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Econ460
April 2, 2017
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INTRODUCTION
Property rights define who the owner of an individual piece of property is and what they
can do with the property. When the owners rights to his property are reduced, they must be
compensated, and they have the right to transfer their property rights to whomever they wish.
When one has clear rights on a piece of their property, they are motivated to develop it and
transfer it to a party that can use the property more efficiently (Gibbon and John 100). Property
that exists by default or custom cannot be transferred or monetized, such property may be owned
by the government and would lead to less efficient use. When property rights are not defined, it
may give rise to either positive or negative externality. Some of the custom owned properties are
as a result of the difficulty in determining the property rights. For example, property rights of
clean air have not been established, if such rights were known, involved parties would adopt a
solution to the spillover effects. While a lot of property rights have been discussed in writing or
literature, there remain certain parts of this issue that should be emphasized. This paper intends
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to address the externalities caused by lack of limited rights to use of property. The externalities
are said to come from different directions. The paper hence uses a contractual approach to
explaining how the externalities arise. Secondly, it examines the control and exchange of goods
such as property. It explains how the interchange of goods and conservation of regulator over the
goods imposes costs on the owner and the trade of the goods. Additionally, it examines some
aspects of property rights as well as the activities of commercial firms that have damaging effects
on others.
The lack of exclusive rights to use a property gives rise to a lack of the right to contract
that would outline the utilization of that property. Hence, the absence of governance over the
property alters the constraints of competition that affects resource allocation. Joining the
resources of numerous owners in production requires the fractional allocation of property rights
outlined in a contract. The agreement defines terms such as the dissemination of income amid the
parties and the conditions on how the resources are to be used. The rights to the transfer are
governed by the forces of competition in the market. The choice of the contract, on the other
hand, is guided by the transaction costs, legal arrangements and the economic risks associated
with the transfer. In cases of private property, the right governing the use of that property is the
wealth maximization goal of the firm or the investor. Such contracts are intended to make the
most of the returns of all the resources subject to competition. Assuming there are no transaction
costs and the conditions of every contract would be reliable with the equimarginal standard. In
such case, the marginal gain and marginal costs would be equal. One or more contractual
condition is required to satisfy one marginal equality. It raises the question of whether it is
known if the marginal inequalities are satisfied. Additionally, the extent to which the provisions
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have on the consequence of income dissemination and resource apportionment. The conditions of
a contract may be inconsistent with the concept of marginal equality of resource. In other cases,
it may not exists as in cases of non-exclusive right. The lack of a contract or yet the presence of a
faulty contract does not suggest economic inadequacies. It can be traced in existing legal
activities, the presence of transaction costs and lack of cost information. Secondly, the
relationship between conditions and the actual outcomes is the contractual enforcement.
Unenforceable conditions may be absent in a contract. However, the absence of the contract itself
will lead to different uses of the resources than when the contract is enforceable. The central
concept here is that if an agreement requires the transfer of all resources used in production, only
the owner is responsible for the decisions made. However, when the transfer involves part of the
resources, the contracting parties have to negotiate the terms mutually. It is clear that the source
of externalities is either the lack of the right to contract, the presence of an agreement that lacks
complete stipulations or occurrence of stipulations that are inconsistent with certain marginal
equivalences.
A good example to explain the externalities is the use of marine fisheries. Fishing rights
are non-exclusive (Shogren, 32). Hence no contractual conditions are governing the utilization of
the fishing grounds. The lack of a contract and the corresponding lack of exclusive rights to use
the fishing ground does not correspond to the real life rules. Fish similar to other growing
biological assets require planting and harvesting. Like in production, decisions are made on what
to be produced, the mode of manufacture, the quantity and time the investment will take and the
method of harvesting. In private property, such decisions are made by the participants. The
absence of exclusive rights leads to increase in the cost of imposing the revenue made by other
private investment inputs. If the fishing ground ownership exists, the owner would enter into
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contracts with the stakeholders and restrict non-participants from interfering in undesirable
practices.
The choice of the product is compelled by the high cost of guarding individual
investment input that arises from the non-exclusive usage of the resource. Second, some
investment input will deterioration if a private fishing converts to non-exclusive. The situation is
due to the high cost of policing that private firm's input compared to the non-exclusive ones.
Third, the physical attributes in marine affect the maturity of the catch. In a private fishery, the
financial maturity and the rate of rotation chosen should be one that would maximize wealth.
However, this is not the case in marine fisheries. The several changes in decisions regarding
planting and harvesting in marine fisheries are examples of the most important effects that occurs
due to lack of exclusive ownership. The example shows that the lack of a right to a contract will
have an impact on the allocation of resources in several ways. Production decisions are many, the
When we evaluate the intensity of fishery harvesting in both exclusive and non-exclusive
fishing grounds, the externalities are said to exist in their purest form. The harvest made by one
fisherman is not only his input but the input of other fishermen as well. If you consider two
private inputs in fishery manufacture, the fisherman labor, and the fishing ground while ignoring
other factors; income from the fishing ground is the vital difference between wage rate and the
marginal creation of labor. The rate of change in income in respect to labor in private ownerships
is required to be zero to maximize income. It implies that wage rate equals the marginal product
of labor. The private ownership of marine fisheries gives the possessor the right to contract and
stipulate. Its absence in the non-exclusive fishery will affect the margin of damage. Every
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economic action has its effects, and the same applies to all decisions on the use of a specified
resource.
Using the exposition of F.H. Knight on A.C. Pigous example, a conclusion on models of
fishery harvesting can be deducted. In equilibrium, the average produce of fishing work which is
labor equals the wage rate which is the marginal factor cost. Therefore, economic waste occurs
since the marginal produce of labor in the fishery is less than that used elsewhere. Pigous does
not use the term externalities (Varia). However, you can trace the growth of the externality
In modern society, the private property consistently requires enforcement and recognition
of law. The existence of government in the society lowers the transaction costs. However, market
responses are faster than the legal responses in times of changing economic conditions.
Transaction costs are not only diminished by governments but by the market changes in demand
The marine fisheries problem is not unique in the economy. Several non-exclusive
property ownership is facing similar challenges. The legal arrangements in some cases may yield
certain characteristics. The growth of the idea of externalities can be traced in the pigous analysis
of divergences between private net product and the social product. One major weakness of the
pigous analysis is the fact that it takes the assertions of fact for granted. Additionally, the report
accepts claims of incomplete contractual arrangements without asking for proof. The
demonstration of this is that some years later, cases of resource misallocation appeared and the
The second weakness of pigous is that the analysis does not have any massive attempt of
generalizing the different types of possible divergences. The analysis assumes that the various
kinds of deviations differ from each other and that there is no convincing way explanation as to
why they differ. The nature of the problem has remained incomprehensible, and its uncertainty
has continued to be a tradition in the literature of externalities. It leaves one wondering what
pigous example would become, had it taken advantage of Knights explanation regarding
misconceptions in the understanding of social cost. The social cost is an expense that cannot be
ignored in any discussion regarding divergences as it gives rise to externalities in the market.
Over the years, pigous was expected to revise his analysis, by incorporating Knights idea.
However, this was not the case. Pigous did not at any time change his report on the social and
private product.
Later on. R.H Coase advances some knowledge on the problem of social cost. In several
cases, he is found commenting on the works of Pigous. He in one instance identified that Pigous
makes a distinction between cases where there are no contracts and ones that have contracts that
are not satisfactory. He continues to recognize that the reason why some events are not subjected
to contracts is the same reasons why some contracts do not satisfy their requirements. In such
cases, it would require much cost to make the matters right. It is crucial to note that the two cases
are the same. Having a contract that does not satisfy the requirements is similar to having no
contract at all. The problem of the social cost will, therefore, occur whenever there are no
contracts or when the contracts are not satisfactory. Transfer of properties among individuals and
firms through the use of contracts in the market requires the owner to have exclusive rights. If
one does not have the exclusive rights to a piece of asset or property, they are not able to make
an honest transfer. This is the case even in legal without considering economics.
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The economic system requires control over goods and their exchange to survive with the
variety of wants of the specialist producers. The exchange and maintenance of these goods inflict
some costs on the owner and the trader. R.H. Coase has demonstrated that there is nothing
distinct concerning the side effects that instructs out the responsibility of being taken account of
the market (Cachanosky 65). In this context, side effects is used as an alternative of external
effects or neighborhood special effects. The effects are accountable by the market relations
between the affected parties. The role of the courts is to determine to whom the right of action
belongs. Assuming zero exchange costs and under competitive conditions, the transactions end
result in an efficient solution to the scarcity problem. Coase uses an example of a cattle ranch,
whereby; if the cattle are allowed to roam, and they stray into an unfenced farmland, the farmer
will offer to pay the rancher to lessen the quantity of cattle in his herd. If the rancher declines the
offer, then he should incur some costs, equal to the expense of the crop his cattle damaged. This
cost becomes the private cost of the rancher for raising additional cattle. Additionally, Coase
shows the competence of the resolution by the size of the crops and the number of cattle. He
does not deliberate the exchange costs of whether the farmer or the rancher is legally accountable
for the harm caused. The party which is not held responsible obtains the right to act, usually in
ways that have damaging side effects to the other party. If the rancher is accountable for the
damage, he will incur a direct cost in his maneuvers, and he has two options. Option one is to
decide whether to decrease his herd. Option two is to pay the farmer to reduce the size of the
crops he plants. The decision made will depend on economic value. If the rancher pays the
farmer to reduce the value of his crops will depend on the value of the crop lost. Additionally, if
the farmer will pay the rancher to lessen the size of cattle, will rely on the value of cattle lost.
Both options will depend on the whether the value lost in crop reduction is greater or less than
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the value lost in cattle reduction. Whichever way the rights are allotted, the consequence of the
bargain will be one that make the most of the value of output. That will be the economic view, as
it aims a maximizing output rather than being fair. The role of the markets and the government
are analyzed about the farmer and rancher example. The government should determine whether
it can take the harmful effects of activity at a cost less than the market can when the exchange
costs are positive. Again, it should identify if the resulting resource arrangement is worth the
charge of compelling the side effects into account at all. Like the farmer takes the damaging
effects because it maximizes the overall effects, so should the government. Since the government
is concerned in the economics of its country, it should be ready to take up side effects when the
The optimality theorem of welfare economics helps determine whether or not the
realignment is worthwhile. There has been improper usage of the theorems though the
conventional method to the problems has not been determined. It is believed that the
circumstances under which side effects create inefficiencies are the same terms under which the
welfare theorems are unsuitable. The lack of markets in which suitable prices for measuring side
effects can be discovered causes the general analysis of market inefficiencies. When optimality
theories have wrongly interpreted the lack of price or markets, it becomes consistent with
efficiency.
In a competitive model, the market prices may bring equalities necessary for produced
goods and services. However, the question of whether some products produce side effects that
are not bartered in the market may arise. When the markets fail to provide incentives that will
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give a guide to behavior that takes justification of the side effects, the required equalities are
absent. It is said that even faultlessly competitive marketplaces do not achieve efficiency.
However, the reasoning does not consider the fact that provision of a market is a valuable and
costly service. In cases where the market or the political action would be the participants are
lacking, this service is not being produced. When there is no production of the service, then the
inequalities among the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates of transformation
may be consistent with efficiency. This consistency is similar to the case where the cost of taking
account of the side effects through the markets or the government may exceed the value of
realigning resources. In cases similar to the above, zero amounts of market pricing or
government equivalent will be efficient. The cost of facilitating these exchanges between
affected parties has been ignored. Considering the price of every good or service produced is
necessary to determine the efficiency (Coase 9). The absence of such prices does not mean that
the market transactions or the government substitute services are desirable. Hence, the most
welfare propositions concerned with these side effects is based on the wrong use of the standard
POLICE EFFECTS
The intrigued parties in some cases decide to take account of the side effects by
cumulating sales to extensions of the firm. Adscititiously, they may find it convenient to modify
the effects. The two alternatives are dependable with efficiency, and yet they do not exhibit a
market in the side effect. The property rights and valuation quandary have two primary tasks that
must be held by any allocative mechanism. The duties are a generation of information
Secondly, the individuals have to be incentivized to take account of the information. The
allocative mechanism solves the two tasks. Hence the quandary regarding the efficient allocation
reduces to an arithmetic issue. The enforcement of the underlying property rights has a
substantial effect on the faculty of prices to quantify benefits. Prices which reflect particular
benefits, do not quantify the gregarious benefit derived from the good. Surmising that it does not
cost to police property rights, shows that there subsists a direct relationship between the extent to
which conveyed property rights are enforced and the degree to which the private benefits
approach convivial benefits. In general, in the case of public goods, if the cost of policing
benefits achieved from the utilization of these products is minimal, then there is an excellent
cause of eliminating those who do not pay for the goods. In that case, the market can calculate
the value of diverting resources from other uses to the engendering of public property.
Eliminating those who do not pay for the public goods will help determine if the asset is likely to
As it was distinguished on account of the farmer and the rancher, an activity of one
individual can lead to the damage of the other person or gathering of individuals. Comparable,
the activities of firms could convey damage to the welfare of people in general. The economic
analysis of such circumstances will dependably separate between people in general and the
private firm. Most economists feel that it is attractive to make the individual creating the
mischief obligated for the harm caused to the general population. On the other hand, a tax system
ought to be delivered to the firm bringing the harm or the company can be dispensed with from
the general population area altogether. Pollution is an example of positive externalities. When
industries emit harmful fumes into the air, they cause harm to people and the natural resources.
High taxation of these industries helps reduce the pollution. The tax is used to discourage those
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polluting the environment by enticing them to use modes of production that are environment-
friendly. The tax makes manufacturers pay for the social cost of pollution. An example of an
The reciprocal way of the issue is one where the conventional approach is taken. In such
an approach, the issue is for the most part on what A makes hurt B, and the choice is the means
by which to limit from A. Thus one deals with a problem of an equal sort. For B to evade the
damage, they would need to hurt A consequently. At that point the main issue progresses toward
deciding, to settle on a choice on whether An is permitted to harm B and the other way around.
Second is the evaluating framework with risk for damage. For this situation, most
business analysts would concur that the best approach to tackle the issue is to the individual or
firm making the mischief pay for the harm created. For example on account of the cows that
damaged the farmer's crops, the rancher should pay the farmer for the damage caused. In this
illustration, it is insignificant whichever supposition is made regarding marginal loss as the size
The third is the pricing system with no obligation for damage. In this case, the
responsible party is not liable for any damage it caused. The business does not have to make a
payment for the damages caused by its actions. The allocation of resources, in this case, will be
similar to when the damaging party was liable for them. In the same example of the farmer and
the cattle-raiser, the farmer will suffer an increased damage of his crops as the herd of cattle
increases. Assume that he would pay the rancher to increase his herd above the size he would
wish to maintain. This would occur after the bargain and so as to induce the farmer to make a
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larger payment. In the same way, the actions of the farmer in cultivating land that planting would
later be abandoned as a result of an agreement with the rancher. Such situations are preliminary
to the agreement and will not affect the long-term equilibrium position. Determining whether or
not one party is liable is important as without the initial delimitation, market transactions would
not occur.
An example is the case of Cooke v. Forbes. In this case, one of the processes in weaving
cocoa-nut fibre was to immerse it in bleaching liquids; then it was hung and dried. The fumes
from a manufacturer of sulfate ammonia would turn the matting from a bright color to a blackish
one. The decolorizing liquid contained chloride of tin which when mixed with the sulphureted
hydrogen caused the dark color. In this case, an injunction was raised to stop the defendant from
emitting the fumes. The defendants lawyer argued that if the plaintiff could stop using the
particular bleaching agent, the fiber would not be affected. He proceeded to identify the
procedure employed by the plaintiff to be unusual and not complying with the custom trade. The
judge ruled that every person has a right to carry on their manufacturing process and that their
neighbor has no right to pour in gas that would interfere with the production process. He
continued that the view was that the damage was accidental and occasional. Hence careful
precautions were taken, and there were no exceptional risks, the injunction was refused. The
economic analysis of the case is similar to the one of the farmers and the cattle rancher. The
sulfate ammonia manufacturer could reduce production or transfer to another area to avoid the
damage. Either course of action would increase their costs as they would alternatively pay for the
damage. The payment for the loss would become an extra charge for the production of sulfate.
The court argued that change of bleaching agent could solve the case. If the extra cost were less
than the damage that would occur, it would be possible for both manufacturers to make a
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satisfactory bargain in the use of the new bleaching agent. The reasoning that courts apply in
determining legal rights always looks strange to the economists. Most of the ways decisions in
court turn may be irrelevant to the economist. Hence decisions on an economic argument of view
must be treated inversely by the courts. In all issues of harmful effects, the economic difficulty is
When taking into account the cost of market transactions, it is crucial to determine the
party that wishes to deal with the other, fundamentally contrary to popular belief. When one
decides whom they want to deal with generally, they inform people of the terms that leads to the
negotiations, which is quite significant. The negotiations, in turn, basically leads to the bargain
than the drawing of the contract in a subtle way. Then the necessary inspections are carried out to
ensure the terms of the agreement specifically are observed in a tremendous way. These
transactions are usually actually expensive sufficient enough to prevent very many operations
that would occur in a system that pricing kind of occurred without cost. When dealing with the
issue of rearrangement of legal rights in the market, the reorganization would occur whenever the
situation would lead to an upsurge in the worth of production, radically contrary to popular
belief. This assumption kind of was made when the transaction costs for the most part were
ignored. Considering the transaction costs, it kind of is basically evident that the rearrangement
would for the most part occur in cases where then upsurge in the value of production kind of is
greater than the costs associated with the reorganization, which particularly is fairly significant.
Laws that relate to demand equalization of factors, comparative advantage, as well as the
relationship between price and cost, can de deduce from traditional microeconomic theory. This
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approach does not deal with the role of property rights exclusively but touches on it in good
property. A discussion of the significant aspects that talk about the rights on properties based on
traditional approach is crucial. People have been ignoring this method because it does not give
information on the whole. By use of an example, it will be easy to tell the importance of
assumptions on social provisions. For instance, as the traditional economic laws states about
demand curves being negatively sloped or the queues that tend to be removed by prices that
fluctuate freely. Despite the fact that ownership of property does not comprise the right to sell or
buy the law of demand remains true but the second law on queues only remains true if there is
right to the right to sell or buy property. This explains more on the economic laws that still stands
when the ownership of property comprises of selling and buying rights and when it does not
The system applied on private ownership include the twofold system which requires the
owners to have a prior agreement before such property becomes affected by others. The court, in
this case, helps to decide on the person who possesses the rights to the property and thus is
allowed to complain in case such rights are affected by other people. It means that the rights
given to that person are under police power protection. This property system is valid, and this
implies that the owner assigned the rights bears the value of any beneficial or harmful effect the
use of property and property rights should be used efficiently when the rights are a form of utility
maximizers. It also implies that output from the property is not dependent on any distribution
rights unless the changes in the distribution of the wealth touch the pattern of demand. These
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implications from a standard proposition of economics on an economic resource while the rights
The efficiency of property rights depends on the ability of value derived from the use of
the property to sufficiently cover both the realignment costs and valuation cost. Apparently, only
the beneficial and harmful effects in the usage of property rights get noticed because other effects
only get to be known in case a significant cost is incurred. This is why property right system such
as twofold advocates for an agreement between the input owners such as workers to ensure that
any cost incurred will be taken care. Costs such as effects of smoke from a factory can only be
substantial if the property bears a significant or very great cost. However, the cost of
uncertainties increase around the rights of the inputs affected and the extent to which they are
affected, and sometimes it is possible for the expected cost that is estimated before the effects
happen to exceed the gains. Other expenses such as those involved to measure legality of claims
in the event of uncertainties have chances of going high as well. Thus, a policy of prior
however when the extent of the effect is known in advance it would be unfair to deny the inputs a
prior payment.
The case of Cooke v. Forbes, not only gave a glimpse of the argument but the legal
approach to the issue of harmful effects, which is fairly significant. Though the above case
essentially was in English, similar selections of American cases would have the same judgment.
In cases where the market transactions are free, the rights of the various parties would be the
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only concern. These rights should be well defined, and the legal results should be predictable.
When market transactions mostly are involved, the situation definitely for all intents and
purposes is a bit different, and it makes it difficult to change the arrangements of rights
determined by the law in a subtle way. When this particularly is the case, the courts influence the
economic activities. It is crucial that the courts, for the most part, understand the economic
implications of their actions in a pretty significant way, pretty contrary to popular belief. They
should necessarily definitely take these outcomes into consideration when making their decisions
and try to specifically avoid uncertainty about their legal position in a relatively big way, which
is fairly significant. Even when it, for the most part, is particularly possible to alter the legal
boundaries of rights through market transactions necessarily, it is desirable to minimize the need
for these transactions, definitely fundamentally contrary to popular belief, which is fairly
significant. It will be specifically kind of help lessen the employment of resources in carrying out
the businesses.
As discussed earlier in cases of fisheries, Pigous explains the divergences that occur
between social and mainly private net products. Such deviations specifically occur in cases
where party A in offering services to which payment, for the most part, is made to B. Then Party
A also renders services to the third party, of a sort that services cannot be extracted from the
benefited party, very contrary to popular belief. Additionally, no form of compensation imposed
on the injured parties in a subtle way. Pigous attempts to explain how the unusually free
operations of self-interest, for the most part, allocate resources of a country in a big way. He
explains that the allocation occurs in a way that is most satisfactory to the making of a huge
distribution considers how feasible it is for the actions of the state to enhance natural tendencies,
contrary to popular belief. He concludes that improvements could be made and he continues to
imply that what is necessary to bring these enhancements mostly is state actions in a pretty
significant way.
Economists fail to substantially reach a correct conclusion on how harmful effects should
be treated, which specifically is fairly large. As such, the failure cannot be attributed to several
omissions in the analysis. Rather, it rises from the approach used in solving problems of welfare
between fundamentally private and social products pays more attention to for all intents and
purposes certain discrepancies in the system. The analyses tend to nurture the belief that any
measure proficient of eliminating the deficiency is virtually required, or so they mostly thought.
The approach hence ignores the changes in the system that are unavoidably associated with a
measure that can cause more harm than the initial shortage in a very major way.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined a variety of property rights and the externalities that are likely
to occur in the absence of these property rights. Any economic transaction implies mutual
recognition of parties who hold the right of ownership. Property rights may be the real factor or
the legal factor in an economic situation. The use of marine fisheries has enabled the discussion
of the effects that would occur in cases where the there are no property rights. The paper has
determined that property rights are necessary for preconditions for market economies to happen.
The market factors have been identified to be faster than the legal factors when responding to
changes in the economic environment. However, the relevance of these legal factors has not been
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ignored. In determining the social effects caused by harms of firms in the economic environment,
the law has a role to play. Though the decisions made by the law are not consistent with the
reasoning of the economists, it is crucial to determine that indeed they have an effect. In future, it
would be helpful if the courts with consider the views of the economists in deciding cases
regarding economic welfare. Problems of social welfare must be eventually dissolved into the
Works Cited
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Lin, Ming-Jen and Chia-Chi Chang. "Testing Coase Theorem: The Case of Free
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2545-2558.
Stevenson, Dru. "Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem." Iowa Law Review,
Varia. "On Pigous Theory of Economic Policy Analysis." conomia - History, Methodology,