempt him by words too plain to be mistaken." 6
From Justice Street: "Exemptions from taxation are highly disfavored, so much so that they may almost be said to be
odious to the law. He who claims an exemption must be able to point to some positive provision of law creating the
right. It cannot be allowed to exist upon a vague implication such as is supposed to arise in this case from the omission
from Act No. 1654 of any reference to liability for tax. The books are full of very strong expressions on this point." 7

At the time then when the Ordinance took effect in April, 1947, the strict rule against tax exemption was undisputed
and indisputable. Such being the case, it would be a plain departure from the terms of the Ordinance to predicate a tax
exemption where none was intended. Wellsettled is the principle ". . . that a constitutional provision must be presumed
to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.
'Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws
upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption'." 8

Respect for and deference to doctrines of such undeniable force and cogency preclude an affirmance of the decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals. This is not to say that the scope of the Ordinance is to be restricted or confined. What it
promises must be fulfilled. There must be recognition of the right of the "citizens of the United States and to all forms
of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States" to operate public
utilities "in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines."

If the language of the Ordinance applies to tax refund or exemption, then the Court of Tax Appeals should be
sustained. It does not, however. Its terms are clear. Standing alone, without any franchise to supply that omission, it
affords no warrant for the claim here made. While good faith, no less than adherence to the categorical wording of the
Ordinance, requires that all the rights and privileges thus granted to Americans and business enterprises owned and
controlled by them be respected, anything further would not be warranted. Nothing less will suffice, but anything more
is not justified.

This conclusion has reinforcement that comes to it from another avenue of approach, the historical background of the
Ordinance. In public law questions, history many a time holds the key that unlocks the door to understanding. Justice
Tuason would thus have courts "look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the
Constitution was framed and adopted, . . . and interpret it in the light of the law then in operation." 9 Justice Laurel
earlier noted that while historical discussion is not decisive, it is valuable. 10 A brief resume then of the events that led
to its being appended to the Constitution will not be inappropriate.
Early in 1945, liberation primarily through the efforts of the American forces under General MacArthur, assisted by

Page32
Filipino guerrillas, heralded the dawn, awaited so long and so anxiously, ending the dark night of the Japanese
Occupation, which was only partly mitigated by a show of cooperation on the part of some Filipino leaders of stature
and eminence. All throughout those years, the Japanese Army in the Philippines enforced repressive measures, severe
in character. What was even more regrettable, in the last few weeks, the few remaining Japanese troops in Manila and
suburbs made a suicidal stand. The scorched earth policy was followed. Guerrilla suspects paid dearly for their
imaginary sins. There were recorded cases, not few in number, or the old and infirm, even those of tender years, not
being spared. The Americans shelled Japanese positions, unfortunately not always with precision, as would have been
unavoidable perhaps in any case. The lot of the helpless civilians, already suffering from acts born out of desperation
of a cornered prey, became even more unenviable. They were caught in the cross-fire.

The toll in the destruction of the property and the loss of lives was heavy; the price the Filipinos paid was high. The
feeling then, and even now for that matter, was that it was worth it. For life during the period of the Japanese
Occupation had become unbearable. There was an intolerable burden on the spirit and the kind of man with all civil
liberties wantonly disregarded. There was likewise a well-nigh insupportable affliction on his health and physical well-
being, with food, what there was of it, difficult to locate and beyond the means of even the middle-income groups.
Medicine was equally scarce, what was available commanding prices unusually high. A considerable portion of the
population were dressed in rags and lived under the most pitiable conditions in houses that had seen much better
days. Moreover in a garrison state with the Japanese kempetai, 11 and the contemptible spies and informers, there
was ever present that fear of the morrow, the sense of living at the edge of an impending doom.

It was fortunate that the Japanese Occupation ended when it did. Liberation was hailed by all, but the problems faced
by the legitimate government were awesome in their immensity. The Philippine treasury was bankrupt and her
economy prostrate. There were no dollar-earning export crops to speak of; commercial operations were paralyzed; and
her industries were unable to produce with mills, factories and plants either destroyed or their machineries obsolete or
dismantled. It was a desolate and tragic sight that greeted the victorious American and Filipino troops. Manila,
particularly that portion south of the Pasig, lay in ruins, its public edifices and business buildings lying in a heap of
rubble and numberless houses razed to the ground. It was in fact, next to Warsaw, the most devastated city in the
expert opinion of the then General Eisenhower. There was thus a clear need of help from the United States. American
aid was forthcoming but on terms proposed by her government and later on accepted by the Philippines.

One such condition expressly set forth in the Philippine Trade Act of 1946 passed by the Congress of the United States
was that: "The disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be
open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprises owned or controlled directly or indirectly,
by United States citizens.'' 12

The above was embodied in an Executive Agreement concluded on July 4, 1946, the agreement being signed by the
President of the Republic of the Philippines and the plenipotentiary of the President of the United States. The
Constitution being in the way, both the exploitation of natural resources and the operation of public utilities having
been reserved for Filipinos, there was a need for an amendment. Such an amendment was only forthcoming. It took
the form of the Ordinance now under consideration, which took effect on April 9, 1947.

The Ordinance thus came into being at a time when the liberation of the Philippines had elicited a vast reservoir of
goodwill for the United States, one that has lasted to this day notwithstanding irritants that mar ever so often the
relationship even among the most friendly of nations. Her prestige was never so high. The Philippines after hearing
opposing views on the matter conceded parity rights. She adopted the Ordinance. To that grant, she is committed. Its
terms are to be respected. In view of the equally fundamental postulate that legal concepts imperatively calling for
application cannot be ignored, however, it follows that tax exemption to Americans or to business owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by American citizens, based solely on the language of the Ordinance, cannot be allowed. There is
nothing in its history that calls for a different view. Had the parties been of a different mind, they would have employed
words indicative of such intention. What was not there included, whether by purpose or inadvertence, cannot be
judicially supplied.

One final consideration. The Ordinance is designed for a limited period to allow what the Constitution prohibits;
Americans may operate public utilities. During its effectivity, there should be no thought of whittling down the grant
thus freely made. Nonetheless, being of a limited duration, it should not be given an interpretation that would trench
further on the plain constitutional mandate to limit the operation of public utilities to Filipino hands. That is to show
fealty to the fundamental law, which, in the language of Story "was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies
of a few years" unlike the Ordinance "but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which w ere locked
up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence." 13 This is merely to emphasize that the Constitution unlike an ordinance
appended to it, to borrow from Cardozo "states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but principles for an
expanding future.'' 14 That is transitory in character then should not be given an interpretation at war with the plain
and explicit command of what is to continue far into the future, unless there be some other principle of acknowledged
primacy that compels the contrary. 15
It would seem to follow from all the foregoing that the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals enlarged the scope and

Page33
operation of the Ordinance. It failed unfortunately to abide by what the controlling precedents require, namely, that
tax exemption is not to be presumed and that if granted, it is to be most strictly construed. No such grant was
apparent on the face of the Ordinance. No such grant could be implied from its history, much less from its transitory
character. The Court of Tax Appeals went too far. That cannot be done.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to it, to grant respondent
Administrator the opportunity of proving whether the estate could claim the benefits of Section 142 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, allowing refund to citizens of foreign countries on a showing of reciprocity. With costs.

Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 184266, 11
November 2013

FACTS

Petitioner is a Value-Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer engaged in the importation and exportation business, as a pure buy-sell
trader. Petitioner alleged that from September 1998 to December 31, 2000, it paid an aggregate sum of input taxes for
its importation of food ingredients.Subsequently, these imported food ingredients were exported between the periods
of April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000, from which the petitioner was able to generate export sales amounting to
P114,577,937.24. The aforestated export sales which transpired from April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000 were zero-
rated sales, pursuant to Section 106(A (2)(a)(1) of the NIRC of 1997.Petitioner alleged that the accumulated input
taxes for the period of September 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000 have not been applied against any output tax.

On March 26, 2002 and June 28, 2002, petitioner filed two separate applications for the issuance of tax credit
certificates.On July 24, 2002, in view of respondents inaction, petitioner elevated the case before this Court by way of
a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6513.Trial ensued and the CTA First Division rendered a Decision on
13 June 2007. It denied petitioners claim for failure to comply with the invoicing requirements prescribed under
Section 113 in relation to Section 237 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 and Section 4.108-1 of
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.On appeal, the CTA En Banc likewise denied the claim of petitioner citing violation of the
invoicing requirements.

ISSUE

Is the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a tax certificate or refund representing creditable input taxes attributable
to zero-rated sales?

HELD

NO.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of
complete documents in support of the application within which to decide on the administrative claim.Counting 120
days from 26 March 2002, the CIR had until 24 July 2002 within which to decide on the claim of petitioner for an input
VAT refund attributable to the its zero-rated sales for the period April to September 2000.On the other hand, the CIR
had until 26 October 2002 within which to decide on petitioners claim for refund filed on 28 June 2002, or for the
period covering October to December 2000.

In this case, the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July 2002. Petitioner clearly failed to observe the mandatory
120-day waiting period. Consequently, the premature filing of its claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA
warranted a dismissal, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA. In accordance with the ruling in San
Roque and considering that petitioners judicial claim was filed on 24 July 2002, when the 120+30 day mandatory
periods were already in the law and BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 had not yet been issued, petitioner does not have an
excuse for not observing the 120+ 30 day period. Failure of petitioner to observe the mandatory 120-day period is
fatal to its claim and rendered the CT A devoid of jurisdiction over the judicial claim.

People of the Philippines vs. Beth Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008

Facts:

Beth Temporada is an accused for the crime of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in whichthe prosecution alleged that the
accused recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in
Singapore, and Soledad Atle,Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong.After
collecting the alleged placement fees amounting to P282,160, it was also noted thatsuch placement fees are in excess
of or greater than that specified in the scheduled of allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and without reasons and
without fault of the saidcomplainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse them the expensesthey
incurred in connection with the documentation and processing of their papers for purposes of their deployment. The

Page34
accused-apellant now contends that the prosecutionfailed to establish all the elements of the offense that were
charged to them.

Issue:
What constitutes the crime of Illegal Recruitment?

Held
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thusly:ART. 13. Definitions. x x x(b) "Recruitment
and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contractservices, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profitor not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for afee, employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.It was held that to constitute illegal
recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements mustconcur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required
by law to enable him tolawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes anyof
the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of thesaid Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the
offender committed the sameagainst three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.In the case at bar, all the
elements were present thus the SC convicted the accused for thecrime of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment.

HECTOR T. HIPE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MA. CRISTINA L. VICENCIO, G.R. No. 181528, October
2, 2009

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court seeking
to nullify and enjoin the implementation of the January 30, 2008 Resolution[1] issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc, which affirmed the July 11, 2007 Resolution[2] issued by its Second Division.

The Facts

Petitioner Hector T. Hipe and respondent Ma. Cristina L. Vicencio were candidates for the mayoralty post in Catubig,
Northern Samar in the May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvass proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Catubig, Northern Samar (MBOC), Vicencio petitioned for the exclusion of seven election returns of Precinct Nos.
0037B, 0052A, 0053A, 0058A, 0080A, 0081A and 0082A on the grounds that they were prepared under duress,
threats, intimidation or coercion; and that the election was marred by massive vote buying, widespread coercion,
terrorism, threats, and intimidation, preventing voters from voting, so that the said returns did not reflect the will of
the electorate.[3] In support of the said petition for exclusion, Vicencio presented affidavits of some of the members of
the Board of Election Inspectors, a sample ballot and an ISO Assessment.[4]

On May 19, 2007, the MBOC ruled in favor of Vicencio and excluded the seven election returns adverted to. On the
same day, petitioner Hipe filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, on May 29, 2007, petitioner Hipe filed his Verified Appeal
with the COMELEC, docketed as SPC No. 07-206 entitled In the Matter of the Petitions to Exclude Election Returns,
Hector T. Hipe vs. Ma. Cristina L. Vicencio, arguing that the written petition to exclude the election returns was filed out
of time, and that the grounds used to exclude the questioned returns were not proper for a pre-proclamation
controversy, were not supported by credible evidence, and were beyond the jurisdiction of the MBOC.[5]

In a July 11, 2007 Resolution,[6] the Second Division of COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time. As
stated in the dispositive portion of the said Resolution:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Verified Appeal is hereby dismissed for being filed out of time.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Subsequently, on July 17, 2007, petitioner Hipe filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[8] On even date, respondent
Vicencio was proclaimed as the mayor.[9] On January 30, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny petitioner
Hipes Motion for Reconsideration.[10]

In the challenged Resolution,[11] the COMELEC En Banc held that the ruling of the MBOC had already attained finality
considering that the filing of the Verified Appeal with the COMELEC was five days late. It stated that the filing of the
Verified Appeal should have been made within the inextendible period of five days from the filing of the written and
verified notice of appeal with the MBOC, with which petitioner Hipe failed to comply. Further, the COMELEC En Banc
held that it was already deprived of proper jurisdiction to entertain the instant case since the case should no longer be
considered as a pre-proclamation controversy, but should rather be ventilated in an election protest. In addition, the
COMELEC En Banc stated that the ruling of the MBOC was amply supported by the affidavits of the Members of the
Board of Election Inspectors, and that the MBOC retained sufficient discretion to avail itself of all available means to
ascertain the results of the elections through witnesses, as well as through an examination of the election returns

Page35
themselves.

The dispositive portion of the January 30, 2008 Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES, to deny the instant
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Appellant-Movant Hector Hipe. The questioned Resolution dated July 11, 2007,
issued by the Second Division of the Commission on Elections for the exclusion of seven (7) election returns in favor of
the appellee, Maria Cristina L. Vicencio, therefore, stands and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Aggrieved, Hipe filed this petition.

The Issue

Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution dated January 30, 2008, which affirmed
the Resolution dated July 11, 2007 issued by its Second Division dismissing petitioner Hipes appeal for being filed out
of time.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Appeal Should Be Given Due Course

In its En Banc Resolution, the COMELEC held that the ruling of the MBOC had already become final and executory; and
thus, its Second Division had not acquired appellate jurisdiction to act on Hipes verified appeal. In support of its ruling,
the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Certification issued by Renato I. Madronio, Acting Election Officer II, Catubig,
Northern Samar, attesting that hard or printed copies of the MBOCs ruling to exclude the seven contested election
returns were received by Atty. V.B. Desales, counsel for the KAMPI-Liberal Party Coalition, at 10:37 p.m. on May 19,
2007 at the provincial Election Supervisors Office.[13] On this basis, the COMELEC En Banc opined that when petitioner
Hipe filed the Verified Appeal on May 29, 2009, said filing was already five days late and should no longer be
entertained.

We disagree. Indeed, there is a disputable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed;[14] and that,
corollary thereto, it is presumed that in its disposition of the contested election returns, the MBOC has regularly
performed its official duty of issuing a written ruling on the prescribed form, authenticated by the signatures of its
members as required under Section 20(d) of Republic Act No. 7166.[15] In fact, the alleged issuance and service upon
the supposed counsel of petitioner Hipe of the written ruling of MBOC was even supported by the aforementioned
Certification of the Chairperson of the MBOC.

The records would, however, reveal that Atty. Venerando B. Desales, the counsel who was supposedly furnished the
alleged written ruling of the MBOC, has denied under oath that he ever received a copy of the alleged written ruling.
[16] He even categorically denied in his Affidavit that he was the counsel of petitioner Hipe.[17]

Notably, nothing in the Status of Canvass Report[18] or in the Minutes of the Proceedings of the MBOC on May 19,
2007[19] showed that a written ruling on the petition for exclusion has been rendered by the MBOC or received by
petitioner Hipe.

On the contrary, a perusal of the Minutes of the Proceedings of the MBOC on May 19, 2007 would reveal that Election
Officer Madronio even notified the counsels of petitioner Hipe that, as of that time, the Municipal COMELEC Office still
did not have the prescribed form of the ruling, and that they would still have to get the prescribed forms in Catarman.
[20] This militates against Madronios statement in his Certification that hard or printed copies of the ruling of the
MBOC were furnished to Atty. Desales on that same day.

When a plaintiffs case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are
equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative fact.[21]

In the case at bar, petitioner Hipe asserted the negative fact, that is, that no copy of the written ruling of the MBOC
was sent to him or his counsel. Thus, petitioner Hipe has the burden of proof to show that he was not furnished with a
copy of the written ruling of the MBOC, which he was able to successfully prove in the instant case. Be that as it may,
it then becomes incumbent upon respondent Vicencio to prove otherwise. This is because the burden of evidence is
shifted if the party upon whom it is lodged was able to adduce preponderant evidence to prove its claim.[22]
Significantly, other than Madronios statement in his Certification that hard or printed copies of the ruling of the MBOC

Page36
were furnished to Atty. Desales on May 19, 2007, no other evidence was adduced by respondent Vicencio to support
her claim. If indeed such written ruling exists and was indeed furnished to petitioner Hipe or his alleged counsel, it
would have been very easy for respondent Vicencio to produce a copy of the written ruling with the signature of
petitioner Hipe or his counsel, which she failed to do in the instant case.

Furthermore, the COMELEC has the discretion to construe its rules liberally and, at the same time, suspend the rules or
any of their portions in the interest of justice.[23] As aptly stated by Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento in his Dissenting
Opinion:[24]
It is well settled that election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose to effectuate
and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representatives. The courts frown upon any interpretation
that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of votes in any election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results thereof.

Disputes in the outcome of elections involve public interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people
in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technicalities. Hence, it is submitted that there is a need
to suspend the procedural rules and resolve the merits of the case to promote justice and safeguard the will of the
electorate of Catubig, Northern Samar.

Accordingly, the COMELEC should have not dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Hipe on the ground of belated
filing.

The Exclusion of the Seven Election Returns

Was Amply Supported by Evidence

Nevertheless, even if we entertain petitioner Hipes appeal from the decision of the MBOC on the questioned election
returns, the Court still rules in favor of respondent Vicencio.

Petitioner Hipe claims that no proof was presented nor was there any showing that the seven election returns in
question were defective.[25] Such contention is not persuasive.

The COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on record, upheld the findings of the MBOC to exclude the
subject election returns on the basis of the affidavits of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors. What exactly
these documents and evidence are upon which the COMELEC based its resolution, and how they have been
appreciated in respect of their sufficiency, are beyond this Courts scrutiny.[26] The rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC,
as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELECcreated and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itselfon a level higher than statutory administrative organs.[27] The factual finding of the COMELEC is,
therefore, binding on the Court. As found by the COMELEC En Banc:

Besides, we do not agree that the exclusion of the seven (7) election returns in question were not supported by any
iota of evidence. This is amply supported by the affidavits of the Members of the Board of Election Inspectors; they
were all made in clear and unequivocal language by public officers who are presumed to have performed such duties
in the ordinary and regular execution thereof. A careful re-examination of the evidence on record reveals that there is
sufficient justification to uphold the MBOC ruling to exclude the subject election returns. The MBOC retains sufficient
discretion to avail itself of all available means to ascertain the results of the elections through witnesses as well as
examination of the election returns themselves. Where there is no abuse of discretion the MBOC is presumed to have
acted within its powers and its decision should be treated with some amount of respect.[28]

This is especially true in the instant case considering that, as noted by the COMELEC En Banc in its questioned
Resolution, one of the witnesses petitioner Hipe previously presented later on recanted her testimony and admitted
that she had made her previous statement as to the regularity of the conduct of the May 14, 1007 elections only out of
fear due to threats upon her person.[29] As correctly observed by the COMELEC En Banc:
We also note that even one of the witnesses presented by the appellant, Melanie Robion, Chairman of the BEI for
precinct No. 0037B, later on recanted her testimony. This spells doom to the appellants cause as it even impacts on
the veracity and truthfulness of the other affidavits that the appellant submitted. We are reminded of the legal
principle that a falsity in one is a falsity in all, Falsus in Onum, Falsus in Omnibus and would now be more inclined to
believe the assertions made by the appellee instead of those presented by the appellant, who has now been
unmasked to have been less than truthful at one time or another.[30]

Considering the foregoing discussion, there is ample evidence to support the findings of the COMELEC that the seven
election returns in question should be excluded. The contention of petitioner Hipe that said election returns were
excluded from the canvass merely on the basis of pure procedural technicalities is, therefore, unfounded.
Respondent Vicencio Substantially Complied with the

Page37
Requirement that Objections Be Made in Writing

Petitioner Hipe contends that the written petition to exclude the election returns was filed beyond the prescribed time
or almost 24 hours after the oral petition to exclude was manifested by the counsels of respondent Vicencio; hence,
the latters objections were raised out of time.[31]

This contention is without merit.

While the records reveal that respondent Vicencio manifested her oral objections on May 15, 2007 at around 7:00 p.m.,
[32] filed the written objections on May 16, 2007 at 6:40 p.m., and submitted the documentary evidence in support of
the protest at 2:45 p.m. only on the following day, the Court nevertheless considers the foregoing acts of Vicencio as
substantial compliance with the requirement that objections be reduced into writing.

In Marabur v. COMELEC,[33] we held that while respondent failed to submit his written objections, respondents
submission of his formal offer of evidence, including the evidence itself, within the prescribed period constituted
substantial compliance with the requirement that objections be reduced into writing.

Notably, the relaxation of the rules becomes all the more necessary in the instant case, considering that respondent
Vicencio has even filed his written objections within the prescribed period; and soon thereafter, the documentary
evidence in support of the written objections.

Technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the electorates true will in the choice of its elective officials.[34]

It should be borne in mind that the object of the canvass is to determine the result of the elections based on the
official election returns. In order that the result of the canvass would reflect the true expression of the peoples will in
the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be based on true, genuine, correctnay, untamperedelection
returns.[35] It is in these proceedings that the COMELEC exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the
enforcement of laws relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the canvass is based on the election
returns as actually certified by the members of the board of inspectors.[36]

Taking into consideration the findings of the COMELEC En Banc that there was ample evidence to support the exclusion
of the seven election returns in question based on the grounds raised by respondent Vicencio, this should suffice in
upholding the latters proclamation, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC En Banc,
in order not to frustrate the electorates will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 30, 2008 COMELEC En Banc Resolution and the July 11,
2007 COMELEC Second Division Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE insofar as they dismissed petitioner Hipes appeal.
The January 30, 2008 COMELEC En Banc Resolution is, however, AFFIRMED insofar as it declared the exclusion of the
seven election returns of Precinct Nos. 0037B, 0052A, 0053A, 0058A, 0080A, 0081A and 0082A to be valid.

SO ORDERED.

AMORA vs COMELECG.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent
Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of the candidates for
councilor in the same municipality, filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria
alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting
competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as
not filed.

Amora countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Effectively, the petition of Olandria is filed out of time;
2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC;
3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary public, Atty. Granada,
before whom he took his oath in filing the document;
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the League of Muncipal
Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and
5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath.
The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay,

Page38
Bohol.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is
equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to
possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an additional
ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
d) Those with dual citizenship;
e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue
to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in
the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a
petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification."

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact that Amora claims to personally know the
notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of Commissioner
Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary
Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He
readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the League of
Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath
was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this instance.

GRANTED.

De La Cruz V. Capital Ins. & Surety Co, Inc., G.R. No. L-21574, June 30, 1966

FACTS:
Eduardo de la Cruz, the son of herein petitioner, was the holderof an accident insurance policy. In connection with
thecelebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-professionalboxer, participated in a boxing contest. In the course of
his boutwith another person, likewise a non-professional, of the sameheight, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped and was
hit by hisopponent on the left part of the back of the head, causingEduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the
ring. Theinsured died with the cause of death reported as hemorrhageintercranial, left. The insurer refused to pay
the proceeds of the policy on the ground that the death of the insured, causedby his participation in a boxing contest,
was not accidental and,therefore, not covered by insurance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the insured is covered by the policy
 Page39
HELD:
The terms accident and accidental as used in the insurancecontract, have not acquired any technical meaning,
and areconstrued by the courts in their ordinary and commonacceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean
thatwhich happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention anddesign, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. Anaccident is an event that proceeds from an unknown cause and,therefore, not expected. Without the
unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he would not have received the blow inthe head and would not have
died. Boxing is attended withsome risks of external injuries, but any injury received in thecourse of the game could be
accidental. In boxing, as in otherequally physically rigorous sports, such as basketball orbaseball, death is not
ordinarily anticipated to result. If,therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only beaccidental or produced by
some unforeseen happening or eventas what occurred in this case. The insurer was liable.

Qua v Law Union. G.R. No. L-4611 December 17, 1955

Facts:
Qua owned 4 warehouses used for the storage of copra and hemp. They were insured with the Law Union.
Fire broke out and completely destroyed 3 bodegas. The plaintiff submitted claims totalling P398,562.81. The
Insurance Company resisted payment on the grounds that the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by
other persons in connivance with him.
Que Chee Gan and his brother were tried for arson, but were acquitted by the trial court. As regards the insurance
claim, the trial court ruled in favor of Qua and entitled him to recover more than Php 300,000 for indemnities from the
insurance company. Hence, the company appealed to the SC.
In its first assignment of error, the insurance company alleged that the trial Court should have held that the policies
were avoided for breach of warranty. The contract noted that fire hydrants were required in a particular measurement
of space (every 150 feet). Hence, they argued that since the bodegas insured had an external wall perimeter of 500
meters, the appellee should have 11 fire hydrants in the compound, and that he actually had only 2, with a further
pair.

Issues:
1. WON the insurance company can void the policies it had issued
2. WON the insured violated the "Hemp Warranty" provisions of the policy against the storage of gasoline
3. WON the insured planned the destruction of the bodega

Held: No. No. No.

Ratio:
1. The insurer, who at the time of issuance, has knowledge of existing facts which would invalidate the contract from
the beginning, such constitutes a waiver of conditions in the contract inconsistent with the facts, and the insurer is
stopped thereafter from asserting the breach of such conditions. Also, an insurance company intends to executed a
valid contract in return for the premium received; and when the policy contains a condition which renders it voidable at
its inception, and this result is known to the insurer, it will be presumed to have intended to waive the conditions and
to execute a binding contract, rather than to have deceived the insured into thinking he is insured when in fact he is
not.

The appellant is barred estoppel to claim violation of the so-called fire hydrants warranty, because it knew the number
of hydrants demanded therein never existed from the very beginning and issued the policies.
To allow a company to accept one's money for a policy of insurance which it then knows to be void and of no effect,
though it knows as it must, that the assured believes it to be valid and binding, is so contrary to the dictates of
honesty and fair dealing, and so closely related to positive fraud, as to the abhorrent to fair-minded men.

The appellant company so worded the policies that while exacting the greater number of fire hydrants and appliances,
it kept the premium discount at the minimum of 2 1/2%, thereby giving the insurance company a double benefit. Such
abnormal treatment of the insured strongly points at an abuse of the insurance company's selection of the words and
terms of the contract, over which it had absolute control.
Receipt of Premiums or Assessments after Cause for Forfeiture Other than Nonpayment. It is a well settled rule of
law that an insurer which with knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a policy as no longer in force, receives and
accepts a premium on the policy, estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture. It cannot treat the policy as void for the
purpose of defense to an action to recover for a loss thereafter occurring and at the same time treat it as valid for the
purpose of earning and collecting further premiums.

Moreover, taking into account the well-known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against
the party that caused them, the "memo of warranty" invoked by appellant bars the latter from questioning the
existence of the appliances called for in the insured premises

2. The ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a
forfeiture. So long as insurance companies insist upon the use of ambiguous, intricate and technical provisions, which
conceal rather than frankly disclose, their own intentions, the courts must, in fairness to those who purchase

Page40
insurance, construe every ambiguity in favor of the insured.

Appellee admitted that there were 36 cans of gasoline in the building designed. It However, gasoline is not specifically
mentioned among the prohibited articles listed in the so-called "hemp warranty." The cause relied upon by the insurer
speaks of "oils", and is uncertain because, "Oils" usually mean "lubricants" and not gasoline or kerosene.

If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the
policy.
The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it
is mere so for the latter, since its dominant bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility.

Also, the gasoline kept in Bodega No. 2 was only incidental to his business, being no more than a customary 2 day's
supply for the five or six motor vehicles used for transporting of the stored merchandise. "It is well settled that the
keeping of inflammable oils on the premises though prohibited by the policy does not void it if such keeping is
incidental to the business."

3. It was unlikely that Qua burned the warehouse to defraud the company because he had the resources to pay off the
National Bank in a short time. Also, no motive appears for attempt to defraud the insurer. While the acquittal of the
insured in the arson case is not res judicata on the present civil action, the insurer's evidence, to judge from the
decision in the criminal case, is practically identical in both cases and must lead to the same result, since the proof to
establish the defense of connivance at the fire in order to defraud the insurer "cannot be materially less convincing
than that required in order to convict the insured of the crime of arson."

As to the defense that the burned bodegas could not possibly have contained the quantities of copra and hemp stated
in the fire claims, the insurer relied on its adjuster investigator who examined the premises during and after the fire.
His testimony, however, was based on inferences from the photographs and traces found after the fire, and must yield
to the contradictory testimony of those who actually saw the contents of the bodegas shortly before the fire, while
inspecting them for the mortgagee Bank.

Benjamin Co vs. Republic of the Philippines GR L-12150, 26 May 1960

Facts:
Petitioner was born in Abram and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to theNationalist Government
ofChina. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated inthe Catholic Church of Bangued. He
speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abram Valley College,
and finished his primary studies in the Colegio in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He
has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to
organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice,
polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of
government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in the military or civil
department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. Healso is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his
tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10, 000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He
contributes to civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the
customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to
have earned P1, 000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he
stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3, 000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a
co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120, 00as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio
mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been delinquent
in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an
amount of not less than P3, 000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business. A petition
for naturalization was filed before the trial court in which after hearing was granted. Court ordered that a certificate of
naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the
requisites provided for in Republic Act 503 have been complied.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.

Decision:
Philippine law requires that an alien must conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community
in which he is living. In the case at bar, petitioners failure to comply with his obligation to register his wife and child
with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act as well as his failure to file his income tax
return despite his fixed salary of P1, 440.00 a year and his profit of P1, 000.00 in his tobacco business indicates that he
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our government. It is also claimed
that he has not stated (during the cross-examinations) that he believes in the principles underlying our Constitution. In
construction, Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and

Page41
against the applicant.Hence, the petition appealed from is reversed without pronouncement as to cost.

Crisologo vs Globe Telecom, G.R. No. 167631, December 16, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner was an employee of respondent company.When she was promoted, she became entitled to anexecutive car.
In April 2002, she was separated fromthe company. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and reinstatement
with NLRC which laterdismissed the complaint. The Petitioner filed forcertiorari with the CA assailing the
dismissal.Pending said petition, Respondent filed a civil case withthe RTC an action for recovery of possession of the
carwith application for a writ of replevin with damagesdocketed as case MC04-2480. Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of litis pendentiaand forumshopping but was denied by the trial court. Thus,petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA.Petitioner also filed with the CA a motion for theissuance of a writ of prohibition to
enjoin proceedings inthe replevin case before the trial court. Thereafter, Respondent filed a motion to
declaredefendant in default in Civil Case No. MC04-2480, whichwas granted by the trial court. Respondent was thus
allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. Petitionerfiled a motion for reconsideration of the order of defaultbut it was
denied by the trial court. The trial courtrendered a judgment by default, declaring respondenthaving the right of
possession over the subject motorvehicle and ordered the petitioner to pay for damages,attorneys fee, and cost of
suit.Petitioner then filed with the Supreme Court a petitionfor review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which was denied for being the wrong remedyunder the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Thus, Petitioner
filed the present motion forreconsideration, alleging that the filing of said petitionis the proper recourse, citing Matute
vs. Court of Appeals, wherein it was ruled that a defendant declaredin default has the remedy set forth in Sec. 2, par
(3) of Rule 41.

Issue:
WON the Petitioners filing of review on certiorari with the SC citing Matute case is the proper recourse for a judgment
by default rendered by the trial court.

Ruling:
No. The filing of the present petition is clearly not theproper remedy to assail the default judgment rendered by the
trial court. The Matute case is of 1969, vintageand pertained to the old Rules of Court and has alreadybeen superseded
by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal withthe Court of Appeals under
Sec. 2 (a), Rule 41 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration isGRANTED. The petition is reinstated and the case is

REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriateaction.

RICHARD VELASCOv. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-14214, May 25, 1960.

This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila which, after trial, was denied for
failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner has appealed.

Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and Miguela Tiu who became
naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that since his birth in Manila on May 12, 1932 he continuously resided in the
Philippines, particularly at 1441 Magdalena St., Manila; that he finished his elementary education at the Francisco
Balagtas Elementary School, and his high school at the Arellano University; that he pursued his collegiate studies at
the University of the East where he graduated in dentistry in 1954; that he is a citizen of the Republic of China in
Formosa; that he has not followed the citizenship of his father when the latter became naturalized as he was then
already 23 years old; that he is single, although he is engaged to be married to a Filipino girl by the name of Noemi
Eugenia; that he is at present employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a monthly salary of
P150.00; that previously he worked as a salesman of his father with a salary of P2,400.00 per annum, even if his father
was only an agent of Elizalde and Co.; that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog; that he is a Catholic
by faith; and he has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that he does not believe in
polygamy or in anarchy or the use of violence for the predominance of mens ideas; that he does not own any real
property although he allegedly has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 at the Republic Savings Bank, P1,000.00
worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern University, P2,000.00 shares of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and
P1,000.00 in cash; that he is not suffering from any contagious disease; that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos;
that he has shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos; and that he desires to become a
Filipino citizen because he considered the Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as his countrymen.

His qualifications as to moral character were attested by Santiago Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila Police
Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a housekeeper, who admitted that she is the prospective mother-in-law of
petitioner.
The trial court found that there are three names mentioned in the petition and in the documentary evidence submitted

Page42
in support thereof, namely, Richard Velasco, Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua Velasco, and that while petitioner
states in his petition that his full name is Richard Velasco, the signature thereon is Richard C. Velasco. Again, the court
found that the joint affidavit of said witnesses states that the affiants personally know and are acquainted with Richard
Velasco while the documentary evidence shows that his name is Richard Chua Velasco. On the other hand, petitioner
testified that he has no alias nor other names and has always been known as Richard Velasco. No evidence was
submitted to prove that they are one and the same person.

The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a character witness, is the prospective mother-in-law of
petitioner, and as such her testimony is biased. It also found that she and her companion witness Santiago Mariano
were also the character witnesses of a brother of petitioner in his petition for naturalization, a circumstance which in
its opinion indicates that petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino friends. The court finally found that the present
income of petitioner is only P150.00 a month which, considering the present high cost of living and the low purchasing
power of our peso, is neither lucrative nor substantial to meet the requirement of the law.

Because of the above facts and circumstances, the trial court declared petitioner not qualified to become a Filipino
citizen.

We agree to the foregoing finding. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that petitioner was employed at the Wilson
Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a salary of P150.00 a month, or barely a month before he filed the instant
petition, and that said store is partly owned by his mother who has one-fifth capital investment therein. This leads one
to believe that petitioners employment, even if true, is but a convenient arrangement planned out by him and his
family in order to show a token compliance with the requirement of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must
have a lucrative income or occupation.

Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant" (Co Quing Y Reyes v. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial court did
not err in denying the petition for naturalization.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellant.

CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. L-10761, November 29, 1958

This is an appeal, taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, from a decision, of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
granting the petition for naturalization, citizen of the Philippines, of appellee Celestino Co y Quing Reyes.

Appellant maintains that:

1. The lower court erred in not finding that the petitioner appellee has failed to comply with all the requisites
prescribed by the law to acquire Philippine citizenship.

2. The lower court erred in finding that the petitioner-appellee possesses all the qualifications prescribed by
Revised Naturalization Law.

3. The lower court erred in granting Philippine citizenship to the herein petitioner-appellee.

From the viewpoint of this Court, the question raised in the first assignment of error is the only one that requires
consideration, namely: did the Court of First Instance of Manila erred in hearing this case and granting the petition in
the case at bar, despite the undisputed fact that said petition was publish in the Official Gazette only once, instead of
three (3) times, as required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act 473. This provision reads:

Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to publish the same at petitioner's
expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general
circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the
hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is located, setting
forth in such notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the
Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of his petition, and the
date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninety days from the date of the last
publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the
naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data to the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Justice, the
Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace of the municipality
wherein the petitioner resides.
This section was squarely construed and applied in Ong Son Cui vs. Republic of the Philippines, 101 Phil., 649, in which

Page43
we said:

It could be seen that, under the aforequoted section of the Revised Naturalization Law, the notice of hearing of the
application for citizenship should be published three times in the Official Gazette, or, in the language of the law, once a
week for three consecutive weeks, and so in the order of publication of the notice of hearing of the present case it was
enjoined that the same be made "once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in the Voz de
Manila." The notice of hearing of this case should therefore have been published three times not only in the Voz de
Manila but in the Official Gazette as well. And there being only one publication of said notice of hearing in this case in
the Official Gazette, the same is clearly incomplete and therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo to
try the case and grant the petition. It is argued, however, that there has been a substantial compliance with law
because the notice of hearing in question was published three times in the Voz de Manila and once in the Official
Gazette; but since the law expressly provides that the notice of hearing be published three times, this should be
strictly observed; for, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief,

"The publication required by law in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is a means of
screening aliens applying for Filipino citizenship by giving the public a chance to come forward and protest the grant of
such citizenship if they possess any information derogatory to the applicant. The official organ of the government
caters to the officials and employees of the government and to the lawyers as well. These people, by reason of their
occupation are in a better position to acquire knowledge of aliens running afoul of the law than the average reader
who scans the newspapers for news. If the law was not after the number of times the notice is published in the Official
Gazette, it could have expressed in words that a single publication in the Official Gazette would suffice; but when the
law expressly provides its publication "once a week for 3 consecutive weeks" the intention to give the reading public 3
chances to read that item is very clear. A single publication therefore of the notice where the law requires 3 is an
incomplete publication, and an incomplete publication is not a valid publication. The grant of citizenship is only a mere
privilege, and a strict compliance with law on the part of the applicant is essential."

Petitioner may contend, however, that the law provides that the publication of the notice of hearing should be made
for three consecutive weeks and as the Official Gazette is now being published monthly, and not weekly as it was
before, petitioner cannot actually comply with law; and because he had the notice of hearing in question published,
once, in the Official Gazette, he should be given the benefit of having followed the law. This contention does not merits
serious consideration. While it is true that the notice of hearing in question cannot actually be published for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, it is no less true that said notice may be published three times
consecutively, although not weekly, in the Official Gazette, and because the true intent of the law is that the said
notice be published 3 times, it is our considered opinion that in the instant case the single publication of the notice of
hearing in question is not a sufficient compliance with law.

We find no valid reason to depart from such view. Indeed, said section 9 requires that the petition for naturalization be
published "once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette." This provision demands compliance
with the following requirements, namely: (1) the publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three (3) times; (3)
and these must be "consecutive."

Compliance with the first condition was, admittedly, impossible, inasmuch as, until recently, the Official Gazette was
not published weekly. Petitioner could have, and, hence, he should have, complied, however, with the second and third
conditions. Hence, the publication once in the Official Gazette is not a substantial compliance with the provisions of the
aforementioned section 9.

Appellee alleges, however, that the sufficiency of said publication was not questioned in the lower court and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; that the duty to publish the petition is imposed by law upon the clerk of court, not
upon petitioner; and that non-compliance with said section 9 "is not a fatal defect unless it is actually established that
it prejudices the opposition to the application."

This pretense is untenable. The decision of the lower court granting appellee's petition for naturalization affected his
personal status and accordingly, it "is in the nature of a judgment in rem" (2 C. J. 1123; U. S. vs. Gleason [C.C.N.Y.] 78
Fed. 396 [aff. 90 Fed. 778, 33 CCA 272]; In re O'Sullivan, 137 Mo. A. 214, 117 S.W. 651; Esker vs. McCoy, 5 Oh. Dec.
[Reprint] 573; 6 Am. L. Rec. 694; 3 C.J.S. 853; 31 Am. Jur. 98). As stated in Scott vs. Stroback (49 Ala. 477, 490): "A
judgment admitting an alien to citizenship has none of the properties or qualities of a judicial proceeding in personam.
It is rather in rem. (Emphasis ours.)

A proceeding in rem is not confined to the status of things, but extends to the status of individuals and their relation to
others. (I Am. Jur., p. 436.)

Proceedings in rem include not only those instituted to obtain decrees or judgments against property as forfeited in the
admiralty or the English exchequer, or as a prize, but also suits against property to enforce a lien or privilege in the
admiralty courts, and suits to obtain a sentence judgment, or decree of other upon the personal status or relations of
the party, such as marriage, divorce, bastardy settlement, or the like. Cunningham vs. Shanklin, 60 Cal. 118, 125,
citing Bouv. (21 Words and Phrases [Permanent Edition] p. 542.)
 Page44
Accordingly, the decision of the lower court, in the case at bar, if valid, would be binding upon "all the world" (Smith
vs. Smith, W. Va. 83 S.E. 2d. 923, 926). In the language of the Court in Bartero vs. Real Estate Savings Bank (10 Mo.
App. 76, 78):

A judgment in rem is generally said to be a judgment declaratory of the status of some subject-matter, whether this be
a person, or a thing. Thus the probate of a will fixes the status of the document as a will; so a decree establishing or
dissolving a marriage is a judgment in rem, because it fixes the status of the person. A judgment or forfeiture against
specified articles of goods for violation of the revenue laws is a judgment in rem. In such case the judgment is
conclusive all the world, . . . (21 Words and Phrases [Permanent Edition] p. 540.)

Upon the other hand, in order that a court could validly try and decide any case, "it must have jurisdiction both over
the subject-matter and over the persons of the parties" (Comments on the Rules of Court, by Moran, Vol. 1 [1957 ed.]
p. 128). Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner is acquired by his voluntary submission to the authority of the Court,
resulting from the filing of the complaint or petition. Jurisdiction over other parties may be obtained, either by their
voluntary appearance or by service of summons (42 Am. Jur. p. 7). In a proceeding in rem, which binds the "whole
world", the latter is, in legal contemplation, a party therein, for, otherwise, it could not be bound by the result thereof.
It being impossible to serve summons personally upon every human being in this world, the summons must be
published as provided by law. Otherwise, the court would have no jurisdiction over all parties concerned and, as a
consequence, any decision rendered in the case would be a nullity (42 Am. Jur. 8; Scott vs. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 38 L.
ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108; Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Earle vs. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503, 23 L. ed 398;
Hobby vs. Bunch, 83 Ga. 1, 10 S.E. 113, 20 Am. St. Rep. 301; Davies vs. Thompson, 61 Okla. 21, 160 P. 75, LRA 1917-B
395; Greenwood vs. Furr [Tex Civ. App.] 251 S.W. 332; 44 Am. Jur. 98). For this reason, it is well settled that the
procedure prescribed by law for the naturalization of an alien "should be strictly followed" (2 C.J. 1120, citing In re
Hollo, 206 Fed. 852; Ex parte Lange, 197 Fed. 769; In re Liberman, 193 Fed. 301; State vs. King County Superior Ct., 75
Wash. 239, 134 P. 916; see, also, 3 C.J.S. 844). In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, naturalization laws "should
be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against applicant for citizenship" (3 C.J.S.
833). And such, accordingly, has been the criterion adopted by this Court in the interpretation and application of our
naturalization laws. (Pardo vs. Republic, 85 Phil., 323; 47 Off. Gaz., 3447-3450; Ng vs. Republic, 94 Phil., 366; 50 Off.
Gaz., 1599; Yu vs. Republic, L-3808, July 29, 1952; Bautista vs. Republic, 87 Phil., 818; De la Cruz vs. Republic, 49 Off.
Gaz.[3] 958; Tiao vs. Republic, 95 Phil., 709; Sam vs. Republic, 98 Phil., 592; 53 Off. Gaz., [1] 145; Ong Son Cui vs.
Republic, 101 Phil., 649; 55 Off. Gaz. [22] 4044.).

As the Supreme Court of the U.S. has aptly put it in U.S. vs. Gingsberg (243 U.S. 472, 61 L. ed. 853, 856), and quoted,
approvingly, by this Court in Bautista vs. Republic of the Philippines (supra):

An alien who seeks political rights as a number of this nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and
conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is
rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of the matters so vital to the public welfare.

In the language of the editors of the American Jurisprudence:

. . . It is not within the province of the courts to make bargains with applicants for naturalization. The courts have no
choice but to require that there be a full compliance, with the statutory provision. (2 Am. Jur. p. 577.)

Referring, specifically to service of notice by publication, American Jurisprudence has this to say:

Substituted service and service by publication was unknown to the common law but depends upon statutory
authorization, and the principle of statutory construction that there must be strict compliance with enactments
modifying the course of common law in regard to legal proceedings is exemplified in the cases involving the
construction and application of provisions authorizing substituted and constructive service. When, by the local law,
substituted or constructive service is in certain situations submitted in the place of personal service when the latter is
inconvenient or impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order to
support the judgment based on such substituted or constructive service. Jurisdiction is not to be assumed and
exercised on the general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the power of the court. The inquiry must
be as to whether the requisites of the statute have been complied with, and such compliance must appear on the
record. The fact that the defendant had actual knowledge of attempted service does not render the service effectual if
in fact the process was not served in accordance with the requirements of the statute. (42 Am. Jur. pp. 55-56.)

In short, non-compliance with the requirements thereof, relative to the publication of the petition, affects the
jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide
the case, regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel. Failure
to raise this question in the lower court would not cure such defect. Upon the other hand, for obvious reasons, public
interest demands that the courts of justice refrain from performing invalid acts. Consequently, it is not only proper,
but, also, advisable, and, even, necessary, that the issue raised in appellant's first assignment of error be considered
and decided by us. In any event, the provisions of section 10, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, relative to the implied
waiver of defenses not pleaded in the answer or motion to dismiss," shall not apply to . . . naturalization . . .
proceedings, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient" pursuant to

Page45
Rule 132 of said Rules of Court and it is, neither "practicable", nor "convenient", to do so in the case at bar.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against petitioner-appellee. It is so ordered.

HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF VIRGINIA A. ROA, G.R. No. 170346,
March 12, 2007

Petitioners, Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by their attorney-in-fact Leonila Jugalbot, assail the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated October 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823 where the petitioners title to the disputed property,
as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. E-103, was cancelled and the previous title, TCT No. T-11543,
was reinstated in the name of Virginia A. Roa. The appellate court reversed the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Central Office in DARAB Case No. 7966, affirming the
Decision4 of the Provincial Adjudicator and the Order5 denying the motion for reconsideration in DARAB Case No. X
(06-1358) filed in Misamis Oriental, for Cancellation of TCT No. E-103, Recovery of Possession and Damages.

On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot based on the latters claim that
he was the tenant of Lot 2180-C of the Subdivision plan (LRC) TSD-10465, subject property of the case at bar, with an
area of 6,229 square meters, located at Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. The subject property was registered
in the name of Virginia A. Roa under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11543, the same being issued on April 1,
1970 in the name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa." The property was originally registered in the name of
Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same sometime in 1966.6

Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the 1950s. On a Certification dated
January 8, 1988 and issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team Leader Eduardo Maandig, the subject
property was declared to be tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn. On March 1,
1988, the Emancipation Patent was registered with the Register of Deeds and Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT No. E-
103.7

On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before the DARAB Provincial Office of
Misamis Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation of Title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery of Possession and Damages against
Nicolas Jugalbot, docketed as DARAB Case No. X (06-1358).8

On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator dismissing private respondents
complaint and upholding the validity of the Emancipation Patent. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was
denied.9

On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicators decision on the sole ground that private
respondents right to contest the validity of Nicolas Jugalbots title was barred by prescription. It held that an action to
invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the expiration of one year from the decree of
registration.10

On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents motion for reconsideration,11 hence they filed a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals which was granted. The appellate court reversed the Decision and
Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on four grounds: (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to
Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property which was less than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed
and kangkong-producing; and (4) the classification of the subject property as residential, which is outside the coverage
of Presidential Decree No. 27.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The sole issue for determination is whether a tenancy relationship exists between petitioners Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot,
and private respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27. Simply stated, are petitioners de
jure tenants of private respondents?

As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals12 and subsequently in Benavidez v. Court of Appeals,13 the doctrine is
well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not automatically make the
case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party
litigants. The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing of harvests between
the parties.14

Valencia v. Court of Appeals15 further affirms the doctrine that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims
that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved
in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an
agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine

Page46
whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner
and private respondents. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.16

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals.17 The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more
important.18

Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27. Private
respondents deny this, citing inter alia, that Virginia A. Roa was not given a notice of coverage of the property subject
matter of this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the private respondents did not have any tenant on the same property;
that the property allegedly covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal
property of Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding was less than seven (7) hectares.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27 due to the absence of
the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them.

Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The Court of Appeals was
correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the
impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices were erroneously addressed and
sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not the proper party in the instant case. The
ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been
therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.

Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals19 held that the presumption under civil law that all property of the marriage
belongs to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.20 In Spouses Estonina, petitioners were unable to present any
proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. The fact that
when the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by
the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza," does not suffice to establish the conjugal
nature of the property.21

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the phrase "married to" appearing in certificates of title is
no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses coverture and are merely descriptive of the marital
status of the person indicated therein. The clear import from the certificate of title is that Virginia is the owner of the
property, the same having been registered in her name alone, and being "married to Pedro N. Roa" was merely
descriptive of her civil status.22 Since no proof was adduced that the property was acquired during the marriage of
Pedro and Virginia Roa, the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Virginia Roa was already
married to Pedro N. Roa as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa," does
not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.

In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification signed by team leader
Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and
primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding
investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property.
The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa
of her right to property through the denial of due process.

By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals23 applies to the case at bar since there was likewise a violation of
due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner was not notified of
any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before acquisition of the property was to be
undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its
retention area in those portions to be acquired.24 Both in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential
Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.

Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the
extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful compliance with
legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore
be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR
conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that
results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due
process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the petitioners

Page47
personally cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing of harvests, except for their self-serving
statements. Clearly, there is no showing that Nicolas Jugalbot or any of his farm household cultivated the land in
question. No proof was presented except for their self-serving statements that they were tenants of Virginia A. Roa.
Independent evidence, aside from their self-serving statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of
harvests, or consent of the landowner, and establish a tenancy relationship.

Furthermore, in the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, it was undisputed that Nicolas Jugalbot was a soldier in the
United States Army from June 15, 1946 to April 27, 194925 and upon retirement, migrated to the United States and
returned to the Philippines sometime in 1998.26 It was established that Jugalbots wife Miguela and daughter Lilia P.
Jugalbot are residents of 17623 Grayland Avenue, Artesia, California, U.S.A., where Nicolas Jugalbot spent his
retirement.27 Thus, the DAR, in particular its team leader Eduardo Maandig, haphazardly issued a certification dated
January 8, 1988 that the subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 by Nicolas Jugalbot and primarily
devoted to rice and corn without the benefit of any on-site fact-finding investigation and report. This certification
became the basis of the emancipation patent and subsequently, TCT No. E-103 issued on March 1, 1988, which was
less than two months from the issuance of the unsubstantiated DAR certification. Coincidentally, October 21, 1972 is
the date Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law.

Neither was there any evidence that the landowner, Virginia A. Roa, freely gave her consent, whether expressly or
impliedly, to establish a tenancy relationship over her paraphernal property.

As declared in Castillo v. Court of Appeals,28 absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even
if he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.29

In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,30 we ruled that the respondents self-serving statements regarding their tenancy
relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not
raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of
a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on
record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing.31 We further observed in Berenguer, Jr.:

With respect to the assertion made by respondent Mamerto Venasquez that he is not only a tenant of a portion of the
petitioners landholding but also an overseer of the entire property subject of this controversy, there is no evidence on
record except his own claim in support thereof. The witnesses who were presented in court in an effort to bolster
Mamertos claim merely testified that they saw him working on the petitioners landholding. More importantly, his own
witnesses even categorically stated that they did not know the relationship of Mamerto and the petitioner in relation to
the said landholding. x x x The fact alone of working on anothers landholding does not raise a presumption of the
existence of agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in the form of lease
rentals or a share in the produce of the landholding involved. (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx

In the absence of any substantial evidence from which it can be satisfactorily inferred that a sharing arrangement is
present between the contending parties, we, as a court of last resort, are duty-bound to correct inferences made by
the courts below which are manifestly mistaken or absurd. x x x

Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and
the private respondents. (Underscoring supplied)32

Bejasa v. Court of Appeals33 likewise held that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented as self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. Proof must always be adduced.34 In addition

The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria could
argue that she did not know of Malabanans arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any
knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanans lease possessed the land. However, the Bejasas claim that this defect
was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died
in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even
assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a
tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease.35

Thirdly, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. In Caballes v. Department of
Agrarian Reform,36 we restated the well-settled rule that all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites does not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status
as a de jure tenant he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws.37 The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked
only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.38
As reiterated in Qua,39 the fact that the source of livelihood of the alleged tenants is not derived from the lots they are

Page48
allegedly tenanting is indicative of non-agricultural tenancy relationship.40

Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is residential property and not agricultural
property. Zoning Certification No. 98-084 issued on September 3, 1998 clearly shows that the subject property Lot
2180-C covered by TCT No. T-11543 with an area of 6,229 square meters and owned by Virginia A. Roa is located
within the Residential 2 District in accordance with paragraph (b), Section 9, Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No. 880,
Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City.41 To bolster the residential
nature of the property, it must also be noted that no Barangay Agrarian Reform Council was organized or appointed by
the DAR existed in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, as all lands have been classified as residential or
commercial, as certified by Barangay Captain of Lapasan.42

In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,43 we held that an agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has
ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision. Petitioners were
not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a residential subdivision in 1955. Not having
been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to
reinstatement.44

This Court in Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals45 succinctly ruled that the land surrounded by a residential zone is
always classified as residential. The areas surrounding the disputed six hectares are now dotted with residences and,
apparently, only this case has kept the property in question from being developed together with the rest of the lot to
which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants rice or corn on a residential lot in the middle of a residential
subdivision in the heart of a metropolitan area cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it into agricultural
land and subject it to the agrarian reform program.46

Despite the apparent lack of evidence establishing a tenancy relationship between petitioners and private
respondents, the DARAB improperly recognized the existence of such a relationship in complete disregard of the
essential requisites under Presidential Decree No. 27. DARAB committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in issuing an Emancipation Patent to Nicolas Jugalbot.

Once again, Benavidez v. Court of Appeals47 is illustrative in its pronouncement that an alleged agricultural tenant
tilling the land does not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute which calls for the application of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and the assumption of jurisdiction by the DARAB. It is absolutely necessary to first establish
the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants. In Benavidez, there was no showing that there
existed any tenancy relationship between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the case fell outside the coverage
of the Agricultural Tenancy Act; consequently, it was the Municipal Trial Court and not the DARAB which had jurisdiction
over the controversy between petitioner and private respondent.48

Verily, Morta, Sr. v. Occidental49 ruled that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to
establish all the indispensable elements of a landlord-tenant relationship:

The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB. It relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner
of the land and Jaime Occidental was her recognized tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of
the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or
petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction.
Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The
issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants
thereof.50

At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered as tenancy-related
for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner,
then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot claim
that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the
above requisites, we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB. 51

In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,52 the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the
following: (a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (b) resolution of agrarian
conflicts and land tenure related problems; and (c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial and other non-agricultural uses.53

To recapitulate, petitioners are not de jure tenants of Virginia A. Roa, to which Presidential Decree No. 27 is found to be
inapplicable; hence, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over this case. The DARAB not only committed a serious error in
judgment, which the Court of Appeals properly corrected, but the former likewise committed a palpable error in
jurisdiction which is contrary to law and jurisprudence. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court
decision and likewise hold that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
grounds that the subject matter of the present action is residential, and not agricultural, land, and that all the essential

Page49
requisites of a tenancy relationship were sorely lacking in the case at bar.

On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the preservation and
maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged. They apply with equal force to
those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the courts.
Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of defending the poor, where no act of
injustice or abuse is being committed against them.54

As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less privileged should not be carried out to such an extent
as to deny justice to landowners whenever truth and justice happen to be on their side. For in the eyes of the
Constitution and the statutes, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the bedrock principle by which our Republic
abides.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823 promulgated on
October 19, 2005 is AFFIRMED. The Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City is ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificate
of Title No. E-103 for having been issued without factual and legal basis, and REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-11543 in the name of Virginia A. Roa. The city Assessors Office of Cagayan de Oro is likewise directed to CANCEL Tax
Declaration No. 80551 issued to Nicolas Jugalbot and RESTORE Tax Declaration No. 270922 in the name of Virginia
Angcod Roa. The heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by Leonila B. Jugalbot or any other person claiming a right or
interest to the disputed lot through the latters title are directed to VACATE the premises thereof and peaceably turn
over its possession to petitioners Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, represented by Lolita R. Gorospe. No pronouncement as to
costs.

In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, GR L-14322, 25 February 1960

Facts:
On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested withBonifacio Minoza to read a
testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street,municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in
19 November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena,
and Simeona Omboy. After confirmingthe contents of the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name
at the foot of the testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark
betweenher name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza alsosigned at the
foot of the testament, in the second page, in the presence of the testator and all threeabovenamed witnesses.
However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the leftmargin or any part of the first page of the
testament, composed of two pages. All the threeinstrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment
written in the second page of thetestament, and the left margin of the first and second page, in the presence of the
testator, BonifacioMinoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was executed freely and spontaneously,
withouthaving been threatened, forced and intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator) undue
influence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying good health. On 22 February1957, the
testator died in here house in Argao.On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman
Aberastine died,leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a
documentpurportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the
ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of thetestatrix. Petitioner
appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because it involves purely a
question of law.

Issue:
Whether the absence of the testators thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the willvoid.

Held:
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictlyconstrued. A will must be
executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it isentirely void. In the present case, the
contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and thatthe three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested
to the court that the document expresses thetrue and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs
counter to the expressprovision of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of
thetestatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply
with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to probate.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without
pronouncement as to costs.

RUFINO RODRIGUEZ vs. CAYETANO ALCALA, ET AL., G.R. No. 32672, November 5, 1930

This case relates to the probate of the will of the deceased Marta Alcantara. On or about March 26,1929, a petition was
filed by Rufino R. Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, praying (1) that the will of the
deceased Marta Alcantara be admitted to probate, and (2) that he be appointed special administrator of the estate of
the deceased. The petition was accompanied by the will (Exhibit A ) written in Tagalog, with its translation into English

Page50
(Exhibit A-1).

To said petition Cayetano Alcala, husband of the deceased, filed an opposition. Oppositions were also filed by the
spouses Maximino de Luna and Petra Rodriguez, and by Isaac Reynoso, all of them relatives of the deceased. The
oppositions were based on the following grounds: (1) That the will was not executed in accordance with formalities
prescribed by Act No. 190, and (2) that the signatures of the testatrix were not authentic and were procured through
fraud and undue influence.

Upon the issue thus presented, the cause was brought on for trial before Francisco Enage, judge. After hearing the
evidence adduced by the petitioner and the opponents in support of their respective claims, the trial court denied the
petition for the probate of the will, and rendered a judgment in favor of the opponents declaring the will invalid on the
ground that the attestation clause thereof was not in conformity with the requirements of section 681 of Act No.190, as
amended. The pertinent parts of the decision read as follows:

Aunque en realidad la testadora y los testigos instrumentales firmaron todas las paginas del testamento de autos en
su margen izquierdo, no se ha hecho constar, sin embargo, este hecho en la clausula de atestiguamiento arriba
transcrita. La frase que dice: "y lo firmamos nosotros los tres testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de
este testamento," no cumple con la ley. Deberia expresarse en dicha clausula, de que los testigos firmaron en "todas y
cada una de las hojas del testamento en su margen izquierdo," como requiere la ley.
xxx xxx xxx
Por todo lo expuesto, se deniega la legalizacion del testamento objeto de la solicitud de autos, con las costas al
solicitante.

From that judgment both the petitioner and the opponents, with the exception of Isaac Reynoso, appealed.

The petitioner-appellant now contends that the lower court erred in not admitting the will to probate because of the
alleged defect of the attestation clause in not expressly stating that the testatrix and witnesses signed each and every
page of the will "on the left margin". It is contended that the omission in the attestation clause of the phrase "on the
left margin" is not fatal because the will itself shows that each and every page thereof was signed on the left margin,
and that this failure of the attestation clause to specifically state the particular location of the signatures on each page
is not sufficient to invalidate the will.

The opponents-appellants contend that the lower court erred in not finding that the signatures of the testatrix were
procured through fraud and undue influence. The lower court deemed it unnecessary to make specific finding as to this
feature of the case, and denied admission of the will to probate on the other ground alleged by the opponents, namely,
that the attestation clause is not in conformity with section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.

The portion of said section 618, pertinent to the case reads as follows:

. . . The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page therof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

The attestation clause in question, as translated into Spanish, reads as folows:

Este testamento o ultima voluntad se compone de ocho paginas todas validas y eficaces, sin tacha de ninguna clase,
lo ha leido la testadora Sra. Marta Alcantara, en presencia de nosotros los tres testigos, y al terminar de leerlo la
testadora, ella estampo su nobre y apellido en presencia de nosotros los tres testigos presentes y cada uno de
nosotros lo firmamos tambien en presencia de la testadora y en presencia unos de los otros, y lo firmamos nosotros los
tres testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento.

The foregoing attestation clause expressly states that the testatrix signed the will in the presence of the witnesses and
that the latter signed it in the presence of the testatrix and of each other, and that both testatrix and witnesses signed
each and every page of the will. It will be noted, however, that the attestation fails to state that the testatrix signed
each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses and that the latter signed each and every page of the
will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.

We are unable to agree with the lower court that the omission alone of the phrase "on the left margin" in the
attestation clause, in the absence of any other defect, is fatal to the validity of the will. Section 618 of Act No.190, as
amended, quoted above, does not expressly provide that the phrase "on the left margin " must necessarily be inserted
in the attestation clause. And in our opinion the reason is obvious, because the will itself as in the present case, will
show that all the pages thereof were signed on the left margin. Furthermore, in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and
Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145, 146) this court held: "A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements
of existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses
appear in the right margin instead of the left." This ruling shows that the inclusion of the phrase "on the left margin" in

Page51
the attestation is not indispensable to the validity of the will.

In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479) this court, speaking of the object of the formal requisites
prescribed by law in the execution of wills, said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authentically. Therefor the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the testators last will, must be
disregarded.

We may conclude, therefore that a mere omission in the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left margin " which is
not expressly required by the statute, when said clause is otherwise in strict conformity with the requirements of
section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, does not render a will invalid.

The cases cited by the lower court in its decision denying probate of the will (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil.,
405; Fernadez vs. Vergel de dios 46 Phil., 922; Sano vs. Quintana 48 Phil., 506) do not support the proposition that the
omission in the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left margin", in the absence of any other defect, is fatal to the
validity of the will.

We are of the opinion, however, that the will should not be admitted to probate on another ground. There is a fatal
defect in the attestation clause which escaped the attention of the lower court. As pointed out above, said defect
consists in the failure of the attestation clause to specifically state that the testatrix signed each and every page of the
will in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed each and every page thereof in the presence of the
testatrix and of each other. The attestation clause simply recites that the testatrix and the witnesses signed all the
pages of the will (" y lo firmamos nosotros los tres testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este
testamento"). In the presence of whom they signed each and every page of will, the attestation fails to state, in
violation of the express requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, to wit: "The attestation clause shall
state . . . that the testator signed the will and every page therof, . . . in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." This defect of
the attestation clause is fatal to the validity of the will.

In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405, 407) the court said:

Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40
Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely
void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the
defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense
with those enumerated in the statutes."

The provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, that the attestation clause
of a will must state the number of pages in the will, and that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other, are
mandatory and non-compliance therewith invalidates the will.

In the case of Sano vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that:

An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the
left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will.

This doctrine was restated and reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30).

In the case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481) this court, following the doctrine laid down in the cases above cited,
held that:

The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No.190, as
amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect constitutes
sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will.

Section 618 of Act No.190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give effect to the intention of
the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed.
Courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will.
For all of the foregoing, it is held that the will in question is invalid because of the failure of the attestation clause to

Page52
state in whose presence the pages of the will were signed by the testatrix and the witnesses. The judgment appealed
from, denying probate of the will, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Bersabal vs. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador, G.R. No. L-35910. July 21, 1978

FACTS:

[P]etitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge and to compel said respondent Judge to
decide petitioners perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court
of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents. The second paragraph of
Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031
provides, in part, as follows:

Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from
the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested . (Emphasis supplied).

A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court. The
respondent Judge dismissed petition on August 4, 1971 upon failure of defendantappellant to prosecute her appeal,
with costs against her. Petitioner filed her memorandum. The respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration
on October 30, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied by the respondent court on March 15, 1972.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the
same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute.

HELD:

NO. The challenged orders of Respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972 are set
aside as null and void.

RATIO:

The above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the
submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter
may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties,
the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum the appellant so
chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on
the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words, the Court is not
empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it
is the Courts mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.

As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while
the word shall is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615,
Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the
appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus
memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.

Anama vs CA, GR No. 187021, January 25, 2012

The Facts

The factual and procedural backgrounds of this case were succinctly recited by the CA in its decision as follows:

Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the Respondent, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB),
entered into a "Contract to Buy," on installment basis, the real property owned and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 301276 in the latter's name. However, Anama defaulted in paying his obligations thereunder, thus, PSB
rescinded the said contract and title to the property remained with the latter. Subsequently, the property was sold by
PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas Co (Co Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in full, caused the
registration of the same in their names and were, thus, issued TCT No. 14239.
 Page53
Resultantly, Anama filed before the Respondent Court a complaint for declaration of nullity of the deed of sale,
cancellation of transfer certificate of title, and specific performance with damages against PSB, the Co Spouses, and
the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II.

On August 21, 1991 and after trial on the merits, the Respondent Court dismissed Anama's complaint and upheld the
validity of the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Undaunted, Anama appealed, at first, to this Court, and after
failing to obtain a favorable decision, to the Supreme Court.

On January 29, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered judgment denying Anama's petition and sustaining the validity of
the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Its decision became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Pursuant thereto,
the Co Spouses moved for execution, which was granted by the Respondent Court per its Order, dated November 25,
2005.

Aggrieved, Anama twice moved for the reconsideration of the Respondent Court's November 25, 2005 Order arguing
that the Co Spouses' motion for execution is fatally defective. He averred that the Spouses' motion was pro forma
because it lacked the required affidavit of service and has a defective notice of hearing, hence, a mere scrap of paper.
The Respondent Court, however, denied Anama's motion(s) for reconsideration.

Dissatisfied, the petitioner questioned the RTC Order before the CA for taking judicial cognizance of the motion for
execution filed by spouses Tomas Co and Saturnina Baria (Spouses Co) which was (1) not in accord with Section 4 and
Section 15 of the Rules of Court because it was without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties; and (2) not in
accord with Section 6, Rule 15 in conjunction with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court because it lacks the
mandatory affidavit of service.

On March 31, 2008, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It reasoned out, among others, that the issue
on the validity of the deed of sale between respondents, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) and the Spouses Co, had long
been laid to rest considering that the January 29, 2004 Decision of this Court became final and executory on July 12,
2004. Hence, execution was already a matter of right on the part of the respondents and the RTC had the ministerial
duty to issue a writ of execution enforcing a final and executory decision.

The CA also stated that although a notice of hearing and affidavit of service in a motion are mandatory requirements,
the Spouses Co's motion for execution of a final and executory judgment could be acted upon by the RTC ex parte, and
therefore, excused from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

The CA was of the view that petitioner was not denied due process because he was properly notified of the motion for
execution of the Spouses Co. It stated that the act of the Spouses Co in resorting to personal delivery in serving their
motion for execution did not render the motion pro forma. It refused to apply a rigid application of the rules because it
would result in a manifest failure of justice considering that petitioner's position was nothing but an obvious dilatory
tactic designed to prevent the final disposition of Civil Case No. 44940.

Not satisfied with the CA's unfavorable disposition, petitioner filed this petition praying for the reversal thereof
presenting the following

ARGUMENTS:

THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE
COURT WITH REGARD TO THE REQUISITE NOTICE OF HEARING - IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTIES NOT TO
THE CLERK OF COURT, THE LATEST (THEN) BEING GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 167103, AUGUST 31, 2006,
500 SCRA 361; DE JESUS V. JUDGE DILAG, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1921, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 176; LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES V. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. 127198, MAY 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441; ATTY. JULIUS NERI V. JUDGE JESUS S. DE
LA PENA, A.M NO. RTJ-05-1896, APRIL 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 538; AND ALVAREZ V. DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1283, MARCH 3,
2004, 424 SCRA 213;

THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE
COURT WITH REGARD TO THE REQUISITE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE - IT SHOULD BE IN THE PROPER FORM AS PRESCRIBED
IN THE RULES AND IT SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE MOTION, THE LATEST (THEN) BEING ELLO V. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 141255, JUNE 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 406; LOPEZ DELA ROSA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. NO. 148470, APRIL 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 614; ALVAREZ V. DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1283, MARCH 3, 2004,
424 SCRA 213; EL REYNO HOMES, INC. V. ERNESTO ONG, 397 SCRA 563; CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 388 SCRA 72,
80-81; AND MERIS V. OFILADA, 293 SCRA 606;

THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON THE "FRAUD PERPETRATED UPON THE
COURT" BY RESPONDENT-SPOUSES AND THEIR LEAD COUNSEL.

SINCE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE RESPONDENT BANK'S
ACTION - THAT OF:
 Page54
ENGAGING IN A DAGDAG-BAWAS (LEGALLY "INTERCALATION") OPERATION OF A PORTION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES (TSN), OCTOBER 12, 1984, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 167, PASIG CITY, IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 44940, PAGES 54-55, AND

PRESENTING IT IN ITS APPELLEE'S BRIEF (IN THE OWNERSHIP CASE, CA-G.R. NO. CV-42663, LIKEWISE, BEFORE THE
RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT) BY CITING IT ON PAGE 14 OF SAID BRIEF, AS IMPLIEDLY COMING FROM THE TSN OF
THE TRIAL COURT.

THINKING THAT THEIR FALSIFIED APPELLEE'S BRIEF WAS MATERIAL IN SAID CA-G.R. NO. CV-42663.

IT COULD NOT RULE THAT THE SAME HAS BROUGHT ABOUT A CRUCIAL MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE
PARTIES WHICH MAKES EXECUTION INEQUITABLE (PUNCIA V. GERONA, 252 SCRA 424, 430-431), OR, IN THE WORDS OF
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL V. CA, G.R. NO. 75964, DECEMBER 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 84, 90, "THERE EXISTS A
COMPELLING REASON FOR STAYING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT."

Basically, petitioner argues that the respondents failed to substantially comply with the rule on notice and hearing
when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC. He claims that the notice of hearing in
the motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co was a mere scrap of paper because it was addressed to the Clerk of
Court and not to the parties. Thus, the motion for execution did not contain the required proof of service to the adverse
party. He adds that the Spouses Co and their counsel deliberately "misserved" the copy of their motion for execution,
thus, committing fraud upon the trial court.

Additionally, he claims that PSB falsified its appellee's brief by engaging in a "dagdag-bawas" ("intercalation")
operation in pages 54 to 55 of the TSN, dated October 12, 1984.

Position of the Spouses Co

The Spouses Co counter that the petition should be dismissed outright for raising both questions of facts and law in
violation of Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Spouses Co aver that petitioner attempts to resurrect the
issue that PSB cheated him in their transaction and that the RTC committed a "dagdag-bawas." According to the
Spouses Co, these issues had long been threshed out by this Court.

At any rate, they assert that they have substantially complied with the requirements of notice and hearing provided
under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioner's allegations, a
copy of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was given to petitioner through his principal counsel, the
Quasha Law Offices. At that time, the said law office had not formally withdrawn its appearance as counsel for
petitioner. Spouses Co argue that what they sought to be executed was the final judgment of the RTC duly affirmed by
the CA and this Court, thus, putting the issues on the merits to rest. The issuance of a writ of execution then becomes
a matter of right and the court's duty to issue the writ becomes ministerial.

Position of respondent PSB

PSB argues that the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 44940 entitled "Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine
Savings Bank, et. al."3 had long become final and executory as shown by the Entry of Judgment made by the Court on
July 12, 2004. The finality of the said decision entitles the respondents, by law, to the issuance of a writ of execution.
PSB laments that petitioner relies more on technicalities to frustrate the ends of justice and to delay the enforcement
of a final and executory decision.

As to the principal issue, PSB points out that the notice of hearing appended to the motion for execution filed by the
Spouses Co substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules since petitioner's then counsel of record was
duly notified and furnished a copy of the questioned motion for execution. Also, the motion for execution filed by the
Spouses Co was served upon and personally received by said counsel.

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the Spouses Co that petitioner's allegations on the "dagdag-bawas operation of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes," the "fraud perpetuated upon the Court by said spouses and their lead counsel," the "ownership,"
and "falsification" had long been laid to rest in the case of "Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine Savings Bank, et. al."4 For
said reason, the Court cannot review those final pronouncements. To do so would violate the rules as it would open a
final judgment to another reconsideration which is a prohibited procedure.

On the subject procedural question, the Court finds no compelling reason to stay the execution of the judgment
because the Spouses Co complied with the notice and hearing requirements under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15. Said
sections, as amended, provide:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the

Page55
adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to
ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the
time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. - No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without
proof of service thereof.
Pertinently, Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 13. Proof of service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the
official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place, and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of
facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon
its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee.

Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing and that
there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the
above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not
absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the
other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.

The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the judgment sought to be
executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the
issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. This right on the part of the
Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based on Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure provides, as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or
final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin
to issue the writ of execution.

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.-

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.- On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or
the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion,
order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.- A several, separate or partial judgment may be executed
under the same terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. (2a) [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]

As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and
hearing requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where
there must be notice to the adverse party. In the case of Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D.
Vda. De Hernandez,5 it was written:
It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not prescribe that a copy of the motion for the

Page56
execution of a final and executory judgment be served on the defeated party, like litigated motions such as a motion to
dismiss (Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule 37), or a motion for execution of judgment pending
appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of which instances a written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant on
the adverse party in order to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application.

It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had already become final and executory.
It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a litigation may, at any time within five (5) years after the entry thereof,
have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement and the court not only has the power and authority to order its
execution but it is its ministerial duty to do so. It has also been held that the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of
execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not
be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there
had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the
controversy has ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment
debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority. Defendant-appellant has
not shown that she falls in any of the situations afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment
is not appealable. Otherwise, as was said by this Court in Molina v. de la Riva, a case could never end. Once a court
renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial
function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is
purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is
fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial.

In Pamintuan v. Munoz, We ruled that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for
execution.

Also of the same stature is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right and the granting of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. Otherwise stated,
once sought by the prevailing party, execution of a final judgment will just follow as a matter of course. Hence, the
judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for execution nor he afforded prior hearing.

Absence of such advance notice to the judgment debtor does not constitute an infringement of the constitutional
guarantee of due process.

However, the established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require that a defendant who has been granted
an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in court should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have
a further notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to reach his property in satisfaction of the
judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential that he be given notice before the
issuance of an execution against his tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must take "notice of
what will follow," no further notice being "necessary to advance justice." [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

Likewise, in the case of Leonardo Lim De Mesa v. Hon. Court of Appeals,6 it was stated:

In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had already become final and
executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter of right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private
respondents, and is a mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the court. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be given
advance notice of the application for execution nor be afforded prior hearings thereon.

On the bases of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in holding that the failure
to serve a copy of the motion for execution on petitioner is not a fatal defect. In fact, there was no necessity for such
service. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

At any rate, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co. The records
clearly show that the motion for execution was duly served upon, and received by, petitioner's counsel-of-record, the
Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a "signed stamped received mark" appearing on said
pleading.7 The records are bereft of proof showing any written denial from petitioner's counsel of its valid receipt on
behalf of its client. Neither is there proof that the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices has formally withdrawn its
appearance as petitioner's counsel-of-record. Considering that there is enough proof shown on record of personal
delivery in serving the subject motion for execution, there was a valid compliance with the Rules, thus, no persuasive
reason to stay the execution of the subject final and executory judgment.

Moreover, this Court takes note that petitioner was particularly silent on the ruling of the CA that he was notified,
through his counsel, of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co when he filed a motion for reconsideration of the
RTC's order dated June 28, 2005, holding in abeyance said motion pending the resolution of petitioner's pleading filed
before this Court. He did not dispute the ruling of the CA either that the alleged defect in the Spouses Co's motion was

Page57
cured when his new counsel was served a copy of said motion for reconsideration of the RTC's June 28, 2005 Order.8

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the
literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its
authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules
of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of
motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was
not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.

Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of
hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where
the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The
Court held:
This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is
the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion
without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the
filing of the requisite pleading.

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for
the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon
the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the
court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an
opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully
oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.9 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

Likewise, in the case of KKK Foundation, Inc. v. Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas,10 this Court stated:

Anent the second issue, we have consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to
receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time
and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these
requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this
rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4)
where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.

A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a chance to be
heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and
answer the arguments in the motion. Records show that while Angeles's Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of the hearing. However, we still find that
petitioner was not denied procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial
court issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled
on the motion only after the reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to study
and comment on the motion for which reason, the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.

The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly.1?wphi1 Procedural due process is not based solely on a
mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally
construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any
action and proceeding. [Emphases supplied]

At any rate, it is undisputed that the August 21, 1991 RTC Decision11 in Civil Case No. 44940 is already final and
executory. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and
laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled
to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court's ministerial duty.12

The Court agrees with the respondents that petitioner mainly relies on mere technicalities to frustrate the ends of
justice and further delay the execution process and enforcement of the RTC Decision that has been affirmed by the CA
and this Court. The record shows that the case has been dragging on for almost 30 years since petitioner filed an

Page58
action for annulment of sale in 1982. From the time the Spouses Co bought the house from PSB in 1978, they have yet
to set foot on the subject house and lot.

To remand the case back to the lower court would further prolong the agony of the Spouses Co. The Court should not
allow this to happen. The Spouses Co should not be prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in their
favor. In another protracted case, the Court wrote:

As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15 years and the execution of this
Court's judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because De Leon filed a frivolous
appeal against the RTC's order of execution based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is
prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its favor. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor
General in its contention that every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate
all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this
litigation.13

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED

People vs. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000

FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City
(Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article
III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide. The following information was provided by the prosecution:

1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of appellant
and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second
floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw
appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a
neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house. Also found was a pencil case with
fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for gunpowder
nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition, nor
has he been given authority to carry firearms.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or
ammunition shall be penalized, unless no other crime was committed. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal
possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, G.R. No.
140230 | 2005-12-15

PLDT is a grantee of a franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7082 to install, operate and maintain a
telecommunications system throughout the Philippines.

For equipment, machineries and spare parts it imported for its business on different dates from October 1, 1992 to May
31, 1994, PLDT paid the BIR the amount of P164,510,953.00, broken down as follows: (a) compensating tax of
P126,713,037.00; advance sales tax of P12,460,219.00 and other internal revenue taxes of P25,337,697.00. For similar
importations made between March 1994 to May 31, 1994, PLDT paid P116,041,333.00 value-added tax (VAT).
On March 15, 1994, PLDT addressed a letter to the BIR seeking a confirmatory ruling on its tax exemption privilege

Page59
under Section 12 of R.A. 7082, which reads:

Sec. 12. The grantee ... shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings, and personal property,
exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. In
addition thereto, the grantee, ... shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the
telephone or other telecommunications businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or
assigns, and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof: Provided, That the
grantee ... shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code
pursuant to Sec. 2 of Executive Order No. 72 unless the latter enactment is amended or repealed, in which case the
amendment or repeal shall be applicable thereto. (Emphasis supplied).

Responding, the BIR issued on April 19, 1994 Ruling No. UN-140-94,[3] pertinently reading, as follows:

PLDT shall be subject only to the following taxes, to wit:

7. The 3% franchise tax on gross receipts which shall be in lieu of all taxes on its franchise or earnings thereof.

The "in lieu of all taxes" provision under Section 12 of RA 7082 clearly exempts PLDT from all taxes including the 10%
value-added tax (VAT) prescribed by Section 101 (a) of the same Code on its importations of equipment, machineries
and spare parts necessary in the conduct of its business covered by the franchise, except the aforementioned
enumerated taxes for which PLDT is expressly made liable.

In view thereof, this Office ... hereby holds that PLDT, is exempt from VAT on its importation of equipment, machineries
and spare parts ... needed in its franchise operations.

Armed with the foregoing BIR ruling, PLDT filed on December 2, 1994 a claim[4] for tax credit/refund of the VAT,
compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and other taxes it had been paying "in connection with its importation of
various equipment, machineries and spare parts needed for its operations". With its claim not having been acted upon
by the BIR, and obviously to forestall the running of the prescriptive period therefor, PLDT filed with the CTA a petition
for review,[5] therein seeking a refund of, or the issuance of a tax credit certificate in, the amount of P280,552,286.00,
representing compensating taxes, advance sales taxes, VAT and other internal revenue taxes alleged to have been
erroneously paid on its importations from October 1992 to May 1994. The petition was docketed in said court as CTA
Case No. 5178.

On February 18, 1998, the CTA rendered a decision[6] granting PLDT's petition, pertinently saying:

This Court has noted that petitioner has included in its claim receipts covering the period prior to December 16, 1992,
thus, prescribed and barred from recovery. In conclusion, We find that the petitioner is entitled to the reduced amount
of P223,265,276.00 after excluding from the final computation those taxes that were paid prior to December 16, 1992
as they fall outside the two-year prescriptive period for claiming for a refund as provided by law.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the instant petition meritorious and in accordance with law.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to REFUND or to ISSUE in favor of petitioner a Tax Credit Certificate in the
reduced amount of P223,265,276.00 representing erroneously paid value-added taxes, compensating taxes, advance
sales taxes and other BIR taxes on its importation of equipments (sic), machineries and spare parts for the period
covering the taxable years 1992 to 1994.

Noticeably, the CTA decision, penned by then Associate Justice Ramon O. de Veyra, with then CTA Presiding Judge
Ernesto D. Acosta, concurring, is punctuated by a dissenting opinion[7] of Associate Judge Amancio Q. Saga who
maintained that the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" found in Section 12 of R.A. No. 7082, supra, refers to exemption from
"direct taxes only" and does not cover "indirect taxes", such as VAT, compensating tax and advance sales tax.

In time, the BIR Commissioner moved for a reconsideration but the CTA, in its Resolution[8] of May 7, 1998, denied the
motion, with Judge Amancio Q. Saga reiterating his dissent.[9]

Unable to accept the CTA decision, the BIR Commissioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of
petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. No. 47895.

As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in the herein challenged Decision[10] dated September 17, 1999,
dismissed the BIR's petition, thereby effectively affirming the CTA's judgment.

Relying on its ruling in an earlier case between the same parties and involving the same issue - CA-G.R. SP No. 40811,
decided 16 February 1998 - the appellate court partly wrote in its assailed decision:

This Court has already spoken on the issue of what taxes are referred to in the phrase "in lieu of all taxes" found in
Section 12 of R.A. 7082. There are no reasons to deviate from the ruling and the same must be followed pursuant to
the doctrine of stare decisis. xxx. "Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decision and disturb not what is

Page60
settled."

Hence, this recourse by the BIR Commissioner on the lone assigned error that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF VALUE-ADDED
TAXES, COMPENSATING TAXES, ADVANCE SALES TAXES AND OTHER BIR TAXES ON ITS IMPORTATIONS, BY VIRTUE OF
THE PROVISION IN ITS FRANCHISE THAT THE 3% FRANCHISE TAX ON ITS GROSS RECEIPTS SHALL BE IN LIEU OF ALL
TAXES ON ITS FRANCHISE OR EARNINGS THEREOF.

There is no doubt that, insofar as the Court of Appeals is concerned, the issue petitioner presently raises had been
resolved by that court in CA-G.R. SP No. 40811, entitled Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine Long Distance
Company. There, the Sixteenth Division of the appellate court declared that under the express provision of Section 12
of R.A. 7082, supra, "the payment [by PLDT] of the 3% franchise tax of [its] gross receipts shall be in lieu of all taxes"
exempts PLDT from payment of compensating tax, advance sales tax, VAT and other internal revenue taxes on its
importation of various equipment, machinery and spare parts for the use of its telecommunications system.

Dissatisfied with the CA decision in that case, the BIR Commissioner initially filed with this Court a motion for time to
file a petition for review, docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 134386. However, on the last day for the filing of the
intended petition, the then BIR Commissioner had a change of heart and instead manifested[11] that he will no longer
pursue G.R. No. 134386, there being no compelling grounds to disagree with the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R.
40811. Consequently, on September 28, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution[12] in G.R. No. 134386 notifying the
parties that "no petition" was filed in said case and that the CA judgment sought to be reviewed therein "has now
become final and executory". Pursuant to said Resolution, an Entry of Judgment[13] was issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 40811. Hence, the CA's dismissal of CA-G.R. No. 47895 on the additional ground of stare decisis.

Under the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, a point of law already established will, generally, be followed
by the same determining court and by all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is
raised.[14] For reasons needing no belaboring, however, the Court is not at all concluded by the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in its earlier CA-G.R. SP No. 47895.

The Court has time and again stated that the rule on stare decisis promotes stability in the law and should, therefore,
be accorded respect. However, blind adherence to precedents, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important
than anything else is that the court is right,[15] thus its duty to abandon any doctrine found to be in violation of the
law in force.[16]

As it were, the former BIR Commissioner's decision not to pursue his petition in G.R. No. 134386 denied the BIR, at
least as early as in that case, the opportunity to obtain from the Court an authoritative interpretation of Section 12 of
R.A. 7082. All is, however, not lost. For, the government is not estopped by acts or errors of its agents, particularly on
matters involving taxes. Corollarily, the erroneous application of tax laws by public officers does not preclude the
subsequent correct application thereof.[17] Withal, the errors of certain administrative officers, if that be the case,
should never be allowed to jeopardize the government's financial position.[18]

Hence, the need to address the main issue tendered herein.

According to the Court of Appeals, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause found in Section 12 of PLDT's franchise (R.A. 7082)
covers all taxes, whether direct or indirect; and that said section states, in no uncertain terms, that PLDT's payment of
the 3% franchise tax on all its gross receipts from businesses transacted by it under its franchise is in lieu of all taxes
on the franchise or earnings thereof. In fine, the appellate court, agreeing with PLDT, posits the view that the word "all"
encompasses any and all taxes collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), save those specifically
mentioned in PLDT's franchise, such as income and real property taxes.

The BIR Commissioner excepts. He submits that the exempting "in lieu of all taxes" clause covers direct taxes only,
adding that for indirect taxes to be included in the exemption, the intention to include must be specific and
unmistakable. He thus faults the Court of Appeals for erroneously declaring PLDT exempt from payment of VAT and
other indirect taxes on its importations. To the Commissioner, PLDT's claimed entitlement to tax refund/credit is
without basis inasmuch as the 3% franchise tax being imposed on PLDT is not a substitute for or in lieu of indirect
taxes.

The sole issue at hand is whether or not PLDT, given the tax component of its franchise, is exempt from paying VAT,
compensating taxes, advance sales taxes and internal revenue taxes on its importations.

Based on the possibility of shifting the incidence of taxation, or as to who shall bear the burden of taxation, taxes may
be classified into either direct tax or indirect tax.
In context, direct taxes are those that are exacted from the very person who, it is intended or desired, should pay

Page61
them;[19] they are impositions for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business he is engaged in.
[20]

On the other hand, indirect taxes are those that are demanded, in the first instance, from, or are paid by, one person in
the expectation and intention that he can shift the burden to someone else.[21] Stated elsewise, indirect taxes are
taxes wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted or
passed on to another person, such as when the tax is imposed upon goods before reaching the consumer who
ultimately pays for it. When the seller passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the
liability to pay it, to the purchaser as part of the price of goods sold or services rendered.

To put the situation in graphic terms, by tacking the VAT due to the selling price, the seller remains the person
primarily and legally liable for the payment of the tax. What is shifted only to the intermediate buyer and ultimately to
the final purchaser is the burden of the tax.[22] Stated differently, a seller who is directly and legally liable for
payment of an indirect tax, such as the VAT on goods or services, is not necessarily the person who ultimately bears
the burden of the same tax. It is the final purchaser or end-user of such goods or services who, although not directly
and legally liable for the payment thereof, ultimately bears the burden of the tax.[23]

There can be no serious argument that PLDT, vis- -vis its payment of internal revenue taxes on its importations in
question, is effectively claiming exemption from taxes not falling under the category of direct taxes. The claim covers
VAT, advance sales tax and compensating tax.

The NIRC classifies VAT as "an indirect tax ... the amount of [which] may be shifted or passed on to the buyer,
transferee or lessee of the goods".[24] As aptly pointed out by Judge Amancio Q. Saga in his dissent in C.T.A. Case No.
5178, the 10% VAT on importation of goods partakes of an excise tax levied on the privilege of importing articles. It is
not a tax on the franchise of a business enterprise or on its earnings. It is imposed on all taxpayers who import goods
(unless such importation falls under the category of an exempt transaction under Sec. 109 of the Revenue Code)
whether or not the goods will eventually be sold, bartered, exchanged or utilized for personal consumption. The VAT on
importation replaces the advance sales tax payable by regular importers who import articles for sale or as raw
materials in the manufacture of finished articles for sale.[25]

Advance sales tax has the attributes of an indirect tax because the tax-paying importer of goods for sale or of raw
materials to be processed into merchandise can shift the tax or, to borrow from Philippine Acetylene Co, Inc. vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[26] lay the "economic burden of the tax", on the purchaser, by subsequently
adding the tax to the selling price of the imported article or finished product.

Compensating tax also partakes of the nature of an excise tax payable by all persons who import articles, whether in
the course of business or not.[27] The rationale for compensating tax is to place, for tax purposes, persons purchasing
from merchants in the Philippines on a more or less equal basis with those who buy directly from foreign countries.[28]

It bears to stress that the liability for the payment of the indirect taxes lies only with the seller of the goods or services,
not in the buyer thereof. Thus, one cannot invoke one's exemption privilege to avoid the passing on or the shifting of
the VAT to him by the manufacturers/suppliers of the goods he purchased.[29] Hence, it is important to determine if
the tax exemption granted to a taxpayer specifically includes the indirect tax which is shifted to him as part of the
purchase price, otherwise it is presumed that the tax exemption embraces only those taxes for which the buyer is
directly liable.[30]

Time and again, the Court has stated that taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception. Accordingly, statutes
granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.[31] To him, therefore, who claims a refund or exemption from tax payments rests the burden of justifying the
exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.[32]

As may be noted, the clause "in lieu of all taxes" in Section 12 of RA 7082 is immediately followed by the limiting or
qualifying clause "on this franchise or earnings thereof", suggesting that the exemption is limited to taxes imposed
directly on PLDT since taxes pertaining to PLDT's franchise or earnings are its direct liability. Accordingly, indirect
taxes, not being taxes on PLDT's franchise or earnings, are outside the purview of the "in lieu" provision.

If we were to adhere to the appellate court's interpretation of the law that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause encompasses
the totality of all taxes collectible under the Revenue Code, then, the immediately following limiting clause "on this
franchise and its earnings" would be nothing more than a pure jargon bereft of effect and meaning whatsoever.
Needless to stress, this kind of interpretation cannot be accorded a governing sway following the familiar legal maxim
redendo singula singulis meaning, take the words distributively and apply the reference. Under this principle, each
word or phrase must be given its proper connection in order to give it proper force and effect, rendering none of them
useless or superfluous. [33]

Significantly, in Manila Electric Company [Meralco] vs. Vera,[34] the Court declared the relatively broader exempting
clause "shall be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatsoever nature ... upon the privileges earnings, income
franchise ... of the grantee" written in par. # 9 of Meralco's franchise as not so all encompassing as to embrace indirect

Page62
tax, like compensating tax. There, the Court said:

It is a well-settled rule or principle in taxation that a compensating tax ... is an excise tax ... one that is imposed on the
performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or the enjoyment of a privilege. A tax levied upon property
because of its ownership is a direct tax, whereas one levied upon property because of its use is an excise duty. ....

The compensating tax being imposed upon ... MERALCO, is an impost on its use of imported articles and is not in the
nature of a direct tax on the articles themselves, the latter tax falling within the exemption. Thus, in International
Business Machine Corporation vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, ... which involved the collection of a compensating tax
from the plaintiff-petitioner on business machines imported by it, this Court stated in unequivocal terms that "it is not
the act of importation that is taxed under section 190 but the uses of imported goods not subjected to a sales tax"
because the "compensating tax was expressly designated as a substitute to make up or compensate for the revenue
lost to the government through the avoidance of sales taxes by means of direct purchases abroad.

xxx If it had been the legislative intent to exempt MERALCO from paying a tax on the use of imported equipments, the
legislative body could have easily done so by expanding the provision of paragraph 9 and adding to the exemption
such words as "compensating tax" or "purchases from abroad for use in its business," and the like.

It may be so that in Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr.[35] the Court held that an exemption from "all taxes" granted to the
National Power Corporation (NPC) under its charter[36] includes both direct and indirect taxes. But far from providing
PLDT comfort, Maceda in fact supports the case of herein petitioner, the correct lesson of Maceda being that an
exemption from "all taxes" excludes indirect taxes, unless the exempting statute, like NPC's charter, is so couched as
to include indirect tax from the exemption. Wrote the Court:

xxx However, the amendment under Republic Act No. 6395 enumerated the details covered by the exemption.
Subsequently, P.D. 380, made even more specific the details of the exemption of NPC to cover, among others, both
direct and indirect taxes on all petroleum products used in its operation. Presidential Decree No. 938 [NPC's amended
charter) amended the tax exemption by simplifying the same law in general terms. It succinctly exempts NPC from "all
forms of taxes, duties fees ...."

The use of the phrase "all forms" of taxes demonstrate the intention of the law to give NPC all the tax exemptions it
has been enjoying before. ....

It is evident from the provisions of P.D. No. 938 that its purpose is to maintain the tax exemption of NPC from all forms
of taxes including indirect taxes as provided under R.A. No. 6395 and P.D. 380 if it is to attain its goals. (Italics in the
original; words in bracket added)

Of similar import is what we said in Borja vs. Collector of Internal Revenue.[37] There, the Court upheld the decision of
the CTA denying a claim for refund of the compensating taxes paid on the importation of materials and equipment by a
grantee of a heat and power legislative franchise containing an "in lieu" provision, rationalizing as follows:

xxx Moreover, the petitioner's alleged exemption from the payment of compensating tax in the present case is not
clear or expressed; unlike the exemption from the payment of income tax which was clear and expressed in the Carcar
case. Unless it appears clearly and manifestly that an exemption is intended, the provision is to be construed strictly
against the party claiming exemption. xxx.

Jurisprudence thus teaches that imparting the "in lieu of all taxes" clause a literal meaning, as did the Court of Appeals
and the CTA before it, is fallacious. It is basic that in construing a statute, it is the duty of courts to seek the real intent
of the legislature, even if, by so doing, they may limit the literal meaning of the broad language.[38]

It cannot be over-emphasized that tax exemption represents a loss of revenue to the government and must, therefore,
not rest on vague inference. When claimed, it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer who must prove that he
falls under the exception. And, if an exemption is found to exist, it must not be enlarged by construction, since the
reasonable presumption is that the state has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that, unless
the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be extended beyond dispute in ordinary cases.
[39]

All told, we fail to see how Section 12 of RA 7082 operates as granting PLDT blanket exemption from payment of
indirect taxes, which, in the ultimate analysis, are not taxes on its franchise or earnings. PLDT has not shown its
eligibility for the desired exemption. None should be granted.

As a final consideration, the Court takes particular stock, as the CTA earlier did, of PLDT's allegation that the Bureau of
Customs assessed the company for advance sales tax and compensating tax for importations entered between
October 1, 1992 and May 31, 1994 when the value-added tax system already replaced, if not totally eliminated,
advance sales and compensating taxes.[40] Indeed, pursuant to Executive Order No. 273[41] which took effect on
January 1, 1988, a multi-stage value-added tax was put into place to replace the tax on original and subsequent sales
tax.[42] It stands to reason then, as urged by PLDT, that compensating tax and advance sales tax were no longer

Page63
collectible internal revenue taxes under the NILRC when the Bureau of Customs made the assessments in question and
collected the corresponding tax. Stated a bit differently, PLDT was no longer under legal obligation to pay
compensating tax and advance sales tax on its importation from 1992 to 1994.

Parenthetically, petitioner has not made an issue about PLDT's allegations concerning the abolition of the provisions of
the Tax Code imposing the payment of compensating and advance sales tax on importations and the non-existence of
these taxes during the period under review. On the contrary, petitioner admits that the VAT on importation of goods
has "replace[d] the compensating tax and advance sales tax under the old Tax Code".[43]

Given the above perspective, the amount PLDT paid in the concept of advance sales tax and compensating tax on the
1992 to 1994 importations were, in context, erroneous tax payments and would theoretically be refundable. It should
be emphasized, however, that, such importations were, when made, already subject to VAT.

Factoring in the fact that a portion of the claim was barred by prescription, the CTA had determined that PLDT is
entitled to a total refundable amount of P94,673,422.00 (P87,257,031.00 of compensating tax + P7,416,391.00 =
P94,673,422.00). Accordingly, it behooves the BIR to grant a refund of the advance sales tax and compensating tax in
the total amount of P94,673,422.00, subject to the condition that PLDT present proof of payment of the corresponding
VAT on said transactions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47895 dated
September 17, 1999 is MODIFIED. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ORDERED to issue a Tax Credit Certificate
or to refund to PLDT only the of P94,673,422.00 advance sales tax and compensating tax erroneously collected by the
Bureau of Customs from October 1, 1992 to May 31, 1994, less the VAT which may have been due on the importations
in question, but have otherwise remained uncollected.

SO ORDERED.

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, G.R.
No. L-23623, June 30, 1977

FACTS:
The reversal by respondent Court of Tax Appeals of a determination by the then Acting Commissioner of Customs, the
late Norberto Romualdez, Jr., that private respondent Manila Electric Company was not exempt from the payment of
the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 for shipment to it of insulating oil, respondent Court entertaining
the contrary view led to this petition for review. The contention pressed in support of the petition is that as a tax
exemption is to be construed strictly, the decision of the respondent Court, which assumed that insulating oil can be
considered as insulators must be reversed and set aside. The appealed decision of respondent Court in the light of
applicable authorities supplies the best refutation of such contention. It must be sustained.

The appealed decision set forth that petitioner Manila Electric Co., nor private respondent, in appealing from a
determination by the then Acting Commissioner of Customs, now petitioner, claims that it is exempt from the special
import tax not only by virtue of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, which exempts from said tax equipment and spare
parts for use in industries, but also under Paragraph 9, Part Two, of its franchise, which expressly exempts is insulators
from all taxes of whatever kind and nature. It then made reference to the franchise of private respondent Manila
Electric Co.: Par. 9. The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant (not
including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are or may be
hereafter required by law to pay. In consideration of Part Two of the franchise herein granted, to wit, the right to build
and maintain in the City of Manila and its suburbs a plant for the conveying and furnishing of electric current for light,
heat, and power, and to charge for the same, the grantee shall pay to the City of Manila two and one-half per centum
of the gross earnings received from the business under this franchise in the city and its suburbs: and shall be in lieu
of all taxes and assessments of whatsoever nature, and by whatsoever authority upon the privileges, earnings,
income, franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which taxes and assessments
the grantee is hereby expressly exempted. It noted that the above exempts it from all taxes of whatever nature, and
by whatever authority, with respect to its insulators in consideration for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross
earnings.

ISSUE: Does the insulating oil in question come within the meaning of the term insulator ?

Insulating oils are mineral oils of high di-electrics strength and high flash point employed in circuit breakers, switches,
transformers and other electric apparatus. An oil with a flash point of 285 F and fire point of 310 F is considered
safe. A clean, well- refined oil will have a minimum dielectric of 22,00 volts, but the presence of a slow as 0.01% water
will reduce the di-electric strength drastically. The insulating oils, therefore, cannot be stored for long periods because
of the danger of absorbing moisture. Impurities such as acids or alkalies also detract from the strength of the oil. Since
insulating oils are used for cooling as well as for insulating, the viscosity should be low enough for free circulation, and
they should not gum. (Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8th Edition 1956, pp. 421-423.) .
The last portion of the appealed decision explained why the determination of the Acting Commissioner of Customs

Page64
must be reversed: There is no question that insulating oils of the type imported by petitioner are used for cooling as
well as for insulating, and when used in oil circuit breakers, they are required to maintain insulation between the
contacts inside the tank and the tank itself. The decision appealed from not being in accordance with law, the same
is hereby reversed. Respondent is ordered to refund to petitioner the sum of P995.00 within thirty days from the date
this decision becomes final, without pronouncement as to costs. It was therein made clear that private respondent
was not liable for the payment of the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394.

HELD: the petition for review is dismissed. No costs.

As noted at the outset, the decision speaks for itself. It cannot be stigmatized as suffering from any flaw that would call
for its reversal.

It is to be admitted, as contended by petitioner, that this Court is committed to the principle that an exemption from
taxation must be justified by words too clear to be misread. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from
taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris. 11 Such a ruling was reaffirmed in
subsequent decisions. It does not mean, however, that petitioner should prevail, for as was unequivocally set forth in
the leading ease of Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes. It is true that in the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions (and deductions are of this nature) are not
favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized
principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the courts
seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. In this ease, we
find the provision of Section 186-A -whenever a tax free product is utilized, all encompassing to comprehend tax-
free raw materials, even if imported. Where the law provided no qualification for the granting of the privilege, the court
is not at liberty to supply any. That is what was done by respondent Court of Tax Appeals. It showed fealty to this
equally well. settled doctrine. It construed the statutory provision as it is written. It is precluded, in the language of
;the Republic Flour Mills opinion, considering that the law is clear and ambiguous, to look further for any legislative
intent, as the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. If there is an extended discussion
of this point, it is due solely to the emphasis placed on the matter by petitioner.

As stated in another decision, only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of evidence, are reviewable by this
Court. The facts then as above ascertained cannot be disturbed. In our latest decision, there is a categorical assertion
that where the question is one of fact, it is no longer reviewable. 17 Such a doctrine is not of limited application. It is a
recognition of the wide discretion enjoyed by the Court of Tax Appeals in construing tax statutes. Nor as a matter of
principle is it advisable for this Court to set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax
Appeals which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax
problems and has necessarily developed an expertice on the subject, unless, as did not happen here, there has been
an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority. The Vi Ve decision has some relevance. There the stand of the state
that the Court of Tax Appeals could rightfully determine that priopionic glycine is the same as glutamic acid was
considered as well within the authority of respondent Court. It would be an affront to the sense of fairness and of
justice if in another case, respondent Court, in the exercise of its discretionary authority, after determining that
insulating oil comes within the term insulator, is not be upheld.

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 100970, September 2, 1992

FACTS:

On October 22, 1986, deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation
with his parents, spouses Julia and Carlos Surposa, and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all
surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, the insured, Carlie
Surposa, died on October 18, 1988 as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the three (3) unidentified men.
Private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner
insurance company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of the
coverage of the insurance policy. Private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which rendered
a favorable response for the respondent. The appellate court ruled likewise. Petitioner filed this petition alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the principle of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a
personal accident insurance policy, since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded in said
insurance policy considering that the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and
intentional act of the assailant. Therefore, said death was committed with deliberate intent which, by the very nature
of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified.

ISSUE: Whether or not the insurer is liable for the payment of the insurance premiums

HELD:

Yes, the insurer is still liable. Contracts of insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly
against the insurer. Thus ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its
beneficiary. The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts have not acquired any technical

Page65
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken
to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual,
and unforeseen. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if
something unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the
protection of the policies insuring against death or injury from accident. In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that
Carlie Surposa died in the course of an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of
these crimes. Neither can it be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to
danger considering that he was just going home after attending a festival. Furthermore, the personal accident
insurance policy involved herein specifically enumerated only ten (10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches to
petitioner insurance company for any injury, disability or loss suffered by the insured as a result of any of the
stimulated causes. The principle of " expresso unius exclusio alterius" the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing is therefore applicable in the instant case since murder and assault, not having been expressly
included in the enumeration of the circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be
considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance company from liability for, any injury, disability or loss
suffered by the insured. Thus, the failure of the petitioner insurance company to include death resulting from murder
or assault among the prohibited risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself
from liability for such death.

Ong Chia vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 127240, March, 27, 2000

FACTS:

The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of
C.A. No. 473, 7 and to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he
failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it
had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance
with 7.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appellants brief without having been presented and
formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence justified the reversal of the
Trial Courts decision.

HELD:

YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.

RATIO:

It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of
substantial compliance with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.

[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the
opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to
object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997

FACTS:
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June
13, 1989 dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it
has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive
the trial court of its authority to grant the application. Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court
of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated
November 19, 1991. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that a newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an

Page66
original land registration case mandatory or directory?

HELD:
YES. The petition was granted.

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue
an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than
ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with.

The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no
alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice
to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one daughter. After 3 years,
the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub.
One day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her servants that she was going to
Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed
because the child was in Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didnt find them and the barangay office issued a
certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA
which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the
ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because it will result to
iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred from one place
to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases
within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and
contradiction. The literal interpretation of exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the
rights and promote welfare of children.

Ocampo v. CA, GR No. 79060, December 8, 1989

Facts: Aniceto Ocampo built his house illegally inside the UP grounds. Despite being apprehended several times, he
continued the construction. An information was thereafter filed against accused Ocampo charging him with violation of
PD No. 772 (Penalizing squatting and other similar acts).

After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner waived the presentation of his evidence and instead filed a motion to
dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on the ground that the prosecution did not present Transfer Certificate of Title No.
192689 to prove ownership of the land in question and that it failed to prove that the land on which the petitioner
constructed his house belongs to the University of the Philippines.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The trial court found Aniceto Ocampo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.

He appealed the case and argued that the quantum of guilt was not met and that he was deprived of the opportunity
to adduce evidence in his defense.

Issue: Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence) filed by Ocampo constituted a bar for him to
present evidence.
 Page67
Held: Yes, the motion to dismiss filed by Ocampo constituted a bar for him to present evidence. Ratio: Sec. 23, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a
non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion
within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer it shall not be reviewable
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

In the case at bar, nowhere does the records show that accused-petitioner's demurrer to evidence was filed with prior
leave of court. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, accused-petitioner waives his right to
present evidence to substantiate his defense a gamble which he lost. As the Solicitor General aptly opined. This is
exactly what petitioner did.And in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.. Petitioner gambled on securing an acquittal. And he cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his
own evidence.

Pahilan vs. Tabalba, COMELEC and Judge Tabano Jr., G.R. No. 110170, February 21, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner Pahilan and private respondent Tabalba were candidates for Mayor during the local elections. The Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Tabalba as the duly elected Mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest which he sent by
registered mail, addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, attaching thereto P200.00 in cash as
payment for docket fees. In a letter dated May 28, 1992, the OIC-Clerk of Court informed Pahilan that the correct fees
that were supposed to be paid amounted to P620.00, and that, accordingly, the petition would not be entered in the
court docket and summons would not be issued pending payment of the balance of P420.00. On June 16, 1992,
petitioner paid the required balance in the total amount P470.00 after learning.

ISSUE: Whether or not the notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief.

HELD:

YES. Order of the Commission on Elections and the Order of the RTC in Election Case No. 3(92) are hereby reversed
and set aside.

RATIO:

The rules which apply to ordinary civil actions may not necessarily serve the purpose of election cases, especially if we
consider the fact that election laws are to be accorded utmost liberality in their interpretation and application, bearing
in mind always that the will of the people must be upheld. Ordinary civil actions would generally involve private
interests while all elections cases are, at all times, and invested with public interest which cannot be defeated by mere
procedural or technical infirmities.

[I]n the present case, the docket fee was paid (P200.00) except that the amount given was not correct. Considering
the fact that there was an honest effort on the part of herein petitioner to pay the full amount of docket fees, we are
not inclined to insist on a stringent application of the rules.

JAIME TAN, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in
question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the
same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within which to
redeem or repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem the property until his

Page68
death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tans heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for
reformation of instrument. Docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. 19049-88, the complaint alleged that, while Tan and the
Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable
mortgage.

Barely hours after the complaint was stamped received, the Magdangals were able to have Tans title over the lot in
question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470. This development prompted the heirs of Tan, who
were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental complaint.

The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is that on June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered judgment finding for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff therein. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

1. The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits B, B-1) is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby
declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;

2. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;

3. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits and to fully give effect to the true intention of the parties, upon the
payment of the aforesaid amount, TCT No. T-134470 in the name of defendants Jose Magdangal and Estrella
Magdangal (Exh. 13) and shall be deemed canceled and null and void and TCT No. T-72067 in the name of
Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Valles Tan (Exh. A) be reinstated.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Annex B, Petition; Emphasis added).

From the above, the Magdangals appealed to this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657.

In a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, this Court, thru its then Special Third Division, affirmed in toto the
appealed decision of the lower court. Copy of this affirmatory judgment was each received by the Magdangals and Tan,
Jr. on October 5, 1995.

On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of this Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said Decision has on October
21, 1995 become final and executory (Annex L, Petition; Emphasis added).

On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF
POSSESSION, therein alleging that they did not appeal from the aforesaid decision of this Court, adding [T]hat the
appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995 or up to
October 20, 1995, which the 120 days redemption period commences. And noting that the redemption period has
expired without Tan, Jr. exercising his option, the Magdangals thus prayed that the title in the name of Jaime C. Tan and
Praxedes Tan be consolidated and confirmed in the name of the (Magdangals) x x x and pending such issuance, a writ
of possession be ordered issued (Annex C, Petition).

In opposition to this motion (Annex F, Petition), Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things, that until an entry of judgment has
been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the court a quo in
this case cannot be considered final and executory. Pressing the point, Tan, Jr., citing Cueto vs. Collantes, infra., would
then assert that the period of redemption on his part commenced to run from receipt of entry of judgment in CA-G.R.
CV No. 33657.

Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution dated March 27, 1996, which he filed directly with this court, prayed this
court to direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88. In a related
move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION therein advising the court a quo of his intention
to redeem the property in question and of the fact that, on such date, he has deposited with its clerk of court the
repurchase price, plus interest, as required by its original decision. By way of relief, Tan, Jr. prayed that the Magdangals
be ordered to claim the amount thus deposited and the Register of Deeds of Davao City, to reinstate the title of Jaime
Tan and Praxedes Tan.

Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION of the Magdangals
(Annex C, Petition), MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr. (Annex I, Petition), the court a quo presided by the
respondent judge, came out with the first challenged order of June 10, 1996 (Annex N, Petition), dispositively reading,

Page69
as follows:

WHEREFORE, x x x the Motion for Consolidation and a Writ of Possession is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

The deposit of the amount of P116,032.00 made by plaintiff with the Office of the Clerk of Court x x x on April 17, 1996
is hereby considered full payment of the redemption price and the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to deliver said
amount to herein defendants.

The Register of Deeds of Davao City x x x is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. T-134470 in the name of Jose
Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal and, thereafter, to reinstate TCT No. 72067 in the name of Jaime C. Tan and
Praxedes Valles Tan and to submit her compliance thereto within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.

Explaining her action, the respondent judge wrote in the same order:

Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120 days period for plaintiff to
pay the amount of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment x x x which
was March 13, 1996. The plaintiff made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well within the 120-day period mandated by the
decision of this Court.

In due time, the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration. However, in her next assailed order of July 24, 1996 (Annex
R, Petition), the respondent judge denied the motion for being pro-forma and fatally defective.[3]

Petitioner assails the aforequoted Decision as follows:

I. Petitioners right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals rendered a judgment on the merits of private
respondents petition without granting to petitioner the opportunity to controvert the same.

II. Appeal not certiorari was the appropriate remedy of private respondents as there was no grave abuse of discretion
as to amount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge. Neither is delay in resolving the main
case a ground for giving due course to the petition.

III. Cueto vs. Collantes, 97 Phil. 325, was disregarded by the Court of Appeals in resolving the petition of private
respondents. It is still good case law and was in effect made a part of section 2 of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on Foreclosure of Mortgage.

IV. The St. Dominic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 242 case is not applicable to the case at bar; on the
other hand the ruling in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. de La Riva, 46 Phil. 827, applies.

V. Equity considerations justify giving due course to this petition.[4](emphasis ours)

We will immediately resolve the key issue of what rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the
trial court by the petitioner.

The operative facts show that in its Decision of June 4, 1991, the trial court held that: (1) the contract between the
parties is not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage; and (2) petitioner Tan should pay to the respondents
Magdangal within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid.[5]

On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657, the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court in toto. Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on October 5, 1995. On
March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision
has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory.[6]

The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession.[7]They alleged
that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. They reckoned that the said period began 15 days
after October 5, 1995, the date when the finality of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court
commenced to run.

On the other hand, petitioner filed on March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in the appellate court praying that it
direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88.[8]On April 17, 1996,
petitioner deposited with the clerk of court the repurchase price of the lot plus interest as ordered by the decision.
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day

Page70
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the appellate court or from March 13,
1996.[9]The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set aside the
ruling of the trial court.

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within
the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of
entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date
of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the
clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory. (2a, R36)

SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered
to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to any appropriate officer for its enforcement.

In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals at a time that it is in
possession of the original record or the record on appeal, the resolution granting such motion shall be transmitted to
the lower court from which the case originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment or final order to be
executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue the proper writ for its enforcement.

This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs. Collantes as follows:[10]

The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of the lower court that plaintiff can still exercise his right of
redemption notwithstanding the expiration of the 90-day period fixed in the original decision and, therefore,
defendants should execute the deed of reconveyance required in said decision. Appellants contend that, the final
judgment of the Court of Appeals having been entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-day period for the exercise of the right
of redemption has long expired, it appearing that plaintiff deposited the redemption money with the clerk of court only
on October 17, 1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days. Appellee brands this computation as erroneous, or one not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules of court.

Appellees contention should be sustained. The original decision provides that appellee may exercise his right of
redemption within the period of 90 days from the date the judgment has become final. It should be noted that appellee
had appealed from this decision. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals and final judgment was entered on
July 8, 1953. Does this mean that the judgment became final on that date?

Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification. Once a decision is rendered by the Court of Appeals a party
may appeal therefrom by certiorari by filing with the Supreme Court a petition within 10 days from the date of entry of
such decision (Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of judgment is made after it has become final, i.e., upon the expiration of
15 days after notice thereof to the parties (Section 8, Rule 53, as modified by a resolution of the Supreme Court dated
October 1, 1945). But, as Chief Justice Moran has said, such finality *** is subject to the aggrieved partys right of filing
a petition for certiorari under this section, which means that the Court of Appeals shall remand the case to the lower
court for the execution of its judgment, only after the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of such judgment, if no
petition for certiorari is filed within that period. (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 950) It would
therefore appear that the date of entry of judgment of the Court of Appeals is suspended when a petition for review is
filed to await the final entry of the resolution or decision of the Supreme Court.

Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for review within the reglementary period, which was dismissed
by resolution of July 6, 1953, and for lack of a motion for reconsideration the entry of final judgment was made on
August 7, 1953, it follows that the 90-day period within which appellee may exercise his right of redemption should be
counted from said date, August 7, 1953. And appellee having exercised such right on October 17, 1953 by depositing
the redemption money with the clerk of court, it is likewise clear that the motion be filed for the exercise of such right
is well taken and is within the purview of the decision of the lower court.[11]

On April 18, 1994, this Court issued Circular No. 24-94, viz:

TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC APPROVING AND PROMULGATING THE REVISED PROVISION ON
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS, SPECIFICALLY IN APPEALED CASES, AND AMENDING SECTION 1, RULE 39 OF THE RULES
OF COURT
 Page71
It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases cannot be promptly enforced
because of undue administrative delay in the remand of the records to the court of origin, aggravated at times by
misplacement or misdelivery of said records. The Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court has
drafted proposals including a provision which can remedy the procedural impasse created by said contingencies.

Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a solution to the
aforestated problems, the Court Resolved to approve and promulgate the following section thereof on execution of
judgments, amending Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied for in the lower
court from which the action originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies
of the judgment or judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to
the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin
to issue the writ of execution.

This resolution shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1994.

April 18, 1994.

(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice

The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section
1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or
final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin
to issue the writ of execution.

The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:[12]

1. The term final order is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the issue of appealability or on the
issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is final if it disposes of the action, as distinguished from an
interlocutory order which leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case (De la
Cruz, et al. vs. Paras, et al., L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of binding effect or whether it can be subject of
execution, an order is final or executory after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal and no appeal has been
perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30, 1959; cf. Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000,
Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla vs. CA, et al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).

2. On the aspect of appealability, these revised Rules use the adjective final with respect to orders and resolutions,
since to terminate a case the trial courts issue orders while the appellate courts and most of the quasi-judicial
agencies issue resolutions. Judgments are not so qualified since the use of the so-called interlocutory judgments is not
favored in this jurisdiction, while the categorization of an order or a resolution for purposes of denoting that it is
appealable is to distinguish them from interlocutory orders or resolutions. However, by force of extended usage the
phrase final and executory judgment is sometimes used and tolerated, although the use of executory alone would
suffice. These observations also apply to the several and separate judgments contemplated in Rule 36, or partial
judgments which totally dispose of a particular claim or severable part of the case, subject to the power of the court to
suspend or defer action on an appeal from or further proceedings in such special judgment, or as provided by Rule 35
on the matter of partial summary judgments which are not considered as appealable (see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the
explanation therein).
 Page72
The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response to complaints over the delay caused by the former
procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal, with notice to
the parties. As things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing party had to wait for
the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin when and where he could then move for the issuance of a
writ of execution. The intervening time could sometimes be substantial, especially if the court a quo is in a remote
province, and could also be availed of by the losing party to delay or thwart actual execution.

On these considerations, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 24-94, dated April 18, 1994, approving and
promulgating in advance this amended Section 1 of Rule 39 and declaring the same effective as of June 1, 1994.

Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment or final order of the
appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a
writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion must be with
notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any objection
thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal
and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.

The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of the appellate courts wherein
the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly delays or unreasonably refuses to act
on the motion for execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the records are still with the
appellate court, or even after the same have been remanded to the lower court, the appellate court can direct the
issuance of the writ of execution since such act is merely in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has the
power to require.

It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject property within the
120-day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate courts entry of judgment. The appellate court, however, did
not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new rule retroactively and
we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this is an error.

There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule, however, has well-
delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:[13]

9.17. Procedural laws.

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide or
regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has
been held that a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or
considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which
do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights
already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes. The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to
impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to
proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new
statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions those which have accrued or are
pending.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural
statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.

Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof prescribing that no record on appeal shall be required to
take an appeal is procedural in nature and should therefore be applied retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the
question as to whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a
record on appeal within thirty days as required under the old rules, which question is pending resolution at the time
Batas Bilang 129 took effect, became academic upon the effectivity of said law because the law no longer requires the
filing of a record on appeal and its retroactive application removed the legal obstacle to giving due course to the
appeal. A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a

Page73
remedial statute that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed after it took
effect, for it does not create new nor take away vested rights. The court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the time it
accrued cannot validly try the claim where at the time the claim is formulated and filed the jurisdiction to try it has
been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal, for even actions pending in one court may be validly taken away
and transferred to another and no litigant can acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular court.

9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain exceptions. The rule
does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are
excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate
circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be
feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would
involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.

We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this
case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject
lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of
this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result
in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural
rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed
the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829
square meters but as petitioner claims, it is the only property left behind by their father, a private law practitioner who
was felled by an assassins bullet.[14]

Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning of
the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied
retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998 and its Resolution dated November 9,
1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled and set aside. The Orders dated June 10, 1996 and July 24, 1996 of the RTC of
Davao City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88 are reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

TEOFILO MARTINEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 132852. May 31, 2000

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, erroneously filed as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But
this procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we have decided to give it due course to resolve the question whether the
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as a pauper litigant.[1]

The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim. Case No. 5753 before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan
City.[2] During the hearing on 23 June 1994 petitioner represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney's
Office of Butuan City objected to petitioner's motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper and moved instead to strike out
the entire testimony of the first witness for the prosecution on the ground that it was inadmissible for being violative of
the testimonial privilege afforded to children in cases involving their parents. The Presiding Judge[3] deferred his ruling
on the objection and allowed the testimony to be continued.[4] On 21 July 1994 the trial court issued an order
overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the court denied the motion for reconsideration.[5] This prompted
petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.[6]

On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto
supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by two (2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to
petitioner's eligibility to avail himself of this privilege.[7] The appellate court subsequently issued its resolution dated
21 March 1997 denying the motion and directing petitioner to remit the docketing fees in the total amount of P420.00
within five (5) days from notice.[8] On 7 April 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying
his motion to litigate as a pauper, but this was similarly denied in the resolution of 8 October 1997.[9] Petitioner then
filed a Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein he stated through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees
required of his client "under protest" and that the money remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez
himself.[10] The transmittal of the amount was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the Motion to
Litigate as Pauper.[11]

In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, citing petitioners failure to
pay the required docket fee.[12] Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the docket fee
requirement as alleged in his Manifestation adverted to above.[13] However, the Court of Appeals in the second
assailed Resolution of 21 January 1998 denied this latest motion on the ground that, per verification by the Judicial

Page74
Records Division, the amount remitted by petitioner as docket fee was short of 150.00.[14] Msesm

The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a motion to litigate as pauper can be entertained by an
appellate court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his original motion to appeal as pauper before the appellate
court the applicable rule was the second paragraph of Sec. 16, rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which
provides-

Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he
is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by
reason of the amount involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate
court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the
appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the
case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same. Esmso

A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate court.

Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate courts
entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the question of whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify
him to litigate as pauper is a question of fact which is best determined by the trial court. The trial court is the court
which may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact which may require presentation of evidence whether the
appellant is an indigent and may appeal as such, and whether the case is of such importance that, by reason not only
of the amount involved but of the nature of the question raised in the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the
appellate court.[15]

When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on 1 July 1997 the provision abovequoted was not reenacted.
Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the procedure for, as well as the effects of, the grant of a motion to
litigate as pauper -

Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court,
upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient
and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees
which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the
indigent, unless the court otherwise provides. Esmmis

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court.
If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient
income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If
payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without
prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.

On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the evidentiary requirements for the exemption of pauper litigants
from payment of legal fees -

Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Pauper-litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their
immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not own real property with an
assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees. Esmsc

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper-litigant, unless the court
otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family
do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own any real property with the assessed value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of that
party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. Esm

It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned provisions that the restrictive policy enunciated by Sec. 16, Rule
41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court was carried over to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nowhere can we find a
provision to the effect that "(a) petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate
court."
We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner retrospectively. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will

Page75
be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that
extent procedural laws are retroactive.[16] We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an indigent can be made
even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions.
Jksm

We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with our Bill of Rights, which decrees that,
"(f)ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person
by reason of poverty."[17] Our espousal of the democratization of appellate remedies is shared by the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black -

There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial
court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough
to pay the costs in advance x x x x Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and
special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.[18]

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a
motion to appear in court as a pauper. He has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he and his immediate
family do not earn a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a hut, cannot be
worth more than P10,000.00.[19] He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed by Florencia L. Ongtico and Helen
Maur, both residents of Butuan City, who generally attested to the same allegations contained in petitioner's own
affidavit.[20] Based on this evidence, the Court finds that petitioner is qualified to litigate as an indigent. Chief

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 1997 dismissing the petition for
certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its Resolution dated 21 January 1998 denying reconsideration are SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for appropriate
action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the
amount of P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid.

SO ORDERED.

BERNADETTE L. ADASA vs CECILLE S. ABALOS, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007

The instant case emanated from the two complaints-affidavits filed by respondent Cecille S. Abalos on 18 January 2001
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, against petitioner for Estafa.

Respondent alleged in the complaints-affidavits that petitioner, through deceit, received and encashed two checks
issued in the name of respondent without respondents knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by
the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks.

On 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the two checks issued
in favor of respondent. In her Supplemental Affidavit filed on 29 March 2001, petitioner, however, recanted and alleged
instead that it was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks which are the subject matter of the complaints
and encashed the same; and that said Bebie Correa left the country after misappropriating the proceeds of the checks.

On 25 April 2001, a resolution was issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City finding probable cause
against petitioner and ordering the filing of two separate Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial
Document by a Private Individual, under Article 315 in relation to Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

Consequently, two separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner docketed as Criminal Cases No. 8781 and No.
8782, raffled to Branches 4 and 5, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, respectively. This instant petition pertains only to
Criminal Case No. 8782. On 8 June 2001, upon motion of the petitioner, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8782 issued
an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to conduct a reinvestigation. After conducting the
reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution dated 30 August 2001, affirming the
finding of probable cause against petitioner. Meanwhile, during her arraignment on 1 October 2001 in Criminal Case
No. 8782, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not guilty. Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City, petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on 15 October 2001.

In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and set aside the 30 August 2001 resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the said office to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner.

The said DOJ resolution prompted the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City to file a Motion to Withdraw
Information on 25 July 2002.
 Page76
On 26 July 2002, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of said resolution of the DOJ arguing that the DOJ should
have dismissed outright the petition for review since Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 mandates that when an accused
has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice
cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright.
Respondent claimed Section 12 thereof mentions arraignment as one of the grounds for the dismissal of the petition
for review before the DOJ.

In a resolution dated 30 January 2003, the DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration opining that under Section 12, in
relation to Section 7, of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal
taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language may
utilized in Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the
fact that the accused has been arraigned.

Meanwhile, on 27 February 2003, the trial court issued an order granting petitioners Motion to Withdraw Information
and dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782. No action was taken by respondent or any party of the case from the said
order of dismissal.

Aggrieved by the resolution of the DOJ, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Respondent raised the following issues before the appellate court:

1. Whether or not the Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to petitioners petition
for review despite its having been filed after the latter had already been arraigned;

2. Whether or not there is probable cause that the crime of estafa has been committed and that petitioner is probably
guilty thereof;

3. Whether or not the petition before the Court of Appeals has been rendered moot and academic by the order of the
Regional Trial Court dismissing Criminal Case No. 8782.

The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 21 July 2004 granted respondents petition and reversed the Resolutions of
the DOJ dated 11 July 2002 and 30 January 2003.

In resolving the first issue, the Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 which states [i]f an
information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if
the accused had already been arraigned, ruled that since petitioner was arraigned before she filed the petition for
review with the DOJ, it was imperative for the DOJ to dismiss such petition. It added that when petitioner pleaded to
the charge, she was deemed to have waived her right to reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that
surrounds it.

Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared that the existence of probable cause or the lack of it, cannot be
dealt with by it since factual issues are not proper subjects of a Petition for Certiorari.

In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held that the order of the trial court dismissing the subject criminal
case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the DOJ did not render the petition moot and academic. It said that since
the trial courts order relied solely on the resolutions of the DOJ, said order is void as it violated the rule which enjoins
the trial court to assess the evidence presented before it in a motion to dismiss and not to rely solely on the
prosecutors averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case.

Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals ruling, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration setting forth the following
grounds:

1. that the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of Department Circular No. 70 is permissive and directory such
that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned;

2. that the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice should be given great weight and respect;

3. that Section 7 of the Circular applies only to resolutions rendered pursuant to a preliminary investigation, not
on a reinvestigation;

4. that the trial courts order of dismissal of the criminal case has rendered the instant petition moot and
academic;

5. that her arraignment was null and void it being conducted despite her protestations; and

6. that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to preliminary investigation has been
nullified or recalled by virtue of the trial courts order of reinvestigation.[4]
 Page77
The Court of Appeals stood firm by its decision. This time, however, it tried to construe Section 7 side by side with
Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 and attempted to reconcile these two provisions. According to the appellate court,
the phrase shall not in paragraph two, first sentence of Section 7 of subject circular, to wit:

If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course
if the accused had already been arraigned. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

employed in the circular denotes a positive prohibition. Applying the principle in statutory construction - that when a
statute or provision contains words of positive prohibition, such as shall not, cannot, or ought not or which is couched
in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, that statute or provision is
mandatory, thus rendering the provision mandatory it opined that the subject provision simply means that the
Secretary of Justice has no other course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when arraignment of an
accused had already taken place prior to the filing of the petition for review.

On the other hand, reading Section 12 of the same circular which reads:

The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss
the petition for review on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken; x x x.

the Court of Appeals opined that the permissive word may in Section 12 would seem to imply that the Secretary of
Justice has discretion to entertain an appeal notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned. This
provision should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to Section 7. The two provisions, taken
together, simply meant that when an accused was already arraigned when the aggrieved party files a petition for
review, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course
thereto, but instead dismiss or deny it outright. The appellate court added that the word may in Section 12 should be
read as shall or must since such construction is absolutely necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the rule
as gathered from the context.

As to the contemporaneous construction of the Secretary of Justice, the Court of Appeals stated that the same should
not be given weight since it was erroneous.

Anent petitioners argument that Section 7 of the questioned circular applies only to original resolutions that brought
about the filing of the corresponding informations in court, but not to resolutions rendered pursuant to a motion for
reinvestigation, the appellate court simply brushed aside such contention as having no basis in the circular questioned.

It also rejected petitioners protestation that her arraignment was forced upon her since she failed to present any
evidence to substantiate the same.

It is petitioners contention that despite her being arraigned, the supposed waiver of her right to preliminary
investigation has been nullified by virtue of the trial courts order or reinvestigation. On this score, the Court of Appeals
rebuffed such argument stating that there was no supposed waiver of preliminary investigation to speak of for the
reason that petitioner had actually undergone preliminary investigation.

Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of the Court of Appeals.

Hence, the instant petition.

Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to an appeal or petition for review despite its having been
filed after the accused had already been arraigned. It asserts that the fact of arraignment of an accused before the
filing of an appeal or petition for review before the DOJ is not at all relevant as the DOJ can still take cognizance of the
appeal or Petition for Review before it. In support of this contention, petitioner set her sights on the ruling of this Court
in Crespo v. Mogul,[5] to wit:

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is
done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. (Emphasis supplied.)
To bolster her position, petitioner cites Roberts v. Court of Appeals,[6] which stated:

Page78
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for
review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised
the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal,
when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals[7] where this Court declared:

Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in
court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice
reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court.

The Court is unconvinced.

A cursory reading of Crespo v. Mogul reveals that the ruling therein does not concern the issue of an appeal or petition
for review before the DOJ after arraignment. Verily, the pronouncement therein has to do with the filing of a motion to
dismiss and the courts discretion to deny or grant the same. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the emphasized
portion in the Crespo ruling is a parcel of the entire paragraph which relates to the duty and jurisdiction of the trial
court to determine for itself whether or not to dismiss a case before it, and which states that such duty comes into play
regardless of whether such motion is filed before or after arraignment and upon whose instructions. The allusion to the
Secretary of Justice as reviewing the records of investigation and giving instructions for the filing of a motion to dismiss
in the cited ruling does not take into consideration of whether the appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was
filed after arraignment. Significantly, in the Crespo case, the accused had not yet been arraigned when the appeal or
petition for review was filed before the DOJ. Undoubtedly, petitioners reliance on the said case is misplaced.

Also unavailing is petitioners invocation of the cases of Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals. As
in Crespo v. Mogul, neither Roberts v. Court of Appeals nor Marcelo v. Court of Appeals took into account of whether
the appeal or petition before the Secretary of Justice was filed after arraignment. Just like in the Crespo case, the
accused in both Roberts v. Court of Appeals and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals had not yet been arraigned when the
appeal or petition for review was filed before the DOJ.

Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals interpretation of the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 violated
three basic rules in statutory construction. First, the rule that the provision that appears last in the order of position in
the rule or regulation must prevail. Second, the rule that the contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation
by the officers who enforce it should be given weight. Third, petitioner lifted a portion from Agpalos Statutory
Construction[8] where the word shall had been construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language.

The all too-familiar rule in statutory construction, in this case, an administrative rule[9] of procedure, is that when a
statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to.[10] Since Section 7 of the subject
circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after
arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary.

Petitioners reliance to the statutory principle that the last in order of position in the rule or regulation must prevail is
not applicable. In addition to the fact that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 needs no construction, the cited principle
cannot apply because, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, there is no irreconcilable conflict between
Section 7 and Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Section 7 of the circular provides:

SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be
patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall
not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of the
petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review. (Italics supplied.)
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same circular states:

SECTION 12. Disposition of the Appeal. The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution. He may,
motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof;

(b) That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been complied with;

(c) That there is no showing of any reversible error;

 (d) That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends the proceedings based on the

Page79
alleged existence of a prejudicial question;

(e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;

(f) That the offense has already prescribed; and

(g) That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal. (Emphases supplied.)

It is noteworthy that the principle cited by petitioner reveals that, to find application, the same presupposes that one
part of the statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized with another part without nullifying one in favor of the other. In
the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither contradictory nor irreconcilable with Section 12. As can be seen above,
Section 7 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the
DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal.

As aptly observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically applies to a situation on what the DOJ must do when
confronted with an appeal or a petition for review that is either clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or
filed after an accused has already been arraigned, i.e., he may dismiss it outright if it is patently without merit or
manifestly intended to delay, or, if it was filed after the acccused has already been arraigned, the Secretary shall not
give it due course.

Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal. Under said section, the DOJ may take any of four actions
when disposing an appeal, namely:

1. reverse the appealed resolution;

2. modify the appealed resolution;

3. affirm the appealed resolution;

4. dismiss the appeal altogether, depending on the circumstances and incidents attendant thereto.

As to the dismissal of a petition for review or an appeal, the grounds are provided for in Section 12 and, consequently,
the DOJ must evaluate the pertinent circumstances and the facts of the case in order to determine which ground or
grounds shall apply.

Thus, when an accused has already been arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course
and must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by the fact that arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of the
appeal or petition for review is set forth as one of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore, in such instance, the DOJ,
noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition for review is a ground for dismissal
under Section 12, must go back to Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein. In other words, the DOJ must not give
due course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the appeal.

Likewise, petitioners reliance on the principle of contemporary construction, i.e., the DOJ is not precluded from
entertaining appeals where the accused had already been arraigned, because it exercises discretionary power, and
because it promulgated itself the circular in question, is unpersuasive. As aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:

True indeed is the principle that a contemporaneous interpretation or construction by the officers charged with the
enforcement of the rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the latters
construction of such rules and regulations. That does not, however, make such a construction necessarily controlling or
binding. For equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where the
law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the
contrary exists, and where the court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.

If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer called upon to implement it has
erroneously applied or executed it, the error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained. If a
contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared null and void. Such principle
should be as it is applied in the case at bar.[11]

Petitioners posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word shall is misplaced. It is petitioners
view that the language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore the mandate in Section 7 has been transformed into a
matter within the discretion of the DOJ. To support this stance, petitioner cites a portion of Agpalos Statutory
Construction which reads:

For instance, the word shall in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that banks or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability of funds xxx, accept at a discount at not more
than two per centum for ten years such (backpay) certificate implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary, meaning

Page80
because of the phrase subject to availability of funds. Similarly, the word shall in the provision to the effect that a
corporation violating the corporation law shall, upon such violation being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto
proceedings has been construed as may.[12]

After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that the same is not applicable to the provision in
question. In the cited passage, the word shall departed from its mandatory import connotation because it was
connected to certain provisos/conditions: subject to the availability of funds and upon such violation being proved. No
such proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the subject circular. Hence, the word shall retains its
mandatory import.

At this juncture, the Court of Appeals disquisition in this matter is enlightening:

Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a discretionary power to
dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its being outrightly dismissible, such as when the accused has
already been arraigned, or where the crime the accused is being charged with has already prescribed, or there is no
reversible error that has been committed, or that there are legal or factual grounds warranting dismissal, the result
would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of
giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time. Moreover, to give
the second sentence of Section 12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application would not only subvert the
avowed objectives of the Circular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administration of justice, but would also
render its other mandatory provisions - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.[13]

In her steadfast effort to champion her case, petitioner contends that the issue as to whether the DOJ rightfully
entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of the accused prior to its filing, has been rendered moot and
academic with the order of dismissal by the trial court dated 27 February 2003. Such contention deserves scant
consideration.

It must be stressed that the trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the Resolutions of the DOJ after it had,
in grave abuse of its discretion, took cognizance of the petition for review filed by petitioner. Having been rendered in
grave abuse of its discretion, the Resolutions of the DOJ are void. As the order of dismissal of the trial court was made
pursuant to the void Resolutions of the DOJ, said order was likewise void. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a void
judgment is a complete nullity and without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions founded thereon are
themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose.[14] That respondent did not file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal from the dismissal order of the trial court is of no moment. Since the dismissal was void,
there was nothing for respondent to oppose.

Petitioner further asserts that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies only to appeals from original resolution of the
City Prosecutor and does not apply in the instant case where an appeal is interposed by petitioner from the Resolution
of the City Prosecutor denying her motion for reinvestigation. This claim is baseless.

A reading of Section 7 discloses that there is no qualification given by the same provision to limit its application to
appeals from original resolutions and not to resolutions on reinvestigation. Hence, the rule stating that when the law
does not distinguish, we must not distinguish[15] finds application in this regard.

Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void as the same was improvidently conducted. Again, this
contention is without merit. Records reveal that petitioners arraignment was without any restriction, condition or
reservation.[16] In fact she was assisted by her counsels Atty. Arthur Abudiente and Atty. Maglinao when she pleaded
to the charge.[17]

Moreover, the settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to
preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.[18] This precept is also applicable
in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such reinvestigation. In this case, when petitioner
unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well
as the right to appeal the result thereof to the DOJ Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ
Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner had already waived or
abandoned the same.

Lastly, while there is authority[19] permitting the Court to make its own determination of probable cause, such,
however, cannot be made applicable in the instant case. As earlier stated, the arraignment of petitioner constitutes a
waiver of her right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable
cause. For this reason, there is no need for the Court to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause.

Besides, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a petition for
review on certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. This being the case, this Court cannot review the evidence
adduced by the parties before the prosecutor on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 July 2004 and its Resolution dated

Page81
10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) AssociationInc. vs CA, GR 117188August 7, 1997
Facts:
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHAI)was organized as the association of homeowners andresidents
of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registeredwith the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessorHome Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), asthe sole homeowners' organization in the subdivision. Itwas organized by the
developer and its first presidentwas Soliven, himself the owner of the developer.However, LGVHAI did not file its
corporate by-laws.Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried toregister its by-laws. They failed to do so. To
theirconsternation, they discovered that there were twoother organizations within the subdivision, a LGVHAINorth, and
a LGVHAI South Association.In July1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, the head of the legal dept.
of the HIGC,informed him that LGVHAI had been automaticallydissolved for two reasons: First, it did not submit its by-
laws within the period required by the Corporation Codeand, second, there was non-user of corporate charterbecause
HIGC had not received any report on theassociation's activities. These developments prompted the officers of
theLGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the HIGC. Theyquestioned the revocation of LGVHAI's certificate of registration
without due notice and hearing andconcomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the Northand South Associations by
reason of the earlier issuanceof a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI.After due notice and hearing, LGVHAI
obtained afavorable ruling from HIGC recognizing them as the dulyregistered and existing homeowners association,
anddeclared the North and South Associations as revokedor cancelled, among others. The South Association appealed
to the Appeals Boardwhich dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The SouthAssociation in turn appealed to the Court
of Appeals.However the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution. The South Association filed the petition for review
oncertiorari.

Issue:
WON failure by LGVHAI to file its by-laws within theperiod prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Codehad the
effect of automatically dissolving the saidcorporation.

Ruling:
No. Section 46 reveals the legislative intent to attach adirectory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word''must" in
the first sentence thereof. The second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of by-lawseven prior to
incorporation. This provision in the samesection of the Code rules out mandatory compliancewith the requirement of
filing the by-laws, within 1month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the
SEC." It necessarilyfollows that failure to file the by-laws within that perioddoes not imply the "demise" of the
corporation.Nonetheless, failure to file them within the periodrequired by law by no means tolls the
automaticdissolution of a corporation.