27/03/2017 Delivery | Westlaw India

Westlaw India Delivery Summary

Request made by : NOVUS IP USER

Request made on: Monday, 27 March, 2017 at 12:55 IST

Client ID: insagar-1

Content Type: UK Journals
Title : Did arbitration fail India or did India fail arbitration?
Delivery selection: Current Document
Number of documents delivered: 1

2017 Thomson Reuters South Asia Private Limited

27/03/2017 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 2

International Arbitration Law Review

2007

Did arbitration fail India or did India fail arbitration?

Sarah E. Hilmer

Subject: Arbitration

Keywords: Arbitral proceedings; India; Legal history

Legislation: Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (India)

Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (India)

*Int. A.L.R. 33 Introduction

India has a rich tradition of arbitration. In ancient India, the settlement of disputes by a person chosen by the
disputants was quite common. Disputes were decided by kulas (family or clan assemblies), srenis (guilds of men
following the same occupation), parishads (assemblies of learned men who knew law), and nyaya panchayats.
Most commonly known and still practised in a few areas of rural India are the panchayats. These are groups of
elders who were ordinarily elected according to their wealth, social standing and influence in the community in
order to decide disputes between villagers. The binding authority behind the panchayats decision was the fear
of excommunication from the community and also from religious services, as panchayats were incomplete
without religious preachers. Since then the Indian arbitration system has changed drastically through a
transformation from an easily available dispute resolution method towards a more complicated and rules-dictated
system.

In order to regulate the country the British introduced regulations and Acts in India. Thus Acts were passed to
formulate a system of arbitration which was in line with the British jurisprudence, such as the Bengal Regulations
of 1772 and 1780, Sir Elijah Impey's Regulation of 1781, the Regulations of Madras of 1816, the Regulation of
Bombay of 1827 and so forth. The major Acts which were passed were Act IX of 1840 relating to arbitration
damages and interested witnesses; Act X of 1877 and Act XIV of 1882. Act I of 1872 (Indian Contract Act)
recognised for the first time in s.28 that two exceptions exist as to the agreement in restraint of legal proceedings.
The first exception related to agreements to refer any disputes which might arise between the parties to
arbitration. The second exception relates to the agreements to refer to arbitration any dispute which has already
arisen between the parties. Act IX of 1899 (Indian Arbitration Act) contains various sections of the English
Arbitration Act that were incorporated into Indian law. The second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908
was completely devoted to arbitrations. However, it did not make any major changes to the Act of 1899. The
Indian Arbitration Act 1940 then repealed the 1899 Act, and on January 25, 1996 the current Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 came into effect.

The 1996 Act was enacted in order to make the Indian law of arbitration more responsive to contemporary
requirements by looking at the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Model Law).
The earlier arbitration law of 1940 was not considered to be as effective as it should have been. The main reason
was that the former arbitration law covered only dispute settlements of a domestic nature compared with the
1996 Act. The 1996 Act seeks to provide an effective mode of settlement for domestic as well as international
commercial arbitration. In addition, methods of conciliation have also been introduced, since none of the earlier
laws provided any mode of conciliation between the parties.

Need for and importance of arbitration in India

In early 1990 India decided to move away from an apparent mixed economy stance towards adopting
market-oriented reforms with the aim of globalisation, and thus to play an increasingly active role in the
international economic world. This requires strategies for swifter resolutions of disputes by lessening the burden
on the courts and providing means for expeditious resolution of disputes. Arbitration has over the years
developed into an alternative process to litigation and since then has been an important element of India's
commercial life. Whether it serves its purpose successfully is still a question to ask almost 11 years after the
27/03/2017 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 3

enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. Legal practitioners, retired judges and other professions
raised their concerns whether arbitration is truly a speedier and less expensive undertaking than India's court
proceedings. Therefore the question arises: has arbitration failed India?

However, there is no doubt that India has an enormous backlog of pending cases in various courts, including the
Supreme Court of India, all 21 high courts and 12,800 subordinate courts of India. The delay in decisions of
cases undermines the faith in the system, as well as motivating the affected parties to get redressal of their
grievances by resorting to unlawful means, which gives rise to a law and order problem. The Honourable Shri
*Int. A.L.R. 34 R. C. Lahoti, former Chief Justice of India, addressed on the occasion of the inaugural function at
the Conference on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)1 the situation of pending matters in the Indian legal
system and presented some dry statistics in order to demonstrate the enormous task and concern Indian courts
are facing.2 Lahoti explained that as on January 1, 1999 the total pendency of civil and criminal cases in the
Supreme Court was 20,358, in the High Court 2,454,195 and in the subordinate courts all over India 20,396,278.
Lahoti indicated that during the period between January 1, 1999 and March 31, 2004, 219,019 matters were
instituted in the Supreme Court, whereas in the high courts 6,032,566 and in the subordinated courts 72,248,414
cases were instituted, compared with the number of disposal of cases during this period: Supreme Court
212,092, High Court 5,511,217, and in the subordinate courts 68,736,587. Even if the number of cases to be
disposed is relatively high, there are still 42,000 cases which are filed in the Supreme Court every year,
1,149,000 in the High Court, and approximately 13,762,000 in the subordinate courts, not to mention the
extremely high number of pending matters. As of today it has been suggested that it might take 20 years to clear
the backlog of cases. The accumulation of arrears in the courts is due to various factors, including the expanding
society, changing social values and manifestations of the rights of justice, and ever-increasing and diversifying
functions of the state in the public as well as the private sector. In the wake of this seemingly incomprehensible
problem, it appears to be more than obvious that ADR methods are desperately needed in India. The 1996 Act
and s.89 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 encourage and outline ADR mechanisms; however, even if such
methods have been mentioned by legislation appropriate interpretation of the same has long been missing and
overdue.3 Thus the initial question--has arbitration failed India?--could also be asked vice versa: has India failed
arbitration?

Transformation from the 1940 to 1996 Arbitration Act

Time-consuming, complex and expensive court procedures forced legal practitioners to search for an alternative
forum; less formal, more effective, and speedy resolution of disputes led to the Arbitration Act 1940 as a separate
enactment governing the field of arbitration alone. The Preamble to the Act described that it was an Act to
consolidate and amend the law relating to arbitration, which existed from 1882 in Pt V of the Code 1882. The Act
reflected a rather court-structured and strictly courtcontrolled arbitration. It provided for court intervention at all
stages of arbitral proceedings, before, during and after arbitration. The court-like proceeding in arbitration,
encouraged by the legal profession and presiding arbitrators, contributed to a high degree to the formalisation
and judicial nature of an arbitral proceeding, and the court's intervention at any stage made the process not at all
attractive or effective. There was a widespread abuse of the process. This has been emphasised in the case of
Guru Nanak Foundation v Rattan Singh & Sons, 4 where Justice Desai and Justice Sen state that the way in
which the arbitral proceedings under the Arbitration Act 1940 are concluded and without an exception been
challenged in courts had made lawyers laugh and legal philosophers weep. Thus, with the objective to make
the Act more responsive to contemporary requirements of the day, amendments were proposed by several
representative bodies of trade and industry and experts in the field of arbitration as well as the Law Commission
of India. Domestic and international commercial dispute resolution mechanisms should be brought in line with
international standards in order to make India's economic reforms fully effective. Besides arbitration, mediation
and conciliation should have legal recognition and the settlement agreement reached between the parties should
have the same status and effect as an arbitral award on agreed terms.

In the spirit of the constitutional mandate and UN recommendation,5 the UNCITRAL Model Law and Conciliation
Rules were adopted by India by promulgation of the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance 1996 by the President
of India on August 16, 1996. The Act provides a detailed and well-conceived legal framework, which is the first
requisite for a well-developed system of arbitration, conciliation and other forms of ADR. This legislation
constitutes an important landmark in the history of legal and judicial reforms in India. The President of India
promulgated the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance 1996; however, the Parliament could not deliberate on
the Ordinance within the time allowed under the Constitution. Thus the Ordinance had to be re-promulgated
twice. It was passed after discussions in both houses of Parliament and received the assent of the President of
India on August 16, 1996 and came into force on August 22, 1996.6 The case of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd v Jindal
Exports Ltd 7 deals with s.1(3)--Effective date of coming into force of the Act. This case clarified that an ordinance
operates in the field it occupies, with the same effect and force as an Act. The first ordinance came into force on
January 25, 1996 and the Act came into force on August 22, 1996. It was held that the Act came into force in
continuation of the first ordinance and this makes the position clear that although the Act came into force on
August 22, 1996, for all practical and legal purposes, it shall be deemed to have been effective from January 25,
1996, particularly when the provisions of the ordinance and the Act are similar and there is nothing in the Act to
the contrary so as to make the ordinance ineffective as to either its coming into force on January 25, 1996 or its
27/03/2017 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 4

continuation up to August 22, 1996.

*Int. A.L.R. 35 The 1996 Act has made certain drastic changes as it has consolidated the law with regard to both
domestic and international arbitration. The Act has been enacted taking into account the UNCITRAL Model Law
and UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules which aim for promoting the unification and harmonisation of international
trade law by harmonising concepts on arbitration and conciliation of legal systems of the world. The case of
Union of India v East Coast Boat Builders & Engineers Ltd 8 explored the effect of the Model Law and Rules. It
was decided that it cannot be said that each and every provision of the said Model Law and Rules form part of
the Act even though the Preamble to the Act says that it is expedient to make laws respecting arbitration and
conciliation, taking into account the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules. Those Model Law and Rules were taken
into account while drafting and enacting the Act but whatever has been enacted is the law on arbitration
enforceable in India. Further, the 1996 Act consolidates and amends the provisions of three Acts: (1) Arbitration
Act 1940; (2) Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 1937; (3) Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement)
Act 1961.

The new Act makes many far-reaching changes in arbitration law and enacts various provisions for encouraging
conciliation. It seeks to streamline the process and to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral
process. Parties and the arbitral tribunal have much greater flexibility in agreeing to a procedure suited to specific
needs. Barring a few mandatory provisions, almost all the provisions lay considerable stress on party autonomy
in that they are subject to an agreement between the parties. In the absence of such agreement the arbitral
tribunal or conciliator is given considerable autonomy. The time limits to render the award are also fixed by the
parties and not, as was previously the case in the 1940 Act, by a statutory time limit of four months. Thus time
limits can be fixed by parties or extended by them. Another important change is that the arbitral tribunal has the
power of ruling on its own jurisdiction and challenges can be made only at the conclusion of the proceedings in a
comprehensive manner. While greater powers are to be exercised by arbitrators, their selection is now subject to
a more transparent process. In addition, every final award is enforceable as if it was a decree of the court. The
grounds available for setting aside an award have been narrowed down and specified. The Act also recognised
the administrative assistance of a suitable institution pursuant to ss.6 and 68 of the Act. Thus the new Act
reached for a non-court intervention not only with regard to nominating arbitrators, but also during the course of
proceedings and in issuing the award. However, the situation remains that the court is allowed to intervene in the
case of interim measures pursuant to s.99 of the Act or s.34 (setting aside arbitral award)10 or s.36 (enforcement
of the award). The Principal Civil Court has the jurisdiction to make an award for interim measure. Section 34 is
one of the most important provisions contained in the new Act. Unlike the previous law by which misconduct and
error apparent on the face of the award were legitimate reasons for seeking the setting aside of an award, which
time and again has led to protracted litigation in courts, it is now provided that an arbitral award can be set aside
only on certain specified grounds: that one of the parties was under incapacity, that the arbitration agreement
itself was not valid under the law which the parties had subjected it to, that a party was not given proper notice of
the appointment of arbitrator or that the party was unable to present its case, that the award dealt with a dispute
not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the arbitration agreement, that the award contained
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement and that the composition of the arbitral
tribunal and the procedure followed were not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. Further, the court
can set aside an award if the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration, or where
the award is in conflict with the public policy of India.11

In addition, the grounds of challenge with respect to the appointment of an arbitrator and the procedure to
challenge such appointment are new grounds of intervention of the court before the arbitration proceedings
actually start. Similarly, s.16 of the Act with respect to the jurisdiction of the tribunal or any objection with respect
to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement opens new gates for disputes to be heard before the
courts. Therefore there are still avenues to delay an arbitration procedure only because of court intervention,
which, however, seems rather essential in some cases.

Nevertheless, the underlying philosophy on which the 1996 Act is based is autonomy of the parties and the
nonintervention of national courts in the arbitral process, which needs to be stressed here. Section 5 of the Act
states that

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part,
no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.

Section 5 clearly demonstrates that the object of the Act, namely of encouraging the resolution of disputes
expeditiously and less expensively and when there is an arbitration agreement, the court's intervention should be
minimal.12 Thus the new arbitration law is away from the courts and towards more arbitral autonomy. As a
consequence, in general, it could be said that with such a proper and operable arbitration law in place as the
Arbitration Act 1996, which is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, arbitration has somehow failed India.
Therefore, to allow the 1996 Act to operate *Int. A.L.R. 36 effectively, there has to be a change in attitudes, not
only on the side of the arbitrators but also on the judges' and lawyers' side. Otherwise arbitration remains
courtcontrolled and will thereby fall back on the old and unattractive Arbitration Act 1940.

Today's concerns
27/03/2017 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 5

There are certain drawbacks which are common to most alternative dispute resolution techniques, be they
arbitration, conciliation, mediation or any other form of dispute resolution methods. In India, the main concerns
within the field of ADR are the increased costs, delaying tactics, compromise on principles (lawyers' opinions), as
well as the fact that ADR practitioners are lacking in required skills. A survey undertaken by a legal research
student, Varun Kedia,13 with the objective of understanding the disadvantages of ADR for an improved
perspective of the legal system, demonstrates that the three major concerns among disputants when dealing with
ADR methods appear to be enforceability, delaying tactics and increased costs. Other issues and reservations
which have been raised include unwillingness of the parties to negotiate, lack of faith in the arbitrator or mediator
and limited scope of appeal, which again costs time and money. Apart from the shortcomings which are common
to most ADR mechanisms, there are certain complications which are specific to the process of arbitration. These
are, as mentioned above, the limited scope for appeal as provided in the 1996 Act, that the arbitral tribunal is not
as authoritative as the courts, and in the case of three arbitrators, decisions are likely to be made in favour of the
party who has chosen their arbitrator. A further concern is that not only arbitrators suffer from a lack sufficient
skills to deal with matters appropriately, but it also seems that judges consider the arbitration practice as a
retirement plan, as judges automatically turn into arbitrators. Although arbitration has been practised for over
decades, it was mainly used and limited to the Government and international corporations. However, the concept
of ADR is just picking up in India and practitioners have started to include ADR clauses in their contracts.
Nevertheless, there is still a lack of properly trained people to practise in the field of arbitration. This is why many
judges take up the arbitration practice after they retire; even though these judges have incomparable legal
knowledge, they have the tendency to stick to certain ways and wish to handle arbitration matters in a similar
manner to their court cases. This attitude relinquishes the advantage arbitration has over court proceedings.
According to the aforementioned survey, conducted among lawyers with respect to limitations of arbitration, the
majority of practitioners also felt that arbitration leads to increased costs, and thus makes the dispensation of
justice expensive. The second most often raised concern among the lawyers was delaying tactics and, thirdly,
the difficult and time-consuming procedure to enforce an award in India.

Goolam Vahanvati14 questioned in his statement Indian Arbitration--is there Scope for Improvement 15 whether
there is hope for improvement in the arbitration sector. He declares it as a concern that even after 1996, a
learned judge of the Supreme Court referred to arbitration as the arbitration mafia in India. Even though a lot of
work has been done in the right direction in arbitration, there is need and scope for improvement. Vahanvati
indicates that the problems and concerns of arbitration stem[s] not so much from the law but from the persons
who associated with the process of arbitration in India.16 He goes on to put forward that it appears to be a rather
practical problem. The problem lies in the fact that under the Act parties are free to determine the number of
arbitrators, whereby most of the agreements state that three arbitrators should be provided. In practice, having
three arbitrators leads to a variety of difficulties. First, the costs involved: three arbitrators mean three separate
set of fees, and that does not include what is now in practice declared as reading fees. Vahanvati doubts that,
after charging the parties, the papers have actually been read. Further, the three selected arbitrators might reside
in three different cities of the country, so that not only travel expenses occur, but also hotel and conference room
fees, without mentioning the so-called what is for lunch? syndrome. The next hurdle to overcome is to agree on
a date which suits all stakeholders involved. That is not only a challenging task for the three arbitrators to find a
common ground, but also, and more concerning for each party, the legal representatives of the parties. This also
entails long adjournments, after which memories have to be refreshed. A further concern Vahanvati explains is
the fact that arbitration proceedings end up as mirror images of Court trials 17 when they are in the hands of the
lawyers. The questions to ask here: are lawyers who appear in arbitration really interested in assisting the
arbitrators towards a swift and satisfactory decision? Or are they looking forward to the next round, which is an
application to set aside the award?

A more statutory concern is the public policy element in s.34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act. While the 1940 Act
interpreted the public policy in a restricted narrow manner, the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corp Ltd (ONGC) v
Saw Pipes 18 gave public policy a wider meaning, namely that the concept of public policy consists of public good
or public interest. What is good for the public or in the public interest or what would be harmful or injurious to the
public good or interest varies from time to time. However, an award which is, on the face of it, in violation of
statutory provisions cannot be said to be in the public interest. Such an award is likely to adversely affect the
administration of justice. Hence the award should be set aside if it is contrary to (1) the fundamental policy of
Indian law; (2) the interest of India; (3) justice or morality; and (4) in addition, if it is patently illegal. The illegality
must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of a trivial nature, it cannot be held that the *Int. A.L.R. 37
award is against public policy. An award can also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks
the conscience of the court. Judges drew at every opportunity a contrast between the judicial activism permitted
under the 1940 Act and the comparatively passive role under the new regime. Unfortunately, in Saw Pipes t he
Supreme Court has opened the floodgates to arbitral litigation. That means, once more that the lawyers will
laugh and legal philosophers weep.19

O. P. Malhorta20 indicates another statutory concern by raising the issue of the court's intervention with regard to
s.11--Appointment of arbitrators--of the 1996 Act. This section has been innovated in the 1996 Act, but has been
completely misconceived, misconducted and misapplied by the courts.21 The power to appoint an arbitrator is a
power given by statute and neither a judicial nor an administrative one.22 However, the problem was that in some
situations the judges of the Supreme Court designated the Chief Justice of India to appoint arbitrators and before
27/03/2017 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 6

they did that, they decided the questions of existence and validity of the arbitration agreement per se. This was
clearly outside their jurisdiction and, as Malhorta describes it, can be seen as judicial hijacking of the tribunals'
jurisdiction. Some other interpretation issues of the 1996 Act have been discussed and decided: for example
s.10, which states: 10(1) The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators, provided that such number
shall not be an even number. The case of Narayan Prasad Lohia v Nikunj Kumar Lohia 23 held that the
requirement of s.10(1) that the number of arbitrators comprising the arbitral tribunal shall not be an even
number is not mandatory and an arbitral tribunal can consist of an even number of arbitrators. Thus this decision
undermines and completely wipes out s.10(1) of the Act.

However, it seems more important to consider the case of ITI Ltd v Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd
24
in terms of another statutory concern with regard to s.3--Appealable orders--of the Act. A two-judge bench of
the court held that even though a second appeal shall not lie from an order of the Appellate Court passed under
s.37, a revision under s.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure still will lie against such orders. This decision
therefore does not only militate against the provisions of s.37 as such, but it has also effect of virtually annulling
s.5, which seeks to marginalise judicial intervention in the arbitral process under Pt I. Thus all these
aforementioned interpretations as a non-exhaustive list attempted to interpret a properly drafted Act in 1996, and
therefore led to the assumption that India could have failed arbitration if one considers the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 as a well-established and workable legislation.

Conclusion

The new law is certainly a welcome change in the area of dispute resolution and was long overdue in order to
bring the arbitration practice in line with international standards. The Act provides a framework for speedier and
less expensive arbitration, conciliation and other methods than before. However, it seems that the aim of every
party to an arbitration, be it domestic or international, is to try to win if you can; if you cannot, do your best to see
that the other side cannot enforce the award for as long as possible. In that sense, arbitration as a means of
settling disputes is a failure--although it is highly regarded as a useful method for resolving disputes. The success
of a system depends upon the method of implementation, the awareness it generates and the persons whose
relations are sought to be regulated thereby. Much would also depend, as shown above, upon the attitude of the
courts and the arbitral tribunals themselves, as well as the conciliators and other professions involved who give
the new law the shape and its utility. It is time for India to achieve an ADR system that is speedy, effective and
final. Three main steps need to be undertaken in order to set arbitration back on track: (1) the arbitration law
must be set right either judicially or by appropriate legislation: the scope of challenge must be even more clearly
defined so that awards are, indeed, made final; (2) a proper arbitration infrastructure needs to be
established--this means arbitration facilities as well as properly trained arbitrators and staff; and (3) what is
needed is a body of arbitrators that will not treat arbitration as a beneficial retirement plan but rather a mode of
dispute resolution method, and awards should be rendered within months not years. The initial hypothesis that
either arbitration has failed India or that India has failed arbitration has legs. It seems obvious and legitimate to
say that either way arbitration has failed in its own way: either the legislation itself or the judiciary operating and
interpreting the same. The question, however, remains: can arbitration still be rescued? If the answer is yes, is
there room for improvement?

Ph.D. candidate, LLB., LL.M.; majors in International Law and Dispute Resolution; Solicitor, Mediator, ADR
consultant; teaches ADR in PRChina, India and Vietnam; contact hilmer@sarahhilmer.com.

Int. A.L.R. 2007, 10(2), 33-37

1. Conference held in Mumbai on November 20, 2004.

2. These statistics were also quoted by the Honourable Shri Justice Dilip Bhosale, sitting judge of the High Court of Bombay, in his article An Assessment of ADR
in India in NYAYA Deep, Official Journal of the National Legal Services Authority.

3. The most recent and significant case in respect to interpreting ADR methods is Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v Union of India (2005) 6 S.C.C. 344.

4. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2075.

5. UN Resolution No.40/72 dated December 11, 1985.

6. See Notification GSR No.375 (E); it was published in the Gazette of India, Extra, Pt II, s.1.

7. (2001) 2 R.A.J. 1 (SC).

8. (1999) 4 R.A.J. 365 (Del).

9. Sundaram Finance Ltd v NEPC India Ltd, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 565; Firm Ashok Traders v Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) 3 S.C.C. 155.

10. P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v P. V. G Raju, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1886; Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v Sumathi, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1603.

11. Gherulal Parakh v Mahadeodas Maiya (1959) Supp (2) S.C.R. 406; Central Inland Water Transport Corp Ltd v Brojo Nath Ganguly, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571; Oil
27/03/2017 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 7

and Natural Gas Corp Ltd (ONGC) v Saw Pipes (2003) 5 S.C.C. 705.

12. P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v P. V. G. Raju, above fn.10; BHEL v CN Garg (2001) 57 D.R.J. 154 (DB).

13. At K.C. Law College, Mumbai.

14. Solicitor General for India.

15. Bombay High Court, Readings on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Mumbai, 2005), pp.212-216.

16. ibid. , p.213.

17. ibid. , p.214.

18. (2003) 5 S.C.C. 705.

19. Guru Nanak Foundation v Rattan Singh & Sons A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2075.

20. The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (Butterworths, Delhi, 2002).

21. ibid. , p.xiv; see also Union of India v RR Industries (2005) 2 R.A.J. 177 (Del); Delkon India Pvt Ltd v The General Manager, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (2005)
2 R.A.J. 266 (Del).

22. Konkan Railway Corp v Rani Construction (P) Ltd (2002) 2 S.C.C. 388.

23. (2002) 1 R.A.J. 281 (SC).

24. CA No.3620 of 2002 decided by the Supreme Court on May 20, 2002.

2017 Sweet & Maxwell and its Contributors