ETHIOPIA: ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Africa Report N°153 – 4 September 2009

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
II. FEDERALISING THE POLITY..................................................................................... 2
A. THE IMPERIAL PERIOD (-1974) ....................................................................................................2
B. THE DERG (1974-1991)...............................................................................................................3
C. FROM THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC (1991-1994)...............................................................................................................4
III. STATE-LED DEMOCRATISATION............................................................................. 5
A. AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES .........................................................................................................6
B. EVOLUTION OF MULTIPARTY POLITICS ........................................................................................7
1. Elections without competition .....................................................................................................7
2. The 2005 elections .......................................................................................................................8
3. Divisions within the opposition .................................................................................................10
4. The 2008 local elections ............................................................................................................12
5. Preparing for 2010 .....................................................................................................................12
IV. CONTROLLING STATE AND PEOPLE.................................................................... 15
A. CENTRAL PARTY, DECENTRALISED STATE .................................................................................15
1. The national level.......................................................................................................................15
2. The regional level ......................................................................................................................16
3. The local level............................................................................................................................18
B. PUBLIC SPACE CURTAILED ........................................................................................................20
1. Civil society ...............................................................................................................................20
2. Media constraints .......................................................................................................................21
V. CONTESTED MULTI-ETHNIC POLITICS............................................................... 22
A. THE POLITICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION ....................................................................................22
B. ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND CONFLICTS .......................................................................................24
C. ETHNO-NATIONAL CONTESTATION ............................................................................................26
1. Oromiya region ..........................................................................................................................26
2. Somali region .............................................................................................................................27
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 29
APPENDICES
A. MAP OF HORN OF AFRICA ................................................................................................................30
B. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS ............................................................................................31
C. THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT (OLF)..........................................................................................32
D. THE OGADEN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ONLF)....................................................................34
E. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................37
F. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2006.....................................................38
G. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................40
Africa Report N°153
ETHIOPIA: ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF), led by its chairman and prime minister, Meles
Zenawi, has radically reformed Ethiopia’s political sys-
tem. The regime transformed the hitherto centralised state
into the Federal Democratic Republic and also redefined
citizenship, politics and identity on ethnic grounds. The
intent was to create a more prosperous, just and repre-
sentative state for all its people. Yet, despite continued
economic growth and promised democratisation, there is
growing discontent with the EPRDF’s ethnically defined
state and rigid grip on power and fears of continued inter-
ethnic conflict. The international community should take
Ethiopia’s governance problems much more seriously and
adopt a more principled position towards the government.
Without genuine multi-party democracy, the tensions and
pressures in Ethiopia’s polities will only grow, greatly
increasing the possibility of a violent eruption that would
destabilise the country and region.
The endeavour to transform Ethiopia into a federal state
is led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF),
which has dominated the coalition of ethno-nationalist
parties that is the EPRDF since the removal in 1991 of
the Derg, the security services committee that overthrew
Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. The EPRDF quickly
institutionalised the TPLF’s policy of people’s rights to
self-determination and self-rule. The federal constitution
ratified in 1994 defined the country’s structure as a multi-
cultural federation based on ethno-national representation.
The government has created nine ethnic-based regional
states and two federally administered city-states. The
result is an asymmetrical federation that combines popu-
lous regional states like Oromiya and Amhara in the
central highlands with sparsely populated and under-
developed ones like Gambella and Somali. Although the
constitution vests all powers not attributed to the federal
government in them, the regional states are in fact weak.
The constitution was applauded for its commitment to
liberal democracy and respect for political freedoms and
human rights. But while the EPRDF promises democracy,
it has not accepted that the opposition is qualified to take
power via the ballot box and tends to regard the expres-
4 September 2009
sion of differing views and interests as a form of betrayal.
Before 2005, its electoral superiority was ensured by
the limited national appeal and outreach of the predomi-
nantly ethnically based opposition parties. Divided and
disorganised, the reach of those parties rarely went be-
yond Addis Ababa. When the opposition was able to
challenge at local, regional or federal levels, it faced
threats, harassment and arrest. With the opportunity in
2005 to take over the Addis Ababa city council in what
would have been the first democratic change of a major
administration in the country’s history, the opposition
withdrew from the political process to protest flaws in
the overall election.
The EPRDF did not feel threatened until the 2005 federal
and regional elections. The crackdown that year on the
opposition demonstrated the extent to which the regime
is willing to ignore popular protest and foreign criticism
to hold on to power. The 2008 local and by-elections
went much more smoothly, in large part because the
opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)
was absorbed with internal and legal squabbles, and
several other parties withdrew after their candidates ex-
perienced severe registration problems. The next federal
and regional elections, scheduled for June 2010, most
probably will be much more contentious, as numerous
opposition parties are preparing to challenge the EPRDF,
which is likely to continue to use its political machine to
retain its position.
Despite the EPRDF’s authoritarianism and reluctance to
accept genuine multi-party competition, political posi-
tions and parties have proliferated in recent years. This
process, however, is not driven by democratisation or the
inclusion of opposition parties in representative institu-
tions. Rather it is the result of a continuous polarisation
of national politics that has sharpened tensions between
and within parties and ethnic groups since the mid-1990s.
The EPRDF’s ethnic federalism has not dampened con-
flict, but rather increased competition among groups that
vie over land and natural resources, as well as adminis-
trative boundaries and government budgets.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
Furthermore, ethnic federalism has failed to resolve the
“national question”. The EPRDF’s ethnic policy has
empowered some groups but has not been accompanied
by dialogue and reconciliation. For Amhara and national
elites, ethnic federalism impedes a strong, unitary nation-
state. For ethno-national rebel groups like the ONLF
(Ogaden National Liberation Front; Somalis in the Oga-
den) and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front; the Oromo),
ethnic federalism remains artificial. While the concept has
failed to accommodate grievances, it has powerfully
Page ii
promoted ethnic self-awareness among all groups. The
international community has ignored or downplayed all
these problems. Some donors appear to consider food
security more important than democracy in Ethiopia, but
they neglect the increased ethnic awareness and tensions
created by the regionalisation policy and their potentially
explosive consequences.
Nairobi/Brussels, 4 September 2009
Africa Report N°153
ETHIOPIA: ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
After ousting Mengistu Haile Mariam’s dictatorship in
1991, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF), led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi,
embarked on a project to radically transform the coun-
try’s political system. The regime not only restructured
the state into the current Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia, but also vigorously redefined citizenship,
politics and identity on ethnic grounds. The remake over
the past eighteen years has been accompanied by tremen-
dous hopes for a more prosperous and peaceful future,
after decades of poverty, hunger and oppression. Despite
continued economic growth, however, these aspirations
have given way to wariness about the ethnically defined
state centralism advocated by the EPRDF. Following the
2005 elections, broad frustration has emerged with the
government’s relapse into authoritarianism.
The absence of consensus regarding ethnic federalism re-
sults from contradictions that date back to the formation
of the modern state in the nineteenth century and have
become virulent since 1991: ethnically defined politics
that decentralise rather than mitigate inter-ethnic relations;
government-propagated democratisation inhibited by
the ruling party’s unwillingness to share power; and rapid
economic growth and increasing urbanisation accom-
panied by growing inequality and social tensions. While
these contradictions have been present since the begin-
ning of EPRDF rule, they exploded in the 2005 elections.
Politics are intensely contested. At stake are fundamen-
tally opposing visions of Ethiopia’s history, problems
and the way forward as conceived by different ethno-
political constituencies and a diaspora dominated by Am-
hara and Amharised urbanites. While Meles Zenawi’s re-
gime has managed to stay in power, its support among
the population at large, former sympathisers and even
members of the powerful Tigray People’s Liberation
Front (TPLF) has continually eroded over the past decade.
An increasingly bitter confrontation between the EPRDF
and major opposition parties, the growing insurgency by
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in the east,
recurrent localised inter-ethnic tensions and rapidly
mounting economic challenges are all serious factors.
4 September 2009
An explosive mix of international, national and local
tensions has emerged that adds pressure on a govern-
ment that has secured high levels of donor support and
economic investment but faces increasing internal dis-
content. Many Ethiopians have benefited from the eco-
nomic modernisation of the past eighteen years. Yet,
many in the rapidly growing population also feel that they
are excluded from the opportunities and resources the
EPRDF continues to control. Segments of the urban, edu-
cated middle class in particular demand greater decision-
making power.
This report provides a synopsis of politics since 1991.
It takes stock of the EPRDF’s major institutional policies
and practices, as well as the political dynamics unleashed
by “ethnic federalism”,1 the contested centrepiece of
the system, whose achievements and shortcomings re-
quire a holistic assessment that takes into account the
formal and informal rules, decision-making and practices
that shape political life. Particular attention is paid to how
well ethnic federalism has satisfied its promises to en-
able popular participation, balance strong urban-rural
and highland-lowland disparities, enhance delivery of
services and maintain stability.
1
Ethnic federalism includes ethnically defined national citi-
zenship, self-determination on an ethno-linguistic basis as en-
shrined in the constitution, ethnically defined political repre-
sentation and decision-making at all administrative levels and
related policies.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
II. FEDERALISING THE POLITY
A. THE IMPERIAL PERIOD (-1974)
Ethiopia is the only African state never colonised by a
foreign power. It traces its origin to the kingdoms that
emerged in the northern highlands in the fourth century
CE.2 Centuries of history were marked by competition
between Amhara and Tigray aristocratic dynasties and
conflict with Muslim emirates of the surrounding low-
lands, as well as the Oromo migrations into the highlands.
The modern nation-state emerged in the nineteenth cen-
tury.3 Emperor Tewodros initiated the first efforts to
unify and modernise the Abyssinian empire during his
reign from 1855 to 1868.4 He established the first national
army, initiated a land reform and propagated the use of
Amharic instead of Ge’ez (the old South Semetic court
and church language). His modernisation agenda sparked
opposition from the land-holding clergy as well as rival
lords, and his army was eventually defeated by an alli-
ance of domestic rivals and British forces in 1868.
Emperor Yohannes IV from Tigray, who succeeded
Tewodros in 1872, adopted a much less confrontational
stance towards the church and powerful principalities,
devolving power to the regional aristocrats who recog-
nised his status as the negus negast (king of kings).
Yohannes’s rule was marked by increasing international
interference, notably by European powers and Egypt,
whose military advance was stopped by Ethiopian troops
in 1875.5 Yohannes was killed in 1889 in an attack by the
Sudanese Mahdists. The next emperor, Menelik II, em-
barked on an aggressive, at times brutal, westward and
southward expansion, subjugating and incorporating
Oromo, Sidama, Gurage, Wolayta and other groups.6 This
2
Ethiopian historiography emphasises continuity between the
Christian kingdom of Axum (fourth to seventh century CE),
the Zagwe kingdom (c. 1150-1270), the “Solomonic” state
(1270-1529), the Gonderine state (seventeenth century) and
imperial Ethiopia (nineteenth century). See Richard Pankhurst,
The Ethiopians: A History (Oxford, 1998); and Paul B. Henze,
Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia (London, 2000). For a
contending view, see Christopher Clapham, “Rewriting Ethiopian
History”, Annales d'Ethiopie, vol. 18, no. 18 (2002), pp. 37-54.
3
Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1991
(Addis Ababa, 2002).
4
A former shifta (bandit), Tewodros’s capital was in Maqdels,
south of Lallibella.
5
This was the period of the scramble for the Horn of Africa by
colonial France, Britain and Italy. The latter had established a
presence in Massawa in today’s Eritrea.
6
Neftegna (Amharic for riflemen) conquered the new territo-
ries in the name of the emperor, settled the lands (gebbar in
Amharic) and levied tribute from farmers. They tried to impose
Amharic and the Christian Orthodoxy they considered supe-
rior to local non-Christian and pagan traditions. Some areas
Page 2
was coupled with advances in road construction, elec-
tricity and education, development of a central taxation
system and foundation of the new capital, Addis Ababa.
Despite an 1889 treaty in which Italy recognised Mene-
lik’s sovereignty in return for control over Eritrea, ten-
sions and conflict between the two states culminated
in the battle of Adwa on 1 March 1896, in which Ethio-
pian forces decisively defeated the colonial army. After
Menelik’s death in 1913, the centralisation drive con-
tinued under his grandson, Iyasu (1913-1916), and Haile
Selassie I (1930-1974),7 halted only by the Italian occu-
pation between 1936 and 1941. The government’s mili-
tary and repressive capacities grew considerably during
Haile Selassie’s reign. Though the emperor was widely
admired internationally, his domestic policies were less
successful, as famine and political protest increasingly
challenged his rule.8 A coup d’état by the commander of
the imperial bodyguard was averted in 1960, but grow-
ing popular dissatisfaction with his feudal politics pre-
pared the way for his downfall.
The imperial period and the formation of the modern state
are interpreted in starkly different terms. The legacy is
a source of considerable pride for Ethiopian nationalists,
particularly Christian highlanders, but is viewed as in-
ternal colonialism by those the empire subjugated. Some
historians consider Ethiopia a truly “multi-ethnic national
society” that emerged from centuries of interaction and
acculturation between ethnic groups.9 Others characterise
the state formation as a colonial process by which an
Abyssinian settler class, in alliance with foreign powers,
colonised a large part of the current country.10
retained a certain political and cultural autonomy as semi-
independent enclaves. The peripheries, mostly inhabited by
pastoralists, were the least affected by imperial expansion at
the turn of the century. Donald L. Donham and Wendy James
(eds.), The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in
History and Social Anthropology (Oxford, 2002).
7
Christopher Clapham, Haile-Selassie's Government (London,
1969).
8
Until the beginning of the 1950s, Haile Selassie was perceived
as a modernist by educated Ethiopians. By the end of the 1960s,
they blamed him for the country’s backwardness. Donald L.
Donham, Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the
Ethiopian Revolution (Berkeley, 1999), p. 123. On the peas-
ant rebellions, see Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: power and protest.
Peasant revolts in the twentieth century (Lawrenceville, 1996).
9
This is typically the highland nationalist account of Ethiopian
history as presented in Donald N. Levine, Greater Ethiopia:
The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (Chicago, 2000).
10
This is typically the Oromo nationalist view as elaborated in
Bonnie K. Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa, The Invention of Ethiopia:
The making of a dependent colonial state in Northeast Africa
(Trenton, 1990).
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
B. THE DERG (1974-1991)
Starting in the mid-1960s, student protest paved the way
for the downfall of the imperial regime. The student
movement was radicalised by widespread rural poverty,
feudal land practices and government repression. Highly
idealistic and influenced by Ethiopian students abroad,
it couched demands for political reform and the right of
nationalities to self-determination in Marxist-Leninist
and anti-imperialist terms.11 By 1974, labour unions had
joined the protests against the regime.12 The decisive
blow to Haile Selassie was dealt not by the popular up-
rising, however, but by mutinous military officers, who
in June 1974 established the Coordinating Committee
of the Armed Forces, the Police and the Territorial Army
known as Derg (Amharic for committee).13 Following
bloody internal power struggles, Mengistu Haile Mariam
emerged as the strongman within the Derg, which de-
posed the emperor on 12 September, abruptly ending the
legendary dynasty.14 What had begun as a popular revo-
lution against an autocratic ruler derailed into a brutal
military dictatorship.15
In what became one of the most radical land reforms
worldwide, the Derg abolished all feudal tenure and na-
tionalised all land in March 1975, administering and re-
distributing it by newly established kebelles (peasant
associations). These were initially welcomed by students
as a means of genuine peasant emancipation16 but turned
into instruments of central government control.17 The
Derg also nationalised all financial institutions and pri-
vate enterprises and subjugated agricultural production
and markets to state control. While Haile Selassie had
close ties with the U.S. and other Western powers,
Mengistu in 1977 sought and received patronage from
the Soviet Union and communist bloc. Soviet and Cuban
11
Randi Rønning Balsvik, Haile Selassie’s Students: The In-
tellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952-1977
(Addis Ababa, 1985).
12
Bahru Zewde, History, op. cit., pp. 220-232.
13
John Markakis and Nega Ayele, Class and Revolution in
Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 2006).
14
Abyssinian emperors claimed descent from King Solomon
and the Queen of Sheba.
15
The Derg transformed into the Provisional Military Admin-
istrative Council in September 1974. Mengistu Haile Mariam,
the Council’s first vice-chairman, became head of state in 1977.
16
After the 1974 land proclamation, students were sent to teach
in several rural education campaigns.
17
Christopher Clapham, “Controlling Space in Ethiopia” in
W. James, D. I. Donham, Eisei Kurimoto and A. Triulzi (eds.),
Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and after (Oxford, 2002), p. 15.
Page 3
military aid was particularly instrumental in winning the
1977-1978 Ogaden War with Somalia.18
While the leftist student movement had a strong ideologi-
cal program, it lacked organisation. Conversely, the Derg
was well organised but initially lacked a political program
apart from the vague patriotic slogan of “Ethiopia first”.
It adopted the Marxist-Leninist vocabulary from the
students, who opposed the military coup and demanded
an elected government. Political competition and differ-
ences over how to deal with the Derg divided the two
foremost student organisations, the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Party and Meison (All Ethiopian Social-
ist Movement). The Derg first sided with Meison and
then successively eliminated all contending political
groups. In the process, it imposed itself as the vanguard
party of the Ethiopian people, propagating socialism as
the state doctrine.19 In what came to be known as the Red
Terror, its security forces arrested, tortured and killed tens
of thousands of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Party members and other enemies in 1976.20 Ruthless
political violence became the trademark of the Mengistu
dictatorship.
The Derg’s repression, failed economic policy and forced
resettlement and “villagisation” programs after the 1984-
1985 famine created great resentment.21 Mengistu adopted
an uncompromising position from the outset towards
ethno-nationalists of the Eritrean Liberation Front and
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), who had
already taken up arms against Haile Selassie in their quest
for regional autonomy and later independence.22 Despite
massive counter-insurgency campaigns throughout the
1980s, the Derg was unable to defeat the Eritrean rebels.
While the EPLF pursued a more conventional warfare
strategy, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)
relied on mobilising the peasantry.23 On a lesser scale,
18
In 1977 Somalia invaded Ethiopia in an effort to conquer
and annex Somali-inhabited regions.
19
The Provisional Military Administrative Council declared the
National Democratic Revolution in April 1976, followed by
the creation of the Provisional Office for Mass Organisational
Affairs, which mobilised and indoctrinated the population. In
1984 the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia, chaired by Mengistu, was
established as the ruling party.
20
Some of those persons responsible for the Red Terror cam-
paign were brought to trial after the fall of the Derg. See Kjetil
Tronvoll, Charles Schaefer and Girmachew Alemu Aneme (eds.),
The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Chal-
lenged (Oxford, 2009).
21
Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in
Revolutionary Ethiopia (Cambridge, 1988).
22
Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domi-
nation, Resistance, Nationalism 1941-1993 (Cambridge, 1995).
23
The EPLF considered Eritrea a victim of Ethiopian coloni-
alism; the TPLF sought self-determination for Tigray and
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
and aided by the EPLF, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
waged hit-and-run attacks in the east and south east and
from across the Sudanese border.24 In 1989-1990 the
EPLF and TPLF made important military gains, and on
21 May 1991 Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe. The victorious
rebel forces reached Addis Ababa a week later.
C. FROM THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT
TO THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
(1991-1994)
The TPLF had prepared for national leadership by estab-
lishing the EPRDF as an umbrella of ethno-national fronts
in 1989. That coalition included the Ethiopian People’s
Democratic Movement (EPDM),25 the Oromo People’s
Democratic Organisation (OPDO)26 and the Southern
Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Front (SEPDF), but from
the onset, the TPLF was its dominant political force. In
a first major step to redefine the political landscape, the
EPRDF invited all ethnic-based opposition parties to a
transitional national conference in Addis Ababa in July
1991.27 Almost 30 attended and adopted a provisional
national charter, created an 87-member Council of Rep-
resentatives and formed the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia (TGE) led by the EPRDF.28
Although the EPRDF encouraged the participation of a
wide range of ethnic-based parties in the TGE, it excluded
the pan-Ethiopian opposition, which had a strong base
in Addis Ababa and drew support from the intellectual
urban elite.29 It had already decided on its general direc-
tion, and the national charter both institutionalised TPLF
other ethno-national groups within Ethiopia. This led to con-
flict between the two rebel fronts, who otherwise cooperated,
in 1984-1985 and 1998-2000. Richard Reid, “Old Problems in
New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations
with Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Inter-State War”,
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, vol. 73,
no. 3 (2003), pp. 369-401.
24
Bahru Zewde, History, op. cit., p. 262.
25
The EPDM, established in 1982 and subsequently renamed
the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), repre-
sents the Amhara nationality within the EPRDF coalition.
26
The TPLF established the OPDO as the vanguard Oromo
party in 1990. Its members are mostly drawn from former Derg
prisoners of war.
27
Sarah Vaughan, The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference
of July 1991: its origins, history and significance (Edinburgh,
1994).
28
The EPRDF controlled 32 of the 87 seats in the Council of
Representatives; the second party was the OLF, with twelve.
29
This was the case of the EPRP and the newly established
Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), which
opposed ethnic-based regionalisation. John Young, “Ethnicity
and Power in Ethiopia”, Review of African Political Economy,
vol. 23, no. 70 (1996), p. 537.
Page 4
policy and paved the way for Eritrea’s independence in
1993, on the ground that the right to self-determination
had been earned as a result of its colonisation by Italy.30
The EPRDF’s superior military and political authority and
its determination to reshape Ethiopia on its own terms
soon brought it into confrontation with its junior partners
in the TGE. Particularly significant were the growing
differences with the OLF between mid-1991 and the be-
ginning of 1992 over whose forces should administer the
Oromo-inhabited territories. Those differences, as well
as competition between the OLF and the OPDO, esca-
lated into clashes in which the TPLF routed the OLF. 31
By the end of 1993 the Council of Representatives that
ruled the TGE was largely reduced to the EPRDF and
ethnic-based political parties of its making.32 While the
TGE claimed multi-ethnic representation, it included no
parties with differing views or policies on ethnically
defined citizenship.
In December 1994, a constitutional assembly ratified the
new constitution, which was lauded for its commitment
to federalism, liberal democracy and respect of political
freedoms and human rights.33 It defined Ethiopia as a
multicultural federation that operates on the basis of ethno-
national representation. A bicameral parliament was
created: the House of Peoples’ Representatives, with 547
members directly elected for five years, and the House
of Federation, with 108 representatives of the country’s
nationalities and tasked with constitutional interpretation
and deciding issues related to national self-determination
but without a legislative role.34 A powerful prime minister
and a ceremonial president make up the federal executive.35
The constitution led to the creation of the nine ethnic-
based regional states: Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya,
Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations,36
30
Kjetil Tronvoll, Ethiopia: A New Start? (London, 2000), p. 15.
31
A series of parties who opposed EPRDF policy left the TGE
in 1992-1993. As in the case of the Sidama Liberation Front,
they were replaced by ethnic-based parties friendly to the EPRDF,
in the latter case, the Sidama People’s Democratic Party.
32
Edmond J. Keller, “Making and Remaking State and Nation
in Ethiopia”, in Ricardo Rene Laremont, ed., Borders, Nation-
alism, and the African State (Boulder, 2005), p. 104.
33
The constitution was ratified on 8 December 1994 and en-
tered into force on 21 August 1995.
34
Each member of the House of Peoples’ Representatives
represents approximately 100,000 persons. Twenty seats are
reserved for minority groups. Each nation, nationality and
people has one representative in the House of Federation, plus
one additional member for every million of its people.
35
Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Di-
versity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study (Nijmegen, 2007),
pp. 213-292.
36
Five ethno-political entities were forcibly merged into the
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR).
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
Gambella and Harar, while Addis Ababa and later Dire
Dawa became federally administered city-states.37 In
restructuring Ethiopia into a multi-ethnic federation, the
TPLF took its home region, Tigray, which it had admin-
istered since 1989, as the prototype for the new regional
states. The resulting asymmetrical federation combines
populous regional states like Oromiya and Amhara of
the central highlands with sparsely populated, under-
developed regional states like Gambella and Somali.
Although the constitution vests all powers not attributed
to the federal government in them, the regional states are
relatively weak.38 On 24 August 1995, the Federal Democ-
ratic Republic was formally proclaimed, with Meles
Zenawi as prime minister and Negaso Gidado as president.
37
The first five regional states (Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya,
Somali) qualify as single ethnic states; the last four (Benis-
hangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Gambella and Harar) are
multi-ethnic regional states without a dominant ethnic group.
38
Paul Brietzke, “Ethiopia's ‘Leap in the Dark’: Federalism
and Self-Determination in the New Constitution”, Journal of
African Law, vol. 39, no. 1 (1995), p. 29.
Page 5
III. STATE-LED DEMOCRATISATION
The EPRDF firmly monopolises political representa-
tion, decision-making and public space. The contradic-
tion between its de facto one-party state and its promises
to deliver multi-party elections, human rights and self-
determination has been the defining trait of politics since
1991. This has produced tensions between the govern-
ment and the opposition, communal and inter-ethnic
animosities and armed conflict between ethno-national
rebels and the government, culminating in the 2005
election crisis.39
Democratic centralism, the dominance of the party ap-
paratus behind the façade of regional and local auton-
omy, an extensive patronage system and the use of force
to silence opposition have severely hampered genuine
democratisation. Although it has broadened its member-
ship, the EPRDF’s support base has continuously eroded
since the disastrous war with Eritrea (1998-2000).40 Once
close to their rural Tigrayan constituency, the TPLF and
the EPRDF top leaderships now largely operate in seclu-
sion from the general public. This has led to a situation
in which an increasingly smaller number of politicians
– the TPLF executive committee and the prime minis-
ter’s immediate advisers – decide the political fate of
the country.
The 2005 crackdown on the opposition and irritated re-
actions to any criticism, domestic or foreign, indicate
that the EPRDF feels itself under pressure.41 Although
it has overseen sustained economic growth and advanced
development, democratic rhetoric has not been matched
by democratic practice. Dissent is provoked by the gap
between promises and the political realities people ex-
perience in their everyday lives. There is a sentiment,
particularly among the urban elite, that the EPRDF, like
the Derg, betrayed democratic aspirations.42 But EPRDF
authoritarianism is only part of the reason why democ-
ratic institutions are as weak today as when the federal
republic was founded.43 Federalism has allowed new
39
Crisis Group interview, analyst, Addis Ababa, 24 July 2008.
40
The war was triggered by a territorial dispute, but old po-
litical and economic disputes also divided TPLF and EPLF
leaders. Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War:
Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (Oxford, 2000).
41
The foreign ministry responds sharply to any criticism of the
government in its “A week in the Horn of Africa” press release.
42
Crisis Group interviews, Addis Ababa, July 2008.
43
John Young, “Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia”,
Third World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2 (1998), p. 195.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
ethnic elites to emerge but has not fundamentally altered
the principle of elite-based paternalistic politics.44
A. AUTHORITARIAN LEGACIES
The bitter ideological differences and violent infighting
between the student movement and the Derg shaped many
of Ethiopia’s current intellectuals and leaders. Ideo-
logical and personal schisms within secretively organised
parties and rebel groups have been trademarks of poli-
tics for four decades.
Political life in many ways reflects how the EPRDF and
its constituent parties conceive policymaking. Both the
TPLF and the EPRDF present themselves as legitimate
representatives of rural citizens, who make up 84 per cent
of the population.45 Indeed, in the first decade of its rebel-
lion against the Derg, the TPLF successfully mobilised
peasants by skilfully fusing Tigrayan ethno-nationalism
with Marxism-Leninism. Open discussion and evaluation
sessions were encouraged to rally farmers to the revolu-
tionary cause and optimise guerrilla tactics.46 But though
the EPRDF is formally committed to a “stable multi-
party democratic system”,47 its decision-making, organ-
isational principles and discourse reflect the Marxist-
Leninist philosophy that has guided the TPLF since its
foundation in 1975.
Experience of arbitrary government repression has fright-
ened many Ethiopians away from politics. Involvement
in government matters is considered dangerous and to be
avoided at all costs,48 though outside the realm of formal
politics, there remain numerous examples of democracy
from below that give citizens a stake in the management
of their affairs. These more participatory mechanisms
44
The urban elites, who primarily make up government, op-
position and civil society, tend to think they know best what
uneducated peasants need and that they can speak on their
behalf. Siegfried Pausewang, “Aborted or nascent democracy?
Structural reasons for the failure of democratisation in Ethio-
pia”, in G. M. Sørbø and S. Pausewang (eds.), Prospects for
peace, security and human rights in Africa's Horn (Bergen, 2004),
p. 148; see also Messay Kebede, “From Marxism-Leninism
to Ethnicity: The Sideslips of Ethiopian Elitism”, Northeast
African Studies, vol. 10, no. 2 (2008), pp. 163-186.
45
“Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population
and Housing Census”, Central Statistical Agency, 2008, at
www.csa.gov.et.
46
John Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray
People’s Liberation Front, 1975–1991 (Cambridge, 1997).
47
“EPRDF program”, EPRDF, 2005, at www.eprdf.org.et/
Eprdffiles/Basicdoc/Basicdocuments_files/EPRDF_Program.htm.
48
Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power
in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life (Stockholm, 2003).
Page 6
exist at grassroots level among the peasantry and in the
realm of traditional types of governance.49
However, the key internal mechanism of the TPLF is the
Leninist principle of democratic centralism; executive
and central committee party members are in charge of
all major policy decisions. These are transmitted to party
officials and state administrators and must be adhered
to; party members bear personal responsibility for their
assignments. TPLF central committee members consider
themselves not only the vanguard of the party, but also
of the Tigrayan people, whose will is represented and
interpreted by the party.50 While debate is possible within
the party, criticism by members once a decision has been
made is considered factionalism. The nine-member ex-
ecutive committee takes decisions collegially, before they
are approved by the central committee.
These organisational principles suited the exigencies of
the armed rebellion and made the TPLF one of Africa’s
most disciplined and effective insurgent groups. But they
also forged a “small, highly centralised, and secretive
leadership”51 that occasionally bordered on paranoid. The
creation of the clandestine Marxist-Leninist League of
Tigray (Malalit, MLLT) within the TPLF in the mid-1980s
further reinforced this trend. This group, which admired
Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha, played a
crucial role in shaping TPLF policy and internal rivalries
alike.52 Although officially disbanded, the MLLT is
shrouded in legend, and some of its protagonists domi-
nate today’s EPRDF, most prominently the former MLLT
chairman and current prime minister, Meles Zenawi.
When faced with internal dissent in 2001 and popular
opposition in 2005, TPLF leaders reverted to an authori-
tarian populism that echoed the party’s Leninist origins.
In recent years, critics within the party have been harshly
sanctioned by Meles and his entourage. A number of
senior government officials have sought asylum abroad.
A case in point is the senior TPLF dissenters removed
from their posts after accusing Meles in March 2001 of
being too soft on Eritrea and undermining Tigrayan
nationalism. Meles accused them of “Bonapartism”, a
Marxist term for a counter-revolutionary attitude.53
49
Bahru Zewde and Siegfried Pausewang (eds.), Ethiopia –
The Challenge of Democracy from Below (Addis Ababa, 2002).
50
Patrick Gilkes, Ethiopia – Perspectives of Conflict 1991-
1999 (Bern, 1999), p. 22.
51
Gebru Tareke, Power and Protest, op. cit., p. 218.
52
Aregawi Berhe, “The origins of the Tigray People’s Liberation
Front”, African Affairs, vol. 103, no. 413 (2004), pp. 569-592.
53
Paulos Milkias, “Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the
2001 Political Tremor”, Northeast African Studies, vol. 10, no. 2
(2008), pp. 13-66.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
The political elite reproduces a “culture of extremism”54
that leaves little room for tolerance. The refusal to en-
gage with political opponents was particularly observable
during the 2005 elections.55 The self-righteous and un-
compromising attitudes of government and opposition
leaders made dialogue impossible. At the same time,
many political groupings, including the EPRDF and the
opposition, cultivate a “cult of personality and party”.56
The EPRDF inherited the organisational principle of
democratic centralism and Maoist conceptions of mass
political mobilisation from its TPLF founders.57 It also
took in not easily reconcilable ideological contradictions:
the EPRDF advocates capitalism, yet retains a strong state
role in the economy, including government land holding,
and limits individual liberties. “Revolutionary democ-
racy” is its attempt to reconcile the TPLF socialist leg-
acy with global capitalism and market liberalism,58 justi-
fying the dominant position of its party-affiliated firms
in the economy by arguing that prosperity requires the
leadership of a strong party that can mobilise the people.59
B. EVOLUTION OF MULTIPARTY POLITICS
While the EPRDF embraced multiparty politics half
heartedly after 1991, it never considered that the oppo-
sition had a legitimate right to take power via the ballot
box.60 Due to its national dominance – ensured by the
limited geographic appeal of the predominantly ethni-
cally based opposition parties – it did not feel threat-
ened until the 2005 federal and regional elections, but it
has tended to regard expression of different political and
economic interests as “like a betrayal, like treason”.61
When the divided and disorganised opposition parties did
manage to extend their reach beyond Addis Ababa to
54
Bahru Zewde, “What Did We Dream? What Did We Achieve?
And Where Are We Heading?”, Ethiopian Economic Asso-
ciation (Addis Ababa, 2004), p. 7.
55
Melakou Tegegn, “Power Politics: Kinijit in the 2005 Elec-
tions”, Journal of Developing Societies, vol. 24, no. 2 (2008),
p. 279.
56
Ibid, p. 278.
57
Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, Culture of Power, op. cit.,
p. 15.
58
Revolutionary democracy was also a response to critics within
the TPLF who were unhappy with the increasingly liberal eco-
nomic policies of the EPRDF government. Crisis Group inter-
view, Ethiopian analyst, 13 March 2009.
59
Jon Abbink, “Discomfiture of democracy? The 2005 election
crisis in Ethiopia and its aftermath”, African Affairs, vol. 105,
no. 419 (2006), p. 195.
60
Christopher Clapham, “Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis”,
Ethiomedia.com, 14 November 2005, at www.ethiomedia.com/
fastpress/clapham_on_ethiopian_crisis.html.
61
Siegfried Pausewang, “Aborted or nascent democracy?”, op. cit.,
p. 135.
Page 7
challenge incumbents at local, regional or federal levels,
the security forces threatened, harassed and arrested their
candidates.62 In 2005, when the opposition might have
been able to control the city council in the federal capital,
it withdrew from the political process to protest national
electoral defects, thus forfeiting a chance to produce the
first democratic change of a major administration in the
country’s history.
Nevertheless, diversification of political positions and
parties has occurred in recent years. The driving force
behind this is not, however, democratisation or the in-
clusion of opposition parties in representative institutions.
Rather a continuous polarisation of national politics has
sharpened tensions between and within parties since the
mid-1990s. As a result, almost all ethnic groups can
now choose between candidates standing on different
politico-ideological programs.
1. Elections without competition
Recent history illustrates the EPRDF’s overwhelming
dominance at the ballot box. The first multiparty regional
and district (woreda) elections, held on 21 June 1992,
failed to offer an alternative. The OLF, the All Amhara
Peoples’ Organisation Party and other ethno-national
parties from the transitional government withdrew at the
last minute, because their candidates faced intimidation,
violence and fraud. The EPRDF received 96.6 per cent
of the vote, and international observers qualified the
election as “sterile, surreal and wholly formalistic”.63
The next election occurred on 5 June 1994, when a 547-
member assembly was chosen to revise and ratify the
draft constitution, whose clauses on state land ownership
and the right of ethnic groups to self-determination “up
to and including secession” were particularly disputed.
Although some public discussion of the draft took place,
a climate of political polarisation and distrust prevailed,
the major opposition parties continued their election
boycott, and the EPRDF and its affiliate parties won
484 seats.64
The first federal and regional parliamentary elections, on
7 May 1995, continued the pattern of non-participation
by the main opposition parties. Rural residents were
mostly apathetic, though their registration and voting
62
Sandra Fullerton Joireman, “Opposition Politics and Eth-
nicity in Ethiopia: We Will All Go down Together”, Journal
of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 3 (1997), pp. 387-407.
63
“An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethio-
pia”, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
(NDI) and African American Institute (AAI), 1991, p. 6.
64
Siegfried Pausewang, “The 1994 Election and Democracy
in Ethiopia”, Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 1994.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
numbers were high, because many feared that displaying
anti-government attitudes or sympathy for the opposition
would provoke repercussions.65 Harassment and intimi-
dation of opposition supporters occurred throughout
Amhara, Oromiya and the Southern Nations, Nationali-
ties and People’s Region (SNNPR).66 In Tigray the TPLF
recruited “independent” candidates to avoid the impres-
sion of a non-competitive election. The EPRDF claimed
a sweeping victory in an election that became the “final
act in a four-year process of political closure”.67
Opposition decisions to contest the 14 May 2000 federal
and regional parliamentary elections resuscitated multi-
party competition. Yet, candidates were mostly unable to
challenge the EPRDF machine. Where they did, govern-
ment officials manipulated the result by arrests and vote
buying and rigging.68 Serious irregularities required the
National Election Board to reschedule voting in parts of
SNNPR to 25 June, and the Somali region voted only on
31 August.69 Elections in Addis Ababa and other cities
were freer, and voters had options among candidates.70
2. The 2005 elections
The federal and regional elections of 15 May and 21 Au-
gust 2005 proved to be a historic watershed. The hitherto
submissive population turned into an enthusiastic elec-
torate in a moment of near revolutionary quality.71 For the
first time, citizens could choose between candidates from
a variety of competing camps. Unprecedented levels
of freedom of political expression and popular excitement
marked the campaign. State television and radio allowed
opposition parties to air their views. Well-publicised de-
bates, for example between Deputy Prime Minister Adissu
Legesse and Birhanu Nega, a leader of the opposition
Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD),72 electrified
65
Kjetil Tronvoll and Øyvind Aadland, “The Process of De-
mocratisation in Ethiopia – An Expression of Popular Participa-
tion or Political Resistance?”, Norwegian Institute of Human
Rights, 1995.
66
Patrick Gilkes, Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 25.
67
Terrence Lyons, “Closing the Transition: The May 1995
Elections in Ethiopia”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 34,
no. 1 (1996), pp. 121-142.
68
Kjetil Tronvoll, “Voting, Violence and Violations: Peasant
Voices on the Flawed Elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia”,
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 39, no. 4 (2001), pp.
697-716.
69
Siegfried Pausewang, Kjetil Tronvoll and Lovise Aalen (eds.),
Ethiopia since the Derg: a decade of democratic pretension
and performance (London, 2002).
70
The political climate in Addis Ababa is freer due to its more
cosmopolitan outlook and the presence of international organi-
sations, NGOs and diplomats.
71
Melakou Tegegn, Power Politics, op. cit., p. 298.
72
The CUD was also known by its Amharic acronym, Kinijit.
Page 8
the public. Many believed a “new era of democracy” had
dawned, and the EPRDF would leave office if it lost.73
The EPRDF’s decision to permit a more open process
was grounded in a belief that more competitive elections
would showcase democratic credentials for the donor
community and the erroneous assumption that rural vot-
ers would cast their ballot for the ruling party, because
they had benefited from its rural development policy or
out of fear. However, two major opposition coalitions
were able to capitalise on discontent with the regime. The
CUD, established shortly before the election,74 garnered
support despite internal rivalries and organisational
weaknesses. Chaired by Hailu Shawal, a former Derg
bureaucrat, it united a number of parties under its um-
brella.75 It fielded candidates nationwide but drew its
strength primarily from urban, educated and ethnic
Amhara constituencies.76
The opposition United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
(UEDF) pulled together five domestic77 and nine exiled
parties.78 Led by Addis Ababa University professors
Merera Gudina of the Oromo National Congress (ONC)
and Beyene Petros of the Ethiopian Social Democratic
Federal Party (ESDFP), it differed from the EPRDF in
style more than substance, as its domestic parts (but not
its more radical exile members, particularly the Ethiopian
Peoples’ Revolutionary Party) endorsed ethnic federalism
73
Crisis Group interviews, Addis Ababa, July 2008.
74
The CUD was formed about one year before the May 2005
elections. CUD was formed in October 2004 and recognised
by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) in Novem-
ber 2004.
75
These were the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), led by
Hailu Shawal; the United Ethiopia Democratic Party – Medhin
(UEDP-Medhin), led by Admassu Gebeyehu; the Ethiopian
Democratic League (EDL), led by Chekol Getahun and Rain-
bow Ethiopia: Movement for Democracy and Social Justice
led respectively by AEUP, UEDP-Medhin, EDL; and Rainbow
Ethiopia, led by Birhanu Nega. The AEUP and UEDP-Medhin
were the strongest components.
76
John Ishiyama, “Nominations and Party Development in Ethio-
pia: The Opposition and the 2005 Parliamentary Election”,
African and Asian Studies, vol. 6, no. 1-2 (2007), pp. 81-105.
77
Oromo National Congress, Ethiopian Social Democratic
Federal Party, Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Coali-
tion, All Amhara People’s Organization and Ethiopian Democ-
ratic Unity Party. The UEDF’s Amharic acronym was Hibret.
78
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, All-Ethiopia
Socialist Movement, Ethiopian Democratic Union-Tehadiso,
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party, Ethiopian National
United Front, Ethiopian People Federal Democratic Unity
Party, Gambella People’s United Democratic Front, Oromo
People’s Liberation Organization and Tigrayan Alliance for
Democracy.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
and state land ownership.79 Started in the U.S., it included
intellectuals and former Derg officials sympathetic to
Meison. Its member parties had their stronghold in SNNPR
and Oromiya. The Wollega-based Oromo Federalist
Democratic Movement (OFDM) participated as an in-
dependent opposition party, financially dependent largely
on its leader Bulcha Demeska, a former chairman of the
Awash International Bank.
The heated campaign brought out most issues, particu-
larly the land question, ethnic federalism and relations
with Eritrea. While the EPRDF defended state land
ownership, the CUD advocated private and communal
holdings,80 criticised the ruling party’s conception of
ethnic-based citizenship and demanded revocation of
Article 39 of the constitution81 and return to a more uni-
tary nation-state.82 The UEDF and OFDM supported
ethnic federalism and state land ownership in principle
but objected to their authoritarian implementation and
repeatedly challenged Meles’s Eritrea policy and endorse-
ment of the Algiers peace agreement.83
EPRDF officials portrayed CUD leaders as antiquated
nationalists who sought to reestablish Amhara dominance
over the country’s multiple ethnic groups. They likened
the CUD agenda to that of Rwanda’s Hutu extremists (the
Interahamwe) and described its candidates as neftegna,
the soldier-settlers who expropriated land from the south-
ern peasantry in imperial times. Nationalist politicians
responded with the charge that the EPRDF was breaking
the Ethiopian nation-state into ethnic groups as part of a
Machiavellian divide-and-rule strategy.
To the surprise of all, the combined opposition won 172
seats in the House of Peoples’ Representatives. While the
EPRDF and its affiliated parties took 372,84 the opposi-
tion’s gains shocked the ruling party to the core. It had
expected substantial losses in the cities but not the mas-
sive rural rejection. Farmers in Amhara region voted for
the CUD due to the expected defeat of the EPRDF and
79
Leonardo R. Arriola, “Ethnicity, Economic Conditions, and
Opposition Support: Evidence from Ethiopia's 2005 Elections”,
Northeast African Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2008), p. 136.
80
“Kinijit Manifest”", CUD, 2006 (unofficial translation).
81
Article 39 grants “every nation, nationality and people in
Ethiopia … an unconditional right to self-determination, includ-
ing the right to secession”.
82
Wolbert G. C. Smidt, “Parlamentswahlen in Äthiopien“,
Africa Spectrum, vol. 40, no. 2 (2005), p. 320.
83
Crisis Group Africa Report N°141, Beyond the Fragile Peace
between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War, 17 June 2008.
84
Former Ethiopian president Negaso Gidado was the only
independent candidate to win a mandate.
Page 9
arrival of a new ruler.85 The TPLF and its allies main-
tained their one-party rule only in Tigray and the periph-
eral regions. The larger regions and major towns were
fiercely contested, mainly between the EPRDF and CUD
in Amhara, while the UEDF was a third factor in SNNPR.86
In Oromiya region, competition between OPDO (an
EPRDF affiliate), the CUD, UEDF and OFDM offered
a genuine alternative.87
The CUD was particularly successful in more urban dis-
tricts with bigger land holdings and relatively poor com-
munities.88 In Addis Ababa, it achieved a landslide,
winning 137 of the city council’s 138 seats. It received
important financial backing from the diaspora, which
subsequently lobbied for a tougher U.S. stance towards
Ethiopia. Domestically, its backbone was the urban
middle class, mostly Amharas and Gurages, who felt
disenfranchised by the government’s economic and ethnic
policies.89 Many educated Amhara urbanites are nostal-
gic for Ethiopia’s past grandeur, and a significant part
of the Gurage mercantile class lost shares in the fertiliser
and agriculture sectors due to EPRDF empowerment of
farmer cooperatives. Excluded from the EPRDF’s patron-
age network, these two constituencies used the election
to protest. With its nationalist and Christian image, the
CUD gained few votes among Muslims and marginal-
ised lowland groups, such as the Somalis and Afar, who
voted for the EPRDF-affiliated SPDP and ANDP.
If the campaign suggested the dawn of a more democ-
ratic era, post-election events saw the return of winner-
take-all politics.90 Claiming large-scale rigging, the CUD
rejected the National Election Board results although it
had decisively won the Addis Ababa regional and federal
seats.91 The European Union (EU) election observation
mission criticised the government for irregularities dur-
ing the ballot counting and tabulation.92 Convinced they
85
René Lefort, “Powers – mengist – and peasants in rural
Ethiopia: the May 2005 elections”, Journal of Modern African
Studies, vol. 45, no. 2 (2007), pp. 253-273.
86
Leonardo R. Arriola, “Ethnicity”, op. cit., pp. 115-144.
87
In Oromiya and Southern regions, the CUD won most seats
in Gurage zone and Woleyta constituencies as well as those with
a significant Amhara population. UEDF support concentrated
in Oromiya and Hadiya and Kambatta areas of Southern region.
88
Leonardo R. Arriola, “Ethnicity”, op. cit., p. 134.
89
“Ethiopia: No contest”, Africa Confidential, vol. 36, no. 11
(1995), pp. 4-6; Axel Klein, The Horn of Turbulence: The State
of War and Peace in the Horn of Africa (London, 1998), p. 61.
90
For a detailed account see Jon Abbink, “Discomfiture of
democracy?”, op. cit., pp. 173-199.
91
The opposition contested results in 299 constituencies; the
National Election Board organised reruns in 31.
92
“Ethiopia Legislative Elections 2005: European Union
Election Observation Mission Final Report”, 2006. European
Parliament member Ana Gomez led the mission.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
had been cheated, CUD leaders called upon its sympa-
thisers to engage in civil disobedience.
Protests quickly degenerated into violence and a major
government crackdown. In the first incidents sparked by
student protests, special forces (Ag’azi) and federal police
shot dead between 30 and 50 protestors and arrested
about 350 in Addis Ababa on 8 June.93 CUD candidates
were split over whether to join parliament. While more
than 90 elected CUD candidates took up their seats, the
more hard-line faction tried to pressure the EPRDF by
stay-home strikes, boycotts and demonstrations. In the
beginning of November, security forces killed almost 200
civilians and arrested an estimated 30,000 opposition sup-
porters in Addis Ababa and other major towns.94 The next
month more than 70 CUD leaders, human rights activists
and journalists were imprisoned on treason charges.95
The CUD’s rejection of a more gradualist approach in
the post-election period was grounded in the assumption
that the election results were bogus and that large seg-
ments of the population expected regime change. Fearing
a colour revolution, the EPRDF viewed the opposition’s
civil disobedience strategy as a threat to its survival.
After a trial, the Supreme Court on 11 June 2007 sen-
tenced 38 senior opposition figures, including the CUD’s
leader, Hailu Shawal, its candidate for Addis Ababa
mayor, Berhanu Nega, and vice chairman, Birtukan
Mideksa, to life imprisonment for “outrage against the
constitution and treason”. They were freed a month later,
after a self-appointed “council of elders” (shimagele-
wotch) led by the retired, pro-government Harvard
scholar Ephraim Isaac mediated a pardon.96 In return,
they had to sign a statement taking responsibility for the
violence.97 The release was timed so the EPRDF could
project a benevolent image shortly before millennium
celebrations began in which it portrayed itself as the
motor of an “Ethiopian renaissance”. It also deflected
93
Other protests occurred in Awassa, Ambo and Bahir Dar.
Wolbert G. C. Smidt, “Parlamentswahlen”, op. cit., p. 327.
94
The number of casualties is contested. According to Wolde
Michael Meshesha, its vice chairman, the government-appointed
commission of inquiry established that 199 individuals, includ-
ing six security force members, died in the June and Novem-
ber 2005 incidents. It also reported concluded that security forces
had used excessive force. In a reversal of its initial findings,
the final report published by the commission in October 2006
blamed the demonstrators for the use of force.
95
Jon Abbink, “Discomfiture of democracy?”, op. cit., pp. 173-
199.
96
Orly Halpern, “In Ethiopia, elders dissolve a crisis the tra-
ditional way”, Christian Science Monitor, 9 August 2007
(online).
97
“Ethiopia Opposition Members Freed”, BBC News, 18 Au-
gust 2007.
Page 10
pressure from the U.S. Congress, which threatened to
adopt the “Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act
of 2007” that would have imposed sanctions on officials
involved in election violence, withheld assistance and
funded democratisation.98
3. Divisions within the opposition
The opposition’s electoral gains were the result more of
a protest against the government than active support for
its candidates. To a degree, opposition politicians’ popu-
larity depended more on their anti-government stance than
their policies.99 Internal divisions soon emerged in all
political groups about how to engage with political foes.
Torn between hawks and doves, diaspora and domestic
supporters, and with most of its leaders in prison, the
CUD gradually disintegrated. Lidetu Ayalew’s decision
to claim the parliamentary seats won by his Ethiopian
Democratic Unity Party (EDUP)-Medhin bloc was a
first blow that brought him criticism as a TPLF “mole”.100
In a sign of desperation, CUD diaspora representatives
participated in the establishment of the loose Alliance
for Freedom and Democracy (AFD) in May 2006, which
included the OLF and the ONLF, both diametrically
opposed to its nationalist agenda. Legal and personal
wrangling between factions over the right to register and
claim the Coalition for Unity and Democratic Party
(CUDP) lasted throughout 2007.101 The release of the
leaders from prison further accelerated the coalition’s
downfall. Hailu Shawal’s All Ethiopian Democratic
League (AEUP) supporters demanded uncompromising
positions towards the EPRDF and were bitterly disap-
pointed when their chiefs incriminated themselves in
return for freedom. Splits within the parliamentary CUD
aggravated the public rivalry between Hailu Shawal and
Birtukan Mideksa.
Most supporters consider Birtukan, a 34-year-old lawyer,
and the parliamentary group led by Temesken Zewdie
(“Temesken group”) as the inheritors of the CUD. As
the CUDP name and symbol was claimed by a compet-
ing faction, Birtukan registered a new party under the
name Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) in August
98
HR 2003, 110th Congress 1st Session, 3 October 2007.
99
Economic as well as ethnic considerations influenced Ethio-
pian voters. Leonardo R. Arriola, “The Ethiopian Voter: As-
sessing Economic and Ethnic Influences with Survey Data”,
International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (2007),
pp. 73-90.
100
In parliament, the Lidetu group later moved closer to the
EPRDF. Lidetu recently endorsed the EPRDF for the 2010
elections. “Ethiopia: Lidetu Says He Supports Meles Over the
Opposition”, Jimma Times, 12 July 2009.
101
“The Accidental Men!”, Addis Fortune, vol. 8, no. 378 (2007).
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
2008.102 It represents a continuity of the CUD in its pan-
Ethiopian agenda and has promised “a new spirit and
greater determination”.103 It is less Amhara dominated
than Hailu Shawal’s AEUP and draws support from the
EDL and Rainbow Ethiopia’s Gurage and Amharised
Oromo base. It was joined by the former head of the
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Professor
Mesfin Wolde Mariam.
The UEDF of Beyene Petros and Merera Gudina also
faced the dilemma whether to join parliament and legiti-
mise a flawed election or to boycott and miss the chance
of exerting influence from within the political system.104
Its domestic parties were more inclined to compromise
than its diaspora members.105 Eventually, the domestic
branch and the OFDM signed a cooperation agreement
with the EPRDF in May 2006 and took up their seats.106
Even though it had joined the EPRDF-dominated par-
liament, UEDF and the other “legal” opposition parties
soon discovered that the ruling party was unwilling to
compromise. Dialogue over a new law regulating the
activities of the National Election Board ended in mid-
2007.107 Since then there has been no official consulta-
tion between the EPRDF and the parliamentary opposi-
tion caucus.108
At first the EPRDF absorbed the 2005 election shock by
detaining and intimidating opposition leaders and fol-
lowers and exploiting rivalries inside the opposition
parties. Worried at the prospect of being publicly chal-
lenged by its opponents, it revised the rules of the House
of Peoples’ Representatives, introducing a 51 per cent
requirement for any bill to be debated. This turned an
already docile legislature into a moribund institution. It
also attempted to broaden its base by recruiting new
102
The new party’s Amharic name is Andinet. The National
Election Board on 11 January 2008 awarded the CUDP party
registration to Ayele Chamisso, leader of the weaker CUD
parliamentary faction.
103
UDJ press release, 25 September 2008, at www.andinetusa.org/
unity-for-democracy-and-justice-press-release.
104
ONC head Merera Gudina was challenged by Tolossa
Tesfaye, who appropriated the party name and leadership in a
move recognised by the National Election Board in November
2005. For legal reasons Merera had to reregister his party
under the name Oromo People’s Congress (OPC) in 2007.
105
John Ishiyama, “Nominations and Party Development in Ethio-
pia: The Opposition and the 2005 Parliamentary Election”, Afri-
can and Asian Studies, vol. 6, nos. 1 & 2 (2007), pp. 102-103.
106
Lahra Smith, “Political Violence and Democratic Uncer-
tainty in Ethiopia”, U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2007, p. 8.
107
The opposition demanded a permanent voters list and more
transparent recruitment of local National Election Board officials.
108
Crisis Group interview, opposition leader, Addis Ababa, 1
August 2008.
Page 11
members in advance of the 2010 federal and regional
elections.
The EPRDF was by the mid-1990s already the only party
with a nationwide presence, an identifiable program and
consistent training of its officials.109 Drawing on the
TPLF’s organisational experience, it has a well-run and
funded political machine. Before 2001, it was mostly
perceived as a tool of the TPLF and had little grassroots
support outside of Tigray, but in September 2008, it
announced that it had 4.5 million members, compared
to 600,000 three years earlier. Its strategists had finally
understood that the party needed to widen its constitu-
ency in order to lure more educated and urban people
from the opposition.110 The mass recruitment was aided
by reminders that membership was a precondition for a
career in the public sector and easily obtaining gov-
ernment services.111
This membership expansion was also a belated response
to dynamics within the TPLF. In recent years an increas-
ing number of Tigrayans inside and outside that move-
ment have distanced themselves from Meles’s progres-
sively more personalised rule. The March 2001 split in
the TPLF central committee produced a power shift from
Tigray’s capital Mekelle to Addis Ababa and from the
central committee to the prime minister.112 Disagree-
ments over a U.S.-Rwandan proposal to resolve the bor-
der hostilities with Eritrea had preceded the 2001 purges
of senior TPLF politicians. Siye Abraha, defence minis-
ter, and Bitaw Belay, the head of regional affairs, were
imprisoned on corruption charges, while Gebru Asrat, then
Tigray regional president, and the TPLF vice chairman,
Tewolde Wolde Mariam, were sacked.113
Nominations to the central committee in October 2003
caused further discontent among the older guard, which
criticised the preference given to loyalists of Meles and
his wife, Azeb Mesfin.114 In 2006, Sabhat Nega, the long-
time grey eminence of the TPLF and one of Meles’s
closest advisers, was demoted from the executive to the
central committee, a move interpreted by some as a
109
Terrence Lyons, “Closing the Transition”, op. cit., p. 139.
110
Tamrat G. Giorgis, “Status Quo Maintained!”, Addis For-
tune, 21 September 2008.
111
Crisis Group interviews, Addis Ababa and Nazreth, July 2008.
112
Medhane Tadesse and John Young, “TPLF: Reform or
Decline?”, Review of African Political Economy, vol. 30, no. 97
(2003), p. 389.
113
A dozen TPLF central committee members opposed Meles in
March 2001. The others were Abay Tsehaye, Alemseged Ge-
breamlak, Aregash Adane, Awelom Woldu, Gebremeskel Hailu,
Hasen Shifa, Solomon Tesfay and Abreha Kahsay. Abay Tse-
haye and Hasan Shifa later changed their allegiance to Meles.
114
“Ethiopia: Unhappy TPLF members”, Indian Ocean
Newsletter, 1 November 2003.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
partial fallout between the two. Sabhat Nega had been
Meles’s mentor and the person who secured him a major-
ity in the TPLF central committee in March 2001. By
mid-2007, there were tensions between Meles and For-
eign Minister Seyoum Mesfin and Sabhat Nega and Am-
hara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) leaders
Bereket Simon and Tefera Walwa.115 The first group
supported a rapprochement with opposition parliamen-
tarians;116 the second opposed the release from prison of
the CUD leaders.
4. The 2008 local elections
Unlike 2005, the 13 and 20 April 2008 local and by-
elections caused little stir in the public and media.117
More than three million seats in the country’s woreda
and kebelle councils were at stake. While the CUD was
absorbed by internal and legal squabbles, the UEDF and
OFDO withdrew after their candidates faced severe
registration problems.118 Opposition parties’ lack of a
broad organisational base put them at a disadvantage with
the EPRDF in fielding candidates nationwide, and the
EPRDF won all but one of the available House of Rep-
resentatives seats and an overwhelming majority at lower
levels.119
In view of the strong opposition showing in 2005, the
results were puzzling. For instance, in a dramatic rever-
sal of the previous CUD victory, the EPRDF won all but
one seat in the Addis Ababa city council and all 2,970
seats at the capital’s district and sub-city administrative
level.120 While the EPRDF attributed this to the success
of its policies, analysts believe the elections were heav-
ily manipulated.121 Voters’ disappointment with the op-
115
Seyoum Mesfin and Abbay Tseheay are the only founding
TPLF members still active in the central committee.
116
A move advocated by the then U.S. chargé d’affaires Vicky
Huddleston. See, for example: “Ethiopian parliament votes to
lift immunity from prosecution”, Associated Press, 11 October
2005.
117
By-elections were held to fill the federal and regional par-
liamentary seats the opposition had refused to take up in 2005.
118
“Ethiopia: Holding Elections after Post-election Trauma”,
Horn of Africa Bulletin, vol. 20, no. 5 (2008), p. 1. The OPC
claimed that 700 of its members were detained in the run-up to
elections. “Ethiopia: Repression Sets Stage for Non-Competitive
Elections”, press release, Human Rights Watch, 9 April 2008.
119
Lovise Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll, “The 2008 Ethiopian
local elections: The return of electoral authoritarianism”, Af-
rican Affairs, vol. 108, no. 430 (2009), pp. 111-120.
120
“Work report for the year 2008 presented to the House of
Peoples' Representatives”, National Election Board, 2008.
121
Crisis Group interview, Ethiopian analyst, Addis Ababa,
8 May 2008.
Page 12
position and fear of losing access to government services
are other possible explanations.122
No independent election observation was permitted,
which a senior official explained as due to the fact that
these were “only” local elections.123 According to some
observers, if people voted for the EPRDF, it was because
they had understood the danger of openly rejecting the
government.124 Many had lost belief in the democratic
process, considering elections merely a ritual.125
5. Preparing for 2010
Parties are now preparing for the June 2010 federal and
regional elections. While the opposition seeks a common
front against the EPRDF, the latter wants to exploit divi-
sions between the UDJ and Amhara nationalist bloc and
the more federalist Oromo bloc.
Attempts to establish a more unified opposition began
in earnest in June 2008, with creation of the Forum for
Democratic Dialogue (FDD).126 Its major objective is to
elaborate joint positions ahead of 2010 in order to avoid
renewed divisions.127 It is supported by ex-President Ne-
gaso Gidado and veteran TPLF military commander and
former Defence Minister Siye Abraha. After the UDJ
joined, the FDD has become the most important multi-
ethnic opposition platform.
The EPRDF, on the other hand, needs to avoid a repeti-
tion of the 2005 violence, as well as further negative
public relations. While his TPLF power base remains
intact, Meles’s Tigrayan support is narrowing, and he
increasingly relies on the ANDM, OPDO and SEPDF to
govern.128 Since 2001, the EPRDF has strengthened its
national outlook and de-emphasised its regional and
ethno-national identity. However, a small group of Me-
les loyalists decides all major policies, crucially includ-
122
“Holding Elections after Post-election Trauma”, op. cit., p. 3.
123
Crisis Group interview, Ethiopian diplomat, Addis Ababa,
9 July 2008.
124
Crisis Group interview, Ethiopian intellectual, Addis Ababa,
29 July 2008.
125
Crisis Group interview, government official, Addis Ababa,
12 July 2008.
126
Statement by the FDDE, Addis Ababa, 24 June 2008. The
party’s name is Medrek in Amharic.
127
Founding members are the UEDF, the OFDM, the Somali
Democratic Alliance Forces (SDAF) and the Arena Tigray for
Democracy and Sovereignty (Arena), a regional party estab-
lished by a former regional president, Gebru Asrat. It claimed
3,000 members in Tigray in June 2007. “Former TPLF members
to establish new party”, Addis Fortune, 25 June 2007.
128
This is reflected in the management of the EPRDF office,
run by TPLF cadres before 2001 and now by officials from
all four coalition parties.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
ing the degree of democratisation.129 The prime minister
has publicly and privately hinted that he has considered
stepping down after 2010,130 but EPRDF leaders fear a
successor would be unable to hold the party together. At
the seventh party congress, in September 2008 in Awassa,
Meles was re-elected, and no official hint was given
about a possible successor in 2010, as the vast majority
of the 36-member executive committee was similarly
re-elected.131
Important questions concerning the elections are open,
relating not only to political strategy but also to larger
issues, such as the economy and relations with Eritrea.
It is uncertain to what degree the government will allow
a freer and fairer electoral process. The EPRDF is aware
that the 2010 vote will attract considerable international
attention. It faces the tricky challenge of making the
elections seem fair while ensuring that opposition gains
are minimal. To do so, it probably will need to maintain
its strong grip at the kebelle level in order to prevent mass
protests that could become uncontrollable.
Concomitantly, it is likely to continue making opposition
members’ lives difficult.132 As UDJ leader Birtukan
Mideksa found out on 29 December 2008, the presiden-
tial pardon that released opposition leaders from prison
in July 2007 can be revoked anytime. After telling UDJ
members in Sweden that her prison release was part of
a political deal, she was arrested upon her return to
Ethiopia and her sentence was reinstated. This was a stark
reminder to other opposition leaders and, if it remains in
effect through the elections, will neutralise an important
figure.133 In end of April 2009, the authorities arrested
35 persons and charged them with conspiring to over-
throw the government on behalf of Berhanu Nega’s un-
129
Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Addis Ababa,
29 July 2008.
130
“Stuck in Somalia”, Newsweek, 10 April 2008.
131
Tamrat G. Giorgis, “Status Quo Maintained!”, Addis Fortune,
21 September 2008.
132
OFDM Secretary General Bekele Jirata was arrested on 30
October 2008 for alleged OLF links. In February 2009, the UDJ
complained that several of its members had been arrested and
its regional branches closed. According to its chairman, Bul-
cha Demeska, the OFDM has had to close 33 of its 35 offices
since 2005 due to government harassment. “Ethiopian oppo-
sition cries foul in election run-up”, Agence France-Presse,
26 February 2009; “Bulcha: Government cut off and edited a
rare opposition airtime on ETV”, Jimma Times, 7 June 2009.
133
Birtukan ignored a government ultimatum to state that she
was released in response to her request for a pardon. Michael
Chebsi, “Ethiopia: Political Space Narrowing”, Inter Press
Service, 12 January 2009. Although a relatively inexperienced
politician, her rearrest has made her a symbol of resistance
for supporters in Ethiopia and abroad.
Page 13
registered party, Ginbot 7.134 Among them were active
and former army officers, including General Tefferra
Mamo, as well as Melaku Tefera, a UDJ politician.135
By June, 46 alleged Ginbot 7 supporters were charged
with conspiracy to assassinate public officials and over-
throw the government.136
In July, the parliament adopted a draconian anti-terrorism
bill with a broad definition of terrorist activity that gives
security forces extensive powers. Opposition politicians
and human rights observers fear the new legislation will
intimidate opponents and the press in the run-up to the
2010 elections.137
It is by no means certain that the FDD can overcome
personal rivalries and policy differences138. By August
2008, it had established a rotating chair and prepared a
series of internal debates on its campaign strategy. On
the agenda were policy toward the ruling party, individ-
ual versus group rights, democratisation, national secu-
rity and land ownership. Although wary of the chauvin-
ist tendencies of some within the CUD, the UEDF agreed
to join with Birtukan Mideksa’s UDJ.139 Other parties
might also join if the FDD can keep a middle ground
between ethnic aspirations as well as forces desiring more
and less centralisation. For the time being, however, the
FDD is a consortium united more by antipathy to the
EPRDF than joint positions.140 Further reshuffling among
134
Ginbot 7 Movement for Justice, Freedom and Democracy,
established in May 2008, has absorbed CUD’s most radical
diaspora members. Its leaders have called for armed struggle
against the EPRDF. Ginbot 7 stands for 15 May, the 2005
election date.
135
Two relatives of Ginbot 7 leaders Berhanu Nega and An-
dargatachew Tsige were among the arrested. “Kin of exiled
opposition leaders charged in coup plot”, Voice of America
(VOA), 27 April 2009.
136
32 are in custody, twelve in exile, including party leader
Berhanu Nega. The whereabouts of two are unknown. “Ethiopia
charges 46 in plot to topple government”, VOA, 4 June 2009.
Thirteen of them were convicted in absentia for plotting to
overthrow the government. Cf. “Ethiopia convicts 13 in absentia
over coup plot”, Reuters, 7 August 2009.
137
“An Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Law”,
Human Rights Watch, 30 June 2009.
138
One of its components, the UDJ, is in turmoil over accusa-
tions of mismanagement by its senior leadership from 21 mem-
bers of its standing committee. Cf. “Ethiopia’s biggest oppo-
sition party in turmoil”, Sudan Tribune, 22 July 2009.
139
Crisis Group interview, opposition leader, Addis Ababa, 1
August 2008.
140
The FDD manifesto will reportedly demand more auton-
omy for regions, removal of the constitution’s Article 39,
recognition of Oromiffa as an official language and an end to
exclusively government-controlled land tenure. It reportedly
will also call for regaining Assab port. “Historic Opposition
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 14

the opposition parties can also be expected. In January vice-chairman and trade and industry minister;146 Arkebe
2009, Merera Gudina’s OPC left the UEDF and estab- Ugbay, TPLF executive committee member; and a range
lished the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), a coalition of senior EPRDF officials.147 What remains uncertain is
with Bulcha Demeska’s OFDM.141 whether the torch will be passed to a member of the
younger generation and whether a non-Tigrayan will be
The 2005 elections were shaped by Amhara and nation- trusted with the position of prime minister.148 The suc-
alist discontent with the “loss” of Eritrea, ethnic feder- cession debate is closely linked to fears the coalition may
alism and EPRDF authoritarianism. Confronted by the split.149 Aware of their increased importance within the
CUD, the ANDM was particularly impotent in respond- EPRDF, the OPDO and SEPDF are resisting TPLF inter-
ing to these grievances. The EPRDF might reach out, ference in their regional states.
therefore, to moderate Oromo nationalists, including
elements of the OLF, to counter-balance demands for a
more unitary nation-state. The nationalist fervour of
some former CUD politicians also poses a problem for
the non-Amhara opposition, including the Oromos. Irri-
tated by the diaspora’s overtly reactionary discourse, they
concluded that the former CUD mistook dissatisfaction
with the government for a desire to resurrect a highly
centralised nation-state under Amhara rule.142 Strongly
unitarian parties like Hailu Shawal’s AEUP and Ginbot
7 are unlikely to win support from pro-federalist, anti-
government voters.

Who succeeds Meles will be critical to the survival of the

regime and the country’s stability. He has tried to step
down as prime minister for some time but has been
pressured by his party to stay. He has said he is willing
to remain the EPRDF chairman,143 but it is unclear
whether the party will agree to divide leadership of
party and state.144 Most probably the September 2009
EPRDF congress will ask Meles to stay on through the
2010 elections.

There is considerable speculation about who will even-

tually replace Meles, however. The ANDM chairman
and deputy prime minister, Adissu Legesse, was thought
to be a candidate until he was surprisingly removed as
agriculture and rural development minister on 30 Octo-
ber 2008.145 Other hopefuls are Girma Birru, OPDO

alliance ‘Medrek’ to finalise manifesto in Ethiopia”, Jimma

Times, 28 June 2009.
141
“OPC and OFDM merge into the Oromo Federalist Con-
gress (OFC)”, Gadaa.com, 17 January 2009. This was partly
in reaction to accusations that OPC harbours OLF members
and sympathisers.
142
Crisis Group interview, Oromo intellectual, Addis Ababa,
25 July 2008.
143
“Ethiopian PM Plans to Quit in 2010,” Pan African News
Agency, 13 February 2009.
144
This scenario has reminded analysts of the arrangement
between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minis-
ter Vladimir Putin. While there would be a new prime minis-
ter, Meles Zenawi would still wield considerable influence.
145
“Ethiopia’s Prime Minister reshuffles cabinet”, Sudan
Tribune, 1 November 2008.
146
Document in possession of Crisis Group, 2 October 2008.
147
“A Change is Going to Come”, Africa Confidential, 15 May
2009. Meles’s successor will likely have a less lenient attitude
toward Eritrea. It was Meles who opposed the capture of
Asmara in 2000, when other leading EPRDF and TPLF figures
were ready to go all the way.
148
Meles Zenawi has stated his preference for the old guard
of TPLF leaders to step down.
149
Crisis Group email correspondence, Ethiopia analyst, 8 May
2008.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
IV. CONTROLLING STATE AND PEOPLE
While the elections attract international attention, every-
day politics under the EPRDF are often ignored. They are
marked by top-down policymaking. Popular participation
is restricted, decisions are monopolised by the de facto
one-party state, and there is little local room for deviat-
ing from federally fixed policy priorities.
However, the EPRDF’s authority is neither complete nor
uniform. There are three distinct political spaces, in the
capital, rural areas and periphery. Addis Ababa enjoys
the most political pluralism and individual liberty.
Concentration of an educated middle class and foreign
presence helps explain the city administration’s greater
accountability and scope for dissent. In rural areas in
Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya and southern regions, inter-
actions between farmers and government are strongly
shaped by the kebelles and state-led rural development
programs. Dependent on access to government land,
peasants can rarely challenge decisions. Government
control is weakest in peripheral regions, but so is service
delivery, including security.150
A. CENTRAL PARTY, DECENTRALISED STATE
Constitutionally, Ethiopia is a federal polity, but its fed-
eral entities are controlled by the strongly centralised
EPRDF that predetermines decisions from the prime
minister’s palace in the capital to remote rural kebelles.
A dual dynamic is at work: a more visible, formally de-
centralised state structure and a more discreet but effec-
tive capture of the state by the EPRDF and its affiliated
regional parties.151 In spite of formal policy and rhetoric,
Ethiopia has only nominally devolved decision-making
150
Armed conflict is common in the western and south-eastern
lowlands.
151
Crisis Group interview, Ethiopian academic, Addis Ababa,
15 July 2008. See also Lovise Aalen, “Ethnic Federalism and
Self-Determination for Nationalities in a Semi-Authoritarian
State: the Case of Ethiopia”, International Journal on Minor-
ity and Group Rights, vol. 13, no. 2-3 (2006), pp. 243-261;
Jon Abbink, “Breaking and making the state: The dynamics of
ethnic democracy in Ethiopia”, Journal of Contemporary Af-
rican Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (1995), pp. 149-163; Alem Habtu,
“Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian
Federation”, Dialectical Anthropology, vol. 28, no. 2 (2004),
pp. 91-123; Edmond J. Keller, “Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal
Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia”, African
Journal of Political Science, vol. 7, no. 1 (2002), pp. 21-50;
Paulos Chanie, “Clientelism and Ethiopia’s post-1991 decen-
tralisation”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 45, no. 3
(2007), pp. 355-384; Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, op. cit.,
pp. 134-139.
Page 15
power to local levels. All important political decisions
must be taken at the centre or be in line with central
policies.152 The EPRDF relies on total control of the
state bureaucracy, not only because it wants to cling to
power, but because public resources are the main patron-
age it can provide to its followers. A well-organised party
network extends from the federal to the regional, from
the regional to the woreda, and from the woreda to the
kebelle and sub-kebelle levels.153
1. The national level
Given the strong link between the state and EPRDF
parties, it is no surprise Meles is at once prime minister
and chairman of both the TPLF and EPRDF. Power is
concentrated and most strategic decisions are taken in
the EPRDF executive committee and the prime minister’s
office.154 Meles is surrounded by a small group of old
TPLF confidantes.155 This inner circle consists of com-
panions from the armed struggle era, such as Foreign
Minister Seyoum Mesfin and the adviser for security
affairs and public organisation, Abay Tsehaye.156 The
advisers for national security affairs (Mulugeta Alem-
seged), military affairs (Berhane Negash) and legal af-
fairs (Fasil Nahum) are also members. Other influential
TPLF leaders include Meles’s wife, Azeb Mesfin; the
ambassador to Belgium, Berhane Gebre Kristos; economic
adviser Newaye Kristos Gebreab; and the Tigray regional
president, Tsegay Berhe. While critics claim the TPLF
152
John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia”, Review
of African Political Economy, vol. 23, no. 70 (1996), p. 539.
Keller asserts that Ethiopia “operates very much like a cen-
tralised, unitary state, with most power residing at the centre”,
in “Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia”, op.
cit., p. 129; also Jon Abbink, “Breaking and making the state”,
op. cit., p. 177; Lovise Aalen, “Ethnic Federalism in a Domi-
nant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000”, Chr.
Michelsen Institute, 2002, p. 85.
153
Relations between party officials are characterised by up-
ward accountability and patron-client dynamics. Higher offi-
cials promote lower ones to government posts that offer regu-
lar income and privileges, eg, access to food aid, fertilizer and
scholarships. Appointees owe allegiance to patrons. Employ-
ment in the public sector or selection for state-sponsored educa-
tion requires being a member or close to the party. Crisis Group
interview, researcher, Nazreth, 19 July 2008.
154
The current EPRDF executive committee consists of the
prime minister, the deputy prime minister, seven key federal
ministers, two state ministers, two special advisers to the prime
minister, the presidents and vice-presidents of Amhara, Oromiya,
Southern and Tigray regions, the mayor and general secretary
of the Addis Ababa city government and five regional bureau
heads.
155
Patrick Gilkes, Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 39; Medhane Tadesse
and John Young, “TPLF”, op. cit., p. 402.
156
The pre-1991 guerrilla times cadres clearly dominate the
other executive committee members in the TPLF politburo.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
leadership is dominated by the “Adwa faction”, the
birthplace of Meles and Sabhat Nega, this is not so,157
although leading figures close to Meles are connected
by family ties.158
Despite the federal government’s multi-ethnic composi-
tion, TPLF officers occupy the highest levels of all min-
istries. The party’s dominance is particularly evident in
the armed forces and the National Intelligence and Secu-
rity Office.159 Most senior military commanders were
former TPLF fighters.160 This remained so when, in
September 2008, Meles promoted a dozen senior mili-
tary officials to lieutenant, brigadier and major general.
Eight of those promoted are Tigrayans, as is the chief
of staff, General Samora Yunis.161 The troops stationed
across the country are thus another means by which the
TPLF exerts control over regional and local constituen-
cies.162 The federal security agenda overrides local insti-
tutions, and in unstable and politically sensitive areas,
military commanders, federal police and security organs
operate largely independently of local authorities. For
example, in Oromiya Tigrayan security and intelligence
personnel are felt to operate like a “state within a state”.163
2. The regional level
The EPRDF’s ability to influence local decisions stems
from its involvement in the establishment of the regional
parties. The core regions of Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya
and SNNPR are firmly held by the TPLF-dominated
coalition. ANDM, OPDO and SEPDF leaders have built
their careers on personal links with TPLF/EPRDF men-
157
This reproach dates back to the TPLF’s 1977/1979 regional
rivalries. Another criticism popular with Ethiopian nationalists
is that leading TPLF figures such as Tewodros Hagos, TPLF
head of propaganda, Meles and others are half-Eritrean.
158
Meles’s wife, Azeb Mesfin, acts as an eminence grise in the
TPLF/EPRDF and chairs the House of People’s Representa-
tives’ Social Affairs Committee. Former Addis Ababa mayor
and TPLF executive committee member Arkebe Uqbay is mar-
ried to the sister of Berhane Gebre Kristos. Sabhat Nega’s
sister, Kidusan, is the mayor of the Tigray regional capital,
Mekelle, and the husband of the Tigray regional president,
Tsegay Berhe. Intermarriages among TPLF leaders continue
the feudal practice of Tigray marriage alliances and also re-
flect the limited choices available during the armed struggle.
Medhane Tadesse and John Young, “TPLF”, op. cit., p. 397.
159
“The Tigrayans still sew up the key posts”, Indian Ocean
Newsletter, 7 July 2006.
160
Patrick Gilkes, Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 39.
161
“Tigrayans at the army top”, Indian Ocean Newsletter,
3 September 2008.
162
Even after the post-war demobilisation of parts of the ground
forces, the ENDF probably has around 220,000 to 250,000
soldiers, plus a reserve of some 350,000. Document from 2007
in possession of Crisis Group.
163
Crisis Group interview, researcher, Shashemene, 21 July 2008.
Page 16
tors. The federal government influences regional gov-
ernments through this channel, assuring broadly uniform
policy and law.164
Disloyal regional politicians are unable to stay in power.165
Regional EPRDF officials are regularly removed or
disciplined by federal politicians.166 For example, fol-
lowing the TPLF split in March 2001, half of the OPDO
central committee was expelled or defected to the OLF
because of association with the weaker TPLF faction
that Meles ousted.167 The same happened in SNNRP,
where the regional president, Abate Kisho, was replaced
by Haile Mariam Desalegn, who the reformed TPLF
leadership considered more trustworthy.168 Scores of
senior officials in Somali have been removed in the past
decade after falling out of favour with powerful federal
EPRDF officials.169
The peripheral Afar, Somali, Gambella and Benishangul-
Gumuz regions are governed by parties with even
stronger EPRDF links.170 The Afar Peoples’ Democratic
Organisation (APDO) includes fragments of other Afar
parties but was initially created in Tigray as the Afar
Democratic Union. EPRDF officials engineered creation
of the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) in
1998.171 Several hundred members of the Gambella
People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM) received TPLF
military and political training in 1989.172 EPRDF officials
also oversaw establishment of the Benshangul-Gumuz
Democratic Unity Front (BGDUF) in 1996, schooled its
leaders and encouraged them to copy ANDM’s political
program.173 The affiliated regional parties have little
164
Assefa Fiseha, Federalism, op. cit., p. 391. Regional party
members regularly attend training in EPRDF party schools.
Since the creation of the Ethiopian Civil Service College in
1995, thousands of civil servants have been trained not only
in public administration, but also in EPRDF principles of
federalism, democracy and development, www.ecsc.edu.et.
165
Paulos Chanie, “Clientelism”, op. cit., p. 366.
166
Crisis Group electronic correspondence, Ethiopia analyst,
January 2009.
167
“Ethiopia: October evolution”, Africa Confidential, vol. 42,
no. 3-4 (2001).
168
Alemseged Abbay, “Diversity and state-building in Ethio-
pia”, African Affairs, vol. 103, no. 413 (2004), p. 610.
169
Tobias Hagmann, “Beyond clannishness and colonialism:
understanding political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region,
1991-2004”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 43, no. 4
(2005), pp. 509-536.
170
The same applies for the Harari National League.
171
Abdi Ismail Samatar, “Ethiopian federalism: autonomy ver-
sus control in the Somali region”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 25,
no. 6 (2004), pp. 1131-1154.
172
John Young, “Along Ethiopia's Western Frontier: Gam-
bella and Benishangul in Transition”, Journal of Modern Af-
rican Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 (1999), p. 326.
173
Paulos Chanie, “Clientelism”, op. cit., p. 364.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
option other than working “hand-in-hand with EPRDF”
on whose financial goodwill their region depends.174
Given inferior organisational capacities and frequent
internal problems, periphery ruling parties were never
offered full membership in the EPRDF coalition.175
The federal government uses various mechanisms to
influence or manipulate policy in the regional states.176
Policymaking descends from the TPLF and EPRDF ex-
ecutive committees via the EPRDF’s affiliated parties to
local government. Executives and members of the regional
councils are expected to conform to decisions taken at
the federal level.177 In many cases regional states simply
copy federal policies, including, in the case of Somali,
the constitution.178 The federal five-year development
programs are also replicated.179 Government reforms
such as the recent creation of super-ministries, the re-
naming of certain bureaus and the reduction of the cabi-
net’s size are usually first implemented at federal and a
little later at regional level.180
The fiscal system further concentrates power in the
federal government, which controlled over 80 per cent
of revenue and more than 60 per cent of expenditure
between fiscal years 1994/1995 and 1999/2000. The
regions and districts thus depend heavily on federal
budget transfers.181
In 2003, the parliament adopted a bill permitting the
federal government to intervene militarily in the regions
and temporarily suspend regional administrations in cases
of insecurity, human rights violations or danger to the
constitutional order.182 The bill mostly serves as a re-
minder to the regions and the Addis Ababa city admini-
stration to keep politics in line with federal priorities.
Local bureaucrats have little room to deviate from region-
ally fixed agendas because they depend on the support
of higher echelon party members.
Senior TPLF/EPRDF officials also intervene in the re-
gions. Before 2001, the Regional Affairs Bureau in the
174
“Political parties reaffirmed support for EPRDF, pledge to
strengthen cooperation”, EPRDF, 16 September 2008.
175
Alem Habtu, “Ethnic Pluralism”, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
176
John Young, “Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia”,
op. cit., pp. 196-197.
177
Edmond J Keller, “Ethnic Federalism”, op. cit., pp. 21-50.
178
Many regional constitutions, proclamations and party pro-
grams are broadly identical with the federal ones.
179
Assefa Fiseha, Federalism, op. cit., p. 395.
180
Crisis Group interview, former government official, Addis
Ababa, 23 July 2008.
181
Paulos Chanie, “Clientelism”, op. cit., p. 369.
182
“System for the Intervention of the Federal Government in
the Regions Proclamation No. 359/2003”, Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, 2003.
Page 17
prime minister’s office dispatched “technical advisers”
to the regional capitals, who exerted strong influence,
at times assuming the role of kingmaker in nominations
and dismissals. Prominent examples included Bitew
Belay’s and Solomon Tesfaye’s interventions in SNNRP
and Oromiya and Abay Tsehaye’s role in Somali.183 In
Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz, EPRDF advisers
participated in regional council meetings.184 With the
adoption of the tehadso (renewal agenda) in the wake
of the TPLF split in 2001 and protests by regional gov-
ernments, the Regional Affairs Bureau temporarily with-
drew its advisers.185 However, senior TPLF members
close to the prime minister still monitor and intervene
in regional politics, particularly in the administratively
weaker and politically more sensitive border regions.
TPLF/EPRDF officials of the federal affairs ministry,
successor of the Regional Affairs Bureau, are a second
administrative layer on whose approval regional officials
are strongly dependent.186
The domination of the federal state by the EPRDF party
network severely undermines democratic institutions.
Both supporters and opponents of ethnic federalism
recognise that centralised party rule and federal interven-
tions in the regions undermine local self-government.
State institutions and the party system are systematically
intertwined. This builds upon a long tradition. The
Amharic term mengist expresses the conflation between
representatives of the local government, the political
party and the state.187 The EPRDF’s local government
officials lack popular support precisely because they were
selected by the party rather than elected by the people.
Across the country and at all administrative levels rep-
resentatives are designated by top-down nominations and
then submitted to popular “confirmation” in the absence
of a formal vote or in non-competitive elections.188
Regional dignitaries at times act more like representatives
of the federal government and the EPRDF than advocates
183
Lovise Aalen, “Ethnic Federalism”, op. cit., p. 126.
184
John Young, “Along Ethiopia’s Western Frontier”, op. cit.,
p. 343.
185
Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, Culture of Power, op.
cit., p. 134.
186
The federal affairs ministry is in charge of relations with
regional states and plays an important role in the Addis Ababa
and Dire Dawa city administrations. Besides decentralisation,
pastoral policy, and conflict resolution, it hosts the federal po-
lice and oversees security in the peripheral states.
187
René Lefort, “Powers”, op. cit., p. 256.
188
Ibid, pp. 257-258. Similar observations were made in
Oromiya. Despite the election of a kebelle legislative body in
the April 2008, the seven-member kebelle council was pre-
selected by the district authorities. Crisis Group interviews,
July 2008.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
of local constituencies.189 Opposition politicians charge
that the regional states are “run by handpicked officials,
many of them corrupt”.190 While disciplined TPLF offi-
cials draw on strong popular support in their native Ti-
gray, the EPRDF affiliate parties lack credibility and are
unable to build a strong base.191 This holds true for OPDO,
SEPDF and SPDP officials, who are described as un-
educated, opportunistic TPLF clients.192 That bureau-
crats are regularly deposed after internal party evalua-
tions shows their dependence on the ruling party. In these
gim gema (self-evaluation) sessions party loyalty and
interests weigh stronger than a popular endorsement.193
3. The local level
The EPRDF’s most effective instrument of local coercion
is the kebelle structure. It revitalised these peasant asso-
ciations inherited from the Derg period for development
and governance aims. Officially conceived to enhance
local participation and decision-making, the kebelle ap-
paratus allows the ruling party to monitor and control
local communities. For ordinary Ethiopians, kebelle of-
ficials and party cadres personify the state in their every-
day life. Rural inhabitants’ welfare depends considerably
on good relations with kebelle officials, who oversee
services.194 Higher-ups in the EPRDF select these offi-
cials before they are submitted to popular approval.195
In daily operations, kebelle administrators are aided by
model farmers known as “cadres”, militia known as ta-
189
John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia”, op. cit.,
p. 539.
190
Crisis Group interview, opposition politician, Addis Ababa,
1 August 2008.
191
Patrick Gilkes, Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 38.
192
Crisis Group interviews, July 2008. In recent years the EPRDF
has sought to improve the education of its cadres and local
officials at kebelle and woreda levels.
193
Such sessions were first used by the TPLF to improve in-
surgency tactics and bring the peasantry and TPLF cadres in
the liberated areas together. John Young, Peasant Revolution
in Ethiopia, op. cit., pp. 42, 143. The TPLF used gim gema as
a management tool, which was adopted by EPRDF and af-
filiated parties at all administrative levels and in all public
sectors, including the military. It is used to evaluate “collective
entities, individuals and programmes through debate in open
forums”. John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia”, op.
cit., p. 540. Over the years, these evaluation sessions have
become politicised, often manipulated and pre-orchestrated
and a means for disciplining party officials, who can be intimi-
dated, dismissed or demoted on even unfounded allegations.
194
They act as gatekeepers to a wide array of government
services, as they are tasked with distributing land, food aid,
agricultural inputs, registering residents, marriages, deaths and
births, collecting taxes, upholding security, and arbitrating prop-
erty disputes.
195
Kjetil Tronvoll and Øyvind Aadland, “The Process of De-
mocratisation”, op. cit., p. 30.
Page 18
taqi (gunmen in Amharic) and party members.196 At
elections, these local officials form the backbone of the
EPRDF machine.197
Over the past eighteen years, ethnic federalism has
dramatically enhanced service delivery as well as rural
inhabitants’ access to the state, allowing the EPRDF to
gradually extend its authority deep into the countryside.
The absence of private landholding and land tenure secu-
rity makes peasants vulnerable to government pressure.
That farmers fear land expropriation and redistribution
by the kebelle198 explains the relative ease with which
the EPRDF keeps them subservient. Kebelle adminis-
trators regularly repress critical peasants.199 Kebelles have
their own militias and prisons, and their leaders operate
with impunity.200 Farmers who refuse to comply with
kebelle decisions have been threatened with imprison-
ment, as during the 1997 Amhara regional state land
redistribution.201
Kebelle officials mobilise farmers for government pro-
grams, notably rural development and food security ac-
tivity. This follows a top-down logic in which federal,
regional and district bureaus define policy interventions
and quotas that kebelle staff then force upon farmers.202
In the name of state-led development, the EPRDF requires
peasants to “voluntarily” contribute cash or labour for
construction, conservation and other communal works.203
Before the April 2008 elections, kebelles were headed by
councils with a maximum fifteen members. This number
was vastly increased, and today these councils consist
of 100 to 300 officials, depending on the region. Although
only the chairman, vice chairman and secretary are
salaried, other members receive informal benefits, such
as when food aid is distributed, new agricultural programs
are tested or farmers are summoned to attend paid train-
ing sessions.204 In Tigray a considerable overlap exists
between model farmers (“cadres”), TPLF membership
196
Getie Gelaye, 2004, “Peasant Poetics and State Discourse
in Ethiopia: Amharic Oral Poetry as a Response to the 1996-
97 Land Redistribution Policy”, Northeast African Studies,
vol. 6, no. 1-2 (2004), p. 178.
197
Terrence Lyons, “Closing the Transition”, op. cit., p. 140.
198
Crisis Group interview, rural development specialist, Addis
Ababa, 10 July 2008.
199
Siegfried Pausewang, “Aborted or nascent democracy?”,
op. cit., p. 135.
200
SarahVaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, Culture of Power, op.
cit., p. 2.
201
Getie Gelaye, “Peasant Poetics”, op. cit., p. 177.
202
Kaatje Segers et al., “Be like bees – the politics of mobi-
lising farmers for development in Tigray, Ethiopia”, African
Affairs, vol. 108, no. 430 (2009), pp. 91-109.
203
René Lefort, “Powers”, op. cit., p. 259.
204
Crisis Group interview, researcher, Shashemene, 21 July 2008.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
and kebelle officials.205 In Amhara, each kebelle is assisted
by a number of “cadres”, who are close to the ruling
ANDM, mobilise and monitor other farmers and report
irregularities, including by the kebelle, to higher levels.206
The EPRDF also created and in some cases reactivated
so-called gott and garee institutions in Tigray, Amhara,
Oromiya and Southern regions.207 Officially, these party
entities are outside the state administration, but they
mobilise households in government-led development
programs and are an informal but highly effective mecha-
nism by which the party hierarchy controls rural dwell-
ers down to household level.208
In this system, local party officials and “cadres” are as-
signed to monitor the everyday activities of their imme-
diate neighbours. Kebelles are divided into sectors, which
are sub-divided into 25-household then again into five-
household units. Each unit is overseen by a party mem-
ber, loyalist or “cadre”, who reports relevant incidents
to higher party officials and kebelle administrators.
Regular meetings are called by these sub-kebelle party
officials to lecture farmers on government policy and
the need to support development projects.209 Those who
refuse to attend or to make the contributions proposed
by the government are branded as “anti-development”.210
Gott and garee officials also closely monitor opposition
supporters.
The EPRDF’s neighbourhood control system exists with
variations across Ethiopia. It is fully effective in rural
areas, more sporadic in the cities. In Oromiya, OPDO
first initiated the sub-kebelle structure during the 2001
local elections, but it only became completely active
before the 2005 elections.211 OPDO pressures inhabi-
205
Segers et al., “Be like bees”, op. cit., p. 105.
206
Harald Aspen, “Models of Democracy – Perceptions of Power.
Government and Peasantry in Ethiopia”, in Bahru Zewde and
S. Pausewang (eds.), Ethiopia – The Challenge of Democracy
from Below (Uppsala, 2002), p. 67.
207
This sub-kebelle structure was invented by the EPRDF, not
the Derg. Gott is Tigrynia and designates a hamlet or closely-
knit neighbourhood in which everybody knows everybody.
208
Lovise Aalen, “Institutionalising the Politics of Ethnicity:
Actors, power and mobilisation in southern Ethiopia under
ethnic federalism”, PhD thesis (Oslo, 2007), p. 81.
209
“Suppressing Dissent: Human Rights Abuses and Political
Repression in Ethiopia’s Oromia Region”, Human Rights
Watch, May 2005, p. 34.
210
Ibid, p. 37.
211
Oromiya region’s kebelles are divided into teams or groups
(Garee), then sub-divided. The sub-groups monitor 25 house-
holds each. The EPRDF’s sub-kebelle structure has different
names in various regions and languages. In Oromiya, kebelles
are known as ganda, each divided into Garee (team or group),
then into birkii (sub-group, literally “step”, 25 households),
which include five gooxi (gott in Tigrynia), each with five
Page 19
tants to pay monthly membership fees to join the party
and in return facilitates access to government services
through the sub-kebelle structure.212 Similar arrangements
operate in Amhara and Tigray.213
Many Ethiopians perceive the EPRDF’s obsession with
surveilling opposition activities as deeply intrusive.
Neighbourhood-level “cadres” report minor occurrences
to kebelle officials, including residents’ whereabouts
and visitors.214 According to many, “their main task is
to monitor the people, spy on people and report to the
kebelle”.215 Barely visible to outsiders and foreigners,
this party control discourages dissent and constantly
reminds people who is in charge.216 It allows the EPRDF
to keep a tight grip on opposition supporters and reward
its own. In situations of political unrest, sub-kebelle party
informants point kebelle police and federal security forces
to families and compounds where opposition is known
or suspected.
The ruling party’s monitoring has contributed to a cli-
mate of mutual distrust in central parts of the country.217
People have become extremely reluctant to discuss views
in public. At the same time, the extension of control to the
neighbourhood level allows the EPRDF to increase the
number of those dependent on it for their livelihoods.218
households. The heads of none of these are salaried, but party
cadres’ activities are compensated informally by kebelle and
district officials. Crisis Group interview, researcher, Shashe-
mene, 21 July 2008.
212
Crisis Group interview, teacher, Nazreth, 18 July 2008.
213
In Tigray, the TPLF had already set up “government groups”
responsible for mobilising 30 neighbouring households dur-
ing its armed struggle against the Derg (Segers et al., “Be like
bees”, op. cit., p. 113). In Amhara, members of the ANDM’s
women and youth associations participate in such mobilising
and monitoring. Crisis Group interview, university lecturer,
Addis Ababa, 29 July 2008. In the southern region, sub-kebelles
are known as nius and divided into government groups (mengis-
tawi budin) of fifteen to 30 households. Document in posses-
sion of Crisis Group.
214
Crisis Group interview, government official, Addis Ababa,
12 July 2008.
215
Crisis Group interview, teacher, Nazreth, 18 July 2008.
216
Crisis Group interviews, government official, Addis Ababa,
12 July 2008; Ethiopian researcher, Addis Ababa, 13 July 2008.
217
Crisis Group interviews, Addis Ababa and Oromiya re-
gion, July 2008.
218
In 2001, tens of thousands of unemployed graduates report-
edly were drafted into the intelligence services. “Ethiopia: Oc-
tober evolution”, Africa Confidential, vol. 42, no. 3-4 (2001),
p. 4. See also Aalen and Tronvoll, “The 2008 Ethiopian local
elections”. op. cit., p. 117.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
B. PUBLIC SPACE CURTAILED
Fierce enmity between government and opposition and
the regime’s growing authoritarianism bode ill for civil
society. Little space exists for non-partisan involvement
and debate. Freedom of expression and association has
been severely undercut by the EPRDF, which categorically
rejects criticism.219 Few journalists, academics, human
rights advocates and intellectuals dare to publicly criti-
cise the government. While self-censorship existed be-
fore the 2005 elections, it has now become widespread.220
1. Civil society
This closing of public space is reflected in the contested
relations between the government and civil society or-
ganisations. The EPRDF sees these entities primarily as
service deliverers that it expects to stay aloof from poli-
tics, human rights work or policy advocacy. The gov-
ernment is suspicious of the motives of many such or-
ganisations, particularly international Non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), and prefers local and party-
controlled alternatives.221 While only two dozen NGOs
operated in Ethiopia during the 1974-1975 famine, 4,700
organisations are currently registered with the federal
justice ministry, and an estimated 7,000 NGOs are active
across the country.222 Despite this impressive number,
very few dare to publicly challenge the state or pursue
agendas that stray from official policy.
The EPRDF considers international NGOs under-regulated
bodies that divert too many resources from its policy
priorities.223 It resents donors, such as EU member states,
that support democratisation and governance projects
by international and local NGOs and blames them for
fomenting anti-government sentiment before elections.
In Somali, the government fears that aid distributed by
NGOs ends up in the hands of the ONLF or “anti-peace
elements”.224 The World Bank and other donor decisions
in 2006 to punish the government for its handling of the
2005 elections by redirecting aid from direct budget
219
Lara Smith, “Political Violence”, op. cit., p. 6.
220
Terrence Lyons, “Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crisis”, Cur-
rent History, vol. 107, no. 708 (2008), p. 165.
221
Dessalegn Rahmato, “Civil Society Organisations in Ethio-
pia”, in Zewde and Pausewang (eds.), Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 116;
Goran Hyden and Mahlet Hailemariam, “Voluntarism and civil
society: Ethiopia in Comparative Perspective”, Afrika Spec-
trum, vol. 38, no. 2 (2003), p. 220.
222
Dessalegn Rahmato, “Civil Society”, op. cit., p. 106; “Rights
issue and development have become inseparable”, The Reporter,
17 January 2009.
223
Jeffrey Clark, “Civil Society, NGOs, and Development in
Ethiopia: A Snapshot View”, World Bank, June 2000, p. 6.
224
Crisis Group interview, former government official, Addis
Ababa, 23 July 2008.
Page 20
support to service delivery programs implemented by
local government and monitored by civil society angered
the EPRDF and challenged its development policy.225
The House of Peoples’ Representatives passed a law
regulating civil society organisations on 6 January 2009.226
It gives the government broad powers to oversee, sanc-
tion and dismantle entities it considers troublesome.227
Indirectly and in the long run it seeks to channel donor
aid through government rather than NGO channels.228
The bill generated strong criticism from local and inter-
national development actors, including Western donors
who support the regime. Senior U.S. officials, including
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human
Rights David Kramer229 and four senators,230 expressed
concern that the law treats a majority of Ethiopia’s op-
erational NGOs as political. Though donors criticised its
particulars, they refrained from openly protesting it as
infringing on political freedoms.231 Civil society organi-
sations are required to reregister in 2009. Time will tell
whether the new charities and societies agency over-
sight board will use the draconian punitive measures
the law offers.
Because of the belated urbanisation and development of
the service sector, Ethiopia has comparatively few pro-
fessional and membership associations.232 Most are ur-
ban based, with few links outside Addis Ababa. Among
the most prominent and vocal that have repeatedly at-
tracted the government’s wrath are the Ethiopian Eco-
225
The Ethiopian Protection of Basic Services Program ran
from May 2006 to June 2009. http://web.worldbank.org.
226
“Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Chari-
ties and Societies, Proclamation No. 621/2009”, Federal De-
mocratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2009. The bill was passed by
the House of Peoples’ Representatives on 6 January 2009.
227
The most controversial clauses stipulate that any civil so-
ciety organisation receiving more than 10 per cent of its income
from foreign sources must register as either a “foreign” or
“Ethiopian” resident organisation, and is barred from con-
ducting human rights work, promoting equality between people,
sexes or religions, children and disability rights, conflict resolu-
tion and reconciliation and criminal justice projects. “Analysis
of Ethiopia’s Draft CSO Law”, Human Rights Watch, Sep-
tember 2008.
228
Crisis Group interview, development consultant, Addis
Ababa, 19 July 2008.
229
Peter Heinlein, “US Says Draft Ethiopian NGO Law Would
‘Close Political Space’”, VOA, 21 October 2008.
230
U.S. Senators Russell Feingold, Johnny Isakson, Patrick
Leahy and Richard Durbin raised these concerns in a letter to
the prime minister, 16 January 2009, www.eastafricaforum.net/
wp-content/2009/01/ethiopiasenate12.pdf.
231
Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Addis Ababa,
29 July 2008.
232
Dessalegn Rahmato, “Civil Society Organisations in Ethiopia”,
op. cit., p. 112.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
nomic Association, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers
Association and the Ethiopian Human Rights Council
(EHRCO).233 Trade union movements have struggled
with government co-option and repression since the Derg
period. Leaders of the Ethiopian Teachers Association,
one of the biggest trade unions, who criticised EPRDF
language and education policy, faced imprisonment and
had their offices ransacked in 2005.234
Universities also have been under close scrutiny.235 Ad-
dis Ababa University was the site of student unrest that
was violently suppressed by security forces in 1993, 1997,
2001 and 2005. Since the dismissal of 40 faculty mem-
bers in 1993 – mostly ethnic Amhara professors who
opposed the EPRDF’s ethnic federalism policy – its
academic independence has slowly eroded. The appoint-
ment of teaching faculty and staff close to the ruling party
and the pressure to accept government-defined student
quotas has ossified the institution. The government re-
cently established thirteen new state universities that are
expected to admit 120,000 students.236 It hopes this bold
initiative will not only expand education but also create
a loyal academic elite.
2. Media constraints
The limited professionalism and outreach of the mass
media compounds the narrowness of public space.237
Although there are about 200 newspapers and magazines,
few are independent or trustworthy news outlets. Low
standards and partisan agendas taint the credibility of the
private press. Government- and party- affiliated media
are subservient.238 Few papers have sought or been able to
strike a balance between government and opposition.
Before 2004, private papers like Menelik, Addis Zena
and Ethiop advocated opposition viewpoints close to
those of the CUD, but courts regularly fine and imprison
critical editors and publishers. In November 2005, four-
teen, including the publishers of Hadar and Lisane
233
Their websites are: http://eeaecon.org/; www.etwla.org/;
www.ehrco.org/.
234
“2007 Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights,
Ethiopia”, International Trade Union Confederation, 2007.
235
During the EPRDF’s seventh party congress, September
2008, Meles observed that universities were opposition friendly.
236
“13 new universities start operation: Ministry”, Ethiopian
News Agency (ENA), 4 March 2007.
237
High illiteracy and unaffordable TV and radio prices also
contribute to mass media’s limited outreach. Newspaper cir-
culation is limited to Addis Ababa and major urban centres.
238
Government papers published by the Ethiopian Press
Agency (EPA) include the Ethiopan Herald (English), Addis
Zemen (Amharic), Al Alam (Arabic) and Barissa (Oromiffa).
The Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) is state-controlled; the
Walta Information Centre (WIC) is run by the TPLF.
Page 21
Hezeb,239 were arrested and charged with violation of
the press law and “outrages against the constitution”.240
As a result, the critical private media has virtually dis-
appeared.241 After six years of deliberation, the parlia-
ment adopted a restrictive press law in July 2008.242
Thanks to Chinese electronic monitoring and control
software, the government is able to block most opposi-
tion electronic communications when it desires. The
state-run Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation
blocked text messaging after the November 2005 clashes
between opposition supporters and government forces
in Addis Ababa and reactivated the capability two years
later.243 Since May 2006, it has intermittently blocked
opposition websites and blogs.244 Technology savvy
Ethiopians now use anonymous proxy servers to circum-
vent online censorship.245 The Amharic programs of
Voice of America and Deutsche Welle reported that their
broadcasts were intermittently jammed in late 2007, and
in June 2009, the government ordered the local Sheger
FM radio station to stop re-broadcasting the former’s
content.246
Foreign correspondents based in Addis Ababa often avoid
sensitive political coverage for fear their one-year resi-
dency and accreditation permits will not be renewed.247
In April 2008, Ethiopia broke diplomatic relations with
239
“2007 Annual Report”, Reporters Without Borders, 2008,
p. 23.
240
“Q & A: An Ethiopian Speaks from Exile”, Committee to
Protect Journalists Blog (http://cpj.org/blog), 26 August 2008.
241
Pro-government private papers like Iftin and government-
leaning papers like Capital and Fortune remain in print. The
private weekly The Reporter/Gete publishes in Amharic and
English. Its editor, Amare Aregawi, a former TPLF cadre, has
vocally criticised the EPRDF and published investigative re-
ports on mismanagement by people close to billionaire Al-
Amoudi. He was assaulted by unknown perpetrators on
31 October 2008. “Editor in hospital after brutal assault”,
The Reporter, 1 November 2008.
242
In return, it gave concessions to two private radio stations
at the end of 2008 in a bid to liberalise the broadcasting sec-
tor. “Ethiopia: Country Liberalises Radio and Television May
Follow”, AllAfrica.com, 8 January 2009.
243
The Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation cited techni-
cal problems, but the government fears that text messages are
used by the opposition to campaign and mobilise street protests.
244
“Critical Websites Inaccessible in Ethiopia”, Committee to
Protect Journalists, 24 May 2006.
245
Ethio-Zagol, “The Hazards of Dissent”, Index on Censor-
ship, vol. 36, no. 4 (2007), p. 63. The block on critical websites
was lifted in March 2009 after the U.S. State Department’s
2008 Human Rights Report on Ethiopia cited the practice.
246
Peter Heinlein, “Ethiopian rights lawyer, VOA reporter
face prison in contraband case”, VOA, 16 June 2009.
247
“Attacks on the Press in 2008: Ethiopia”, Committee to
Protect Journalists, February 2009.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 22

Qatar after Al Jazeera carried a series of critical reports V. CONTESTED MULTI-ETHNIC

on the counter-insurgency campaign in the Ogaden. POLITICS

The EPRDF’s ethnic federalism has decisively trans-

formed politics, although not always with the hoped-for
consequences. It has not resolved the “national question”.
Ethnic conflicts have not disappeared but have been ei-
ther transferred from the national to the regional, district
and kebelle levels or been contained by the security
forces. Relations between ethnic groups have become
increasingly competitive, as they vie for control of admin-
istrative boundaries and government budgets in addition
to land and natural resources.248

It is not the principle of ethnic-based regionalisation per

se that has proved problematic. Rather it is that Ethiopia’s
ethnic dispersion is seldom homogenous. More gravely,
the idea of unconditional “self-determination” encour-
ages local officials to establish an administrative unit on
an exclusive basis in order to access state resources. Con-
sequently, ethnic federalism has sharpened differences
among groups since 1991, and ethno-nationalist griev-
ances with the nation-state, which the TPLF set out to end,
remain. Displeasure with the central government in broad
segments of the Oromo and Somali population fuels the
armed struggles of the OLF and ONLF respectively.

A. THE POLITICS OF SELF-DETERMINATION

Ethnic-based federalism is the most controversial EPRDF
policy. Celebrated by some as the panacea for holding
multi-ethnic Ethiopia together, it is decried by others as
a dangerous concept that will eventually dismember the
country. Behind the controversy are contested definitions
of citizenship and of what it means to be Ethiopian.

For nationalists, the policy is a deliberate ploy to under-

mine national identity, pride and self-esteem flowing
from the exceptional history and continuity of the
Abyssinian empire and Ethiopian state. They see the
constitutional granting of self-determination to ethnic
groups as a deliberate step backward from the nation-
building process.249 The preference for group over indi-
vidual rights is criticised as counterproductive, especially
when attempts are made to develop a more liberal politi-
cal culture. Members of the urban, educated middle
classes who identify as Ethiopian rather than with a

248
A succinct overview of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups is in Kjetil
Tronvoll, Ethiopia: A New Start?, op. cit., pp. 4-11.
249
The more nationalist, pan-Ethiopian opposition requests a
redrawing of regional entities on the basis of socio-economic
rather than strictly ethnic boundaries, citing Haile Selassie’s
administrative regions as an example.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
particular ethno-nationality feel degraded at having to
confess allegiance to a particular national group.250 Many
describe ethnic federalism as a malicious TPLF tactic
to plant divisions among ethnic groups so as to facilitate
rule by the Tigrayan minority. The allegation that the
TPLF manipulates ethnic identities and conflicts to stay
in power is made by most opposition supporters.251
Critics decry worsening ethnic relations as a result of
ethnic-based competition. In their view, the political
system divides rather than unites people, by creating
mutual suspicion and rancour and instituting tribal dy-
namics that could easily spiral out of control.252 The
constitutional clause that gives nationalities the right to
secede is touted as proof of the EPRDF’s anti-Ethiopian
stance. Eritrea’s independence, which turned Ethiopia
into a landlocked country, is viewed as further evidence
of a desire to dismember it. A recurrent claim is that the
EPRDF has unduly privileged its Tigray base and regional
state to the national detriment.253
Proponents of ethnic regionalisation, however, acclaim
the recognition of group rights, seeing creation of ethnic-
based administrative entities as the only meaningful
approach for defusing ethnic discontents. According to
this view – actively propagated by the government –
Ethiopia’s ethnic and minority groups have suffered
centuries of domination by a central state that forced Am-
haric language and culture upon them. Granting “nation-
alities” their cultural, ethnic, and political aspirations is
necessary to redress historic injustices and decolonise
the country. Equality among citizens cannot be realised
by forcing a pre-defined national identity upon them but
only by recognising existing differences and allowing
the articulation of their interests at the central level.
The EPRDF’s conception of ethnicity and its proposed
solutions are grounded in the Marxist-Leninist tradition.
As descendents of the student movement, TPLF leaders
were inspired by Stalin’s approach to the “national
question”, that informed the ethno-territorial makeup
of the Soviet Union. Self-determination and the option
for secession are the EPRDF’s attempt to accommodate
the nationalities. Political sovereignty is invested in
ethnic groups or “nationalities” rather than individuals.
The problem, however, lies in the definition as well as
250
Identity cards issued by the kebelle identify Ethiopians by
ethnic group or nationality.
251
Makau wa Mutua, “The regionalisation controversy”, Africa
Report, vol. 38, no. 5 (1993), p. 31.
252
Critics refer to ethnic federalism as ye gossa politika (Amharic,
tribalist politics).
253
While this is supported by data on expenditures and yearly
subsidy transfers, TPLF-affiliated businesses have amassed
considerable wealth that also benefits Tigray. Paulos Chanie,
op. cit., pp. 378-380.
Page 23
in the distinction between “nations, nationalities and
peoples”. The EPRDF has oscillated between the idea
that ethno-linguistic groups can be objectively and ex-
ternally identified and its experience that they must be
mobilised in their own language and culture to assert
their collective rights.254
Defining ethno-linguistic groups and circumscribing
ethno-territorial entities at regional and local level have
been challenges for the government. The constitutional
definition of nationality is imprecise.255 Initially, the
EPRDF relied on institutional research to determine the
number and location of almost 90 ethno-linguistic
groups.256
The number and shape of regions, districts and kebelles
have continuously evolved since 1991, as groups were
awarded or denied self-administration. While the federal
architecture is dynamic, its underlying principles are not.
Ethnic federalism assumes that ethno-linguistic groups
are homogeneous and occupy clearly delimited territo-
ries.257 Although groups relate to distinct locations, their
settlement patterns are often complex. Pastoralists have
different relations to territory in the semi-arid lowlands
than farmers.258 Labour migration and mixed parenthood
are old practices that defy simplistic delineation between
ethnicity and territory.259 Differentiating ethnic groups’
status has also been a challenge. The transitional gov-
ernment gave Tigrayans, Amharas, Oromos, Afars, Soma-
lis and Hararis the status of nationality with their own
regional state but denied that right to groups with simi-
lar claims like the Gurage, Sidama and Woleyta, which
had to find self-determination in special zones or districts.
254
Sarah Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia”, PhD
thesis, College of Humanities and Social Science, School of
Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, 2003,
pp. 169-170.
255
“A ‘Nation, Nationality or People’ for the purpose of this
Constitution, is a group of people who have or share a large
measure of common culture or similar customs, mutual intel-
ligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities,
a common psychological makeup, and who inhabit an identi-
fiable, predominantly contiguous territory”, Article 39, para 5.
256
The Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities was
established in 1983 by the Derg to study options for restruc-
turing the country in line with a Stalinist nationality policy.
Sarah Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power”, op. cit., p. 151.
257
The assumption of internally homogenous groups again
reflects TPLF experience with Tigrayan ethno-nationalism.
258
Günther Schlee and Abdullahi A. Shongolo, “Local war
and its impact on ethnic and religious identification in South-
ern Ethiopia”, GeoJournal, vol. 36, no. 1 (1995), pp. 7-17.
259
Jon Abbink, “Ethnicity and Constitutionalism in Contem-
porary Ethiopia”, Journal of African Law, vol. 41, no. 2 (1997),
pp. 159-174.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
At the same time, federalism brought important recog-
nition of their culture and language to many marginal-
ised groups. Pastoralists and shifting cultivators on the
periphery rarely felt like equal citizens in the past. Ex-
cluded from education and major business opportunities,
they were (and continue to be) despised by many high-
landers. Their empowerment is to the credit of the
EPRDF. Every ethnic group now has the right to be in-
structed in its own language.260 Two or three languages
are taught in the schools; primary students learn in their
mother tongue or Amharic; secondary and higher edu-
cation institutions teach in English. This has required
major investment in education, notably in SNNPR, where
more than 23 large groups speak their own tongues.261
The new policy allows people to be involved with and
understand local government. Together with appoint-
ments of representatives of all major ethnic groups at
local, regional and national level, ethnic federalism is a
clear break with the past.
B. ETHNIC FEDERALISM AND CONFLICTS
The emergence of new regional elites is a major conse-
quence of ethnic-based decentralisation. For the first
time, political representation and bureaucratic appoint-
ments at all levels are reserved for educated members
of the local ethnic group. Ethnic federalism thus quickly
replaced the Amhara state with a multitude of ethno-
cratic regional and local states. Civil servants, previously
sent from the centre, are now recruited in the locally
dominant ethnic group, the focus of whose elites changed
from a post in Addis Ababa to one in the regional or
district administration. Competition over public sector
representation and appointments shifted to the regional
and district level.262
But the EPRDF’s conception of ethnicity did not always
match the multi-ethnic makeup of many cities and areas.
The Southern region, Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz
and Harar are inhabited by multiple ethnic groups. Tigray,
Amhara, Oromo and Somali states are dominated by
one ethnic group but host others.263 By some accounts,
260
In urban multi-ethnic areas pupils can choose between
schools that instruct in either Amharic or their mother tongue.
261
Lara Smith, “The Politics of Contemporary Language Pol-
icy in Ethiopia”, Journal of Developing Societies, vol. 24,
no. 2 (2008), pp. 207-243.
262
Crisis Group interview, intellectual, Addis Ababa, 11 July
2008.
263
Alem Habtu. “Ethnic Pluralism”, op. cit., pp. 110-111.
Page 24
30 to 45 per cent of the population in parts of Amhara
is Oromo.264
Granting self-administration to dominant ethnic groups
thus created new minorities. This has been particularly
acute for Amharas and Gurages, who live in cities and
larger settlements across the country. With the estab-
lishment of the ethnically defined regions, these popu-
lations became minorities that in some cases did not
speak the language of the new administration. The
principle was interpreted by some groups as an oppor-
tunity to claim exclusive rights over land by evicting
settlers and other newcomers. These tensions have often
been nurtured by politicians from local indigenous
groups. Examples include the conflict between the Berta
and Amhara and Oromo settlers in Asosa zone that ex-
ploded during the 2000 federal elections. Sometimes
the conflicts take on the character of ethnic cleansing;
“non-natives” have been chased away in Arussi, Harar
and Bale.265 In Southern region, the ethnically defined
administration played into the hands of the historically
dominant Sidama and Wolayta clans that revived dis-
criminatory practices against lower caste groups such
as craftsmen and slave descendents.266
Ethnicity also has become the primary means of mobi-
lisation. Since political representation is organised on
ethnic grounds, groups are encouraged to claim “ethnic
rights” at the expense of others. The constitutionally
enshrined self-determination clause incites them to con-
trol kebelles, districts and regions in order to have a share
of resources channelled from the federal to the local
level. Local politicians and party officials from all eth-
nic groups – and from both government and opposition
– have at times incited followers to engage in conflict
with competing groups.267 Territorial gains translate
into more administrative power, land, tax revenue and,
potentially, food aid.268
Since ethnic mobilisation is a rewarding strategy, nu-
merous conflicts, both political and violent, have been
264
Sandra Fullerton Joireman, “Opposition Politics and Eth-
nicity in Ethiopia: We Will All Go down Together”, Journal
of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 3 (1997), pp. 405-406.
265
Jon Abbink, “Breaking and making the state”, op. cit., p. 153.
266
Lovise Aalen, “Institutionalising the Politics of Ethnicity”,
op. cit., p. 142.
267
For instance, land-related clashes between Gumuz and
Oromos in eastern Wollega claimed over 130 lives in May 2008.
An independent inquiry established that Oromo state police
were involved in clearing settlers. Document in possession of
Crisis Group. Oromos accused the Gumuz-Benishangul admini-
stration of arming and mobilising Gumuz militia. “Hundred
killed during clashes between Gumuz and Oromos in Ethio-
pia”, Sudan Tribune, 24 May 2008.
268
Document in possession of Crisis Group.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
sparked by decentralisation. These are routinely described
as “ethnic conflicts”, but they are more often the result
of rivalry over state resources than of irreconcilable ethnic
differences. Many are about administrative boundaries.269
In Southern region, playing the clan card has become
politically rewarding among the Woleyta.270 Existing
tribal divisions, for example among the Arsi Oromos, are
exacerbated by decentralisation, as increasingly smaller
kinship groups compete for influence and territorial
control.271 As a result, many conflicts have become more
protracted as struggles over land, political power and
administrative control become intertwined.
Beginning in the first half of the 1990s, a wave of local
conflicts gripped the country, as groups were incited by
the transitional charter to settle old disputes or claim
territory they felt was rightfully theirs. Some of the most
severe were between Amhara settlers and Anuak in De-
cember 2003 in Gambella, where the federal army appar-
ently sided with the highlanders.272 In Somali after 2000,
several hundred were killed in repeated fighting between
the Sheikash, a small clan that sought to establish its own
district, and Ogaden sub-clans. A border dispute between
the Guji and Gedeo exploded into large-scale fighting
in 1998 over control of Hagere Mariam district.273 Land
disputes triggered by administrative boundary changes
incited a confrontation between the Guji and Boran in
June 2006, causing at least 100 deaths and massive dis-
placement.274 Some 70,000 fled the border area between
Oromiya and Somali after conflict erupted between Bo-
ran and Garri over a borehole.275 By a very conservative
estimate, several thousand people were killed in inter-
ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia between 1991 and 2005.276
The redrawing of administrative boundaries was particu-
larly painful for groups that had historically changing
identities, such as Oromo-Somali pastoralists like the
Garri, Gabra and Guji. Resource-sharing agreements with
neighbouring pastoral groups became increasingly diffi-
269
Jon Abbink, “Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia:
Some Problems and Prospects of Ethno-Regional Federalism”,
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 24, no. 3 (2006),
pp. 390-397.
270
Lovise Aalen, “Institutionalising the Politics of Ethnicity”,
op. cit., p. 151-154.
271
Crisis Group interview, researcher, Shashemene, 20 July 2008.
272
“Targeting the Anuak: Human Rights Violations and
Crimes against Humanity in Ethiopia’s Gambella Region”,
Human Rights Watch, March 2005.
273
Kjetil Tronvoll, Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 22.
274
Lara Smith, “Political Violence”, op. cit., p. 10.
275
“Water pipe sparks Ethiopian conflict”, BBC, 13 March 2009.
276
Jon Abbink, “Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia:
some problems and prospects of ethno-regional federalism”,
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, vol. 24, no. 3 (2006),
p. 408.
Page 25
cult, since territorial control is a prerequisite to claim a
district. They were forced to settle for an Oromo or Somali
ethnic identity and ally with the predominant ethnic group
in those regional states. Oromiya and Somali claimed
their territory, leading to disputes between the two states.
Following a federal arbitration proposal in 1995 and a
federally supervised referendum in 2004, the disputed
kebelles and territory were allocated between them.
Existing constitutional mechanisms and the federal gov-
ernment’s conflict management have proven insufficient
to resolve such competing ethnic self-determination.277
The House of Federation is formally mandated to deal
with nationality issues and federal-regional relations,
but it meets only twice a year and lacks the authority to
effectively mitigate ethnic conflicts; it has been reluc-
tant to approve referendums to decide the status of dis-
puted localities. 278 Exceptions include the 2001 refer-
endum in which the Silte, until then largely considered
part of the Gurage clan federation, established their own
zone and thereby ethno-political identity.279 The 2004
referendum cited above allocated some 500 kebelles to
Oromiya and 100 to Somali, but the border is not yet
fully demarcated.280
Grants of special districts are another strategy to defuse
ethnic tensions. Establishing special zones (woredas) is
a regional state prerogative initiated by either the con-
cerned ethnic group or the administration. Eight special
districts existed in 2000, five in Southern region, two in
Benishangul Gumuz and one in Afar, as well as three
special zones in Amhara.281 At the end of the 1990s, the
EPRDF became less willing to grant self-administration
to Southern region groups282 after its attempts to engi-
neer ethnic identities that matched its institutional pro-
posals met limited success. The Welayta in Soddoin
violently rejected an effort to construct the Wagagoda
language out of Woleyta, Gamo, Gofa and Dawro dia-
lects in 1999.283 Earlier, the forced merger of five ethno-
national entities in today’s Southern region frustrated
the Sidama, who settled for a separate zone instead of
their own region.284 When the government tried to settle
competing claims over Awassa by giving it a multi-ethnic
277
Ibid, p. 391.
278
Lovise Aalen, “Ethnic Federalism”, op. cit., p. 249.
279
The referendum asked the question “Are the Siltie Gurage
or not?”. Lara Smith, “Voting for an ethnic identity: procedural
and institutional responses to ethnic conflict in Ethiopia”,
Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 45, no. 4 (2007), p. 565.
280
Crisis Group interview, former regional official, Addis
Ababa, 23 July 2008.
281
Kjetil Tronvoll, Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 20.
282
Sarah Vaughan,, “Ethnicity and Power”, op. cit. p. 249.
283
Lara Smith, “Political Violence”, op. cit., p. 208.
284
Lovise Aalen, “Institutionalising the Politics of Ethnicity”,
op. cit., p. 123.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
status similar to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, a Sidama
protest forced it to back down.285
C. ETHNO-NATIONAL CONTESTATION
Communal conflicts sparked by ethnic-based federalism
have become common. While they often involve kill-
ings, displacement and property destruction, they are
not directed against the federal government. Ethno-
national rebellions against the EPRDF have not disap-
peared, however. With varying success, the ONLF, OLF,
Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF)286 and Tigray
People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM) are waging
such armed struggles. Oromiya is of particular concern,
since it contains 37 per cent of Ethiopia’s population
(roughly 27 million people).287 Its secession would en-
tail disintegration of the Ethiopian state. The ONLF in-
surgency in Somali would not, but it has triggered a
humanitarian crisis.
1. Oromiya region
With creation of the region, Oromo national identity was
territorialised for the first time,288 but many Oromos are
unhappy with their political and economic situation.
Oromo nationalists argue that their ethnic group contin-
ues to be exploited, and they draw an unbroken line from
oppressive Abyssinian rule under Emperor Menelik in
the nineteenth century to the EPRDF.289 A frequent
complaint is that the Tigrayan-led regime plunders the
region. Oromiya’s rich resources – coffee, agricultural
produce, livestock and water – are said to be siphoned
off by the federal government.290 Such views are shared
by many politically aware Oromos, including members
285
Lovise Aalen, “Ethnic Federalism”, op. cit., pp. 243-261.
286
The EPPF is a minor rebel group established by radical
members of the Ethiopian Democratic Movement in 1998. Its
troops operate in the lowlands of Amhara and Tigray region
and are supported by Eritrea.
287
“Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population
and Housing Census”, Central Statistical Agency, 2008.
www.csa.gov.et.
288
A collective Oromo national consciousness emerged rela-
tively recently and has been weakened by internal divisions.
Five groups belong to the Oromo: Western Oromo in Wellega
area – mostly Protestant farmers; strongly Amharised north-
ern Oromos in Shoa; small pastoralists in the South, practic-
ing animal husbandry; conservative Muslims of Hararghe re-
gion; and the agro-pastoral Boran on the Kenyan border. Tron-
voll. Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 8; see also Alemseged Abbay, “Di-
versity”, op. cit., p. 604.
289
Edmond J Keller, “The Ethnogenesis of the Oromo Nation
and Its Implications for Politics in Ethiopia”, Journal of Modern
African Studies, vol. 33, no. 4 (1995), p. 625.
290
Crisis Group interviews, Oromiya region, July 2008.
Page 26
of the ruling OPDO.291 The temporary transfer of the
regional capital from Addis Ababa to Nazreth in 2004 –
widely seen as proof of EPRDF intent to strip the Oromo
nation off its most valuable economic asset, the capital
city – sparked immense protest. Peasant grievances also
result from forced, state-led development projects that
require farmers to provide unpaid labour.292 State and
party monitoring of peasant views and movements is
widely resented.293
Hatred of the EPRDF, its OPDO subsidiary and the se-
curity forces294 is nourished by the government’s harsh
reaction to opposition and dissent. The EPRDF closed
OLF’s humanitarian wing, the Oromo Relief Associa-
tion, in August 1995 and the Oromo nationalist Macha
Tulema welfare association in July 2004.295 Harassment,
intimidation and imprisonment of suspected OLF sup-
porters remain widespread. Public and sometimes pri-
vate criticism of OPDO and the regime are met by arrest.
Detainees are regularly tortured and deprived of due
process,296 and there are frequent but unsubstantiated
allegations of targeted killings and disappearances of
OLF members. A recurrent government method to silence
critics is to accuse them of being OLF, OPC (formerly
ONC) or OFDM members. Reporting OLF sympathis-
ers buys favours from local administrators, including
kebelle court judgments in property disputes.297 Unsur-
prisingly, Oromiya has the country’s highest level of
reported human rights violations.298 An atmosphere of
suspicion, intimidation and fear prevails.299
Oromo discontent is symptomatic of ethnic federalism’s
shortcomings. Ethnic-based decentralisation addresses
some major historic concerns of the nationalists. Under
the emperor and the Derg, Oromos were denied access
to the education system and public sector, where Am-
291
Paulos Milkias, “Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the
2001 Political Tremor”, op. cit., p. 28.
292
Crisis Group interview, teacher, Adama, 18 July 2008.
293
“Suppressing Dissent”, Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 32.
294
Crisis Group interview, Oromo intellectuals, Addis Ababa,
12 July 2008.
295
The Macha Tulema welfare assocation, the first influential
Oromo nationalist organisation, was banned by the Haile Selassie
government in 1966 and readmitted after the EPRDF came to
power.
296
“Suppressing Dissent”, Human Rights Watch, op. cit.
297
Crisis Group interviews, Oromiya region, July 2008.
298
Kjetil Tronvoll, “Human Rights Violations in Federal
Ethiopia: When Ethnic Identity is a Political Stigma”, Inter-
national Journal on Minority and Group Rights, vol. 15, no.
1 (2008), p. 65.
299
In recent years, Oromo students have often led efforts to
reclaim ethno-national and democratic rights. Region-wide
demonstrations by secondary and college students took place
in major cities of Oromiya in 2002, 2004 and 2005.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
haric was solely used.300 The EPRDF’s language policy
contributed significantly to restoring Oromo cultural
rights. While parents acknowledge the advantage of
having their children taught in Afaan Oromiffa, however,
many credit this to the earlier OLF campaign for Oromo
literacy rather than the EPRDF. And the EPRDF policy
of self-determination further fuels nationalist aspirations,
fostering, in combination with political repression, a
sentiment among large parts of the Oromo elite that
they have not yet received their full political rights.301
Religion, economics, genealogy and geography divide
Oromo loyalties, which are exploited by OPDO and
OLF. The Wellega zone is widely considered an anti-
government stronghold, where many relatively well-
educated Lutheran Oromos of the Mekane Yesus Church
sympathise with the OLF, which also commands strong
support from the Boran in southern Oromiya region. Con-
versely, the OPDO has fared relatively better, working
through the gada and clan system, generating a follow-
ing among segments of the historically marginalised
Arsi Oromos.302
Despite its organisational flaws and divisions, many
ordinary Oromos retain an almost messianic belief in
the OLF as the major nationalist organisation.303 The
first modern party to articulate national self-awareness
and self-determination, it shaped Oromo political con-
sciousness and, in collaboration with diaspora intellec-
tuals, created a nationalist narrative that influences the
discourse of all Oromo opposition parties.304 Many con-
sider the OPDO a TPLF puppet and portray its officials,
including the regional president, Abadula Gemeda, as
opportunists.305 To exert authority in regional politics,
the OPDO relies on a mixture of patronage and intimi-
dation.306 After the 2005 elections, it recruited massively,
expanding its membership to one million. However, most
new members joined to get public sector jobs or to avoid
300
Mekuria Bulcha, “The Politics of Linguistic Homogenisa-
tion in Ethiopia and the Conflict over the Status of ‘Afaan
Oromoo’”, African Affairs, vol. 96, no. 384 (1997), pp. 325-352.
301
Crisis Group interview, Oromo intellectuals, Addis Ababa,
12 July 2008.
302
Crisis group interview, researcher and intellectual, Shashe-
mene, 20 July 2008. Some Arsi Oromo are suspicious of what
they perceive as Wollega domination within the OLF.
303
For more on the OLF see Appendix C.
304
John Sorenson, “Learning to be Oromo: Nationalist Dis-
course in the Diaspora”, Social Identities, vol. 2, no. 3 (1996),
pp. 439-468.
305
Crisis Group interviews, Oromiya region, July 2008.
306
Terrence Lyons, “Ethiopia's Convergence of Crisis”, op. cit.,
p. 156.
Page 27
allegations of OLF membership. In fact, many were
OLF sympathisers.307
Oromo nationalism is increasing, as pervasive govern-
ment repression increases both real and perceived
grievances. The EPRDF uses a carrot and stick strategy,
rewarding those who join the OPDO and punishing those
who refuse. Negotiations with parts of the OLF are
likelier to be an effort to co-opt some Oromo constitu-
encies than an indicator of genuine reconciliation. The
2010 elections in Oromiya will most probably be a con-
trolled process that produces a large OPDO majority and
a limited number of seats for the legal opposition. In free
and fair elections, votes would probably be divided more
equally between OPDO and FDD.
2. Somali region
Ethnic Somalis’ rebellion against the Ethiopian state
dates to colonial times. It flared up again in 2007, when
the army launched a ruthless counter-insurgency cam-
paign against the Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF). The Ogaden territory was incorporated into
the Abyssian empire at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, a move sanctioned by colonial treaties between
Ethiopia, Italy and Great Britain. In the mid-1970s, the
irredentist Western Somali Liberation Front (WSFL)
began an armed insurgency against the Derg, with
Somalia’s support. This culminated in the 1977/1978
Ogaden War.308 Few attempts were made by past
Ethiopian regimes to integrate Ogaden inhabitants, and
a profound feeling of marginalisation has prevailed
among the Somali population.
The region obtained self-administration when the So-
mali Regional State was created in 1993.309 But despite
attempts to lure the inhabitants into the federal body
politic, they are only nominally represented at national
level. Few Christian highland Ethiopians would consider
Ethiopian-Somalis citizens with equal rights. Over the
years the EPRDF’s heavy-handed military and political
interventions alienated substantial parts of the Ogaden
and other clan groups that had initially been sympathetic
to the federal experiment.310 Ridden by clan rivalries
and destabilised by conflicts in neighbouring Somalia,
307
Crisis Group interviews, Shashemene, 20 July 2008.
308
Gebru Tareke, “The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revis-
ited”, The International Journal of African Historical Studies,
vol. 33, no. 3 (2000), pp. 635-67. As noted above, Ethiopia’s
victory owed much to Soviet and Cuban military support.
309
The Somali Regional State includes the former Ogaden
province and former eastern Hararghe and Bale.
310
Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. Khalif, “State and Poli-
tics in Ethiopia's Somali Region since 1991”, Bildhaan: An
International Journal of Somali Studies, vol. 6 (2006), pp. 25-49.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 28

the Ogaden is Ethiopia’s most underdeveloped periphery.
Its remoteness, harsh climate, lack of infrastructure and
chronic instability contribute to its poverty.
The ONLF insurgency, which has fought the army since
1994, seeks an independent Ogadenia311 and controls
much of the rural hinterlands of Fiq, Degehabur, Qorahe,
Wardheer and Godey zones, which are predominantly
inhabited by Ogaden clans of the Darood clan family. As
the rebellion gained momentum, the army’s response,
which often involved collective punishment of entire
communities, alienated most Ethiopian-Somalis. Mass
arrests of suspected rebel supporters, indiscriminate kill-
ings, torture and rape have been characteristics of the
counter-insurgency strategy since 2007, but the security
forces have failed to weaken popular support for the
ONLF.312
Though hard pressed, Ethiopia has prevented creation
of a front of insurgent groups, including ONLF, al-
Shabaab and others, on its eastern and southern flanks.
Withdrawal from Somalia has freed military resources
for containing the ONLF rebellion. Somali attitudes
toward Ethiopia are at an historic low, but there is little
sign political dynamics in the Somali periphery will
impact national politics. Local elections were not held
in the region in 2008, and the 2010 elections are unlikely
to offer voters a genuine political choice given the re-
pression since 2007.

The uprising is significantly influenced by international

dynamics that contribute to the region’s disorder. During
its 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia and thereafter, Eritrea
has sponsored the ONLF and other Ethiopian insurgen-
cies to put pressure on the government.313 With Addis
Ababa’s intervention in Somalia in December 2006, the
Ogaden became a battlefront between Ethiopian forces
and Somali insurgents on both sides of the border.314 A
wave of anti-Ethiopian sentiment swept the Somali ter-
ritories, allowing the ONLF to present itself as leading
resistance to aggression. Large oil and natural gas re-
serves in the Ogaden further complicate the issue.
Western and Asian interests compete for exploration
concessions.315

311
See www.onlf.org.
312
“Collective Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional
State”, Human Rights Watch, June 2008; “Ogaden Region:
Ethiopia’s Hidden Horrors”, Mail & Guardian, 7 January
2009. Crisis Group interview, Ethiopia analyst, Addis Ababa,
15 July 2008. For further detail see Appendix D.
313
During the war, Eritrea sought to create a second front.
Thereafter, it has supported anti-EPRDF groups to force ac-
ceptance of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission ruling
that granted it control of the disputed town of Badme. See Crisis
Group Africa Report Nº141, Beyond the Fragile Peace between
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War, 17 June 2008.
314
See Crisis Group Africa Report Nº147, Somalia: To Move
Beyond the Failed State, 23 December 2008.
315
Crisis Group interview, former regional official, Addis
Ababa, 23 July 2008. The mines and energy ministry has
given concessions to Malaysian Petronas, the Ethiopian-owned
South West Energy, Pexco and the Swedish Lundin Petroleum.
All suspended work after the ONLF attacked the Obole oil-
field in Dehegabur in April 2007, where the Chinese Zhoun-
gyan Petroleum Exploration Bureau was doing seismic tests Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 44, no. 10 (2007), pp. 17587B-
for South West Energy. “Ethiopia: Insecurity Threatens Oil”, 17587C.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
VI. CONCLUSION
Ethiopia has experienced substantial political transfor-
mation since EPRDF forces captured Addis Ababa in
1991, but many things stay the same. Despite its democ-
ratic rhetoric, the regime is unwilling to share power or
to accept criticism as normal. After 2005, its objective
has been simply to stay in power. To do so, it has estab-
lished a party-state system that perpetuates its rule but
frustrates large parts of the population. Its obsession with
controlling political processes from the federal to the
local level reflects the former liberation fighters’ para-
noia and incites opposition groups to consider armed
struggle their only remaining option.
Economic growth and the expansion of public services
are to the regime’s credit, but they increasingly fail to
translate into popular support. The EPRDF’s authoritar-
ian rural development policies produce higher yields but
not electoral approval. Initially greeted with enthusiasm,
ethnic federalism has failed to resolve the “national
Page 29
question”. Instead it generates greater conflict at local
level, as ethnic groups fight over political influence. That
policy has empowered some groups but has not been
accompanied by dialogue and reconciliation. For Amhara
and national elites, it impedes a strong, unitary nation-
state. For ethno-national rebel groups like the ONLF and
OLF, it remains artificial. But overall it has powerfully
promoted ethnic self-awareness among all groups. Al-
though the current federal system may need to be modi-
fied, it is unlikely Ethiopia can return to the old unitary
state system.
The international community has ignored or downplayed
the problems. Some donors consider food security more
important than democracy in Ethiopia. In view of the
mounting ethnic awareness and political tensions created
by the regionalisation policy, however, external actors
would be well advised to take the governance problems
more seriously and adopt a more principled position
towards the Meles Zenawi government.
Nairobi/Brussels, 4 September 2009
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 30

APPENDIX A

MAP OF ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS
AEUP: All Ethiopian Democratic League
AFD: Alliance for Freedom and Democracy
ANDM: Amhara National Democratic Movement
APDO: Afar People’s Democratic Organization
BGDUF: Benshangul-Gumuz Democratic Unity Front
CUD: Coalition for Unity and Democracy (Amharic
acronym: Kinijit)
CUDP: Coalition for Unity and Democratic Party
Derg Literally “committee” in Amharic. The military
junta that deposed Emporer Haile Selassie in 1974,
and imposed a socialist state doctrine. It was over-
thrown by the EPLF and TPLF in 1991.
EDUP: Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party
EDU – Tehadiso: Ethiopian Democratic Union –
Tehadiso
EHRCO: Ethiopian Human Rights Council
EPDM : Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement
EPLF: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPPF: Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front
EPRDF: Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front
EPRP: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
ESDFP: Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party
ESDL: Ethiopian Somali Democratic League
FDD: Forum for Democratic Dialogue in Ethiopia
(Amharic acronym: Medrek)
Gada: An Oromo term used to refer to a system that
groups persons (males) of the same generation into
sets that are ordered hierarchically and assigned a
range of social, military, political, and ritual rights
and responsibilities. Generation-set systems are
found in varying forms among the Oromo and other
groups in the Horn of Africa.
Garee Each gott is divided into smaller groups of
roughly 30 households (garee, “group” in Afan
Oromo).
Gebbar areas Lands owned by northern settlers (often
Neftegna) and farmed by tribute-paying peasants.
Gott (Gooxi) An organisation below the kebele level,
of between 60 to 90 households, that can be further
sub-divided into garee or misoma.
GPDM: Gambella People’s Democratic Movement
Page 31
Kebelles (Ganda in Oromiya region) Formal local gov-
ernmental set-up of peasant associations with own
council, executive council, tribunal and militia, ini-
tially set up by the Derg, further institutionalised by
EPRDF.
MEISON: All Ethiopian Socialist Movement
MLLT : Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray (Malalit)
Neftegna Amharic for riflemen, they conquered addi-
tional territory for the Abyssinian empire and were
then given land farmed by tribute-paying peasants
(gabbar).
OFC: Oromo Federalist Congress
OFDM: Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OLF: Oromo Liberation Front
ONC: Oromo National Congress
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPC: Oromo People’s Congress
OPDO: Oromo People’s Democratic Organization
SDAF: Somali Democratic Alliance Forces
SEPDF: Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Front
SNNPR: Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
Region
SPDP: Somali People’s Democratic Party
TGE: Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPDM: Tigray People’s Democratic Movement
TPLF: Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UDJ: Unity for Democracy and Justice (Amharic acro-
nym: Andinet)
UEDF: United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (Amharic
acronym: Hibret)
UEDP – Medhin: United Ethiopian Democratic Party
– Medhin
WSLF: Western Somali Liberation Front
Woreda An administrative division managed by a local
government, equivalent to a district and composed
of a number of kebelle.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
APPENDIX C
THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT (OLF)
Founded in 1973 by former members of the Macha
Tulema welfare association, the OLF fights for an inde-
pendent Oromo state and Oromo self-determination. It
claims a substantial part of Ethiopia – approximately
600,000 square kilometres, roughly half the country –
as “Oromiyaa”.316 Its insurgency began in eastern Ethio-
pia’s Chercher highlands, where it had set up a rudimen-
tary administration by early 1977, and was active in Bale,
Sidama and Arsi.317 Following a major Derg counter-
insurgency campaign in Hararghe, it had to abandon its
“liberated areas” and revert to guerrilla tactics in 1979.
Two years later it expanded its activities to Wellega in
the east. Between 1979 and 1984 the Derg countered
with a large village program, cutting Oromo, Sidama and
Somali rebels off from their support base in Bale, Sidama
and Hararghe.318
The OLF recruited fighters through the gada system and
traditional elders. It mostly relied on the local population
for food, supplies and intelligence but was also aided by
Sudan.319 In western Ethiopia, it drove the Sudan Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army (SPLA) from the northern and
southern parts of western Wellega in 1990-1991.320
By the mid-1980s, the OLF and TPLF had established a
tactical alliance in their armed struggle against Derg
forces around Assosa, but relations were soon severed
because of political rivalry and differences over how to
run the rebellion.321 The OLF joined the EPRDF-led
Transitional Government of Ethiopia in 1991, but ani-
mosities between the dominant TPLF and the more
junior OLF resurfaced in the run-up to the June 1992
election.322 TPLF forces attacked OLF troops in Arsi and
Bale regions killing several hundred fighters and support-
ers in November 1991. A U.S.-mediated ceasefire did
316
See www.oromoliberationfront.org/OromiaBriefs.htm.
317
Africa Confidential, vol. 19, no. 11 (1978).
318
“Evil Days: 30 years of war and famine in Ethiopia”, Hu-
man Rights Watch, September 1991, pp. 74-80.
319
OLF trained its soldiers in south-western Sudan. In return,
the Derg supported the rebel SPLA against Khartoum.
320
“Evil Days”, Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 276.
321
Sarah Vaughan, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia”, op.
cit., pp. 178-179.
322
Tensions between the two fronts were the result of politi-
cal competition, not ideological differences. Senior OLF cad-
res like former deputy secretary general Leencho Lata had
played an important role in co-drafting the Transitional Na-
tional Charter.
Page 32
not hold for long.323 After OLF forces left their camps
around Dembi Dolo, the two armies clashed again, and
the EPRDF arrested large numbers of OLF.324 With their
military personnel and hardware decimated, the remain-
ing OLF leaders fled to Kenya and sought refuge in
Europe and the U.S. A clandestine network remained in
Ethiopia and partly infiltrated state organs.325
A prolonged period of disintegration and leadership di-
vision weakened the OLF after 1992. It lost support as
its ability to challenge EPRDF troops dwindled signifi-
cantly. From an estimated 14,000 men under arms in
1991, its armed force has dropped to several thousand.326
Nevertheless, its fighters repeatedly infiltrate from
Kenya and Sudan, for example at the end of the 1990s
in Borana territory and in 2002 from Sudan. Most such
attempts are short-lived. The OLF has also been accused
by the government of responsibility for a series of bomb-
ings throughout the country.327 The organisation rejoined
an alliance with Eritrea following the 1998-2000 war.328
Kenya withdrew its support, fearing secessionist claims
by its own Boran population. Khartoum ended support
as it reconciled gradually with Ethiopia in the late 1990s.
The OLF’s leaders are seriously divided on personal,
political and ideological grounds. While some favour na-
tional self-determination for Oromos within the EPRDF’s
323
Siegfried Pausewang et al, 2002, op. cit., pp. 30-33.
324
Amnesty International estimates that over 20,000 sus-
pected OLF members were detained in military camps with-
out charge or trial. “Ethiopia: Accountability past and pre-
sent: human rights in transition”, Amnesty International,
April 1995.
325
Crisis Group interview, Ethiopia analyst, 27 October
2008.
326
Gérard Prunier, “Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad,
CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia”, Center for Interna-
tional Peace Operations, April 2008, pp. 13-14.
327
Human Rights Watch, “Suppressing Dissent”, op. cit., p.
10. The OLF leadership denies targeting civilians and claims
that its attacks are directed exclusively against military tar-
gets. “Interview with Dawud Ibsa Ayana, Chairman of the
Oromo Liberation Front”, Les Nouvelles d’Addis, 29 March
2006.
328
OLF had received substantial assistance by EPLF after its
foundation. The two fronts entered into dispute after OLF’s
withdrawal from the TGE. At the time of the OLF-EPRDF
fallout the forces of the latter were partly commanded by Eri-
trean officers, which some Oromo consider as an Eritrean
treason to the Oromo cause.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 33

framework of ethnic federalism, others refuse all attempts government arrested 200 alleged OLF “terrorists” in
to negotiate a return of the movement into Ethiopian Addis Ababa and Oromiya, including senior regional
national politics.329 Three factions compete over the OLF officials and the secretary-general of the OFDM, Bek-
leadership and legacy. The first is led by the elected ele Jirata.338 The arrests were widely interpreted as an
chairman, Dawud Ibsa, a former military commander attempt to pressure the OLF back to the negotiation table.
from Wollega, who has been based in Eritrea since 1998. A few days later, the then OLF military commander,
In August 2008 he was joined in Asmara by Brigadier Legesse Wegi, whom the government accused of respon-
Kamal Gelchu, who had defected from the Ethiopian sibility for a series of attacks in the capital, was killed in
army, bringing 150 soldiers with him 330 and now com- western Wellega.339
mands the Oromo Liberation Army, which receives
Eritrean training.331 Both are challenged by OLF mem-
bers of the Gelassa group,332 headed by Dhugasa Bakako,
whose power base and fighters are mostly in northern
Kenya. Dhugasa accuses the two Asmara-based factions
of having sold out to the EPRDF and pan-Ethiopian na-
tionalists.333

In a bid to further weaken the OLF and reclaim part of

the armed Oromo opposition from Eritrea, the prime min-
ister’s office mandated mediators to hold pre-negotiation
talks with the Dawud Ibsa faction.334 In October 2007 a
delegation of Oromo intellectuals close to that faction met
with officials in Addis Ababa.335 In a meeting in the
Netherlands in January 2008, the OLF leader allegedly
accepted the EPRDF’s precondition for negotiations by
endorsing the constitution.336 Subsequently, the govern-
ment enlisted 125 Oromo elders, who publicly requested
the OLF to immediately begin peace talks with the
EPRDF.337 These failed and in November 2008, the

329
Various attempts to mediate a rapprochement between the
OLF and the EPRDF occurred over the years. Mediation at-
tempts were made by the Carter Center (1994), the U.S.
Congressmen Harry Johnston (1995), Germany (1996-1997),
and most notably the Norwegian government (1999-2005).
Norway has historic links to the OLF via the Norwegian
Protestant Missions and the Mekane Yesus church.
330
Martin Plaut, “Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front”, Re-
view of African Political Economy, vol. 33, no. 109 (2006),
p. 588.
331
He mostly draws on support from the Arsi, Bale and Bo-
ran Oromos.
332
Named after the former OLF chairman Gelassa Dilbo who
had been ousted from the leadership by Dawud Ibsa’s sup-
porters in 1999.
333
OLF’s decision to join forces with former CUD politicians
in the AFD alliance was particularly criticised.
334
The mediators, referred to as “elders”, included Ambassa-
dor Berhanu Dinka, former UN envoy to the Great Lakes re-
gion, pastor Itefa Gobena, head of the Ethiopian Evangelical
338
Church Mekane Yesus and Alemayehu Ketema, a well- “Ethiopia arrests opposition leader, journalist hurt”,
known businessman with close links to the OPDO. Reuters, 3 November 2008. Bekele Jirata was released on
335
“Meles Zenawi blows hot and cold”, Indian Ocean News- bail on 4 February 2009. The EPRDF did, however, convince
letter, no. 1224, 20 October 2007. a senior OLF official, Abba Biya Abba Jobir, to return to
336
“Ethiopia elders urge OLF rebels to negotiate”, Reuters, Ethiopia. ‘The reason why OLF went to Eritrea was because
15 November 2008. it has nowhere to go’, The Reporter, 13 December 2008.
337 339
“Ethiopia’s Prime Minister says ready for talks with “Ethiopia says rebel leader killed in west”, Reuters, 7 No-
Oromo rebels”, Sudan Tribune, 24 November 2008. vember 2008.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
APPENDIX D
THE OGADEN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (ONLF)
The ONLF’s transformation from a political organisation
to a military front during the 1990s was linked to the
region’s politics. It won the first local and regional
elections in 1992 with a wide margin, and its inexperi-
enced officers took over the Somali region’s admini-
stration.340 Relations between the Ogaden nationalists
and the EPRDF broke down in February 1994, after re-
gional parliamentarians demanded an independence ref-
erendum. The EPRDF augmented its political control of
the region and promoted a coalition of non-Ogaden clans
by establishing the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League
(ESDL), which took over the regional administration
after the 1995 elections. Its successor, the ruling Somali
People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), is the EPRDF’s
satellite party. Although it includes members from all
local clans, its backing is very limited. Both the Ogaden
and non-Ogaden groups claim a demographic majority in
the region, which influences competition over govern-
ment resources and appointments.341
The federal government’s strategy of co-opting non-
Ogaden and moderate Ogaden groups, while suppress-
ing the more radical ONLF, was successful for a long
time. However, the regional government’s failure to
develop the region, the SPDP’s weaknesses and un-
democratic record and the Eritrean involvement strength-
ened the ONLF, whose fighters overpowered Ethiopian
troops protecting the Chinese oil exploration in Obole
on 24 April 2007, killing more than 60 soldiers and local
Somali workers and nine Chinese.342 The rebels had
warned that they would “not tolerate” oil exploration by
foreign companies in the Ogaden,343 and they exploited
the security gap that resulted from Ethiopia’s preoccu-
pation with its intervention in southern Somalia.344
340
John Markakis, “The Somali in Ethiopia”, Review of Afri-
can Political Economy, vol. 23, no. 70 (1996), pp. 567-570.
341
Tobias Hagmann, “Beyond clannishness and colonialism:
understanding political disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region,
1991-2004”, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 43, no.
4 (2005), pp. 509-536.
342
Human Rights Watch, Collective Punishment: War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of
Ethiopia’s Somali Region, New York, 12 June 12, 2008, p.
100.
343
“ONLF Statement on Malaysian Firm Petronas’ Oil Ex-
ploration in Ogaden”, press release, ONLF, July 2005.
344
“Ethiopia to press Ogaden campaign despite criticism”,
Reuters, 23 August 2007. It is widely assumed that Eritrean
Page 34
Government forces responded with a counter-insurgency
campaign that continues in an effort to deprive the rebels
of food, money and weapons.345 Already in April 2007,
the prime minister’s national security adviser, Abay
Tsehay, General Yunis Samora and the commander of
the Hararghe division met and decided to impose an eco-
nomic blockade on the Ogaden population. Starting the
next month, the military blocked all circulation of goods
and persons from and to Degehabur, Qorahe, Wardheer,
Fiq and Godey zones, making it difficult for the ONLF
to resupply but also indiscriminately punishing civilians.
Numerous settlements were forcibly relocated to areas
controlled by the army. Observers contend the crack-
down motivates civilians to join the ONLF.346
In collaboration with local officials, the army also has
systematically coerced local communities to form mili-
tias to fight the ONLF. Clan leaders and civil servants
who failed to recruit militias were arrested or dismissed.347
The militias receive food aid diverted from the World
Food Programme (WFP).348 WFP’s contact with bene-
ficiaries in the region had always been minimal, as the
aid is distributed through the regional Disaster Preven-
tion and Preparedness Agency.349 Most of it is report-
edly taken by the government for its counter-insurgency
campaign.350
Federal authorities instructed regional officials to pres-
sure the Ogaden sub-clans to abandon support for the
ONLF. Waves of arrest targeting elders, businessmen
and ordinary people occurred throughout 2008. Regional
prosecutors and judges were dispatched from the regional
capital, Jijiga, to the “unsecure areas”, to conduct trials
of elders who did not support the counter-insurgency
military advisers helped prepare the Obole attack. Crisis
Group interviews, Addis Ababa, July 2008.
345
The ONLF regularly taxed lorries passing through its terri-
tory.
346
Crisis Group interview, humanitarian worker, Addis
Ababa, 15 July 2008.
347
“Civilians are forced to fight Ethiopian rebels”, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, 14 December 2007.
348
Crisis Group interview, humanitarian worker, Addis
Ababa, 15 July 2008.
349
Document in possession of Crisis Group, 20 August 2007.
350
Crisis Group interview, donor representative, Nairobi, 2
September 2008.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
unconditionally.351 Public executions, imprisonment,
torture and threats intimidated much of the local popu-
lation, including regional government officials. Many
better-off urban residents fled to Kenya.352 Indeed, both
the rebels and the government coerce elders, business-
men and young males to help them and punish those
who refuse.353
Food prices exploded,354 and in combination with poor
rainfall in some parts of the region a humanitarian crisis
developed by mid-2007. The few agencies that provided
relief in the “insecure areas” prior to the escalation were
forced out by the military. In July 2007, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to close its
Godey and Jijiga offices after the army accused it of
supporting the ONLF. When international concern
mounted, the government reluctantly agreed to a visit
by an interagency UN mission in August 2007355 but
allowed it to drive only on the main road from Jijiga to
Qabrideher and after food aid was distributed in the
area. Elders who described the plight of their community
and government repression were subsequently impris-
oned.356 In a confidential note, the mission concluded
that ”there are serious protection concerns relating to
civilian populations and violations of economic, social,
cultural, civil and political rights in the Somali region”.357
It also observed a reduction of 80 to 90 percent in the
flow of commercial goods as a result of the trade ban,
which aggravated the crisis.358
The authorities allowed the UN to expand its presence
in the region in November 2007 and a dozen NGOs to
begin humanitarian work. Deeply suspicious of NGOs,
however, security officials closely monitored and often
restrained their operations.359 On several occasions NGO
workers, including expatriate staff, were arrested, and
351
The elders were imprisoned in military facilities in Somali
region. Crisis Group interviews, Addis Ababa, 25 July 2008.
352
Crisis Group interview, Ogadeen refugees, Nairobi, 30
August 2008.
353
“Ethiopians caught between army and rebels”, Reuters, 22
January 2008.
354
Sally Healy, Conflict in the Ogaden and its Regional Di-
mensions (London, 2007), p. 4.
355
Attention was stimulated by an article by a journalist who
accompanied ONLF fighters in Degehabur before being ar-
rested by Ethiopian troops. Jeffrey Gettleman,“In Ethiopia,
Fear and Cries of Army Brutality”, The New York Times, 18
June 2007.
356
Crisis Group interviews, Addis Ababa, 25 July 2008.
357
“Note on the Human Rights Claims in the Somali Region
of Ethiopia”, United Nations, September 2007.
358
“Report on the Findings from the UN Humanitarian As-
sessment Mission to the Somali Region, Ethiopia, 30 August
– 5 September 2007”, United Nations, September 2007.
359
Crisis Group interview, former regional official, Addis
Ababa, 23 July 2008.
Page 35
they were made to understand that they could continue
to operate only if they kept silent about human rights
violations.360
The increased conflict has diverted attention from the
ONLF’s lack of a clear long-term agenda. Neither crea-
tion of a landlocked, arid Ogadenia state nor union with
chaotic Somalia are realistic options. Although it claims
to represent all Ethiopian-Somalis, the ONLF draws
support exclusively from Ogaden clansmen, particularly
the Rer Abdille, Bah Gerii, Abdalle and Rer Issak sub-
clans. In late 2006, Eritrea built up its military capacity
and helped it infiltrate hundreds of trained fighters back
into the region.361 It now has an estimated 8,000 fighters,
equipped mostly with automatic firearms as well as some
rocket-propelled grenades.362 Most other material sup-
port comes from the local population and the Ogaden
Diaspora.
The leadership and organisation are in disarray. With
most leaders in exile in the UK and U.S., field command-
ers have great autonomy. This gives flexibility but hin-
ders strategic decision-making. Since 1998, the central
committee has been chaired by a former Somalia admi-
ral, Mohamed Omar Osman.363 His deputies are Mohamed
Ismail Omar, who shuttles between the Ogaden and the
diaspora, and Abdulkadir Hassan Hiirmoge “Adani”. In
2006 the central committee split over Eritrea’s involve-
ment. While Osman and his deputies favoured Asmara’s
help, others, led by Dr Mohammed Siraad Dolaal, the
former head of the UK-based Ogaden Action Group, were
opposed.364 Dolaal returned to the Ogaden as a com-
mander and was killed on 18 January 2009 in Denan.365
Apart from disagreements over collaboration with Eri-
trea, the ONLF has an ambiguous record in relations
with Islamist groups in the region. Until 2001, it coop-
erated with the Ethio-Somali branch of al-Ittihad al-
Islaami, but it has distanced itself from Islamist groups
after the advent of the US-led “war on terror” by em-
phasising the nationalist character of its struggle.
Ethiopia routinely refers to the ONLF as a “terrorist
organisation” and pressures its Western allies to do the
360
“In Ethiopia, does staying silent save lives?”, Christian
Science Monitor, 26 February 2008.
361
“Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1676” (2006). S/2006/913.
362
Gérard Prunier, “Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad,
CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia”, op. cit., p. 14.
363
The historic leader of ONLF, Sheikh Ibrahim Abdalla,
died in June 2008.
364
Abdi M. Abdulahi, “The Ogaden National Liberation
Front (ONLF): The Dilemma of its Struggle in Ethiopia”,
Review of African Political Economy, vol. 34, no. 113
(2007), p. 558.
365
Press release, ONLF, 24 January 2009.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 36

same.366 Afraid of being added to the U.S. list of such

organisations, the ONLF has cooperated with U.S. se-
curity officials in the Ogaden.367

A number of skirmishes between the ONLF and the

United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), the
successor of al-Ittihad al-Islaami in the Ogaden, have
been reported. At the same time, ONLF leaders in the
diaspora and the region mobilise fighters by inviting them
to join the jihad against Christian Ethiopian aggression.
In a March 2008 interview with al-Jazeera, the deputy
chairman, Abdulkadir Hassan Hirmoge, confirmed co-
operation with Somalia’s Islamists, though not with the
more radical al-Shabaab.368 In December 2007, the
ONLF lost some 40 troops in a clash in Aware with al-
Shabaab, which accused it of being pro-American.369
Radical Islamists rather than the ONLF are believed to
have been behind the assassination attempt on Abdul-
lahi Hassan “Lugbuur”, the former Somali region state
president, in Jijiga on 29 May 2007, in which eleven
persons died.

366
Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, London, 27
July 2008.
367
U.S. troops affiliated to Camp Lemonnier Joint Task
Force in the Horn of Africa have maintained outposts across
Ethiopia’s Somali region until mid-2007.
368
Mohammed Mealin Seid, “The Role Of Religion In The
Ogaden Conflict”, Social Science Research Council,
(http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org), 26 January 2009.
369
Document in possession of Crisis Group, June 2008.
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
APPENDIX E
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with
some 130 staff members on five continents, working
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to
prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research.
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing
practical recommendations targeted at key international
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch,
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regu-
lar update on the state of play in all the most significant
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the
world.
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed
widely by email and made available simultaneously on the
website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely
with governments and those who influence them,
including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to
generate support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business
and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the
reports and recommendations to the attention of senior
policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-
chaired by the former European Commissioner for
External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S.
Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief
Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour,
former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and
Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.
Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels,
with major advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it
is based as a legal entity) and New York, a smaller one in
London and liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing.
The organisation currently operates nine regional offices
(in Bishkek, Bogotá, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta,
Nairobi, Pristina and Tbilisi) and has local field represen-
tation in eighteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku,
Bangkok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Jeru-
salem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Ouagadougou, Port-
au-Prince, Pretoria, Sarajevo, Seoul and Tehran). Crisis
Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or
potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this
includes Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Page 37
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa,
Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Burma/
Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia,
Kosovo, Macedonia, Russia (North Caucasus), Serbia,
Turkey and Ukraine; in the Middle East and North Africa,
Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine,
Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen; and
in Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable
foundations, companies and individual donors. The fol-
lowing governmental departments and agencies currently
provide funding: Australian Agency for International De-
velopment, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development
Agency, Canadian International Development and Re-
search Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign
Office, Irish Aid, Japan International Cooperation
Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for
International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Department
for International Development, United Kingdom
Economic and Social Research Council, U.S. Agency for
International Development.
Foundation and private sector donors, providing annual
support and/or contributing to Crisis Group’s Securing the
Future Fund, include the Better World Fund, Carnegie
Corporation of New York, William & Flora Hewlett Foun-
dation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Jewish
World Watch, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation,
John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open
Society Institute, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Radcliffe
Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller Brothers
Fund and VIVA Trust.
September 2009
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
APPENDIX F
CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2006
CENTRAL AFRICA
Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis, Africa Report N°103,
9 January 2006 (also available in French)
A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, Africa Brief-
ing N°35, 11 January 2006
Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report N°104, 13
February 2006 (also available in French)
Congo’s Elections: Making or Breaking the Peace, Africa Re-
port N°108, 27 April 2006
Chad: Back towards War?, Africa Report N°111, 1 June 2006
(only available in French)
Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peacebuilding in Sudan,
Congo and Uganda, Africa Report N°112, 28 June 2006
Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in
the Congo, Africa Report N°114, 20 July 2006 (also available in
French)
Peace in Northern Uganda?, Africa Briefing N°41, 13 Septem-
ber 2006
Securing Congo’s Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa
Showdown, Africa Briefing N°42, 2 October 2006 (also avail-
able in French)
Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk, Africa Report N°120,
30 November 2006 (also available in French)
Congo: Staying Engaged after the Election, Africa Briefing
N°44, 9 January 2007 (also available in French)
Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace, Africa
Report N°124, 26 April 2007
Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report N°128, 5 July
2007 (also available in French)
Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL, Africa Report
N°131, 28 August 2007 (also available in French)
Northern Uganda Peace Process: The Need to Maintain Mo-
mentum, Africa Briefing N°46, 14 September 2007
Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report N°133,
31 October 2007 (also available in French)
Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State, Af-
rica Report N°136, 13 December 2007 (also available in French)
Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, Africa
Report N°140, 13 May 2008 (also available in French)
Burundi: Restarting Political Dialogue, Africa Briefing N°53,
19 August 2008 (also available in French)
Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework, Africa Report
N°144, 24 September 2008 (also available in French)
Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue,
Africa Briefing N°55, 9 December 2008 (also available in
French)
Northern Uganda: The Road to Peace, with or without Kony,
Africa Report N°146, 10 December 2008
Chad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa Report N°149, 15 April
2009 (also available in French)
Page 38
Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, Africa
Report N°150, 11 May 2009 (also available in French)
Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, Af-
rica Report N°151, 9 July 2009
Burundi: réussir l'intégration des FNL, Africa Briefing N°63,
30 July 2009
Tchad: sortir du piège pétrolier, Africa Briefing N°65, 26 Au-
gust 2009
HORN OF AFRICA
Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, Africa Report N°102, 5 Janu-
ary 2006
To Save Darfur, Africa Report N°105, 17 March 2006
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road
Ahead, Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006
Somaliland: Time for African Union Leadership, Africa Re-
port Nº110, 23 May 2006 (also available in French)
Darfur’s Fragile Peace Agreement, Africa Briefing N°39, 20
June 2006 (also available in Arabic)
Beyond Victimhood: Women’s Peacebuilding in Sudan,
Congo and Uganda, Africa Report N°112, 28 June 2006
Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?, Africa Report N°116, 10
August 2006
Getting the UN into Darfur, Africa Briefing N°43, 12 October
2006
Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead, Africa Briefing N°45, 26
January 2007
Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process, Africa Report N°125,
30 April 2007 (also available in Arabic)
A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan, Africa Report
N°130, 26 July 2007 (also available in Arabic)
Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock, Africa Briefing N°47, 12
October 2007 (also available in Arabic)
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War, Africa Brief-
ing N°48, 5 November 2007
Darfur’s New Security Reality, Africa Report N°134, 26 No-
vember 2007 (also available in Arabic)
Kenya in Crisis, Africa Report N°137, 21 February 2008
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis,
Africa Briefing N°50, 13 March 2008 (also available in Arabic)
Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea:
Averting New War, Africa Report N°141, 17 June 2008
Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur?, Af-
rica Report N°145, 21 October 2008 (also available in Arabic)
Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report
N°147, 23 December 2008
Sudan: Justice, Peace and the ICC, Africa Report N°152, 17
July 2009
Somalia: The Trouble with Puntland, Africa Briefing N°64, 12
August 2009
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 39

SOUTHERN AFRICA Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State, Africa Report N°142, 2

July 2008 (also available in French)
Zimbabwe’s Continuing Self-Destruction, Africa Briefing Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform?, Africa Report N°143, 31
N°38, 6 June 2006 July 2008
Zimbabwe: An Opposition Strategy, Africa Report N°117, 24 Nigeria: Ogoni Land after Shell, Africa Briefing N°54, 18 Sep-
August 2006 tember 2008
Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?, Africa Report N°122, 5 Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, Africa
March 2007 Report N°148, 13 January 2009
Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?, Africa Report N°132, 18 Guinea-Bissau: Building a Real Stability Pact, Africa Briefing
September 2007 N°57, 29 January 2009 (also available in French)
Zimbabwe: Prospects from a Flawed Election, Africa Report Guinea: The Transition Has Only Just Begun, Africa Briefing
N°138, 20 March 2008 N°58, 5 March 2009 (also available in French)
Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition, Africa Briefing N°51, 21 Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, Africa Brief-
May 2008 ing N°60, 30 April 2009
Ending Zimbabwe’s Nightmare: A Possible Way Forward, Af- Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun, Africa Briefing
rica Briefing N°56, 16 December 2008 N°61, 25 June 2009 (also available in Portuguese)
Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government, Africa Brief- Côte d'Ivoire: What's Needed to End the Crisis, Africa Briefing
ing N°59, 20 April 2009 N°62, 2 July 2009
WEST AFRICA
Liberia: Staying Focused, Africa Briefing N°36, 13 January OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS
2006
Liberia: Resurrecting the Justice System, Africa Report N°107, For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:
6 April 2006
 Africa
Guinea in Transition, Africa Briefing N°37, 11 April 2006
 Asia
(also available in French)
 Europe
Côte d’Ivoire: Peace as an Option, Africa Report N°109, 17
 Latin America and Caribbean
May 2006 (only available in French)
 Middle East and North Africa
Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, Africa Report N°113, 19  Thematic Issues
July 2006
 CrisisWatch
The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest, Africa
Report N°115, 3 August 2006 please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org
Côte d’Ivoire: Stepping up the pressure, Africa Briefing N°40,
7 September 2006 (only available in French)
Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, Africa Report N°118, 28 Sep-
tember 2006
Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, Africa Report N°119,
25 October 2006
Guinea: Change or Chaos, Africa Report N°121, 14 February
2007 (also available in French)
Nigeria’s Elections: Avoiding a Political Crisis, Africa Report
N°123, 28 March 2007
Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State?, Africa Report N°126,
30 May 2007
Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring
Peace?, Africa Report N°127, 27 June 2007 (also available in
French)
Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity, Africa Report N°129,
12 July 2007
Guinea: Change on Hold, Africa Briefing N°49, 8 November
2007 (also available in French)
Nigeria: Ending Unrest in the Niger Delta, Africa Report
N°135, 5 December 2007
Côte d’Ivoire: Ensuring Credible Elections, Africa Report
N°139, 22 April 2008 (only available in French)
Guinea: Ensuring Democratic Reforms, Africa Briefing N°52,
24 June 2008 (also available in French)
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Co-Chairs
Lord (Christopher) Patten
Former European Commissioner for Exter-
nal Relations, Governor of Hong Kong and
UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Oxford
University
Thomas R Pickering
Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia,
India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nige-
ria; Vice Chairman of Hills & Company
President & CEO
Louise Arbour
Former UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
Executive Committee
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
and Ambassador to Turkey
Emma Bonino*
Former Italian Minister of International
Trade and European Affairs and European
Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner
to the UK and Secretary General of the
ANC
Maria Livanos Cattaui
Member of the Board, Petroplus,
Switzerland
Yoichi Funabashi
Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi
Shimbun, Japan
Frank Giustra
Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada
Stephen Solarz
Former U.S. Congressman
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
Pär Stenbäck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland
*Vice Chair
Other Board Members
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah
II and to King Hussein, and Jordan Perma-
nent Representative to the UN
Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
APPENDIX G
HRH Prince Turki al-Faisal
Former Ambassador of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to the U.S.
Kofi Annan
Former Secretary-General of the United
Nations; Nobel Peace Prize (2001)
Richard Armitage
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Lord (Paddy) Ashdown
Former High Representative for Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Leader of the Liberal De-
mocrats, UK
Shlomo Ben-Ami
Former Foreign Minister of Israel
Lakhdar Brahimi
Former Special Adviser to the UN Secre-
tary-General and Foreign Minister of Alge-
ria
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to
the President
Kim Campbell
Former Prime Minister of Canada
Naresh Chandra
Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and
Ambassador to the U.S.
Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Former President of Mozambique
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe
Pat Cox
Former President of the European Parlia-
ment
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark
Gareth Evans
President Emeritus of Crisis Group; For-
mer Foreign Affairs Minister of Australia
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Joschka Fischer
Former Foreign Minister of Germany
Yegor Gaidar
Former Prime Minister of Russia
Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and U.S.
Trade Representative
Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Affairs Minister of Sweden
Page 40
Swanee Hunt
Former U.S. Ambassador to Austria; Chair,
The Initiative for Inclusive Security and
President, Hunt Alternatives Fund
Anwar Ibrahim
Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim
Foundation; Founder, Celtel International
Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of
Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan
James V. Kimsey
Founder and Chairman Emeritus of
America Online, Inc. (AOL)
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Aleksander Kwaśniewski
Former President of Poland
Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Former International Secretary of
International PEN; Novelist and journalist,
U.S.
Jessica Tuchman Mathews
President, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, U.S.
Moisés Naím
Former Venezuelan Minister of Trade and
Industry; Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy
Ayo Obe
Chair, Board of Trustees, Goree Institute,
Senegal
Christine Ockrent
CEO, French TV and Radio World Services
Victor Pinchuk
Founder of EastOne and Victor Pinchuk
Foundation
Fidel V. Ramos
Former President of Philippines
Güler Sabancı
Chairperson, Sabancı Holding, Turkey
Ghassan Salamé
Former Lebanese Minister of Culture;
Professor, Sciences Po, Paris
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Foreign Minister of Norway
Ernesto Zedillo
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale
Center for the Study of Globalization
Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents
Crisis Group Africa Report N°153, 4 September 2009 Page 41

PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
Crisis Group’s President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing
essential support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission.
BHP Billiton Frank Holmes StatoilHydro ASA
Canaccord Adams Limited Frederick Iseman Ian Telfer
Mala Gaonkar George Landegger Guy Ullens de Schooten
Alan Griffiths Ford Nicholson Neil Woodyer
Iara Lee & George Gund III Royal Bank of Scotland
Foundation

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute
their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.
Rita E. Hauser Harry Bookey & H.J. Keilman Yves OltramareDonald
(Co-Chair) Pamela Bass-Bookey George Kellner Pels and Wendy Keys
Elliott Kulick David Brown Anna Luisa Ponti &
Amed Khan Geoffrey Hoguet
(Co-Chair)
John Chapman Zelmira Koch
Hamza al Kholi Chester Michael Riordan
Anglo American PLC Scott Lawlor Tilleke & Gibbins
Chevron
APCO Worldwide Inc. Jean Manas Vale
Richard Cooper
Equinox Partners Marco Marazzi VIVATrust
Neil & Sandy DeFeo
Ed Bachrach McKinsey & Company Yapı Merkezi
John Ehara Construction and
Stanley Bergman & Najib Mikati Industry Inc.
Seth Ginns
Edward Bergman Harriet Mouchly-
Joseph Hotung Weiss

SENIOR ADVISERS
Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice
and support are called on from time to time (to the extent consistent with any other office they may be holding at the time).
Martti Ahtisaari Gianfranco Dell’Alba Matthew McHugh Christian Schwarz-
(Chairman Emeritus) Jacques Delors Nobuo Matsunaga Schilling
George Mitchell Alain Destexhe Miklós Németh Michael Sohlman
(Chairman Emeritus) William O. Taylor
Mou-Shih Ding Timothy Ong
Hushang Ansary Leo Tindemans
Gernot Erler Olara Otunnu
Ersin Arıoğlu Ed van Thijn
Marika Fahlén Shimon Peres
Óscar Arias Simone Veil
Stanley Fischer Surin Pitsuwan
Diego Arria Shirley Williams
Malcolm Fraser Cyril Ramaphosa
Zainab Bangura Grigory Yavlinski
I.K. Gujral George Robertson
Christoph Bertram Uta Zapf
Max Jakobson Michel Rocard
Alan Blinken
Todung Mulya Lubis Volker Rühe
Jorge Castañeda
Allan J. MacEachen Mohamed Sahnoun
Eugene Chien
Graça Machel Salim A. Salim
Victor Chu
Barbara McDougall Douglas Schoen
Mong Joon Chung