[Translation of Article Published in the Economic Observer, April 12, 2010]

Note: The original Chinese is available at: http://www.lrn.cn/stratage/expertpoint/201004/t20100412_480131.htm

http://www.eeo.com.cn/observer/shijiao/2010/04/13/167385.shtml

Responsibility of Upstream States: Environmental Impacts of China’s hydropower development on

the Upstream Mekong

Reflections on a Depleted Mekong River

Qin Hui

Outbound Runoff Volume Accounts for 13.5%?

As China continues to make progress developing hydropower on the mainstream of Langcang
River, public attention from the downstream Mekong River Countries has continued to increase.
Criticisms of negative impacts in particular, have increased since the year 2008. For example,
irregularities in water flows between the Tonle Sop Lake and the Mekong River in Cambodia, rare
catastrophic flooding in the Vientiane plain in Laos and sea water encroachment in Vietnam at the
Mekong Delta have all been attributed to China’s upstream development.
Especially since the recent catastrophic drought in Southwest China and the occurrence of
record low water levels in the downstream Mekong River just beyond the Chinese border, the Lao
and Thai media have focused even more attention on Mekong River issues. On March 11, the
Chinese Embassy in Thailand held a press conference on the Mekong River drought, at which in
addition to repeating its routine statement that “annual runoff of the outbound Langcang River
represents only 13.5% of annual Mekong runoff volume,” the Embassy also pointed out that the
reservoirs of three new dams on the upstream Langcang: the Manwan Reservoir, Dachaoshan
Reservoir and Jinghong Reservoir cause only negligible evaporation as they are relatively small
and have low water consumption. Based on this, the Embassy went on to conclude that China’s
hydropower development has virtually no impact on the water volume of the downstream Mekong
River.
During recent visits to Southeast Asia, the author heard frequent criticisms of Chinese
construction of hydropower facilities, which are said to cause numerous environmental problems.
The author feels compelled to respond to these criticisms. The author thinks that these criticisms of
China are often groundless, or at a minimum they lack compelling evidence, and has debated
regularly with critics of China throughout his travels to the region. However, in the author’s view,
the response of the Chinese Embassy officials is completely inappropriate, and does nothing to
help to put the record straight. Instead, it gives the impression that China is trying to pull a fast one
on its neighbors. It is said that this very tactless statement came not from the Embassy directly, but
was based on a statement from the Ministry of Water Resources. From the author’s perspective,
this is even more puzzling. It is difficult to understand how such an ignorant statement might come
from a professional department like the Ministry of Water Resources.
The main argument Chinese officials have repeatedly is that “the annual runoff of the outbound
Lancang represents only 14% (or 13.5% or 16% alternatively) of the annual runoff volume of the
Mekong River.” When applied to problems arising in the far downstream area, especially in the
Mekong River Delta, such as the sea water encroachment issues faced by Vietnam it might follow
from this argument that such phenomenon are not related to developments in China. After all, the
runoff in the Delta area obviously did not come directly from China. On the other hand, such an
argument is ridiculous when applied to problems arising in the near downstream area. In the far
downstream, the three downstream tributaries of the Mekong River – the Mun River, the San -
Mekong River and Tonle Sap River account for the vast majority of the runoff from Champassak,
Laos down south to the Mekong River Delta. North of the Mun River up to the port of Guanlei, the
runoff of the Lancang River (which is within China’s borders) represents a much greater
proportion of total runoff volume of the Mekong (for example, approximately two thirds of runoff
volume near Luang Prabang, Laos comes from China). For this reason, we cannot just say that
river water problems in this area have nothing to do with China. For example, the 2008 flood in
Vientiane, Laos and the present low water levels occurred in sections of the Mekong River for
which nearly all of its runoff originates from China. Any argument which focuses on the
percentage of runoff coming from China at the Mekong River Delta to talk about what is
happening just south of the Chinese border is ridiculous.

Tall Dams and Large Reservoirs have “No Impact?”

Of course, even if all of the water flows originate within China, it would be ridiculous to say
that China is able to control the Mekong River system, and to blame it for natural changes in river
flows during the wet or dry seasons. The drought in Southwest China definitely played a role in
causing the unusually low water levels in the downstream earlier this year. To link the low water
levels in the downstream to China’s construction of a number of tall dams in the upstream though
requires evidence to prove that changes in outbound runoff are not natural occurrences. The
argument that the construction of hydropower stations has no effect on downstream runoff because
of their low water evaporation and low levels of water consumption is a prevarication and is
completely illogical. It is common knowledge that the impacts of a reservoir on the downstream
are not a result of “evaporation” or “water consumption,” (What do you think a reservoir is
afterall? A giant kettle?) but are a result of the storing and discharging of water. The opening and
closing of floodgates has tremendous impacts on the downstream runoff – if this were not the case,
why would experts constantly be talking about the ability of reservoirs to prevent droughts or
floods?
Of course the capacity of a reservoir is limited, and its ability to influence downstream runoff
is also limited. The larger a reservoir’s storage capacity (especially adjustment capacity), the
greater will be the duration and distance over which it will influence downstream runoff.
Reservoirs, accordingly, could be divided into those with daily, monthly, seasonal, annual and
long term impacts. Chinese reservoirs have tremendous capacity for water resource adjustment.
Although China’s outbound runoff represents only 14% of the Mekong’s total runoff volume, the
capacity of Chinese reservoirs represents 70% of total storage capacity of all reservoirs along the
Mekong River (once the Nuozhadu reservoir is put into use, the total share will rise to nearly
90%). On the mainstream of the Mekong, Chinese reservoir capacity represents 100% of total
mainstream reservoir capacity (note that there are only Chinese reservoirs on mainstream of the
Mekong River). The effect (and as will be see below, this is not just a negative effect) of the
operation of these reservoirs cannot simply be reduced to mere water resource calculations.
Theoretically speaking, there is a possibility that these reservoirs can affect not only the near
downstream but also the far downstream area, at times having impacts as far away as down in the
delta area!
Chinese government officials emphasize the small surface areas of the Manwan, Dazhaoshan
and Jinghong reservoirs, yet the effect of a reservoir relies heavily on its capacity, and has
nothing to do with surface area. The three above mentioned reservoirs are all reservoirs of tall
dams that exceed 100 meters in height. Their respective capacities are 920 million, 940 million
and 1.4 billion cubic meters, which collectively adds up to the volume of Dianchi Lake three
times over. According a relevant technical department in China, the Manwan Reservior and
Dachaoshan Reservior have seasonal water flow adjustment capacity, while the Jinghong
 Reservoir has monthly capacity (although it is said by some to have seasonal capacity). This is to
say that the three reservoirs have the capacity to influence the downstream runoff for at least a
period of four months (one season). While it might be argued that positive impacts outweigh
negative, it goes against common sense to argue that the reservoirs seldom influence downstream
runoff volume because they cause “limited evaporation.” For the Chinese government to make
such an argument in the face of common knowledge severely harms China’s national image.
Government officials also claim that there are only three reservoirs on the Lancang River. The
Chinese media though has reported that the forth reservoir, the Xiaowan, which is much bigger
than the others, was put into use on September 25, 2009. The dam at Xiaowan is the highest double
arch dam in the world, and its capacity, which is said to be 15.8 billion cbm, (or at least 14.6
billion cbm) ranks just below that of Three Gorges Dam, and is almost 5 times larger than the total
capacity of the above mentioned three reservoirs. Relying on average annual runoff, it takes more
than four and half a months to fill the reservoir. During the dry season, when average runoff is
equal to only half of average annual runoff, releasing the full capacity of the reservoir will increase
downstream runoff to the annual average for a period of nearly 10 months. Obviously no dry
season will ever last 10 month, so of course the question is begged – what will water levels be like
the rest of the time?
Of course these are only rough estimations – in reality the capacity of the reservoir to regulate
downstream flows is always designed to be less than the total storage capacity. However, the
capacity of this reservoir to regulate downstream flows is most impressive. Even propaganda and
statements from the hydropower industry repeatedly claim that the capacity of the reservoir
enables it to balance runoffs to the downstream dams, including the Jinghong hydropower facility,
which is not far from the border. Oddly enough, despite this fact, government officials still find it
prudent to make the claim that the dam has “almost no impact.” In fact, people in the downstream
counties suspect that since the Xiaowan Reservior was only put into use in September, that
because of its huge capacity, even now it is still in the process of filling. While certainly the
drought throughout the region was horrible, it is also completely possible that water levels in the
Mekong were decreased further because of the impact of this new over-sized reservoir. In order to
determine whether or not the reservoir is having an impact, this requires that one have information
regarding the operations of the reservoir. Merely saying that the reservoir has “hardly no impact”
does nothing to convince the public that the dams did not contribute to the drought.
What is more, we know that construction on the biggest reservoir in the Lancang River area,
the Nuozhadu Reservoir, began in 2006, and that once complete it will have the capacity to store
23.7 billion cbm. We also know that this reservoir has already started storing water. Not only will
the Nuozhadu have even greater capacity than the Xiaowan Reservoir, it is also very close to the
downstream border. I really wonder whether once this project is complete if we will still make
statements like “it has a small surface area, low evaporation levels and low water consumption,
meaning it has no serious effect on the downstream?”

Release or Store Water during the Drought?

By this point it should be clear that the reservoirs of tall dams do impact the downstream, and
what matters is whether the impacts are positive or negative. A number of environmental
organizations have tended towards worshiping all things natural, and necessarily judge all impacts
of infrastructure projects to be negative. Such analysis is far too simple. In reality, a reservoir can
have both positive and negative impacts. The types of impacts depend not only on the
appropriateness of the reservoir’s construction but also to a great extent on the subsequent
operation and regulation of the reservoir.
The way a reservoir operates and regulates is constantly changing and inevitably involves
extensive technical knowledge. In the most simple terms possible, a reservoir’s operation alternates
between the following two activities: one is known as positive regulation, which consists of
holding water to prevent flooding and releasing water to relieve a drought. Normally, the way of
doing this is to keep the water level of the reservoir as low as possible before river waters rise so
that the reservoir can trap as much of the downstream runoff and fill to maximum capacity by the
end of the flood season. In order to accomplish this, during the dry season, the reservoir must be
maintained at the lowest possible level by releasing as much water as possible into the river. This
has the comprehensive effect of keeping runoffs at elevated levels during the dry season, and at
levels below peak flood stage in the wet season. In this way, a reservoir can prevent flood, relieve
drought and balance runoff volumes downstream. Such an impact, in most cases, is welcomed by
downstream residents. However, this kind of regulation usually conflicts with the electricity-
generation and sediment-flushing needs of hydropower stations.
The other mode of operation consists of discharging the flood waters and retaining limited
flows in the dry season. This type of operation represents almost the exact opposite of the first type
of operation discussed above. In this case, upstream reservoirs release turbid waters in the wet
season and store water by cutting the upstream water flow in the dry season. Because flood waters
carry much sediment and are likely to cause blockages, this way of regulating permits the flushing
of sediment in the wet season and sustains reservoir capacity in the dry season. Beyond this
consideration, such a mode of operation increases the efficiency of electricity-generation, which is
dependent on the volume of water flows and the head or height of the water. As during the dry
season, water flow volume is limited, storing water helps to sustain high water levels upstream,
which is good for electricity generation, although bad for the downstream. Used to the maximum
extent, this mode of operating will lead to extreme flooding in the wet season and extreme drought
in the dry season, which obviously will seriously harm interests of the downstream.
The Three Gorges Reservoir, the Sanmenxia Reservoir and some other Chinese reservoirs
adopt such a mode of operations, which some Chinese refer to as “a great innovation”. In reality if
one desires to protect hydropower facilities and maximize electricity output, it is really not so
difficult to think of such an operating scheme. However, this scheme goes totally against the
original intent of the reservoir which was to control flooding and relieve drought. It was only when
reservoirs, particularly the Sanmenxia Reservoir, were faced with great threats from sedimentation
that they began using such a means of operation. Although experts have racked their brains and
designed a complicated regulating method to balance the need to regulate flows for the sake of the
downstream and to protect facilities, the original design function of the reservoir to protect against
flooding has been greatly reduced. By now, Sanmenxia reservoir has practically lost this function.
Operators want to sustain capacity and ensure electricity generating, which often conflicts
with the downstream needs of flood and drought control. Within China, this is a dilemma regularly
faced by operators. To offer an extreme example, conflict between Henan province and Shanxi
province over the use of Sanmenxia Reservoir got so heated that the provinces began debating
whether the reservoir should be entirely abandoned.
As for the tall dams and big reservoirs spanning the Lancang River, they are built primarily
for power generation, as the Lancang River flows through ravines and valleys which are sparsely
polluted and where there is little farmland. In the downstream on the other hand, the Mekong river
flows through vast flatlands and plains where there are dense populations and along which are
located the economic centers of a number of downstream states. As such, fighting floods and
draught are the basic needs of downstream countries. One can easily imagine that the need of the
upstream to sustain reservoir capacity and generate power conflicts with the need of the
downstream to control flooding and prevent draught.
The Thai media has blamed China for the unusually low level of water in the Mekong this
year. The Chinese media reported the response made by one Thai official to these protests. This
official noted that China is unlikely to cut off water flow in the dry season and that accordingly the
unusual Mekong drought should be attributed to natural disaster caused by global warming.
This official has probably not heard anything about the controversy over how most Chinese
dams operate. However, it should be the responsibility of the Chinese hydropower authorities to
publicly explain whether or not reservoirs are retaining water in the dry season. If Chinese
reservoirs have not retained water, but have instead released stored water to help relieve the
downstream drought, China might be said to be making a great contribution to the downstream,
and should proudly promote the efforts that it has made. However, in this case Chinese
hydropower authorities have kept silent on the issue, claiming that there are “no impacts to the
downstream areas” and have evaded the real issue by changing the subject to talk about
“evaporated quantity of water.” In reality, such a response reveals much about what is likely the
truth.

Can two Conflicting Criticisms Co-exist?

Publicizing that our reservoirs are retaining water in the dry season will inevitably invite
criticism. However on occasion this might also invite gratitude. Normally, downstream areas
welcome flood control and drought relief, but under certain conditions, exaggerated effects in the
flood and drought seasons may be welcomed by downstream areas.
In fact, determining whether the impacts of a reservoir’s operations are positive or negative
for the downstream is a complicated problem. Different operating schemes have different impacts,
and even the same scheme may result in different consequences at different points along the
downstream. Just as there is no consensus between the upstream country and the downstream
countries, there is similarly no consensus among different downstream states. For example, for
both the catastrophic flood along the Vientiane Plain in Laos in 2008 and the unprecedented low
water levels in the north Mekong river this year, we heard people in Laos complain that operation
of reservoirs upstream in China had caused extreme changes in runoff volume, meaning greater
runoff volumes in the flood season and smaller runoff volumes in the dry season. However, during
my recent trip to Cambodia, I heard exactly the opposite complaints. The Tonle Sap plain, which is
the source of most of Cambodia’s fish and rice, has a unique ecology which relies on seasonal
changes in river flows. In the flood seasons when the water level of the Mekong River is high, the
water backs into the Tonle Sap Lake through the Tonle Sap tributary, enlarging the surface area of
the lake and bringing in rich organic sediment. This naturally fertilizes Cambodia’s unique
elevated rice paddies, and allows large numbers of fish to migrate to and reproduce in the lake,
making it one of the most productive lakes in the world for freshwater fish. In the dry season, the
water level falls in the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap Lake flows into the Mekong River
through the Tonle Sap Tributary. The surface area of the lake decreases and the fish are caught by
local populations in delicately designed traps. As the water level decreases, the bed of the lake
becomes farmland once again, and local people can go out on foot instead of by boat to collect the
now mature high-pole rice.
These traditional livelihoods in Cambodia, which alternate between wet and dry ecologies,
depend entirely on seasonal changes in Mekong river water flows. In other words, the expectations
of Cambodians are quite different from their Lao neighbors. Contrary to the Lao, Cambodians
desire much higher water levels in the flood season and decreased water levels in the dry seasons.
This year, Cambodians complained about diminishing water flows in the wet season, noting that
this year the Tonle Sop Lake’s surface area is not large enough to irrigate all high-pole rice in the
flood season and that water levels are not shallow enough to collect under-water rice in dry season.
Additionally, fish migration has been impacted, causing a decrease in local incomes and
threatening traditional lifestyles and the unique ecology. Public opinion tends to attribute all of
these negative consequences to the operating practices of Chinese dams upstream.
I therefore told the Cambodians that even though I have no information about the operation of
upstream reservoirs, what I can say is that the complaints made in Cambodia are the exact opposite
of those being made in Laos. I further told them that these two sets of complaints are not logically
compatible. Theoretically speaking, upstream reservoirs could control floods and relieve droughts
or discharge runoff in the flood season and retain water in the dry season. The consequences of
each of these actions should be quite clear when we think through the logic. However, it is
logically impossible for operation of one reservoir to have two different consequences
simultaneously. If the two situations described by the Lao and the Cambodians coexist, then it
would seem reasonable to argue that the situation in the upper downstream (Laos and Thailand)
might have something to do with the operation of reservoirs in China, but that the situation further
downstream must be related to other factors.
Of course there is still another possibility -- that all of the problems are being caused by local
floods and droughts, and have nothing to do with Chinese reservoirs. It is impossible to draw such
a conclusion at present though, as analysis of local hydrographic and metrological data and of
information regarding the operation of upstream Chinese reservoirs cannot be completed.

Why Inviting Only Criticisms and No Gratitude?

These criticisms push me to think more deeply. However Chinese reservoirs operate at any
given time, whether they adopt flood control and drought relief which leads to balanced
downstream runoffs, or they adopt practices which maximize maintenance of facilities and
generation of electricity, there should be both positive impacts and negative impacts at the same
time. For instance, if Chinese reservoirs release water in the flood season, the Thais and the Lao
may complain, but the Cambodian should thank China. On the other hand, if Chinese reservoirs
release water in dry seasons, the Cambodians will complain but the Lao and the Thais should thank
China. Currently though, regardless of what happens, China receives nothing but criticisms and
complaints. Why is this so? Should China blame Southeast Asians for being “biased” against it?
I think that the problem lies in the Chinese government’s repeated statement that it has “no
impact” regardless of what happens in the downstream. Because China makes such a statement,
countries positively impacted by Chinese regulation of river runoffs have no need to show
gratitude, while countries negatively impacted will never be convinced by such statements, as they
are completely groundless. Are the complaints made by Southeast Asians supported by any
evidence? No, because there is none as China has not disclosed any information about the
operations of its reservoirs, meaning that other nations cannot objectively judge the actual impacts.
As all China talks about are things like “evaporation volume,” other nations criticize China for
making a mockery of public opinion.
Nearly everyone would agree that natural drought has played at least some role in the
catastrophic low water levels in the north Mekong River this year. The question is how China’s tall
dams and big reservoirs respond to this situation. Relevant Chinese government departments
refused to disclose any data regarding upstream reservoirs. If China had released water to help
relieve the drought, the Thais and the Lao should thank China. In such a situation, local people
would attribute the severe drought to nature, which has caused low water levels despite Chinese
efforts to relieve the situation. What if China had done the opposite? The Thais and the Laos would
then be justified in blaming China, but the Cambodians further downstream should thank China.
As it stands, as China has claimed to have done nothing, it will receive no thanks, while at the
same time as it cannot provide evidence to argue with the Thais and the Lao, they will continue to
suspect that China has cut upstream runoff by retaining water in the wet season.
Therefore, when the Chinese hydropower authorities are evasive and make misleading claims,
they face the following consequences: when China does something good, no one knows; when
China does something bad, it fails to hide it; when China does nothing it all, it is suspected of
having done so.
Some Chinese officials seem to believe that the citizens of other countries behave like people
in China who unite behind whatever is written in official press releases. As such, these officials
show concern only for what officials from other countries are saying. I once overheard an
employee from a Chinese invested company say “why are these NGO organizations and
independent media outlets fussing over China all the time, when even their government officials
are not blaming china?” In fact, the political regimes of these countries are quite different from
those of China. Under a democratic political regime, public opinion and official statements tend to
be complementary when it comes to international affairs, but rarely echo one another. Public
opinion can express what government officials feel is inconvenient to say, successfully exerting
pressure on relevant foreign governments while leaving room for official negotiation. In fact,
government officials generally want to shift pressure when they are in trouble, therefore they
welcome such public opinion.
The Chinese government on the other hand does not know how to take advantage of the
complementary role of public opinion; instead it usually strictly controls public opinion at home on
international affairs as it is afraid of “trivial issues disrupting its diplomacy.” However, if China
attempts to deal with foreign public opinion in the same way, it will tend to backfire – ignoring it
or mocking it will only make the situation worse.

Giving Priority to Establishing an Information-Sharing and Multilateral

Negotiation Platform

The debate over the Mekong River has developed in a positive direction in recent years. The
Mekong River Commission which consists of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand held a
conference to discuss regional issues related to the Mekong River, and China and Myanmar
attended the meeting as observers. Before the conference, Chinese authorities claimed that they
would disclose some hydrological data regarding the Manwan Reservoir and the Jinghong
Reservoir to Mekong River Commission, and begin taking the interests of downstream countries
into consideration when developing the upstream. China also agreed to negotiate relevant issues
with concerned countries. While these claims indicate a positive trend, personally I think that
China could be much more open. Why is China unwilling to provide data on the Xiaowan
Reservoir which is more important, and which has capacity almost 10 times as great as that of
small reservoirs such as the Manwan and the Jinghong? It will be understandable (of course not
OK) if China were to refuse to provide any data at all out of concerns related to sovereignty. As
long as data from only small reservoirs are provided though, it will be impossible to avoid raising
the suspicions of neighbors.
Further, China will appear passive and even foolish if the amount of information it provides
depends on the degree of criticism it receives from neighbors. Why not be more proactive? It is
easy to calculate changes in runoffs caused by such a huge reservoir with the aid of a remote
sensing satellite. If it is true, as many in China have argued, that there are anti-China elements
behind the complaints regarding the impacts of Chinese dams, there will be no need to hide any
data. If the claims of these so-called anti-China forces prove false, more proactive behavior and a
more open attitude on the part of China will disperse broader suspicions of China.
From what I learned visiting Laos and Cambodia, most people outside of government know
little about China. Local rumors indicate that the eight Chinese reservoirs on Lancang River are
causing a lot of problems. In fact, although China does have plans to build eight reservoirs on the
Lancang River, only four have been built and put into use. Interestingly though, the complaints that
I heard most frequently from civil society groups in these countries is not that the Chinese are
necessarily doing anything wrong, but that they have no idea about how Chinese reservoirs are
operated. They complain that Chinese authorities are prejudiced against NGO organizations and
independent media and that the Chinese government refuses to communicate with non-official
organizations. They are upset that requests to learn more through the Chinese Embassy and
Chinese authorities are always turned down. Comparatively speaking, Southeast Asian NGO actors
find Western countries much friendlier. Westerners invite NGO organizations and members of the
media to visit construction sites and gather information about projects, and hold conferences to
deal with controversies.
Our Chinese companies do a very good job of illustrating just how serve this problem is. A
representative from a Chinese company in Southeast Asia described Western companies to me as
sly and good at flattering NGO organizations and the media. He went on to give the example of
two hydropower stations in Laos. One, a Chinese invested station is guarded by an army, and
forbids all visitors; the other, a Western invested project is open to all NGO organizations and to
the media, and regularly hosts visitors every day. It is easy to imagine how local populations
respond to these two different companies.
As a vehicle of official communication, the Mekong River Commission gets much support
from international organizations including the United Nations, and it has influence over many
countries. China did not have a normal diplomatic relations with most of the member states in
1980s when the Commission was established, and was not invited to join in, which definitely was
no fault of China’s. But as China developed upstream reservoirs and as diplomatic relations
between China and most of the member states were restored, China should be expected to join the
Mekong River Commission. Like many other multi-national consultative organizations, the
Mekong River Commission is said to be inefficient and laden with disputes. It is said that in order
to avoid getting involved in these disputes, that China has refused to participate and has remained
only an observer.
As said above, different interests not only exist between China and downstream countries, but
also exist among downstream countries themselves. Regardless of how China operates its upstream
reservoirs, there will always be costs and benefits in the downstream. That China receives only
criticisms results from Chinese unilateral decision making. If instead China embraced multi-lateral
organizations which make rules through multilateral negotiations, mechanisms of compensation
and clear obligations might be established, and conflict might be brought under control. The needs
of the Thais and the Lao are totally different from those of Cambodians when it comes to how to
balance water flows in the Mekong River in each season. Presently though, they do not blame one
another, but instead both criticize China. Despite the fact that neither of these countries have large
reservoirs or tall dams, there is another reason they have all joined the Mekong River Commission
and have made common decisions and have shouldered common responsibilities. Their common
decisions justify the results of their action, while Chinese unilateral decisions are prone to
criticism. All in all, upstream development will continue to have greater impacts on downstream
countries, and China should join the Mekong River Commission as soon as possible.

There Should be More Negotiations at home as wells as Abroad

 The impacts of the drought along the Mekong River have generated many criticisms of China,
including that it is “hegemonic.” On many occasions I have replied to such criticisms to argue that
China is not behaving in such a way. Nevertheless, the Chinese hydropower authorities do seem to
deserve their reputation as being “domineering.” What many probably do not realize though is that
they are much more domineering back in China than they are overseas. Although foreign countries
cry out that China is a hegemon in the Mekong River region, honestly speaking, China treats
criticisms from abroad, especially those from foreign governments much more seriously than
domestic criticisms. Though opinions from foreign NGO organizations are thought to be ignored,
they tend to attract more attention than the opinions of the Chinese people. There are many
conflicts in China: conflict among different stakeholder over floods, relocation and changes in
upstream hydrology; conflict between social needs (flood control and drought relief) and the
interests of hydropower station operators; and conflict between environmental protection and
development. There are heated debates over Sanmenxia, Pubugou, and Yangliuhu Reservoirs in
China. There are also controversies over whether we should build some hydropower stations at all,
and for others over how we should build and operate them. All these conflicts and controversies
need mechanisms through which they can be resolved – currently China has absolutely no such
mechanisms.
In today’s China, reform and development are two complimentary trends. The globalization
process will eventually give China a lesson on how to manage its domestic affairs. We can learn a
lesson from Capital Iron and Steel Corporation, the largest Chinese invested companies in South
America, in dealing with autonomous labor unions in Peru. We can also get successful experiences
from Chinese Aluminum Company, which respects land interests of indigenous Australians in their
Aolukun project. All of these help us to improve labor rights and interests and find ways of
reforming land tenure systems. Likewise, the debate over Mekong River will be significant if it
provides precious experience for the hydropower authorities with respect to how to communicate
with different stakeholders.