Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 1
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES a minor, observing as far as practicable, the following
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC
[MAY 01, 2003]
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule shall
apply to petitions for guardianship over the person or
property, or both, of a minor.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the person and property of their
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a
court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be
suppletory to the provisions of the Family Code on
guardianship.
Section 2. Who may petition for appointment of
guardian. On grounds authorized by law, any relative
or other person on behalf of a minor, or the minor
himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the
Family Court for the appointment of a general guardian
over the person or property, or both, of such minor. The
petition may also be filed by the Secretary of Social
Welfare and Development and by the Secretary of Health
in the case of an insane minor who needs to be
hospitalized.
Section 3. Where to file petition. A petition for
guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a
minor may be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the minor actually resides. If he resides in a
foreign country, the petition shall be filed with the Family
Court of the province or city where his property or any
part thereof is situated.
Section 4. Grounds of petition. The grounds for the
appointment of a guardian over the person or property,
or both, of a minor are the following:
(a) death, continued absence, or incapacity of his
parents;
(b) suspension, deprivation or termination of
parental authority;
(c) remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter Is
found unsuitable to exercise parental authority;
or
(d) when the best interests of the minor so require.
Section 5. Qualifications of guardians. In
appointing a guardian, the court shall consider the
guardians:
(a) moral character;
(b) physical, mental and psychological condition;
(c) financial status;
(d) relationship of trust with the minor;
(e) availability to exercise the powers and duties of a
guardian for the full period of the guardianship;
(f) lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and
(g) ability to manage the property of the minor.
Section 6. Who may be appointed guardian of the
person or property, or both, of a minor. In default
of parents or a court-appointed guardian, the court may
appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, of
order of preference:
(a) the surviving grandparent and In case several
grandparents survive, the court shall select any
of them taking Into account all relevant
considerations;
(b) the oldest brother or sister of the minor over
twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or
disqualified;
(c) the actual custodian of the minor over twenty-
one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(d) any other person, who in the sound discretion of
the court, would serve the best interests of the
minor.
Section 7. Contents of petition. A petition for the
appointment of a general guardian must allege the
following:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The name, age and residence of the prospective
ward;
(c) The ground rendering the appointment necessary
or convenient;
(d) The death of the parents of the minor or the
termination, deprivation or suspension of their
parental authority;
(e) The remarriage of the minors surviving parent;
(f) The names, ages, and residences of relatives
within the 4th civil degree of the minor, and of
persons having him in their care and custody;
(g) The probable value, character and location of the
property of the minor; and
(h) The name, age and residence of the person for
whom letters of guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified and accompanied by a
certification against forum shopping. However, no defect
in the petition or verification shall render void the
issuance of letters of guardianship.
Section 8. Time and notice of hearing. When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is
filed, the court shall fix a time and place for its hearing,
and shall cause reasonable notice to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition, including the minor if
he is fourteen years of age or over, and may direct other
general or special notice to be given.
Section 9. Case study report. The court shall order a
social worker to conduct a case study of the minor and
all the prospective guardians and submit his report and
recommendation to the court for its guidance before the
scheduled hearing. The social worker may intervene on
behalf of the minor if he finds that the petition for
guardianship should be denied.
Section 10. Opposition to petition. Any interested
person may contest the petition by filing a written
opposition based on such grounds as the majority of the
minor or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters
are prayed, and pray that the petition be denied, or that
letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable
person named in the opposition.
Section 11. Hearing and order for letters to issue.
At the hearing of the petition, it must be shown that the
requirement of notice has been complied with. The
prospective ward shall be presented to the court. The
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court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of
their respective allegations. If warranted, the court shall
appoint a suitable guardian of the person or property, or
both, of the minor.
At the discretion of the court, the hearing on
guardianship may be closed to the public and the records
of the case shall not be released without its approval.
Section 12. When and how a guardian of the
property for non-resident minor is appointed;
notice. When the minor resides outside the Philippines
but has property in the Philippines, any relative or friend
of such minor, or any one interested in his property, in
expectancy or otherwise, may petition the Family Court
for the appointment of a guardian over the property.
Notice of hearing of the petition shall be given to the
minor by publication or any other means as the court
may deem proper. The court may dispense with the
presence of the non-resident minor.
If after hearing the court is satisfied that such non-
resident is a minor and a guardian is necessary or
convenient, it may appoint a guardian over his property.
Section 13. Service of final and executory
judgment or order. The final and executory judgment
or order shall be served upon the Local Civil Registrar of
the municipality or city where the minor resides and the
Register of Deeds of the place where his property or part
thereof is situated shall annotate the same in the
corresponding title, and report to the court his
compliance within fifteen days from receipt of the order.
Section 14. Bond of guardian; amount; conditions.
Before he enters upon the execution of his trust, or
letters of guardianship issue, an appointed guardian may
be required to post a bond in such sum as the court shall
determine and conditioned as follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three
months after the issuance of his letters of
guardianship, a true and complete Inventory of
all the property, real and personal, of his ward
which shall come to his possession or knowledge
or to the possession or knowledge of any other
person in his behalf;
(b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to
manage and dispose of the property according to
this rule for the best interests of the ward, and to
provide for his proper care, custody and
education;
(c) To render a true and Just account of all the
property of the ward in his hands, and of all
proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of
the management and disposition of the same, at
the time designated by this rule and such other
times as the court directs; and at the expiration
of his trust, to settle his accounts with the court
and deliver and pay over all the property, effects,
and monies remaining in his hands, or due from
him on such settlement, to the person lawfully
entitled thereto; and
(d) To perform all orders of the court and such other
duties as may be required by law.
Section 15. Where to file the bond; action thereon.
The bond posted by a guardian shall be filed in the
Family Court and, In case of breach of any of its
conditions, the guardian may be prosecuted in the same
proceeding for the benefit of the ward or of any other
person legally interested in the property.
Whenever necessary, the court may require the guardian
to post a new bond and may discharge from further
liability the sureties on the old bond after due notice to
interested persons, if no injury may result therefrom to
those interested in the property.
Section 16. Bond of parents as guardians of
property of minor. If the market value of the property
or the annual Income of the child exceeds P50,000.00,
the parent concerned shall furnish a bond In such
amount as the court may determine, but in no case less
than ten per centurn of the value of such property or
annual income, to guarantee the performance of the
obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed
in the Family Court of the place where the child resides
or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the Family
Court of the place where the property or any part thereof
is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special
proceeding In which all incidents and issues regarding
the performance of the obligations of a general guardian
shall be heard and resolved.
Section 17. General duties of guardian. A guardian
shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward
and the management of his property, or only the
management of his property. The guardian of the
property of a nonresident minor shall have the
management of all his property within the Philippines.
A guardian shall perform the following duties:
(a) To pay the just debts of the ward out of the
personal property and the income of the real
property of the ward, If the same is sufficient;
otherwise, out of the real property of the ward
upon obtaining an order for its sale or
encumbrance;
(b) To settle all accounts of his ward, and demand,
sue for, receive all debts due him, or may, with
the approval of the court, compound for the
same and give discharges to the debtor on
receiving a fair and just dividend of the property
and effects; and to appear for and represent the
ward in all actions and special proceedings,
unless another person is appointed for that
purpose;
(c) To manage the property of the ward frugally and
without waste, and apply the income and profits
thereon, insofar as may be necessary, to the
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the
ward; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, to sell or encumber
the real or personal property, upon being
authorized by the court to do so;
(d) To consent to a partition of real or personal
property owned by the ward jointly or in common
with others upon authority granted by the court
after hearing, notice to relatives of the ward, and
a careful investigation as to the necessity and
propriety of the proposed action;
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(e) To submit to the court a verified inventory of the
property of his ward within three months after his
appointment, and annually thereafter, the
rendition of which may be required upon the
application of an interested person;
(f) To report to the court any property of the ward
not included in the inventory which is discovered,
or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward within
three months after such discovery, succession, or
acquisition; and
(g) To render to the court for its approval an
accounting of the property one year from his
appointment, and every year thereafter or as
often as may be required.
Section 18. Power and duty of the court. The court
may:
(a) Request the assistance of one or more
commissioners in the appraisal of the property of
the ward reported in the initial and subsequent
inventories;
(b) Authorize reimbursement to the guardian, other
than a parent, of reasonable expenses incurred in
the execution of his trust, and allow payment of
compensation for his services as the court may
deem just, not exceeding ten per centum of the
net income of the ward, if any; otherwise, in such
amount the court determines to be a reasonable
compensation for his services; and
(c) Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of
any person having actual or prospective interest
in the property at the ward, require any person
suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or
disposed of any money, goods or interest, or a
written instrument belonging to the ward or his
property to appear for examination concerning
any thereof and issue such orders as would
secure the property against such embezzlement,
concealment or conveyance.
Section 19. Petition to sell or encumber property.
When the income of a property under guardianship is
insufficient to maintain and educate the ward, or when it
is for his benefit that his personal or real property or any
part thereof be sold, mortgaged or otherwise
encumbered, and the proceeds invested in safe and
productive security, or in the improvement or security of
other real property, the guardian may file a verified
petition setting forth such facts, and praying that an
order issue authorizing the sale or encumbrance of the
property.
Section 20. Order to show cause. If the sale or
encumbrance is necessary or would be beneficial to the
ward, the court shall order his next of kin and all person/s
interested in the property to appear at a reasonable time
and place therein specified and show cause why the
petition should not be granted.
Section 21. Hearing on return of order; costs. At
the time and place designated in the order to show
cause, the court shall hear the allegations and evidence
of the petitioner and next of kin, and other persons
interested, together with their witnesses, and grant or
deny the petition as the best interests of the ward may
require.
Section 22. Contents of order for sale or
encumbrance and its duration; bond. If, after full
examination, it is necessary, or would be beneficial to the
ward, to sell or encumber the property, or some portion
of it, the court shall order such sale or encumbrance the
proceeds of which shall be expended for the
maintenance or the education of the ward, or invested as
the circumstances may require. The order shall specify
the grounds for the sale or encumbrance and may direct
that the property ordered sold be disposed of at public
sale, subject to such conditions as to the time and
manner of payment, and security where a part of the
payment is deferred. The original bond of the guardian
shall stand as security for the proper appropriation of the
proceeds of the sale or encumbrance, but the court may,
if deemed expedient, require an additional bond as a
condition for the sale or encumbrance. The authority to
sell or encumber shall not extend beyond one year,
unless renewed by the court.
Section 23. Court may order investment of
proceeds and direct management of property.
The court may authorize and require the guardian to
invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any
other money of his ward in his hands, in real or personal
property, for the best interests of the ward, and may
make such other orders for the management,
investment, and disposition of the property and effects,
as circumstances may warrant.
Section 24. Grounds for removal or resignation of
guardian. When a guardian becomes insane or
otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or is found
thereafter to be unsuitable, or has wasted or
mismanaged the property of the ward, or has failed to
render an account or make a return for thirty days after it
is due, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the
guardian, remove him as such and require him to
surrender the property of the ward to the person found to
be lawfully entitled thereto.
The court may allow the guardian to resign for justifiable
causes.
Upon the removal or resignation of the guardian, the
court shall appoint a new one.
No motion for removal or resignation shall be granted
unless the guardian has submitted the proper accounting
of the property of the ward and the court has approved
the same.
Section 25. Ground for termination of
guardianship. The court motu proprio or upon verified
motion of any person allowed to file a petition for
guardianship may terminate the guardianship on the
ground that the ward has come of age or has died. The
guardian shall notify the court of such fact within ten
days of its occurrence.
Section 26. Service of final and executory
judgment or order. The final and executory judgment
or order shall be served upon the Local Civil Registrar of
the municipality or city where the minor resides and the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where his
property or any part thereof is situated. Both the Local
Civil Registrar and the Register of Deeds shall enter the
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final and executory judgment or order in the appropriate
books in their offices.
Section 27. Effect of the rule. This Rule amends
Rules 92 to 97 inclusive of the Rules of Court on
guardianship of minors. Guardianship of incompetents
who are not minors shall continue to be under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts and governed by the
Rules of Court.
Section 28. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on
May 1, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than April 15, 2003.
G.R. No. 110427
February 24, 1997
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented
by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife,
LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; What determines
the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an
action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. An inquiry into the averments of the
amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in order.
Same; Same; Ejectment; Unlawful Detainer; A
complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it
alleges that the withholding of possession or the
refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been
adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for
unlawful detainer, to allege that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer
is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; An owners act of
allowing another to occupy her house, rent-free,
does not create a permanent and indefeasible
right of possession in the latters favor.The
argument is arrant sophistry. Caizas act of allowing the
Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a
permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the
latters favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary
sense of fairness clearly require that that act of liberality
be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the
necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house
to Caiza upon her demand. More than once has this
Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latters tolerance or permission without
any contract between them is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. The situation is not much different
from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who
continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in
which case there is deemed to be an unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of
the demand to vacate. In other words, one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land or property the moment he is
required to leave.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there had been
more than one demand to vacate, the one-year
period for filing the complaint for unlawful
detainer must be reckoned from the date of the
last demand, the reason being that the lessor has
the option to waive his right of action based on
previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises.It may not be amiss to
point out in this connection that where there had been
more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period
for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be
reckoned from the date of the last demand, the reason
being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises. Now, the complaint
filed by Caizas guardian alleges that the same was
filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter
of demand dated February 3, 1990. Although this
averment is not in accord with law because there is in
fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 5
27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the
complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well
within one year from the second (last) written demand to
vacate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Guardianship; A judicial
guardian is clothed with authority to withdraw the
wards earlier express permission given to third
persons to occupy a certain property.The
Estradas possession of the house stemmed from the
owners express permission. That permission was
subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right;
and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made
through her judicial guardian, the latter being
indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of
any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a
will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas;
that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in
the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that
they might in the future become owners thereof, that
right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of
ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly
probated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the issue is
possession de facto, not de jure, the proper
remedy is ejectment, not accion publiciana.In any
case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised
under the circumstances was that involving the Estradas
possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de
jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper
remedy for Caiza is not ejectment but accion publiciana,
a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for
recovery of the right to possession de jure.
Wills and Succession; A will is essentially
ambulatoryat any time prior to the testators
death, it may be changed or revoked, and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and
no right can be claimed thereunder; An owners
intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance is not
inconsistent with the formers taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient.A will is essentially ambulatory; at
any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed
or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the
law being quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court (ART. 838, id.). An
owners intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent
with the formers taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in
this case there was sufficient cause for the owners
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the
physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her
extreme age.
Guardianship; The ward has no right to possession
or control of his property during his or her
incompetency.Amparo Evangelista was appointed by
a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her
Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly
installed her as the guardian over the person and
properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full
authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may
be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for
the management of her properties **. By that
appointment, it became Evangelistas duty to care for
her aunts person, to attend to her physical and spiritual
needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of
her person in preference to relatives and friends. It also
became her right and duty to get possession of, and
exercise control over, Caizas property, both real and
personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has
no right to possession or control of his property during
her incompetency. That right to manage the wards
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof
and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and
defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
Actions; Ejectment; Even when, in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the
undoubted competence to resolve the issue of
ownership only to determine the issue of
possession.It may be pointed out in relation to the
Estradas defenses in the ejectment action, that as the
law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve
the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue of
possession.
Same; Same; Parties; An ejectment case survives
the death of a party.To be sure, an ejectment case
survives the death of a party. Caizas demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through
her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal
one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place
and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
NARVASA, C.J.:
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years
of age, Carmen Caiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist,
and former professor of the College of Chemistry and
Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was
declared incompetent by judgment 1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, 2 in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. 3 She was so adjudged because of her
advanced age and physical infirmities which included
cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A.
Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person
and estate.
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Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias
St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian
Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch
35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from
said premises. 4 The complaint was later amended to
identify the incompetent Caiza as plaintiff, suing
through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
The amended Complaint 5 pertinently alleged that
plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in
question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of
kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their
children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily
reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had
urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet
her expenses for support, maintenance and medical
treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked
the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house
but they had refused to do so; and that "by the
defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the
possession of the house in question, they . . (were)
enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent,
because, while they . . (were) saving money by not
paying any rent for the house, the incompetent . . (was)
losing much money as her house could not be rented by
others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed
within one (1) year from the date of of first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants
declared that they had been living in Caiza's house
since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful
service they had been considered by Caiza as her own
family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic
will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to
the Estradas the house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992
in Caiza's favor, 6 the Estradas being ordered to vacate
the premises and pay Caiza P5,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees.
But on appeal, 8 the decision was reversed by the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 96. 9 By judgment
rendered on October 21, 1992, 10 the RTC held that the
"action by which the issue of defendants' possession
should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining
factual and legal situation . . demanding adjudication by
such plenary action for recovery of possession cognizable
in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the
decision of October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt.
In a decision 11 promulgated on June 2, 1993, the
Appellate Court 12 affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It
ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed
an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion
interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have
not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort
of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by
what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff;
and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed
probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of
defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of
intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that
defendants are to remain and are to continue in their
occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's
supervening incompetency can not be said to have
vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the
defendants out." 13
Through her guardian, Caiza came to this Court praying
for reversal of the Appellate Court's judgment. She
contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding
that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and
not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight
to "a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is
irrelevant to this case." 14
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's
requirement, 15 the Estradas insist that the case against
them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue
that since possession of the house had not been
obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied,"
as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be
deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence
never became unlawful) within the context of the law."
Neither could the suit against them be deemed one of
forcible entry, they add, because they had been
occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real
owner," Carmen Caiza, which "occupancy can even
ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of
petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate." They
conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the
power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from the
disputed premises.
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs
the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew,
respectively were by this Court's leave, substituted for
her. 17
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an
ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for
recovery of possession of the property in dispute; (b)
assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not
Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to
bring said action; and (c) assuming an affirmative answer
to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may
continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
I
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an
action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. 18 An inquiry into the averments of the
amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus in
order. 19
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 7
The amended Complaint alleges: 20
6. That the plaintif Carmen Caiza, is the sole and
absolute owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Scout
Tobias, Quezon City, which property is now the
subject of this complaint;
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren
and sons-in-law, were allowed to live temporarily in
the house of plaintif Carmen Caiza, for free, out of
her kindness;
10. That the plaintif, through her legal guardian, has
duly notified the defendants, for them to vacate the
said house, but the two (2) letters of demand were
ignored and the defendants refused to vacate the
same
11. That the plaintif, represented by her legal
guardian, Amparo Evangelista, made another
demand on the defendants for them to vacate the
premises, before Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz
of Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after
two (2) conferences, the result was negative and no
settlement was reached. A photocopy of the
Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990, issued
by said Barangay Captain is attached, marked Annex
"D" and made an integral part hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more
than thirty (30) days to vacate the house, but they
still refused to vacate the premises, and they are up
to this time residing in the said place;
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year
from the date of first letter of demand dated
February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to
the defendants, by her legal guardian Amparo
Evangelista;
14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the
plaintiff of the possession of the house in question,
they are enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent plaintif because, while they are saving
money by not paying any rent for the house, the
plaintiff is losing much money as her house could not
be rented by others;
15. That the plaintif's health is failing and she needs
the house urgently, so that funds could be raised to
meet her expenses for her support, maintenance and
medical treatment;
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the
house at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the
plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled
to go to court for justice, and she has to spend
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Its prayer 21
is quoted below:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of
law, plaintif, Carmen Caiza, represented by her
legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, respectfully
prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendants as
follows:
1. To order the defendants, their children,
grandchildren, sons-in-law and other persons
claiming under them, to vacate the house and
premises at No. 6 1 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so
that its possession can be restored to the
plaintif Carmen Caiza; and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of
P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit.
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Caiza's house
by tolerance having been "allowed to live
temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Caiza's)
kindness;"
2) that Caiza needed the house "urgently" because
her "health . . (was) failing and she . . (needed) funds
. . to meet her expenses for her support,
maintenance and medical treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Caiza
requested the Estradas several times, orally and in
writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse
to give back the house to Caiza, to her continuing
prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from
the last demand to vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been
adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for
unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant
is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient, 22 and a complaint for unlawful
detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 23
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a
literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court which inter alia authorizes the institution of an
unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied." They contend that
since they did not acquire possession of the property in
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 8
question "by virtue of any contract, express or implied"
they having been, to repeat, "allowed to live
temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Caiza's)
kindness" in no sense could there be an "expiration or
termination of . . (their) right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an
action for forcible entry lie against them, since there is
no claim that they had "deprived (Caiza) of the
possession of . . (her property) by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth.
The argument is arrant sophistry. Caiza's act of allowing
the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not
create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession
in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most
rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that that
act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly,
accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of
returning the house to Caiza upon her demand. More
than once has this Court adjudged that a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 24 The
situation is not much different from that of a tenant
whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by
tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to
be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession
as of the date of the demand to vacate. 25 In other words,
one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is
required to leave. 26 Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust
vs. Court of Appeals, 27 where a company, having lawfully
obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to
buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its
promise of payment despite demands, this Court held
that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, . . (its)
continuing possession . . became illegal and the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that
where there had been more than one demand to vacate,
the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful
detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last
demand, 28 the reason being that the lessor has the
option to waive his right of action based on previous
demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the
premises. 29 Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's
guardian alleges that the same was "filed within one (1)
year from the date of the first letter of demand dated
February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in
accord with law because there is in fact a second letter of
demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the mistake
is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed
on September 17, 1990, well within one year from
the second (last) written demand to vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the
owner's express permission. That permission was
subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right;
and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made
through her judicial guardian, the latter being
indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of
any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed a
will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas;
that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in
the premises after demand to vacate on the theory that
they might in future become owners thereof, that right of
ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of
ownership being possible unless and until the will is duly
probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action
of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the
property, whether as possessors by tolerance or
sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right
of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended.
They could not assert any right of possession flowing
from their ownership of the house; their status as owners
is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by
which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to
them an event which still has to take place; in other
words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of
possession by them would be premature and
inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be
raised under the circumstances was that involving the
Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de
facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate
that the proper remedy for Caiza is not ejectment
but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an
action that is one for recovery of the right to
possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them
by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain
in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her
judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting
them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent
with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; 30 and
until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and
no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). 31 An owner's
intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent
with the former's taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in
this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the
physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her
extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court
the general guardian of both the person and the estate of
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 9
her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of
Guardianship 32 dated December 19, 1989 clearly
installed her as the "guardian over the person and
properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full
authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may
be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for
the management of her properties . . " 33 By that
appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her
aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual
needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of
her person in preference to relatives and friends. 34 It
also became her right and duty to get possession of, and
exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real and
personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has
no right to possession or control of his property during
her incompetency. 35 That right to manage the ward's
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof
and recover it from anyone who retains it, 36 and bring
and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose. 37
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista
was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward"
explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds
applied to maintenance of ward. A guardian must
manage the estate of his ward frugally and without
waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so
far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and
suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if
there be any; and if such income and profits be
insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or
encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by
order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as
may be necessary to such maintenance.
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's
defenses in the ejectment action, that as the law now
stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve
"the issue of ownership . . only to determine the issue of
possession." 38
III
As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during
the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's
death automatically terminated the guardianship,
Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial
guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to
represent her in the present appeal. The motion is
without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward, 39 the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of
the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being
Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and
by Resolution of this Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were
in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place
of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, viz.: 41
Sec. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the
court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The
court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may
be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased
may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs.
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a
party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish
the desahucio suit instituted by her through her
guardian. 42 That action, not being a purely personal one,
survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and
now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993
affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment and
dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April
13, 1992 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151243
April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner, vs. ROMMEL,
ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed
PABALE, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Words
and Phrases; Res judicata literally means a
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 10
matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled
by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing
final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in
all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.
Same; Same; Same; Bar by prior judgment
distinguished from conclusiveness of judgment;
Concepts of the doctrine of res judicata.The
doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules
which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation
and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or
subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two
main rules mark the distinction between the principles
governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first
general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the
afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, is referred to as bar by former
judgment; while the second general rule, which is
embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule,
is known as conclusiveness of judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Conclusiveness of judgment
bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or
question already settled in a previous case;
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the
identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of
action.Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-
litigation in a second case of a fact or question already
settled in a previous case. The second case, however,
may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on
the same fact or question adjudged in the first case.
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of
issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
Same; Appeals; Evidence; In general, the Court of
Appeals conducts hearings and receives evidence
prior to the submission of the case for judgment;
Only under exceptional circumstances may the
court receive new evidence after having rendered
judgment.It is true that the Court of Appeals has the
power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. In
general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts
hearings and receives evidence prior to the submission
of the case for judgment. It must be pointed out that, in
this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing
to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She
thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the
identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No.
58133 had been submitted for judgment, but after the
Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in
said case on 10 April 2001. The parties must diligently
and conscientiously present all arguments and available
evidences in support of their respective positions to the
court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment.
Only under exceptional circumstances may the court
receive new evidence after having rendered judgment;
otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since
the parties may continually refute the findings therein
with further evidence.
Remedial Law Special Proceedings; Guardianship;
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for
appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the
Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a
person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who
has no capacity to care for himself and/or his
properties; and second, who is most qualified to
be appointed as his guardian.The objectives of an
RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first,
whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent
who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his
properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be
appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume
that the people who best could help the trial court settle
such issues would be those who are closest to and most
familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent,
namely, his relatives living within the same province
and/or the persons caring for him.
Same; Same; Same; The burden of proving
incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests
upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient
proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed. While both cases involve a determination
of Naves incompetency, it must be established at two
separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A
finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not
automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v.
Jaojoco, 46 Phil. 957, 960 (1924), the Court ruled that
despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally
incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the
execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that
she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the
significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be
gainsaid since Naves mental condition in 1986 may
vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening
period. Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person
who has not previously been declared incapable, and
such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the
contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his
acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his
mind. The burden of proving incapacity to enter into
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 11
contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges
it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented,
capacity will be presumed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the
reversal and setting aside of the Decision, 2 dated 10 April
2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133;
as well as the Resolution, 3 dated 19 December 2001 of
the same court denying reconsideration of its
aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its
assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by
Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer,
Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the
Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in
Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set
aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2 December 1997 Decision
of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into
by Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M.
Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and
ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to
Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to
the present Petition, determined by the Court of Appeals
to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando,
representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
[Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by
Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil
Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly S. Nave [Nave],
owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna
covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando]
alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten
"Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was
entered into by and between him and [Nave]
involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave]
reneged on their agreement when the latter refused
to accept the partial down payment he tendered to
her as previously agreed because she did not want to
sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed
that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor,
and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she
could not be ordered to execute the corresponding
Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the
following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of
the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed
to her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When
she was informed that it was for the sale of her
property in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-
3317 (27604), she immediately returned to
[Fernando] the said piece of paper and at the same
time repudiating the same. Her repudiation was
further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando]
tendered the partial down payment to her, she
refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold
the property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin,
Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the Pabale
siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint
was filed against her but before she received a copy
thereof. Moreover, she alleged that [Fernando] has
no cause of action against her as he is suing for and
in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is
not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even
assuming that said entity is the real party in interest,
still, [Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the
corporation there being no evidence to show that he
was duly authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to
Intervene alleging that they are now the land owners
of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was
amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party
defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the
trial court denied [Naves] Motion to Dismiss
prompting her to file a Manifestation and Motion
stating that she was adopting the allegations in her
Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernandos]
amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her
Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim
praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo
be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as
her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of
the fact that she was made to appear as widow when
in fact she was very much married at the time of the
transaction in issue. Despite the opposition of
[Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the trial court
admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second
Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-
claim against [the Pabale siblings], this time
including the fact of her incapacity to contract for
being mentally deficient based on the psychological
evaluation report conducted on December 2, 1985 by
Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical
psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the
same was denied by the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof
asseverating that in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C
entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised therein
as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a
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decisive factor to determine once and for all whether
the contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to
the subject property is null and void, the Second
Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-
claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be
admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted
upon, the proceedings in this case was suspended
sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for
Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No.
146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the
petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was
rendered in the said guardianship proceedings, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S.
Nave who now resides with the Brosas spouses
has categorically refused to be examined again
at the National Mental Hospital, the Court is
constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric
Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986 submitted
by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the
supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted
by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National
Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave
an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of
the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by
reason of age, disease, weak mind and
deteriorating mental processes cannot without
outside aid take care of herself and manage her
properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation, said condition having
become severe since the year 1980. She and her
estate are hereby placed under guardianship.
Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as
her regular guardian without need of bond, until
further orders from this Court. Upon his taking
his oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner
is ordered to participate actively in the pending
cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of
protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales
of her real properties, from the overpayment in
the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong,
and in recovering her lost jewelries and monies
and other personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not
appeal therefrom, while the appeal interposed by
spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed
by this Court for failure to pay the required docketing
fees within the reglementary period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992.
On September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo,
[Naves] sole heir, she being an orphan and childless,
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining
to his inherited properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the
dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of
a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22,
1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for guardianship)
was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14,
1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed
their Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1)
they were not made a party to the guardianship
proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the
Decision therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their
favor was never raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On
January 9, 1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a
motion seeking the courts permission for his
substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the
instant case. Not long after the parties submitted
their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for
substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic)
[Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property
was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be
substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he
executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the
same was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997.
Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied.
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order
declaring that it cannot make a ruling as to the
conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits,
the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2,
1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell
dated January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave
and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no
force and effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 20, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in
favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and
void and of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the
owner of the property covered by TCT No.
111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a
transfer of title over the property in favor of Ms.
Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of
reconveyance because the sale in their favor has
been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender
possession over the property to Ms. [Alamayri]
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and to account for its income from the time they
took over possession to the time the same is
turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and
thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings],
jointly and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by
Fernando, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the
portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC
ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and
severally pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R.
CV No. 58133 averring that the RTC erred in declaring in
its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their
favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was
found incompetent since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April
2001, granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty
Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed
by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by
its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the
appeal interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller
and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, are hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.
No pronouncements as to costs. 7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted
Decision of the appellate court, invoking the
Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the
guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition
becoming severe since 1980; and thus appointed Atty.
Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already
became final and executory when no one appealed
therefrom. Alamayri argued that since Nave was already
judicially determined to be an incompetent since 1980,
then all contracts she subsequently entered into should
be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale,
dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be
bound by the findings of the RTC in its 22 June 1988
Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated
in the said guardianship proceedings through their father
Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly
named in its orders Jose Pabale as among those present
during the hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19
November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus
filed on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing
to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she could mark and
submit as evidence certain documents to establish that
the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse, likewise filed
his own Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
58133, asserting Naves incompetence since 1980 as
found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right
to the subject property as owner upon Naves death in
accordance with the laws of succession. It must be
remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the
RTC the supposed transfer of his rights to the subject
property to Alamayri, but the court a quo refrained from
ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of
Appeals denied for lack of merit the Motions for
Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS
INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-
86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO
AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE
EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO.
146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING
ON RESPONDENTS PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING
TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS
THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9
It is Alamayris position that given the final and
executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since
1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res
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judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled
by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an existing
final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in
all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b)
and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The
effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties
or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final
order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main
rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment
or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action either before the
same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or
demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits
are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction
between the principles governing the two typical cases in
which a judgment may operate as evidence. 11 In
speaking of these cases, the first general rule above
stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted
paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while
the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph
(c) of the same section and rule, is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of
Deeds provides the following enlightening discourse on
conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two
different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and
(b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment
states that a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
the parties to that action and persons in privity with
them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in
any future action between such parties or their
privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that
in order that a judgment in one action can be
conclusive as to a particular matter in another action
between the same parties or their privies, it is
essential that the issue be identical. If a particular
point or question is in issue in the second action, and
the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit
(Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.),
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]),
reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in
regard to the distinction between bar by former
judgment which bars the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars
the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of
material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to
all matters essentially connected with the subject
matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions
necessarily implied in the final judgment, although
no specific finding may have been made in reference
thereto and although such matters were directly
referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or
formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of
the former trial shows that the judgment could not
have been rendered without deciding the particular
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matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties
and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain
premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment
itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied
Banking Corporation, further differentiated between the
two rules of res judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as
between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar
to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or
decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits concludes the litigation between the parties,
as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a
new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first
and second cases, but no identity of causes of
action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved
therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated
differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court
in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation
in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a
previous case. The second case, however, may still
proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same
fact or question adjudged in the first case.
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of
issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness of
judgment has no application to the instant Petition since
there is no identity of parties and issues between SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC
by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian
over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging
her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person
and estate of a minor or an incompetent, the latter being
described as a person "suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those
who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
themselves and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation."14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for
the appointment of a guardian, to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of
guardian for resident. Any relative, friend, or other
person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent
who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor
himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition
the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a
general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of
such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal
Administration of the United States in the Philippines
may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof,
and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane
person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an
isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the
appointment of a general guardian must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the
appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives
of the minor or incompetent, and of the persons
having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the
petition or verification shall render void the issuance
of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice
thereof. When a petition for the appointment of a
general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 16
and place for hearing the same, and shall cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
mentioned in the petition residing in the province,
including the minor if above 14 years of age or the
incompetent himself, and may direct other general or
special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested
person may, by filing a written opposition, contest
the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged
minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or
the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are
prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed,
or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to
any suitable person named in the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At
the hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent
must be present if able to attend, and it must be
shown that the required notice has been given.
Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the
parties in support of their respective allegations, and,
if the person in question is a minor or incompetent it
shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or
estate, or both, with the powers and duties
hereinafter specified.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or
judgments under this rule shall be served upon the
civil registrar of the municipality or city where the
minor or incompetent person resides or where his
property or part thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special
proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e., petitioner
versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly,
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re:
Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency,
Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named
respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though,
require that the petition contain the names, ages, and
residences of relatives of the supposed minor or
incompetent and those having him in their care, so that
those residing within the same province as the minor or
incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the
hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for
appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of
Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a
minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for
himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most
qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules
reasonably assume that the people who best could help
the trial court settle such issues would be those who are
closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or
incompetent, namely, his relatives living within the same
province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate
that creditors of the minor or incompetent be likewise
identified and notified. The reason is simple: because
their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and
understandably so, that they will only insist that the
supposed minor or incompetent is actually capacitated to
enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said
contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent
obligated to comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings
were given notice and actually took part in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C. They are not Naves relatives, nor are they the
ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to
direct the giving of other general or special notices of the
hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it
was not established that the RTC actually did so in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings participated
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30
October 198715 and 19 November 1987,16 issued by the
RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the
presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the
father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on
the same dates. However, the said Orders by themselves
cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the father of
the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his
children to appear in the said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court
of Appeals to submit and mark additional evidence to
prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale
siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try
cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and
perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. In general,
however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and
receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for
judgment.17 It must be pointed out that, in this case,
Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark
Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus
sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of
Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had
been submitted for judgment, but after the Court of
Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said
case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present
all arguments and available evidences in support of their
respective positions to the court before the case is
deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after
having rendered judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment
may never attain finality since the parties may
continually refute the findings therein with further
evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why
she did not present her evidence earlier. Merely invoking
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that the ends of justice would have been best served if Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No.
she was allowed to present additional evidence is not 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the
sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules of latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on
procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural Naves competency in 1984, when she executed the
rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the
therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly Pabale siblings.
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.19 Procedural rules are tools designed to In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants Nave was incompetent at the time of filing of the petition
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of
while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in a guardian over her person and estate.
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue
interpretation and application of the rules applies only to
was whether Nave was an incompetent when she
proper cases and under justifiable causes and
executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a
of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence,
game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
rendering the said sale void.
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration
of justice.20 While both cases involve a determination of Naves
incompetency, it must be established at two separate
times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the Court of
she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically
Appeals did not deny her Motion to Schedule Hearing to
mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the
Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its
Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was
Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of
declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only
Appeals also denied the said motion on the following
nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it
grounds:
does not prove that she was so when she executed the
contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the herein cannot be gainsaid since Naves mental condition
[herein respondents Pabale siblings] participated in in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the
the guardianship proceedings considering that the intervening period.
Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late father,
[herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who
documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even
has not previously been declared incapable, and such
though admitted in evidence at this late stage,
capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary
cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to
be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting
their father is not notice to them there being no
he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind. 23 The
allegation to the effect that he represented them
burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual
before the Calamba Court.21
relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence be presumed.24
Alamayri wanted to submit do prove that the Jose Pabale
who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be
19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the
mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the RTC
father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm
started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not
his authority to represent his children in the said
judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988
proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale
when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC,
was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20
resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner
February 1984 over the subject property, which was
as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still
executed by Nave in favor of the Pabale siblings. Without
presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into
proper authority, Jose Pabales presence at the hearings
contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to
property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale
the outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to
siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving
the subject property.
otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed
to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding
therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its
Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
No identity of issues on Naves condition "having become severe since the
year 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a
 Special Proceedings | Prepared by Terence Valdehueza | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 18
declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in
said Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-
Ramos, dated 14 April 1986, 26 and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T.
Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon their
examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain
syndrome secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with
psychotic episodes," which impaired her judgment. There
was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which
may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said
mental condition. All they said was that it existed at the
time Nave was examined in 1986, and again in 1987.
Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which
made him realize that her mind was very impressionable
and capable of being manipulated, on the occasions
when Nave visited the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence,
for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Naves
incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her
incompetency in 1984. And other than invoking the 22
June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own
evidence that Nave was mentally incapacitated when she
executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to
render the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues
between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-
84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Naves
incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case
that Nave still had capacity and was competent when
she executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale over
the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error
when it upheld the validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed
of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10
April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.