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CONSCIOUSNESS:ANATURALHISTORY*

forthcoming in:
JournalofConsciousnessStudies,5,No.3,1998,pp.26094
copyrightc1998,ImprintAcademic

MaxineSheetsJohnstone,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofOregon,Eugene,OR
97403,USA.Email:msj@oregon.uoregon.edu

[W]ealwaysstartatthesensoryendandtrytocomeoutatthemotorside.Iverymuchagreewiththe
latevonHolstwhenhesuggeststhatwestartattheotherendandworkourwhy(sic)backtoward
sensation....Itrequiressomedifferentwayoflooking.
H.L.Teuber1

Ifanypersonthinkstheexaminationoftherestoftheanimalkingdomanunworthytask,hemusthold
inlikedisesteemthestudyofman.Aristotle(Partsof
Animals,645a267)

I:Introduction

ThomasNagel,inareviewofJohnSearles(1992)book,TheRediscoveryoftheMind,states
thatwedonotreallyunderstandtheclaimthatmentalstatesarestatesofthebrain.He
followsthisstatementmorefinelywiththeremarkthat,Wearestillunabletoforma
conceptionofhowconsciousnessarisesinmatter(Nagel,1993,p.40).Themissing
conceptionis,ofcourse,reallyamissinganswer:

Howdoesconsciousnessariseinmatter?

Nagelimplicitlyraisesthequestionattheculminationofadiscussionofwhathecategorizes
asSearlesfirstargumentsagainstmaterialists.Helaysouttheseargumentsafter
summarizingSearlesviewofhowvarioustheoriesofmindhaveattemptedtoreducethe
mentaltothephysicalandofhowtheyallfailtotakeconsciousnessintoaccount.Withoutan
accountofconsciousness,accordingtoSearle,noneofthetheoriescanrightfullyclaimtobe
atheoryofmind.QuotingSearle,NagelpointsoutthatThecrucialquestionisnotUnder
whatconditionswouldweattributementalstatestootherpeople?butrather,Whatisit
thatpeopleactuallyhavewhentheyhavementalstates?(p.38).Nagelsagreementwith
Searlethatthesubjectiveispreciselythecrucialquestiontoaddressisexemplifiedinhis
recognizablywordedstatementthatFactsaboutyourexternalbehaviorortheelectrical
activityorfunctionalorganizationofyourbrainmaybecloselyconnectedwithyour
consciousexperiences,buttheyarenotfactsaboutwhatitslikeforyoutohearapolice
siren(p.39,italicsadded).Thequestionofhowconsciousnessarisesinmatterthusappears
absolutelycentralforbothNagelandSearle.
InthispaperIoutlinebasicreasonsforthinkingthequestionspurious.Thiscriticalworkwill
allowmetopinpointtroublesomeissueswithinthecontextofdefinitionsoflifeandinturn
addresstheproperlyconstructivetaskofthisessay:todemonstratehowgenuine
understandingsofconsciousnessdemandcloseandseriousstudyofevolutionasahistoryof
animateform.Ishouldnotethatthisdemonstrationwillomitaconsiderationofbotany,
thoughplantlifeisindisputablypartofanevolutionaryhistoryofanimateform.The
omissionhasnothingtodowithimportance,butwithkeepingamanageablefocusonthe
questionofconsciousness;andithasnothingtodoeitherwithatrivializationofthewaysin
whichplantsareanimate,butwithanintentionalnarrowingofthecomplexityofanalready
complexsubject.Aswillbeshownintheconcludingsection,thedemonstrationhassizable
implicationsforcognitivistsgenerallyandforphilosophersinparticular,notably:(1)aneed
torethinkthecommonassumptionthatunconsciousnesshistoricallypreceded
consciousness;(2)aneedtodelveasdeeplyandseriouslyintonaturalhistoryasintobrains
andtheircomputationalanalogues;(3)acriticalstancetowardarmchairjudgmentsabout
consciousnessandacorrelativeturntowardcorporealmattersoffact.

II:ReasonsForCriticallyQuestioningtheQuestion

Tobeginwith,whilethequestionseemstophrasethedifficultpointinexactingterms,itin
factassumescertainmetaphysicaldistinctionsinadvanceofidentifyingthem,showingthem
tobethecase,and/orjustifyingthemtheoretically.Tothatdegree,thequestioneither
underminesorprecludesanyanswerthatmightbeproposed.2Theassumedmetaphysical
distinctionsareactuallythreeinnumber.Twoofthemhavearelationshiptoaparticular
history,therelationshipineachcasedependingupontheinterpretationallatitudegiventothe
wordarises.Inthemostgeneralsense,thequestionassumesahistoricaldistinctionbetween
theorganicandtheinorganic,i.e.anarisingoftheformerfromthelatter.Thus,inabroad
sense,thequestionassumesacertainplacementofconsciousnesswithrespecttocosmic
history.Atcloserrange,thequestionassumesahistoricaldistinctionbetweenhigherand
lowerformsoflife,i.e.atimeatwhichhighercapacitiesarose.Inabroadsense,itthus
assumesacertainplacementofconsciousnesswithrespecttotheevolutionoflife,most
especially,humanlife.Instillfinerperspective,thequestionassumesadistinctionbetween
mindandbody,i.e.anarising(development,emergence,issuance)ofthementalfromthe
physical.Inabroadsense,itthusassumesacertainplacementofconsciousnesswithrespect
to(merely)corporealbeing.Thefirsttwodistinctionsareplainlyhistorical;thethird
distinctionhasnoparticularhistoricalcharacter,thoughsomepeopleforexample,
philosopherDanielDennettaccorditoneinontogeneticterms.Writingofhumaninfants,
Dennettsaysthat[consciousness]ariseswhenthereisworkforittodo,andthepreeminent
workofconsciousnessisdependentonsophisticatedlanguageusingactivities(Dennett,
1983,p.384).Toacquireabonafidehistoricalcharacterratherthanbeingassignedoneon
thebasisofanunsubstantiatedontogenesis,thethirddistinctionwouldhavetoaddressthe
questionoftheoriginofconsciousnesswithinthecontextofthetwoearlierdistinctions,since
itisonlyinthecontextofthosedistinctionsthatthethirddistinctionactuallycomesto
prominence.Ineffect,ananswertothequestionofhowconsciousnessarisesinmatterdoes
notreducetosayinghowacertainphysicalorneurologicalmaturitydrivesconsciousness;it
mustspecifyhowconsciousnesscomestobeinthecontextofaprogressivelyfinernatural
history,onethattakesintoaccounttheactuallivesofindividuallivingformsastheyare
understoodwithincosmicandanimateevolutionaryhistories.Toanswerthequestioninthis
way,however,necessitatesarevisioninthequestionitself,preciselybecausethehistorical
characterofthefirsttwodistinctionsdemandsit.Inparticular,

consciousnessdoesnotariseinmatter;
itarisesinorganicforms,formsthatareanimate.

Whatisrequiredisthusanexactrenderingofhowconsciousnessisgroundedinanimate
form.Howdoesconsciousnesscometobeinthenaturalhistoryoflivingcreaturesandto
inhereintheanimate?3

Approachingthequestionofconsciousnessfromanhistoricalperspectiveiscertainlynot
unique.NeurobiologistGeraldEdelmanhasemphasizedrepeatedlythenecessityofgenetic
understandings,geneticnotinthesenseofgenes,butinthesenseoforigins.Asheinsists,
Theremustbewaystoputthemindbackintonaturethatareconcordantwithhowitgot
thereinthefirstplace(Edelman,1992,p.15,italicsadded).Hisapproachistoconsider
morphologyandhistoryatalllevels:notjustattheleveloftheembryologicaldevelopment
ofbrains,butcontinuingthroughtothelevelofactuallife,thustothelevelofmovementand
ofexperiencesofmoving,andtoaconsiderationoftheeffectsoftheseexperienceson
morphology.Throughanattentivenesstoanexperientialhistoryanditsmorphological
mooringsandeffects,Edelmanconjoinstypicallyseparatedaspectsofcreaturelylife.He
discoverscells,anatomy,andmorphologicallystructuredmappingswithinthebrainas
undergoingcontinuouselectricalandchemicalchange,drivingandbeingdrivenbyanimal
movement.Hefurthermorefindsanimalmovementitselftobeconditionedbyanimalshape
andpattern,leadingtobehavior(p.15).Thoughhedoesnottermitsuch,animateformis
clearlycentraltohisinvestigations.

WhetherornotoneispersuadedbyEdelmanstheoryoftheoriginofconsciousness,his
focalemphasisupontheneedforaproperhistoryofconsciousnesscannotbedismissed.It
articulatesfromanexplicitlyevolutionaryvantagepointtheimplicitbutunexamined
historicalclaimsofNagelandSearle.Theessentiallyevolutionaryconvergenceisnot
surprisinggivenSearlesinsistenceonbiologicalnaturalism4andNagelsfamousinquiry
aboutabat(Nagel,1974);eachevincesovertonesofanaturalhistoryoftheanimate.
Conversely,whenEdelman(1992)writes,[I]tisnotenoughtosaythatthemindis
embodied;onemustsayhow(p.15),heisgivingvoicetoahowaspressinglyand
provocativelysubjective(e.g.eachconsciousnessdependsonitsuniquehistoryand
embodiment,p.139)asthatofSearleandNagel,butahowexplicitlytetheredtothe
evolutionoflife.
PhilosophersofmindcommonlypursuethesamehowquestionasSearleandNagelbut
many,ifnotmost,takequiteotherpathsandenteratadecisivelyearlierpoint.Daniel
DennettandPaulChurchlandarenotableinthisrespectandwarrantspecialattention.Both
endeavourtoofferahistoricalperspectivebyplacingconsciousnessfirstofallincosmic
time.Theirrespectiveattemptsarenotprotractedbyanymeanstheydonotreflectatany
lengthuponthecosmicbeginningsoflifeandneitherspeaksexplicitlyoftheorganicand
theinorganic.Inwhatisnonethelessaclearlycosmologicalanswertothehowquestion,both
advertstraightofftotheadventofreplicatorsandoftheprocessofselfreplication.
Churchlandsopeningsentenceofthefirstsection(Neuroanatomy:TheEvolutionary
Background)ofachaptertitledNeurosciencereads:Nearthesurfaceoftheearths
oceans,betweenthreeandfourbillionyearsago,thesundrivenprocessofpurelychemical
evolutionproducedsomeselfreplicatingmolecularstructures(Churchland,1984,p.121,
italicsinoriginal).5Dennettsopeningsentencesofthesecondsection(EarlyDays)ofa
chaptertitledTheEvolutionofConsciousnessreads:Inthebeginning,therewereno
reasons;therewereonlycauses....Theexplanationforthisissimple.Therewasnothing
thathadinterests.Butaftermillenniatherehappenedtoemergesimplereplicators(Dennett,
1991,p.173,italicsinoriginal).Clearly,inbothcasesthereisanattempttoseparateoutthe
inchoatecreaturelyfromthepurelychemical,thustospecifythecosmicbeginningsoflife
andtherebythenatureofthecrossoverfromtheinorganictotheorganic.

DennettsandChurchlandsmodestnodinthedirectionofanaturalhistoryisshortlived,as
suchnodsgenerallytendtobeamongcognitivistphilosophers.Theirrespectivefindings
fromstudiesofthebeginningsoflifeonearthareneithercarriedforwardinaconsideration
oftheevolutionofanimateformsnorexaminedinthelightofadiversityofintact,actually
livingbodies.Theirrespectiveallusionstoselfreplicationsufficetolocatetheoriginofa
naturalhistoryofconsciousness.Infinerterms,selfreplicationoffersforthemafully
satisfactoryanswertothehistoricalquestionofhowconsciousnessarisesinmatterbecause
selfreplicationiswhereitallbeganandwhereitallbeganiswhereitstillis:consciousness
isamatterofmatter.Themolecularexplanationofconsciousnessissuccinctlyexemplifiedin
ChurchlandsMatterandConsciousness.WhateverChurchlandsaysoftheselfreplicating
beginningsoflifeattheendofhisbookispredictablycuedinadvancebywhathehasstated
atthebeginningofhisbookabouthumanlife:

[T]heimportantpointaboutthestandardevolutionarystoryisthatthehumanspeciesandallofits
featuresarethewhollyphysicaloutcomeofapurelyphysicalprocess....Wearenotableonlyinthat
ournervoussystemismorecomplexandpowerfulthanthoseofourfellowcreatures....Weare
creaturesofmatter.Andweshouldlearntolivewiththatfact(Churchland,1984,p.21).

Theproblemcomesnotinlivingwiththatfactbutinlivinghermeticallywiththatfact.
Livinghermeticallywiththatfactcomesattheexpenseofaviablenaturalhistory,forthefact
passesoverfundamentalunderstandingsofanimatecorporeallife.Theseomissionsin
understandingemergeinastrikingwayinthemetaphysicalrelationshipChurchlandproposes
betweentheorganicandinorganic(thoughagain,notspecificallyusingthesebroadlycosmic
terms).Heinsiststhatlivingsystemsdifferfromnonlivingsystemsonlybydegrees:
Thereisnometaphysicalgaptobebridgedorashesaysaparagraphlaterwithrespectto
thesamelesson(i.e.differenceonlybydegrees)applyingtointelligence:No
metaphysicaldiscontinuitiesemergehere(p.153).This,perhapsatfirstsurprising,
viewpointontheorganicandinorganicisnotshowntobetruebyChurchland,noteven
throughhislessonsinhowtoforgedefinitionsoflifethatwillbeopaquetodiscontinuities,
suchasclaimingthattheglowingteardropofacandleflame...mayjustbarelymeetthe
conditionsofthedefinition[oflife]proposed,i.e.lifeisanysemiclosedphysicalsystem
thatexploitstheorderitalreadypossesses,andtheenergyfluxthroughit,insuchawayasto
maintainand/orincreaseitsinternalorder.Inbrief,Churchlandsviewpointisofnecessity
trueinvirtueofChurchlandtheory:ifhumanconsciousnessismerematterrelatively
morecomplexandpowerfulmatter,(p.21)butmerematterneverthelessthroughand
throughthentheorganiccandifferfromtheinorganiconlybydegrees.Metaphysical
distinctionsareblurredbyfiatasonlytheycanbeinsuchatheory.

Atleastoneconsequenceoftheblurringshouldbesingledoutinordertodemonstratethe
questionableproprietyofclaimingthatNometaphysicaldiscontinuitiesemergehere.A
continuousmetaphysicscreatesaproblemfordistinguishingintraditionalwesternways
betweenlifeanddeath.Howeverrationallydoubtful,onthesmudgyfaceofthings,quasi
eternallife(quasiinsofaraseternallifeisapparentlypunctuatedfromtimetotimebutnot
whollydiscontinued)suddenlyemergesasaviablemetaphysicalfuturepossibilityifonly
materialistphilosopherscandeliveruptheirstone,aided,ofcourse,bydeliveriesonpromises
bywesternmaterialistscience.Ofcourse,thenotionofcosmicallydifferingonlyby
degreesisinametaphysicallytwistedandthoroughlyironicwayalsosupportiveofeastern
notionssuchasreincarnationandofsocalledprimitivenotionsoflifeafterdeath,notions
exemplifiedbynonwesternburialpracticesinwhichdeadpersonsareinterredalongwith
itemstheywillneedintheirongoingjourneys.Withrespecttotheselatternotions,however,
itisrathersomeformofthementalthatisprimary;matterissimplycontingentstuffforthe
instantiationofspirit.Whatdiffersonlybydegreesisthusnotfundamentallymatteratall
butaprincipleoflifespiritus,pneuma,orwhateverelsemightbeconceivedtoconstitute
invincibleandinexhaustibleanimatingvapours.

Theconsequencesandramificationsofholdinganogapheremetaphysicaltheoryabout
theorganicandinorganicaside,themajorquestionishowandtowhatextentsucha
theoryactuallyclarifiesconsciousness.Inparticular,howevermuchinformationChurchland
givesus,whetheraboutselfreplication,energyflux(pp.1524),neurophysiology,orany
othermaterialaspectsoflivingsystemsandwhetherindirecttermsorintermsof
computationalnetworksandwhatevertheprogressivelyrefineddefinitionshegivesusof
life,weneverseemtoarriveatanelucidationofconsciousness.Thereductiveequationof
consciousnesstomatterisnotinfactshown.Thereductionistprogrammeisatbestamatter
ofcorrelation;thatis,whenthereisconsciousness,thereisacertainkindofelectricalactivity
ongoinginabrain;whenthereisnotconsciousness,thereisnotthatcertainkindofelectrical
activityongoinginthebrain,butelectricalactivityofanotherkind,ornoelectricalactivityat
all.Noactualidentityhaseverbeenshowntoexistbetweenathought,anawareness,a
concept,anintention,ameaning,oranyotherkindofmentalhappeningandaparticular
constellationofmaterialhappenings,i.e.neuraleventsinabrain.AsphysiologistBenjamin
Libethasobserved,Onecanonlydescriberelationshipsbetweensubjectivephenomenaand
neuralevents,nothowonegetsfromonetotheother(Libet,1985,p.568).Thereductionof
thementaltothephysicalortheidentificationoftheformerwiththelatteristhus
evidentiallyungrounded.Ineffect,withoutcollateralsubstantiatingfacts,itisimpossibleto
cashinreductionistoridentitytheory.

Impedimentsotherthanthemetaphysicalonesdiscussedabovesimilarlyplagueaccountsof
howconsciousnessarisesinmatter.Primaryamongtheseistheclaimthatconsciousnessis
abrainactivityexclusivetohumans,hencethatshortofahumanbrain,thereisno
consciousness,oratleastnoconsciousnessworthyofthename.Thisthesisimpedesan
understandingofconsciousnessinanumberofways.Mostimportantly,ithazardsa
conceptualbreakwithevolutionarytheory.Notthatnewcapacitiesand/ornewmodesof
livingcannotemergethatarediscontinuouswithpreviouscapacitiesormodesinthemanner
specifiedbypunctuatedequilibriumtheory,butthatadispositiontosethumanscategorically
apartfromtherestofnaturewhetheronthebasisoflanguage,art,orwhatevergoes
unexaminedandunchecked.Indeed,withsuchathesis,oneformoranotherofcreationism
caneasilyholdsway.Thisisbecausethecoreconceptofevolutioninahistoricalsense
descentwithmodification,touseDarwinsexactphraseisignored.Humansmayinturn
beconceivedasspecialcreations,evenSpecialCreations,asonewellknownphilosopher
affirms(Sellars,1963,p.6).Afundamentalproblemwiththeviewmaybestatedintheform
ofahistoricaltruth:whileallhumansarehominids,notallhominidsarehuman.Inparticular,
withthenotionthatconsciousnessisexclusivetohumanbrains,aspectsofhominidevolution
becomevirtuallyimpossibletounderstandthebeginningsofstonetoolmaking,for
example,bymembersofthespeciesHomohabilissometwoandahalfmillionyearsagoand
thedevelopmentofprogressivelymorecomplextoolmakingtechniquesbyothernonhuman
hominidspeciesoverthespanofthosesametwoandahalfmillionyears.6Furthermore,
nonhumananimalsocialbehaviours,especiallythoseofournearestextantprimaterelatives
thathaveunequivocalaffinitieswithourownsocialbehaviours,becomevirtuallyimpossible
toaccreditpattinganotherindividualtoreassure,forexample,orhidingsomethingfrom
another.Groundsvanishfordelimitingthesesocialphenomenaasbehavioursinthefirst
place,whichinturnmakesgroundsforbehaviouralcategorization,muchlessgroundsfor
warrantedhumaninterpretationandassuredcomprehensionofthesenonhumananimals,
nonexistent.Ifconsciousnessissomethingonlyhumanbrainsproduce,thennomatterhow
muchanonhumanbrain,evenahominidnonhumanbrain,mightresembleahumanone
anatomically,creaturesthatarenothumanarenotconsciousbutmerelyroboticpiecesof
matter.Hence,howevermuchtheirpracticesintoolmakingortheirsocialinteractionsmight
evidencecontinuitieswithourown,therearenomentalconnectionslinkingustogether.In
short,toespousethenotionthatconsciousnessisanexclusivelyhumancapacitymeansthat
humanmentalpowersareevolutionarilydiscontinuouswiththoseofothercreatureswhose
behavioursareactuallythepointoforiginofmanyfundamentalhumanonesandeven
basicallyresemblehumanbehaviours.Discontinuityinthisinstancethusmeansnotan
espousalofpunctuatedequilibriumbutanespousaloftheviewthat,howevercloseany
particularlinealrelationshipsmightbe,theconnectionispurelyphysical.

Itisimportanttoconsiderthiskindofprivilegingbecauseforallitsinconsistencieswith
evolutionarythought,itisnotthatdisfavouredaview.Dennettsconceptionof
consciousness,forexample,stronglyexemplifiesandevenurgesjustthisprivilegingof
humankind.Unequivocallytetheringhisviewofconsciousnesstothehavingoflanguage,
Dennettisloathtofindconsciousnessinanycreaturethatdoesnotspeak.Heclaims
specificallythatlanguagelesscreature[s]suchasbatsandlobstersareseverelyhamperedin
havingnocenterofnarrativegravity,andthushaveadramaticallytruncated
consciousnesscomparedtoours.Aftermakingthisclaim,heaskshimselfasmuchasthe
readerIsntthisanawfullyanthropocentricprejudice?Hegoesaboutansweringthe
questioninanevenbolderandmoreradicallyseparatistway,forheimmediately
counterposestohimselfthequestion,[W]hataboutdeafmutes?Arenttheyconscious?His
answer:Ofcoursetheyarebutletsnotjumptoextravagantconclusionsabouttheir
consciousness,outofmisguidedsympathy.Dennettscriterionisaustereandunwavering.
Nomatterahumanpedigree,aswithbatsandlobsters,unlessthereislanguage,thereisa
decidedlyimpoverishedconsciousness,ifanyatall.DennettconcludesthatManypeopleare
afraidtoseeconsciousnessexplainedbecausetheyfearwewillloseourmoralbearings;
thatis,wemightgetintobadhabits,treatinganimalsasiftheywerewinduptoys,babies
anddeafmutesasiftheywereteddybears,andjusttoaddinsulttoinjuryrobotsasif
theywererealpeople(Dennett,1991,pp.447f.).

Wearealongwayfromanaturalhistoryofconsciousness.Giventheultraexclusive
definingtermsDennettinsistson,itisnosurprisethatthathistoryishardtocomeby.By
radicallyprivileginglanguage,Dennettpullstheevolutionaryrugoutfromunderus.7
Whatevermodestnodsmadeinthedirectionofanevolutionaryhistoryatthebeginningof
hisquesttoexplainconsciousness,hedoesnotfollowthrough.Aconsiderationoflanguage
itselfinthetermsheconceivesitshowshislackoffollowthroughunequivocally.If,as
Dennettexplains,humanlanguageexplainsconsciousness,thenconsciousnessaroseinthe
formofhumanlanguage.ThequestionDennettdoesnotaskhimselfishowhumanlanguage
itselfarose.8Clearly,heshouldaskthequestion.Indeed,heshouldasknotonlyhowhuman
languagecouldevenhavebeenconceivedshortofanalreadyexistingconsciousnessbuthow
humanlanguageinthebeginningcouldevenhavebeenstandardizedshortofalreadyintact
consciousnesses.9Dennettdoesnotseemremotelyawareofsuchquestions,muchlessaware
oftheirneedinganswerswhichiswhyonlylinguisticcreationismcanexplaina
Dennettianconsciousness.
Insum,wecannotarriveatanunderstandingofhowmindgotthereinthefirstplaceby
espousingbiologicalnaturalismbutneglectingnaturalhistory,bywonderingwhatitisliketo
beabodyotherthantheoneoneisbutneglectingpenetratingstudiesofotheranimateforms,
bychampioningametaphysicaltheorythatshacklesinquirybeforeitevenbegins,bygiving
selectivedefinitionsoflife,byprivileginghumanbrains,orbyexplainingconsciousnessin
narrativeterms.Innoneoftheseinstancesdowearriveatanelucidationofconsciousnessas
adimensionoftheanimate.Untilsuchanelucidationisgiven,aviableanswertothe
questionofhowmindgotthereinthefirstplacewillbeconsistentlybaffled.

III:LifeandItsDefinitions:AQuestionofAnimationandJustification

Itisinstructiveatthispointtoexaminedefinitionsoflifemorecloselybothtoexemplify
theimportoftheanimateandtohighlightinapropermannerthetroublesometextualuseof
quotationmarksasameansofapportioningmentalcreditanddistinguishingamongmental
attributes.Biologicaltextsoftendevotesomepagestodefinitionsoflife.Amongthe
constituentsofthosedefinitionsisselfreplication.OrderandenergyfeaturesChurchland
toocomestoincorporateinhisprogressivedefinitionsoflifearealsonamed.
Responsivityisspecifiedasafurtherprimeconstituent.Asonetextnotes:Plantseedlings
bendtowardthelight;mealwormscongregateindampness;catspounceonsmallmoving
objects;evencertainbacteriamovetowardorawayfromparticularchemicals...[T]he
capacitytorespondisafundamentalandalmostuniversalcharacteristicoflife(Curtis,1975,
p.28).Oddlyenough,thisfundamentalandalmostuniversaldimensionoflifedoesnot
typicallyfigureindefinitionsoflife(livingsystems,consciousness)offeredbycognitivists
generally,norphilosophersofmindinparticular,especiallythoseineithercategorywhoare
weddedtoinformationprocessing,computationalmodels.Yetresponsivitybending,
congregating,pouncing,movingtowardoraway,inshort,animationcommonlyappears
anintegralpartofphenomenasuchascognition,hencepartandparcelofconsciousness.If
queriedonthematter,cognitivistsandphilosophersmightrespondinamannerconsistent
withpervasivepresentdaywesternthoughtthatitdependsonwhatisdoingthebending,
congregating,pouncing,ormovingtowardoraway,whetherthetermscognitiveor
consciousapply,thatis,whetherthetermsareproperascriptionsornot.Thisanswer
unfortunatelyskirtsthecriticalpointatissue:justifyingthecognitivedistinctionsonemakes
diacritically.ThepointisneatlyexemplifiedbyChurchlandpreciselybecausehisaccountof
consciousness,i.e.eliminativematerialism,conceptuallyprecludesdiacriticalpracticeto
beginwith.Ifthedistinctionbetweentheorganicandtheinorganicisblurred,thenofcourse
distinctionsamongtheorganicarealsoblurredjustasChurchlandinfactsaystheyare
blurredwithrespecttointelligence:therearedifferencesonlybydegrees.Buttheblurring
betweenorganicformsisnecessarilyfinerthantheblurringbetweentheorganicandthe
inorganicsinceorganicformsarecomparativelymorecloselyrelatedtoeachotherthanthey
aretotheinorganic.Ineffect,tobeconsistentwithChurchlandtheory,commontextual
practiceshouldbealtered.Quotationmarkstypicallysurroundingcognitivefunctionsasthey
areascribedtowhataretermedlowerformsshouldbeerased.Adifferenceonlyby
degreesdoesnotjustifythem.

Tocounterthatadifferenceonlybydegreesdoesnotentailthatwecannotjustly
distinguishbetweendegreesofconsciousness(cognitiveabilities,intelligence)withinthe
organicthatwecannotjustlymakedistinctionsonthebasisofwhoisdoingthepouncing,
forexampleisaclaimdifficulttouphold.Properjustificationislackingintheformof
whollyobjectivesupportingfacts.Thisisbecausewhatbasicallymattersisnotwhoisdoing
thepouncing;whatmattersistheabilitytoprovideawhollyunprejudicedrationalefor
commontextualpractice.Indeed,theoriginalchargecanstillbepressedbecausea
fundamentalmandateexists;namely,specificationoftheexactdegree(s)atwhichquotation
marksareappropriate.Thismandateexistsregardlessofwhatmetaphysicaltheoryone
espouses.ItisasnecessarytoSearlesaccountofconsciousness,forexample,asto
computationalcognitivistsaccounts.Butasmightbeevident,themandateposesan
insuperableproblem.Whatevermightbeclaimedtoconstituteacriterionfordistinguishing
amongdegreesofconsciousness(intelligence,cognitiveabilities)isnotamatteroffactbuta
matterofhumanjudgment.Whilecranialcapacities,neuroncounts,dendriticbranchings,and
bodysize,forexample,certainlyconstitutemattersoffact,thesemattersoffactdonotin
themselvesspecifyanythingwhatsoeverinthewayofastandard.Oneneedonlyrecallwhat
DarwinwroteonthebasisofhisstudyofHymenoptera:*Itiscertainthattheremaybe
extraordinarymentalactivitywithanextremelysmallabsolutemassofnervousmatter.10In
short,themandatetoshowappropriatenessappearsdoomedfromthestart.Specification
whateveritstheoreticalcontextturnsouttobeascompletelyarbitraryasitisabsolutely
mandatory;awhollyobjectivesupportingbaseisnowheretobefound.Indeed,inits
arbitrariness,specificationcanonlybelabelledsubjective;astandardcompletely
impervioustohumanbiascannotpossiblybeidentified.Inconsequence,acancellingofall
quotationmarksappearswarrantedthoughasindicatednotnecessarilyonthegroundsof
Churchlandtheoryatall.Thefollowingdescriptionofabacteriummovingtowardoraway
fromparticularchemicalsisanespeciallyinterestingaswellasexemplarycandidateinthis
respect.

Processinginabacteriummaybethoughtofasasortofmolecularpolling:...thepositivevotescast
byreceptorsinresponse,say,toincreasingconcentrationsofasugararematchedagainstthenegative
votesproducedbyincreasingconcentrationsofnoxiouscompounds.Onthebasisofthiscontinuous
votingprocess,thebacteriumknowswhethertheenvironment,onthewhole,isgettingbetteror
worse.Theresultsofthisanalysisappeartobecommunicatedbyelectricalsignalstotheresponse
centers.Thefinalstage,theresponse,consistsofabriefchangeinthedirectionofrotationofthe
severalstiff,helicalflagellathatpropelthebacterium.Theresultisthatthebacteriumfoundersbriefly
andthenstrikesoutinanewdirection,onceagainsamplingtoseewhethertheenvironmentis
improvingordeteriorating(Keeton&Gould,1986,p.452).

Inadditiontobeinganexemplarycandidatefordiacriticalerasure,thedescriptivepassage
demonstratesinanintimatelyrelatedwaywhyresponsivitythefundamentalandalmost
universalcharacteristicoflifeisofcriticalimport.Sampling,foundering,andstrikingout
inanewdirectionarepreciselyamatterofanimationandanimationispreciselyinsome
sensecognitiveormindfulasinassessingpropitiousandnoxiousaspectsofthe
environment.Cognitiveaspectsoforganicanimationinthisinstance,cognitiveaspectsof
abacteriumsanimationcannotthusreasonablybeconsideredmerefigurativeaspects.
Moregenerally,cognitivecapacitiescannotreasonablybereservedonlyforwhatare
commonlytermedhigherorderorganisms.11

Theunjustifiableuseofdiacriticalmarkingstodistinguishcognitivelyamongorganisms
leadstoaseriesofinterlinkeddemands:acessationofrelianceonwhatisinfacta
conceptuallylazy,inapt,and/orobfuscatingtextualpractice;acorollaryrecognitionofthe
importofanimation;aconsequentinvestigationoftheanimateintermsofitsnaturalhistory;
adelineationofwhatitmeanscognitivelytobeanimate.Inaquiteprovocativesense,one
mightsaythatChurchlandsblurringofmetaphysicallinesitselfleadstosuchaseriesof
interlinkeddemands.Hisoverarchingmetaphysicalblurringonbehalfofanunrelenting
materialismwhetheronefindsthelattercredibleornotforcesanexaminationand
justificationofcommontextualpracticeandtypicalwesternthinkingregardingsocalled
higherandlowerformsoflife.Itclearlycallsourattentiontoafundamentalquestion
aboutwhereandonwhatgroundscognitivelinesarediacriticallydrawninorderto
distinguishamongcapacitiesofvariousformsoforganiclife.Allthesame,itisimportantto
emphasizethatinansweringtothefourfolddemand,wearenotchargedwiththetaskof
understandingmatter,thatis,ofmakingappropriatedistinctionsinmaterialcomplexityby
takingneuroncountsandthelike.Onthecontrary,wearechargedwiththetaskof
understandingtheanimate,preciselyasthebacteriumexampledemonstrates.Accordingly,
thequestbeginsfromtheotherside.Wetakethephenomenathemselvesasapointof
departure,nottheory,andearnestlyinquireintowhatweobservetobelivingrealities.
Denyingdistinctionsthusbecomesinthisinstanceandinaheuristicsenseepistemologically
salutaryratherthanmetaphysicallycatastrophic.

Searlesintenseconcernwithpreservingdistinctionsbetweenkindsofintentionalityby
maintainingdiacriticalmarkingsisdecidedlytopicalinthiscontext.Aftergivingexamplesof
whathetermsmetaphoricalattributionsofintentionality,andinsistingonthenecessityof
distinguishingbetweenintrinsicintentionalityandasifintentionality,hestatesrather
hyperbolicallythatIfyoudenythedistinction[betweenthetwo]itturnsoutthateverything
intheuniversehasintentionality(Searle,1990,p.587).Becauseheisconcernednotjust
withtheanimateworldbutwithcarburetors,computers,andsuch,hisbroadclaimisperhaps
lessrashthanitmightatfirstappear.Understoodspecificallyintermsofpresentconcerns,
hispointisthatwhenlanguageisusedasinthebacteriumpassagequotedabove,
intentionalitymustbereadasdescribinganasifintentionalitynottherealintrinsic
thing.ToaccedetoSearleslineofreasoningandbroadwarning,however,ispreciselyto
misstheepistemologicalchallenge,andindeedtoforegoexaminingwhatmightleadto
foundational12understandingswithinbiologicalnaturalism.Inthislatterrespect,itisof
coursealsotomissthechallengeofadescriptivemetaphysicsthatwouldadequately
comprehendnaturalhistoryandonthataccountofferfundamentalunderstandingsofthe
animateworldthatareinformedbyevolutionarythought.Whilethepenaltyofblurring
distinctionscancertainlybeconfusion,itdoesnotnecessarilyturnoutthatonereaches
absurdityifoneblursthem,asSearleclaims(ibid.).Ifthephenomenathemselvesaretaken
asapointofdeparture,itinfactturnsoutneitherthateverythingintheuniverse[is]mental
northateverythingintheuniverseismaterial.Itturnsoutonlythateverythingintheanimate
universeneedstobeconsideredaswhatitisanimateandthatinconsequenceweneed
totakeseriouslythehistoricalperspectiveofevolutionarythought:byexaminingthelivesof
livingcreatures,bydeterminingthecorporealmattersoffactthatsustainthoselives,andby
tracingoutinanevolutionarysensehowconsciousnessarisesinanimateform.Onlybydoing
soarewelikelytogetourconceptualbearings,justifynewtextualpractice,ifany,andinthe
endcometosoundunderstandingsofthecomplexitiesaswellasprovenienceof
consciousness.

IV:CorporealConsciousness:AMatterofKnowing

KnowthyselfisaSocraticimperative.Itmayalsobesaidtobeabuiltinbiologicaloneina
specialandfundamentalsense.Itisimportanttosetthisbiologicalimperativeexplicitlyin
themainstreamofgeneralcognitivisttrendsincurrentwesternthoughtandAmerican
philosophyofmind.Insodoing,wecanshowinunequivocaltermshowtheimperative
offersamoreexactingevolutionaryunderstandingofconsciousness.Wecanfurthermore
expose,andinequallyunequivocalterms,whatistypicallyomittedinthewayofempirical
evidenceincontemporarytheoriesofconsciousness.Accordingly,alongerbutproportionally
richerandmoreinformativeroutewillbetakentoitsexposition.Wemightcallthisroute
TheLiabilitiesofaParadigmaticCognitivistAccountoftheSocraticImperative.The
accountisbasedondescriptiveremarksDennettmakesaboutTheRealityofSelvesinthe
processofexplainingconsciousness.

Energeticallyaffirmingthateveryagenthastoknowwhichthingintheworlditis!Dennett
(1991,p.427)beginsbyspecifyingwhatthisknowingentails.Heconsidersfirstsimpler
organismsforwhomthereisreallynothingmuchtoselfknowledgebeyondthe
rudimentarybiologicalwisdomenshrinedinsuchmaximsasWhenHungry,DontEat
Yourself!andWhenTheresaPain,ItsYours!Inthiscontext,hesaysofalobsterthat[It]
mightwelleatanotherlobstersclaws,buttheprospectofeatingoneofitsownclawsis
convenientlyunthinkabletoit.HegoesontosaythatItsoptionsarelimited,andwhenit
thinksofmovingaclaw,itsthinkerisdirectlyandappropriatelywiredtotheveryclaw
itthinksofmoving.

Thesituationisdifferent,Dennettsays,whenitcomestocontrollingthesortsof
sophisticatedactivitieshumanbodiesengagein,becausetherearemoreoptions,andhence
moresourcesofconfusion(ibid.).Hestatesthatthebodyscontrolsystem(housedinthe
brain)hastobeabletorecognizeawidevarietyofdifferentsortsofinputsasinformingit
aboutitself,andwhenquandariesariseorscepticismsetsin,theonlyreliable(butnot
foolproof)wayofsortingoutandproperlyassigningthisinformationistorunlittle
experiments:dosomethingandlooktoseewhatmoves(pp.427f.).Theexperimental
approachisthesame,Dennettsays,whetheramatterofexternalsignsofourownbodily
movementorinternalstates,tendencies,decisions,strengthsandweaknesses:Do
somethingandlooktoseewhatmoves.Withrespecttointernalknowledge,headdsthatAn
advancedagentmustbuilduppracticesforkeepingtrackofbothitsbodilyandmental
circumstances(p.428).

Dennettsdescriptivepassagesofcoursereadilyofferthemselvesascandidatesforerasureno
lessthanpassagesinbiology,notoncosmichistoricalgroundsDennettsmaterialismdoes
notappeartorunsofarastoblurthedistinctionbetweentheorganicandtheinorganicbut
onevolutionaryandmind/bodyones:Dennettmarksmentalphenomenadiacriticallyboth
inordertomakedistinctionsbetweenhigherandlowerformsoflifeandinorderto
maintainathoroughlymaterializedconsciousness.Inshort,histheoryofconsciousness
demandsthathetemperthemeaningofthementalatbothmetaphysicallevels.Whathis
diacriticalmarkingsactuallyallowishavinghismaterialcakeandeatingittoo.However
loosehisvocabulary(e.g.athinkinglobster),andhowevermuchitstraysfrompurely
materialisttheory(e.g.mentalaswellasbodilycircumstances),itisdiacriticallyreinedinto
accordwiththetheoreticaldistinctionshewantstomaintainandthematerialistdoctrinehe
wantstouphold.

WhatmakesboththeentailmentsandelaborationofDennettsenergeticaffirmationsucha
compellingandrichlyinformativepointofdepartureforexaminingthebioSocratic
imperativeispreciselywhattheyoverlookintheory,method,andfact.Itisasif
proprioceptioningeneralandkinesthesiainparticular13didnotexist;whateverthetalkof
movementwithrespecttohumans,forexample,itisasifthesenseofmovementwere
nonexistent.Thus,onehastolookandseewhatismoving.14Insuchanaccount,the
kinestheticismorethanoverriddenbythevisual;itisnotevenonthebooks.Wereoneto
examineDennettstheoryofhumanagencywithrespecttoinfants,onewouldstraightaway
discoveritserror.Wereonetoexaminehistheorywithrespecttoblindpeople,onewoulddo
thesame.Inaword,andcontraDennett,wehumanslearnwhichthingwearebymoving
andlisteningtoourownmovement.Wesenseourownbodies.Indeed,wehumans,along
withmanyotherprimates,mustlearntomoveourselves.Wedosonotbylookingandseeing
whatweremoving;wedosobyattendingtoourbodilyfeelingsofmovement,whichinclude
abodilyfeltsenseofthedirectionofourmovement,itsspeed,itsrange,itstension,andso
on.Ourbodilyfeelingsofmovementhaveacertaindynamic.Wefeel,forexample,the
swiftnessorslownessofourmovement,itsconstrictednessoropenness,itstensional
tightnessorlooseness,andmore.Inshort,

weperceivethequaliaofourownmovement;
ourbodilyfeelingsofmovementhaveacertainqualitativecharacter.
ItisinstructivetorecallSherringtonsexperientialaccountofproprioceptioninthiscontext.
Howeverinadvertentlyheexcludeskineticqualiafromhisaccount,Sherringtonexplicitlyif
brieflyaffirmsitinthecourseofspecifyinganddescribingthenatureofourexperiential
awarenessofmovement.Underscoringfirstofallthefactthatwehavenoawarenessof
neuralevents,e.g.,ofnervefibresregister[ing]thetensionatthousandsofpointsthey
sampleinthemuscles,tendons,andligamentsof[a]limb,hesaysIperceivenotraceofall
this[neuralactivity].Withrespecttothelimb,hestatesthatIamsimplyawareofwherethe
limbis,andwhenitmoves.Inthiscontext,healsopointsoutthatwearenotevenawarethat
thelimbpossess[es]musclesortendons(Sherrington,1953,p.248).Hegoesonto
emphasizethelackofthiskindofanatomicalawarenessinactualexperiencewhenhe
describestheexperienceofmovingthelimbtopickupapaperfromthetable:Ihaveno
awarenessofthemusclesassuchatall(ibid.,pp.248f.).15Thelackofdirectexperiential
awarenessofmusclesassuch,however,doesnotimpedeanexperientialawarenessofthe
movement.AsSherringtonaffirms,thoughIhavenoawarenessofthemusclesassuchatall,
...Iexecutethemovementrightlyandwithoutdifficulty.ItstartssmoothlyasthoughIhad
beenawarepreciselyofhowtenseandhowlongeachmuscleandhowtenseeachtendon
was,and,thusaware,tookthemasmystartingpointforshorteningorpayingoutasmaybe,
eachonefurther(italicsadded).Interestinglyenough,hethenpointsoutthatifhehad
movedclumsily,itwouldnotdomuchgoodtolookatmylimb(p.249,italicsadded).As
hehimselfsays,lookingprovideshimnomorethananadditionalsenseofwherehislimbis.
Ineffect,withrespecttoonesownbody,heaffirmsthatvisionisnotaprimarybuta
supplementalspatialsense.Sherringtonconcludeshisexperientialaccountofmovementby
characterizing[t]heproprioceptiveperceptofthelimbasamentalproduct,aproduct
derivedfromelementswhicharenotexperiencedassuchandyetarementalinthesensethat
themindusestheminproducingthepercept(ibid.).Insofaras[s]uchmentalproductsare
anintimateaccompanimentofourmotoracts,hesaysthat[w]emaysupposetherefore
thereobtainssomethingliketheminouranimalkithandkinasaccompanimentoftheir
intentionalmotoracts(ibid.).

Nowclearly,ifwecarefullyexamineSherringtonsaccountandreflectbothonwhatheis
implicitlyaffirmingandatthesametimeonwhatheisinadvertentlyexcluding,wefindan
openavowalofkineticqualia.Anawarenessofsmoothnessisfirstofallanawarenessof
somethingoverandaboveanawarenessofwherealimbisandofwhenitismoving.Itisan
awarenessofhowabodypartorthebodyasawholeismoving;howpreciselynotinthe
neurophysiologicalsenseSherringtonhimselfdetailsasimpossible,buthowinthesame
experientialsenseaswhereandwhen.Moreoversmoothnessisnotamentalproduct,any
morethanjerkyorswiftorhesitantorexpansiveorcollapsingorintenseorconstrictedor
weakorabruptarementalproducts.16Neitherisweightamentalproduct,theweightone
perceivesinthefeltheavinessorheftofonesbodyorbodypartsinmoving;neitherismass
amentalproduct,themassoneperceivesinthefeltthreedimensionalityorvolumeofones
bodyandinitsfeltsmallnessorlargeness.Inshort,qualiaareintegraltobodilylife.Theyare
thereinanymovementwemake.Theyaredifferentiallythereinthebodilylifeofanimate
forms.Theyarenotamentalproduct,buttheproductofanimation.Theyarecreatedby
movementitself.Accordingly,anytimeonecarestoattendtothefeltsenseofones
movement,oneperceivesqualia.

Whenwelearntomoveourselves,welearntodistinguishjustsuchkineticbodilyfeelingsas
smoothnessandclumsiness,swiftnessandslowness,brusquenessandgentleness,notinso
manywords,butinsomanybodilyfeltdistinctions.Shortoflearningtomoveourselvesand
beingattentiveinthiswaytothequaliaofourmovement,wecouldhardlybeeffectiveagents
anymorethanacreaturewhodoessomethingandthenlookstoseewhatmovescould
beaneffectiveagent.Inneithercaseisthereanagentinthetruesenseofbeingincommand
oforasphenomenologicalphilosopherEdmundHusserlwouldsay,ofholdingswayin
onesownbody.Anagentwhoholdsswayisabonafideagentpreciselyinsofarasshe/he
isawareofher/hisownmovement,awarenotonlyofinitiatingit,butawareofitsspatio
temporalandenergydynamics,whichistosayofitsrichandvariablequalia.17Withrespect
toDennettsinjunctions,weretheytakenliterallytotheletter,hisagentsocalled
wouldsuffernotonlyfromhavingtohaveinsightatalltimesallpartsofhis/herbodyin
ordertoseewheretheywereandwhattheyweredoing.Hisagent,beingobliviousofqualia,
couldinnowaybuilduppracticesinthemannerDennettsuggests,forthebuildupofsuch
practicesdependsuponkinesthesiaandkinestheticmemory,i.e.uponanawarenessofthe
spatiotemporalandenergydynamicsofonesmovement.Anagentdevoidofkinesthesiain
factbelongstonoknownnaturalspecies.Agentsthosehavingthepowertoact
necessarilyhaveakinestheticsenseoftheirownmovement.

WhenDennettconsiderssimplerorganismssuchaslobsters,theperceptualsituationisno
differentfromwhatitiswithhumans.Kinesthesia,oritscounterpart,isnowhere
acknowledgedasafeatureoftheselowercreatures.Theideathatthesecreatureshavea
senseoftheirownbodyandbodymovementisalientothetheoryofathoroughly
materializedconsciousnessaswellasanalienthoughtinitself.Whoeverthethinkermight
beinDennettszoologyalobsterthinker,abatthinker,alionthinkeritappearsto
getwhatitwants,ifitgetsitatall,simplyinvirtueofitsimpeccablemotorwiring,nothing
more.Thethinkerinotherwordsappearsnottohaveorneedanyproprioceptive
connectionstoitsbody;itsbody,infact,isonDennettsaccountnomorethanadirectlyand
appropriatelywiredmechanicalcontrivanceforgettingaboutintheworld.Yetweshould
askwhatitmeanstosaythatalobsterwilleatanothersclawsbutthatconveniently,as
Dennettputsit,itfindseatingoneofitsownclawsunthinkable.Doesitmeanthatthereis
actuallyaruleDonteatyourownclaws!wiredintothelobstersneurologicalcircuitry?
Butitispatentlyunparsimonioustothinkthatthereissucharuleandjustaspatentlyabsurd
tothinkthateverycreaturecomespreparedwithanownersmanual,asitwere,arulebook
repletewithwhatDennettcallsmaxims.Suchamaxim,forexample,wouldbeonlyoneof
anindefinitelygreatnumberofmaximsthatalobster(or,inanalogousterms,anyother
simplerorganism)couldbesaidtocarryaroundintheneuralmachinerythatcountsasits
Headquarters:18Donttrytogoonland!Donttrytoeatasquid!Shovelinnewsand
grainsaftermolting!Thelargeclawisforcrushing!Thesmallclawisforseizingand
tearing!Andsoon.Whatmakeseatingitsownclawsconvenientlyunthinkableisclearly
somethingotherthanaruleofconduct.Theputativeevolutionarysenseofconveniencethat
Dennettinvokesismisguided.Convenienceisnotamatterofanopportuneadaptationbut
ofanastoundinglyvariedandintricatelydetailedbiologicalfacultythatallowsacreatureto
knowitsownbodyanditsownbodyinmovement.

Dennettisnotaloneeitherinhisomissionofthekinestheticorinhisprivilegingofthevisual.
Typically,kinesthesianevermakesanappearanceindiscussionsofthesensesthefive
senses.Anycursoryglanceatindicesofrelevantbooksinbiology,psychology,and
philosophydiscloseseitheraradicallyabbreviatedtreatmentofkinesthesiaincomparisonto
vision(andaudition),oracompletelackoftreatmentaltogether.Onemightsaywithgood
reasonthatthemind/bodyproblemiswrittenintotheverytextsthemselves.Moreoverthe
topicofbodymovement,ifmakinganappearanceatall,typicallycomesonthesceneonly
marginallyinthesebooks.Thewayitdoessoisthroughreductiontothebrainandits
efferentpathways.Inbothtypicalinstances,wecomeuppainfullyshortofasenseof
movement.Inonerespectitisnotsurprisingthatkinesthesiaisomittedorslightedandthat
webelieveourselvestohaveonlyfivesenses.Asadults,wehavelongsinceforgottenhow
welearnedtomoveourselvesinaveryrealsense,howwelearnedourbodies.Onlyif
now,asadults,wepaykinestheticattentionforexample,towhatitfeelslike,orrather,
doesnotfeellikewhenourarmfallsasleepmightwebegintorealizehowfundamental
kinesthesiais.Itisfundamentalnotonlytoourknowledgeofwhichthingintheworldwe
are;itisfundamentalbothtoourabilitytomakeourwayintheworldtomove
knowledgeablyinitandtoourknowledgeoftheworlditself.Thoughwemayhave
forgottenwhatwefirstlearnedoftheworldthroughmovementandtouch,thereisnodoubt
butthatwecametoknowitfirstbymovingandtouchingourwaythroughit,inaword,
throughourtactilekinestheticbodies.19

Theastoundinglyvariedandintricatelydetailedbiologicalfacultythatallowsknowingones
ownbodyandbodymovementandthatinthemostbasicsenseallowsknowingtheworldisa
dimensionofconsciousness.Inversely,consciousnessisadimensionoflivingformsthat
movethemselves,thatareanimate,andthat,intheiranimation,areinmultipleandcomplex
waysengagedintheworld.Theearlierdescriptionofabacteriumscognitivecapacitiesis
relevantpreciselyinthiscontext.Whatthedescriptionpointstoisachemicallymediated
tactilediscriminationofbodiesapartfromoroutsideofthebodyoneis.Givenits
stereognosticsensitivity,abacteriumsdiscriminativeabilitymightjustifiablybetermeda
metacorporealconsciousness,aconsciousnessofsomethingbeyonditself.Clearly,the
essentiallytactileabilitytodiscriminatebodiesotherthanoneselfisnotthesameasa
proprioceptiveabilitytodiscriminateaspectsofoneselfasananimateform,thoughjustas
clearlytactilityisavitaldimensionofthatproprioceptiveability.Proprioceptivelyendowed
creaturesarenotonlyalwaysintouchwithsomethingoutsidethemselves;theytactilely
compressanddeformthemselvesbodilyintheprocessofmoving.Whenacreaturebendsits
leg,forexample,itbringstwosurfacesincontactwitheachotherinmutualdeformation.
Tactilitythusentersintotheessentiallykineticcognitionalabilitiesbywhichacreature
discriminatesaspectsofitselfasananimateform.Inthemostfundamentalsense,these
kineticcognitionalabilitiesconstituteacorporealconsciousness,aconsciousnessthat,asI
shalltrynowtoshowatsomelength,isanastoundinglyvariedandintricatelydetailed
biologicalfaculty.Thepurposeofthedemonstrationistolinkunderstandingsof
consciousnesstocorporealmattersoffactandtherebytoanevolutionaryhistory.Inother
words,witharecognitionofthisbiologicalfaculty,andwithattendantunderstandingsofits
rootednessincorporealmattersoffact,wecanbegintograspthepossibilityofatrue
evolutionaryhistoryofconsciousness.Itbearsemphasizingthatwedothisbydirect
considerationofthetopicatissue:consciousness,andnotbyappealtoconstituentsin
definitionsoflifetoselfreplication,organization,andsoon.Thenotionofconsciousness
asfundamentallyacorporealphenomenoninfactalreadysuggestsaradicalrevisionofthe
commonevolutionarycharacterizationofconsciousnessbothasahigherorderfunctioni.e.
afunctionhavingnothingtodowithbodies,andasahigherorderfunctionexclusiveto
higherformsoflife,i.e.apreeminentlyhumanendowment.Similarly,italreadysuggestsa
radicalrevisionofthematerialistscharacterizationofconsciousnessasidenticalwith
neurologicalbrainevents.Thekeytothereconceptualizationofconsciousnessandtothe
evolutionaryimportofthatreconceptualizationistherealizationthatbodiesintheformof
livingcreaturesarenotmerephysicalthingsbutanimateforms.

Consciousnessisthusnotinmatter;
itisadimensionoflivingforms,
inparticular,adimensionoflivingformsthatmove.

Transposedtothiscontext,Searlesbiologicalnaturalismhisbiologicalnaturalizationof
consciousnessproperlybeginswithmovement.Itwouldshowhowconsciousnessis
rootedinanimateform.Indeed,itwouldshowconcretelyhow,intheevolutionofanimate
forms,consciousnessemergednotasahigherlevelorintrinsicstalkthatonedaysprouted
outofaneuralblue,butasadimensionthatitselfevolvedalongwithliving,moving
creaturesthemselves.

Whatisnecessarytothetaskofreconceptualizationisasenseoftheevolutionaryhistoryof
proprioception,includingasenseofthehistoryofitsderivation.Itshouldbeclearlyevident
thatasenseofthishistorydoesnotentailaconcernwiththeevolutionoftheneuralcircuitry
ofproprioceptioningeneral,anassessmentoftheneurologyofproprioceptioninmammalsin
particular,noroftheneurologyofproprioceptioninhumansinsingularlyfinedetail.It
entailsaconcernwiththeproprioceptivelivesoflivingcreatures,invertebrateandvertebrate,
insofarastheyhavebeenstudiedandrecordedbynaturalists,zoologists,andbiologists,and
insofarasonecandiscernwithinsuchstudieswhatisattimesleftunsaidwithrespecttoan
awarenessofmovement.Howeverneglectedorunderstated,proprioceptionisacorporeal
matteroffact.Itsrootsareembeddedinthekineticpossibilitiesoftheearliestformsoflife.
Thusasenseofitsevolutionaryhistorymeanscoincidentlyaconcernwithorganismssuchas
bacteriaandprotozoa.Inshort,understandingsoftheevolutionofproprioceptionlead
preciselytounderstandingsoftheprovenienceofconsciousness.Withtheseunderstandings
comeavocabularyconsistentwithcorporealmattersoffactandconceptualclarificationsby
whichonecanformulateastandardforlinguisticpracticethatisneitherarbitrarynor
superficialamerediacriticalbandaidbutastandardwarrantedbytheevidencefrom
naturalhistory.

V:TotheThingsThemselves:CorporealMattersofFact20

Animateformsarebuiltinwaysthataresensitivetomovement.Theirsensitivitycanbe
doublyreflected;theycanbesensitivetodynamicmodificationsinthesurroundingworld
andtodynamicmodificationsoftheirownbody.Theycan,inotherwords,besensitivetothe
movementofthingsintheirenvironment,includingtheverymediuminwhichtheylive,and
tothemovementoftheirownbodies.Amomentsseriousreflectiononthematterdisclosesa
majorreasonwhythissensitivitytomovementisbothbasicandparamount:nomatterwhat
theparticularworld(Umwelt)21inwhichananimallives,itisnotanunchangingworld.
Hence,whatevertheanimal,itsmovementcannotbeabsolutelyprogrammedsuchthat,for
example,atalltimesitsparticularspeedanddirectionofmovement,itseveryimpulseand
stirring,itseverypauseandstillness,runautomaticallyonsomethingakintoalifetimetape.22
Consider,forexample,anearthworm,itsbodypressedagainsttheearthasitcrawlsalong,or
abeetlewalkingalongtheground.Ineachcase,theimmediateenvironmentistangibly
inconsistent;ithastopologicalandtexturalirregularitiesbumpshere,smoothnessthere,
moisturehere,hardnessthere,andsoon.Bothearthwormandbeetlemustadjustkinetically
towhattheyfindintheimmediatemoment.Aprominentinvertebrateresearchermakesthis
verypoint:Informationregardingtheabsolutedispositionofthebodyisimperativeinorder
thatminoradjustmentsofmuscularactivitymaybemadetocopewithirregularitiesinthe
surface(Laverack,1976,pp.4f.).Clearly,theworldislessthanconsistentinits
conformationsandanyanimalthatsurvivesmustliterallyorfigurativelybendtoitsdemands.
Considerfurthertheveryfluidorchangingmediuminwhichsomeanimalslive.Airand
watermove,andthatmovementintheformofcurrentsorwindscurrentsandwindsthat
themselvesshiftfromgentletomoderatetoturbulentagitates,deforms,orotherwise
impingesontheanimalsbody.Ineffect,suchmovementinfluenceshowtheanimalmoves
frommomenttomoment;itinfluenceswhattheanimalcandoandwhatitactuallydoes.A
locustisproprioceptivelysensitiveinjustthiswaytoaircurrents.Itsfaceiscoveredwith
hairsthatrespondtothemovementofairacrosstheirsurface:Eachhairrespondsmaximally
towindfromaspecificdirection,withtheoptimaldirectionbeingdeterminedbytheangleof
curvatureofthehairshaft(pp.5f.).Sensitivitytoitsfacialhairdisplacementsfacilitatesthe
locustscontrolofliftduringflightandisinformativeoforientationinflying.The
intricatenessofaspidersexternalproprioceptivesystemoffersequallyimpressivetestimony
totheimportanceofproprioception.Spidersalsohavehairsontheirbodythat,whenbent,
informthem,forexample,ofthedispositionoftheirbodyrelativetotheirweb(p.27).Far
morenumerousthantheirhairs,however,areothersurfacesensoryorganscalledslitsensilla.
Thesearesingleorcomplexproprioceptiveorgans,thecomplexoneslyriformorgans
beinglocatedontheirappendages,pedipalps,andwalkinglegs.Aspidersslitsensillaare
functionallyanalogoustoaninsectscampaniformsensilla(see,e.g.Wright,1976,pp.353
f.);botharesensitivetodeformation,i.e.cuticularstressthroughcompression.Togivean
ideaofthesingularimportanceofsuchproprioceptors,considerthatthehuntingspider
Cupienniussaleihasover3000slitorgansonitswalkinglegs(ibid.;seealsoLaverack,1976,
pp.24f.).Giventhequantityofsuchorgans,itisnowonderthatthequantityof
proprioceptiveinformation...fromanappendageataparticulartime(e.g.duringwalking)
maybeconsiderable(Wright,1976,p.354).

Theabovecorporealmattersoffactcanbeputwithinthepurviewofamoreexplicit
evolutionaryhistoryofanimateformbyaproportionatelybroaderconsiderationof
invertebrates.Broaderconsiderationoftheseformsofanimatelifeprovidesanespecially
edifyingevolutionaryviewpointinsofarasninetypercentofanimalspeciesareinvertebrates
creaturesrangingfromspongesandcoraltolobster,scallops,mites,centipedes,
segmentedworms,spidersandhostsofotheranimals,althoughmostareinsects,ofwhichthe
largestcategorycomprisesspeciesofbeetles.23Fullerconsiderationwillfurthermorebringto
theforetheimmediacyofmostcreaturesliveswithrespecttotheirsurrounds.Indeed,it
wouldbeerroneoustojudgeinvertebratesbyhumanstandards,especiallyfullyclothed
westernones,forexternalproprioceptionfunctionsfarmoreasaformofmovementdetection
forthemthanforhumans.

Aninvertebratemaybesoftorhardbodied.Hardbodiedinvertebratesaresocalledbecause
theyhavearticulablebodypartsattachedtoanexoskeleton.Assuggestedbytheabove
examples,hardbodiedinvertebrateshaveexternalsensillaofvariouskinds:hairs,exoskeletal
plates,epidermalorgans,cilia,spines,pegs,slits,andsoon.Itistheseexternalsensory
organsthatmakepossibleanawarenessofsurfaceeventsinthedoublesensenotedabove:an
awarenessoftheterrainonwhichand/ortheenvironmentthroughwhichtheanimalis
movingandanawarenessofbodilydeformationsorstressesoccurringcoincidentwith
movingontheterrainand/orthroughtheenvironment.Toappreciateinabeginningwaythe
differenceinproprioceptivesensitivitybetweenhardandsoftbodiedinvertebrates,compare,
forexample,abeetleandapolyp.Abeetlethatiswalkingonthegroundhastactilecontacts
thatallowanawarenessofthegroundsirregularitiesbumps,stones,holes,andsoon
andtactilecontactwiththeairbreezes,vibrations,andsoonaswellasanawarenessof
itselfastopologicallydeformedoragitatedbythesecontacts.Proprioceptionisthus
distinctivelyinformativeofbothbodyandsurrounds.Asedentaryhydrozoanpolyphas
tentaclesbearingciliathataresensitivetovibrationsinthesurroundingwater.When
vibrationsoccur,thepolypbendsitstentaclestowardtheirsource,thustowardfoodparticles
suchasbarnaclenauplii.Englishmarinebiologist,D.A.Dorsettstates,Theresponseis
reflexiveratherthanproprioceptiveinthatit[thepolyp]isnotrespondingtomovements
generatedbyorimposedupontheanimalitself(Dorsett,1976,p.447).WhatDorsettmeans
isthattheresponseischaracterizedasreflexivebecausethebendingmovementisneither
generatedbythepolypitisgeneratedbythevibrationsnorimposeduponthepolyp
itisnottheresultofactualsurfacetosurfacecontact,i.e.contactofanimalbodywithsolid
object.HispointismorebroadlymadeinthecontextofananalysisbyM.S.Laverack,
anotherEnglishmarinebiologist,whodistinguishesamongfourbasicmodesofexternal
proprioceptionininvertebrates(Laverack,1976,pp.3f.).Thesimplestmodeisthrough
distortionofthebody,whetherthroughmusclecontractionorpassivedeformation:external
proprioceptorsareineithercaseaffected.Thesecondmodeistetheredtothefactthatanimals
moverelativetospace;ineffect,contactofthesurfaceofananimalsmovingbodywitha
solidobjectresultsinproprioceptionconcerningitsmovementandpositionrelativetothe
object.Thethirdmodeisalsotetheredtothefactthatanimalsmoverelativetospace;itisa
reiterationofthesecondmodeofproprioceptivestimulationbutwithreferencetoasubstrate
ratherthantoasolidobject.Thefourthmodederivesfromthecircumstanceinwhich
movementofonebodyparttactilelystimulatesanotherbodypartthroughcontactofexternal
sensorsofonekindoranother,e.g.,hairs,suchcontactprovidinginformationregarding
movementandpositionofthetwobodyparts.Tosaythatthepolypsbendingmovementis
reflexiveisthustosayboththatthepolypisnotstimulatedtomovebybodilydeformationor
stress(thefirstmode)24norisitstimulatedtomovebecauseasurfaceofitsbodyhascome
intocontactwithasolidobject(thesecondmode).Thatthepolypissedentarymeans,of
course,thatitdoesnotbudgefromitsbase;hence,thethirdmodeofstimulationisnota
possibility.Neitheristhefourthmodesincethemovementofthetentaclesdoesnot
proprioceptivelystimulateanotherbodypart.

Polypsbelongtoaclassofanimalscalledcoelenterates,primitiveaquaticanimals(Keeton
andGould,1986,p.161).Itmightbetemptingtogeneralizeaboutproprioceptionin
coelenteratesandperhapsinothersoftbodiedinvertebratessuchasannelidsandmolluscs
aswellonthebasisoftheaboveexampleanddiscussion,butgiventhediversityof
coelenterateformsoflife,itwouldbeamistaketowriteoffproprioceptionaltogetherinsuch
creatures.Differentproprioceptivecapacitiesorcounterpartsthereofarehighly
suggestedbythemovementofcreatureswithinthesameclassandevenwithinthesame
phylum.Thesomersaultinghydra,forexample,isanexceptiontowhatmightotherwisebe
consideredthesedentaryhydrozoanpolyprulewithrespecttothethirdpossiblemodeof
externalproprioception;fightingseaanemones(anthozoansratherthanhydrozoans)are
sensitivetothetouchofanalienformofanemone,thussensitiveinwaysconsistentwiththe
secondpossiblemodeofexternalproprioception;inmovingfromoneplacetoanotherona
rockoneinchperhourafightingseaanemonechangescontactwithasubstrate,thus,
likethesomersaultinghydra,ittooisopentoproprioceptionthroughitsownmovem

Frame 2
Thebestevidenceforproprioceptioninsoftbodiedinvertebratescomesfromstudiesof
gastropods(molluscs).Intheircomplexfeedingbehaviour,anumberofspeciesprotractand
retractabuccalmassincoincidencewithwhoseretraction,aradularaspsagainstthe
substrate,takingupbitsofplantoranimaltissueintheprocess.Thebehaviourismodulated
byproprioceptionaccordingtoload.Giventhedifferenceinanimateformbetweena
gastropodandasedentaryhydrozoanpolypwhichdifferenceofcoursemeansadifference
inmovementpossibilities,thusadifferenceinbehaviouralpossibilities25itisnot
surprisingtofindproprioceptivecapacitiesreadilyevidentintheoneandnotintheother.It
ispreciselyinthiscontextofrecognizingdifferencesinanimateformthatthesignificanceof
boththeaffirmationandtheideaoftrueproprioceptionbecomesapparent:Whatwould
disposemarinebiologiststoaffirmproprioceptiveunitsinthefaceofslimevidenceifnot
anintuitivesenseofthecentralimportanceofproprioceptiontoanimatelifeingeneral,and
inparticular,ofitsnecessityincarryingthroughobservedcomplexlifeenhancingbehaviours
suchasthoseofcertaingastropodspeciesdescribedabove?Whatifnotthisintuitivesense
generatestheideaofsuchaphenomenonastrueproprioception,thustheideathatthereare
lesserformsofthesame,formsonemighthistoricallycallprotoproprioception?Consider
thefollowingremarkthatvalidatesjustsuchevolutionarynotions:[I]npassingfromthe
coelenteratestotheannelidsandmolluscs,wearelookingatsomeoftheearlieststagesinthe
evolutionandorganizationofthenervoussystemandmustaskourselvesatwhatstagedoesa
trueproprioceptivesensearise(Dorsett,1976,p.443).Thequestionisindeedprovocative:
atwhatstagedoesatrueproprioceptivesensearise?Doesitarisewithmolluscs,for
example?Orcanitbesaidtohavearisenwithsomeofthepresumablyearlierevolving
coelenterates?Ontheotherhand,whatistrueproprioception?Andcanastagebe
pinpointedasitsinception?;thatis,isitpossibletosaywithrespecttoanyparticulargroupof
creaturesandwithrespecttoanyparticularevolutionaryperiod,trueproprioceptionstarts
here?Inviewofthediversityofcreaturelylife,onemightrathersaythattrue
proprioceptionarisesforeachcreatureaccordingtotheanimateformitis,andthatiftrue
proprioceptiondoesnotarise,theformdoesnotariseeitherbecauseitisnotkinetically
viable.Inotherwords,onemightwanttosaythattheoriginofproprioceptionisnotan
historicaleventassuch;itisaneventtiedtotheevolutionofanimateforms.Indeed,the
evolutionofformaldiversityspeakstotheevolutionofadiversityofproprioceptive
capacitiesbecauseitspeaksofthesamephenomenon:theevolutionofformsoflifeasforms
ofanimation.

Onthebasisoftheabovecorporealmattersoffact,wecaninfactbegintodistillasenseof
theevolutionofproprioception,

fromametacorporealconsciousnesstoacorporealconsciousness
throughtheevolutionofexternalsensors.

Asalloftheaboveexamplessuggest,theundoubtedlymultiplebeginningsofproprioception
areineachinstancetiedtosurfacerecognitionsensitivity.Notonlyaretheciliaofpolyps
tactilelysensitivetomovement,butthesurfacesensitivityofciliathemselves,organellesthat
arepresentingroupsofcreaturesfromprotozoa(unicellulareukaryoticorganismssuchas
parameciaandamoebas)tomammals,atteststothesignificanceofanoriginaltactilefaculty
subservingmovementandtherecognitionofsomethingoutsideofonesownbody.
Laveracksremarkaboutciliaisinfacthighlysuggestiveinthisrespect.HewritesthatIfthe
ciliummaybetakenasatleastasimplestartingpointforsenseorganstructurewemaylook
forreceptorsevenamongsttheprotozoa.Sensitivitytowardsphysicochemicaleventsiswell
known,butspecializedreceptorsmuchlessso(Laverack,1976,p.17).Hisremarkmaybe
glossedinthefollowingway:theevolutionofsenseorgansatthemostprimitiveeukaryotic
levelheraldsanewkindofsensitivity,onemediatedbyspecializedsenseorgans,i.e.cilia,
ratherthanbyphysicochemicalevents,butstillservingthesamebasicfunction:movement
andtherecognitionofsomethingoutsideonesownbody.Whilethissurfacesensitivityis
spokenofintermsofmechanoreception(ibid.),itisclearly,andindeed,fromtheviewpoint
oflivingorganisms,moreappropriatelyspecifiedasaformoftactilereception.The
protozoanciliatespeciesStentor,forexample,usesitsciliatosweepawaynoxiousparticles
andtheStentoritselfbendsawayfromthetactiledisturbance.26Tactilityintheserviceof
movementandofrecognizingsomethingoutsideonesownbodysimilarlydescribesthe
ciliamediatedtentaclemovementofasedentaryhydrozoanpolyptowardafoodsource.
Fromtheviewpointofciliaasthebeginningofspecializedsenseorganstructure,apolyps
movementisnotreflexivebutproprioceptive.27Morebroadly,thenotionoftrue
proprioceptionisdefinitivelyrecast.Itisnotahistoricalattainment;itisafunctionof
animateform.

Specifiedinanimateterms,livingformsdiscloseevenbroaderevolutionarycontinuities.A
bacteriumthatgoesaboutsamplingtheenvironment,asdescribedearlier,showsarelated
sensitivity.Thebacteriumaprokaryoticorganism,thatis,asinglecelledorganism
withoutanucleusandwithoutmembraneenclosedorganellesisenvironmentallysensitive
nottoshapeortomovementbuttothechemicalcompositionofitsenvironment(butseealso
belowonafurthermodeofbacterialsensitivity).Itssensitivityisallthesamesimilarly
mediatedbytouch,itsimilarlysubservesmovement,anditissimilarlymetacorporeal.
Hence,inbothprokaryoticandearlyunicellularandmulticellulareukaryoticformsoflife,
tactilitydetermineswhataparticularorganismdoes:abacteriumssurfacesensitivityanda
ciliatedprotozoansandciliamediatedpolypssensitivityarefoundedoncontactwith
somethingintheenvironment,ametacorporealphenomenonormetacorporealeventwhich
excitestheorganismtomoveinsomeway.Anevolutionarypatternthusbeginstoemerge
withrespecttosurfacerecognitionsensitivity.Thepatternisevidentinprokaryotic
organisms,whicharetactilelysensitivetotheirphysicochemicalenvironmentandwhich
movedynamicallycommensuratewiththatsensitivity,i.e.sampling,foundering,changing
direction;eukaryoticformsoflifeemerge,whicharetactilelysensitivetotheenvironment
throughspecializedsenseorgansandwhichmoveinwayscoincidentwiththatsensitivity,
protozoanciliatesrespondingtonoxiouselementsintheenvironmentbybendingor
sweepingmovements,forexample,theciliaofsedentarypolypsrespondingtovibrationsin
thesurroundingmediumandexcitingthepolyptobendatentacletowardfood,mobileforms
suchasannelidsandmolluscsmovinginstrikinglymoreintricateandvariedwaysonthe
basisofmorecomplexexternalorganssensitivetodeformationandstress.Insum,thepattern
isadynamicone.Whatevertheformofsurfacesensitivityinprokaryoticandearly
unicellularandmulticellulareukaryoticformsoflife,itisultimatelyintheserviceof
movement:towardorawayfromchemicalsintheenvironment,towardsourcesoffood,away
fromnoxiouselementsoraliencreatures,andsoon.

Asurfacesensitivitysubservingmovementbecomesapparentthemomentonelooksto
corporealmattersoffact,analysestheminsensorykineticterms,realizesthecentralityand
significanceofmovementtocreaturelylife,andbeginsthinkingintermsofanaturalhistory
ofanimateforms.Itclearlysuggeststhebasisonwhichproprioceptionarisesandisclearly
suggestivetooofitscrucialsignificance.Acommonlyciteddefinitionofproprioceptors
justlyacknowledgesaprimeaspectofthissignificance:Senseorganscapableofregistering
continuouslydeformation(changesinlength)andstress(tensions,decompressions)inthe
body,whichcanarisefromtheanimalsownmovementsormaybeduetoitsweightorother
externalmechanicalforces.28Inaword,proprioceptivesensitivityiscontinuous.Notonlyis
acreaturessurfaceincontactcontinuouslywithothersurfacesintheenvironment,whetherit
ismovingorwhetheritisstill,butitsownconformationscontinuouslychangeinthecourse
ofmoving.Continuoussensitivityisthusdoublyindicativeofhowamovingcreatureprofits
fromsuchorgans:itissensitivebothtothechangingworldinwhichitfindsitselfandtoits
ownmovementandchangingbodilyform.Movingcreaturesanimateformsare,infact,
topologicalentities,changingshapeastheymoveandmovingastheychangeshape.
Proprioceptionimplicitlyarticulatesthistruth.Deeperandmoredetailedstudyshowsitto
articulateafurtherfactualtruth;namely,thatanimalmovement,howevercentrally
programmed,cannotbeconsideredtobewhollydevoidofproprioception.29

Tounderstandthisfurtherfactualtruth,weneedfirsttonotethatunderstandingsof
consciousnessonthebasisofanimateformareconceptuallyrevisionaryinmanyrespects,
perhapsnotleastincallingintoquestionthepracticeofbestowingconsciousnessinmiserly
andselfservingfashion.Thepracticefliesinthefaceofcorporealmattersoffact,precisely
asthosedetailedabove.Tothosefactsmaybeaddedthefollowing:Anycreaturethatmoves
itself,i.e.thatisnotsessile,sensesitselfmoving;bythesametoken,itsenseswhenitisstill.
Distinguishingmovementfromstillness,motionfromrest,isindeedafundamentalnatural
discriminationoflivingcreaturesthatisvitaltosurvival.Thelackofconstancyofthe
everydayworlddemandssuchdiscrimination.Asemphasizedearlier,whatevertheparticular
Umweltmightbeforanyparticularmovingcreature,thatworldisnotconsistent:weather
fluctuates;terrainsareirregular;surroundschangewithgrowthanddecay;themovements
andhabitsofothercreaturesaltertheenvironment;differentcreaturesthemselvesappearand
disappeareachday;sequencesofeventsshift:whatoccurredprogressivelyyesterdayisnot
whatoccursprogressivelytoday;andsoon.Clearly,noundeviatingworldpresentsitselfday
inanddayoutforanycreature;Umweltsrepeatthemselvesneitherspatiallynortemporally
nordynamically.Bythesametoken,creaturelymovementisnotthesamefromonedayto
thenext,thesameinthesenseofanundeviatingreplicationofsomemasterprogram.
Certainlyacreaturesbasicbehavioursdonotnormallychange,buttheyarenonetheless
contextdependentinaspatial,temporal,anddynamicsense.Acreaturedoesnotpursue
somethingthatisnotactuallythereforit,forexample.Whatacreaturedoes,thatis,howand
whenitmoves,isdeterminedateachmomentbythesituationinwhichitfindsitself.The
newandchallengingmathematicalscienceofcognitiondynamicsunderscoresthesevery
pointsinitsemphasisonrealtime.Cognitionfromadynamicstandpointisprocessual,not
astaticseriesofrepresentations.Ittakesplaceintherealtimeofongoingchangeinthe
environment,thebody,andthenervoussystem.Withrespecttothesethreefactors,dynamic
analysesshowthestructureofcognitiontobemutuallyandsimultaneouslyinfluencing
change.30Accordingly,howeverroteitsbasicbehavioursmightbewithrespecttoitsdayto
daylivingintheworld,31acreatureisnecessarilysensitiveinaproprioceptivesensetothe
presentmoment;itbeginscrawling,undulating,flying,stepping,elongating,contracting,or
whatever,inthecontextofapresentcircumstance.Itiskineticallyspontaneous.Elucidation
ofthisfurthertruthaboutthenatureofanimateformwillshowinthemostconcretewayhow
animateformisthegenerativesourceofconsciousnessandhowconsciousnesscannot
reasonablybeclaimedtobetheprivilegedfacultyofhumans.

VI:FromCorporealMattersofFactToCorporealConsciousness

Acreaturescorporealconsciousnessisfirstandforemostaconsciousnessattunedtothe
movementandrestofitsownbody.Whenacreaturemoves,itbreaksforthfromwhatever
restingpositionitwasin;itinitiatesmovement,andinwaysappropriatetothesituationin
whichitfindsitself.Theinherentkineticspontaneityofanimateformsliesfundamentallyin
thisfact.32Kineticspontaneitymaybeanalysedintermsofkinestheticmotivations,aspecies
specificrangeofmovementpossibilities,arepertoireofwhatmightbetermedIcans,and
bywayofproprioceptionand,moreparticularly,ofkinesthesiaasenseofagency.As
mightbeapparent,thesedimensionsofspontaneityarekeenlyinterrelated.Acreatures
initiationofmovementiscoincidentwithitskinestheticmotivations,itsdispositionstodo
thisorthatturn,pause,crouch,freeze,run,orconstrict;itskinestheticmotivationsfall
withintherangeofitsspeciesspecificmovementpossibilitiesanantisnotdisposedto
pounceanymorethanacatisdisposedtocrawl;thesepossibilitiesarethebasisofits
particularrepertoireofIcans,arepertoirethatmaynotonlychangeoverthelifetimeofthe
animalasitages,butthatmaybeselectivelydistinguishedinsofarastheanimalcanrun
faster,forexample,orconcealitselfmoreeffectivelythanothermembersofitsgroup;as
enacted,anyitemwithinitsrepertoireofIcansisundergirdedproprioceptively
(kinesthetically)byasenseofagency.Acreaturescorporealconsciousnessisstructurallya
compositeofthesefourkineticdimensionsofspontaneity.Itisacompositenotinastudied
analyticalcomparativesensee.g.,I,ahorse,cannotflylikeabirdandcertainlynotin
thesenseofdemandinglinguisticformulation,butinanexistentiallykineticsense,inthe
senseofbeinganimate.Ineffect,creaturesknowthemselvestheyknowwhichthingin
theworldtheyareinwaysthatarefundamentallyandquintessentiallyconsistentwiththe
bodiestheyare.Theyknowthemselvesinthesewaysnotbylooking,i.e.notbywayofwhat
isvisibletothemoftheirvisualbodies,butproprioceptively,ormorefinely,kinesthetically,
i.e.inwaysspecifictomovementalone,sensingtheirbodiesasanimateformsinmovement
andatrest.

Thisformofcreaturelyknowingcanbespelledoutalongevolutionarylines,indeed,along
thelinesofdescentwithmodification.Theevolutionarypatternsketchedaboveemphasized
thebasicphenomenonofsurfacerecognitionsensitivitybeginningwithbacteriaand
proceedingtociliatedprotozoa,tosedentaryinvertebrates,andtomolluscsandannelids.This
beginningsketchcanbeamplified.Creaturessuchaslobstersandspidersarecreatureswith
anarticulableskeleton,hencetheyhavenotonlyexternalsensorsbutinternalonesaswell,
particularlyaroundtheirjointedappendages.Generallytermedchordotonalorgansin
invertebrates,theseinternalproprioceptorsaresensitivedirectlytostresseswithinthebody
itself.Onthebasisoforganicanaloguesandstructuralhomologies,biologistsbelievethese
internalproprioceptorstohavederivedfromexternalsensoryorgans,thatis,tobetheresult
ofamigrationofcertainformerlyexternalproprioceptivebodilystructures.Suchstructural
migrationsare,ofcourse,notunknowninevolution.Aquitecommonlycitedhomology
concernsthreereptilianjawunitsthatovertimecametoformtheauditoryossiclesofthe
mammalianmiddleear:thestapes,malleus,andincus.Usingadifferentexample,Laverack
makesthisverycomparisonbetweeninvertebrateandvertebrateorganderivationsor
homologies.AfternotingthatEvolutionarytrendsinseveralgroups[ofinvertebrates]show
agradualremovalofproprioceptorsfromthesurfacetoadeeporinternalplacement,he
pointsoutthatthisderivation,whileapparentinsomeinvertebrates,isdemonstrablein
vertebrates,givingasexamplethechangeinpositionoftheacousticolateralissystemin
fishandamphibia(Laverack,1976,p.19).Laverackinfactgivesvariousexamplesof
analogousproprioceptiveorgansininvertebrates:forexample,theexoskeletalplatesofa
hermitcrabareanalogoustolimbproprioceptorsinotherinvertebrates(p.10).Helatergives
aspecificexampleofapossibleinvertebrateproprioceptivehomologyorderivation:[T]he
chordotonalorgansofdecapodCrustacea[e.g.,lobsters]mayhaveoriginated...fromgroups
ofhairs,verysimilartohairplatesofinsects,ofwhichtheindividualsensillahaveshortened,
losttheircontactwiththesurface,andfinallybeenincorporatedinaconnectivetissuestrand
orsheet.Theremainingvestigesofhairsareevidentasscolopidia[thecomplexcellularunit
ofachordotonalorgan].Further,withrespecttothesimilarityofdecapodchordotonal
organstoinsecthairplates,headvertstoresearchthat,onanatomicalandontogenetic
groundsandinconsiderationoftheprocessofmolting,suggeststhatthecuticularsheathof
sensoryhairsandcampaniformsensilla[ininsects]arehomologoustotheextracellularcapor
tubeofscolopidia(p.21).

Ifthethesisiscorrectthatexternalproprioceptorsweremodifiedandinternalizedovertime,
thenasingularlysignificantconsequenceobtains:internallymediatedproprioception,
howevervariouslyaccomplishedintermsofanatomicalstructures,remainsnonetheless
epistemologicallyconsistentinitsresults,viz,adirectlymovementsensitivecorporeal
consciousness.33Suchaproprioceptiveconsciousnessiskinestheticallyratherthantactilely
rooted.Corporealconsciousnessthusevolvedfromitsbeginningsintactilityintokinesthesia,
intoadirectsensitivitytomovementthroughinternallymediatedsystemsofcorporeal
awareness.Ineffect,throughalltheintricateandchangingpathwaysofdescentwith
modification,knowthyselfhasremainedaconsistentbiologicalbuiltin;akineticcorporeal
consciousnessinformsadiversityofanimateforms.

Thethesisthatinternalproprioceptorsevolvedfromexternalproprioceptiveorgansmaybe
expandedandinachallengingandperhapsunexpecteddirection.Laverackwritesthat
externalsensorshavetwomajordisadvantages:(1)Alackofdiscriminationbetween
stimulationgeneratedbymovementofthebodyandthatgeneratedbyexternaltactileevents.
(2)Avulnerabilitytowearanddamage.Asuperficialplacementisboundtoexposehairsand
pegstoabrasionandotheraccidents(p.46).34Hestatesthatthesedisadvantagesmayhave
placedadaptivesignificanceuponthesubsequentdevelopmentofparallel,internal
proprioceptors.Hisperspectiveonthedisadvantagesofexternalsensorsandtheadaptive
significanceofinternaloneshascertainunexpectedaffinitieswiththeperspectiveof
molecularbiochemistR.M.Macnabwho,writingonsensoryreceptioninbacteria,conjoins
withinasingleperspectivetwootherwiseopposedviewpointsonthesensoryapparatusofa
unicellularprokaryote(Macnab,1982,p.98).Macnabdiscussesthesensitivityofa
bacteriumtosurfaceeventsorenvironmentalphenomenaontheonehand,andtoitsown
kineticpotentialorenergylevelontheother,thusactuallycallingintoquestionanaccountof
bacterialknowingasonlymetacorporeal.Beingsensitivetoitsownkineticpotential,a
bacteriumcanbesaidtohavearudimentarycorporealconsciousness,rudimentarynotinthe
senseofbeinglessthanfunctionalincompleteorunderdeveloped,forexamplebutin
thesenseoftherebeingnoproprioceptiveorganotherthantheorganismthebacterium
itself.Indeed,thesourceofabacteriumsmotilityisPMFprotonmotiveforce,[or]
protonelectrochemicalpotential(p.78)anditisdescribedasboththemotorandthe
truesensoryinput(p.77);themotorisanautonomousPMFsensingsystem(p.98).
Clearly,movementandthepotentialformovementareattheheartofarudimentarycorporeal
consciousness.ThespecificcontrastinviewpointsthatMacnabreconcilesbearsthisout.The
contrastconcernsasensingofthephysiologicalconsequencesofanenvironmental
parameter[suchaslight,oxygen,andsoon]andasensingoftheparameteritself(p.77).
Inotherwords,abacteriumcaneithersenseitselfwithrespecttotheenvironmentorsense
theenvironment.MacnabpointsoutthatEvenintherudimentarybehaviouralsystemof
bacteria,bothcapabilitiesarepresent(p.77)aremarkofconsiderableinteresttoanyone
concernedtoprovideabonafideevolutionaryaccountofconsciousness.Helaterspecifies
explicitlytheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofeachkindofsensibility:inphysiological
sensing,thesignalcanbethoughtofas:Forreasonsunspecified,yourcurrentdirectionof
travelhasalreadyresultedinyourPMF...fallingdangerouslylow;inenvironmental
sensing,[thesignalcanbethoughtof]as:Basedonthefollowingspecificinformation
increasingaspartateinyourexternalenvironmentyourcurrentdirectionoftravelmay
offerenhancedopportunitiesforgrowth.Inthefirstinstance,thefreelymovingbacterium
reliesonasenseofitsownenergytodeterminethebenefitsofcontinuingtravelinitspresent
direction.Ifitsensesitsenergicpotentialrunninglow,itisnotgettingwhatitneedsfromits
immediateenvironmentandmoveselsewhere.Inthisinstance,thefreelymovingbacterium
ismonitoringitsenvironmentinternallythroughanelectrochemicalsensitivitytotheeffectof
theenvironmentonitskineticpotential.Inthesecondinstance,thefreelymovingbacterium
reliesonspecificsensingabilities,i.e.externalchemoreceptorsforaminoacidsandsugars,in
ordertodeterminewhetherthepathitisfollowingislikelytocontinuebeingpropitiousor
not.Macnabpointsoutthevalueandliabilityofeachmodeofsensinginwhatareactually
exactingepistemologicalterms:Thephysiologicalconsequenceofsensoryinformation[i.e.
physiologicallyderivedsensoryinformation]hastheadvantagethattheinformationis
certain,butthedisadvantagethatitislate;theanticipatorysensoryinformationhasthe
advantagethatitisearly,butthedisadvantagethatitisuncertain,becausethephysiological
consequenceispresumed,andmayinfactneveroccur(p.100).

Thecertaintyofabacteriumsinternallygeneratedinformationasofananimalsinternal
proprioceptionisclearlyofmoment.Astheearlierdefinitionofproprioceptionimplied,
continuoussensitivitytoonesownbodilyconditionmeansknowingwithexactitudethe
natureofthatconditionwhetheroneskineticpotential,onesposturalconformation,or
thespatiotemporaldynamicsofonesmovement.Aninternallystructuredcorporeal
consciousnessisfromthisviewpointbothkinestheticallyindubitableandkinesthetically
unambiguous.Forabacterium,thismodeofconsciousnesstranslatesintoknowledgethatis
similarlyindubitableandunambiguous.Theadaptivesignificanceofacontinuousbodily
sensitivityintheformofaninternallystructuredcorporealconsciousnessofmovementorof
movementpotentialcanthushardlybeminimized.Itisthegenerativesourceofacreatures
immediatekineticspontaneity.Acreaturesinitiationofmovement,includingtheinitiationof
achangeofdirection,isalwaysfromaparticularcorporealhereandnowpositionally,
energetically,situationally,andsoon.Givenitsparticularcorporealhereandnow,certain
speciesspecifickineticpossibilitiesexistforithereandnow;otherspeciesspecific
kineticpossibilitiesmayemergeonlywhenanother,differentcorporealhereandnowobtains,
thedifferentcorporealhereandnowthatcomeswithgrowth,forexample,thuswitha
changedanimateform.Similarpossibilitiesandconstraintsholdwithrespecttoacreatures
repertoireofIcans:givenitsownparticularstrengthsandliabilities,ithascertaincorporeal
possibilitiesandnotothershereandnow.Evenabacteriumcannotautomaticallyupgrade
itsPMFjustbecausetheenvironmentisright.Forexample,whileaspartatemightbepresent
initsenvironment,thebacteriumsaspartatetransportsystemmaybedefective.The
bacteriummaythusbeunabletotakeadvantageoftheaminoacid,preciselyasMacnab
suggestswithrespecttophysiologicalconsequencesbeingpresumed.35Finally,indubitable
andunambiguousknowledgeisbasictoacreaturessenseofagency.Lackinganinternally
structuredcorporealconsciousnessthatisbothpeculiartotheanimateformitisand
epistemologicallyresonantateachmoment,acreaturecouldhardlyinitiatemovement
changedirection,increasespeed,pause,reachoutwithanappendage,turnitselfaround,
avoidanobstacleorpredator,explore,flee,ormovepurposefullyininnumerableotherways
orstopallsuchmovementorcessationofmovementbeingconsistentbothwiththe
situationinwhichitfindsitselfandwithitsownimmediatespatiotemporalcorporeality.

Clearly,thecorporealpathbywhichwecantracetheevolutionofconsciousnesscanbe
richlyelaboratedintermsoftheinherentkineticspontaneityofanimateforms.Such
elaborationdecisivelychallengestheputativeevolutionarynotionofanagentassomething
thatdoessomethingandthenlookstoseewhatmoves.Attentiontocorporealmattersof
factdemonstratesthatabonafideevolutionaryaccountofconsciousnessbeginswithsurface
recognitionsensitivity.Ittherebyacknowledgesametacorporealconsciousness.It
furthermoretakesintoaccounttheemergenceofadiversityofanimateforms,showinghow
surfacerecognitionsensitivity,whilemediatedbytouch,isactuallyintheserviceof
movementforcreaturesallthewayfrombacteriatoprotiststoinvertebrateformsto
vertebrateones.Itstronglysuggestshowaformofcorporealconsciousnessispresentin
bacteria.36Indeed,itshowshowabacterium,beingananimateformoflife,issomethingfirst
ofallthatmovesandiscapableofmovingonitsownpowerratherthanbeingalways
impelledtomovefromwithout;itshowsfurtherhowitissomethingthatfeeds,thatgrows,
thatchangesdirection,that,ineffect,canstopdoingwhatitisdoingandbegindoing
somethingelse.Abonafideevolutionaryaccountshowshow,withtheevolutionofvaried
andcomplexexternalsensors,adifferentformofcorporealconsciousnessispresent,and
how,withtheevolutionofinternalsensorsfromexternalones,astilldifferentformof
corporealconsciousnessispresent.Itshowshoweachoftheseformsofcorporeal
consciousnessiscoincidentwiththeevolutionofvariedandcomplexanimateforms
themselves,andequally,howeachformofproprioceptionthatevolved,fromthemost
rudimentarytothemostcomplexofkinestheticsystems,iscoincidentwithparticularforms
oflife.Itshowsallthisbypayingattentiontocorporealmattersoffactandbypresenting
concretesensorykineticanalyses.

Thereisafinalpointtobemade.Foraninvertebrateorvertebrate,aninternallystructured
corporealconsciousnessisnotdirectlyvulnerabletoenvironmentalwearandtearandinthis
senseisprotected.AsLaverackssecondremarksuggests,acreaturewithinternal
proprioceptorsisnotatthedirectmercyofthesurroundingworld.Forabacterium,such
protectionisnotofcourseofmoment;beingunicellular,ithasnosensoryorinternalorgans
assuch.Somesoftbodiedinvertebratessuchasannelidwormshavehydrostaticskeletons,
muscleslengtheningandshorteningthebodyagainstsemifluidbodycontentsthatdonot
compresssothatvolumeremainsconstantwhilesegmentsoftheanimalincreaseand
decreaseindiameter.Althoughinternalproprioceptionhasbeensuggestedviastudiesof
stretchresponse,andalthoughsomeannelidshaveverytoughoutercuticleswhichinteralia
wouldofferprotectionforinternalproprioceptors,astrongcasecannotreasonablybemade
forprotectionortheneedforprotectioninthesenseLaveracksuggests,i.e.theevolutionof
internalproprioceptionasameansofprotectingsensoryorgansfromenvironmentalwearand
tear.Thedecisiveturningpointforproprioceptiveprotectionisclearlyevidencedinthe
evolutionofanarticulableskeleton.Arthropodsandvertebratesarenotableinthisrespect.
Thoughtheirevolutionarylineagesaredistinct,specieswithineachphylumaresimilarin
havingaskeletalstructureandinbeingextremelymobileforms.37Althoughtheirrespective
skeletalstructureisdifferentlyplaced,theattachingmuscularstructureisineachcase
internalandfunctionsinasimilarmanner;whenamusclecontracts,skeletaljointsclose,
pullingtwobodysegmentstowardeachother.Adirectandcontinuoussensitivityto
movementthusappearstohaveevolvedintwodistinctbuthighlymobileformsoflifeand
withthesameadvantage:aninternallymediatedcorporealconsciousnessofmovementthatis
notdependentonexternalstimuli,henceontactility,butthatisinternallymediated.Thiskind
ofcorporealconsciousnessisnotonlyrelativelyprotectedaswellascontinuousin
comparisontoanexternallymediatedcorporealconsciousness.Beinginternal,its
possibilitiesforelaborationarequitedifferent.Inparticular,whatisbeingsensedinthecase
ofaninternallymediatedcorporealconsciousnesshasthepossibilityofopeningup,of
expandingintoarichlyvariableandcomplexdomainofawarenesses.Thepossibilityofsuch
adomainisadumbratedinthequestionWhatisitliketobeabat?Indeed,thequestion
Whatisitliketobeabat?presumestheexistenceofaninternallymediatedcorporeal
consciousnessthathasalreadyopenedupintoarangeofkineticallytiedandinternallyfelt
phenomenaandacts.Inotherwords,itpresupposesarangeofexperiencesthatabathasof
itselfasananimateform.

Proprioceptionisinthissenseanepistemologicalgateway,
onethat,bydescentwithmodification,
mayclearlybeelaboratedbothaffectivelyandcognitively.

Injusttheseways,corporealconsciousnessshowsitselftohavethepossibilityofexpanding
intoasenseofself.Theevolutionofproprioceptionfoundationallyexplainsthispossible
expansion.TheRealityofSelveshasitsrootsincorporealconsciousness.

VII:Implications

Threeimplicationsinparticularwarrantmention.First,thenaturalhistoryofconsciousness
describedabovedemandsarethinkingofthecommonassumptionthathistorically
particularlywithreferencetotheevolutionofnonhumananimalsunconsciousness
precededconsciousness.Corporealmattersoffactshowthisassumptiontobeunfounded.It
hasneverinfactbeenshownthatnonhumananimalsdonotthink,orchoose,oreven
deliberatewithrespecttomovement,38orthattheydonothaveasenseofspeed,space,effort,
andsoon.Onthecontrary,iftheabovesensorykineticanalysisofconsciousnessiscorrect,
thentheevolutionofsuchcorporealcapacitiesandawarenessesiscoincidentwiththe
evolutionofanimateforms.Corporealawarenessisabuiltinofanimatelife;asstatedinthe
beginning,knowthyselfisincontrovertablyafundamentalbiologicalbuiltin.
Second,thereisinpresentdaywesternsocietyatendencytobemesmerizedbybrains,so
mesmerizedthatthelargercreaturelyworldofwhichhumansareapartisforgotten,
egregiouslyslighted,orarrogantlydistorted.Cognitivistprogrammesofresearchinscience
andphilosophyareattheforefrontofthismesmerization.Shouldresearchersinthese
disciplinesfindthatthesubjectofnonhumananimalsisingeneralnotcongenialtotheir
interests,orthattheforegoingevolutionaryanalysisofconsciousnessisinparticularnot
excitinginthewaythatcomputerizedstudyoftheirownbrainsisexciting,itmaywellbe
becausetheyhavelosttouchwiththeirownnaturalhistory.Indeed,comparedwith
Aristotlesstudiousforaysintotheworldofanimalshumanandnonhuman
cognitivistsknowledgeofanimalsappearsinmanycasespainfullylimited.Oneiseasilyled
tothink,atleastwithrespecttosomeofthecreaturestheywriteaboutlobstersand
scallops,forexamplethattheironlyencounterwiththemhasbeenonaplate.Yetserious
studyofanimateformsisrequiredforunderstandingsofconsciousness.Includedinthis
requisitestudyisastudyofhominidsthemselvesandforthefollowingreason:any
evolutionaryunderstandingofhumanconsciousnessanynaturalisticstudyof
consciousness(Flanagan,1984,p.307)mustacknowledgeahistoricalfactrecorded
previously,namely,thatwhileallhumansarehominids,notallhominidsarehuman.
Accordingly,anyevolutionaryrenditionofhumanconsciousnessmusttakeintoserious
accountartifactualevidenceattestingincontrovertablytotheintellectualacumenof
nonhumananimals.Suchanaccountcanhardlyberenderedincomputationalbrainstate
terms.Itcan,however,berenderedandinfacthasbeenrenderedinsensorykineticterms
demonstratingacorporealconsciousness(cf.SheetsJohnstone,1990).

Thethirdimplicationisrelatedtothesecond.Wecanhardlyhopetounderstand
consciousnessifwemakeauthoritativeandselfservingevolutionaryarmchair
pronouncementssuchasConsciousnessdidnothavetoevolve....Consciousnessisnot
essentialtohighlyevolvedintelligentlife....However,fromthefactthatconsciousnessis
inessentialtohighlyevolvedintelligentlife,itdoesnotfollowthatitisinessentialtoour
particulartypeofintelligentlife(Flanagan,1992,p.129;thefirstsentenceappearsinhis
1984,p.344);or,ifinthecourseofexplaininghowitispossiblethatsomelivingthingsare
conscious(Flanagan,1984,p.307;1992,p.1),wemakeclaimsaboutcreatureswhomwe
havenotbotheredtostudybutaboutwhomwefeelentitledtomakejudgments.Toaffirm,
forexample,thatscallopsareconsciousofnothing,thattheygetoutofthewayofpotential
predatorswithoutexperiencingthemassuch,andwhentheyfailtodoso,theygeteatenalive
without(quitepossibly)experiencingpain(Flanagan,1984,p.344f.;1992,p.132),isto
leaptheboundsofrigorousscholarshipintoamazeofunwarrantedassumptions,mistaking
humanignoranceforhumanknowledge.Asamatteroffact,awellknownintroductory
biologytextshowsapictureofascallopsensinganapproachingstarfish,andleap[ing]to
safety.Thesamebook,commentingonthecomplexityofascallopseyes,elsewherenotes
thatalthoughthelensofitseyescannotfocusonimages,itdetectslightanddarkand
movement(Curtis,1975,pp.29,387).
Evolutionaryunderstandingsofconsciousnessonthebasisofanimateformareclearlya
radicaldeparturefrommaterialistconceptionsthat,basicallyidentifyingconsciousnessand
matter,eschewseriousinquiryintothenatureofanimatelife.Itisthusnotsurprisingthatin
offeringtheirreductiveprogrammes,materialistsofferametaphysicsinadvanceofan
epistemologyandanaturalhistorythatsupportit.Theirmetaphysicsisinadvanceofa
supportiveepistemologyinthatbothexperienceandmeticulousstudybelietheory.
Proprioceptioningeneralandkinesthesiainparticularadverttoaknowingsubject,asubject
that,atminimum,knowswhenitismovingandknowswhenitisnot.Consciousnesscan
thereforebejudgedneitherinessentialnoressentiallylinguistic,acenterofnarrative
gravity.Consultationofandreflectionuponcorporealmattersoffacttestifytoacorporeal
consciousnessthatisepistemicinnatureandthatcanbeignoredonlyattheperilofa
degenerateepistemology.Theirmetaphysicsisinadvanceofasupportivenaturalhistoryin
thatitignorescloseknowledgeoftheliteratureonnonhumananimals,including,as
suggestedabove,thosenonhumananimalsthatwerethedirecthominidancestorsofmodern
dayhumans.Anevolutionarybackboneisthusessentiallylackingtotheirmetaphysics,
whichiswhyitmustbeproppedupbymoleculardefinitionsoflifeandwhythelifethe
metaphysicsdescribes,beingmereongoingstatesofabrain,offersaportraitoflifeasiflife
wereaseriesofstills.Insum,seriousinquiryintothenatureofconsciousnessperforcemust
takeintoaccountitsnaturalhistory.

GLOSSARY

Althoughmanytermsusedinthetextaredefinedinthetext,alistingisgivenherefor
convenienceandaddedreference.(Note:Biologicalclassificationisintermsofkingdom,
phylum,class,order,family,genus,species.)

Amoeba:Agenusofprotozoanorganismsdistinguishedbytheirpseudopodia.

Annelida:aphylumofinvertebrateanimalsthatincludesearthwormsandmarineworms,allofwhichhave
segmentedbodies.(FromLatinanellus,ring.)

Anthozoa:aclassofcoelenteratesthatincludesseaanemonesandcorals.(FromGreekanthos,flower+zoion,
animal.)

Arthropoda:aphylumofhardbodiedinvertebrateanimalsthelargestphylumintheanimalkingdomthat
includeslobsters,spiders,ants,andcentipedes,allofwhichhaveanexternalskeletonandthusarticulablebody
parts.(FromGreekarthro,joint+podos,footed.)

buccal:pertainingtothecavityofthemouth.

campaniformsensilla:bellshapedproprioceptiveorgansininsectsthataresensitivetodeformation.

chordotonalorgans:internalproprioceptiveorgansofinvertebrates.
cilium(pl.cilia):ahairlikestructurethatprotrudesfromthesurfaceofacellandiscommonlyfoundinrows;it
hasacharacteristic9+2internalstructure,i.e.ninepairsofmicrotubulessurroundingtwomicrotubulesatthe
center.

Coelenterata:aphylumofinvertebrateanimalsthatincludespolyps,jellyfish,seaanemones,andcorals.(From
Greekkoilos,hollow+enteron,intestine.)

Crustacea:aclassofarthropodsthatincludesbarnacles,prawns,crab,waterfleas,andcrayfish.(FromLatin
crusta,theshellorhardsurfaceofabody.)

decapodCrustacea:crustaceanssuchaslobstersandcrabhavingfivepairsoflegsandbelongingtotheorder
Decapoda.

eukaryote:acellthathasanoutermembranethatseparatesitfromitsenvironmentandbothamembrane
boundnucleusandmembraneboundorganelles.(FromGreekeu,good+karyon,nut,kernel.)

flagellum(pl.flagella):ahairlikestructurethatprotrudesfromthesurfaceofacellandthatisinstrumentalin
locomotionandfeeding;itislongerthan,buthasaninternalstructuresimilarto,acilium.

Gastropoda:Aclassofmollusksthatcomprisesthelargestnumberofspeciesofmollusks(80,000).Theclass
includeswhelks,snails,limpets,conches,andabalones,whichhaveeitheraunivalveshellornoshellatall,and
whicharemoremobilethanbivalvemolluskssuchasthescallop.(FromGreekgastro,stomach+podos,
footed.)

Hydrozoa:aclassofcoelenterateswhichincludespolypsandjellyfishandofwhichthepolypisthedominant
form.(FromGreekhydor,water+zoion,animal.)

Hymenoptera:anorderofinsectsthatincludesbees,ants,andwasps.(FromGreekhymen,membrane+
pteron,wing.)

Mollusca:aphylumofsoftbodiedinvertebrateanimalsthatincludessnails,slugs,oysters,mussels,scallops,
octopuses,andsquid.(FromLatinmolluscus,soft.)

nauplius(pl.nauplii):alarvalformofcrustacean.

Paramecium:agenusofprotozoanorganismsdistinguishedbytheirciliamediatedmovement.

polyp:acoelenterateanimalthatisusuallysessileandthathasavaseshapedorcylindricalbody,themouthof
whichissurroundedbytentacles.

prokaryote:acellthathasanoutermembranethatseparatesitfromitsenvironment.(FromLatinpro,before+
Greekkaryon,nutkernel.)

Protista:akingdomofeukaryotic,unicellularorganisms.

Protozoa:aphylumoforganismswithinthekingdomProtista.Theanimalsarecharacteristicallyonecelled
organismsthatareinvisibletothenakedeye.Theyareclassifiedaccordingtotheirformoflocomotion:
movementbymeansofflagella,ofcilia,orofpseudopodia.Someprotozoathesporozoansarenonmotile
forms.(FromGreekprotos,first+zoion,animal.)
radula:afeedingorganbywhichgastropodsrasporscrapeoffbitsofplantoranimaltissue.(FromLatin
radere,toscrape.)

scolopidia:complexpegorspikelikestructurescomprisingthecellularunitsofchordotonalorgansin
invertebrates.

sensilla:externalproprioceptiveorganssuchashairs,pegs,slits,andplates.

sessile:stationary,attachedtoasubstrate,notfreelymoving.(FromLatinsedere,tosit.)

Stentor:agenusofprotozoanorganismsdistinguishedbytheirciliamediatedmovement.

Endnotes

*
AshorterversionofthispaperwaspresentedasaguestlectureattheUniversityofAarhus(Denmark)in
November1996,attheUniversityofSanSebastian(BasqueCountry)inDecember1996asaninvitedpaperat
aninternationalconferenceonTheOriginofCognition,andatVanderbiltUniversityasaninvitedplenary
sessionaddressattheMarch1997meetingoftheMetaphysicalSocietyofAmerica.Thefinalversionwill
appearasachapterinmyThePrimacyofMovement,forthcomingfromJohnBenjamins,Advancesin
ConsciousnessResearchseries.

1
Teuber(1966),pp.440f.HeisdiscussingD.M.MacKayspaperCerebralOrganizationandtheConscious
ControlofAction,thethemeofwhichisthecontrollingfunctionofthebraininvoluntaryagency.

2
Whetheritunderminesorprecludesdependsuponthedegreetowhichtheassumptionsarerecognizedand
acknowledged.

3
Areviewerwrotethatgivinganexplanationofhowifonecannotidentifywhatseemsdifficult,since
theobjectoftheinquiryisnotspecified.Inpractice,wherethestudyofconsciousnessisconcerned,the
distinctionbetweenhow(consciousnessarises)andwhat(consciousnessis)isfarlessstraightforwardthan
thisremarkimplies.
Asmaybeapparentfromthediscussionthusfar,aperusalofcurrentliteratureonconsciousnessshowsno
considerationofthedistinction,andthusnoapparentinclinationonthepartofwriterstobeconcernedwithitor
tothinkthatwhatmustbeclarifiedbeforeaconsiderationofhow.Indeed,writersonconsciousnesslaunchtheir
inquiriesstraightaway,evensometimesspecifyinginthebeginningwhatconsciousnessisintermsthatbegthe
questionofsayingjustwhatitise.g.,wecansaythatamentalstateisconsciousifithasaqualitative
feel....Theproblemofexplainingthesephenomenalqualitiesisjusttheproblemofexplainingconsciousness
(Chalmers,1996,p.4).Themuddlestronglysuggeststhatclarificationofthedistinctionrequiresan
acknowledgmentofwhatiscalledthehermeneuticcircle.Inclassicterms,onealreadyunderstandsthatwhich
oneisonthewaytointerpreting;andconversely,onehasalreadyinterpretedthatwhichonehasalready
understood.Inmorescientificterms,onealreadyknowsthewhatthatoneisabouttoinvestigate;and
conversely,onehasalreadyinvestigatedthewhatthatonealreadyknows.Inshort,aresearchercouldhardly
investigateanythingiftherewerenotalreadyaknowndelimitedsubjectathand,asubjectthattheresearcher
alreadyknowsatleasttotheextentthats/hewantstoinvestigateit.Moreovertheprocessofinvestigationis
itselfahermeneuticcircle:aswhatisinvestigatedbecomesknowninmoreexactingways,thatnewknowledge
becomesthebasisforfurtherinvestigation.Injustthisway,whatconsciousnessismaybecontinually
elucidatedintheprocessofelucidatinghowitarises.Thepresentpaperprogressivelydoesjustthat:itanswers
thewhatquestioninthecourseofspecifyinghowconsciousnessarisesinanimateform.
4
Mentaleventsandprocessesareasmuchpartofourbiologicalnaturalhistoryasdigestion,mitosis,meiosis,
orenzymesecretion(Searle,1992,p.1,italicsadded).

5
ItisofinteresttopointoutthatChurchlandsideaofanaturalevolutionarycourseofevents,akindof
biologicaldeterminismwithrespecttolifeandintelligence,conflictswithprominentideasandexperimental
findingsinbiology.Churchlandstatesthat[G]ivenenergyenough,andtime,thephenomenaofbothlifeand
intelligencearetobeexpectedasamongthenaturalproductsofplanetaryevolution.StephenJayGouldisa
strongproponentoftheviewthatevolutionisathoroughlycontingent,nonrepeatablehistoricalprocess(see,
e.g.,Gould,1989;1995).SeealsoMcDonald,1995.ThearticlesummarizesmicrobiologistzoologistRichardE.
Lenskisintricateexperimentsandtheirresults,whichshowtheplayofchanceinthecourseofevolutionand
theunrepeatabilityofnaturalhistory.

6
Theburialpracticesofnonhumanhominidsalsobecomevirtuallyimpossibletounderstandsincesuch
practicesentailaconceptofdeath.SeeSheetsJohnstone(1990),chapter8,OntheConceptualOriginof
Death).

7
Hecontinuestodosoinhislaterwritings(1995;1996).Notonlydoeshisconsistentuseofquotationmarks
(e.g.Cleverexperimentsbypsychologistsandethologistssuggestotherwaysinwhichanimalscantryout
actionsintheirheads[1996,p.91])tomakedistinctionsbetweenusandthemalertustothehazardsof
makingsimplecomparisonsamongextantcreaturesoverthebenefitsofexaminingnaturalhistory(cf.Sheets
Johnstone,1992;1994[chapter2];1996);buthisconsistentassessmentofnonhumananimalsintermsoftasks
notcommontothebehaviouralrepertoireofthespecies(e.g.1996,pp.133,157)alertsustothehazardof
makingselfservingprescriptions(e.g.[W]emustnotassumethat[nonhumananimalsthink],1996,p.160)
overthebenefitsofexaminingthepresumptionsunderlyingthoseprescriptions,includingtheassumptionladen
claimthat[T]hosewhodeploreArtificialIntelligencearealsothosewhodeploreevolutionaryaccountsof
humanmentality(1995,p.370).

8
Eveninhislatestbook,hetakestheinventionoflanguagecompletelyforgranted:Thereisnostepmore
uplifting,moreexplosive,moremomentousinthehistoryofminddesignthantheinventionoflanguage.When
Homosapiensbecamethebeneficiaryofthisinvention...(Dennett,1996,p.147).

9
Foradiscussionofthesemattersindetail,seeSheetsJohnstone(1990),chapter6,OntheOriginof
Language.

*
Foraglossaryofbiologicalterms,seepp.292f.below.

10
Darwin(1871/1981),p.145.Darwingoesontosay:[T]husthewonderfullydiversifiedinstincts,mental
powers,andaffectionsofantsaregenerallyknown,yettheircerebralgangliaarenotsolargeasthequarterofa
smallpinshead.Underthislatterpointofview,thebrainofanantisoneofthemostmarvellousatomsof
matterintheworld,perhapsmoremarvellousthanthebrainofman.

11
Foranevenmoreimpressiveindicationofabacteriumscognitivecapacities,seeLosickandKaiser(1997).

12
FoundationalisaperfectlygoodEnglishword,asinthesentence,Evolutionaryunderstandingsare
foundationaltounderstandingsofwhatconsciousnessisallabout.

13
Proprioceptionrefersgenerallytoasenseofmovementandposition.Itthusincludesanawarenessof
movementandpositionthroughtactilityaswellaskinesthesia,thatis,throughsurfaceaswellasinternalevents,
includingalsoasenseofgravitationalorientationthroughvestibularsensoryorgans.Kinesthesiarefers
specificallytoasenseofmovementthroughmusculareffort.
14
LestitbethoughtthatDennettisidiosyncraticinhisprocedure,considerthenineteenthcenturyGerman
philosopherJ.J.EngelscriticismofBritishphilosopherDavidHumesaccountofthederivationoftheconcept
offorce:Heoughttousehismuscles,butinsteadheuseshiseyes;heoughttograspandstruggle,andinstead
heiscontenttowatch(QuotedbyScheerer,1987,p.176).

15
ItshouldbenotedthatSherringtonusesthewordtensioninapurelyneuromuscularsensewhenhesays,in
tandemwithhisstatementthatIhavenoawarenessofthemusclesassuchatall,thatIhavenoawarenessof
tensioninthemuscles(p.249).Tensionisabsentinthespecifiedneuromuscularsense,butitisnotabsentinan
experientialsense.Sherringtoncouldhardlygoontodescribehisawarenessofhismovementassmoothifhe
didnotmovewithacertaintensionalqualitycoincidentwithsmoothness:acertainkinetictensionisintegralto
smoothmovement.Thatkinetictensionisnotaconstituentofjaggedmovement,forexample,orofmyriad
othermovementsbetweenthetwoextremesofsmoothandjagged.Itwouldthusbeanepistemologicalmistake
tothinkSherringtonsdisavowalofanawarenessofdiscretemuscletensionsadisavowalofadirectexperiential
awarenessofthetensionalqualitiesofmovement.Thiswouldbetoconflateneurosciencewithexperience.On
theotherhand,itwouldalsobeanepistemologicalmistaketothinkSherringtonscharacterizationof
proprioceptionasamentalproductcorrectsincethesmoothnessSherringtonexperiencesisnotonlythere,
directlyevidentinhismovement;thesmoothnessiscreatedbyhismovementandexistsinvirtueofhis
movement.

16
Onemightclaimthattermssuchasswiftandweakdescribemovementdirectly,whiletermssuchashesitant
describeanaffectivestatederivativefrommovement.Theclaimisaprovocativeone,bearingouttheetymology
ofthewordemotion.Thetermexpansive,forexample,describesagenerous,openperson,onewhois
affectivelysympathetictowardothers,ausageclearlytiedtomovement,i.e.toanexpansiveopen,generous
spatialityofthebodyinmoving.ObservationsofinfantpsychologistandpsychiatristDanielSternsupport
theideaofacoincidence,ifnotaderivation,ofaffectfrommovement.Inparticular,Sterndescribeswhathe
callsvitalityaffects:qualities[ofexperience]thatdonotfitintoourexistinglexiconortaxonomyofaffects
[butthat]arebettercapturedbydynamic,kineticterms,suchassurging,fadingaway,fleeting,explosive,
crescendo,decrescendo,bursting,drawnout,andsoon(Stern,1985,p.54).Affectsmaywellbebetter
capturedbydynamic,kinetictermsthanspecialfeelingtermsbecausetheyhavetheirorigininthetactile
kinestheticbody.Fromthisperspective,complexityofaffectmaybetiedtocomplexityofmovement.Ifthisis
so,thentheevolutionofaffectmightbestudiedfromtheviewpointoftherichnessandvariabilityoftactile
kinestheticbodies,andnotjustfromtheviewpointofasocialworld.Apassingremarkofanthropologists
SherwoodWashburnandShirleyStrumissuggestiveinthisrespect.Intheirdiscussionoftheevolutionof
speech,theywritethatAttemptingtoteachamonkeytomakemoresoundsisliketryingtoteachittohave
moreemotions(WashburnandStrum,1972,p.475).Iftheemphasisisonthemakingofsoundsandnotonthe
soundsthemselves,thenarelationshipbetweenspeciesspecificpossibilitiesofmovementandspeciesspecific
possibilitiesofaffectisclearlyadumbrated.Inturn,howeversuperficialandabbreviatedthesuggestion,one
maywellask,iskineticcomplexitythebasisofaffectivecomplexity?

17
Itmightbenotedthatthedegreesoffreedomproblemisintimatelyrelatedtothefactthatmovementcreates
richandvariablequalia.

18
Dennett(1991),e.g.p.106:ThebrainisHeadquarters,theplacewheretheultimateobserveris.

19
Foradetailedaccountofthetactilekinestheticbody,seeSheetsJohnstone(1990).Inanontogeneticsense,
thepriorityofmovementandtactilityisnotsurprising.Thesequenceofdevelopmentofembryonicneuraltissue
underscorestheirsignificance.Inparticular,thereisearlybeginningdevelopment(thefourthweekoflife)ofthe
semicircularearcanalswhich,throughvestibularsensations,provideasenseofbalanceorimbalance,and(at
thefetalstage)ofreceptorsinthemuscleswhich,throughkinestheticsensations,provideasenseofpositionand
movement.Thoughrudimentary,thesensorysystemforbalanceisinplacebythebeginningofthefourth
month.Bythebeginningofthefourthmonthtoo,reflexivebehaviourappears,whichmeansthatthemovement
ofthefetusiscoordinatedinresponsetostimulation.Thecomparativelyearlydevelopmentofneuraltissue
relatedtomovementisofparticularinterestinconjunctionwithphysiologicalstudiessuggestingthatneural
developmentofthemotorcortexisstimulatedbythebodymovementsofthefetusitself.Inotherwords,form
doesnotdevelopsolelyonitsown.Movementinfluencesmorphology.Myelinationstudiesalsoshowthat
motorneuronsmyelinateearlyandthatacousticvestibularneuronsmyelinatenext.Foradiscussionofprenatal
developmentandbehaviour,seeRobeck(1978)andWindle(1971).

20
Evolutionarystudiesofproprioceptionarenolongerfashionable.Indeed,attentionshouldbecalledatthe
beginningofthisdescriptiveanalysistothefactthatcontemporarystudyofproprioceptionlagssofarbehind
studiesofvisionandauditionthatitisbarelyperceptibleintheliterature.Moreovermostofthejournal
literatureisdevotedtoproprioceptiveinjuriestotheknee,tokneesurgery,andtotopicsrelatedtothelossof
proprioception.Ofthe27articlesonproprioceptionpublishedinscientificjournalsin1994andthefirstsix
monthsof1995,14ofthemweredevotedtosuchtopics.Accordingly,whereevolutionaryreferencesare
pertinentorseemnecessary,Iuseearlierwritings,themostcomprehensivetextbeingthe686pagevolume
StructureandFunctionofProprioceptorsintheInvertebrates,editedbyP.J.Mill(1976).

21
vonUexkll(1928).Cf.ErnstCassirersconciseexplanationofwhythereareUmwelts:Everyorganism...
hasaworldofitsownbecauseithasanexperienceofitsown(Cassirer,1970,p.25).

22
As,forexample,philosopherPeterCarruthersindicateswhenhewritesthatbruteshaveonlynonconscious
experiences,andsoexperiencenothing(Carruthers,1989,pp.268,259).

23
Thereareapproximately800,000speciesofinsectsofwhichapproximately275,000arespeciesofbeetles.

24
Ifoneconsidersthattentacleciliaarepassivelydeformedbyvibrationsinthesurroundingwater,thenof
courseapolypsbendingresponseisproprioceptive,notreflexive.SeefurtherinthetextitselfLaveracks
remarkaboutciliaasthebeginningofspecializedsenseorganstructure.

25
Foranexcellentdiscussionofmorphologyinrelationtomovementandoftheevolutionofarthropodsfrom
annelidswithrespecttothatrelationship,seeManton(1953).TheeminentbiologistJ.B.S.Haldanespoke
laudinglyofMantonswork,sayingMantonhasdoneforaphylumwhatcomparativeethologistshavedone
forsmallvertebrategroupssuchastheAnatidae.Hedescribedherasapioneerwithrespecttoher
phylogeneticfocusonmovement(Haldane,1953,pp.xvi,xvii).

26
Cf.Curtis(1975)p.311:Afterbendingawayfromanoxiousstimulus,andiftheoffensivestimuluspersists,
theStentorwillreverseitsciliaandtrytosweeptheparticlesaway.Ifbendingandsweepingarenotsuccessful,
itcontractsandwaits.Onceithascontracted,itdoesnotbendorsweepagain,butitmayreachouttosamplethe
waterseveraltimesbeforeitfinallyswimsaway.Thelengthoftimeittoleratesthenoxiousstimulusapparently
dependsonwhetherornotitssitehadpreviouslyprovedagoodfeedingarea.Thus,evenciliatesshowsome
flexibilityinbehavior.

27
Seefootnote24above.

28
Lissman(1950),p.35(quotedinMill,1976,p.xvi).LissmanamendsSirCharlesSherringtonsoriginal1906
coinageanddefinitionofthetermproprioceptorssensoryorgansstimulatedbyactionsofthebodyitself
inthat,asLissmanstates,Sherringtonsdefinitiondoesnotappearquiteadequate,because,clearly,thereare
fewtypesofsenseorganswhichcannotbestimulatedbyactionsofthebodyitself(p.35).
29
[P]roprioceptiveinformationplaysavitalpartinthecontrolofmovementsandorientation.Itisofinterestto
noteinthiscontexttheremarksofzoologistM.J.Wellswithrespecttothequestionoftherelationshipbetween
proprioceptionandlearning:Becauseitisnormallyimpossibletoeliminatealltheproprioceptorsandneverbe
quitecertainthatonehassucceededineliminatingallothersensorycues,itisrarelypossibletobecertainthat
ananimalisusingproprioceptiveinformationwhenitlearns....Onemustexaminecaseswhereanimalslearn
incircumstancesthat,primafacie,implythattheyaretakingintoaccountinformationderivedfromwithintheir
ownjointsand/ormusclesand/ororgansofbalanceandexplorethesecasesrathercarefullytoseewhat
alternativeexplanationsarepossible.Itshouldbeemphasizedthattheobjectofthisexerciseisnottoestablish
whetherparticularsortsofanimalcanpossiblylearnfromproprioceptiveinputsinanycircumstances(sincethat
questionisunanswerable),butratherwhethertheynormallyappeartodoso(inMill,1976,pp.567f.).

30
vanGelderandPort(1995),p.3.Inthesametext,seealsoBeer(1995)andGiunti(1995).Seealso,for
example,Schner(nodate).

31
Wemightnotethatitisonlyspecifiedbehavioursthatarechosenforobservationandrecording,not
behavioursoutsideasetprotocoltobeginwith.Thustheconvenientlydiscardablefilecalledanecdotal
behaviour.See,forexample,theconsternationwithwhichsomeresearchersgreettheideaoftacticaldeception
inprimatesasputforthbyprimatologistsWhitenandByrne(1988).

32
Kineticspontaneitydescribesfundamentaldimensionsofanimation.Thetermisnottiedinanywaytoa
centralistdoctrine.Hence,thetermshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeoldernotionsofinnervationsensations,
willing,volition,oreffort,orinanyotherwayconfusedwiththeclassicefferentsideofthe
efferent/afferentdivide.(Forathoroughgoingcriticismoftheideathatthereisaconsciousnessofthemotor
discharge[fromthebrain],seeJames,1950,p.494).

33
Cf.Laverack,1976,p.48:Ifthethesisthatmanyinternalreceptorsmayderivefromexternalreceptors,(sic)
isvalid,thenitwouldbeanticipatedthatthepropertiesofallmechanoreceptorswillbesimilar.Varietymaybe
expectedasaresultlargelyofanatomicalratherthanphysiologicalattributes.

34
Wemightclarifythefirstdisadvantagebynotingthattactilityisareflexivesense,thatis,oneinwhichwhatis
touchingandwhatistouchedcoincideorblend.Hence,thesenseoftouchcanindeedbeambiguous,
preciselyasLaverackpointsoutingeneralratherthansensoryspecificterms.

35
Macnab(1982),p.100.Atangentialbutcriticalpointmightbemadewithrespecttothetwofoldsensitivities
ofabacterium,theonesensitivitybeingdescribedasimmediate,theotherasanticipatory,theoneinformative
ofthebacteriumspresentenergicstatebutnotoftheenvironmentalcauseofthatstate,theotherinformativeof
particularaspectsofthebacteriumsenvironmentbutnotofwhatitsconsequenceswillbe.Acaveatmightbein
orderwithrespecttowhatamountstoanequipotentialweightingofacorporealconsciousnessandmeta
corporealconsciousness.Abacteriumcanbeconceivedprofitablyattunedtothefutureonlywithacertain
reserve.Ifthebacteriumhasbothcapabilities,thenitssensitivitytoitsownbodyisparamount.Ifthereisno
guaranteethatpresentenvironmentalmunificencewillcontinueandevengrow,thereisnoguaranteeeitherthat
thebacteriumitselfwillcontinueandevenprosper.Ifitssensitivitytoitsownenergiclevelbecomesdeficient
foranyreason,itcouldconceivablyexhaustitselfinthemidstofplentyorinthepursuitofmore.

36
SeealsoLosicksandKaisers(1997)accountofhow[b]acteriaconversewithoneanotherandwithplants
andanimals(p.68).

37
Cf.Fields(1976),whoexplicitlydrawsaparallelbetweencrustaceansandvertebrateswithrespecttotheneed
forprecisecontrolofamultijointed,highlymobilebodyinchangingcircumstancese.g.,variableload,
musclefatigue,andthelike.Inparticular,Fieldsdrawsattentiontothefactthatthemusclereceptororganof
crustaceansissimilartothemusclespindleofvertebrates.

38
Animalsmayconstantlybeseentopause,deliberate,andresolve(Darwin,1871/1981,p.46).

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PaperreceivedJuly1996,revisedApril1997

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