WhyThurdinv.

SEIBoston,LLCDoesa
DisservicetoSmallBusiness

MICHAELSARACINO*

ABSTRACT

In October 2008, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC)

decided the case of Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC. The SJC held that an
employmentdiscriminationclaimcanbesustainedagainstbusinesseswith
fewer than six employees under the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act
(MERA).TheSJCmadethisdecisiondespitethefactthatbusinesseswith
fewerthansixemployeesareexemptfromcompliancewithChapter151B
of the Massachusetts General Laws, Massachusetts primary employment
discrimination statute. The SJCs holding effectively circumvented the
exemptionforsmallbusinessesinchapter151B.
This Comment discusses the three principles upon which the SJC
wronglydecidedthiscase.First,MERAgrantsnonewrightstowhitemale
citizensandonly grants to all others those rights that white male citizens
already had, which are subject to the limitations of chapter 151B. Second,
the SJCs principles of statutory interpretation inform that, if possible, a
statute should be interpreted in harmony; this principle dictates that
MERAandchapter151Bbemadeconsistentbyapplyingtheexemptionin
chapter 151B into MERA. Lastly, the enforce contracts language in
MERAwastakendirectlyfrom42U.S.C.1981,andpriortotheenactment
of MERA, the United States Supreme Court held that the enforce
contracts language did not protect against discrimination during the
course of employment. The Massachusetts Legislature could not have
meant to adopt a different meaning when the statute was enacted. In
addition,thisCommentanalyzestheimpactthattheSJCsdecisionhason
the effectiveness of chapter 151B and employment discrimination claims
againstsmallbusinessesandthereasonswhycaselaw,legislativehistory,
andprinciplesofstatutoryconstructiondonotsupporttheSJCsrationale.

*CandidateforJurisDoctor,NewEnglandSchoolofLaw(2011).B.B.A.,Management,cum

laude,HofstraUniversity(2008).

489
490 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

INTRODUCTION

I
n October 2008, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC)
decidedthecaseofThurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC.1Thetrialcourtoriginally
granted the defendants motion to dismiss the complaint, and the
appeal was transferred directly to the SJC.2 The plaintiff, Tracy Thurdin,
filed an employment discrimination suit under the Massachusetts Equal
RightsAct(MERA)becauseshewasplacedonunpaidadministrativeleave
aftersheinformedheremployerthatshewaspregnant.3Initially,Thurdin
hadfiledadiscriminationclaimwiththeEqualEmploymentOpportunity
Commission (EEOC) and the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination(MCAD)foradministrativeremediesunderTitleVIIofthe
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and chapter 151B of the Massachusetts
General Laws.4 However, those claims were dismissed due to lack of
jurisdiction.5Thurdinthenturnedtoajudicialremedy,filingaclaiminthe
Massachusetts Superior Court under MERA.6 The SJC held that even
though chapter 151B exempts employers who employ fewer than six
employees,anemploymentdiscriminationclaimcouldbesustainedunder
MERA, which contains no textual exemption for small businesses, thus
circumventingtheexemptioncontainedinchapter151B.7
This Comment will analyze the impact that the SJCs decision has on
the effect of chapter 151B and employment discrimination claims against
small businesses and explain why the SJCs interpretation of MERAs
application was incorrect due to the SJCs principles of statutory
interpretation.8 Part I of this Comment will discuss the history and

1895N.E.2d446(Mass.2008).

2Id.at447.TheSJCmay,onitsownmotion,transferanappealbyavoteinfavorofdirect

appellatereviewbyanytwojustices.MASS.R.APP.P.11(f).
3Thurdin,895N.E.2dat44748.

442 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e17 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B (2008); Thurdin, 895

N.E.2dat448.AccordingtotheMCAD,[a]nemployermaynot...forceapregnantwoman
to take leave prior to giving birth if she is willing to continue working. Mass. Commn
Against Discrimination, Maternity Leave Act, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/mcad/
maternity2.html#6 (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). Therefore, if chapter 151B applied to SEI, their
actionslikelywouldhavebeenunlawful.Seeid.
5Thurdin,895N.E.2dat448(Theplaintiffscomplaintappearstohavebeenclosedbythe

EEOC for lack of jurisdiction after the defendant contended that it had only three
employees.).BoththeEEOCandtheMCADlackjurisdictionoverclaimsagainstemployers
offewerthansixemployees;TitleVIIoftheFederalCivilRightsActof1964appliesonlyto
employersoffifteenorgreateremployees,andchapter151Bappliesonlytoemployersofsix
orgreateremployees.See42U.S.C.2000e(b);MASS.GEN.LAWSch.151B,1(5).
6Thurdin,895N.E.2dat448.

7Seeid.at459;seealsoMASS.GEN.LAWSch.93,102(2008);id.ch.151B,1.

8SeeinfraPartIII.
2011 Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC 491

application of chapter 151B and MERA in the context of employment

discrimination.PartIIofthisCommentwilldiscussthefactsofThurdin,its
disposition at the trial court level, and the decision on appeal to the SJC
that employees are permitted to bring employment discrimination claims
under MERA against employers of fewer than six employees. Part III of
this Comment will discuss the reasons why case law, legislative history,
andprinciplesofstatutoryconstructiondonotsupporttherationaleofthe
SJC.

I. BackgroundofRelevantLaw

A. Chapter151B

In 1946, the Massachusetts Legislature passed the Fair Employment

PracticeAct.9Thebillwasenactedintolawaschapter151B.10Chapter151B
is the states primary employment discrimination statute,11 prohibiting an
employerfromdiscriminatingonthebasisofrace,color,religiouscreed,
national origin, sex, sexual orientation,... genetic information, or
ancestry.12Thestatuteprovidesthatthetermemployerdoesnotinclude
anyemployerwithfewerthansixpersonsinhisemploy.13Sincechapter
151Bappliestobehaviorbyemployers,thosewhoemployfewerthansix
employeesareexemptedfromcompliancewiththetermsofthestatute.14
Whentheoriginallegislationwaspassedin1946,italsoestablishedan
agency to enforce its provisions, known as the Fair Employment Practice
Commission.15 This Commission is now known as the MCAD.16 The
MCADisanadministrativeagencywithitsfunctions,powers,andduties

9FairEmploymentPracticeAct,ch.368,1946Mass.Acts372(currentversionatch.151B);

Mass. Commn Against Discrimination, The History of the MCAD, MASS.GOV, http://www.
mass.gov/mcad/history.html(lastvisitedApr.8,2011).
104,1946Mass.Actsat373.
11Mass. Commn AgainstDiscrimination,ForAttorneys,MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/

mcad/forAttorneys.html(lastvisitedApr.8,2011);seeThurdin,895N.E.2dat449.
12Ch. 151B, 4. Compare id. (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, religious

creed,nationalorigin,sex,sexualorientation,geneticinformation,orancestry),with42U.S.C.
2000e2(2006)(prohibitingdiscriminationbasedonlyonrace,color,religion,sex,ornational
origin,butnotprohibitingdiscriminationbasedonsexualorientation,geneticinformation,or
ancestry).
13Ch.151B,1(5).Compareid.(exemptingemployersoffewerthansixemployees),with42

U.S.C.2000e(b)(exemptingemployersoffewerthanfifteenemployees).
14Seech.151B,1(5),4(1).

153,1946Mass.Actsat372(currentversionatMASS.GEN. LAWSch.6,56(2008));seealso

Thurdin,895N.E.2dat465(Cordy,J.,dissenting).
16ActofMay23,1950,ch.479,2,1950Mass.Acts323,323(currentversionatch.6,56);

seeThurdin,895N.E.2dat465(Cordy,J.,dissenting).
492 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

setoutinchapter151B,section3.17TheprimaryfunctionoftheMCADisto
enforcechapter151Bandadjudicatediscriminationclaims.18
Thestatutorylanguageofchapter151B,section9providesdirectionfor
interpretation of the chapter.19 Section 9 states that the chapter should be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes, and any law
inconsistent with any provision of [the] chapter shall not apply, but
nothingcontainedin[the]chaptershallbedeemedtorepealanyprovision
of any other law of this commonwealth relating to discrimination.20 The
statute continues to provide that the administrative procedure set out in
section 5, while pending, is the exclusive remedy for acts made unlawful
by section 4.21 Also, a final determination on the merits under the
administrative remedy precludes any other action by the employee who

17See ch. 151B, 3. The MCADs functions, powers, and duties include: to investigate

complaints of unlawful practices, to render opinions upon the request of any employer
regarding whether their requirements for employment are bona fide occupational
qualifications, and to create rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of [chapter
151B].Id.
18SeeMASS. COMMN AGAINST DISCRIMINATION,2007ANNUAL REPORT 2(2007),availableat

http://www.mass.gov/mcad/documents/2007%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
19Seech.151B,9.

20Id.Chapter151B,section9onceincludedaspecificlistofstatutesthatchapter151Bwas

not to repeal; however, this list was eliminated when the statute was amended in 2002.
Thurdin,895N.E.2dat450n.8;seeActofAug.7,2002,ch.223,2,2002Mass.Acts818.
21Seech. 151B, 9. The MCAD administrative remedy begins with a charge of
discrimination filed with the MCAD. MASS. COMMN AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, KNOW THE
FACTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE COMPLAINT PROCESS AT THE MCAD (2007), available at
http://www.mass.gov/mcad/documents/Practical%20Guide%20to%20the%20Complaint%20Pr
ocess%20at%20the%20MCAD.pdf. At the time of filing, an employee meets with an
investigator who collects facts during a discussion with the employee, and drafts a formal
complaint, which is sent to the employer. Id. After this process, an initial investigation is
conducted to determine whether probable cause exists to support the allegations in the
complaint. Ch. 151B, 5.If it isdetermined that there is no probable cause, MCAD issues a
lettertotheemployeewithintendaysofthedetermination.Id.Withintendaysofreceiving
theMCADsdecision,theemployeemayfileawrittenrequestforapreliminaryhearing.Id.
Atthepreliminaryhearing,theCommissioner,whopresidesoverthehearing,mayuphold
thedetermination,sendthecasebackforfurtherinvestigation,orreversethefinding(makea
determinationthatthereisprobablecause).MASS. COMMN AGAINST DISCRIMINATION,supra.
A determination that there is no probable cause ends MCADs involvement with the
complaint.Id.Whenthereisafindingofprobablecause,theMCADfirstattemptstoresolve
thesituationbyconference,conciliationandpersuasion.Ch.151B,5.Ifthatavenuefails,
the employer is summoned to a public hearing. MASS. COMMN AGAINST DISCRIMINATION,
supra. An MCAD Commissioner presides over the Public Hearing, hears testimony, and
reviewssubmitteddocuments.Id.Legalbriefsaresubmittedattheconclusionofthehearing,
and the Commissioner reviews them and issues a decision. Id. A decision in favor of the
employer results in dismissal of the case; a decision in favor of the employee results in a
remedy,possiblyincludingbackpayandemotionaldistressdamages.Id.
2011 Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC 493

filed the complaint, based on the same complaint.22 The language of

chapter 151B, section 9 also indicates that after an employee files a
complaint with the MCAD, an employee may elect to bring an action in
superiorcourtfordamagesagainstanemployerninetydaystothreeyears
afterfilingthecomplaint.23
Eveniftheemployeewishestoseekajudicialremedy,acomplaintis
stillrequiredtobefiledwiththeMCAD.24Asubsequentelectiontopursue
ajudicialremedybarsthecomplaintfrombeingrefiledwiththeMCAD.25
Essentially,theemployeehasanoptionbetweenanadministrativeremedy
throughtheMCAD,asdescribedinchapter151B,section5,andajudicial
remedy in superior court.26 Once an employee opts for a judicial remedy,
the MCAD takes no further action.27 Furthermore, where chapter 151B
applies, an employee may not attempt to circumvent the requirement to
fileacomplaintwithMCADbypursuingtheclaimunderanotherstatute,
forexample,MERA.28

B. MERA29

MERAwasenactedin1989.30Themodelforthestatutewas42U.S.C.
1981, which was enacted by Congress after the Civil War to ensure that
AmericansofallraceswereaffordedthesamerightsaswhiteAmericansin
a wide array of activities thought necessary to their full participation in
civil society.31 The Massachusetts Legislature enacted MERA in
anticipation that the United States Supreme Court might overrule its
Runyon v. McCrary32 decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,33 which
wasthenpendingbeforetheCourt.34InRunyon,theCourtheldthat1981

22Ch.151B,9.

23Id.

24Thurdin,895N.E.2dat450.

25Seech.151B,9.

26SeeStonehillColl.v.Mass.CommnAgainstDiscrimination,808N.E.2d205,218(Mass.

2004)(quotingBrunsonv.Wall,541N.E.2d338,341(Mass.1989)).Seegenerallysupranote21
(describingtheadministrativeremedyofchapter151B,section5).
27Thurdin,895N.E.2dat451(citingStonehillColl.,808N.E.2dat217).

28SeeCharlandv.MuziMotors,Inc.,631N.E.2d555,559(Mass.1994)(holdingthatchapter

151Bistheexclusiveemploymentdiscriminationremedy,whereitapplies).
29MASS.GEN.LAWSch.93,102(2008).

30AnActRelativetoEqualRightsUnderLaw,ch.332,1989Mass.Acts655(codifiedasch.

93,102).
31Thurdin,895N.E.2dat466(Cordy,J.,dissenting).

32427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (establishing that 1981 extends to discriminatory conduct by

privateactors).
33491U.S.164(1989),supersededbystatute,CivilRightsActof1991,Pub.L.No.102166,105

Stat.1071(codifiedinscatteredsectionsof42U.S.C.).
34Thurdin,895N.E.2dat466(Cordy,J.,dissenting).
494 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

was applicable to discrimination by private actors.35 The purpose of the

enactment of the Massachusetts statute was to ensure[] that
antidiscrimination laws would continue to apply both to private and
governmentactors.36Ultimately,theCourtdidnotoverruleitsdecisionin
Runyon.37Rather,theCourtdecidedthat1981didnotapplytoconductby
anemployerafteranemploymentrelationshipbegan.38
MERA states, [a]ll persons within the commonwealth, regardless of
sex,race,color,creedornationalorigin,shallhave,exceptasisotherwise
provided or permitted by law, the same rights enjoyed by white male
citizens,tomakeandenforcecontracts....39MERAmakesnoreferenceto
employment or employment discrimination, and the history of its
enactment indicates no intent that it was meant to broaden the reach of
employmentdiscriminationlawsofthestate.40

II. Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC

In 2008, the state antidiscrimination statutes of chapter 151B and

MERA unavoidably collided.41 Bringing a claim under MERA against an
employer of fewer than six employees is squarely contrary to the
exemption traditionally given to small businesses in employment
discrimination cases based on the statutory exemption in chapter 151B.42
However,theSJCdeclaredthatwherearemedyunderchapter151Bisnot
available to an employee because the employer has fewer than six
employees,theemployeeispermittedtobringaMERAclaiminsuperior
court.43

A. FactsandProceduralHistory

On February 15, 2005, SEI Boston, LLC, a provider of information

technology services, offered Tracy Thurdin a position as an onsite
information technology consultant.44 Thurdin started working for SEI on
March 15, 2005 and was supervised by SEIs managing principal, Vicki
Hudson.45 On April 11, 2005, Thurdin disclosed to Hudson that she was
pregnant, with a delivery date of June 27, 2005 but would be able to

35Runyon,427U.S.at173.

36Thurdin,895N.E.2dat466(Cordy,J.,dissenting).

37Patterson,491U.S.at171.

38Seeid.at17677;seediscussioninfraPartIII.C.

39MASS.GEN.LAWSch.93,102(a)(2008).

40Thurdin,895N.E.2dat466(Cordy,J.,dissenting).

41Seeid.at447(majorityopinion).

42SeeMASSGEN.LAWSch.151B,1(5)(2008).

43Thurdin,895N.E.2dat459.

44Id.at447.

45Id.
2011 Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC 495

continue to fulfill her job responsibilities, including her onsite consulting

work.46
Thefollowingday,HudsontoldThurdinthatshehadinformedDaniel
Pierce,ownerofSystemsEvolution,Inc.ofMason,Ohio,ofthepregnancy
andthattheywerebothunhappywiththesituation.47Hudsonthenasked
Thurdin to take a voluntary unpaid leave of absence, which Thurdin
summarilyrefused.48HudsonassertedthatitwasunethicalofThurdinnot
to reveal her pregnancy at the time of her job interview.49 Hudson stated
that the pregnancy would prevent her from placing Thurdin onsite with
clients, and that the company would incur a loss as a result of having
Thurdinonthebenchwhileshewaspregnantandonmaternityleave.50
HudsonalsomentionedthatThurdinwasplacinganundueburdenonthe
company, specifically because SEI was a small company attempting to
expanditsbusinessintheBostonarea.51ThurdinaskedHudsontoattempt
tosympathizewithherposition,butHudsonrepliedthatitwasnot[her]
problem.52
Thurdin later made phone calls to a friend, her husband, and her
attorney, informing them that she thought her employer was
discriminating against her because of her pregnancy.53 Another SEI
employee, who overheard the conversations, informed Hudson of
Thurdins actions.54 On April 22, 2005, Thurdin received a letter dated
April 20 notifying her that she was being put on unpaid administrative
leave due to her pregnancy.55 After receiving the letter, Thurdin never
returnedtowork.56
Before receiving the letter, Thurdin filed a discrimination charge
against SEI with the EEOC and the MCAD, seeking administrative
remediesunderTitleVIIoftheFederalCivilRightsActof1964andchapter
151B, the federal and state antidiscrimination laws respectively.57 The
EEOCclosedThurdinscaseforlackofjurisdiction,afterSEIassertedthat
itemployedonlythreepersons.58

46Id.
47Id.

48Id.

49Thurdin,895N.E.2dat44748.

50Id.at448.

51Id.

52Id.

53Id.

54Id.

55Thurdin,895N.E.2dat448.

56Id.

57Seeid.

58Id.;seesupranote5.ThetrialjudgenotedthatitwasundisputedthatSEIemployedfewer
496 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

Thurdin filed a complaint in Massachusetts Superior Court in March

2006, claiming pregnancy and gender discrimination under MERA.59 SEI
filedamotiontodismiss,whichwasgrantedbythetrialjudge.60Thejudge
foundthatSEIhadfewerthansixemployeesandheldthatchapter151Bis
the exclusive remedy available for employment discrimination claims.61
The judge explained that the legislature intended that employers with
fewer than six employees not be subject to discrimination claims.62 The
judgealsonotedthatThurdinhadnorecourseunderMERA,becausethe
statutes make and enforce contracts language does not apply to
behaviorofanemployeraftertheemployeeishired.63Thejudgeusedthe
United States Supreme Courts interpretation of 1981 in Patterson to
support his decision.64 Thurdin appealed the judgment and the SJC
transferredthecaseonitsownmotion.65

B. TheDecisionoftheSJC

After undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the history,

construction, and interpretation of both chapter 151B and MERA, the
majority opinion held that in cases where chapter 151B does not apply
because the employer has fewer than six employees, an employee may
initiate an action in superior court against the employer under MERA.66
The basis for this decision was both legislative intent and the ordinary
meaningofthelanguageofthestatutes.67
The court began its analysis by confronting SEIs argument that the
trial courts decision was correct because the definition of employer in
chapter151Bisplainandunambiguous,andbecauseofafootnoteinthe
proposed 1946 bill that noted that the exclusion of small businesses from
thescopeofthestatutewasintentional.68

thansixemployeesandwasthereforeoutsidethejurisdictionofchapter151B.Thurdinv.SEI
Bos.,LLC,No.060994,2007WL5086402(Mass.Super.Ct.Mar.5,2007).
59Complaintat4,Thurdin,2007WL5086402(No.060994),2006WL5605196.
60Thurdin,2007WL5086402.

61Id.

62Id.
63Id.

64Id.;seediscussioninfraPartIII.C.SeegenerallyPattersonv.McLeanCreditUnion,491U.S.

164, 180 (1989) (holding that 1981 did not apply to conduct by an employer after an
employment relationship began), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102166,105Stat.1071(codifiedinscatteredsectionsof42U.S.C.).
65Thurdin v. SEI Bos., LLC, 895 N.E.2d 446, 447 (Mass. 2008). See generally supra note 2

(explainingtheprocessbywhichtheSJCtransfersacase).
66Thurdin,895N.E.2dat459.

67Seeid.at45159.

68Id.at451;seeH.R.154400,2dSess.,at12n.1(Mass.1946).Thefootnotestates:

Althoughthecommitteereceivedanumberofsuggestionstoreducethe
2011 Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC 497

Thecourtstatedinafootnotethatitdidnotdisagreewiththefactthat
SEIwasoutsideofthescopeofchapter151B,ratherthattheexemptionwas
vulnerable to an interpretation that the intention of the legislature was
simplytoexemptsmallbusinessesfromtheburdensofparticipatinginthe
administrative process involving the MCAD, not to abrogate the
employers responsibility to refrain from discrimination.69 SEI further
noted that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 149, section 105D, which
provides for maternity leave, job restoration, and protection of seniority
and pay, states that the definition of employer in chapter 151B, section
1(5) applies.70 SEIs contention was that this statute shows that small
businesses were intentionally excluded from pregnancy discrimination
laws.71 The court flatly dismissed this argument; after explaining the
argumentputforthbySEI,thecourtsimplystated,[w]edisagree.72
Continuingwithitsanalysis,thecourtbrieflyexplaineditsmethodfor
statutory interpretation.73 The court stated, [o]rdinarily, where the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to
legislative intent. Moreover, we construe civil rights statutes liberally,

exceptions in this section, it was decided after careful consideration to

leaveitunchanged.Thissectionexemptsthosewhoemploylessthansix
persons for reasons of practical administration and to exempt more or
less personal relationship, small business and family farms from the
scopeofthebill.
Id. Although perhaps not contemplated by the Legislature at the time chapter 151B was
enacted, there are now significant policy reasons supporting the exemption. Brief of Amici
Curiae New England Legal Foundation et al. in Support of DefendantAppellee at 2628,
Thurdin v. SEI Bos., LLC, 895 N.E.2d 446 (Mass. 2008) (No. SJC10123) [hereinafter NELFs
Brief]. The cost to defend an employment discrimination suit is roughly the same as the
annualaftertaxrevenueofsmallemployers,sotherecanbenoquestionthattheexemption
ofsuchsmallfirmsfromthepurviewof[c]hapter151Bservesalegitimatepolicyobjective.
Id.at28.
69See Thurdin, 895 N.E.2d at 451 n.13 (citing Stonehill Coll. v. Mass. Commn Against

Discrimination,808N.E.2d205,21617(Mass.2004));accordCollinsv.Rizkana,652N.E.2d653,
66061 (Ohio 1995) (holding that an exemption in a discrimination statute providing for an
administrative remedy evidenced intent by the legislature to exempt small businesses from
that remedy, not to grant small businesses . . . a license to sexually harass/discriminate
against their employees with impunity). The interpretation that the legislature intended to
exempt small businesses from the MCAD process is counterintuitive: [s]maller employers
aresubjecttolawsuitsimmediatelyoverdiscrimination,whilelargeremployersareprotected
fromthecostsandrisksoflitigationtosomedegreebytheadministrativeprocess.JamesO.
Castagnera et al., Small Business Exemptions to State Civil Rights Laws Under Fire in
Massachusetts,TERMINATIONEMP.BULL.,Dec.2008,at5.
70MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, 105D (2008); id. ch. 151B, 1(5) (excluding employers with

fewerthansixemployeesfromthedefinitionofemployer).
71Thurdin,895N.E.2dat452.

72Id.

73Id.
498 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

givingeffecttoeveryprovisiontoproduceaconsistentbodyoflaw.74In
addition, the court assumes that the legislature, when it enacts new
statutes,isawareofexistingstatutes.75
Applyingtheserules,thecourtnotedthattheplainlanguageofMERA
does not support an exclusion of its application for small businesses.76
MERA simply states that [a]ll persons... shall have... the same rights
enjoyed by white male citizens, to make and enforce contracts.77 In
addition, the court pointed out that the plain language of chapter 151B
doesnotsupportanassertionthatwhereitisnotapplicable,anemployee
isprecludedfromassertingaclaimunderanotherstatute.78

III. HowThurdinFunctionallyRepealstheSmallBusinessExemptionof
Chapter151B

TheholdingofthemajorityopinioninThurdinhaseffectivelyrepealed
the specific and intentional exemption from employment discrimination
claimsforemployerswithfewerthansixemployees,whichiscontainedin
chapter 151B, section1(5).79 The SJC reached this decision despite the fact
that MERA makes no reference to employment discrimination.80 The
conclusion that the legislature intended to repeal the exemption for small
businessesinchapter151B,thestatesprimaryemploymentdiscrimination
law, through MERA is contrary to statutory language, legislative history,
andcaselaw.81

A. ConstruingthePlainStatutoryLanguage

ThelanguageofMERAgrantstoallpersonsthesamerightsenjoyed
by white male citizens to make and enforce contracts.82 In substance,
MERA grants no new rights to white male citizens and only grants to all
others those rights that white male citizens already had.83 MERA was
enacted in 1989,84 and chapter 151B was enacted in 1946;85 therefore, the

74Id.(internalcitationsomitted).

75Id.

76Id.
77MASS.GEN.LAWSch.93,102(a)(2008).

78Thurdin,895N.E.2dat452.

79Id.at465(Cordy,J.,dissenting);seeMASS. GEN. LAWSch.151B,1(5)(2008);supranote

68.
80Seech.93,102(a).

81Thurdin,895N.E.2dat465(Cordy,J.,dissenting).

82Id.at467(quotingch.93,102(a)).

83Seeid.at467n.9.

84AnActRelativetoEqualRightsUnderLaw,ch.332,1989Mass.Acts655(codifiedasch.

93,102).
85Fair Employment Practice Act, ch. 368, 1946 Mass. Acts 372 (current version at MASS.
2011 Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC 499

rights of white male citizens in the context of employment, at the time

MERA was enacted, were those granted by chapter 151B.86 Since MERA
simply grants those same rights to all citizens, and chapter 151B has no
applicationtoemployerswhoemployfewerthansixemployees,MERAis
similarlylimitedinapplicationandshouldnotsupportaclaimagainstan
employeroffewerthansixemployees.87
In addition to this interpretation, the same result is reached by a
differentanalysis.88MERAsgrantofrightstoallpersonsislimitedbythe
language, except as is otherwise provided or permitted by law.89 This
indicates that the legislature did not intend to change or affect the
applicationofalreadyexistinglaw,suchaschapter151Binthecontextof
employment discrimination.90 Based on this interpretation, the limitations
ontheapplicationofchapter151B,includingtheexemptionforemployers
whoemployfewerthansixemployees,canbeextendedintoMERA.91

B. AnalysisofStatutoryConstruction

The same conclusion is reached by using the SJCs wellsettled

principles of statutory construction.92 When a statute is construed, the

GEN.LAWSch.151B(2008)).
86Thurdin,895N.E.2dat468(Cordy,J.,dissenting).JusticeCordystated:

[Chapter 151B] gives white males (and all others) the right not to be
discriminatedagainstbyemployersofsixormorepersonsbasedontheir
race,gender,religiouscreed,nationalorigin,orsexualorientation.Tothe
extentthattherightsofwhitemalecitizensaredefinedinandlimited
in the employment context by [chapter] 151B, the plain language of the
statutesuggeststhattherightsguaranteedto[a]llpersonsunderMERA
aresimilarlydefinedandconstrained.
Id.
87Id.;seealsoch.93,102(a);ch.151B,1(5).

88SeeThurdin,895N.E.2dat468(Cordy,J.,dissenting).
89Ch.93,102(a).

90Thurdin,895N.E.2dat468(Cordy,J.,dissenting).

91Marjorie Heins, Massachusetts Civil Rights Law, 76 MASS. L. REV. 77, 86 (1991) ([T]he

ambiguouslanguageof[MERA](exceptasisotherwiseprovidedorpermittedbylaw). ..
could be interpreted to extend the [chapter] 151B exemptions for small employers . . . to
[MERA].).
92Thurdin,895N.E.2dat468(Cordy,J.,dissenting);cf.Charlandv.MuziMotors,Inc.,631

N.E.2d555,558(Mass.1994).InCharland,theSJCheardacasewithanissuesimilartothatin
Thurdin. Compare Thurdin, 895 N.E.2d at 447, with Charland, 631 N.E.2d at 556. The issue in
Charlandwaswhetherafailuretoabidebytheadministrativeproceduresrequiredbychapter
151B precluded a claim from being brought by an aggrieved employee under MERA.
Charland, 631 N.E.2d at 55657. The court held that where applicable, . . . [chapter] 151B
provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination . . . and that the plaintiffs
failure to adhere to the requirements of . . . [chapter] 151B required the dismissal of his
complaint.Id.at559.
500 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

court will make the assumption that the legislature knew of existing
statutes.93Ifpossible,astatuteshouldbeinterpretedinharmonywithprior
laws to maintain a consistent system of laws.94 In addition, the court will
find that a statute impliedly repeals a prior statute only when the prior
statute is so repugnant to, and inconsistent with, the later enactment that
both cannot stand.95 The result of this rule is that, when it is not clear
whetherthestatutehasanyrepealingeffect,astatutewillbeconstruedso
it operates consistently with the prior law.96 Lastly, general statutory
languagemustyieldtothatwhichismorespecific.97
Basedontheseprinciplesofstatutoryinterpretation,whereMERAand
chapter 151B overlap, in the area of employment discrimination, there
must be a consistency between the two statutes because they are not so
inconsistentthatonecouldbeallowedtorepealtheother.98Infact,MERA
and chapter 151B can easily be made consistent as they apply to
employmentdiscriminationbyreadingtheexemptionofchapter151Binto
MERA, therefore giving MERA application only to employers employing
six or more employees.99 Any interpretation that reads MERA toapply to
employers of fewer than six employees, such as the one made by the
Thurdin court, functionally repeals the exemption from employee
discriminationclaimsgrantedunderchapter151B,inviolationoftheSJCs
settledprinciplesofstatutoryconstruction.100
MERAshouldalsobesubjecttothelimitationsofchapter151Bbased
on the tenet of statutory construction that general statutory language
must yield to that which is more specific.101 MERA is a general statute
with application to equalrights violations in manycontexts and does not
specifically mention employment discrimination in any of its text;
however,chapter151Bisveryspecificastoitsapplicationtoemployment
discrimination, and expressly defines the term employer to exclude...

93Charland, 631 N.E.2d at 557 (quoting Town of Hadley v. Town of Amherst, 360 N.E.2d

623,626(Mass.1977)).
94Id.

95Commonwealthv.Graham,445N.E.2d1043,1049(Mass.1983).
96Thurdin,895N.E.2dat46869(Cordy,J.,dissenting).

97TBI,Inc.v.Bd.ofHealth,725N.E.2d188,195(Mass.2000)(quotingRiskMgmt.Found.

oftheHarvardMed.Insts.,Inc.v.CommrofIns.,554N.E.2d843,847(Mass.1990)).
98Thurdin, 895 N.E.2d at 469 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see also Charland, 631 N.E.2d at 557;

Graham,445N.E.2dat1049.
99Thurdin, 895 N.E.2d at 469 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, 1(5)

(2008).Theprincipallimitationwithinchapter151Bwithrespecttothiscaseisthatitdoesnot
applytoemployersoffewerthansixemployees.Seech.151B,1(5).
100Thurdin,895N.E.2dat469(Cordy,J.,dissenting);seesupratextaccompanyingnotes94

95.
101TBI,Inc.,725N.E.2dat195(quotingRiskMgmt.Found.oftheHarvardMed.Insts.,Inc.,554

N.E.2dat847);seeThurdin,895N.E.2dat469(Cordy,J.,dissenting).
2011 Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC 501

anyemployerwithfewerthansixpersonsinhisemploy.102Basedonthe
principle of statutory construction set out in TBI, Inc. v. Board of Health of
NorthAndover,thegenerallanguageofMERAmustyieldtothespecific
language of chapter 151B;103 therefore, an appropriate interpretation is to
read the exemption for small businesses of chapter 151B into MERA,
applyingMERAonlytoemployersofsixormorepersons.104

C. DefiningTheRighttoEnforceContracts105

TheThurdincourtrestsitscreationofanaggrievedemployeesrightto
bring an employment discrimination claim under MERA on the statutory
language that [a]ll persons... shall have... the same rights enjoyed by
white male citizens, to...enforce contracts; the theory of the SJC is that
the right to enforce contracts is implicated in the case of discrimination
during the course of employment.106 Therefore, requiring an employee to
take a leave of absence because of her pregnancy abridges her right to
enforce her contract.107 However, the enforce contracts language in
MERAwastakendirectlyfrom1981,108andjustpriortotheenactmentof
MERA,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtheldthattheenforcecontracts
language did not protect against discrimination during the course of
employment.109
OnJune15,1989,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtissuedadecisionin
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.110 The question before the Court was
whether an action under 1981 could be supported by discrimination by
an employer after the employee had been hired.111 The Court held that a

102Thurdin, 895 N.E.2d at 469 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (quoting ch. 151B, 1(5)). Compare

ch.93,102,withch.151B,1(5).
103SeeTBI,Inc.,725N.E.2dat195.

104Thurdin, 895 N.E.2d at 469 (Cordy, J., dissenting); see ch. 151B, 1(5); TBI, Inc., 725

N.E.2dat195.
105SeeMASS.GEN.LAWSch.93,102(a)(2008).
106Id.;seeThurdin,895N.E.2dat458.

107SeeThurdin,895N.E.2dat458.
108Comparech.93,102(a)(Allpersonswithinthecommonwealth,regardlessofsex,race,

color, creed or national origin, shall have, except as is otherwise provided or permitted by
law, the same rights enjoyed by white male citizens, to make and enforce contracts . . . .
(emphasisadded)),with42U.S.C.1981(a)(2006)(Allpersonswithinthejurisdictionofthe
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts...asisenjoyedbywhitecitizens....(emphasisadded)).
109ComparePattersonv.McLeanCreditUnion,491U.S.164,164,17778(1989)(decidingon

June 15, 1989 that the right to enforce contracts is not abridged by discriminatory behavior
duringthecourseofemployment),withAnActRelativetoEqualRightsUnderLaw,ch.332,
1989Mass.Acts655(codifiedasch.93,102)(ApprovedAugust3,1989).
110491U.S.164(1989).

111Id.at17577.
502 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

racial harassment claim could not be supported by 1981 because it did

notprotectemployeesfromconductofanemployeraftertheformationof
the employment agreement.112 The basis for this interpretation was that
conduct by an employer after the employment relationship has already
starteddoesnotinvolvetherighttomakeacontract,butratherimplicates
the performance of established contract obligations and the conditions of
continuingemployment,mattersmorenaturallygovernedbystatecontract
law and Title VII.113 Further, the Court noted that construing 1981 to
apply to conduct of an employer during the course of an employment
relationship would undermine the detailed and wellcrafted procedures
forconciliationandresolutionofTitleVIIclaims.114
ThePattersondecisioninfluencestheanalysisoftheenforcecontracts
language in MERA in two ways: (1) the SJCs principles of statutory
construction dictate that construction of Massachusetts state statutes will
be influenced by the construction of a parallel federal statute given by
federalcourts,115and(2)thedecisioninPattersonwasrenderedpriortothe
enactmentofMERA;thereforethelegislatureischargedwithknowledgeof
the definition of enforce contracts given by the Court.116 However, an
interpretation by federal courts of a similar federal statute is not binding,
sothereremainsaquestionofintent:didtheLegislatureintend(whenit
enacted MERA) [the] words [make and enforce contracts] to mean what
theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsaidthey[mean].117
TheconclusionthattheMassachusettsLegislaturedidintendtoadopt
the meaning of enforce contracts given by the United States Supreme
Courtissupportedbyseveralfacts.118First,MERAwasenactedfortyeight

112Id.at17778.

113Id.at177.TheCourtreferstoTitleVIIbecauseitisinterpretingfederallaw,andTitleVII

isthefederalemploymentdiscriminationstatute.See42U.S.C.2000eto2000e17;Patterson,
491U.S.at17778.
114Patterson,491U.S.at180;seesupranote113.
115See Howard v. Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Mass. 1987) (In construing

Massachusetts statutes [the SJC is] ordinarily guided by the construction given the parallel
FederalstatutebytheFederalcourts.).
116See supra note 109; cf. Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 631 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Mass. 1994)

(quotingTownofHadleyv.TownofAmherst,360N.E.2d623,626(Mass.1977))(holdingthat
legislaturesarepresumedtoknowtheexistinglawswhentheyenactlegislation).
117Thurdin v. SEI Bos., LLC., 895 N.E.2d 446, 470 (Mass. 2008) (Cordy, J., dissenting); cf.

Mass.Elec.Co.v.Mass.CommnAgainstDiscrimination,375N.E.2d1192,1198(Mass.1978)
(While interpretations of a Federal statute which is similar to the State statute under
consideration are often helpful . . . such interpretations are not binding on a State court
construingitsownStatestatute.).
118See infra text accompanying notes 11920. But see Ian Fidencio Haney Lopez, Recent

Development, An Act Relative to Civil Rights Under LawMassachusetts General Laws Ch. 93,
102 (1989), 25 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 147, 157 (1990) (Governor Dukakis has stated that
[MERA] reinstates the employment discrimination protection of the 1976 Supreme Court
2011 Thurdinv.SEIBoston,LLC 503

days after the decision in Patterson was announced; therefore, the

interpretation given by the Supreme Court of the enforce contracts
language in 1981 was in effect at the time MERA was enacted, and the
legislature took no corrective action.119 Most persuasively, however, is
thefactthatCongressamended1981in1991todefinethephrasemake
and enforce contracts;120 the Massachusetts Legislature again took no
action to amend MERA.121 If it was the intent of the legislature for the
language enforce contracts to apply to posthiring conduct of an
employer, it would be expected that at some point during this long
historyofdecisionsitwouldhaveamendedthestatutetosayso.122

CONCLUSION

ThedecisionbytheSJCinThurdiniscontrarytocaselaw,principlesof
statutory construction, and legislative history.123 The legislative history of
chapter 151B shows that the exemption for employers of fewer than six
employeeswaspurposeful,forreasonsofpracticaladministrationandto
exemptmoreorlesspersonalrelationship,smallbusinessandfamilyfarms
from the scope of the bill.124 Case law and principles of statutory
constructionteachthatacourtshouldattempttoreadstatutestogetherto
provide a consistent body of law and should not find that a statute
impliedlyrepealsanotherstatuteunlesstheyaresoinconsistentthatthey
cannot stand together.125 Following these principles, MERA should be
subjecttotheexemptionforsmallbusinessesfoundinchapter151B,anda
claim against a business employing fewer than six employees should not
bepermitted.126
In addition, even if it is accepted that a claim under MERA can be
sustainedagainstasmallbusiness,ithasnoapplicationtopostformation

Runyonv.McCraryrulingwhichwaspartiallyoverturnedinJunebyPattersonv.McLeanCredit
Union. (quoting News Release, Office of Governor Michael S. Dukakis, Dukakis Signs
LandmarkCivilRightsLegislation(Aug.3,1989)(onfilewiththeHarvardCivilRightsCivil
LibertiesLawReview))).
119Compare An Act Relative to Equal Rights Under Law, ch. 332, 1989 Mass. Acts 655

(codifiedasMASS. GEN. LAWSch.93,102(2008))(passedonAugust3,1989),withPatterson,

491U.S.at164(decidedonJune15,1989).
120CivilRightsActof1991,Pub.L.No.102166,101(2),105Stat.1071,107172(codifiedat

42U.S.C.1981(b)(2006)).
121See ch. 93, 102(containing no definition of the term make and enforce contracts to

remainconsistentwithfederallaw).
122Thurdin,895N.E.2dat471(Cordy,J.,dissenting).

123Id.at46371;seesupraPartIII.

124H.R.154400,2dSess.,at12n.1(Mass.1946);seesupranote68.

125Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes9495.

126SeeThurdin,895N.E.2dat46571(Cordy,J.,dissenting);supraPartIII.AB.
504 NewEnglandLawReview v.45|489

conduct by an employer based on the language enforce contracts as

interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and intended by the
MassachusettsLegislature.127NearlytwomonthsbeforetheMassachusetts
Legislature actually enacted the statute, the United States Supreme Court
interpretedthesamelanguageinthefederalstatutethatiscontainedinthe
state statute to exclude conduct by an employer after the employment
relationship begins.128 Congress eventually amended the federal statute;129
however,theMassachusettsLegislature,tothisday,hasnotamendedthe
state statute.130 This inaction leads to a conclusion that the Massachusetts
Legislature intended the meaning applied by the United States Supreme
Court,thattheproceduressetoutinantidiscriminationlawsforresolution
ofemploymentdiscriminationclaimsshouldnotbeupset.131

127SeesupraPartIII.C.

128Pattersonv.McLeanCreditUnion,491U.S.164(1989);AnActRelativetoEqualRights

UnderLaw,ch.332,1989Mass.Acts655(codifiedasMASS. GEN. LAWSch.93,102(2008)).

PattersonwasdecidedJune15,1989,andMERAwasenactedfortyninedayslateronAugust
3,1989.Patterson,491U.S.at164;ch.332,1989Mass.Acts655.
129SeeCivilRightsActof1991,Pub.L.No.102166,101(2),105Stat.1071,107172(1991)

(codifiedat42U.S.C.1981(b)(2006)).
130Seech.93,102.

131See Thurdin, 895 N.E.2d at 471 (Cordy, J., dissenting); supra Part III.C; cf. Patterson, 491

U.S.at180(concludingthatthefederaldiscriminationstatute,TitleVIIoftheCivilRightsAct
of1964,wasnotmeanttobeupsetby1981,thefederalanalogtoMERA,byapplyingitto
behaviorbyanemployeraftertheemploymentrelationshiphadstarted).