Prva Mms

Kumrila
First published Tue May 4, 2010; substantive revision Sat Nov 8, 2014

Kumrila Bha a, who likely flourished around 660CE, was a proponen of he orhodox
Brahmanical school of Prva Mmms. Among he mos influenial hinkers in he hisory of
Indian philosophy, he made significan conribuions regarding he full range of issues ha
follow from ha school's consiuive concern wih Vedic auhoriy and exegesis; virually all
Indian philosophers wriing subsequen o himand paricularly Buddhis philosophers,
whose posiions were mos compleely aniheical o hisfound i necessary o reckon
especially wih his argumens regarding episemology and philosophy of language. Among
he areas in which he exercised lasing influence are hermeneuics, poeics, jurisprudence,
and (arguably) hisoriography. Chief among he docrines ha have recenly occasioned
philosophical ineres in him is ha of svatah prmn yainrinsic reliabiliy, or immediate
justificationwhich surely represens Kumrila's mos significan episemological
conribuion; occasionally dismissed as fundamenalis in spiri, his has come o be
appreciaed (someimes in ligh of he reformed episemology advanced by conemporary
hinkers such as William Alson and Nicholas Wolersorff) as a cogen working-ou of he
kinds of commonsensical episemic inuiions characerisic of Thomas Reid. Togeher wih a
robus realism abou linguisic universals and he peculiarly Mmmsaka convicion ha he
Vedic exs are eernal, his episemology was effecively deployed by Kumrila o show ha
a commimen o he uniquely auhoriaive saus of he Vedas (and o he riual pracices
enjoined hereby) was raionally held.

1. Life, works, and influence

o 1.1 Indian philosophical debae in he middle of he firs millennium

o 1.2 The Brahmanical radiion of Prva Mmms

o 1.3 The works of Kumrila as commenaries on foundaional exs

2. Episemology: Direc realism and he docrine of immediae jusificaion

o 2.1 Early Mmmsakas on he episemic saus of Vedic esimony

o 2.2 Kumrila's developmen of a general episemological docrine

o 2.3 The significance of falsificaion for Kumrila's docrine

o 2.4 Alernaive inerpreaions of Kumrila's episemology

3. Meaphysics and philosophy of language

o 3.1 On he eernaliy of he Vedas, and of language in general

o 3.2 On he realiy of linguisic universals

Prva Mms

o 3.3 Presumpion, aprva, and he naure of he self

4. Ideology and ehics

Bibliography

o Criical ediions of primary exs

o Translaions of primary exs

o Secondary lieraure

Academic Tools

Oher Inerne Resources

Relaed Enries

1. Life, works, and influence

1.1 Indian philosophical debate in the middle of the first millennium

Having flourished in he laer par of he sevenh cenury CE, Kumrila Bha a was roughly
conemporaneous wih he Buddhis philosopher Dharmakri (whose predecessor Dignga is
significanly engaged by Kumrila), and is widely aken o have exercised an influence on his
younger conemporary akara (fl. c. 710). He wroe, hen, a a ime of profoundly
significan philosophical aciviy in India, conribuing much o a pan-Sanskriic discourse
someimes referred o as pramn a-stra, or echnical lieraure on reliable episemic
warransha was characerized by shared sandards of raionaliy and iner-radiional
influence. Increasingly pressed by philosophically polyglo proponens of rival schools of
hough, Indian philosophers a his ime were in an unprecedenedly good posiion o work
ou he enailmens of heir various commimens, and philosophical radiions quickly
developed in subley and sophisicaion from his poin on.

Characerisic of his period of iner-radiional debae is he legendary accoun of Kumrila

as having sudied for a ime a he famous Buddhis monasic universiy a Nland, hen in
is prime; based on he masery of Buddhis docrine gained in his way, Kumrila is said o
have been able decisively o couner Buddhis philosophical posiions. According o a
Buddhis variaion on such legendary reflecions of he sae of philosophical conesaion
(one recorded by he 17h-cenury Tibean hisorian Tranha), Kumrila is indeed
represened as having defeaed various lesser Buddhis hinkers in debae; his repuaion
promps he Buddhis Dharmakri, in urn, o go in disguise o sudy wih Kumrila, from
whom Dharmakri learns he secres o his success and hen bess him in debae, convering
Kumrila and his followers o Buddhism. As hisory, such accouns are surely as suspec as
he view (sill aesed in some Indian scholarship) ha Kumrila's dialecical successes are
chiefly o be credied for he decline of Indian Buddhism; neverheless, hese radiions
Prva Mms

confirm a leas ha Kumrila was a formidable philosophical opponen of his Buddhis

counerpars. I is fiing, hen, ha among he sources for sudying Kumrila's hough should
be no only he exs of such Mmmsaka commenaors on his work as Umveka Bha a (fl.
c. 710), Prhasrahimira (fl. c. 1075), and Sucariamira (c.1120), bu also he Buddhis
naraks ia (c.725788), whose massive Tattvasamgraha exensively engages (and quoes
from he works of) Kumrila.

1.2 The Brahmanical tradition of Prva Mmms

I is someimes surmised from his eviden knowledge of Dravidian languages (his

Tantravrttika includes some discussion of Tamil word forms) ha Kumrila may have been
souh Indian, bu as is ypically he case for he figures of classical Indian philosophy, he is
really known o us only in he sylized erms of radiional hagiographies. Wha is cerain is
ha Kumrila was one of he wo mos significan commenaors on he foundaional exs of
he radiion of Prva Mmms; indeed, his orhodox Brahmanical radiion of hough
divides chiefly along wo lines of sevenh- and eighh-cenury commenary, wih hose
Mmmsakas who ake heir bearings from Kumrila ypically syled Bhttas (followers of
Bha a ), while hose who defer insead o Prabhkarawho flourished around 700, and
who is someimes said once o have been Kumrila's sudenare comparably called
Prbhkaras.

Insofar as his cenral divergence beween Kumrila and Prabhkara involves reference o a
shared foundaion of exs, i is imporan o appreciae he radiional Brahmanical conex
for Kumrila's hough. Kumrila's radiion of Prva (prior) Mmms, hen, is ypically
so denominaed in conras o Uttara, or subsequen, Mmms. Boh srands of
Mmms have as heir guiding concern he inerpreaion and righ applicaion of Vedic
exs, which hese wo schools agree in hinking o be uniquely auhoriaive for maers of
ulimae concern. These schools differ chiefly over which porion of his vas corpus of exs
should be hough definiive; for Vedaa scripural caegory ha is arguably definiive of
Hinduismrepresens a saus radiionally claimed for a huge range of exs, composed
over a large period of ime (from c. 1200 BCE o early in he firs millennium and even laer),
exemplifying a wide specrum of lierary genres and characerisic docrines. Advocacy of he
Prva Mmms posiion is defined by commimen o he auhoriy paricularly of he
earlier porion of he Vedic corpus (culminaing wih exs called Brhman as), which chiefly
concerns he performance of riual sacrifice; hence, he school of hough advanced by
Kumrila was also well known as Karma Mmms (Mmms regarding riual acion) and
Adhvara Mmms (Mmms regarding sacrifice). In conras, Uttara Mmms akes is
bearings from ha porion of he Vedic corpus, comprising he Upanis ads, ha was
radiionally syled Vedna (culminaion of he Veda), and Uara Mmms is far more
widely referred o by ha erm. (On relaions beween hese wo radiions of Mmms, see
Taber 2007.)

Jus as exs in he many sraa of he Vedic corpus mosly represen hemselves as in some
sense inerpreing he exs ha precede hem, so, oo, he philosophical radiion of Prva
Mmms (henceforh, simply Mmms), ypically of he generally scholasic syle of
Indian philosophy, developed in he form of commenaries on he foundaional exs of he
radiion (and commenaries on he commenaries, ec.). Mmmsakas, as adherens of his
school are called, hus ake heir bearings from he Mmms Stras aribued o a cerain
Jaimini, who is hough o have flourished near he beginning of he firs millennium c.e. The
firs of Jaimini's stras (aphorisms) names he desire o know dharma (dharmajijs) as
Prva Mms

he consiuive concern of Mmms, where dharma is represened in early commenary

simply as wha connecs a person wih he highes good. Among he salien poins abou he
goal hus commended by Mmms's foundaional ex is ha dharma, as here imagined,
denoes a consiuively fuure sae of affairs; dharma, Mmmsakas ypically say, is always
ye o be (bhavisyat).

This characerizaion of dharma can be aken o sugges ha i consiss chiefly in he

realizaion of pos-morem exisence, which was indeed among he expeced resuls of cerain
Vedic ries. (Early proponens of Mmms mosly differed from mos oher Indian
philosophical schools in no aking liberaion from samsra o be he ulimae desideraum.)
The perennially subjuncive characer of alk of dharma perhaps more significanly reflecs,
however, he view ha Vedic injuncions essenially enjoin he ongoing bringing into being
(bhvan) of a riual world ha mus coninually be renewed; i is insofar as no one ever
finishes bringing his world ino being ha is realizaion is always sill o come. (See, on his
idea, Clooney 1990, 129161.) Philosophically, he significan poin is ha, as always yet to
be realized, he summum bonum for Mmmsakas is essenially inaccessible o percepion,
and only language can be hough o represen a way of knowing i; his is surely he
paramoun inuiion informing he enire Mmmsaka projec, which ceners on confidence in
he episemic saus of Vedic injuncions and he mind-independen realiy of language.

1.3 The works of Kumrila as commentaries on foundational texts

Typifying he sra genre of mnemonic concision, Jaimini's aphorisms are ofen inelligible
only wih reference o commenaries; he earlies of he compleely available commenaries
on Jaimini's sras is ha of abara (fl. c. 400 c.e.), whose commenary (which iself quoes
from a leas one no-longer-exan earlier commenary) defines he basic parameers of he
radiion's unfolding. The divergen elaboraions of he Mmmsaka projec represened by
Kumrila and Prabhkara are herefore framed, in urn, as commening on abara's
inerpreaion of he Mmms Sras. I is ypical, hen, for passages from Kumrila's corpus
o be cied wih reference o he secion of abara's commenary from which hey depar
which effecively means ha Kumrila's opics can usually be referred o by he paricular
sras of Jaimini upon which abara was himself commening. So, for example, Kumrila's
elaboraion of he svatah prmn ya (immediae jusificaion) docrine in episemology is
framed in erms of abara's commenary on Jaimini's codan strahe sra, ha is, ha
specifies ha Vedic injuncion (codan) is he only valid way of knowing dharma.
References, hen, o he passages in which Kumrila develops his signal episemological
conribuion are ypically o he numbered verses of he codan stra chaper of his
lokavrttika.

The laer ile names one of four works aribued o Kumrila, and one of he wo mos
imporan; i is he lokavrttika ha is ypically aken o be of greaes philosophical
significance, and i was surely his work ha was mos recurrenly engaged by oher Indian
philosophers. The lokavrttika is framed by abara's commenary on he beginning of he
firs chaper of Jaimini's workhe par of abara's commenary radiionally syled
Tarkapda, or he par concerning reasoning, wherein abara considers as a preliminary
maer he quesions peraining o wheher Vedic exs ough in he firs place o be hough an
episemically reliable basis for acion. I is hus in he lokavrttika ha Kumrila argues for
he episemological and meaphysical commimens relevan o he governing claim ha he
Vedas are uniquely auhoriaive for maers of ulimae concern. Typically of he vrttika
genre of commenary, Kumrila's commenary ofen significanly revises or elaboraes on
Prva Mms

he houghs advanced in abara's ex, and he novely of some of Kumrila's argumens is

herefore ofen clear. Typically, as well, of he iner-radiionally conesed period in which he
wroe, he episemological and oher argumens of he lokavrttika generally involve
Kumrila's heavily engaging rival Indian schools of hough and showing heir alernaive
posiions o fail as defeaers. While he argumens are in he service of claims (such as ha
he Vedas are eernal) ha are unlikely o be aracive o modern readers, his ex is ofen a
model of philosophical subley and sophisicaion.

The philosophically rich lokavrttika can be undersood, however, as a prolegomenon o he

real, hermeneuical business of Mmms, which is mos significanly advanced in Kumrila's
Tantravrttika; framed as a commenary on he remainder of abara's chaper 1 hrough his
chaper 3, his massive work addresses quesions raised by he differen kinds of senences o
be found in he Vedas, he saus of Brahmanical lieraure ha is no par of he Vedic corpus,
and all manner of grammaical and meaphysical issues peraining o he performance of
Vedic riual as ha is enjoined by someimes inerpreively obscure Vedic exs. In his under-
sudied ex, hen, here is much o be learned abou Kumrila's highly ramified philosophy of
language, as well as abou he ideological and pracical pariculars of he riualisic Vedic
worldview. In addiion o he lokavrttika and he Tantravrttika, Kumrila auhored he
Tuptk,
which commens on he remaining balance of abara's commenary; and he no-
longer-exan Brhatt
k,
whose exensive reamen of many of he concerns of he
lokavrttika is recoverable from he large pars of i ha are preserved in he Buddhis
naraks ia's Tattvasamgraha (see Frauwallner 1962).

2. Epistemology: Direct realism and the doctrine of

immediate justification
2.1 Early Mmmsakas on the epistemic status of Vedic testimony

I is relevan o begin wih Kumrila's characerisic episemological docrine no only

because many would judge his o represen his mos significan philosophical conribuion,
bu also because Kumrila appeals o he episemological inuiions elaboraed in his docrine
in arguing, as well, for a grea many of his oher claims; indeed, he commonsense realism
refleced in Kumrila's episemology represens a useful way ino his overall philosophical
projec, which is sho hrough wih essenially realis commimens. Thus, for example,
Kumrila was srongly criical of he docrine of svasamvitti (self-awareness) ha is
arguably foundaional for he Buddhiss Dignga and Dharmakri; i is paricularly insofar as
ha docrine figures in a generally represenaionalis episemologyone ha is o be
undersood as par of a larger Buddhis case for episemic and perhaps even meaphysical
idealismha Kumrila will have no ruck wih he idea, insead affirming ha wha we are
immediaely aware of is jus he ordinary objecs we ypically take ourselves o be aware of.
Kumrila's guiding inuiion, hen, is ha we are generally jusified in aking awareness
veridically o disclose precisely he kind of world i seems o us o disclose.

Kumrila's developmen of a comprehensive episemological orienaion along hese lines is

occasioned by abara's commenary on he second of Jaimini's Mmms Stras. So, having
announced in he firs sra ha he desire o know dharma is he consiuive concern of
Mmms, Jaimini hen says in he second sra ha dharma is a goal defined by [Vedic]
injuncion (codan)ha, in oher words, wha is episemically auhoriaive wih respec o
wha Mmmsakas ake o be he summum bonum is jus he exs of he Vedas (and more
Prva Mms

precisely, hose injuncive passage ha enjoin he execuion of paricular riual acs). This
amouns o he generally episemological claim ha among he various ways of knowing
available o us, he linguisic iems ha are Vedic exs uniquely represen reliable episemic
warrans (pramn a) wih regard o dharma.

Indian philosophers, paricularly under he influence of he Nyya radiion of hough (and of

he appropriaion and sysemaizaion of is main erms of ar by he Buddhiss Dignga and
Dharmakri), were generally preoccupied by Kumrila's ime wih he issue of pramn as
wih he quesion of which doxasic pracices (percepion, inference, esimony, ec.) should
be reckoned as episemic crieria or reliable doxasic pracices (as we migh render
pramn a), and wih characerizing he crieria so idenified. Mmms's Buddhis opponens
characerisically affirmed, in his regard, ha only percepion and inference had his saus,
and ha all oher ways of arriving a beliefs were somehow reducible o one of hese.
Proponens of Mmms chiefly aimed o affirm, in conras, no only ha here is an
irreducibly and disincively linguistic way of knowing, bu indeed ha i is his (and no
percepion) ha should be undersood o have a privileged saus; for while i is in he naure
of percepion o bear only on acually presen saes of affairshe salien poin of Jaimini's
fourh sra, on percepion, is ha his consiss in he kind of sensory cogniion had when
there is contact with something present (satsamprayoge)language alone has he capaciy o
engender awareness of fuure, or o-be-realized (bhvya), saes of affairs. Insofar, hen, as
he dharma ha Mmmsakas are mos ineresed in is jus such a sae of affairs, he fac of
percepion's bearing only on wha is (as i were) ready-o-hand is o be reckoned a deficiency;
he episemological projec for proponens of his school hus becomes ha of making sense
of he unique episemic auhoriy of he kinds of Vedic injuncions (paradigmaically, one
desirous of heaven should perform he agnihotra sacrifice) ha would no fare well on any
accoun ha insead privileged percepion.

To ha end, Kumrila's predecessor abara argued ha linguisic uerances engender some

cognition (avabodhayati), and ha as long as he idea hus engendered is clear or
deerminae (nicita), one is eniled o accep i as a basis for acion. Of a senence such as
one desirous of heaven should perform a sacrifice, hen, abara would mainly ask: do you
understand the sentence? If no, hen he senence is reasonably disregarded owing o is
engendering an essenially doubful (samdigdham) cogniion; bu insofar as he senence
makes an episemically conenful claim, we are eniled o judge he prima facie
unambiguous cogniion hus brough abou o be false only if i is explicily falsifiedif, e.g.,
we come o have knowledge o he effec ha someone has not gone o heaven as a resul of
having performed he agnihotra sacrifice. Deerminaely conenful linguisic cogniions ha
have no been falsified are reasonably aken, hen, as bases for acion.

2.2 Kumrila's development of a general epistemological doctrine

Despie, however, abara's probably warraned confidence ha his inerlocuors could never
be in a posiion o show ha senences regarding he pos-morem careers of Vedic
praciioners are falsified, he burden of proof will surely be hough by mos o remain on
him. I is a his poin, hough, ha Kumrila more convincingly shifed, in effec, he burden
of proof. His ground-breaking approach o episemology involves raising a second-order
quesion abou he doxasic pracices we ake o be reliable (abou, ha is, pramn as); of any
way of knowing, hen, ha migh be hough relevan o he adjudicaion of a claim such as
abara's (and Kumrila recognized ha i is sraegically advanageous in his regard o focus
especially on percepion), Kumrila asks: does i have is saus as episemically reliable
Prva Mms

does i have, as Kumrila pus i, is prmn ya, or being a pramn ainrinsically

(svatah ), or mus i be shown wih reference o somehing else (paratah ) ha i is reliable?
Wha Kumrila hus asks is wheher any cogniion's having he episemic qualiies in virue
of which i is o be reckoned a reliable warranruh-conduciveness, say, or he capaciy o
confer jusificaionis somehing ha obains immediately, or wheher insead jusificaion is
necessarily mediaed by one's having higher-order reasons for confidence in one's firs-order
cogniions.

The locus classicus for Kumrila's argumen here is verse 47 of he codan stra chaper of
he lokavrttika: I should be undersood ha all pramn as being pramn as obains
inrinsically; for a capaciy no already exising by iself (svatah ) canno be produced by
anyhing else. (All of he passages given here from Kumrila and his commenaors can be
found in Arnold 2005, 57114.) The argumen Kumrila concisely expresses here in verse
form is sraighforward bu compelling: if i is hough ha any cogniion finally couns as a
reliable doxasic pracice only insofar as i can be demonsraed o be such (for example, by
appeal o a subsequen cogniion of he causes of he iniial one), infinie regress ensues; for
he subsequen, jusifying cogniion would, as iself a cogniion, similarly require
jusificaion, and so on. Or, as Kumrila here suggess, if he iniial cogniion isn' credied
wih he inrinsic capaciy for conferring jusificaion, hen no furher cogniion could be
able o besow ha, eiherunless, of course, he furher cogniion is iself credied wih
immediaely having ha capaciy, in which case, why no simply allow his wih respec o
he iniial cogniion? As Kumrila's commenaors like o pu i, if i is hough ha we mus
awai second-order jusificaion before hinking we are jusified in crediing firs-order
cogniions, hen he whole world would be blind.

Among Kumrila's guiding inuiions here is he commonsensical hough ha radical

skepicism is no a enable ideaha, in oher words, i is o be presumed ha we are, simply
as a maer of empirical fac, already jusified in believing a grea deal, and ha he ask of
episemology is herefore o consider wha mus be he case in order for ha o be so. The
hrus of Kumrila's argumen can be brough ou by briefly conrasing his episemological
posiion wih wha Mmmsakas no unreasonably ook o be he characerisically Buddhis
posiion in his regard (wih is being paricularly he hough of he Buddhiss Dignga and
Dharmakri ha Mmmsakas mos significanly argeed wih heir episemological
argumens). Agains he kind of common-sense realism exemplified by proponens of
Mmms, hese Buddhiss were inclined o encourage wariness wih regard o our ordinary
episemic inuiions; Buddhiss are, afer all, chiefly concerned o argue ha we are misaken
in inferring (wha is perhaps among our mos unshakable convicions) ha our manifesly
episodic cogniions are he saes of an underlying self. To ha end, Buddhiss like Dignga
and Dharmakri privileged wha hey ook o be he consiuively nonconcepual, perceptual
awareness ha ulimaely discloses, hey ake i, only fleeing pariculars. Dharmakri's
inuiion in his regard was ha i is especially in virue of he causally describable characer
of percepion ha i is hus o be privileged, since on his view, he capaciy o inerac
causally wih oher pariculars is wha disinguishes anyhing as really existent. (This inuiion
means, among oher hings, ha Buddhiss would also aack he srong linguisic realism of
Mmmsakas, since he kinds of absrac objecs posied o make sense of language canno be
hough o have causal efficacy.)

In characerizing wha he akes o be he Buddhis posiion wih regard o he issues we are

here scouing following Kumrila, he laer Mmmsaka commenaor Prhasrahimira
invokes hese cenral commimens of Dharmakri o moivae a case for he direcion of
Prva Mms

explanaion ha Mmmsakas mean o quesion: Since we see ha here is cogniion of a jar

ha is someimes based on a jar, and someimes not based on a jar, a jar canno be ascerained
only by ha [i.e., only by a cogniion ha seems o us o have a jar as is conen].
Accordingly, i mus be ascerained ha he arising of a cogniion of a jar really is based on a
jar only afer ascerainmen ha here is a jar which really exiss as he cause of ha
cogniion, [which ascerainmen can be] based only on percepion of pragmaic efficacy.
This credibly represens Buddhiss in he radiion of Dignga and Dharmakri as holding
ha we reach episemic bedrock only when we have cogniion whose phenomenal conen is
pragmaic efficacy (arthakriynirbhsam jnam)ha, in oher words, i is reasonable o
doub wheher hings really are as represened in cogniion unil we have arrived a he kind
of awareness ha is causally relaed o wha i is of (as, for example, when one no only sees
ha here is a jar, bu acually carries water wih i).

This, hen, is among he hings i migh look like o suppose, agains he Mmmsakas, ha
he saus of firs-order cogniions as episemically reliable should be hough o require
demonsraion wih reference o somehing over and above he iniial cogniions. Kumrila
argues, hough, ha he problem wih such an appeal is ha he second-order awareness that
he hing perceived is pragmaically efficacious is iself jus anoher cogniion. Kumrila
would allow, in his regard, ha a subsequen cogniion concerning pragmaic efficacy could
coun as a poenial source of falsificaion; he impossibiliy of carrying waer wih wha had
seemed o be a jar would indeed coun as overriding he previously jusified belief ha one
saw a jar. Wha he refuses, however, is he claim ha he cogniion of pragmaic efficacy
provides a fundamenally differen kind of jusificaion han he iniial cogniion. Confidence,
o he conrary, ha pragmaic efficacy does provide somehing moreha i ells us, e.g.,
ha an iniially justified belief is also truecould only be based on he presupposiion ha
pragmaic efficacy is somehow more immediaely available o awareness han, say, a jar;
bu his begs precisely he quesion a issue, and Kumrila can no unreasonably ask why he
Buddhis is willing o credi he second-order cogniion as inrinsically valid, bu no he firs.

2.3 The significance of falsification for Kumrila's doctrine

I is imporan o appreciae he exen o which Kumrila's episemology involves essenially

phenomenological consideraions abou he credibiliy of cogniion; he says in his regard (a
codan verse 53) ha he episemic reliabiliy of cogniion is obained jus by virue of is
consising of cogniionha, in oher words, i is simply in he naure of conenful
awareness o make an episemic claim on he subjec hereof, and ha hese claims are o be
suspended or se aside only when specifically counervailing cogniions are forhcoming.
Moreover, one ypically does no go seeking knowledge ha one's firs-order cogniions are
false; raher, i is only when presented wih overriding cogniionscogniions, Kumrila
says, brough abou efforlessly, i.e., based on no osensibly jusificaory search on he par
of he subjecha one someimes finds i necessary o revise one's judgmens. Kumrila
does no propose, hen, ha one mus firs consider and rule ou all possible defeaers before
arriving a convicion; he poin, raher, is ha one's judgmen is jusified unil and unless
some specifically overriding cogniion happens o be forhcoming.

An accoun of he possible overriding of prima facie jusified beliefs urns ou, hen, o be
inegral o Kumrila's episemology. One migh, in his regard, worry ha on he view he hus
proposes, second-order cogniions of defeaers end up hemselves having a privileged saus;
ha is, Kumrila migh be hough o credi overriding cogniions (bdhakajna) wih a
capaciy for effecing episemic closure such as he does no allow for he iniial cogniions
Prva Mms

hus overridden (which, as wih scienific hypoheses for Popper, are aken as never able o
provide any definiive episemic closure). Thus, for example, i could be supposed ha one
migh jus as well conclude, from he fac ha wo conradicory cogniions have arisen, ha
he second one is suspecand ha i would herefore be unwarranedly privileging
overriding cogniions o suppose ha second-order cogniions ipso facto coun as evidence
of he falsiy of he prior cogniions on which hey bear. Here, hough, i maers ha
Kumrila's accoun involves essenially phenomenological consideraions; his poin is jus
ha a subsequen cogniion calls for he revision of a preceding one only if it seems to a
subject to do so. Thus, o have some prima facie jusified belief subsequenly called ino
quesion just is for he subsequen cogniion o presen iself as having, phenomenologically,
he force of overriding he preceding; if ha is no how he second awareness seems, hen is
phenomenological conen will no be ha of an overriding cogniion in he firs place, and i
herefore will no presen iself o he subjec hereof as undermining any already-held belief.

I migh also be worried ha Kumrila's accoun of falsificaion leaves he episemic process

infiniely open, wih somehing like an infinie regress of poenial revisionsha we could
never be eniled, on his accoun, o claim anyhing like knowledge. Regarding his line of
objecion, Kumrila and his commenaors finally fall back on an appeal o common sense,
urging ha i is unreasonable o encourage doub where no specific cogniion of any
deficiencies explicily raises one; oherwise, as he commenaor Sucariamira pus i, here
would be he unwaned consequence of annihilaing all worldly discourse. The Mmmsakas
hus ake i ha skepical concerns can reasonably be pressed only so far, and ha if i is
hough ha we are eniled only o hose beliefs ha have been decisively secured agains all
such doubs, hen i would urn ou ha we know very lile indeed. This hough reflecs,
again, Kumrila's commonsense realism, according o which i is beyond doub ha we do
know a grea deal, and ha any episemology according o which ha urns ou o be
problemaic is, ipso facto, o be hough suspec.

2.4 Alternative interpretations of Kumrila's epistemology

The foregoing reading, on which Kumrila's characerisic episemological docrine cenrally

involves he claim ha phenomenologically deerminae cogniions immediaely confer
prima facie justification, is informed by one of a couple of significan lines of radiional
inerpreaion of Kumrila's exs; in paricular, his reflecs he inerpreaion of he
commenaor Prhasrahimira, which is arguably preferable boh in erms of is exegeical
adequacy o Kumrila, and in erms of is philosophical cogency. There is, however, an
alernaive line of inerpreaion o be gleaned from he commenary of Kumrila's near-
conemporary Umveka Bha a (whose commenary is referred o in he Buddhis
naraks ia's engagemens wih Kumrila). Among he salien poins of Umveka's reading is
he worry ha Kumrila canno, as has so far been suggesed, have mean o argue ha all
phenomenologically credible cogniions are o be credied wih being ruh-conducive;
seemingly couner, hen, o Kumrila's own suggesion (quoed above) ha he validiy of
cogniion is obained jus by virue of is consising of cogniion, Umveka noes ha he fac
of being a cogniion (bodhakatva) commonly characerizes boh veridical and erroneous
cogniions.

Umveka worries, hen, ha if Kumrila is undersood as saying ha a cogniion's being ruh-

conducive follows simply from is being a cogniion, here would be he unwaned
consequence ha if one misook he glin of moher-of-pearl for ha of a piece of silver (a
sock example of error in Indian philosophy), his erroneous cogniion would have o be
Prva Mms

credied as a veridical cogniion (pramn a). (I maers for his discussion ha he word
pramn a is equivocal, alernaely referring o reliable doxasic pracices, and o episodes of
veridical cognition such as resul from he exercise hereof.) Umveka's inuiion, hen, is ha
being a pramn a can only characerize, as i were, he cerified outcome of he episemic
process; he is herefore concerned o inerpre Kumrila's docrine in such a way ha being
inrinsically ruh-conducive ends up being predicaed only of wha are clearly veridical
cogniions.

To ha end, Umveka urges ha Kumrila be undersood as arguing ha wha produces he

ruh-conduciveness inrinsic o some cogniions jus is he causes of hose cogniions ha are
veridicalha, in oher words, he poin of Kumrila's characerisic claim is ha he ruh-
conduciveness of any cogniion originates inrinsically, arising from he same causal facors
in virue of which i is righly said o be veridical. Wih respec, hen, o Kumrila's claim (a
codan 47) ha a capaciy no already exising by iself canno be produced by anyhing
else, Umveka glosses Kumrila's by anyhing else as suggesing ha a cogniion's capaciy
for ruh-conduciveness canno be produced by anything over and above the causal factors
relevant to cognition. Umveka hus reains wha is (on he inerpreaion here proposed)
precisely he poin Kumrila means o call ino quesion, which is ha veridical cogniions
can be disinguished paricularly wih reference o he causes hereof; for on Umveka's view,
wha disinguishes a veridical cogniion of shiny silver from misaking moher-of-pearl for
such, is he fac ha in he former case alone, silver really is presen as he cause of he
cogniion. Umveka hus akes i ha wha immediaely or inrinsically aaches o
cogniions is o be undersood no in erms of wha may be he case prima facie (no in erms
of how cogniions may a firs appear), bu in erms of wha we end up wih; he saus of
ruh-conducive cogniions as ruh-conducive, hen, is here undersood as inrinsically he
resulan effect jus of he causes of cogniions known o be veridicalin which case, he real
ask is o deermine, by appeal o causes, which cogniions hese are.

In conras o his inerpreaion of Kumrila, he elevenh-cenury commenaor

Prhasrahimirawho also wroe an independen essay on he docrine here in view
(eniled Svatah prmn yanirn aya, Ascerainmen of Inrinsic Validiy; see A. Subrahmanya
Shasri 1982, Arnold 2002)embraced jus he view ha Umveka hough so problemaic; he
affirms, hen, ha i was precisely Kumrila's poin o argue ha all phenomenologically
credible cogniionsall cogniions, ha is, ha firs presen hemselves as candidaes for he
saus of reliable episemic warransshould be hough inrinsically or immediaely o have
ha saus. This is, on one view of he maer, because Prhasrahimira akes he fac of any
cogniion's being ruh-conducive (prmn ya) essenially o concern no truth, bu
justificationno, ha is, he outcome of he episemic process, bu wha ges i off he
ground in he firs place. Kumrila's reference, hen, o he capaciy ha cogniions
immediaely have in his regard is o be undersood as a capaciy for conferring justification
a hough ha Prhasrahimira expresses by saying he akes Kumrila's docrine o
affirm (agains Umveka) no ha his saus inrinsically exists (bhavati), bu ha i
inrinsically appears (bhti); he poin of deparure on his undersanding of Kumrila, hen,
is he kind of episemic claim ha any cogniion seems to a subject o make upon him.

Among he poins Prhasrahimira adduces in favor of his inerpreaion is ha Umveka

canno make sense of he accoun of falsificaion ha figures in Kumrila's elaboraion of his
episemology. On he reading of Kumrila's episemology proposed by Umveka,
Prhasrahi says, Kumrila would have o be undersood as claiming, wih regard o
cogniions ha urn ou o be overridden, ha heir truth-saus had changed. In oher words,
Prva Mms

on he view ha being ruh-conducive (prmn ya) is inrinsically produced (i.e., by he

same causes ha produce he cogniion), any subsequen revision in judgmen would have o
consis in he acual ransformaion of he iniially known sae of affairswha had been
true, ha is, would now be false. Agains his, Prhasrahimira urges ha his doesn'
make sense, because of [he cogniion's having been] non-veridical from he ouse. This
rejoinder virually amouns o he saemen of a realis concepion of ruh: in cases where
our iniial cogniion is overridden, he iniial cogniion was false all along; all ha changes is
our awareness hereof. Prhasrahi hus separaes he (subjecive, episemic) sae of
justification from he (objecive) fac of truth, and clarifies ha wha is inrinsic o cogniion
has o do wih he former. This is why Prhasrahi can coherenly ake he whole docrine of
inrinsic validiy precisely o depend on wha Umveka ook o be an unwaned consequence:
is being all deerminaely conenful cogniions ha can reasonably be assumed immediaely
o confer jusificaion.

On his reading, hen, Kumrila's docrine is o be undersood as claiming ha i is

characerisic of conenful cogniions immediately o confer jusificaion, wih he mediaion
of higher-order cogniions capable no of conferring anyhing essenially differen in kind, bu
only of calling for revision. If, absen he arising of any overriding cogniion, he prima facie
jusificaion holds, hen he iniial cogniion sands as veridical in virtue of the fact that it was
truth-conducivein virue of he fac, as Prhasrahi pus his poin, ha being ruh-
conducive (prmn ya) is he moivaor of he concep and he word pramn a
(pramn abuddhiabdayor bhvakatay). This effecively reverses he direcion of
explanaion favored by Umveka, who is insead concerned o argue ha he saus of being
ruh-conducive is caused by he same facors ha cause veridical cogniions.

If i seems like seling for less hus o argue, wih Prhasrahi, ha defeasible jusificaion
is all ha can be yielded by our episemic pracices, he Mmmsaka proponen can ask
wheher i could make sense o wan anyhing more han ha; wha could i look like,
episemically, no only o be justified in holding a belief, bu also o know i is true? In fac,
his is already jus wha one is eniled o hink in virue of being jusified, and i is hard o
imagine wha sense i could make o hink we migh be, wih respec o any paricular belief,
in a beer episemic posiion han already entitled to think it true. Indeed, i is arguably jus
he poin of Kumrila's episemology hus o challenge he inuiion ha knowing could
only consis in knowing that one knows. Jus, hen, as wih he influenial effors of
conemporary reformed episemologiss o undermine he hrea of evidenialis
challenges (see, especially, Alson 1991, as well as Arnold 2005), Kumrila's episemology
amouns o a criique of empiricis foundaionalismone ha ges is purchase largely by
showing ha he foundaionalis impulse ends up leading o inracable skepical problems
such as can only be foreclosed by an appeal o common sense.

3. Metaphysics and philosophy of language

3.1 On the eternality of the Vedas, and of language in general

Of course, here are, in addiion o he foregoing philosophical consideraions in favor of

Kumrila's episemology, specifically Mmmsaka concerns driving he projec. In his
regard, Prhasrahi has a paricularly cogen poin in favor of he inerpreaion on which
Kumrila has, as suggesed above, effecively reversed he sandard order of episemological
explanaion. Thus, Prhasrahi urges ha Mmmsakas cannot proceed on he assumpion
Prva Mms

ha Kumrila mean o ask abou he saus only of pramn as (i.e., only of hose cogniions
ha are already known o be veridical); for his would effecively disqualify he Vedas from
coming under he purview of his discussion, since Mmms's opponens will no gran ha
he Vedas coun as episemically reliable (as a pramn a) in he firs place. Indeed, wheher or
no we are eniled o hink he Vedas episemically reliable is just the issue in question; i
would herefore be o lile avail o ask how i is simply ha cogniions already known o be
reliable have he saus hey do, since i mus firs be esablished ha Vedic injuncion is a
raional basis for acion in he firs place. And he only way o furher his goal, Prhasrahi
argues, is o show ha all conenful cogniions (even hose ha urn ou no o have been
veridical) should be recognized as immediaely conferring jusificaion. Aply expressing he
reversed direcion of episemological explanaion commended by his inerpreaion, William
Alson has asked o similar effec: if a subjec were no ofen really perceiving X why should
he experience involved provide jusificaion for beliefs abou X? (1991: 10) Similarly,
Prhasrahi can ask: if i were no really he case ha one desirous of heaven should
perform a Vedic sacrifice, hen why (as his episemological program is concerned o show)
would he experience of a Vedic injuncion o ha effec provide jusificaion for ha belief?

On he view, hen, ha Kumrila's docrine reverses he usual order of episemological

explanaion, he claim is ha insofar as any cogniion engendered by a Vedic injuncion
inrinsically confers jusificaion simply in virue of is being a cogniion, Vedic injuncion
firs becomes a candidae for he saus of reliable doxasic pracice (pramn a)and he
poin of Kumrila's episemology is ha his is a saus ha any reliable doxasic pracice
should hen be hough o enjoy unil or unless i is overridden. Here, hough, is where oher
characerisically Mmmsaka commimens significanly come ino playchiefly, he
commimen o he view ha he Vedic exs are, like language iself, eernal or primordial.
Jaimini's fifh Mmms Stra specifies in his regard ha he relaions beween words and
heir referens are primordial (autpattika)a view mean o underwrie he claim ha he
Vedas hemselves are ranscenden or impersonal (apauruseya). I is, hen, paricularly
ogeher wih his view ha Kumrila's episemology can be aken o warran he Mmmsaka
claim ha he Vedas are, in fac, uniquely auhoriaive; for insofar as hey are hus aken
essenially o ranscend any human perspecive, Vedic injuncions, uniquely among reliable
doxasic pracices, herefore cannot be falsified.

Tha he claims expressed by or implici in Vedic exs canno be falsified has o do wih he
disincive capaciy of language o bear on impercepible saes of affairs such as are no
ready o hand, bu always going o be realized (bhvya or bhavis yat). Thus, o he exen
ha any linguisic episode reflecs or expresses somehing of he episemic perspecive of a
paricular language-user, he claim i makes is always such as can be overridden based on
consideraions involving ha limied episemic perspecivebased, e.g., on he speaker's
mendaciy, or on his reporing a percepual or inferenial claim ha urns ou iself o be
overridden. Language itself, however, is no hus limied by any paricular perspecive; o he
exen, hen, ha one joins Mmmsakas (as Heidegger someimes seems o do!) in finding
inelligible he idea ha language itself migh, as i were, uer he Vedas, he fac of here
being no episemically limied auhor whose inenions he Vedas would express means here
can, in his case alone, be no basis for overriding he claims ha issue from hese exs. (Tha
Mmmsakas argued srenuously agains Buddhis and Jaina claims abou he possible
culivaion of omniscience reflecs he sake hey hus had in denying ha here could be any
episemically unlimied perspecive; language as such, in conras o such individual knowers
as he Buddha and he Jina, is no iself a limiing perspecive.)
Prva Mms

I is imporan o noe (wha is someimes overlooked) ha he foregoing claims abou he

eernaliy of language and of he Vedas are logically independen of he episemological
posiion Kumrila has elaboraed; he episemological docrine of immediae jusificaion
does no, ha is, by iself suppor he claim ha he Vedas are uniquely auhoriaive. While
Kumrila's episemology may, hen, by iself show ha Vedic exs are justifiably credied as
episemically reliable (ha, in oher words, Mmmsaka beliefs are rationally held), i is
logically independen claims abou he eernaliy of he Vedas ha are aken by Mmmsakas
o warran he sronger conclusion ha Vedic injuncions are uniquely so. I is imporan o
appreciae he independence of hese posiions from one anoher, and accordingly o noe ha
he assessmen of Kumrila's episemology (boh radiionally and among modern scholars) is
someimes driven more by resisance o he eernaliy claim han o anyhing inegral o
Kumrila's episemology.

Thus, for example, he enh-cenury Nyya hinker Jayana Bha awho was himself much
influenced by he hough of Kumrila, and who was inclined o cede o Mmmsakas
auhoriy in hermeneuical maerswas worried, as a heis, abou Kumrila's
episemological case for he auhoriaive saus of he Vedas. Jayana hough Kumrila's
defense of he Vedas problemaic, however, chiefly insofar as Kumrila's episemology
doveails wih claims abou he eernaliy of he Vedas, hus making for an essenially
atheistic case for he eernaliy of he Vedas. So, while Nyya hinkers like Jayana
characerisically held ha auhorship of he Vedas is o be aribued o vara, God,
Kumrila's defense of the eternality of language involves criiques of heism ha are, indeed,
very much like some characerisically Buddhis criiques of heism. (On his, see Krasser
1999.) Bu while Kumrila's episemological docrine is clearly mean o doveail wih hese
oher commimens o secure a unique episemic saus for he Vedas, he claimed eernaliy of
language (and he consequen criique of heism) is no iself a poin ha is advanced by
Kumrila's episemological case for he immediaely jusificaory saus of conenful
cogniions; indeed, ha here is nohing inrinsically ani-heisic abou his episemology is
suggesed by he fac ha William Alson (1991) has elaboraed a srikingly similar
episemology precisely in order o show specifically theistic pracices o be jusified. To he
exen, hen, ha Jayana aacks Kumrila's episemology chiefly by pressing he poin ha i
is problemaic o suppose here could be auhorless exs (as, for example, in his philosophical
play gamad ambara; see Dezso 2005, 21317), i should be recognized ha he misses he
mark.

Despie he imporance of hus disinguishing hese wo momens in Kumrila's case for

Vedic auhoriyhe epistemological momen, ha is, and he case for he essenially
ranscenden characer of he Vedasi should be allowed ha Mmmsaka commimens
regarding he eernaliy of language in general (and of he Vedas in paricular) are hardly
incidenal o heir overall posiion. While, however, few modern readers are likely o be
favorably inclined owards he view ha he Vedic exs are auhorless, hese commimens
reflec ofen profound inuiions, elaboraed by Kumrila and oher Mmmsakas, abou he
irreducibly linguisic characer of hough, and abou he realiy of he kinds of universals ha
mus be posied o make sense of he objeciviy of language. Arguing, in his regard, for he
eernaliy of language, Kumrila challenged (chiefly Buddhis and Nyya) proponens of
conrac- or convenion-heories of linguisic origins o explain how any particular linguisic
ac could coherenly be imagined o be he first such ac. The problem he raises is ha any
paricular linguisic ac is inelligible as a linguisic acinelligible, ha is, as insiuing
linguisic policiesonly given he prior undersanding ha he meaning-creaing uerance
iself means somehing. One person could, ha is, propose o anoher ha (for example) his
Prva Mms

hing here be called a cow only by telling her sobu he possibiliy of his doing so is jus
wha we are in his case rying o explain.

Kumrila can be said in his regard o share Wigensein's famously expressed inuiion abou
he problem wih Augusine's accoun of language-acquisiion: Augusine describes he
learning of human language as if he child came ino a srange counry and did no undersand
he language of he counry; ha is, as if i already had a language, only no his one. Or
again: as if he child could already think, only no ye speak. And hink would here mean
somehing like alk o iself. (Wigensein 1958, 32) Kumrila can be aken similarly o
have urged, in pressing his case for he eernaliy of language, ha we can only imagine
thinking o consis in alking o oneselfand ha o undersand that is o undersand
somehing more han jus what things are called. Wha Kumrila challenges his Nyya and
Buddhis opponens o explain, hen, is where we ge he very idea of meaning somehing,
and in wha ha consiss.

Kumrila hus argues ha he irreducible givenness of languageis always already being

hereis a condiion of he possibiliy of here being any paricular speech acs, and of any
thought such as migh explain hese. Paricularly as agains he essenially psychologisic
accoun of language o be gleaned from he Buddhis Dharmakri, Kumrila's view can be
undersood o credi somehing of he irreducibly social characer of language, which is o be
undersood on his view as having an essenially mind-independen realiy; he possibiliy of
meaning anyhing canno be explained wih reference o he goings-on in any particular
minds. I migh reasonably be said, hen, ha while Dharmakri's apoha docrine amouns o
a paradigm case of wha V. N. Volosinov characerized as individualisic subjecivism,
Kumrila's accoun paradigmaically exemplifies he alernaive pole ha Volosinov
characerized as absrac objecivism. (On hese argumens, see Arnold 2006, and 2012,
Chaper 4; Taber [forhcoming]. See, as well, Volosinov 1986, 4563.)

3.2 On the reality of linguistic universals

I is imporan o noe, wih respec o Kumrila's characerisically Mmmsaka inuiions

abou language, ha he word abdawhich ofen means word, as in he fifh of Jaimini's
Mmms Stras, where i is relaions beween abda and referens (artha) ha are said o be
primordialis essenially ambiguous beween wha Saussure disinguished as langue and
parole. Thus, he same word can also refer generally o soundha is, as Indian
philosophers ake i, o he propagaion of acousic disurbances in space (ka), which
describes he objecs of he audiory sense faculyand abda can herefore be reasonably
undersood as referring eiher o language as such (Saussure's langue), or o paricular,
emporally describable occasions of linguisic uerance (Saussure's parole). Clearly, hen,
argumens for hinking ha abda is eernal will seem raher differen depending on which of
hese senses one akes o be in play. Buddhiss, especially insofar as hey are ypically ap o
focus on paricular occasions of use, find i obviously rue ha (as on one favored Buddhis
example of a formally saed inference) abda is impermanen, because i is produced, jus
like arifacs like jars (which we know o be boh produced on paricular occasions, and
essenially impermanen); bu his claim is less obviously compelling if insead one akes i
ha abda denoes always already available condiions of he possibiliy of any paricular
uerance's couning as linguisic.

While, however, i is surely appropriae hus o credi Kumrila's argumens for he eernaliy
of language wih capuring profound insighs regarding our linguisic being, he case for his
Prva Mms

accoun of he eernaliy of language is grealy complicaed by he fac ha Kumrila acually

holds, in a way, ha i is in both of he foregoing senses of he word ha abda should be
undersood as eernal; on his view, ha is, i is no only linguisic universals ha are imeless,
bu also the phonemes that manifest these. This view reflecs, no doub, characerisically
Mmmsaka commimens, cenering on he caegory of mantra, abou he Vedas
commimens, in paricular, abou he inheren power no only of language as such, bu of
properly uered Sanskri senences o bring into being he saes of affairs hey concern.
Many Brahmanical exs preserve, in his regard, a famous sory of he significance of precise
ransmission of he ex: wishing, by uering he nominal compound Indra-atru (which
could mean conqueror of Indra), o make his son riumphan, he myhical figure of
Tvas ar insead ensured his son's deah by pronouncing he compound so ha i had he
sense of an adjecival, bahuvrhi compound (having Indra as conqueror)wih he laer
sae of affairs hen brough ino being by his uerance.

I is perhaps insofar as he was auned o such a view of he significance of Vedic language

ha Kumrila was ap o eschew ypically holisic undersandings of meaning, and insead o
hold he kind of aomisic view on which individual phonemes can be hough par of wha is
eernal abou language. Kumrila was, in his regard, criical of he Sanskri grammarians'
sphota (bursing forh) heory of meaning, which had been elaboraed precisely o accoun
for he expression of meaning in ligh of he manifesly temporal characer of linguisic
uerance. The consideraions here in play are no unlike hose ha preoccupied Husserl in his
On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1991); jus, hen, as Husserl
was led o venure ha he seemingly insananeous presen of consciousness mus somehow
comprise somehing of he pas and fuure if we are o accoun for hings like he musical
experience of melody, so, oo, Sanskriic hinkers had wondered how o accoun for he
dawning of meaning relaive o he necessarily emporal unfolding of any senence one could
encouner. A he momen, for example, when he las phoneme of a senence is uered, he
iniial phonemes are no longer presen; a wha poin, hen, are we o say ha he senence's
meaning is experienced, and how are we o accoun for ha wih regard o he necessarily
vanished momens ha are involved?

While proponens of he sphota (or bursing forh) heory had urged ha we mus, in his
regard, posi he sudden dawning of somehing akin o a uniary proposition (which migh,
indeed, be aken as he sense of he word sphota in his conex), Kumrila insead argued ha
undersandingwheher of sentences, or jus of individual wordscan be explained wih
reference o memory of discree phonemes, and ha reference o anyhing over and above he
phonemes was herefore unnecessary. Similarly, Kumrila eschewed he holisic accoun of
senence-meaningcalled anvitbhidhnavda, he docrine ha a senence is he expressed
meaning of a series [of words] (per Brough, 1953, 416)advanced by Prabhkara, who
would argue ha complee senences represen he basic uni of meaning; insead, Kumrila
held he so-called abhihitnvayavda docrinehe view ha a senence is a series of
expressed word-meanings (Brough, 416)on which senence-meaning is essenially
analyzable in erms of word-meanings ha are independenly inelligible. Agains, hen, he
kind of holisic view on which he sense of a word is o be known chiefly from subsiuion in
senences, Kumrila argued (jus as he had agains he sphota heory) ha as he words are
uered in a senence, each word performs is ask of expressing is meaning, and he senence
is he summaion of hese meanings. (Brough, 415; see, as well, Kunjunni Raja 1963,
Mailal 1990, Sideris 1991.)
Prva Mms

While such aomisic views migh no be judged very promising, and while hey are no
obviously required by (and may even seem in ension wih) such inuiions as ha language
essenially ranscends individual occasions of use, hey fi well wih Kumrila's addiional
commimen o hinking ha he phonemes of Vedic Sanskri are par of wha is eernal in
languagehough i is surely difficul o imagine how somehing as eminenly emporal as
sound could hus be reckoned as in any sense timeless. Nowihsanding his couner-inuiive
commimen o eernally exisen phonemes, Kumrila was also an uncompromising realis
abou more clearly absrac universals, aking i, for example, ha he referens of kind-erms
are real properies such as being a cow. (See Scharf 1996.) This comes hrough no only in
Kumrila's philosophy of language, bu also in his episemology; agains, hen, Buddhiss
who argued (wih Dignga and Dharmakri) ha percepion is essenially non-concepual,
Kumrila firmly held ha perceptions, properly speaking, immediaely yield jusified beliefs
regarding hings as he kinds of hings hey are; ha percepion hus discloses hings under
some description shows, among oher hings, ha he kinds of concepual iems ha figure in
descripions are real.

One can really see, ha is, no only paricular bovine criers, bu also he fac of heir
exemplifying go-tva, he propery of being a cow; his is jus wha i means o perceive any
such paricular as a cow. This is among he poins regarding which Kumrila found i ap o
deploy he episemological docrine of immediae jusificaion; hus, among he reasons why
i canno reasonably be denied ha properies like being a cow are real is ha here is nohing
ha finally falsifies he many jusified beliefs we have concerning hings ha are perceived as
exemplifying jus such properies. Insofar, ha is, as we are prima facie jusified in hinking
of somehing perceived as being a cow really o be cow, and insofar as no overriding
cogniion is forhcoming, we are eniled o hink he perceived fac of is being a cow is real.
(See, on hese lines of hough, Taber's 2005 ranslaion of he lokavrttika's chaper on
percepion.)

Wih respec o he quesion of how imeless properies like being a cow relae o he
individuals ha manifes hem (okens are in his conex referred o as vyakti,
manifesaions of ypes), Kumrila aimed o finesse he issue ha bedeviled Brahmanical
proponens of he Nyya school. Thus, Naiyyikas characerisically invoked he Vaies ika
caegory of inherence (samavya), holding ha an inherence relaion obained beween
universals and he pariculars ha insaniae hem. Criicizing he Nyya accoun on he
grounds ha hus posiing an inermediary caegory o do he work of relating he wo
differen kinds of hings jus opens up an infinie regress, Kumrila insead held a view wih
affiniies o he kind of perspecivalism ha is generally characerisic of Jaina philosophy; on
his view, universal and paricular represen differen aspecs of he same hings, wih
neiher aspec being finally inelligible apar from he oher. (See, e.g., lokavrttika,
krtivda
8, ff.; Jha, rans., 1983, 282, ff.)

3.3 Presumption, aprva, and the nature of the self

Among he grounds for cerain of Kumrila's claims regarding universals is he episemic

pracice of arthpatti, or necessary presumpion. This represens a doxasic pracice
admied as disinc (i.e., as a pramn a) only by Mmmsakas, wih proponens of oher
schools of hough having regarded his as indisinc from inference (anumna). If here is a
difference from inference as ha doxasic pracice was sysemaized by Indian philosophers,
i is perhaps ha arthpatti will no as readily admi of formalizaion; his represens, hen,
somehing more like inference to the best explanationhe presumpion or posiing
Prva Mms

(kalpan) of somehing wihou which some explanandum would no make sense. According
o a sock example, i mus be supposed, of a corpulen person who never eas during he
dayime, ha he eas a nigh. Kumrila appealed o his mode of reasoning o argue, for
example, for he necessiy of posiing universals as he referens of words; hus, wha one
undersands, on righly aking he meaning of a word, is that (a universal) without which he
word's communicaive capaciy would no be inelligible.

The same episemic procedure is invoked, as well, o offer a peculiar alernaive o he

characerisically Buddhis view ha awareness is inherenly reflexive (ha all awareness,
ha is, involves svasamvitti, or self-awareness). Profoundly wary of he significance of
self-awareness in Buddhis argumens for idealismDharmakri's argumens for he
foundaional characer of self-awareness, for example, amoun o a case a leas for he kind
of epistemic idealism on which he direc objecs of awareness are menal represenaions (see
Arnold 2008)Kumrila was a pains o disallow ha awareness is essenially reflexive;
hus, he held he couner-inuiive view ha our awareness of ourselves as being aware is in
fac a presumpion from jtat, he fac of somehing's being known. From he occurrence
of an ac of being known, ha is, we presume here o have been an ac of knowing, hough
ha is no iself par of he conen of our awareness. Les his seem a manifesly unenable
idea, i is worh noing ha he broadly Sanskriic discussion of hese issues ypically ook is
bearings from grammarians' analyses of he various facors relaable o a verb in any
senence; hus, Kumrila, like oher Indian philosophers who argued agains he Buddhis
docrine of self-awareness, urged ha i is incoheren o hold ha he same hing could a
once be agent and patient of a single acand if i is couner-inuiive o hink, wih
Kumrila, of somehing's being known prior o or independenly of a subject's knowing
that, i may make a difference ha he guiding idea of being known is ha of an act such
as can be referred to. Being known, hen, is here hough o characerize he objects of such
acs, and is herefore no somehing iself o be known by inrospecion.

Mos conroversially, Kumrila invoked he episemic pracice of necessary presumpion in

arguing (a grea lengh in he Tantravrttika) for he caegory of aprva, which i is hard no
o consider a basically ad hoc caegory mean o accoun for he efficacy of Vedic sacrificial
ries. Aprva denoes, hen, he emporally remoe consequence of riual acswha i is, in
oher words, in virue of which a correcly performed Vedic rie can be judged efficacious,
even in he absence of any immediaely observed effec of he expeced kind. The fel need o
posi such an eniy follows from Kumrila's convicions regarding he episemic claim ha is
made (a leas upon he righ kind of person) by Vedic injuncions. Thus, insofar as one can
(as Kumrila argued in elaboraing he episemology skeched in 2, above) jusifiably hold
ha Vedic injuncions make conenful claims abou maers of ulimae imporance, and
insofar as he ries enjoined hereby are manifesly emporal evens ha are ye said o bear on
always ye-o-be-realized saes of affairs, i mus be he case ha somehing relaes
presen, emporally occurren riual performances o he essenially impercepible realm of
dharma; for oherwise, he Vedic injuncions would be meaningless.

Here again, Kumrila's argumens relae closely o linguisic preoccupaions in ligh of which
he poin he makes can seem more ineresing han i migh a firs. Wih respec, hen, o he
quesion of wha, in he Vedic exs, refers to he obscure aprva he has hus posied,
Kumrila holds ha his should finally be undersood as he referen of verbs; for nouns
essenially denoe already presen hings, whereas i is verbs in virue of which injuncive
senences enjoin acions ha are always to be completed. (See, e.g., Tantravrttika 2.2.1, ff.;
and lokavrttika, vkydhikaran a, 330, ff.) Kumrila's argumens here rack, hen, an ofen-
Prva Mms

cied hermeneuical maxim favored by Mmmsakas: wha exiss conduces o wha is o be

brough ino being (bhtam bhavyya kalpate). I is, in oher words, he sae of affairs
whose realizaion (bhvan) is expressed by he verb ha should be judged predominan
paricularly in he injuncive senences ha represen, for Mmmakas, he mos imporan
pars of he Vedas. (See McCrea 2000.) So, jus insofar as hey refer o already-presen hings,
nouns refer o hings ha are essenially subordinated o he realizaion (he bhvan, or
making real) of he acts ha are wha such senences primarily enjoin; insofar, hen, as i is
reasonable o hink ha verbs, oo, mus have referens, and insofar as hese referens are
always essenially yet to be realized, Kumrila hinks i necessary o posi aprva (he
emporally remoe consequence of riual acs) as being, as i were, he referens of verbs.
(See Clooney 1990, 239, ff.; Halbfass 1991, 300307)

Once again, hen, Kumrila can here be seen o ake his bearings from he hough ha wha
maers mos is wha is disclosed by he unique capaciy of language somehow o bring ino
viewindeed, o bring ino beinga world beyond wha is acually presen. Kumrila's
richly elaboraed sense of our linguisic being hus reflecs, above all, a guiding commimen
o he view ha Vedic injuncions essenially enjoin he ongoing bringing into being of a
riual world ha mus coninually be renewedha, indeed, he world iself is susained by
Vedic sacrifice, which is raionally underaken chiefly insofar as he exs ha enjoin his
essenially ranscend any paricular human perspecive.

Kumrila's confidence in he genuinely referenial naure of language is also refleced, finally,

in his characerisic argumens for he idea ha i is an enduring tman (self) ha is he
underlying subjec of all of our acions (and ha herefore sands o realize, in he fuure, he
fruis of Vedic pracices). Like hinkers in he Brahmanical Nyya radiion of philosophy,
Kumrila (here closely following abara) was concerned o vindicae his convicion
paricularly in he face of Buddhis argumens o he conrary (he claim ha persons are
wihou self, or antma, being a cardinal Buddhis docrine). Kumrila's inuiions in his
regard cener on he hough ha he noion I (aham-pratyaya) mus have a real referen.
Tha his is so, he argues, is direcly experienced in he case of memory, he conen of which
consiuively involves reference o I as he subjec of pas experiences now remembered.
In conras, hen, o argumens (such as hose offered by many proponens of Nyya) o he
effec ha memory presupposes an enduring subjec, Kumrila's disincive claim is ha in
he always firs-personally indexed content of mnemonic experience we really encouner
he referen of he firs-person pronoun. Insofar, ha is, as i doesn' make sense o hink one
migh remember an experience, and a he same ime be uncerain abou whose experience i
is ha's remembered, i mus be hough ha here is in his case genuine recogniion
(pratyabhij) of he referen of he noion I. (See, especially, lokavrttika, tmavda,
verses 107110; Jha 1983, rans., 40102; Taber 1990.)

Ineresingly, Buddhiss like Dignga and Dharmakri ake he phenomenologically second-

order characer of memory here idenified by Kumrilahe fac, ha is, ha mnemonic
awareness is disinguished from presen awareness by he former's having an explicily
reflexive characeras evidence only ha all momens of awareness mus always already be
reflexive (mus always involve, ha is, svasamvitti, self-awareness; see Ganeri 1999). Tha
each momenary menal sae hus involves a reflexive aspecinvolves, ha is, a sense of
oneself as he subjec of he saeis no, on he Buddhis accoun, muually exclusive of is
neverheless being rue ha here is no enduring exisen over and above any series of such
menal saes; each momen's involving an elemen of reflexiviy can iself be explained,
Prva Mms

hese Buddhiss argue, by he same sricly causal coninuiy in virue of which I remember
my experiences bu no yours.

Kumrila, we noed a he beginning of his secion, is deeply resisan o he Buddhis

docrine of self-awareness, insofar as ha is enlised by hese Buddhiss as evidence for he
idealis claim ha we are, finally, indubiably aware only of he conen of our own menal
saes. Agains, hough, he Buddhis appeal o he phenomenologically disincive characer
of memory, Kumrila can urge ha wha is encounered in he firs-personal characer of
mnemonic awareness is no jus a subjecive aspec of wha migh, for all ha, neverheless
be an essenially momenary sae; raher, wha is genuinely recognized in he conen of
memory is ha he subjec who now remembers is the same as he subjec disclosed in he
remembered experience. In his regard, as hroughou his projec, Kumrila again akes his
bearings from he guiding episemological inuiion skeched in 2: ha we are generally
jusified in aking awareness veridically o disclose jus wha i seems o us o disclose. While
Buddhiss like Dignga and Dharmakri propose, hen, an explanaion of personhood ha is
couner-inuiive in ligh of he phenomenally coninuous characer of awareness, Kumrila
can again invoke his characerisic episemological docrine; hus, he argues no only ha we
are prima facie jusified in believing ourselves really o be as we seem (paricularly in he
case of memory) o ourselves o be, bu also ha here is finally nohing ha be aken o
override ha convicion. (See tmavda verses 12526 [Jha 1983, 405], and, as well, Taber
1990.) Kumrila's accoun of he self, hen, is finally of a piece wih he common-sense
realism ha informs his enire projec.

4. Ideology and ethics

Tha Kumrila can so ofen enlis common-sense inuiions in defense of his projec,
however, migh be hough in ension wih such surely non-commonsensical ideas as ha
here is a myserious aprva connecing he eminenly emporal acs of Vedic praciioners
o he always ye-o-be dharma from which Mmmsakas ake heir bearingsand in
ension, as well, wih Mmms's foundaional appeal o an essenially auhorless corpus of
Sanskri exs. Indeed, Kumrila's philosophically sophisicaed effors hus o deach
characerisically Vedic claims from any finie human perspecive can be undersood as raher
insidious. I is no beside he poin o noe in his regard ha he Mmms radiion he
advanced can be characerized (as by Sheldon Pollock) as he dominan orhodox discourse
of radiional India (1989, 604); for i is a leas arguably he case ha i is precisely he
appeal o he ranscenden characer of he Vedas ha secured Mmms's dominance, and
ha the securing of dominance was jus he poin of ha appeal.

The laer is surely as some proponens of he skepical Crvka school of hough held;
hus, Br haspai, he supposed founder of his criical school of hough, is ypically
represened as having argued ha he various aspecs of he Vedic worldview were inroduced
by Brahmins simply in order o secure heir own livelihood as he adjudicaors of ha
radiion. Wheher or no ha represens a reasonable accoun of he aims of Kumrila and
oher Mmmsakas, i is surely a defensible view a leas ha such ideological effecs were
among he upshos of Mmmsaka influence. Sheldon Pollock has recurrenly argued, in his
vein, ha he dominance achieved by proponens of he Mmmsaka projec is refleced in
widespread Indic concepions of auhoriaive discourse in generalconcepions such as
Kumrila himself advanced wih his argumens concerning, e.g., he episemic saus of he
vas corpus of Brahmanical lieraure (generally syled smrti, radiion) ha exends beyond
he Vedic corpus (conrasively syled ruti, revelaion).
Prva Mms

Thus, Kumrila argued a lengh in he Tantravrttika (e.g., 1.3.1, ff.) ha radiional

lieraure can be acceped as auhoriaive jus insofar as i exhibis he propery of being
rooed in he Vedas (vedamlatvam)even if ha means, in some cases, inferring he realiy
of a no-longer-accessible Vedic ex as he basis for reaining manifesly imporan radiions
ha do no obviously sem from any exan Vedic ex. Chief among he upshos of his is ha
wha Kumrila and oher Mmmsakas ook o be he basis for he disincive episemic saus
of he Vedasnamely, heir being ranscendenly impersonal (apauruseya)was
effecively claimed, as well, for whole radiions of learning osensibly relaable o he Vedas.
As Pollock has suggesed, oher sors of Brahmanical inellecual pracices seeking o
legiimae heir ruh-claims had perforce o conform o his special model of wha couns as
knowledge, and so o suppress he evidence of heir own hisorical exisence. (1989, 609;
see, as well, Halbfass 1991, passim)

The characerisically Mmmsaka claim ha he Vedas are eernal can hus be undersood o
inform a pan-Sanskriic episeme such as lends iself o he sor of analysis ha is
characerisic of Pierre Bourdieu, according o whom every esablished order ends o
produce (o very differen degrees and wih very differen means) he nauralizaion of is
own arbirariness. (Bourdieu 1977, 164) The enormous influence of philosophical projecs
such as Kumrila's, ha is, arguably had he effec of masking he specifically locaed and
ineresed characer paricularly of Brahmanical claims o auhoriy, giving hisorical and
coningen claims he saus ha goes wih heir supposedly jus reflecing the way things are.
I is no unreasonable, hen, o see in he success of Kumrila's projec a paradigm case of he
kind of hisorical siuaion in which, as Bourdieu pus i, he esablished cosmological and
poliical order is perceived no as arbirary, i.e. as one possible order among ohers, bu as a
self-eviden and naural order which goes wihou saying and herefore goes unquesioned.
(ibid., 1656) To ha exen, Kumrila's philosophy would seem readily o admi of he kind
of ideology criique advanced, following Bourdieu, by Pollock.

While his is a no unreasonable characerizaion of he conex and implicaions of his

philosophy, Kumrila can also be read as arguing for a radical de-cenering of individual aims
and projecsfor he relaivizaion of all claims and goals o an essenially linguisic realiy
ha is above all disinguished by is vasly exceeding any paricular perspecive.
Mmmsakas ypically disinguished, in his regard, beween dimensions of Vedic pracice
ha are essenially for he sake of he person (purus rtha), and hose ha are for he sake
of he sacrifice (kratvartha)and in he final analysis, i is he laer dimensions ha are of
ulimae significance for proponens of he Vedic worldview defended by Kumrila. (This
inerpreaion is advanced by Clooney 1990, 163, ff.) While Kumrila's robus realism surely
exended, hen, o he hough ha he selves persons ypically ake hemselves o be are real
ha, e.g., he referenial characer of he firs-person pronoun discloses somehing ha is
really he casehere is an imporan sense in which his projec can be aken finally o cu
agains he pursui of any self-cenered agenda. Emphasizing, o similar effec, some
profound inuiions ha can be undersood as refleced in he docrine of he ranscendence of
he Vedas, J. N. Mohany has suggesed ha he salien poin of his claim is ha he
inenion of he auhor is no relevan for undersanding he exs. The ex iself is primary
and auonomous. (2007, 65)

Exemplifying, ha is, a long-sanding radiion ha has always already preceded he

individuals who find hemselves consiued hereby, he Vedas, on he undersanding of hem
commended by Mohany, consiue he founding exs for he Hindu world by opening up
he horizon wihin which he radiion has undersood iself and [wihin which] we who
 Prva Mms

belong o ha radiion have undersood ourselves. (ibid.) Mohany, hen, no implausibly

finds i possible o see a basically Gadamerian hough refleced in he idea of he Vedas as
auhorless, and hus o emphasize he characer of hese as represening a horizon for (raher
han a consrain on) ehical hinking: The Hindu undersanding of dharma as embodied in
he imperaives laid down in he [Vedas] preserves he idea of ehics as rooed solidly in ha
radiion which was founded by hose exs, bu which hose exs have permied us o
reinerpre ever anew. (ibid.) While his is an ineresingly profound characerizaion of some
of he insighs driving Kumrila's projec, i is no less reasonable o emphasize, as well, ha
insofar as Kumrila's argumens helped secure for Mmmsakas he saus of privileged
arbiers of his ongoing reinerpreaion, quesions of power and auhoriy remain
ineliminable from an undersanding of wha he was up o.

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Related Entries
absrac objecs | Dharmakri | Early Modern India, analyic philosophy in | Indian
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Prva Mms

Philosophy (Classical): percepual experience and conceps | Indian Philosophy (Classical):

self-knowledge | jusificaion, episemic: inernalis vs. exernalis concepions of | meaning,
heories of | Reid, Thomas | reliabilis episemology | naraks ia

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