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Project Report

Introduction: A book written by my grandmas great great uncle, Samuel H. Hurst

connects my family to the Civil War. Hurst was a Union general in the civil war and

wrote a detailed journal, which provided a first-hand account of being a part of the

seventy-third Ohio volunteer infantry. Hurst writes about how difficult war recruiting was

during this time and notes how the propaganda he saw in newspapers was humorous.

Hurst spends more time providing detailed accounts of each battle in the war, and only

briefly mentions propaganda. This led me on a journey to find propagandist pieces that

were written around the time Hurst does. Each battle I examined is one Hurst wrote about

while mentioning propaganda he noticed. First will be Lincoln elected, the battle of

Belmont, Burnside stuck in the mud, battle of Chancellorsville, battle of Gettysburg,

battle of Missionary Ridge, new hope church, peach tree creek, second battle of

Kernstown, march to the sea, illustrations, resources during the war, and finally, North

Carolina.

Research Question: Did both the Union and Confederate newspapers provide glorified

and misleading coverage of the civil war?

Literature Review: The bulk of my secondary sources are books from confederate

viewpoints of the civil war since I wanted sources that contrasted with the primary

sources. Mainly these books are from the South, such as Virginia, and North Carolina.

The most helpful one was A press divided which has viewpoints from both sides. In

contrast, Journal-history of the seventy-third Ohio volunteer infantry and The North

Reports the Civil War provide insight into the Norths account of the war.
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Methodology: Internal criticism of Hurts journal is a family genealogy book written by

my great-great grandfather, C.E. Fowler, who identifies his wifes uncle as Samuel H.

Hurst, a general in the Civil War. Family research on Ancestroy.com also verifies this link

to Samuel Hurst. Hurts journal is called Journal-History of the Seventy-Third Ohio

Volunteer Infantry and Hardpress published the journal, whose niche is to print classic

and hard-to-find books. The journal Hurst wrote is authentic because it is also in the

University of Californias library system and can be found on Amazon.

Original research/evidence: The primary sources I found are newspapers from

Confederate states via the library of congress. The Athens post, The Free South, The New

York Herald, The Alleghanian, and The Telegraph & Confederate all provide confederate

viewpoints of the battles Hurst writes about. The other main primary source is Hurts

journal.

Analysis: Hurst wrote about propaganda he witnessed over a four-year span and

aptly realized how outlandish these newspapers were. It is unusual for a general, who is

amongst the chaos of the war, to notice something so trivial. We are daily in receipt

of newspapers of Augusta and Savannah, and of the rural districts,

which our foragers bring in; and we laugh ourselves to tears

sometimes at their last ditch literature. Half-scared to death, and yet

boastful and defiant, they exhibit a rich combination of the coward and

the braggart (Hurst, 159). As being in the center of the war, Hurst had

a unique viewpoint that other soldiers missed, ignored, and failed to

write about. It is unusual to look at the Civil War as a propagandist war,

yet multiple sources allude to that. Hursts realization was quite

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modern, as historians whom examined the press after the war are able

to see the blatant transparency. To modern readers, the acerbic tone

of the eras reporting seems more akin to partisan propaganda than

objective journalism (Davis & Robertson, 35). This further reiterates

what Hurst picked up on and shows how most journalists wrote in a

propagandist tone. Even when the Civil War had just begun, there was

already a general favoritism towards the Confederates which set the

tone for snarky pieces on the Union. Early in the conflict, negative

press plagued Union generals, and Grant was no exception. At Belmont

in November 1861, inexperienced journalists misinterpreted much of

what they saw, and their subsequent accounts minimalized the Union

successes to the point of calling it a total defeat (Sachsman, 96).

Perhaps part of the problem was the influx of new journalists who

werent sure how to report on the war and copied the tone of other

confederate writers. Likewise, the Union took advantage of reporting

unflattering pieces on the Confederates as well. Jefferson Davis and

his military leaders recived scathing criticism after the defeats in the

spring of 1862 (Sachsman, 133). No side was exempt from damning write-ups in

papers.

Lincoln played a significant role in how the Union was perceived during the war.

Hurst describes newspapers he saw on Lincolns election. Those newspapers were clearly

propaganda, as Hurst does not mention the different opinions towards Lincolns re-

election, perhaps because he was only sent or only read opinions that matched his own.
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And newspapers also, telling us that Abraham Lincoln is re-elected President. So the

people- the loyal millions- stand by the President, and the army, and the country. To them

the war is not a failure, and this is their verdict: that the nation shall be saved (Hurst,

163). This one-sided account of Lincolns win shows that Hursts journal was not exempt

from utilizing his influence as a general to create more support for the Union.

While the Union stood by Lincoln, the Confederates were conflicted. The Daily

Macon Telegraph & Confederate newspaper was not happy about

Lincoln running for president, and voiced their dismay. The Sentinel

says that the Yankee privates are very much depressed at the result of

the Presidential election, declaring there was not a free expression of

opinion allowed them, and that they are hopeless of a speedy

termination of the war. The number of deserters has largely increased

since the result of the election was made known in the army. To use the

expression of our informant, they are deserting in droves (Telegraph &

Confederate, 1864). Many Confederates were dissatisfied with Lincoln

becoming President and this differs from Hurts account of Lincolns

win. Even General Grant, who many journalists liked to make fun of,

helped change some of the less favorable views of Lincoln. Grants

embrace of Lincolns leadership, often expressed through Cadwaladers

dispatches from headquarters, gradually led to a lessening of the

Heralds previously vitriolic view of the President (Sachsman, 104).

This shows how Grant had the power to change the publics perception
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of Lincoln and thus be against the Union as they went hand and hand

with Lincoln.

The Union was less favored to win the due to the fact that they

opposed slavery and had Lincolns support. Therefore many journalists

were more supportive towards the Confederates in their writing. Even

when the Union won the battle of Belmont, Confederate newspapers

still wrote about the Union in an unkind tone. The battle at Belmont

though called by Gen. Grant who commanded the expedition a

victory, was in effect a severe repulse and deranges a plan for taking

New Madrid and Columbus (Ivins, 1861). This shows how even though

Grant admitted that the Union won the battle, the Confederates did not

buy such a claim and instead wrote that the Union had an alterative

motive. This negative attitude towards the federalists could help bring

some light as to why the North suppressed some of the Southern

papers. The unflattering comments upset the Union and they resulted

in exerting their power.

The battle of Fredericksburg was a battle that the Union lost.

While Hurst did not mention any discrepancies between his experience

and what the press wrote, there are some differences. The

encyclopedia of Virginia mentions how the Union destroyed Virginia

and does not congratulate the Confederates on their victory. After

crossing the Rappahannock into Fredericksburg, the Union troops

engaged in widespread looting and vandalism, effectively destroying

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what was left of the town (Rafuse, 2011). This one-sided view makes

the Union look bad and fails to mention the damage the Confederates

did beforehand. This omission continues the confederate trend of

painting the North in an unflattering light. What the correspondents

failed to mention was that some of the destruction of property in

Fredericksburg had been committed by Confederate soldiers who had

occupied the city before the battle (Andrews, 230). These differing

accounts show how easy it was to change the narrative depending on

who the audience was. The Rebel press was not on the Union side and

continued to write about how they would win the battle of

Fredericksburg. We must wait-wait for pontoons to cross on, which will

be simply waiting for the rebel army to arrive and entrench itself

(Rable, 81). This confidence in the Confederates was a common theme

in Rebel newspapers, and shows how they were favored. Yet the

opposing side was no better. The Republican papers tried to limit talk

of the Fredericksburg campaign loosing and often had contradictory

reports of the battle. Republican newspapers, despite sometimes

contrary reports in their own columns, naturally tried to scotch talk of

the campaign fizzling (Rable, 82). This unorthodox journalism method

was common throughout reporting of the war, and each side used such

measures to attract more support for their army.

Even something as seemingly insubstantial as the number of casualties in battles

was something that both sides fluctuated to work in their favor. The battle of
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Fredericksburg is one such example. Hurst reflected on the battle by noting that the loss

of our army was very great; that of the enemy very slight (49). Hurst does not provide

any numbers, so it is hard to trust his statement. Whilst both parties never gave accurate

accounts of the deaths of soldiers nor the number of soldiers fighting, the Confederates

were all over the place. Confederate newspaper editors and reporters played the numbers

game with both casualty figures and estimates of the numbers of troops engaged. Perhaps

the acme of such foolishness was in a letter to the Knoxville Register from Richmond,

which credited Burnside with having had 20,000 soldiers participating in the battle while

the Confederates had only 20,000 troops engaged. In the same letter the statistics of killed

and wounded were placed at 1,800 Confederates and 19,000 Yankees! (Andrews, 230).

This broad range of numbers was a way for both parties to gain more sympathy. Loosing

more soldiers than your enemy is a sign of a battle well fought, while killing more of the

enemies soldiers shows how strong that party is. The peach-tree creek battle is a different

story. Hurst did not provide the physical number of soldiers who died, but did mention

that the rebels lost a significant amount of soldiers. The enemys loss was very heavy,

being estimated by themselves at six thousand men (Hurst, 140). Hurst took more of an

informative tone, and was kind to both sides with his journal entries.

Hurst mentions how the rebels had a monopoly on newspaper

headlines on January 20, 1863 after General Burnsides surprise

campaign resulted in many union soldiers being stuck in mud. The

rebel pickets furnished the headlines for the Northern press, by posting

up placards opposite our picket-posts, with Burnside Stuck in the

Mud! in large capitals. They thus wrote the history of the expedition
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(Hurst, 51). Therefor the Confederates controlled what the press said

about the mud march while simultaneously making fun of the Union

army. Hursts interpretation of the mud march is confirmed by another

writer. Southerners response to Federal maneuvers had largely been

contemptuous. Confederate soldiers had set up hand boards with

large letters that read Burnside Stuck In The Mud. Scornful pickets

shouted to the Yanks with mockingly polite invitations to come over or

offers to help with the pontoons (Rabel, 421). While these comments

were not misleading, they once again painted the Union in an

unflattering light. Such nasty comments were also printed in

newspapers. The Alleghanian did not have kind words to say about the

Norths dire situation. I do not hesitate to say that the failure of this

latest movement was due, primarily and mainly to the insubordination-

the word not too strong- of some of the generals in command under

Burnside (the allegnhanian, 1863). These harsh words about the

Union seem to stem not only from the unfortunate mud campaign, but

also from a general hatred of the union. They are spiteful words

persuaded individuals with like-minded views. The Confederates

thought this sticky situation was so amusing that they made up a short

song for said occasion. Hookers and Franklins men could be heard

joining a lugubrious chorus of what was turning into a campfire

favorite, Burnsides Army Lies Floundering in the Mud (Rabel, 418).

This shows how the Confederates felt about the Union and there
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situation. The belief that the Union would win the war was at an all

time low after this disastrous campaign. Similarly to mass media today,

although circulated slower, the news of their failure spread like wildfire.

Reports rapidly spread from the camps to the newspapers and finally

to the southern home front that the Army of Potomac had become

completely demoralized (Rabel, 421). This is an exaggerated account

of what happened, and thus mislead the public into believing the Union

was destroyed. As the North tried to downplay their unfortunate

circumstances, the Rebels werent buying it. People did not find their

assessments credible. Northern dirt-eaters grow more insolent and

shameless everyday, George Templeton Strong wrote wearily (Rabel,

421). It is interesting that the Rebels and perhaps other Northerners

picked up on the untruthful stories the Union was writing, and called

them out for it. Yet it seems like the only instance where this

happened.

While the siege of Savannah happened in 1864, Hurst mentions a

few other battles where he noted some discrepancies between what

happened and what he witnessed. Another battle that the

Confederates won was Chancellorsville. Hurst describes how the Union

was not prepared for the battle and that contributed to their downfall

which the Confederates could interpret as an excuse. The truth was

that neither the commander of the corps nor of the respective divisions

whose duty it was to guard the flank had made any preparation to
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meet the enemy in that direction; The attack of his massed column of

20,000 was a surprise from which the men could not recover- a shock

which they could not resist (Hurst, 56). Yet this is a one-sided view as

Hurst was on the Union side. The Free South newspaper described the

Unions position in the battle of Chancellorsville differently than Hursts

account by focusing on the strategies of the North, which provides a

different interpretation of the war that makes the Union look bad.

Many members of the staff of General Hooker and other general

officers placed themselves in the road, and with drawn sabres smote

and slashed the cowardly rascals (The Free South, 1863). This account

of the Chancellorsville battle differs from Hursts and shows how

differing angles can change the publics perception. The Free South

newspaper chose to depict the North as prepared for the battle and

was also overly optimistic after their win. Our troops are perfectly cool

and confident. They have fought with great enthusiasm and spirit, and

will continue to do so (the free south, 1863). While this is not

propaganda, it shows how this paper was written to match the views of

its readers. Suppression of news was done on both the north and south

sides. In retaliation of the confederates winning the battle of

Chancellorsville, the North temporarily suppressed the news of their

loss via telegraph censors. The New York editors were upset that news

about the Union defeat at Chancellorsville, Virginia, in May 1863 had

been suppressed by military telegraph censors for a month because

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General Joseph Hooker was trying to protect his rear, and did not want

the world to know about his retreat(Sachsman, 281). When reflecting

on the war, most individuals consider the Confederates to be more

propagandist than the Union yet suppressing the news in order to skirt

away from a defeat is just as bad. The Northern press used another

interesting tactic to take the blame away from the Union and place it

upon the Germans, which Blank notes were not significant members of

the battle of Chancellorsville. In their efforts to find a scapegoat upon

which to fasten responsibility for the failure of that magnificent army

and its leader, they enlarged on the misconduct of the cowardly

Dutchmen of the Eleventh Corps although considerably less than half

of the corps were Germans (Cutler, 371). Thus the Union tried to shift

the blame from themselves onto someone else. Since news during this

era took awhile to reach the public, this helps explain how the Union

was able to temporarily suppress the news.

Resources during the war were a problem that was rarely covered in newspapers

and was often glorified. The Macon Daily had some choice words to say about the

soldiers use of resources. Our soldiers act as if our resources were inexhaustible, when

in fact they are becoming very scanty (1863). Yet this attitude contradicts what Hurst

mentions. The men bore these privations with commendable patience, though many fell

sick for want of proper food (Hurst, 21). There were also discrepancies on the resources

during the battle of Gettysburg. Today there were hundreds of well-dressed citizens

coming in to see the battle-field. They were talking about what a noble battle we had
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fought, and what a splendid victory we had won; but they said not a word about helping

to bind up the wounds of our suffering thousands- not a word about making a cup of

coffee or a pallet of straw for a single bleeding patriot. They had come to see merely

(Hurst, 77). This is a sad image, and shows how many individuals were not providing

resources nor helping soldiers. This is also something that is rare to see in newspapers as

it depicts a seemingly boring side of the war. Many individuals do not want to think about

dwindling resources and rather read about the battles of the war.

Hurst described the battle of New Hope Church as a battle that

Gen. Hooker had been against, and one that made the confederates

stronger (Hurst, 130-131). A confederate newspaper, The New York

Herald, had some choice words to say about the battle. The newspaper

notes that Sherman was not against the battle, but adds a question of

doubt to this statement. Which the rebel papers say Sherman has so

repeatedly refused (New York Herald, 1864). The mention of the rebel

papers, and the language used shows how this confederate paper was

doubtful that the Union was unsupportive of the battle of New Hope

Church. It is also interesting to note that Hurst talks about Gen. Hooker

being against this battle, while the New York Herald only talks about

Sherman being opposed of the war.

An article titled the last repulse of the Yankees talks about the second battle of

Kernstown which happened on July 24, 1864. The article refers to the confederates

veteran General and his invincible soldiers which is a glorified way to refer to their

soldiers. The article also does some hypothesizing as to what the Union soldiers might do
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next. But we suspect that Sherman will be foiled completely and his strategy

overwhelmed by the rapid movements of an active rival whose enterprise is not inferior

to his own (The Lancaster ledger., 1864). The Confederates did beat the Union in this

war and were clearly riding on their high horse with these comments. Once again, there is

a dissonance between what the Union and Confederates wrote about each other.

According to Hurts journal, his comment about propaganda was written around

November 15th to December 21st 1864, when Sherman began his march to the sea. One

explanation for the questionable journalist tactics during Shermans march was the fact

that Southeastern states did not have reliable sources to begin with, which made writing

objective pieces difficult. The newspapers of Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina had

to depend for news about Shermans advance and Wheelers hit-and-run tactics on

newspaper exchanges that were hardly better informed then they (Andrews, 469). Thus

having unsatisfactory sources results in less than substantial information on the civil war

and results in journalists embellishing stories to keep readers interested. The New York

Herald, a confederate paper, did not shy away from being critical of the North, even when

it was evident that Sherman and his army were winning the war. So much for Shermans

great and glorious Christmas Gift to the Union (New York Herald, 1864). It is difficult

to figure out what this journalist is alluding to, as Sherman did successfully capture the

port of Savannah. Opposing newspapers still had critical, and hypothetical comments

during coverage of the civil war. As Hurst talks about in his journal, the above comment

is laughable, as this Confederate newspaper was grasping through thin air for a negative

thing to say about this upset.

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The Daily Macon Telegraph & Confederate newspaper did not hide their political

views when they reported on their hope for the Unions demise. Shermans situation is

daily growing more precarious, and we may confidently hope for his complete overthrow

and destruction (Telegraph & Confederate, 1864). This comment is misleading, as by

1864, the Union had conquered both Georgia and Atlanta and seems to be a last ditch

effort to reassure the Confederates that they could still win the war. This comment might

have been written around the time of Shermans March to the Sea since this newspaper is

dated November 24, nine days after Sherman began his famous march. The Atlanta

Confederacy was hopeful that Johnstons troops would ultimately herd the Union back to

Tennessee. We have before us a letter from one of the highest official sources in the

Army of Tennessee, from which we extract the following: we are in superb spirits. The

Yankees have got to fight for Atlanta, and when they do fight, we are certain to whip

them as decisively as the sun is certain to rise on that day (Sachsman, Rushing, and

Morris, 171). The decision to not name their source makes it less reputable, and once

again the Confederates tried to turn something negative into a positive. This further

explains why it was such a surprise that the Union won. Yet even some Northern papers

were surprised that the Union defeated the Confederates, as Im sure the public was just

as dumbfounded. They are in earnest the like of which the world never saw before,

silently, calmly, but desperately in earnest; they will fight on, in my opinion, as long as

they have men, muskets, and powder until they win an unconditional victory (The

London Daily News, 1864). These are supportive words, even though there is a tone of

surprise to the set in stone victory of the Union.

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The tone in Confederate papers began to change once some realized the Union

might win the war. The Confederates were stubborn throughout their reporting of the

Civil War and used a superior tone in their papers until Richmond, Virginia was captured

in 1865 by the Union. Up to the very hour of the evacuation of Richmond, newspapers

appeared as confident as ever. The superiority of southern fighting ability, of southern

resources, patriotism, and vigilance was always assumed. At the same time the Union

solider was belittled, the dissension and disaffection in his section were magnified many

times over (Silver, 501). It is interesting that this newspaper chose to write about how

the Union soldiers were feeling since they were not on the field. Even with multiple wins

under their belt, the Union continued to face backlash from opposing forces until it was

painfully clear that the Union would win. Junius Daniel, who served in the Confederate

States Army during the Civil War, made such disbelief apparent in a journal entry he

wrote. The news of 1863 had been nearly all bad for the Union. Disaster at

Fredericksburg. The Dismal Mud March. Burnside relieved by Hooker. Defeat for the

Union ironclads at Charleston Harbor (Crozier, 336). While these defeats are true,

Daniel does not mention the victories of the Union and uses a tone of superiority when

writing about them.

One of the few newspapers to act like Switzerland received a huge amount of

backlash for doing so. The Republican paper did not succumb to the union or confederate

side and instead advocated for both sides, since the two editors of the paper had different

views, but the public was not pleased with this decision. The general public deemed it

weakness and a sign of duplicity to publish articles advocating both sides of the issue

and dubbed the paper the swill tub (Sachsman, 53). A Virginia paper tried this tactic as
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well, to no avail. The attempt, however, on the part of any opposition paper to be

simultaneously a Union journal and a Southern journal was becoming illogical if not well

neigh impossible (Cappon, 14). This explains why the majority took a side during the

civil war, as no newspaper wanted to loose the core of their audience due to not taking

sides. It is important to note that not all of the papers in this era were propagandist. The

Enquirer was able to omit their opinions and write objectively towards the war. Wise

and his successors objectively reported the news rather than venting their dissatisfaction

with Confederates conduct of the war (Tunnell, 37). This should have been how all the

papers of this era reported the war yet a backlash amongst the public contributed to a

public outcry which can be detrimental to a newspapers survival.

Even the government was susceptible to using propaganda to sway the publics

opinion. The most obvious propaganda device of the state governments was the

governors proclamation, which might take any form from a dignified defense of

secession to the use of atrocity stories to highlight emotional predictions as to the fate of

the Confederacy if its people did not respond to patriotic appeals (Silver, 491). It is

alarming to realize how much influence the government had on the publics perception of

the war. Interestingly, some Confederates found Union reports of the war trust worthier

than the governments own account. Perhaps this was because the government was more

blatantly controlling in their writing, while reports straight from the horses mouth was

more trustworthy. The first information that Richmond received about the battle (of

Gettysburg) was from Northern news sources. Richmond editors were understandably

skeptical about a Yankee version of the fighting, although the Examiner concluded that

the enemy accounts were more favorable to us than any the Northern government has yet
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permitted [to] appear immediately after a battle (Andrews, 315). Both sides had to be

careful when writing about battles, as they were aware that both sides were reading one

anothers to try and see what their next plan of attack was. Yet this sometimes resulted in

reporting errors by the Confederates and Union. General Thomas J. Jackson once found

an account of an intended secret march printed in a Baltimore paper before he was

halfway to his objective, and Davis himself was responsible in 1864 for an indiscretion

which allowed Sherman to discover, through newspaper accounts of his Macon speech,

the military plans of the government (Silver, 489-499). This misinformation was not

uncommon and probably taught each side to read those reports with an error of caution.

A common theme amongst newspapers on both sides was to make the war seem

more exciting by writing that soldiers were excited to fight. Hurst recalled the anxiety he

and his soldiers felt before embarking on another battle. There was great anxiety

throughout the army, but not much inspired concerning the enterprise (Hurst, 50).

Individuals at home were already worried enough about their loved ones fighting in a

war, and thus newspapers had no incentive to write about hardships the army faced. One

such individual wrote to his wife that the newspapers interpretation of the soldiers was

wrong. The report of newspaper correspondents that the troops are all eager for the fray

are simply all bosh (McPherson). Contrary to the heroic image of soldiers created by the

media, many were anxiety ridden and ready to come home.

Another propagandist element Hurst could have been referring to was illustrations

in newspapers. Two of the most popular illustrated newspapers were Harpers Weekly, a

pro-Union newspaper and Frank Leslies illustrated newspaper supported the rebels.

Harpers published a cartoon that showed a cowardly soldier in a dress and feminine
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utensils such as a broom which challenged the manhood of those who were not

volunteering to fight for the Union (Kuhn, 2006). This type of cartoon was used to play

into males fears of being labeled as weak for not volunteering to fight in the war. Both

sides utilized this medium to make the other look bad. Leslies published a cartoon in

1863, which depicted New York City as having a tantrum while the cities mother,

Lincoln, looked exasperated. This cartoon was a diss towards the Union due to riots that

occurred in New York due to their call for a new draft of soldiers for the Union armies.

Another cartoon makes fun of Lincoln and his surplus of generals who had fought and

lost to Southern armies in Virginia. The cartoon depicts Lincoln as a puppet master who

is holding a toy of Lincolns newest general/puppet, fighting Joe Hooker. These

cartoons were quite creative, and showed the great lengths each side would go to prove

how great they were.

These unfortunate circumstances led to an awkward farewell between Union

soldiers and North Carolina at the end of the war. Orders were issued that the greatest

possible lenity should be shown to the citizens of North Carolina, because of their long

continued devotion to the old government at the commencement of the war, and also on

account of their oft-repeated and now earnest demand that the war should cease (Hurst,

170). Even though there was some bad blood between the North and South, some states

were able to make amends.

The amount of propaganda on both sides was relatively evenly distributed. Since

Hursts journal was through the point of view of a union soldier, the bias in this paper

cannot be controlled. Even 150 years later, this tactic of persuading the publics opinion

to one side over another can be found in the present day media. Now more than ever our
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political parties are split, and both used propagandist techniques to sway the publics

opinion. Yet perhaps this old-fashioned technique should be banished, as the Unions win

was a surprise to many who followed the newspapers relentlessly; just as Trumps victory

was a shock to many individuals. Part of the dissatisfaction of the North was due to

Lincolns outspoken support for them, which he often spoke about during his campaign.

Confederates who did not support Lincoln also wanted to separate from the Union, which

helps explain why there was so much hatred towards the opposite party.

Hooper Hurst Elizabeth James

B: November 27, 1793 B: 1873
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Robert J. Doyle
B: June 1842 Ohio Emily Lucretia Hurst Samuel H. Hurst
B: February 1842 B: September 22, 1831

Charles Evan Fowler Lucille Hurst Doyle

B: February 10, 1867 B: October 17, 1869

Irene Viola Harkness

B: September 1, 1893 Harold Doyle Fowler
B: September 16, 1891

Elizabeth Ann Fowler Byron Hastings Miller

B: July 9, 1926 B: November 19, 1926

Elisabeth Ann Miller

B: October 23rd 1962 Peter Rhodes Lindburg
B: December 7, 1958

APA
Annika Lindburg
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Andrews, J. C. (1970). The South Reports The Civil War. Princeton, New Jersey:

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