1st Class Conditions and Verbal Aspect

in the Greek New Testament

Tyler Vela

Greek Exegesis I
Dr. Michael Vanlaningham
Fall 2008

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 Much ink has been spilled already concerning the structure and function of

conditional statements in the Greek New Testament. From the classical grammarians to the

more recent verbal aspect and speech-act theory advocates, our understanding of conditional

clauses has undergone some major transformations in recent years and it should be noted

that these changes must not be seen as a minor importance in our exegetical studies. There

are over 600 conditions in the Greek New Testament which would mean that there is nearly

one condition per page of the latest Novum Testamentum Graece. Of those over 600

conditions, more than 300 of them are 1st class conditions.1 The 1st class condition is a major

contributing factor to any understanding of the grammar of the New Testament if for no

other reason than the sheer volume of its occurrences. In this paper we will seek to discuss

that importance of the 1st class condition in the New Testament as well as explore the

function, structure, and meaning of this conditional form in comparison with the other

conditions employed in Greek grammar.

At their core, conditional statements are a representation of contingency: If

something A, then something B. If A is fulfilled, then B, because it is contingent on A, will

also be fulfilled. The first component of a conditional phrase is the protasis. The protasis is

the “if” clause of the conditional. In the sentence, “If you drive without a license, you will get a

ticket,” the protasis is unable to stand alone as its own complete thought and thus it is

grammatically dependent on the next clause. Yet at the same time, the person‟s driving without a

license does not need their receiving a ticket in order to be fulfilled. The protasis, then, is

semantically independent.

The second clause, the apodasis, is the exact reverse of the protasis in these regards.

Consider our previous example of driving without a license. The apodasis can stand as its

own complete thought and thus it is grammatically independent. The fulfillment of the apodasis

however, is directly linked to the previous action of driving without a license and so while it

1 James L. Boyer, “First Class Conditions: What Do They Mean?” Grace Theological Journal. 2.1 (1981) 76
2
is grammatically independent, it is semantically dependant on the protasis. A comment should be

made here that not all conditions will have an explicit protasis or apodasis in the New

Testament. One or the other may be omitted and yet implicit by the context or implied

within the intent of the speaker. This is abundantly clear by the total lack of a complete 4th

class condition in the New Testament.

However, can we simply label which clause is the protasis and which is the apodasis

and be done? Unfortunately it is not so simple. There are varied opinions about what is

necessary in a valid approach to language in general, and conditionals in specific. We will

now look at the three major views concerning conditionals.

The first approach to conditionals is designated as the Structural approach. This is the

most basic of the three because it is intentionally minimalistic. Those who advocate for a

structural reading of conditionals will often not differentiate between classes of conditions

because they do not see the significance of the mood used in their understanding of the

conditions. For the structuralist, conditional statements are merely simple forms of an

“if/then” statement and thus they only seek to find the particle εἰ or ἐάν.2 This view, as a

whole, seems to be generally outdated and not held by any current grammarians, yet we will

see allusions to it in our treatment of the 1st class condition by such as W.W. Goodwin in his

treatment of the 1st class condition, which he labels it as a “simple” condition. Due to the

limited nature of this understanding, and its apparent lack of interest in the mood, tense, and

context, the majority of classical grammarians have seen this view as not necessarily wrong,

but rather as saying too little about the construction of conditions. To hold strictly to this

view would not allow for any distinction between the conditions and thus would curb our

ability to rightly exegete the texts in which they are found.

2 Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar, Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. 1996) 681
3
 To counter this minimalistic view of the condition, another school of thought

emerged that Wallace calls the Semantic or Universal Grammar view.3 This school, rather than

stopping at the structure of the condition, moves further and attempts to find the logical

connection between the protasis and the apodasis. Although Goodwin makes use of the

structuralist approach he would be better classified here in this Semantic line of thought

along with B.L. Gildersleeve, even though they have their profound differences. It seems

that most other classical grammarians such as Robertson, Burton, Zerwick, as well as a host

of others could be rightly ascribed to this school of thought.

In their attempt to find the logical connections between the two clauses, there are

three categories of logical connections that have been identified.4 The first is that of cause-

effect. In Romans 8:13 Paul says, εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζ῅τε μέλλετε ἀποθνῄσκειν. Here the

impending death is the direct result of “living according to the flesh.” The protasis is the

direct cause of apodasis. The next kind of logical connection is evidence-inference. While this

will often be the converse of cause-effect, it cannot be said to always be such. Here the

apodasis is not caused by the protasis, but rather can be inferred from it. In Romans 8:17 we

read, εἰ δὲ τέκνα καὶ κληρονόμοι. While our being “children” is not the root cause of our

being “heirs”, we can infer from our position as children of God, that we are also heirs to

God. Finally, there is the logical connection of equivalence. Here the protasis and the apodasis,

rather than flowing directly from one to the other, are shown to be the same entity or event.

For an example of this we can turn to James 2:11, εἰ... φονεύεις δέ γέγονας παραβάτης

νόμου. Here, the one who commits murder, which is to break the law, is called a

“lawbreaker.” They are one and the same. Yet at the same time it could also be the case that

because they have committed murder, they have then become a lawbreaker. Wallace cautions

3 Wallace Greek Grammar 681

4 Ibid. 682-683
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us that there is often overlap between the three logical connections and so we should not

think of them as entirely distinct.5

In addition to their emphasis on the logical connection between the two clauses,

semantic grammarians have also attempted to classify conditionals based on a temporal

verbal scheme leading to conditional categories such as “simple,” “present general,” “present

contrary to fact,” “future more vivid,” etc.6 As we will see however, a temporal

understanding cannot account for a large portion of conditional usages, specifically in the 1st

class, and thus is not an adequate system for classification.

While the semantic view still holds a grip on a large portion of the Greek

grammarians, there is a newer theory on the rise that seems to be adding quite a bit of

assistance to our treatment of conditionals. This is called the Speech-Act Theory, or what

Wallace also titles the Pragmatic approach.7 While an extensive treatment of this approach is

outside of the scope of this paper, we must give this theory a brief assessment because of its

increasing influence on Biblical exegesis. We will also see further in our consideration of 1st

class conditions that speech-act will be useful in dealing with the various uses of mood and

tense in the writers‟ decision on which class of condition to employ.

The basic observations of the speech-act theory are that many sentences in language

are not statements but rather are exclamations, questions, commands, or expressions of

emotions and even sentences that have the grammatical structure of a simple declarative still

may not be simple statements.8 An example of this would be a statement like, “I bet you ten

dollars that the Pistons will win tonight.” In these cases the speaker is not making a

statement of truth, but rather is performing an illocutionary action.9 When this is applied to

the conditionals in the Biblical text, a whole new world of opportunity is opened up in our

5 Ibid. 684
6 Stanley E. Porter, Idioms of the Greek New Testament (Sheffeld, UK: Sheffeld Academic Press, 1992) 254
7 Wallace Greek Grammar 681, 703-704
8 John I. Saeed, Semantics (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 225
9 Gillian Brown and George Yule, Discourse Analysis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 232

5
interpretation. Rather than just attempting to identify the logical connection between the

protasis and the apodasis, the speech-act theorist can also attempt to understand the

conditional as an action of the author expressing a possible wish, desire, argument, or a

whole host of other attitudes. Some, like Richard Young, have taken this even so far as to

believe that speech-act has made the discussion of structure nearly obsolete.10 While this may

be too extreme of a view, the exegetical value of this approach cannot be ignored.

In his article Young gives multiple categories of possible illocutionary acts such as

expressing a wish, a rebuke, a lament, a request, an exhortation, or to argue or manipulate

some one. He states that this is often done in the interest of courtesy or to soften the

harshness that may otherwise be present in a formal statement. We see a good example of a

rebuke in the words of Martha in John 11:21: κύριε εἰ ἦς ὧδε οὐκ ἂν ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἀδελφός

μου. Martha, presumably out of deference to Jesus, softens her rebuke by stating it indirectly

as a conditional. We further see in statements such as, εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι

οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται, that manipulation is clearly the intended action of the speaker. Satan

is not using the 1st class condition in order to make a mere logical argument but rather he is

performing an illocutionary act attempting to cunningly persuade Jesus to perform according

to his own will apart from the will of the Father.

It is clear that the speech-act theory will be of great use to the advancement of

Biblical studies. However, Wallace again gives a helpful caution. He states that although we

cannot focus only on the structure of conditions, “it is equally wrong headed to abandon the

structural conventions of the language and seek meaning elsewhere… the choice of the first

class condition must mean something. The second class would not convey the same meaning,

for example.”11

10 “...speech act theory yields more meaning results that traditional approaches.” Richard A. Young, “A
Classification of Conditional Sentences Based on Speech Act Theory” Grace Theological Journal. 10.1 (1981)
76
11 Wallace Greek Grammar 704

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 Now that we have seen the three major approaches, we are in a position to decide

which is most useful to employ in our exegesis and understanding of the text in general and

conditionals in specific. Here Wallace is the most helpful in that he is also most balanced. He

essentially holds an “all of the above” approach where structure, semantics, and speech-acts

all play a significant role in our understanding of conditionals. We will see next that after we

have identified the structure of the 1st class condition, we can then move on to determine

what the logical connection is between the protasis and apodasis, and finally seek to find the

illocutionary intent of the speaker. The balanced view that Wallace presents seems most

beneficial to our exegesis. Let us turn our attention now to the 1st class condition.

What sets apart the 1st class condition from the other conditionals is the use of either

particle εἰ or ἐάν followed by an indicative verb in the protasis. The apodasis however, is not

restricted to the indicative and can employ the use of any tense in any mood. 12 Due to the

fact that it will always begin with an indicative verb, the 1st class condition will be negated by

οὐ.13 As stated in the introduction, there are over 300 1st class conditions, making this the

most conditional of choice in the New Testament.14 We will begin first by examining some

of the erroneous assertions that people have made regarding the 1st class condition before

working through how it actually functions in context.

First, the 1st class condition is not equivalent to “since.” Given that the protasis of

the 1st class condition is always an indicative verb, and the indicative is commonly assumed

to the mood of reality “which always makes a clear-cut assertion one way or the other,”15

many have concluded that this condition must be an assertion of fulfilled reality and can thus

be translated with “since.” We can see that this may be true in some texts such as in

Galatians 3:29, εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς Χριστοῦ ἄρα τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ σπέρμα ἐστέ. Here, it would be

12 A.T. Robertson, A New Short Grammar of the Greek Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House,
1985) 349
13 Porter Idioms of the Greek New Testament 256
14 Boyer “First Class Conditions: What Do They Mean?” 76.
15 Robertson A New Short Grammar of the Greek Testament 349

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 logical to render this, “Since you are Christ‟s, then you are also Abraham‟s offspring.”

Nevertheless we will see shortly in our discussion that it would still be preferable to keep the

translation as a conditional “if/then” to retain the rhetorical force, even though the logic of

the structure may be upheld with “since.”

This use of “since” however, frequently does not adequately represent the logic of

the 1st class condition. In fact, as Boyer points out, of the over 300 1st class conditions in the

New Testament, 36 (12%) of them are obviously false.16 Several excellent examples can be

given to prove this. First in Matthew 12:27 Jesus states, εἰ ἐγὼ ἐν Βεελζεβοὺλ ἐκβάλλω τὰ

δαιμόνια… Clearly we cannot understand Christ to mean, “Since I cast out demons by

Beelzebub…” To translate this as “since” would do violence to the text as well as directly

contradict Jesus next statement that he in fact casts out demons by the Spirit of God. Also in

1 Corinthians 15:13, Paul states, εἰ δὲ ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ Χριστὸς

ἐγήγερται. It is not possible to render this, “Since there is no resurrection…” Further in

v14 where Paul writes, εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐγήγερται… He could not possibly mean,

“Since Christ is not raised…” Clearly this not how the 1st class condition is functioning.

Not only are there many verses where the protasis is obviously false but the majority

of 1st class conditions, 155 instances (51%), are in fact undetermined as to their fulfillment in

reality from the perspective of the speaker. We see in Acts 5:39 Gamaliel‟s assertion that, εἰ

δὲ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐστιν οὐ δυνήσεσθε καταλῦσαι αὐτούς. This can obviously not mean “since”

because Gamaliel‟s entire point is that they were not in a position to know whether or not

the Christian movement was an act of God or not.

Second, the 1st class condition is not “simple.” Due to the fact, as we have seen, that the

1st class condition does not always refer to fulfilled reality, it must also not be seen as a simple

construction only used to make a logical point. Goodwin states, “When the protasis simply states

16 Boyer “First Class Conditions: What Do They Mean?” p76

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a particular supposition, implying nothing as to the fulfillment of the condition, it has the

indicative with εἰ.”17 Burton, with his temporal understanding of the Greek verbal system, states

that the future indicative in the protasis of a 1st class condition is used “to state not what will

take place on the fulfillment of a future possibility, but merely to affirm a necessary logical

consequence of a future event.”18 While the future is difficult to detach from a temporal

understanding, even under an aspectual theory of Greek verbs,19 the emphasis on the tense

being used to affirm a logical necessity betrays Burton‟s simplistic view of the condition. Under

his rendering, not only is the action temporally future but the tense itself is used as part of the

simple logical construction of the condition. Here again Wallace brings our attention to the fact

that using the tenses to merely indicate the type of logic employed will ultimately lead to no

distinctions between the various conditionals.20 Specifically, Wallace is concerned at the loss of

distinction between the 1st class condition and its counterpart, the 2nd class condition, which

both employ the indicative mood in their protasises. To state that the 1st class is “simple”

because of the logical connection between its clauses is to say too little because all conditionals

have a logical connection between their clauses. This simply does not say enough about what

makes the 1st class condition distinct from the others.

Next, there is a line of reason put forth, primarily by Goodwin, which states that the

1st class condition speaks of specific people, things, or events. In other words, the 1st class

condition is the condition of particularity.21 However this does not hold true for more than

60 of the 300+ instances of the 1st class condition which are in fact general.22 This means

that about 20% of the time this categorization does not adequately describe the 1st class

17 W.W. Goodwin, Greek Grammar (Boston, MA: Ginn&Co., 1938) 294

18 Ernest De Witt Burton, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1900) 103
19 Porter states that the future is neither completely aspectual nor temporal but rather that it is “best

understood as grammaticalizing a unique semantic feature [+expectation].” Stanley E. Porter, Verbal Aspect in
the Greek of the New Testament With Reference to Tense and Mood. Studies in Biblical Greek 1 (New York, NY: Peter
Lang, 1989) 438
20 Wallace, Greek Grammar 691
21 Ibid. 705-706
22 Ibid. 706

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condition. In fact, every use of the 1st class condition in Revelation is general rather than

specific.23 If this really were the condition of particularity, one would expect that John would

have at least employed it that way in some, if not most cases. An excellent example where

this categorization does not hold true outside of Revelation is found in 1 Corinthians 8:2, εἴ

τις δοκεῖ ἐγνωκέναι τι... Here Paul seems to be blatantly general rather than specific.

Along with Goodwin‟s claim that 1st class conditions were particular, is that they

were also the condition of present time. While this may be the primary use of the 1st class

condition, it should be noted that there are over 20 occasions where the protasis is in the

Future tense such as Luke 11:8: εἰ καὶ οὐ δώσει αὐτῷ. Here it should also be mentioned

that many 1st class conditions may use the Present tense but should be understood as

gnomic. We find a timeless present in Matthew 19:17: εἰ δὲ θέλεις εἰς τὴν ζωὴν εἰσελθεῖν

τήρησον τὰς ἐντολάς. We can also locate future referring presents such as in Matthew

8:31: εἰ ἐκβάλλεις ἡμᾶς ἀπόστειλον ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀγέλην τῶν χοίρων. In addition to

these, we find the 1st class condition referring to past events such as in 2 Timothy 2:11: εἰ

γὰρ συναπεθάνομεν καὶ συζήσομεν. We will address this further during our discussion of

the impact of verbal aspect on our understanding of the 1st class condition.

If the 1st class condition is not a statement about fulfillment in reality, and if it is not

a simple logical construction or a particular, present event, then what is it? The common

understanding of the 1st class condition is that it is the assumption of a supposition for the

sake of argument. The author need not believe that the statement is actually true, but rather

simply assume the truth of the statement in order to draw their conclusion or make their

point. It is not a statement about reality but a “presentation of reality.”24 The common

example given, as we have seen already, is Jesus‟ conversation with the Pharisees concerning

his ability to cast out demons in Matthew 12:27. Here he utilizes the 1st class condition to

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. 692
10
challenge the inconsistency of the Pharisees whose own disciples were apparently able to

cast out demons also. This tactic is also used by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:13, where he states,

εἰ δὲ ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ Χριστὸς ἐγήγερται. Clearly Paul does not

actually believe that there is no resurrection from the dead, but assumes it as true in order to

show the logical absurdity that would follow.

As stated above, translating this condition as “since,” even when it may accurately

represent the fulfilled condition in some instances, is still not the preferred translation for

this condition. The εἰ should be consistently translated “if” so that the semantic force of the

condition can be understood. This is where our understanding of speech-act theory is

especially helpful. We know that Greek has words for “since” (such as ὡς, διότι, ὥσπερ,

εἴπερ, etc.) and therefore we must conclude that the writers made use of εἰ and the 1st class

condition for a reason. Vanhoozer states that “illocutions can be used as a means to a

perlocutionary end.”25 In fact, the Bible asserts this very plainly in John 20:31. John states

that, ταῦτα δὲ γέγραπται ἵνα πιστεύσητε ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ

θεοῦ. Here John expects that his act of communication will achieve a desired result. This

also seems to be the goal of conditionals. “There is great rhetorical power in if”26 because

the use of the conditional is an invitation into dialogue between the speaker and the listener.

If εἰ is translated “since,” the desire for two-way dialogue turns into a one-way address.

Wallace gives us several very good examples on this point. One of them is found in Matthew

5:30: εἰ ἡ δεξιά σου χεὶρ σκανδαλίζει σε ἔκκοψον αὐτὴν. While it is entirely true that we

sin with our hands, here, says Wallace, Jesus is not attempting to prescribe a system by which

we can keep ourselves pure. If this were the case, all Christians would be bloody and

crippled. Rather, Jesus assumes the supposition of the Pharisees, (that it is our external deeds

which make us unclean), and brings them to their logical conclusion. The condition then,

25 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There Meaning In This Text? (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing, 1998) 224
26 Wallace Greek Grammar 692
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adds powerful weight to the persuasive rhetorical style of Jesus. Rather than lecturing them

on their shallow pietism, he uses this conditional to shift his hearers‟ belief that it is the

hands which make us unclean, to the reality that it is our hearts which make us unclean.

Thus while our hands may cause us to sin in reality, translating εἰ as “since” would not only

diminish the reason Jesus opted to use the 1st class condition, but may even miss the entire

point of the condition and institute a new legalism.

One last verse should be shown here to prove that there is more to the 1 st class

condition than simple logic or even the mere assumption of truth for the sake of argument.

We find it in Jesus‟ Gethsemane prayer in Matthew 26:39 where Jesus laments, πάτερ μου εἰ

δυνατόν ἐστιν παρελθάτω ἀπ' ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο. Strangely enough, the parallel of

this in Mark 14:36 does not employ a conditional at all. Rather it begins with the statement,

αββα ὁ πατήρ πάντα δυνατά σοι, and then continues on to the imperative, παρένεγκε τὸ

ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπ' ἐμοῦ. Clearly Jesus knew that all things are possible with God, and

neither him, nor the Father had said otherwise. Thus it would seem an odd assertion to state

that Jesus was assuming someone‟s truth for the sake of argument. Not only that, but Jesus

was not trying to convince the Father to let the cup pass from him, so assuming it for the

sake of argument would result in the serious theological conundrum of disunity within the

Godhead.27 What seems likely is not that Jesus was making an argument of any kind, but

rather that he was simply performing the act of expressing lament over what must soon take

place. We see then that while the common understanding of 1st class conditions may

function in many instances, there are some anomalous verses that do not fall under that

classification. Wallace here shows that this is not as unusual as it may seem. There are other

27 Young “A Classification of Conditional Sentences Based on Speech Act Theory” 31

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grammatical structures that also function as speech-acts. Jesus‟ quotation of Psalm 22:1 from

the cross, though formally a question, was in fact an expression of “profound pain.”28

We now turn our attention briefly to what will be the most controversial and highly

disputed area of this sort of study. Due to the fact that so many grammarians disagree about

the meaning of the moods and the way the Greek verbal system operates, there is

understandably little agreement as to the reasons why an author would select a certain mood

or tense in their conditions. For this reason we must tread cautiously. While the attempt in

this section will be to look primarily at the 1st class condition, a comparison with other

conditions will be necessary on several occasions.

Goodwin believed that one of the functions of mood was the portrayal of what he

called “vividness” to the reader. He stated that the function of the mood in 3rd class

condition was “future more vivid” while in the 4th class condition it was “future less vivid.”29

In this section we will see that Goodwin is correct is noting that there is a graded degree of

vividness in the conditionals. However, this is not due to a function of the mood, but rather

of the tense. So how does the mood differentiate between the various classes?

Contrary to Goodwin, Gildersleeve‟s understanding of the mood, at least in the cases

of the 1st and 2nd class conditions, seems adequate to explain the differences between the

two. Unlike Goodwin, Gildersleeve did not see the mood as a mode for vivid or remote

portrayal, but rather as the vehicle for a certain portrayal of reality as fulfilled or unfilled.

Again, this does not mean that the author was convinced one way or the other as to the

reality of the fulfillment, but rather that they were merely presenting a supposition for the

purpose of argumentation. Wallace says that “the moods in the conditions need to be taken

seriously and consistently with how they are used elsewhere.”30 For Wallace then, the 1st class

condition, because its use of the indicative in the protasis is necessary, is not a presentation

28 Wallace Greek Grammar 704, n47

29 Ibid. 705-706
30 Ibid. 711

13
of a possible reality but rather is the assumption of truth concerning a supposition in order

to show the outcome of such a supposition. He states, “This is keeping with the force of the

indicative. This condition is primarily used as a form of persuasion.”31 We can even see this

in the previously noted prayer of Jesus in Gethsemane. While Jesus was not attempting to

persuade God to let the cup pass, we see that he was making a statement using the

supposition “if it is possible…” The inner struggle of Jesus is seen as more genuine when we

realize that the possibility to circumvent the cross was a very real temptation for him. This

would not have been the case if the 4th class condition of remote possibility had been

employed instead.32 Yet there must also surely be overlap in the semantic domains of the

various conditions. For example, Matthew 18:8 portrays the Lord as saying the 1 st class

condition, εἰ δὲ ἡ χείρ σου ἢ ὁ πούς σου σκανδαλίζει σε ἔκκοψον αὐτὸν, while in the

parallel passage in Mark 9:43 frames it as a 3rd class condition, ἐὰν σκανδαλίζῃ σε ἡ χείρ

σου. The precise nature of this overlap is outside of the scope of this paper, but it ought to

be stated that the functions of the moods must be robust enough to be utilized in various

conditions where one may expect otherwise.

Thus we see that the function of the mood is highly important to the construction of

the various conditionals. While there is still much disagreement over what those functions

may be, we must be willing to state that the 1st class condition means something that the other

conditions do not. Surely this something is the very function of the selected mood.

The only other area that has more debate than the moods is the discussion of the

role of tense in conditionals. Wallace is only willing to concede in a brief statement on tense,

that, “conditions are thus linked to time, to some degree.”33 While Wallace‟s temperance on

this issue is to be admired, more can be stated in regard to the use of tenses in conditionals,

though not very much more. Here it should be mentioned that in all of the 1st class

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. 709

14
conditions that are repeated between the synoptic gospels, there is absolutely no variation of

tense in the protasis. While, as we saw above, one author may present their version of the

conditional as an entirely different class, it is surprising that no variation in tense is found

when the 1st condition is used. While this is an interesting fact considering their normal

willingness to alter tense usage from the other evangelists, this makes comparative uses of

tenses in conditionals within identical contexts nearly impossible.

As we saw previously, the 1st class condition may favor the presentation of present

reality, yet to state that it is the present condition is an assumption based on a faulty

temporal perspective of the Greek verbal system. Porter states, “A distinction of conditional

clauses along temporal lines on the basis of tense-form… cannot be sustained,” and again,

“…temporal reference… must be determined by context.”34 Here, the theory of verbal

aspect is surely a better explanation of the role of tenses in conditional statements. This will

be shown in a contrast between the preferred tenses used in the 1st and 2nd class conditions

because both use the indicative in the protasis to present a supposition of reality as either

true or untrue. Campbell is extremely helpful on the use of the Imperfect in the 2nd class

condition. He draws attention to the fact that while the 1st class condition attempts to

present something as a true supposition and thus logically proximate, the 2nd class condition

seeks to present something as an untrue supposition and thus logically remote. This concept of

a logically proximate or remote use of the tense fits very well in the idea of real or unreal

suppositions. It is also helpful in understanding why the 1st class condition favors Present

tense verbs (proximate), while the 2nd class condition favors the Imperfect, Pluperfect, and

Aorist tense verbs (remote). Here Campbell states, “the proximate tense-forms are never

used in unreal conditional sentences, but all three remote tense-forms are.”35 Millhouse also

adds, concerning the Imperfect in 2nd class conditions, that, “the unreal or contrary to fact

Porter Idioms of the Greek New Testament 258

34

Constantine R. Campbell, Verbal Aspect, The Indicative Mood, and Narrative: Studies in the Greek of the
35

New Testament 13. (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2007) 230
15
use of the Imperfect can be explained by the concept of remoteness. Instead of temporal

remoteness… conditional statements are examples of logical remoteness. Instead of then vs.

now, the Imperfect represents real vs. unreal.”36

Porter also brings our attention to the rarely addressed use of the Perfect tense in the

1st class condition. Here the classical understanding of the Perfect as presenting a past event

with on going effects is clearly not as adequate as the Imperfective or Stative aspect of the

Perfect. We can see this clearly in passages such as John 11:12, εἰ κεκοίμηται σωθήσεται,

and Acts 16:15, εἰ κεκρίκατέ με πιστὴν τῷ κυρίῳ εἶναι… μένετε. Porter also reminds us

that the only explanation that can comprehensively explain the different tenses used in the 1st

class condition, which presents a supposition about reality, is verbal aspect.37

As we have seen, there is a multiplicity of approaches and interpretations concerning

the Greek conditional statements and this may be daunting to anyone who would attempt to

come to a comprehensive understanding of their usage in the Greek New Testament. In

summation of the findings of this paper, as one approaches the conditions it seems vitally

important to maintain a normal understanding of the uses of moods, combined with a

working knowledge of the verbal aspect of Greek tenses, and a sensitivity to not only the

context in which the condition is found, but also to the emotional or illocutionary intent of

the speaker. It seems that a healthy balance of these three systems is the best way to proceed

in any further study on the Greek conditional clauses.

36 Roy R. Millhouse, “Use of the Imperfect Verb Form in the New Testament: An Investigation into Aspectual
and Tense Relationships in Hellenistic Greek.” (M.A. Thesis: Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1999) 65
37 Porter Idioms of the Greek New Testament 269

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