INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES IN INDIA

Doctrine of strict or liberal construction have a peculiarly important place in the interpretation of
criminal statutes. The extraordinary vitality of the old common-law rule of strict construction,
statutes in about a third of the states substituting more liberal rules of construction in place of the
common-law rule, unite to contribute to the influence of such doc trines at the present time.
Rarely is there available to a state court faced with a borderline criminal case any evidence from
the records of the state legislature as to the meaning or purpose of the criminal statute which is to
be construed.
The name strict construction is really misleading. Under the rule, an ambiguous statutory
determinable imposing or enlarging criminal liability will be construed narrowly,2 while such a
deter minable relieving from or diminishing liability will be construed broadly,3 so that the
particular determinate will be placed with reference to the statutory determinable where it is of
most advan tage to the accused.The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps
not much less old than construction itself." 4 Thus did Chief Justice Marshall pay his respects
more than a hundred years ago to the antiquity of this rule. But the antiquity of the rule has been
overstated. It did not spring into existence as soon as there were any statutes to construe.

Strict construction
Strict construction refers to a particular legal philosophy of judicial interpretation that limits or
restricts judicial interpretation. Strict construction requires the court to apply the text as it is
written and no further, once the meaning of the text has been ascertained. That is, court should
avoid drawing inference from a statute or constitution. It is important to note that court may
make a construction only if the language is ambiguous or unclear. If the language is plain and
clear, a judge must apply the plain meaning of the language and cannot consider other evidence
that would change the meaning. If, however, the court finds that the words produce absurdity,
ambiguity, or a literalness never intended, the plain meaning does not apply and a construction
may be made. Strict construction occurs when ambiguous language is given its exact and
technical meaning.

Applicability

A Penal Statute must be constructed strictly. This means that a criminal statute may not be
enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used or the meaning
that is reasonably justified by its terms. It is fundamentally important in a free and just society
that Law must be readily ascertainable and reasonably clear otherwise it is oppressive and
deprives the citizen of one of his basic rights. An imprecise law can cause unjustified convictions
because it would not be possible for the accused to defend himself against uncertainties.
Therefore, an accused can be punished only if his act falls clearly into the four corners of the law
without resorting to any special meaning or interpretation of the law. For example, in Seksaria
Cotton Mills vs State of Bombay, 1954, SC held that in a penal statute, it is the duty of the
Courts to interpret the words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they do
not become traps for honest unlearned and unwary men. If there is honest and substantial
compliance with an array of puzzling directions that should be enough, even if on some hyper
critical view of the law
If a penal provision is capable of two reasonably possible constructions, then the one that
exempts the accused from penalty must be used rather than the one that does not. Whether a
particular construction achieves the intention of the statute or not is not up to the court to think
about in case of penal statutes. It is not apt for the court to extend the scope of a mischief and to
enlarge the penalty. It is not competent for the court to extend the meaning of the words to
achieve the intention of the legislature. If a penal provision allows accused to go scot-free
because of ambiguity of the law, then it is the duty of the legislature and not of the courts to fix
the law. Unless the words of a statute clearly make an act criminal, it cannot be construed as
criminal. Chinubhai vs State of Bombay, AIR 1960, is an important case in this respect. In this
case, several workers in a factory died by inhaling poisonous gas when they entered into a pit in
the factory premises to stop the leakage of the gas from a machine. The question was whether the
employer violated section 3 of the Factories Act, which says that no person in any factory shall
be permitted to enter any confined space in which dangerous fumes are likely to be present. The
Supreme Court, while construing the provision strictly, held that the section does not impose an
absolute duty on the employer to prevent workers from going into such area. It further observed
that the fact that some workers were present in the confined space does not prove that the
employer permitted them to go there.

Seksaria Cotton Mills vs State of Bombay, 1954,

BENCH:
BOSE, VIVIAN
BENCH:
BOSE, VIVIAN
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
JAGANNADHADAS, B
In Seksaria Cotton Mills Ltd v State of Bombay , it was held by the Supreme Court as follows

But we need not go into all this. Here is an order which is to affect the business of hundreds of
persons , many of whom are small petty merchants and traders, the sort of men who would not
have lawyers constantly at their elbows; and even if they did , the more learned their advisers
were in the law the more puzzled they would be as to what advice to give, for it is not till one is
learned in the law that subtleties of thought and bewilderment arise at the meaning of plain
English words which any ordinary man of average intelligence, not versed in the law, would
have no difficulty in understanding. In a penal statute this kind, it is the duty of the courts to
interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they shall not become
traps for honest, unlearned and unwary man. It there is honest and substantial compliances with
an array of puzzling directions that should be enough even if on some hypercritical view of the
law other ingenious meanings can be devised. The agent could in the circumstance be described,
without any straining of language, as the person to whom the goods were actually delivered.

In Tolaram v State of Bombay 7 ,

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
13/05/1954
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
BENCH:
MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA

the Supreme Court observed that

: If possible and reasonable construction can be put upon a penal provision the court must
lean towards the construction which exempts the subject from penalty . It is not competent to the
Court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by the legislature in order to carry out the
intention of the legislature

In Alamgir v State of Bihar 8 ,

BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
SARKAR, A.K.

the wife left her husband voluntarily and of her free will came to stay with the appellant. On the
question whether the appellant was guilty of an offence under section 498 IPC, it was held
One of the ingredients of the section is that the offender must take or entice away or conceal of
detain the wife of another person.. The policy underlying the provision may no doubt sound
inconsistent with the modern notions of the status of women and of the mutual rights and
obligations under marriage. That however is a question of policy with which courts are not
concerned. It is no doubt true that if the words used in a criminal statute are reasonably capable
of two constructions , the construction which is favourable to the accused should be preferred;
but in construing the relevant words, it is obviously necessary to have due regard to the context
in which they have been used Detention in the context must mean keeping back a wife from
her husband or any other person having the care of her on behalf of her husband with the
requisite intention.

Chinubhai vs State of Bombay, AIR 1960,

BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
IMAM, SYED JAFFER
 In Chinu bhai v State of Bombay 9, several workers in a factory died by inhaling poisonous
gas when they entered into a pit in the factory premises to stop leakage of poisonous gas from a
machine there. The Inspector of Factories on inspection did find beating and revising apparatus,
belts and ropes in the factory in violation of section 4 of the Factories Act. The question was
whether employer violated section 3 of the Act which says that no person in any factory shall be
permitted to enter any confined space in which dangerous fumes are likely to be present.
The Supreme Court, while holding that the nature of the enactment being penal had to be
strictly construed, held that section 3 does not impose an absolute duty on the employer to
prevent entry of persons in an area where dangerous fumes are likely to exist. The mere fact that
some workers went inside the pit does not prove that they were permitted by the employer to
enter. The prosecution must prove that first before any defence was called for. Since the
prosecution failed in its duty , the employer could not be convicted.