Effects of Bandwagon Theory

The Emergence of Bandwagon Effects: A Theory
Author(s): Richard L. Henshel and William Johnston

Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1987), pp. 493-511
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4120670
Accessed: 10-09-2016 01:26 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Wiley, Midwest Sociological Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to The Sociological Quarterly
This content downloaded from 202.92.130.58 on Sat, 10 Sep 2016 01:26:49 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THE EMERGENCE OF
BANDWAGON EFFECTS:
A THEORY
Richard L. Henshel
William Johnston*
University of Western Ontario
Previous explanations of bandwagons from election polls have exclusively empha-

sized conformity causes. We propose, in addition, "indirect" causes, in which election
predictions first affect key actors, influencing their decisions concerning financial
support, volunteer work, or endorsements. These decisions then produce major cam-
paign alterations that influence the voters and alter the election outcome. Our addi-
tion clarifies anomalous bandwagon research findings and directs attention to the
possibility of bandwagon feedback on subsequent elections. If the same forecasters
create frequent bandwagon effects, their credibility should increase as a result of
enhanced accuracy. But increased credibility should in turn increase the self-fulfilling
tendency of their subsequent forecasts. Such deviation-amplifying feedback would
permit polls to produce a highly significant, and expanding, influence on elections.
Since the inception of scientific polling over 40 years ago, serious questions have been
raised about the possible influences of poll forecasts on election outcomes. The concept
of a bandwagon effect from a pre-election poll, in which a prediction of victory for one
candidate or party leads to a higher vote for that candidate or party than would have
occurred otherwise, dates back at least to the 1940s, but this history is fraught with
difficulties. A principal difficulty is that studies of this phenomenon have produced
contradictory findings: some researchers detect a bandwagon effect and others do not.'
This undesirable situation has been recognized for some time (Dizney and Roskins
1962, p. 108). It is a basic thesis of this article that these difficulties have appeared in
part because of conceptual inadequacies, which are reflected in empirical research.
Therefore, we intend to retrace and reconceptualize in a fundamental way the linkages
involved in bandwagon phenomena. When the research is reexamined in the light of
improved understanding, the existence of bandwagon effects in some elections appears
unambiguous. Further, the strength of the effects due to polling may be increasing over
time, because of mechanisms that will be set forth below.
*Direct all correspondence to: William A. Johnston, Department of Sociology, University of Western
Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5C2, Canada.
The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 28, No. 4, pages 493-511.
Copyright ? 1987 by JAI Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISSN: 0038-0253
494 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Vol. 28/No. 4/1987
The objectives of this article are as follows: (1) to outline an alternative set of mech
nisms by which polls may create election bandwagons; (2) to resolve apparently con
dictory research findings; (3) to explicate feedback mechanisms through which polls
successive elections may become increasingly potent; and (4) to indicate by the fore
going the possibility of major political ramifications of polling. In addition, we will s
that some of the apparent extreme irrationality of election bandwagon behavior ha
rational, calculating basis.
BANDWAGON AND UNDERDOG EFFECTS:

THE TERMINOLOGY
A bandwagon effect in an election occurs when the predicted winner in an election poll
gains additional votes as a result of the publication of the poll. Conversely, an underdog
effect occurs when the predicted loser in an election poll gains additional votes as a
result of the publication of the poll.2 It is essential to the definitions that candidates gain
or lose votes not merely after a poll but because of the poll. This causal relationship can
be subdivided into effects caused by (1) voters switching their votes, the principal
concern with respect to pre-election polls, and (2) alterations in voter turnout, the
principal concern in election-day exit polls. In this article we will concentrate exclusively
on pre-election polls and their vote-switching potential.
In this article, bandwagon and underdog effects3 will be considered for (1) any con-
scious decision, (2) about specific, reasonably well-defined alternatives (to include per-
sons, parties, or concrete choices), (3) spelled out in advance of a specific date on which
the decision will be made, (4) by means of some majority or plurality principle, and (5)
about which some forecast of outcome has been communicated to voters. This delinea-
tion of scope deliberately includes not only secret ballot/mass elections for representa-
tives, but also conditions of open, direct voting on issues or voting in small face-to-face
bodies such as parliaments or unions. On the other hand, the conception retains sufficient
boundaries to insure that we continue to deal with a set of relatively well-delineated
phenomena.
The requirements that at least moderate specificity must exist in advance about the
possible choices, the decision procedure, and the timing of the decision ensures that the
voting under examination will be consciously recognized by those involved as specific
decision events about which predictions can be made. This criterion distinguishes the
present concern from the conception of "bandwagon" sometimes employed in collective
behavior models such as Granovetter's (1978, esp. p. 1424) or Schelling's (1978, esp. pp.
90-101). Requirement (5) demands further that an overall prognostication of the out-
come be disseminated in advance, thereby excluding exhortations or hegemonic influen-
ces of a powerful mass media (Noelle-Neumann 1984).
The most significant demarcation is expressed in components (3) and (5), which
require a concentration on the expected numbers of others rather than their actual
numbers, such as a poll of current opinion can provide. This future orientation rules out
those conformity studies (e.g., May and Martin 1975) in which information on the
distribution of present opinion is the key experimental variable. Our intent here is not to
imply that certain uses of the term bandwagon are improper, but to prevent the inap-
propriate extrapolation of research findings concerning conformity to public opinion into
The Emergence of Bandwagon Effects: A Theory 495
conclusions about conformity to predicted election outcomes. Such an

appears the more possible because the common term "bandwagon" is
domains (cf. Marsh 1985). Predicted election outcomes are mere possib
future, while public opinion is actual and concurrent; some of the mechanis
explain a bandwagon effect in an election work differently in contempor
tions and in future possibilities. Further, as will be seen, many indirect m
might create a bandwagon effect in elections are entirely absent from a
public opinion awareness, so that the failure to detect a bandwagon effec
should never be extrapolated to the former.
DIRECT AND INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE BANDWAGON EFFECT
Up to this point, all theoretical accounts of bandwagon or underdog effec

have proposed that the election forecast exerts a direct influence on the in
Although the proposed mechanisms vary considerably, they all share
between publication of an election forecast and some degree of change
voter intentions. Existing models can be represented schematically, as sho
of Figure 1. All these models have the virtue of simplicity, but miss a majo
indirect causes in which the forecast first operates selectively on certain k
influencing their decisions in ways that, in turn, influence the election out
(a)
forest psychological alterations

forecast effects --' in outcome
(individual
voters)
(b)
alterations I
in financial +
contributions
forecast 1 71 volunteerism campaign in

alterations outcome
Poll ' o t alterations in + Major + Alterations

alterations in
endorsements
Only key individuals Voters in general

affected by poll oaffected
Figure 1. Direct and Indirect Models of Bandwagon Causes
Specifically, we see three principal ways in which such indirect caus

after a pre-election poll: (1) through alteration in the flow of financial
candidates, (2) through alteration in volunteerism (campaign support),
alteration in the quality and quantity of endorsements. These three v
abbreviated collectively as f, v, and e, and the donor of any one of the
called a contributor.
People do not wish to throw away their money or waste valuable tim
Because monetary contributions, volunteers, and endorsements are ess
political campaigns, the belief that a candidate is a lost cause can create
Substituting these specific mechanisms into our general conception of
leads us to part (b) of Figure 1. We do not propose indirect causes as r
direct causes, but as a fundamental, essential addition.5 Alterations in f
effect, intervening variables between forecast and election outcome-in
forecast and individual voter decisions.
Two components are required to make indirect causes important: (1)
of f, v, and e on election outcomes, and (2) the influence of polls
contribute f, v, or e. The final section of this article reviews the avai
these components. The empirical evidence demonstrating (1) is excellen
presently available empirical evidence concerning (2) is supportive but
we will examine its theoretical basis here.
Decisions to contribute f, v, or e are generally important for the pe
and therefore represent genuine, deliberate choices by these persons.
ably adopt a rationality model for such decisions, which are ordin
ample time for consideration of consequences and alternatives. Each d
f, v, or e represents a certain cost, including opportunities forego
notes with respect to political volunteerism, "the distance between
behavior and the eventual reward...is typically very great, and th
pattern sporadic and uncertain. The wonder, then, is not that people d
pate, but that they do" (1968, p. 262). In a rationality model of suc
do people offer f, v, or e?
We postulate that contributors act rationally to accomplish certain ob
ing an expressive, consummatory enjoyment of participation per s
Zech 1975), two extrinsic or instrumental objectives seem significant: (1
political power of the candidate who most closely approximates one's i
tion, and (2) to secure personal or group benefits that flow directly fro
This distinction does not deny the possibility that these two objectives m
another in a given election, but in other elections they may be quite di
odds.
If contributing entails obvious costs, a rational decision to offer
depend upon the value of the benefits forthcoming and on the probabil
these benefits. It is with respect to the latter that polling forecasts b
would expect expressive participation and the ideological support objec
tributed randomly between predicted winners and predicted losers, but
utors motivated wholly or in part by tangible benefits should be highly
forecasts of victory or defeat because tangible benefits will be forthco
case of victory for the candidate aided.
The same rational model leads us to believe that consideration of

(particularistic benefits) will not determine what the average voter
secret/mass election. Even though casting a vote for a particular ca
that candidate, the tangible reciprocity should be nil because an indi
miniscule value to the candidate and costs the voter little, and beca
ascertained in a secret ballot. Thus, notwithstanding the opinions o
coalition bandwagons (e.g., Brams and Garriga-Pico 1975), voters in
tions will not switch their votes on the basis of a poll in anticipation
(reciprocity) considerations. If individual voters are affected by a pol
conformity (direct cause) or through the influence of alterations i
causes).
On the other hand, financial contributors, volunteers, or endorsers are relatively few in
comparison to the electorate, incur relatively high costs, contribute something of rela-
tively high value to the candidate, and are anything but anonymous. They have every
reason to expect reciprocity should their candidate prevail. Yet because they incur
serious costs by their actions, in a rational model they must be compensated by adequate
returns, or at least by a sufficient subjective probability of obtaining such returns. When
the subjective probability of a successful outcome falls below an acceptable minimum,
the costly behavior will be withheld.6 Hence the crucial importance of the polls for the
intervening variables that produce indirect causation: the polls provide a quasi-objective
basis on which to ground the subjective estimates of the probability of reciprocity.7
CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSES
AND RESOLUTION OF CONTRADICTORY RESEARCH FINDINGS
We will now set forth the various possible causes of election forecast effects with the
intent of determining the relative predominance of bandwagon and underdog effects.
The causes of election forecast effects can be divided into two principal types, direct and
indirect; the distinguishing characteristic is whether the cause operates immediately
(directly) upon the individual voters, or through the decisions of certain key agents,
whose behaviors then influence the voters.
We have already discussed indirect causes. When we turn to direct causes, we note
that three types have been described in existing literature (four, if coalition theories are
counted); an additional type is set forth here for the first time. Because the first three
types have been addressed by others, their treatment here is brief. The first two of these
types are derived from the psychological literature on conformity, as adapted to band-
wagon phenomena by Fraser (1971).
1. Normative aspect of conformity. People conform to what they believe is the

norm-the "proper" view.
2. Informational aspect of conformity. People change their view of reality upon

hearing of the opinions of others.
Normative and informational causes are more or less terms for existing interpretations
of the bandwagon effect, and are approximated roughly as "conformity."
3. Sympathylempathy. This is the standard explanation for an un
4. Calculation. When a voter really prefers candidate X but s

cannot possibly win, calculation might cause the voter to shift
even though X is really preferred, just so that candidate Z wil
hypothetical example in Baumol [1957], p. 320.) Calculation may
mon in small-body elections. It can also occur in mass elect
circumstances, such as when an extremely controversial party
victory. In these cases, smaller parties are squeezed out as
around the feared party and its most prominent opponent. Th
of the 1970s, for example, polarized around the separatist Part
the federalist Quebec Liberal Party, annihilating the long-esta
Nationale.8 It is doubtful whether calculation in this sense occur
involving only two parties.
When we combine the three indirect causes with the four direct
clear that only a minority of the possible causes of forecast effect
explicitly. Some of the most interesting and potentially significan
disregarded thus far.
Now we can also offer a resolution for the conflicting findings r
wagon effect (see note 1). We begin by observing a perfect corresp
the studies surveyed, between finding and type of research: no
experiments finds a bandwagon effect (Cantril 1980; Ceci and K
Roshens 1962; Fleitas 1971; Gaskell 1974; Laponce 1966; Navazi
Kaplowitz 1977), while all of the field studies and theoretical treatm
theoretically indicate a bandwagon effect (Beniger 1976; Brams and
Gartner 1976; Grush 1980; Straffen 1977; Zech 1975).9 The crit
laboratory experiments seems to be the omission of indirect effects.
experiments on the bandwagon, which concentrate exclusively on co
simulate f, v, or e decisions among potential contributors. Thus
ignores the potentially powerful alterations on the flow of such cont
ble victory forecasts can create, alterations that indirectly affect
Meanwhile, field research on the bandwagon, which studies actual
inadvertently incorporates these indirect causes, albeit without rec
therefore does generally detect a bandwagon effect. The conflictin
note I arise in this fashion, and can now be understood and reconcile
that bandwagon effects do exist in actual elections.
THE POTENTIAL FOR BANDWAGONS AND

POSITIVE FEEDBACK OVER SUCCESSIVE CAMPAIGNS
Regarding the seven listed causes of election forecast effects-four direct and three
indirect-we must ask whether they produce forecast effects that are all in the same
direction (all bandwagon or all underdog), or whether they interfere with and nullify one
another. As Catherine Marsh (1985) pointed out, nullifying would lead us to underesti-
mate the intrinsic importance of election forecast effects.'0
o Ideological Personal
L Contribution Conution
o0 Contribution
0
o
t4,
0 50% 100%/
Predicted vote for contributor's
preferred candidate
Figure 2. Schematic Curves for Contributions, Based on Expected Outcome
We conclude that (1) informational and normative causes can produce only band-
wagon effects; (2) sympathy/empathy can produce only underdog effects; (3) calculation
can produce either effect but is most unusual in mass elections; and (4) financial assis-
tance, volunteerism, and endorsement (f, v, and e) intrinsically can produce either a
bandwagon or an underdog effect, but are very likely to have a net bandwagon effect.
The last of these conclusions requires explanation. We derived this conclusion by
noting that contribution of f, v, or e is activated in part by expectation of personal or
group gain in reciprocation for costly actions, and in part by ideologically based objec-
tives. The ideologically based acts probably peak in close races, as illustrated in Figure 2,
implying more or less equal likelihood for bandwagon or underdog effects. We reach a
very different conclusion, however, regarding f, v, or e offered for tangible benefits to the
contributor: it continues at a high level when one's candidate is far ahead and diminishes
when one's candidate is thought to be behind. (For the contrast in effects see the
illustrative curves in Figure 2.) These theoretical conclusions are supported by empirical
research." Thus, although f, v, or e have underdog components, the predominant (or
"net") effect should be bandwagon. The overall conclusion is that the principal direction
of votes is toward bandwagon effects, and the potential for bandwagon effects is far
higher than for underdog effects. This finding is particularly clear in mass elections,
where "calculation," as defined above, intrudes infrequently.
A POSITIVE FEEDBACK LOOP:

BANDWAGON EFFECTS AND POLL CREDIBILITY
To this point we have analyzed and reconceptualized the bandwagon effect in a new and
(we hope) more satisfactory form, but pre-election polling seems to have further implica-
tions that increase its potential importance in the political process.

very modest bandwagon effect over a series of discrete electio
interesting feedback effects may occur. The charm of these effects
that only modest bandwagon effects need to be assumed in order
long-run consequences highly significant.
Pre-election polls are issued repeatedly by established, recog
These institutions, as well as the polls associated with them, may b
some level of prestige and credibility. In addition, we assume
fluctuate over time, and that the credibility or prestige of a poll
which people alter their actions to take it into account.
Credibility and prestige can influence predictive accuracy by cer
anisms, which rely on the impact of the source's credibility
audience. An extensive empirical literature in the fields of attitu
opinion discusses the importance of the perception of source exper
ness.12 Regarding self-altering predictions such as the bandwagon
argues that the strength of the self-altering tendency is a functio
social status, or prestige of the individual or group" that issues t
present discussion, the extent to which a given election pred
depends on the credibility and prestige of the polling institution.'3
But now it seems reasonable to also assume that polls influence
ity by their record of accuracy. In combination, these assum
situation. The idea that the accuracy of election predictions influ
and prestige of the institution that issues them should occasion n
much more provocative to consider that, at least in the social wo
credibility and prestige may influence its predictive accuracy
thus discern that the bandwagon effect, as it is repeated over a n
can become part of a larger feedback loop linking predictive a
credibility, and bandwagon strength. This "credibility loop"
survey-based predictions from particular institutional sources co
"races" in a given election period. The credibility and prestige of
the strength of the bandwagon effects, which then affect the o
predictions. Then this overall accuracy alters the credibility of t
next election period. By addressing the credibility loop as a w
trate on what happens if there is a time-series, or sequence,
issued by the same sources.
We assume there is some threshold level of credibility, below w
casts would not be acted upon. Such a threshold undoubtedly vari
decision makers, but for analytic purposes these differences can
Let us call the accuracy of a set of election predictions in th
wagon effect its intrinsic accuracy. If the intrinsic accuracy of p
in past elections, produces a level of credibility above the thresh
will act in terms of these polls, allocating f, v, and e in accordan
casts. The point here is that f, v, and e are not forthcoming
fashion: there are levels of support, and there can be more or fe
we hold the content of the forecasts constant, then the higher t
(beyond threshold), the greater the support conducive to a bandwa
Pre-election Shifts in election +

poll forecosts i outcoe expectations
Shifts in f, v.
+ ond e in
+ direction
forecast
Poll
SShifts in voter
intentions in
direction
forecost
Shifts in election
outcomes in
direction forecst
Figure 3. Credibility Loop for Pre-Election Polls
It is important to consider what "accuracy" of a poll refers to in this context. A

might be understood either as the poll's "won-lost record"-its success in disting
winners and losers-or as its "percentage error." We will assume that it is the w
record that is significant for credibility.15 The distinction is important because,
percentage error can either increase or decline as a consequence of a bandwagon
won-lost records can only improve.
We now discern not only feedback over successive elections, but, in particular
possibility of positive, deviation-amplifying feedback. The greater the bandwagon
the higher the won-lost accuracy of the pre-election polls. The higher the polling
zation's accuracy during a given period, the greater its prestige and credibility
next election period. And the greater its credibility at that time, the greater t
bandwagon effect it creates. If we assume that intrinsic accuracy is unchan
apparent accuracy (intrinsic accuracy plus bandwagon effect) should increas
successive iterations.16 This state of affairs is illustrated in Figure 3.
Before discussing the inevitable limitations of such a credibility loop, we
mention an additional strength. In the language of cybernetics, we are desc
deviation-amplifying mutual causal feedback (Maruyama 1963). One of the impo
features of this feedback is that the iterations contribute progressively to the d
amplification. Therefore, it can happen that in each election iteration the incre
changes in each variable are slight, yet the cumulative long-term effects are sign
(Zetterberg 1965, pp. 72-73). The process permits slight incremental effects to
ally produce major alterations. The increasing alteration of accuracy across
iterations is depicted in the illustrative curve of Figure 4.
100%
Realized Accuracy
t-
0
o Intrinsic Accurocy
threshold
I I I I I
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Election Iterations
Figure 4. Graph of Intrinsic Accuracy and Apparent (Realized) Accuracy

(Illustrative Only)
Obviously, constraints must exist on the positive feedback; otherwise, all polls eventu-
ally would possess absolute credibility, and bandwagon effects would overwhelm all
other electoral influences. Positive feedback, however, does not necessarily imply
"explosive" deviation (Blalock 1969); convergent positive feedback with damped
incremental deviation, as illustrated in Figure 4, seems the likely possibility in the
present case.'7
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, SIMULATION, AND TESTING STRATEGIES
Although this article of necessity concentrates on developing a new understanding of

election forecast effects, we must also examine existing evidence and develop testing
strategies. Here we can distinguish three components. First, the validity of the credibility
feedback loop may be distinguished from the validity of indirect causes. Second, within
indirect causes, the validity of the postulated influence of polls on f, v, and e may be
distinguished from the validity of the postulated influence of f, v, and e on election
outcomes.
Influence of f, v, and e on Election Outcomes
If indirect causes are to operate, differentials in financing, volunteering, and endors

must affect the outcome of elections. It seems reasonably clear that f, v, and e
indispensable in modem election campaigns, but because indirect causes are a no
approach to bandwagon studies we will briefly substantiate their influence on electi
outcomes.
Concerning the importance of financial contributions, there is amp

contemporary election campaigns require enormous and steadily i
money. Heard (1968. p. 235) refers to financial contribution in electi
sion of economic power into political power. In 1974, political action
$12.5 million to federal congressional races; in 1980 they gave an esti
million (Alexander 1983, p. 127). One recent study of electoral spendi
more than $1 billion were spent during the electoral campaigns of 19
$275 million were expended in the presidential race that year (Alexan
Research on Western Europe shows the same trend (Heard 1960, 1968
for advertising and staffing, and no one seems to doubt its importan
success.'8 In many cases, money determines who will stay in a r
withdraw. In one gubernatorial race a potential candidate, who dr
became clear that he would need $1 million to wage a successful
interviewer, "I did have some promise of support, but I didn't see
(Kelly 1976, p. 15).
As demonstrated by Jacobson's (1980) recent empirical examinat
campaign expenditures in congressional elections, spending by c
strongest influence on their performance. The importance of expendit
is also attested to in Grush's (1980) study, which revealed that 78% o
voting outcomes in primaries was accounted for by campaign expend
exposure, and past performance in primaries.
Volunteerism, as a form of political participation, is also vital f
campaign. Volunteers for the more mundane services and tasks
always in short supply, and even abundant cash cannot substitute fo
asm. Further, as Stavis notes, "machine and reform politicians both
that the most effective method of campaigning is personally to talk
about the candidate" (1969, p. 28; see also Kayden 1973). Such fac
with large numbers of people can be accomplished only by volunteer
Popular wisdom dictates that securing endorsement from prominent
or organizational sources contributes to electoral success, although som
here is less unequivocal (Roshwalb and Resnicoff 1971). Mason (197
an election with a large number of little-known candidates, civil and
group endorsements were significant.
Influence of the Polls on f, v, and e
Although no systematic study exists to link poll results with fluctuat

examples abound. To cite one instance, Napolitan observed in his anal
presidential election that "the published polls hit Hubert Humphrey wh
in the pocketbook. The September and early October polls that showe
fifteen points ahead dried up Humphrey's money" (Napolitan 1972, p
pointed presidential aspirant John Connally noted in 1980, "Politi
political odds" (Newsweek 1980, p. 30). Even a casual reading of a
(1976, 1979, 1983) exhaustive studies of electoral financing shows how
probability of success affect contributions. Case studies affirming a
legion."9 More systematic research by Jacobson disclosed that the pe
of winning appears to be the most important factor affecting how much

incumbents or challengers can raise (1980, p. 105).
In spite of these gratifying indications, there remains an unfortunate scar
matic research on the effect of polls on potential contributors. Therefore,
primarily on the foregoing theoretical analysis, which emphasizes the pa
favoritism that contributions can create. Here again, indirect empirical sup
our analysis. If contributions provided for selfish reasons of favoritism ar
would expect more of these contributions to go to expected winners
election, we would expect such contributors to actually receive preferent
Empirical research on political action committees (PACs) in the United St
these expectations. Welch (1979) found that economic interest group PAC
a small fraction of their money to primary losers" (p. 205). The same stu
the central hypothesis of a relationship between expected vote percen
amount of contributions. Ashford (1986) and Langbein (1986) show t
contributions significantly influence access and legislative voting pattern
is still essential to conduct systematic research on the direct impact of poll
flow of f, v, and e. This type of analysis, which uses readily available ma
pose no special problems.20
Evidence Concerning a Bandwagon Feedback Loop
The bandwagon feedback loop is difficult to test. Existing evidence is ent

tial: if a positive feedback loop exists, we should expect (1) increasing awa
predictions, (2) more accurate polls, (3) proliferation of polls, and (4) increa
of money spent on polls by political parties and the media. Available data i
that are uniformly in the right direction; such shifts would be expected gi
loop.
If a bandwagon feedback loop exists, there must be a long-term increase in poll
credibility. Two important indicators show this increase taking place. First, old figures for
the United States show a remarkable growth in the proportion of persons aware of poll
results (Goeke 1965, p. 444). Second, a clear trend exists toward the increased use of
professional political polling (King and Schnitzer 1968). Polls today account for 3% to
5% of a candidate's campaign funds and are considered an integral element of a success-
ful electoral intervention (Roll and Cantril 1980). Field (1983) estimates that a total of
$20 million was spent on public and private polls in the 1980 election, and that private
polls accounted for about 75% of that expenditure.
Polls have become considerably more accurate. The average error of the final pre-
election Gallup poll fell from 3.7 percentage points (1936 to 1950) to 1.4 percentage
points (1954 to 1968). Even more significant, the largest error in the eight elections
between 1954 and 1968 was considerably less than the average error in elections
between 1936 and 1950 (Mendelsohn and Crespi 1970).
Further indicative support for the feedback loop may also be sought in simulation runs
performed on models of the postulated process. A working paper explicating discrete-
time models of the bandwagon loop21 and providing the results of simulation runs is
available from the senior author (Henshel 1986). The simulations help by showing that
the sequences of values generated do not violate common-sense experience with respect
to modern elections.22
Such simulations and existing trend data are supportive but hardl
focused testing scheme is required. In a direct empirical investigati
feedback loop, we encounter the well-known difficulties of studyin
tems. Because of these difficulties, a brief discussion of two possib
First, credibility feedback can be created by laboratory experiment
sive polls with rigged intrinsic accuracy, for a series of small body
important arguments in favor of an experimental approach to issue
stake here, see Brody and Brownstein [1975], especially pp. 214-
series of relevant phenomena, gradually developed by operationalizi
and predictive accuracy, would in principle offer an alternative, rigor
however, such a newly conceived time series could not provide a co
A more practical alternative is the retrospective construction of a tim
elections, using available proxies for the unmeasured data. For exam
real expenditures on private polls by political parties provides a rea
unmeasured poll credibility.
THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
It may appear premature to spell out theoretical and political implications of the theory
in advance of direct empirical confirmation. Yet because considerable research is
required, it is highly desirable to list the issues whose resolution hinges upon the research
results. These issues may be divided imperfectly, but usefully, into the political and the
theoretical.
Political Issues
Ever since the inception of scientific polling, questions have been raised about the
potential for the polling institution to sway elections. Indeed, the first congressional
investigation of this issue took place only a few years after the first scientific sample poll.
The issue has been debated ever since, but apparently it has concentrated on only one
part of the set of possible mechanisms, with predictably equivocal results.
The present theory answers the influence question with a strong affirmative; it also
indicates a new path by which such influence can occur. The improved understanding
permits resolution of the contradictory research findings on poll effects. Further, confir-
mation of a bandwagon feedback loop would entail the conclusion not only that polls
influence elections but that this influence is growing over time.
Theoretical Issues
The theory provides an entirely new dynamic-the three indirect causes-to explain
how bandwagon effects may emerge. The theory subsumes not only formal polls but
also any poll-like predictors, such as the outcomes of early primaries, within a common
framework.25
The notion of indirect causes implies that bandwagon phenomena may be quite
rational-that is, generated by rational, calculating considerations. This idea is a funda-
mental departure from the traditional view of bandwagons as representing essentially
herdlike irrationality. If one argues that the electorate's voting response to shifts in f, v,
and e is merely the means by which the true bandwagon decisions,

minority, are manifested, then it may be possible to apply formal ratio
to this minority. Further, even direct causes now appear less irrationa
circumstances.26
Finally, there are philosophical implications regarding the positivist di

the bandwagon feedback loop. The self-fulfilling prophecy (SFP) forms
demarcation principles for separating social science from natural scien
in the social world but not in the natural world (Buck 1963; Henshel 19
feedback incorporates the SFP as a necessary component, but goes
credibility loop constitutes a self-altering mechanism that amplifies the
exist only in the social world, where credibility influences behavior. Thu
of "bootstrap" enhancement of predictive accuracy that it embodies is,
possible only in selected areas of social science.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks are expressed to Hayward Alker, Fred Evers, Edward Grabb, John Kunkel, and
Benjamin Singer for helpful suggestions. We benefited a great deal from being able to
see a draft paper by Catherine Marsh. Earlier versions of our article were presented to
the XI World Congress of the International Sociological Association, New Delhi (1986),
and the Seventh International Congress of Cybernetics and Systems, London (1987).
NOTES
1. Beniger (1976), Grush (1980), and Straffen (1977) find some empirical evidence for an
election bandwagon effect. Brams and Garriga-Pico (1975), Gartner (1976), Straffen (1977),
and Zech (1975) provide theoretical support for the existence of such an effect. But Cantril
(1980), Dizney and Roshens (1962), Navazio (1977) and Tyson and Kaplowitz (1977) find no
effect. Ceci and Kain (1982), Fleitas (1971), Gaskell (1974), and Laponce (1966) find an
underdog effect. No attempt has been made to provide a definitive survey of findings.
2. For classical treatments see Merton (1948, and to a lesser degree, 1936), Simon (1954),
and Baumol (1957).
3. The term effect commonly used to describe bandwagon and underdog phenomena, might
imply some alteration in outcome, but in situations in which a bandwagon effect and an under-
dog effect exist simultaneously from the same poll, there may be no overall visible disturbance in
the proportional distribution of votes. In such instances, however, we might detect widespread
switching within different blocs of voters (something not visible at the aggregate level) or
increases in the total voting population (as bandwagon and underdog effects both work to draw
out additional voters). In light of the possibilities of countervailing forces, which produce little if
any overall change in proportions, it might be preferable to speak of bandwagon and underdog
"tendencies."
4. Occasionally, the belief that a candidate is a shoo-in could also have the effect of reducing
campaign support, thus leaving open the possibility of an underdog effect. However, this outcome
seems less likely because, as will be seen, there is a second reason people become contributors:
not only to produce victory but to produce gratitude for victory.
5. In this article, the meaning of the terms direct and indirect differs from that in two earlier
works. First, for Mendelsohn and Crespi (1970), "direct" effects refer to any influence of poll
forecasts on election outcomes. They conceive of these effects only in terms of conformity and
reject them entirely. "Indirect" effects, in their usage, refer to influences

strategies-which candidates to run, what issues to emphasize, and h
machinery. Among the indirect effects, Mendelsohn and Crespi do refer b
of polls on party morale and financing, but this is a minor point for them
in analyzing the relationship between poll forecasts and outcomes. They
strictly in terms of conformity, and they reject it. Second, Gartner (1976
meaning to "direct" and "indirect" in bandwagon research.
6. This statement oversimplifies a complex reality in which varying leve
f, v, or e are possible. Adding such rich complexity, however, contribu
understanding of the phenomenon. Influences may also exist between f
funding, for example, can affect the level of volunteering. Insofar as altera
may result from a forecast, such cascading effects on the other variables (
the election outcome) would represent another form of indirect caus
probably occurs during primary campaigns in the United States, the to
further here.
7. This conceptualization is in accord with the formulation of the exp
in rational choice models (Steiner 1970, p. 7). Readers familiar with resou
in collective behavior (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1976) may al
to the present model, especially if the "free riders dilemma" (Olson 197 1)
to decisions to provide f, v, and e.
8. For a second illustration, which concerns the fateful German p
1932, see the switch in the runoff election described in Zeitlin (1981, p
9. Navazio (1977) did detect a bandwagon effect for certain occupat
10. The seven causes of election forecast effects listed above shoul
possibilities only; there is no certainty that a particular cause actually
assume, for the moment, that each cause is operative in at least some cir
11. Welch (1979) demonstrated the utility of the distinction between
economic self-interest motivation for financial contributions (f) by or
disclosed a strong correspondence between type of organization and patt
bution. Welch substantiated his principal hypotheses that "an economic
American Medical Association Political Action Committee] contribut
winners and that an ideological group [e.g., the National Committee for
contributes mainly to candidates in close races" (1979, p. 208, emphasis
volunteerism (v) the available evidence is less direct, but we note, first
rapid turnover and instability of volunteers among parties that have l
elections as indicators of the importance of selfish motivation; and seco
ness of contest (rather than runaway victory) increases the volunteer tu
ideological motivation (McClosky 1968).
12. For the classic statement on source credibility, see Hovland et al.
more recent summaries, see Cronkhite and Liska (1980) and Triandis (1
13. Straffin (1977) makes the point that a common strategy of candida
is to question the accuracy of the figures, thus attacking the poll's credibi
14. For that matter, the credibility itself of a given poll at any time
decision makers. This point, too, can safely be ignored.
15. It seems extremely unlikely that members of the public, or even
would take the time to find and compare the actual vote percentage
forecast, or even to remember the figures, although such technical compa
of pride and concern within the forecasting community itself. (We hasten
age approach, such as mean absolute percentage error [MAPE], is a m
accuracy.) Such technical comparisons are difficult for a lay person to mak
outside the technical polling community are not motivated to prefer percentage erro
for credibility, because people who read election polls are interested mainly in learnin
win the election. In short, the nontechnical audience should be expected to judge the
polling by its won-lost record, because it is concerned with that record. In operatio
what is relevant for credibility is that in the last election a poll called (for example)
races correctly, not that its MAPE was (for example) 1.4.
16. Baumol (1954) proposed another form of election poll feedback loop in which t
of multiple election polls in a single campaign were examined. In this case, the result
initial poll influence the public's preference distribution, which is reflected in turn
poll, which influences in turn.... We suspect that this sort of feedback occurs, although
not in the elegant manner foreseen, which ignores "random shocks" produced by the
themselves.
17. In the latter case, deviations of the loop variables from their initial values inc
progressively smaller amounts on successive iterations. When difference equations ar
the linearity of the loop relationships is assumed, the test of convergence (or "st
whether the product of the slopes empirically exceeds unity (Blalock 1969, pp. 81-82
18. The efficacy of political advertising can be challenged under certain condition
other situations it is clearly vital for campaigns, as are expenditures for other purpo
campaign (Grush 1980).
19. The significance of funding as an indirect cause might appear to be threatened
tendency of some interest groups to donate to both sides in order to maintain polit
regardless of who wins. Studies have shown, however, that the amounts given to
candidates are usually quite unequal. Thus the amount given to both sides can be rega
access base and can be ignored for present purposes. We must ask instead why poten
tributors decide to provide additional funding to their preferred candidate, how th
varies with the outcome predicted, and how much this additional amount helps the ca
20. Empirical confirmation of indirect causes does not exhaust important question
subject. As the predicted gap or margin widens between candidates or parties, is there
less monotonic change in the level off, v, and e (as selfish motivation would anticipate),
change curvilinear (as ideological motivation suggests)? Are f, v, and e affected in
ways? Do the degree and type of reaction vary across major sectors of the population
21. The initial model linked poll accuracy, poll credibility, and self-altering ten
three bivariate linear equations, one of which uses a first-order difference equation t
system. Modified systems were also explored, first, by assuming credibility linked to
racy by a distributed lag function, and, second, by assuming credibility linked to self
tendency by a power function. All four systems were studied through Monte Carlo simu
22. Although certain counterintuitive parametric values generated "explosive" curv
vertical asymptotes, results for all four systems overwhelmingly produced curves with t
configuration of "realized accuracy" in Figure 4. That is, they displayed damped inc
deviation and ultimately converged to horizontal asymptotes.
23. The brevity of this treatment is not intended to minimize the special difficulties p
empirical analysis of feedback systems. In the present case, however, a considerab
pendable time lag between the alteration in poll credibility after one election and th
bandwagon effects in the next election permits the use of discrete time procedures, s
difference equations. Provided tests for autocorrelation are negative, the bandwagon
system can be treated as quasi-recursive, with a lagged variable treated as "exogen
approach considerably simplifies the (still difficult) tasks of estimation and testin
analysis of the system's long-term stability.
24. Mendelsohn (1966, p. 219) provides an illustration of research on poll cre
Although his data pertain to election night projections, they illustrate the operation
suggested.
25. The theory probably works somewhat better in electoral systems wi

each election and with single-member, simple plurality rules. One reason
accuracy is greater in some systems-for instance, two-party systems-
credibility threshold must be crossed if poll results are to influence f, v, an
the historical growth of plebiscitary democracy in the selection of party ca
States (Neustadt 1980, pp. 175-176) has increased the applicability of indi
26. In multiparty contests, calculation (as defined previously) can be
one's favorite candidate cannot succeed. In addition, the informational asp
be rational in small-body elections with open voting: one's support of
personal ramifications. Both of these direct causes, flowing from electio
probably can be adapted to a formal rationality model.
REFERENCES
Alexander, H.E. 1976. Financing the 1972 Election. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
. 1979. Financing the 1976 Election. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.
1983. Financing the 1980 Election. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Ashford, K. 1986. "The Role of Corporations in the 1980 U.S. Congressional Elections." Socio-
logical Inquiry 56: 409-432.
Baumol, W.J. 1957. "Interactions Between Successive Polling Results and Voting Intention."
Public Opinion Quarterly 21: 3 18-323.
Beninger, J.R. 1976. "Winning the Presidential Nomination." Public Opinion Quarterly 40: 22-38.
Blalock, H. 1969. Theory Construction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Brams, S., and J. Garriga-Pico. 1975. "Bandwagons in Coalition Formation." American Behav-
ioral Scientist 18: 472-496.
Brody, R.A., and C. N. Brownstein. 1975. "Experimentation and Simulation." Pp. 211-263 in
Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7, edited by F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby. Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley.
Buck, R.C. 1963. "Reflexive Predictions." Philosophy of Science 30: 359-374.
Cantril, A.H. 1980. Polling on the Issues Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press.
Ceci, SJ., and E.L. Kain. 1982. "Jumping on the Bandwagon with the Underdog." Public Opinion
Quarterly 46: 228-242.
Cronkhite, G., and J.R. Liska. 1980. "The Judgment of Communicant Credibility." Pp. 101 -139
in Persuasion New Directions in Theory and Research, edited by M. Roloff and G.R. Miller.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Dizney, H.F., and R.W. Roskens. 1962. "An Investigation of the Bandwagon Effect in a College
Straw Election." Journal of Educational Sociology 36: 108-114.
Field, M. 1983. "Political Opinion Polling in the United States of America." Pp. 198-222 in
Political Opinion Polling, edited by R. Worcester. London: Macmillan.
Fleitas, D.W. 1971. "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal Information Elections."
American Political Science Review 65: 434-438.
Fraser, C. 1971. "Group Risk-Taking and Group Polarization." European Journal of Social
Psychology 1: 493-5 10.
Gartner, M. 1976. "Endogenous Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in a Rational Choice
Model." Public Choice 25: 83-89.
Gaskell, G. 1974. "Polls and the Voters." New Society 4(April 28) (600): 23-24.
Goeke, J.W. 1965. "Public Reaction to Pre-Election Polls and Computer Election Projections."
Public Opinion Quarterly 29: 444-445.
Granovetter, M. 1978. "Threshold Models of Collective Behavior." American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 63: 1420-1443.
Grush, J.E. 1980. "The Impact of Candidate Expenditures, Regionality, and Prio
the 1976 Democratic Presidential Primaries." Journal of Personality and Soc
38: 337-347.
Heard, A. 1960. The Costs of Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- 1968. "Political Financing." Pp. 235-241 in International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, vol. 12. New York: Macmillan.
Henshel, R.L. 1978. "Disciplinary Prestige and the Accuracy of Social Predictions as a
Deviation-Amplifying Feedback." Pp. 143-158 in Sociocybernetics, vol. 2, edited by R.F.
Geyer and J. van der Zouwen. London: Martinus Nijhoff.
. 1982. "The Boundary of the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy and the Dilemma of Social
Prediction." British Journal of Sociology 33: 511-528.
. 1986. "Two Discrete-Time Models of Credibility Loops." Working Paper No. 1 (32
pp.) typed. Studies in Social Prediction, Department of Sociology, University of Western
Ontario.
Hovland, C.I., I.L. Janis, and H.H. Kelley. 1953. Communication and Persuasion. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Jacobson, G. 1980. Money in Congressional Elections New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kayden, Xandra. 1973. "The Political Campaign as an Organization." Public Policy 31:
240-277.
Kelly, J. 1976. "Maryland: Money Talks." Pp. 14-38 in Campaign Money, edited by H.E.
Alexander. New York: Free Press.
King, R., and M. Schnitzer. 1968. "Use of Private Political Polling." Public Opinion Quarterly 32:
431-436.
Langbein, L. 1986. "Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence." Journal of Politics 48
1052-1065.
Laponce, J.A. 1966. "An Experimental Method to Measure the Tendency to Equibalance in a
Political System." American Political Science Review 60: 982-993.
Marsh, C. 1985. "Back on the Bandwagon: The Effect of Opinion Polls on Public Opinion."
British Journal of Political Science 15: 51-74.
Maruyama, M. 1963. "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Pro-
cesses." American Scientist 51: 164-179.
Mason, W.M. 1973. "The Impact of Endorsements on Voting." Sociological Methods and
Research 1: 463-495.
May, R.M., and B. Martin. 1975. "Voting Models Incorporating Interactions Between Voters."
Public Choice 22: 37-53.
McCarthy, J.D., and M.N. Zald. 1976. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial
Theory." American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212-1239.
McClosky, H. 1968. "Political Participation." Pp. 252-265 in International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, vol. 12. New York: Macmillan.
Mendelsohn, H. 1966. "Western Voting and Broadcasts of Results on Presidential Election Day."
Mendelsohn, H., and I. Crespi. 1970. Polls, Television and the New Politics. Scranton, PA:
Chandler.
Merton, Robert K. 1936. "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action." Ameri-
can Sociological Review 1: 894-904.
1948. "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy." Antioch Review 8: 193-210.
Milbrath, Lester W. 1965. Political Participation How and Why Do People Get Involved In
Politics? Chicago: Rand McNally.
Napolitan, Joseph. 1972. The Election Game. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Navazio, R. 1977. "An Experimental Approach to Bandwagon Research." Public Opinion Quar-
terly 41: 217-225.
Neustadt, R.E. 1980. Presidential Power. New York: Wiley.

Newsweek 1980. "Big John: Whistling Dixie." March 3: 30-31.
Noelle-Neumann, E. 1984. The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion, Our S
University of Chicago Press.
Oberschall, A. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements Englewood Cliffs
Olson, M. 1971. The Logic of Collective Actiorn Public Goods and the Theor
Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roll, C., and A. Cantril. 1980. Poll& Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press.
Roshwalb, I., and L. Resnicoff. 1971. "The Impact of Endorsements and Pub
1970 New York Senatorial Election." Public Opinion Quarterly 35: 410
Schelling, I. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
Simon, H. 1954. "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects and the Possibility of E
Stack, GJ. 1975. "Reflexivity and the Paradox of Prediction." Annali di Soc
Stavis, B. 1969. We Were the Campaign. Boston: Beacon Press.
Steiner, I.D. 1970. "Perceived Freedom." Pp. 187-248 in Advances in Expe
chology, vol. 5, edited by L. Berkowitz. New York: Academic Press.
Straffin, P. 1977. "The Bandwagon Curve." American Journal of Political S
Triandis, H.C. 1971. Attitude and Attitude Change New York: Wiley.
Tyson, J., and S. Kaplowitz. 1977. "Attitudinal Conformity and Anonym
Quarterly 41: 226-234.
Welch, W.P. 1979. "Patterns of Contributions: Economic Interest and Ideol
199-220 in Political Finance, edited by H. Alexander. Beverly Hills, CA:
Zech, C. 1975. "Leibenstein's Bandwagon Effects as Applied to Voting.
117-122.
Zeitlin, I. 1981. The Social Condition of Humanity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zetterberg, Hans. 1965. On Theory Construction in Sociology. 3rd ed. Totowa, NJ: Bedminster
Press.

Effects of Bandwagon Theory

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Effects of Bandwagon Theory

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

The Emergence of Bandwagon Effects: A Theory

Author(s): Richard L. Henshel and William Johnston

Previous explanations of bandwagons from election polls have exclusively empha-

BANDWAGON AND UNDERDOG EFFECTS:

conclusions about conformity to predicted election outcomes. Such an

DIRECT AND INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE BANDWAGON EFFECT

Up to this point, all theoretical accounts of bandwagon or underdog effec

forest psychological alterations

forecast 1 71 volunteerism campaign in

Poll ' o t alterations in + Major + Alterations

Only key individuals Voters in general

Figure 1. Direct and Indirect Models of Bandwagon Causes

Specifically, we see three principal ways in which such indirect caus

The same rational model leads us to believe that consideration of

1. Normative aspect of conformity. People conform to what they believe is the

2. Informational aspect of conformity. People change their view of reality upon

3. Sympathylempathy. This is the standard explanation for an un

4. Calculation. When a voter really prefers candidate X but s

THE POTENTIAL FOR BANDWAGONS AND

Figure 2. Schematic Curves for Contributions, Based on Expected Outcome

A POSITIVE FEEDBACK LOOP:

tions that increase its potential importance in the political process.

Pre-election Shifts in election +

Figure 3. Credibility Loop for Pre-Election Polls

It is important to consider what "accuracy" of a poll refers to in this context. A

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Figure 4. Graph of Intrinsic Accuracy and Apparent (Realized) Accuracy

AVAILABLE EVIDENCE, SIMULATION, AND TESTING STRATEGIES

Although this article of necessity concentrates on developing a new understanding of

Influence of f, v, and e on Election Outcomes

If indirect causes are to operate, differentials in financing, volunteering, and endors

Concerning the importance of financial contributions, there is amp

Influence of the Polls on f, v, and e

Although no systematic study exists to link poll results with fluctuat

of winning appears to be the most important factor affecting how much

Evidence Concerning a Bandwagon Feedback Loop

The bandwagon feedback loop is difficult to test. Existing evidence is ent

THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

and e is merely the means by which the true bandwagon decisions,

Finally, there are philosophical implications regarding the positivist di

reject them entirely. "Indirect" effects, in their usage, refer to influences

25. The theory probably works somewhat better in electoral systems wi

Neustadt, R.E. 1980. Presidential Power. New York: Wiley.

Вам также может понравиться