Lao Gi v.
Court of Appeals Held
December 29, 1989
Fulache, Dece
Doctrine
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,
however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitxutional right of such person to
due process should not be denied.
Private prosecutors cannot intervene in deportation proceedings in order to avoid
harassment and oppression. Hence, there are special prosecutors tasked to prosecute
deportation.ABE
Petition:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
Facts
- Sept. 3, 1958: Sec. of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191 finding Filomena Chia, jr. alias Sia
Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that his father Filomena Chia, Sr. is a Filipino
citizen
- Oct. 3, 1980: Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147 cancelling Opinion No. 191 and
setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr.
- March 9, 1981: a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children
- March 19, 1981: Amended charge was filed with CID; respondents refused to register as
aliens (by Nituda) having been required to do so
- Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended charges on the ground that CID has no
authority to reopen a matter already settled under Opinion No. 191. Motion to dismiss was
opposed by private prosecutor. And due process was accorded to the respondents.
- Motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration: denied by CID
- Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the CFI or alleging that
he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of certain real
property.
Trial court: acquitted
CA: acquitted
- Deportation case was set by CID on Sept. 23, 1982.
Were directed to move for reconsideration of the order directing them to
register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest by
Commissioner Nituda
Motion for reconsideration: Denied
Issues:
1. W/N petitioners were accorded due process as they were ordered to register as aliens
- CID alleges that their citizenship was obtained thru fraud although no evidence had been
presented yet in support of the charge of fraud in the acquisition of petitioners citizenship.
2. W/N private prosecutors are allowed to intervene in the prosecution with regard to
deportation. NO
CIDs Authority
- Has the authority to hear and determine deportation case
- Before an alien may be deported upon a warrant of Commissioner of Immigration, there
should be a prior determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground as charged by the alien
Case at Bar:
- Petitioners are charged with having entered the Philippines by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration authorities
at a designated port of entry.
- After appropriate charges are filed in the CID the specific grounds of which he should be
duly informed of, a hearing should be conducted, and it is only after such a hearing by the
CID that the alien may be ordered deported.
Petitioners are questioning the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that they register as
aliens: must be predicated on a positive finding that they are aliens. (They allege no
evidence was presented)
Power to deport
- Act of the State
- A police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be
injurious to the public good.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional
right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
c No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for
deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by
the Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions
complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable
a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be
deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted
to determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation. The
proceedings must be in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Fealty to the
prescribed rules of procedure in deportation cases shall insure a speedy, fair and just
dispensation of justice.
The Court takes note of the fact that a private prosecutor is assisting in the prosecution of
the case by the special prosecutor of the CID. The Court sees no reason why a private
prosecutor should be allowed to participate in a deportation case. Under the 1985 Rules on
 Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 16, Rule 110 thereof, an offended party may
intervene in a criminal prosecution when there is civil liability arising from the criminal
action claimed by said party. In such case he may intervene by counsel.
In deportation cases, the Court cannot conceive of any justification for a private party to
have any right to intervene. Even if such party can establish any damages due him arising
from the deportation charge against the alien, such relief cannot be afforded him in the
deportation proceeding. His recourse if at all is in the ordinary courts. Thus the Court rules
that the intervention of a private prosecutor should not be allowed in deportation cases.
The possibility of oppression, harassment and persecution cannot be discounted. The
deportation of an alien is the sole concern of the State. This is the reason why there are
special prosecutors and fiscals tasked to prosecute such cases.
Final Ruling:
- order of Commissioner Nituda: set aside
- CID to continue to hear the deportation case: resolve first the issue on citizenship to
determined whether they should be deported or not.
Maceda v ERB
by Anonas, Aiyla
Key takeaway: The ERB, as an administrative agency, is not bound by the strict or
technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings.
RECIT-READY:
In a hearing regarding a petition for the provisional increase of the oil price, ERB outlined
the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidences. It provides that the cross
examination of the evidence-in-chief of Caltex, Shell and Petron will be deferred to give the
oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are asking for. All the
evidence-in-chief to be p laced on record first and then the the cross examination will
come later. Maceda maintains that because of the procedure adopted by the ERB in the
reception of evidence leading to the price increases of 5 and 6 December 1990, he was
not able to finish his cross examination of Petrons sole witness. And, even before each of
the witnesses of Shell and Caltex could be cross examined by petitioners and before they
could present evidence in support of their opposition to the increase, the ERB had already
issued its 5 December 1990 order allowing a provisional increase sought by the oil
companies in their respective supplemental applications. SC ruled that such relaxation in
the procedure does not violate Macedas right to due process
The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and
to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of
this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not
improper. Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the
ERB, which in matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi legislative,
not quasi judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or
technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings
FACTS:
Petitioner Maceda seeks nullification of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) Orders dated
December 5 and 6, 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second
provisional increase in oil prices did not allow him substantial cross examination, in effect,
allegedly, a denial of due process.
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 2, 1990, private respondents oil
companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron, filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil
price increase
ERB issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990 (E. Maceda v. ERB,
et al.,), seeking to nullify the provisional increase.
SC dismissed the petition reaffirming ERBs authority to grant provisional increase even
without prior hearing, pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, clarifying as follows:
What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, exparte, a provisional
increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or not:
1. to make it permanent
2. to reduce or increase it further or
3. to deny the application.
Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given exparte and which are
subject to the resolution of the main case.
Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate
exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same
time.
Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may
decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending
that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally,
without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding
The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant
of provisional authority which is of course, the better procedurehowever, it
cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.
In the same order issued by ERB, authorizing provisional increase, the ERB set the
applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties on October 16, 1990.
Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as on the second hearing on
October 17, 1990. To afford registered oppositors the opportunity to crossexamine the
witnesses, the ERB set the continuation of the hearing to October 24, 1990.
This was postponed to November 5, 1990, on written notice of petitioner Maceda.
On November 5, 1990, the three oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to
file or admit amended/supplemental applications to further increase the prices of
petroleum products.
The ERB admitted the respective supplemental/amended petitions at the same time
requiring applicants to publish the corresponding Notices of Public Hearing in two
newspapers of general circulation
Hearing for the presentation of the evidence inchief commenced with ERB ruling that
testimonies of witnesses were to be in the form of Affidavits.
ERB subsequently outlined the procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence
That the cross examination of the evidence-in-chief of Caltex, Shell and Petron will be
deferred to give the oppositors and the Board a clear picture of what the applicants are
asking for. All the evidenceinchief to be placed on record first and then the the cross-
examination will come late
Maceda maintains that because of the procedure adopted by the ERB in the reception of
evidence leading to the price increases of 5 and 6 December 1990, he was not able to
finish his crossexamination of Petrons sole witness. And, even before each of the
witnesses of Shell and Caltex could be crossexamined by petitioners and before they could
present evidence in support of their opposition to the increase, the ERB had already issued
its 5 December 1990 order allowing a provisional increase sought by the oil companies
in their respective supplemental applications.
ISSUE: Whether or not the relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.
HELD: NO
The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and
to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of
 this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not
improper
Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB,
which in matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasilegislative, not
quasijudicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or
technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings
PARAS, J., Dissenting:
Administrative Law Energy Regulatory Board Taxation The ERB has no power to
tax which is solely the prerogative of Congress.I dissent. As I have long
previously indicated, the ERB has absolutely no power to tax which is solely the
prerogative of Congress. This is what the ERB is precisely doing by getting money
from the people to ultimately subsidize the ravenous oil companies. Additionally,
the stubborn refusal of the ERB to effectively rollback oil prices is a continuing
bestial insult to the intelligence of our countrymen, and a gross abandonment of
the people in their hour of economic misery. I therefore vote for a complete and
effective rollback of all oil prices.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting:
Administrative Law Energy Regulatory Board Any increase in the price of oil
products, provisional or otherwise, should be allowed only after the ERB shall
have fully determined, through bona fide and fulldress hearings that it is
absolutely necessary, and by how much it shall be effected.In the matter of
price increases of oil products, which vitally affects the people, especially those in
the middle and low income groups, any increase, provisional or otherwise, should
be allowed only after the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) shall have fully
determined, through bona fide and fulldress hearings, that it is absolutely
necessary and by how much it shall be effected. The people, represented by
reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in their
opposition to any increase in the prices of fuel. The right to be heard includes not
only the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof, but
also the right to confront and crossexamine the witnesses of the adverse parties.
SARMIENTO, J., Separate Opinion:
Administrative Law Energy Regulatory Board Oil pricing is a question best
judged by the political leadership, and oil prices are political, rather than
economic decisions.As I said, Philippine oil prices today have nothing to do with
the law on supply and demand, if they had anything to do with it in recent years.
(I also gather that the Government is intending to readjust the prices of gasoline
and diesel fuel soon since apparently, low diesel prices have reduced the demand
for gasoline resulting in distortions.) As the Court held in the first Maceda v.
Energy Regulatory Board, oil pricing is a question best judged by the political
leadership and oil prices are (and have been apparently), political, rather than
economic, decisions.
Corona v UHP
by Angeles, Hannah
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural
due process, are essential only when an administrative bod yexercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules
and regulations, and administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice
and hearing.
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: Dec. 12, 2013, GR No. 111953
PONENTE: Romero, J.
PETITIONER: Corona, in his capacity as Assistant for Legal Affairs, petitioner. United
Harbor Pilots Assosciation of the Philippines and Manila Pilots Association (UHP),
respondents.
RECIT-READY DIGEST: An administrative order was issued by the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA), which provided that all appointments for harbor pilots made by the PPA
will have to be renewed every year, and that the existing appointments made will only be
valid until December 1991. Thus, respondents sought to have the implementation of this
order suspended. In the meantime, the PPA issued the guidelines for the issuance of new
appointments. These issuances were thus brought before the courts by the respondents on
the question of their constitutionality based on violation of their right to exercise their
profession and on due process grounds
COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST:
FACTS:
o Petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of RTC Manila
declaring that the Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order 04-92
is null and void
o Prior to PPA-AO 04-92, PPA-AO 03-85 states that
An aspiring pilot shall:
Hold a pilot license
Train as probationary pilots in outports for 3 months
When they achieve satisfactory performance, they are given
permanent appointments by the PPA to exercise harbor pilotage
until they reach 70 years old
o Respondents:
Questioned the AO before the DOTC since it limits the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to 1 year subject to yearly renewal
or cancellation. However, DOTC Secretary stated that the PPA
board of directors is the governing body.
Respondents appealed before the Office of the President,
however, it lifted the TRO through Assistant Sec. of Legal Affairs
Corona since the PPA was only implementing Sec. 6 of PD 857
to control, regulate & supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots
in any port district.
Respondents filed a case before RTC and ruled in favor of them:
PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of
discretion
PPA AO 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and
Orders are null and void
PPA and the pertinent gov agencies are permanently
enjoined from implementing PPA AO 04-92
Respondents claim that the AO deprives their right to exercise
their profession which denies them of due process
Procedural aspect: No hearing was conducted
o Petitioners
PD 857
Authorizes PPA to control regulate and supervise
pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district
AO only regulates the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession in PPAs jurisdictional area
ISSUES: WON the AO violates respondents right to exercise their profession, and their
right to due process of law
HELD/RATIO: YES
o 2 kinds of due process: PROCEDURAL and SUBSTANTIAL
o Procedural
 Respondents rights were not denied since they were duly
represented in the PPAs board of directors
o Pilotage has a nature of a property right since it is a profession. With the
said AO, veterans and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-
year terms which ipso facto expire at that period
o The AO unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
and deprives the respondents right to property without due process of
law
Pagcor v CA
by Reyes, Phoebe
DOCTRINE:
While due process in an agency investigation may be limited as compared to due process
in criminal proceedings, where however a statute specifically provides for a procedure and
grants particular rights to a party under investigation such as in the investigations of
persons covered by the Civil Service Rules, these rights shall not be utterly disregarded.
RECIT-READY:
Private respondent Manahan was a Treasury Officer of PAGCOR, and handled fund transfer
requests. She received a fax of a document for Fund Transfer of 4.2M from another branch
of PAGCOR to be released to David Fuentabella. 30 minutes later, said person appeared
and private respondent approved the release of money. Another Treasurer Officer on duty
informed the other branch that the fund transfer was paid, but they denied such transfer.
Private respondent was informed that the other branch sent no fund transfer. She was
charged with Serious Procedural Deviation/Gross Negligence and was placed on preventive
suspension. She was sent a notice by the Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) to appear and
explain the said event. Private respondent filed with the CIU a Written Statement giving
her account of the events after the CIU allegedly did not allow her to be assisted by
counsel during the April 23, 2004 meeting and instead granted her the option to submit a
written statement.
She was dismissed from service.
From a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process must
be complied with. PAGCOR did not comply with the requirements, disregarding
respondents rights protected under the CSC resolution.
FACTS:
Private respondent Manahan was a Treasury Officer of PAGCOR, assigned in Casino Filipino-
Manila Pavilion (CF-Pavilion). Among her functions as Treasury Officer was the handling of
fund transfer requests received by CF-Pavilion.
On April 14, 2004 at 1:30PM, private respondent received from the fax machine of CF-
Pavilion's SVIP-Treasury a document that appeared to be a Request for Fund Transfer
coming from Casino Filipino-Laoag (CF-Laoag). The request was for P4,200,000.00 to be
released to Arnulfo Fuentabella or David Fuentabella.
About 30 minutes from Manahan's receipt of the fax document, a person who represented
himself to be David Fuentabella claimed from CF-Pavilion the amount of P4,200,000.00.
Private respondent approved the release of the money to said person.
At 7:30PM, the Treasury Officer on duty informed CF-Laoag through the phone that the
fund transfer had already been paid. However, CF-Laoag denied such fund transfer had
been made by CF-Laoag to CF-Pavilion. Private respondent was called by PAGCOR's
Assistant Chief Security Officer asking her to report immediately to CF-Pavilion, where she
was informed of CF-Laoag's claim that it sent no fund transfer for P4,200,000.00 in favor of
Arnulfo or David Fuentabella. She was then placed on preventive suspension for the charge
of Serious Procedural Deviation/Gross Negligence arising from the fund transfer.
Private respondent was instructed to report to the Corporate Office of PAGCOR where she
was again questioned regarding the fund transfer incident. On April 21, 2004, she received
a Notice to Appear and Explain, from PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU).
On April 26, 2004, private respondent filed with the CIU a Written Statement giving her
account of the events that transpired in relation to the disputed fund transfer. The
Statement was filed in lieu of her oral testimony, after the CIU allegedly did not allow her
to be assisted by counsel during the April 23, 2004 meeting and instead granted her the
option to submit a written statement.
On June 2, 2004, private respondent received a letter informing her she was dismissed
from service. She filed a MR of the PAGCOR Board of Directors' (BOD) decision. MR was
denied by PAGCOR BOD.
Private respondent appealed PAGCOR's ruling to the CSC. CSC granted private
respondent's appeal after a finding of violation of private respondent's right to due
process. The case was remanded to PAGCOR for the issuance of a formal charge, if
warranted, then a formal investigation.
PAGCOR's MR was denied by CSC. PAGCOR filed with CA a petition for review. CA affirmed
Resolutions of CSC. PAGCOR's MR was denied by CA.
ISSUE: WON Private Respondent was validly dismissed
RULING:
No.
From a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process must
be complied with.
Private respondent herein had signified her desire to be represented by a counsel during
the proceedings before PAGCOR, and even requested to be furnished with documents
during the investigations then being conducted by the petitioner. However PAGCOR did not
allow these requests. Although private respondent may be advised regarding the technical
intricacies akin to the fact in issue, she was not allowed to be accompanied or represented
by her lawyer during the investigation. (CSC Resolution provides that the person is entitled
to be assisted by a counsel of his choice)
While due process in an agency investigation may be limited as compared to due process
in criminal proceedings, where however a statute specifically provides for a procedure and
grants particular rights to a party under investigation such as in the investigations of
persons covered by the Civil Service Rules, these rights shall not be utterly disregarded,
especially so when invoked by the party under investigation, as was Manahan, because
these rights already form part of a procedural due process.
The finding that PAGCOR failed to comply with the required procedure is further supported
by the fact that in PAGCOR's letter, it explained that the investigation process against the
respondent had just commenced. If this were the case, i.e., that the investigation process
had just began at that time, then the proceedings conducted by PAGCOR were clearly
flawed, since a formal charge can be made only after a finding of prima facie case during
investigations. Section 15 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 provides as follows:
Section 15. Decision or Resolution After Preliminary Investigation. If a prima facie case is
established during the investigation, a formal charge shall be issued by the disciplining
authority. A formal investigation shall follow. In the absence of a prima facie case, the
complaint shall be dismissed.
Without proper investigation and, thereafter, a decision that clearly indicated the facts
constituting the offense imputed upon the respondent and the company rules she
supposedly violated, the respondent did not get the chance to sufficiently defend herself.
Salaw v NLRC
by Santos, Patrick
September 27, 1991
DOCTRINE: Hearings and invitations without the right to avail of counsel
already breaches ones right to due process.
RECIT-READY:
Facts: Petitioner was employed as a credit-investigator appraiser whose job was to identify
the companys foreclosed assets and give valuation to its real properties.
One day, the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary got from
petitioner a sworn statement without council saying that he contributed to selling 20
units of sewing machines and electric generators which were already foreclosed by the
bank.
A month later, petitioner was asked to appear before the banks investigation and
discipline committee without a lawyer, to answer for such case.
A few months later, he was terminated from office for serious misconduct or willful
disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the first trust reposed on him by the bank
basically he was fired for being fraudulent.
The petitioner filed a case to the labor arbiter, citing illegal dismissal which was affirmed
by the arbiter.
Upon appeal by the respondents, NLRC reversed the decision. Hence this case in the SC.
The SC ruled that there was illegal dismissal. In cases such as these, it is important
that two kinds of due process, both substantive and procedural are followed.
Looking at the facts, compliance with due process was already in question when petitioner
was asked to stand in from of the investigative committee without counsel.
Furthermore, the evidence used against him was extracted also without counsel this
makes it inadmissible as evidence. In sum, the right to due process requires that the
person must be availed of a lawyer during hearings. If he was not given the right of
counsel, unless he waived that right, the case might as well be dismissed from
the get-go.
FACTS:
Facts: Petitioner was employed by private respondents as a credit investigator-appraiser
whose main duty was to inspect, investigate, appraise, and identify the companys
foreclosed assets as well as to give valuation to its real properties.
On November 27, 1984, the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary
extracted from petitioner a sworn statement that he along with another employee named
Madrigal sold 20 sewing machines and electric generators already foreclosed by the
respondent bank of Worldwide Garment and L.P. Money Garment for P60,000
On December 5, 1984, petitioner was requested to appear before the banks Personnel
Discipline and Investigation Committee the following day, without counsel, in connection
to the foreclosed sewing machines and generators.
On April 1, 1985, petitioner was terminated from office effective March 27, 1985 for
serious misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the first trust
reposed on him by the private respondents.
On April 17, 1985, petitioner filed a case in the NLRC arguing illegal dismissal against
private respondent. The labor arbiter held that there was illegal dismissal and the
petitioner was to be reinstated immediately. After appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision
which brings us to this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner was legally justified and
followed due process.
HELD:
RULING: THIS IS AN ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an
employee are twofold: the substantive and the procedural.
The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employers
intent to dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal; on the other hand, the
requirement of hearing affords the employee the opportunity to answer his employers
charges against him and accordingly defend himself therefrom. If one is missing, there is a
violation of due process.
The SC agrees with the labor arbiter that there was illegal dismissal because of the
following reason but as the records clearly show, complainant was denied that
constitutional right when his subsequent request refute the allegations against him was
granted and a hearing was set without counsel or representative.
As provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code governing the dismissal of employees, Section 5 of the said rule requires that the
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the technical rules
of procedure in the adjudication cases. However, the right to counsel, a very basic
requirement of substantive due process has to be observed.
Furthermore, the minutes of the meeting regarding petitioners dismissal were not even
presented which is also contributive to his deprivation of due process. Even the evidence
used against him, taken from a sworn statement by Criminal Investigative Service were
made without counsel which made it inadmissible as evidence. Right from the start, the
private respondents argument had no leg to stand on.
 Proper procedure in Administrative cases (Just in case)
Right to a hearing
Tribunal must consider evidence presented
Decision must have something to support it
Evidence must be substantial
Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
NLRC should act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy separate from the private investigative body
NLRC should render its decision in such a manner that all parties involved are informed of
the various issues involved.
Lopez v Alturas by Cabochan, Jonas
DOCTRINE: There is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where
the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy.
RECIT-READY: Quirico Lopez was a truck driver for the Alturas group of companies. After
10 years of service, he was dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence when he was
caught smuggling scrap iron springs, as well as cartons which he sold. He prayed that due
process was not awarded to him as there was no hearing and that the NLRC held that such
was the case. However, the appellate court reversed the NLRC ruling, and stated that due
process was provided as long as he was given the opportunity to be heard to present his
side. The issue is WON the legality of the manner of dismissal adhered due process? Yes it
did as he was given the chance to submit a written response and had no showing of a
request for formal hearing to be conducted or to be assisted by counsel. Even if there was
no hearing, as long as he was given the opportunity to present his side of the controversy,
due process has been complied with.
FACTS:
Petitioner was truck driver (of an Isuzu Cargo Van with plate no. PHP 271) for the
Alturas Group of Companies. He was dismissed after a security guard caught him in the act
of smuggling scrap iron lift springs (said hed make axes).
Termination of employment due to loss of trust and confidence. Investigation
further revealed that he had been smuggling cartons, which he sold in conspiracy with
Maritess Alaba. A criminal case for Qualified Theft was filed.
Labor Arbiter held that the dismissal was justified.
The NLRC set aside that decision stating that the evidence did not suffice to
warrant the termination and held that the petitioner should have been afforded or at least
advised of the right to counsel.
The appellate court reversed the NLRC ruling, that the evidence found in the
preliminary investigation are [sic] sufficient to show prima facie guilt. However, it did hold
that due process was not observed when the company failed to give him the chance to
defend his side. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the legality of the manner of dismissal adhered to due process?
HELD: YES.
Procedural due process has been defined as giving an opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered.
In Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (illuminating correct
proceedings): After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the
employee may submit a written explanation, offer evidence in support, and sworn
statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his explanation personally
or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He may also ask the employer to
provide him copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also
include a request that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct
of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory.
Petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side when he was informed of
the charge against him and required to submit his written explanation with which he
complied. There is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where
the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy.
Also, there is no showing that he requested for a formal hearing to be conducted
or that he be assisted by counsel.
Carabeo v CA
by Panaligan, Celina
Doctrine: December 4, 2009
Lifestyle checks by virtue of EO 259 by the DOF-RIPS are valid since EO 259 does not
require IRRs to be enforceable
Recit Ready:
Petitioner Carabeo, OIC of the office of the Treasurer of Paranaque, questions the validity of
the lifestyle check conducted on him by the DOF-RIPS, an investigative body created under
EO 259, which was an internal regulation. The check yielded proof of non-disclosure in
Carabeos SALN of monetary assets as well as real property, vehicles, club shares, and
travels abroad. The said lifestyle check gave rise to the filing of criminal and
administrative complaints against him before the Ombudsman and an order of his
preventive suspension from office. He claims that EO 259 was unenforceable because it
lacked IRRs and publication and that his preventive suspension was not valid because he
was not informed beforehand of the complaint against him and he was not able to take
corrective action.
The SC held that EO 259, being an internal regulation, did not need an IRR nor publication
for it to be enforceable; and that his preventive suspension was valid because it was within
the Ombudsmans authority to issue and since under RA 3019, one of the laws he was
charged to have violated, did not require the Ombudsman to furnish Carabeo a copy of
the order of suspension before handing out such suspension.
Facts:
Liberato M. Carabeo, OIC of the Office of the Treasurer of Paranaque City, filed a petition
for certiorari before the SC after the CA denied its MR dismissing his petitions against
herein respondents.
Members of the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS),
in charge of conducting lifestyle checks on public officers within their department, are
some of the respondents in this case. They filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against
petitioner due to unexplained wealth in the form of millions, real properties, vehicles, club
shares ownership, and various trips abroad that were undeclared in his SALNs between
2001 and 2004. The DOF-RIPS prayed that the Ombudsman order the filing of criminal
informations for violations of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), RA 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), RA 1379 (Act
Declaring Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth of Public Officers and Employees), and
administrative cases due to dishonesty and grave misconduct. They also prayed for
commencement of forfeiture proceedings against petitioners property. As a result, the
Ombudsman ordered Secretary of Finance Teves (another respondent in this case) to
place Carabeo under preventive suspension during the investigation.
In response, Carabeo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, claiming grave abuse of
discretion in the handing out of the suspension. The CA issued a 60-day TRO enjoining
enforcement of said suspension. Carabeo filed another petition citing Secretary Teves for
contempt for transferring him to the DOFs Central Office.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, ruling that the preventive suspension was
within the Ombudsmans authority to issue and was not a violation of Carabeos right to
due process as the suspension was not a punishment but a means taken to insure
impartial investigation. The suspension also stemmed from the factual findings of the
DOF-RIPS, which was granted authority by EO 259 to conduct lifestyle checks and file
complaints against its public officers. Likewise the CA held that EO 259, being internal in
nature and only regulating the personnel of the DOF, did not require any publication or
IRR.
Issues:
W/N
1) EO 259 requires publication and implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
before it can be enforceable
2) The preventive suspension was validly issued
3) The complaint against and the suspension of Carabeo violated RA 6713* which entitles
Carabeo to be informed beforehand of the complaint against him and to take the
necessary corrective action.
*Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
Held:
1) No. While EO 259 lacks implementing guidelines, such fact is immaterial and does not
affect the validity of the criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. The DOF-
RIPS was vested with the power in order to validly file criminal and administrative charges;
its creation is an essential component in the organized & effective collection of evidence
against corrupt DOF officials and employees. Besides, any concerned citizen can file
charges against any corrupt govt official or employee if there exists sufficient evidence.
EO 259 is internal in nature and covers only officers and employees engaged in revenue
collection, such as herein petitioner.
The Court finds nothing illegal with the lifestyle check as long as the constitutional and
statutory rights of the accused are recognized by the DOF-RIPS.
2) Yes. Prior notice and hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive
suspension order. The suspension was neither a punishment nor a penalty but merely a
preventive measure which the Ombudsman, by virtue of Sec. 24 of RA 6770, can validly
issue. While a preventive suspension order may originate from a complaint, the
Ombudsman is not required to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint prior to
ordering a preventive suspension.
3) No. In addition to RA 6713, Carabeos non disclosure of assets in his SALN constitutes a
violation of RA 3019, among others. Under RA 3019, prima facie evidence of unexplained
wealth shall constitute a valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public
official concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth
is completed.
People v Nazario by Alejandro, Ritz
Doctrine: Vague Statutes
Recit Ready:
Eusebio Nazario, lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao Quezon, was charged of Violation
of Municipal Ordinance for refusing and failing to pay municipal taxes in the total amount
of 362.62. He contends that the ordinance is ambiguous and uncertain because: 1) owner
or manager doesnt specify if lessees are included and 2) the periods specified cause
confusion on the payment period. The court held that there is no ambiguity in the said
ordinance and Nazario is clearly liable. As actual operator of the fishpond in question and
as recipient of profits, he is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. The fact that
the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the dates presents a mere problem in
computation, but it does not make the ordinance vague. The ordinances in question set
forth enough standards that clarify ambiguities. Nazario was convicted guilty of the said
crime being held to pay the tax in question and a penalty of P50.
Facts:
Eusebio Nazario
48 years of age, married, owner and general manager of the ZIP Manufacturing
Enterprises, lives in Sta. Mesa Manila but is a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao
Quezon.
Oct. 1968: he was charged of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an
information filed by the provincial Fiscal for refusing and failing to pay the municipal taxes
in the total amount P362.62 as a fishpond operator despite of repeated demands
Ordinance in question: Ordinance no. 4 series of 1955, as amended by ordinance no. 5,
series of 1965, and as further amended by ordinance no. 12, series of 1966
Salient Point of the Ordinances:
Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao
shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per
annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964.
For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the
territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto,
shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries.
3 Witnesses Testified against him: 1) Miguel Francia - worked there from 1962-1964
2) Nicolas Macarolay - (barrio captain) confirms that the fishpond still operates 3) Rodolfo
Alvarez - (municipal treasurer) sent a demand letter asking him to pay but up to now he
still hasnt, old city treasurer has done the same, sent a letter to fishery commission to
confirm payment and a certificate was received confirming non-payment from 1964-1966
Nazarios Defense
1. confirms he is a lessee of a fishpond owned by the Philippine Fisheries Commission
2. received 3 demand letters asking him to pay for different amounts, answered the 3 letters
diligently, went to the treasurer to apply for a license tax but was told to just pay taxes
3. I did not pay because up to now I do not know whether I am covered by the Ordinance or
not.
4. taxes sought to be collected have already lapsed and that there is no law empowering
municipalities to pass ordinances taxing fishpond operators
5. as lessee of a forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not covered by said
municipal ordinances
6. the ordinance in question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of the municipal
council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact; and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in
question is ambiguous and uncertain
Trial Court: Guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P50 w/ subsidiary payment at rate of
P8/day
Issue/s:
Did the lower court err in:
1. declaring that said ordinance of municipality of Pagbilao,
Quezon, is null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain?
2. not holding that the ordinance in question covers only owners or
overseer of fishponds of private ownership and not to lessees of public lands?
Held/Ratio:
Clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question
Ordiance being ambiguous and uncertain
Vague statute
- lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
- Repugnant to constitution in two respects
1. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid
2. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
- must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either
a saving clause or by construction
- To be declared null and void, an act must be utterly vague on its face i.e. it
cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction
Coates v. City of Cincinnati differentiates:
Perfectly vague act: obscurity is evident on its face
Legislation couched in imprecise language: couched in imprecise language but
specifies a standard, thus can be saved by proper construction
Statutes apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain activities - cant be
challenged to certain types of activities
He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances
vague
He comes within the term manager thus is liable for the taxes in
question
Ordinance no. 15s after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the
date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries, and amendment by
ordinance no. 12 stating beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964, does not give rise to ambiguity of
period of payment
The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the dates
presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinance vague.
The ordinances in question set forth enough standards that clarify
ambiguities
Coverage: owners and overseers of fishponds
As actual operator of the fishpond in question and as recipient of profits,
he is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question.
While the government owns them, the Government never shared in the
profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of
tax under the said ordinances
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed.
Estrada v Sandiganbayan by Domasig, Rein
Recit Ready: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659, assails it saying that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his
burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law. The Plunder
Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00 that can be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. Plunder is malum
in se which requires proof of criminal intent, therefore the element mens rea. The
legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se, punishable by reclusion perpetual to death.
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under
RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659,
assails it saying that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
He specified Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of RA 7659 which transgressed constitutional
boundaries. (sec 4- Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy).

8 separate informations were filed before sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion raising the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause.
2001, Sandiganbayan issued resolution finding probable cause for the plunder exists to
justify the issuance of warrant of arrest to Estrada. He filed a motion to quash but
sandiganbayan denied it
Issue:
1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder
and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it
is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Held:
1. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is
indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no
finding of unconstitutionality. And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder
Law. The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently
explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as
the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them
2. Petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a
pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of
at least P50,000,000.00 that can be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Legislature did not
in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The
burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or
element necessary to constitute the crime.
3. Plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent, therefore the element
mens rea (degree of responsibility of offender is determined by his criminal intent) must be
proven. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder
was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of petitioner. The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of
plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
Feeder v CA
by Erbon, Roni
Doctrine: The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or a law. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party
in a noncriminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such
representation he will not be bound by such proceedings.
Recit-ready:
M/T ULU WAI - foreign vessel, was going to Zamboangga from Singapore to deliver 2.2k
mt of oil to Zamboangga. It anchored in Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notice to
authorities. Since it was not able to present required ship and shipping documents, a
warrant for seizure and detention was issued. Decision was made and petitioner was found
guilty of violating the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines requiring forfeiture of
items. Such decision was affirmed by Commission of Customs, CTA and CA. The case was
brought to SC with the following issues: (1) W/N petitioner was deprived of property
without due process of law in that its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized
and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
W/N the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel
in violation of their constitutional.
The Court also affirmed the CAs decision stating that was not deprived due process
because there was enough evidence to prove that there was indeed a violation. The Court
also held that There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a noncriminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation
he will not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is
not indispensable. Thus, SC affirmed CAs decision.
Facts:
Petition: seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8,
1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court of Tax Appeals which found the
vessel M/T ULU WAI liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil
liable under the same Code and ordering the forfeiture of vessel and cargo.
M/T ULU WAI - foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder
International Shipping Lines of Singapore
May 6, 1986 - M/T ULU WAI left Singapore carrying 1,100 mt of gas oil and 1,100 mt of
fuel oil consigned to Far Eastern Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
May 14 - the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying
the Iloilo customs authorities.
Presence came to their knowledge thru civilian informer
May 19 - Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team to verify
found that vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except
for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for Zamboan.
(Zamboangga)
warrant of seizure and detention was issued after due investigation
Dec. 12 - Feeder filed a motion to dismiss & to squash the warrants but Collector District
denied
Mar. 17, 1987 - Decision of District collector: M/T ULU WAI and her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas
Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are hereby found guilty of violating the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines and are forfeited in favor of the Philippines
 Mar. 26 - the Master of M/T ULU WAI, Capt. Deposa filed a Marine Protest
May 28 - Mr. Antonio Torres, Owners representative of M/T ULU WAI gave a sworn
statement to Atty. Hernando Hinojales
May 13 -Comm. of Customs denied appeal, affirmed the District Collectors decision
June 25 - filed a petition for review of decision of both D.Collector and CoC with the CTA
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to
enjoin Comm. from implementing the decision
Dec. 14, 1988 - CTA decision: also affirmed 2 prior decisions
Jan. 19, 1990 - filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals decision with this
Court.
Mar. 21 - referred the disposition of the case CA (bec. such decrees our w/in its exclusive
jurisdiction)
May 8 - Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals.
July 4 - Motion for Reconsideration denied
Hence, Petition.
Issue/s:
W/N petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be
presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
W/N the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel
in violation of their constitutional.
Held:
A. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal
importation committed, or at least an attempt thereof, which would justify a
forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo.
Forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which
involves such circumstantial evidence as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt does not apply.
Importation - begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Phil.
with intention to unload therein. (Sec. 1202, Tariff and Customs Code)
mere intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation
Intent - being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be
inferred from the facts, and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions,
conduct and circumstances generally.
Case at bar: there was intent to unload because based on the CAs decision:
1. the route to Zamboanga was shorter and Iloilo lies further north. It is not logical for the
sailing vessel to travel a longer distance to get the necessary repairs.
2. When it anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras, Iloilo, it did not notify the Iloilo port or
Customs authorities of its arrival.
3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ships and shipping
documents were not on board except the clearance from Singaporean port officials
clearing the vessel for Zamboanga.
4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T CATHEAD, and the large M/T SEMIRANO
NO. 819 were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the barge and the tugboat were
contracted by Consignee Far East Synergy to load the cargo of the vessel into the awaiting
barge and to discharge the same to Manila
The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with the
findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court
of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary
principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding
upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
B. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the
assistance of counsel may not be considered an outright violation of their
Nera vs. The Auditor General
The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required
by the Constitution or a law.
Exception is made in the charter only:
during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his
right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel,
and during the trial of the accused, who has the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
either retained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a noncriminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be
bound by such proceedings.
The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
We thus find no compelling reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the said sworn
statements.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
CB v CA by Bernas, Claud
KEY TAKEAWAY:
Prior notice and hearing not required before placement of bank under receivership
FACTS
Trust Savings Bank(TSB) was found to be in a state of insolvency. The monetary board
issued on May 31, 1985 a resolution preventing TSB from doing business in the Philippines
and placed it under receivership and appointing Ramon T. Tiaoqui as receiver. TSB filed
with the trial court a petition for an issuance of a temporary restraining order given that
said Monetary Board resolution was done without them being found guilty of anything
thereof; in other words they were not accorded their right to due process as the resolution
was issued without prior hearing.
ISSUE:
W/N TSBs right to due process was violated having been subject of a resolution by the
Monetary Board without prior hearing?
HELD:
NO
Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 of R.A 265 does not contemplate
prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed
under receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the
filing of a case within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the
bank, it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case.
Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing"
in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of
absence thereof.

This case would present the exception to the general rule. Because of the nature of the
business of the banking industry prior hearing is not required before the issuance of a
resolution placing a bank under receivership. Going through prior hearing would be an
unnecessary delay to what the Monetary Board would like to accomplish: protect the
banks depositors money. Due process in this case does not always require prior hearing;
close now and hear later
This close now and hear later scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations
to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the banks assets and as a valid exercise of police
power to protect depositors, creditors, stockholders and the general public.
Perez v Madrona by Bernardo, Ivy
DOCTRINE:
If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his
remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his
request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents
supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. (There must be
judicial intervention).
RECIT-READY:
Petitioners Fortunito Madrona and his wife Yolanda Pante own a house in Marikina City with
a concrete fence and steel gate. They received a letter from Jamie perez, Chief of Marikina
Demolition Office ordering that their fence and gate be demolished because they had
violated some laws and ordinances. Madrona refused to comply with the order, stating that
the demolition violated their right to their property without due process. But Perez still
pushed the demolition order, prompting Madrona to file a petition for injunction before the
RTC of Marikina. The RTC ruled in favor of Madrona, which was affirmed by the CA, thus,
Perez brought this up to the SC. However, the Supreme Court held that the injunction was
proper because the requisites for a writ of injunction were present: one, Madrona has a
right to the possession of his property, and two, the demolition order, which was the
subject of the injunction, was violative of that right. Additionally, if Perez truly found that
the fence and gate were a nuisance to the welfare of the community, his recourse should
have been to bring it to the court.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner: Jamie Perez of the Marikina Demolition Office
2. Respondents: Spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda Pante.
3. Madrona and his wife own a house in Marikina City enclosed by a concrete fence and steel
gate.
4. They received a letter from Jamie Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office stating
that their concrete fence and steel gate violated some laws, and therefore, they have to be
demolished. They were given 7 days from the receipt of the letter to demolish the concrete
fence and steel gate or else Perez will take corresponding action.
5. Madrona responded with a letter essentially refusing to follow Perezs orders, arguing that
the demolition violated their right to their property without due process.
6. Despite that, Perez still demanded that the fence and gate be demolished. This prompted
Madrona to file a complaint for injunction with the RTC of Marikina City.
7. Madrona argued, among other things, the demolition order had no sound legal basis, and
thus was violate of their right to the possession of their property. The recourse of Perez
should have been to bring the action to court.
8. The RTC held that Madrones and his wife are entitled to the peaceful and open possession
of every inch of their property and Perezs threat to demolish the fence around their
property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled to
protection under the Constitution and laws.
9. It also argued that Perez had no basis in saying that the fence was a nuisance and
presented an immediate danger to the communitys welfare, nor did it encroach on the
sidewalk. Thus, it found no justification for the demolition order.
10. The CA affirmed the order.
ISSUE:
WON Madrones was entitled to permanent injunction, thereby restraining Perez or anyone
acting for or on his behalf for carrying out the threatened demolition of their fence and
steel gate.
HELD: YES
- Perez argues that:
o The service of the notice of demolition cant be an invasion of a right
because it already presupposes that Madrona will be given an
opportunity to be heard before any action can be taken.
o Clearly, the gate and fence were violative of existing laws and ordinances,
thus Madrona cant have absolute right over them.
o The clearing of the sidewalks is for an infrastructure project of the
Marikina City Government so the courts cannot restrict it.
- The Court disagrees:
- For an injunction case to issue, two requisites must concur:
o There must be a right to be protected
o There acts against which the injunction is to be directive are violative of
said right
- The requisites are clearly present in this case:
o Madrona has a right over his fence which cannot be removed without due
process
o The summary demolition of the concrete fence, against which the
injunction is directed, would violate said right
- If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his
remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his
request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents
supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence.
DPWH v Sps Tecson by Olivarez, Shannin
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 7, 268 square meteres located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan. The parcel of
land was among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940 without the
owners consent and without necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the
construction of the MacArthur Highway
In a letter dated December 15, 1994: spouses Tecson demanded the payment of the fair
market value of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras, then the
District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of DPWH, offered to pay the
subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per Resolution of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan
Spouses Tecson were not satisfied with the offer; they demanded for the return of their
property or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value
Since their demand was still not granted, spouses Tecson filed a Complaint for recovery
of possession with damages against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the
possession of the ubject parcel of land and that they be paid attorneys fees; the
respondent spouses claimed that the subject parcel of land was assessed at P2,543,800.00
On the other hand, the petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
following grounds:
1.) That the suit is against the State which may not be sued without its consent
2.) That the case has already prescribed
3.) That spouses Tecson have no cause of action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies
4.) If respondents are entitled to compensation, they should be paid only the
value of the property in 1940 or 1941
June 28, 1995: the RTC issued an Order granting spouses Tecson a motion to dismiss
based on the doctrine of state immunity from suit (therefore, even damages that were
demanded are waived)
When elevated to the CA, the appellate court did not agree with the RTC and found
instead that the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable, because the
recovery of compensation is the only relieve available to the landowner: to deny such relief
would undeniably cause injustice to the landowner
The CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the complaint and, consequently,
remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining the just compensation
to which spouses Tecson are entitled to recover from the government
The case was then remanded back to the RTC, and released a dispositive demanding the
DPWH to pay said complainants the amount of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500)
per square meter for the lot subject matter of this case in accordance with the Resolution
of the Provincial Appraisal Committee dated December 19, 2001
On appeal, the CA affirmed the above decision with the
modification that the just compensation (which is P1,500 per square meter), should earn
interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the filing of the action on March 17,
1995 until full payment
In its appeal before the CA, petitioners DPWH raised the issues of
prescription and laches, which the CA brushed aside on two grounds:
1.) That the issue had already been raised by DPWH when the case was
elevated before the CA the first time
2.) The issues proper for resolution had been laid down in the pre-trial order
which did not include the issues of prescription and laches. Thus, the same
can no longer be further considered
DPWH insist that the action is barred by prescription having been
filed 54 years after the accrual of the action in 1940; they stated that the court can just
automatically dismiss the complaint if they see that it has already exceeded the
prescription period
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson are co-owners
of a parcel of land with an area of 7, 268 square meteres located in San Pablo, Malolos,
Bulacan. The parcel of land was among the properties taken by the government sometime
in 1940 without the owners consent and without necessary expropriation proceedings and
used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway
In a letter dated December 15, 1994: spouses Tecson demanded
the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R.
Contreras, then the District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of DPWH,
offered to pay the subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per Resolution of the
Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan
Spouses Tecson were not satisfied with the offer; they demanded
for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the current fair market
value
Since their demand was still not granted, spouses Tecson filed a
Complaint for recovery of possession with damages against petitioners, praying that they
be restored to the possession of the ubject parcel of land and that they be paid attorneys
fees; the respondent spouses claimed that the subject parcel of land was assessed at
P2,543,800.00
On the other hand, the petitioners moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the following grounds:
1.) That the suit is against the State which may not be sued without its consent
2.) That the case has already prescribed
3.) That spouses Tecson have no cause of action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies
4.) If respondents are entitled to compensation, they should be paid only the
value of the property in 1940 or 1941
June 28, 1995: the RTC issued an Order granting spouses Tecson a
motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of state immunity from suit (therefore, even
damages that were demanded are waived)
When elevated to the CA, the appellate court did not agree with
the RTC and found instead that the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable,
because the recovery of compensation is the only relieve available to the landowner: to
deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice to the landowner
The CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the complaint and,
consequently, remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining the just
compensation to which spouses Tecson are entitled to recover from the government
The case was then remanded back to the RTC, and released a
dispositive demanding the DPWH to pay said complainants the amount of one thousand
five hundred pesos (P1,500) per square meter for the lot subject matter of this case in
accordance with the Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee dated December 19,
2001
On appeal, the CA affirmed the above decision with the
modification that the just compensation (which is P1,500 per square meter), should earn
interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the filing of the action on March 17,
1995 until full payment
In its appeal before the CA, petitioners DPWH raised the issues of
prescription and laches, which the CA brushed aside on two grounds:
1.) That the issue had already been raised by DPWH when the case was
elevated before the CA the first time
2.) The issues proper for resolution had been laid down in the pre-trial order
which did not include the issues of prescription and laches. Thus, the same
can no longer be further considered
DPWH insist that the action is barred by prescription having been
filed 54 years after the accrual of the action in 1940; they stated that the court can just
automatically dismiss the complaint if they see that it has already exceeded the
prescription period
ISSUES:
1.) CA gravely erred in granting just compensation to spouses Tecson, considering the
highly dubious and questionable circumstances of their alleged ownership of the subject
property
2.) The CA gravely erred in awarding just compensation to spouses Tecson, because their
complaint for recovery of possession and damages is already barred by prescription and
laches
3.) The CA gravely erred in affirming the RTCs decision ordering the payment of just
compensation based on the current market value of the alleged property of spouses
Tecson
HELD/RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The instant case stemmed from an action for recovery of possession with damages filed by
respondents against petitioners. It, however, revolves around the taking of the subject lot
by petitioners for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. There is taking when the
expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a permanent
duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property to public use in such a manner as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
The Court concludes that the issue regarding the prescription period and the laches are
not proper issues for resolution, since they were already included in the pre-trial order.
To be sure, the pre-trial order explicitly defines and limits the issues to be tried and
controls the subsequent course of the action unless modified before trial to prevent
manifest injustice.
Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and prescription, the same must still fail.
Laches is principally a doctrine of equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when
to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an injustice. This doctrine finds
no application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to
respondents claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be
compensated if his property is taken for public use. Neither shall prescription bar
respondents claim following the long-standing rule "that where private property is taken
by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through
expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value
thereof does not prescribe."
When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides
for the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return
is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation
for the land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped
from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the
power was exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of compensation. The trial
and appellate courts found that respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue
left for determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one
who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government." This
rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit, and
even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation.
The issue in this case is not novel.
As in said cases, just compensation due respondents in this case should, therefore, be
fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic v. Lara, et al., and
repeatedly held by the Court in recent cases, thus:
"The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the
date of the filing of the proceedings." For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for
which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its
value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property
from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic
conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually
loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken.
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in
1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due
respondents instead of the higher value which is P1,500.00. While disparity in the above
amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving
such outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss
in guarding against the cruel effects of belated claim. The concept of just compensation
does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must be just not only
to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject property for more than fifty years
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings. In taking respondents property without
the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation,
petitioners clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents proprietary rights which cannot
be countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, respondents are entitled to adequate
compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages which in this case should be
the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the value of the land at the time of
taking in 1940 until full payment. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a
matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position
as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.
Estrada v Ombudsman
by Galang, Maan
DOCTRINE
RECIT-READY
FACTS:
On November 25, 2013, the Ombudsman served a complaint upon Senator Jinggoy Ejercito
Estrada, filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed that criminal proceedings for
plunder be conducted against Estrada.
On December 3, 2013, the Ombudsman served another complaint against the petitioner,
filed by the Field Investigation Officer (FIO) of the Ombudsman, which likewise prayed that
criminal proceedings for plunder and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be conducted
against petitioner.
Petitioner then filed a request to be furnished with copies of counter-affidavits of the other
respondents (or corespondents), affidavits of new witnesses and other filings. His request
was made pursuant to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the
complaint which he may not have been furnished and to have access to the evidence on
record.
On March 27, 2014, Ombudsman denied his request because the Rules of Court and Rules
of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman do not entitle him to be furnished all the filings
 of the respondents; the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-affidavits
and controverting evidence to the complainant, and not to the other respondents.
Ombudsman then issued a joint resolution on both complaints, finding probable cause to
indict petitioner and his corespondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to dismiss the charges against him
He also filed a motion for reconsideration with the Supreme Court on the March 27
decision of the Ombudsman denying him of his request of copies of counter-affidavits,
claiming that he was deprived due process of law.
On the same date, the Ombudsman issued a joint order furnishing the petitioner with the
counter-affidavits of Tuason, Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Francisco Figura, Gregoria
Buenaventura, and Alexis Sevidal, and directing him to comment thereon with a non-
extendible period of five days from the receipt of the order.
Petitioner insists that he was deprived due process of law because although he was given
copies of the counter-affidavits of some of his corespondents, he claimed these were
incomplete.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was deprived due process of law
HELD: No. The petition was DISMISSED.
1. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a
respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estradas claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent.
This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, [a]fter such affidavits [of the
complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer
shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other
supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x.
Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the
corespondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the
corespondents are not part of the supporting affidavits complainant.
2. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with
copies of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estradas
claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is
issued to the respondent.
This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, [a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses]
have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy
of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit,
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x.
Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, not the affidavits of the corespondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits
of the corespondents are not part of the supporting affidavits complainant.
3. Sen. Estradas Petition, involves a preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case
The denial of his Request happened during the preliminary investigation where the only
issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an
information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of
the counter-affidavits of his corespondents during the pretrial or even during the trial.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and probable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part
of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his
rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence. Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.
4. The Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary
investigations in criminal cases.
The GSIS vs. CA clarification affirms the non-applicability of the Ang Tibay guidelines to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases: The investigating officer, which is the role that
the Office of the Ombudsman plays in the investigation and prosecution of government
personnel, will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation,
after conducting its own fact-finding investigation, is to determine probable cause
for filing an information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations
of the parties under the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay. The
investigating officer investigates, determines probable cause, and prosecutes
the criminal case after filing the corresponding information.
The Ombudsman and the prosecution service under the control and supervision of the
Secretary of the Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing
officer, judge and jury of the respondent in preliminary investigations. Obviously, this
procedure cannot comply with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
5. Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present
case when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand
the full exercise of the rights of an accused person
In short, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are merely statutory
rights, not constitutional due process rights. An investigation to determine probable cause
for the filing of an information does not initiate a criminal action so as to trigger into
operation Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution. It is the filing of a complaint or
information in court that initiates a criminal action.
VELASCO, J. Dissenting Opinion
The right to the disclosure of the evidence against a party prior to the issuance of a
judgment against him is, to reiterate, a vital component of the due process of law, a clear
disregard of such right constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As Section 4(c) of AO No. 7, or the Office of the Ombudsmans very own Rules of
Procedure, clearly provides that a respondent shall have access to all the evidence on
record without discriminating as to the origin thereof and regardless of whether such
evidence came from the complainant or another respondent, the provisions of the Rules of
Court supposedly limiting a respondents access to the affidavits of the complaint only is
not applicable to investigations conducted by the Ombudsman. Put piquantly, this
restrictive misconstruction of Sections 3 and 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be applied to
Sen. Estrada to deprive him of his right to due process clearly spelled out in AO No. 7.

BRION, J. Dissenting Opinion
A necessary starting point in considering how preliminary investigation and its set of rights
are to be viewed is the mother of rights under the Bill of Rights the Due Process Clause
under Section 1: [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. This guarantee, no less, lies at the bedrock of preliminary investigation
process as life, liberty and property all stand to be affected by State action in the criminal
justice process.
Interestingly, under the Constitution, actual and active protection starts at the earliest
stage when an individual the specific concern of the Bill of Rights and whom this part of
the Constitution particularly secures against State action becomes potentially exposed to
harm from an all-powerful State. The Constitution describes the trigger point of this
protection to be at the investigation for the commission of an offense.
American Inter-fashion v OP by Chung, Lyn
Parties:
Glorious (Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing Co) private respondent,
siya yung natanggalan ng export quotas (ang naapi)
GTEB (GARMENTS & TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD) siya yung nagdecide na tanggalan ng
export quotas si Glorious (Ang nang-api)
American Inter-Fashion Corp ang nakinabang sa pangaapi ni GTEB kay Glorious (sa
kanya kasi napunta ung export quota na tinanggal kay Glorious ni GTEB)
Recit- ready:
in a 1984 decision made by GTEB, Glorious was held guilty of dollar-salting and
misdeclaration of importations which led to the cancellation of its export quotas. Glorious
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition but also subsequently withdraw such petition.
2 years later, Glorious filed a petition for the restitution of its export quota allocation and
requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. This was
granted by the OP. The OP held that GLORIOUS was indeed denied due process and
ordered GTEB to further investigate the case of GLORIOUS. So American inter-fashion (one
of the 2 companies that received the export quotas that were cancelled from GLORIOUS)
filed an appeal. American inter-fashion claimed that the violation of the right to due
process of GLORIOUS was cured by the subsequent investigation (held in 1987).
ISSUE: is there a violation of due process by GTEB? Is this cured by the subsequent
investigation in 1987?
HELD: The right of due process of GLORIOUS was violated by GTEB and this is not cured in
the 1987 subsequent investigation.
Facts:
April 27, 1984 - GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of
importations by the GTEB. The Export quotas allocated to GLORIOUS were CANCELLED due
to this decision.
because of this, GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court,
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, contending that its right to due
process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial
evidence.
AGREE naman ang Court kay GLORIOUS the Court issued a resolution on June 4, 1984,
ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against
respondent GLORIOUS
Pero naduwag itong si GLORIOUS July 25, 1984, respondent GLORIOUS filed a
manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition
so the case was dismissed because of this motion to withdraw by GLORIOUS.
2 years later tumapang na ulit si GLORIOUS GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition
for the restitution of its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the
GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984 (ito yung decision na nagtanggal ng export quotas
nya)
o GLORIOUS stated that his withdrawal was due to duress and intimidation and undue
influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer the export
quotas to Marcos crony owned corps
kasi nung pagkatanggal sa kanya ng export quota nya.. may tinayong 2 bagong corp..
namely.. American inter-fashion (petitioner) and De Soleil)
siyempre idedeny ni GTEB ung sinasabi ni GLORIOUS
dahil hindi magkasundo, an appeal was then taken to the Office of the President.
ditto na sa appeal na ito pumasok sa eksena si American Inter-fashion (petitioner in this
case)
Office of the President ruled in favor of GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the
GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. The
motion for reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied.
ISSUE (S) (maisue kasi itong si American Interfahsooownn )
Petitioner (American Interfashion) raised the following Issue:
o RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GADALEJ IN
HAVING TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF GLORIOUS SUNS APPEAL SINCE:
it amounted to an administrative review of the final judgment of the courts;
Glorious Sun had long ago abandoned its right to appeal the 1984 Decision of the
GTEB.
o ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT GLORIOUS SUN'S APPEAL WAS PROPER, THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GADALEJ IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF
GLORIOUS SUN'S RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (para kay American interfashion,
mali daw yung findings ng OP na naviolate due process ni GLORIOUS)
HELD:
First Issue about the reviewing of the OP of the findings of the 1984 decision
withdrawing the export quotas of GLORIOUS.
o Sabi kasi ni Glorious, Res Judicata na since final na ung decision.
o Time and again we have held that for a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur:
1) it must be a final judgment;
(2) the court which resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be identity between the two cases, as to the parties, subject matter
and cause of action.
o So the question is WON the judgement of the 1984 (yung decision na nagtanggal ng
export quotas ni GLORIOuS) is a judgement based on merits or not?
obviously NO! The 1984 judgement did not resolve anything. The motion to
withdraw the petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that not only Glorious
Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed by the martial law regime.
 Ano ba meaning ng judgment based on merits?
a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or
final or merely technical point."
as matter of substance in law, as distinguished from matter of form, and
as the real or substantial grounds of action or defense in contradiction to some
technical or collateral matter raised in the course of the suit. A judgment is upon
the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective
rights and duties of the parties
So hindi siya RES JUDICATA!
Second Issue: About the lack of due process.
o the petitioner assails the questioned resolutions of the Office of the President on the
ground that private respondent Glorious Sun was not denied due process during the
hearings held in GTEB.
Pano nya nasabi ito???
GTEB required Glorious Sun to submit its reason why its petition for restitution of
export quotas should be given due course, the former furnished the latter various relevant
documents for its perusal and examination
These very same documents are constitutive of the evidence submitted by the GTEB
which it considered in arriving at its 1984 Decision
With this subsequent disclosure, Glorious Sun was given all the opportunity, to
comment thereon, with the end in view of convincing GTEB that its petition, for restitution
should be given due course
the protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had been effectively
remedied by the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its request for copies of the
relevant documents. After Glorious Sun had examined the same, and submitted their
arguments in refutation of previous findings which were based thereon, the GTEB
considered these arguments. These subsequent events, we respectfully mention, are clear
indications that effective disclosure within the context of the due process clause had been
more than sufficiently met. (DAW!!!)
o However, the COURT DISAGREES
The petitioner's posture is to say the least misleading. At issue in this petition is the
1984 resolution of the GTEB. This resolution was the sole reason for stripping off
Glorious Sun's export quotas and awarding the export quotas to two newly and hastily
created corporations, the petitioner herein and De Soleil The petitioner can not use as
an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious Sun
in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious Sun was
denied due process when the GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a
resolution against Glorious Sun
Also, there is an affidavit from Chairman Puno stating that there was already a
decision even prior the investigation of the case of GLORIOUS by GTEB.
Prior to the start of the investigation, I was instructed by Minister Ongpin
to submit a report finding Glorious Sun (Appellant herein) guilty of dollar-salting
and other violations that would justify the cancellation of Glorious Sun's export
quotas which were among the most substantial and valuable in the garments
industry in trouser's line.
After Glorious Sun submitted its evidence refuting the dollar-salting charge,
I told Minister Ongpin that there was no evidence to substantiate the dollar-
salting charge against Glorious Sun or any other violations of existing laws or
rules. However, Minister Ongpin still instructed me to submit a report to the
GTEB, of which Minister Ongpin was the Chairman, finding Glorious Sun guilty of
dollar-salting.
Before the cancellation in 1984, the private respondent had been enjoying export
quotas granted to it since 1977. In effect the private respondent's export quota allocation
which initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not be
removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another.
Substantive Due Process
US v Toribio by Carlos, Von
Doctrine: Police power, when exercised properly, does not violate due process.
Recit Ready:
Toribio was penalized for violating RA 1147 for slaughtering a carabao for human
consumption without a permit from the treasurer of the municipality. He previously applied
for such permit but was denied because the carabao was found not unfit for agricultural
purposes or draft work. Counsel for Toribio assails the constitutionality of the law for
depriving right to property without due process. The court held that the regulation of
private use of property if it is detrimental to the public welfare. In this case, the law was
passed to meet the demand for carabaos, due to their almost extinction by an infectious
disease. Since public interest demands it, the law is a proper exercise of police power.
Facts:
[There is a discussion on the interpretation of statute, but I chose to omit it since hindi
relevant] Interpretation of the court: The statute is for regulating the use and the slaughter
of carabaos through permits from the treasurer of the municipality, regardless if there is no
municipal slaughterhouse in the area.
RA 1147: The act of regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of carabaos
Sec 30: Permit for slaughter from the municipal treasurer
Sec 31: Slaughter permit for those who are unfit for agricultural work but fit for
consumption
Sec 32: Record Keeping by the municipal treasurer
Sec 33: Fine of 10-500 pesos and/or 1-6mos imprisonment
Toribio was penalized for slaughtering a carabao without a permit from the municipal
treasurer
He previously applied but was denied for the carabao is not unfit for agricultural work
Section 5 of the Philippine Bill: No law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person
of life, liberty and property without due process of law
 Issue: WN the regulation is a violation of Section 5 of the Philippine Bill. NO
Held:
Doctrine of Police power: a legitimate exercise of legislative power to regulate and
restrain particular use of property that as would be inconsistent or injurious to the rights of
the public.
To prohibit or penalize the slaughter of carabaos is a just practice of police power
There has been a decline in the population of carabaos due to an outbreak of an
infectious disease
The demand for carabaos rose due to their decline in population
The public interest for carabaos is a justification for such regulation
Ynot v IAC by Ignacio, Quina
RECIT READY:
RESTITUTO YNOT - PETITIONER// INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT - RESPONDENT
In 1984, President Marcos penned EO# 262-A which prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and their slaughtering not complying with the requirements of
previous EO# 262 with respect to age. It also further stipulated that in light of farmers
trying to circumvent EO# 262 by transporting carabeef, it too shall be punished with
confiscation of carabeef. The purpose of these executive orders were to conserve carabaos
and buffaloes to the benefit of small-time farmers who use them for plowing fields.
Restituto Ynot transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo, on Jan 13
1984, when it was confiscated by the police in Barotac Nuevo. Ynot sued for recovery, and
was issued a writ of replevin (court action for recovery of personal property) and required
bond of 12k. The trial court sustained the confiscation, and since the carabaos could not
be produced, confiscated the bond. Ynot asserts that such executive order is
unconstitutional for it allows outright confiscation without according the owner rights to
substantive due process-- that is, the right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court.
ISSUE: W/N EO#262-A is violative of the rights to substantive due process-- YES
HELD: The purpose of the EO was not challenged, but rather the implementation. For the
government to validly exercise its police power, it must be acting in the best
interest/general welfare of the people, and its methods must not be oppressive. In (United
States v. Toribio) it was established that carabaos were a main resource of energy, and to
prevent the loss of such services (because owners may be tempted to sell carabeef for
money), their slaughter was prohibited. ** In the Toribio case, the statute in question
included penalty of fine and imprisonment, to be imposed after a trial and conviction of the
accused. In this case, EO# 262-A merely provided the penalty of confiscation, to be carried
out by executive authorities (police). Such measure is violative of substantive due process
(right to be heard/present defense), and must therefore be struck down as
unconstitutional.
OTHER RELEVANT STUFFS (in case na magtanong si Mam):
- 2 orders, 262 (carabao slaughter not allowed -- carabaos cannot be killed unless of a
certain age-- For males- must be at least 7 yrs old || for females, 11 yrs old ) --- order 262-
A is supplementary and prevents interprovincial transport of carabao and CARABEEF
- US vs. Toribio cannot apply because in this case while still regarding protection of
carabaos, the statute provided for penalty of fine and imprisonment AFTER a trial &
conviction by the courts. The trial & conviction was not included in EO 262-A.
- The penalty of confiscation in EO 262-A is an INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER as
it is oppressive and arbitrary.
- The trial court refused to answer the questions of constitutionality raised by Ynot. SC says
that they could have, and should not have shrinked from their duty to do so when possible.
- SC held also that there was no connection between the purpose of preventing slaughter to
the method of preventing TRANSPORT. (because when it dont matter where you have
carabaos, the place will not decrease their chances of being slaughtered because they can
be slaughtered ANYWHERE)
- The policeman was not held liable for damages coz the law was valid at the time. w3w
diba
- Due process clause was stipulated broadly in order for it to be flexible and resilient,
requiring the most minimum compliance is notice and hearing.
** For males- must be older than 7 yrs old || for females, 11 yrs old
Churchill v Rafferty by Reyes, Meg
December 21, 1915
KEY TAKEAWAY:
Due Process on deprivation of property
Police power: If a law relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general
welfare of the community, it is within the scope of the police power of the State. (This
includes the regulation of billboards)
RECIT READY DIGEST:
(This is from Jech Tiu digest)
Act 2339 allows the COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, after due investigation, to decide
that any sign or billboard exposed to the public view is offensive to the sight or is
otherwise a nuisance and empowers him to summarily order the its removal; and if not
complied with within 10 days, he may cause the removal himself.
The plaintiffs, whose billboards are upon private lands in Rizal, contend that it constitutes
deprivation of property without due process of law.
The SC held that the regulation of billboards falls squarely within the police power of the
State.
The SC also held that things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell, or hearing, may
be suppressed by the State, especially those situated in thickly populated districts.
In other words, the people are entitled to protest against the indiscriminate and wholesale
use of the landscape by advertisers, especially if they are offensive to the senses under
certain conditions
The SC further held that the State has the duty to promote a healthy social and economic
condition and the comfort and convenience of the people fall squarely within its coverage.
The prevailing public sentiment likewise militates against the erection of billboards that are
offensive to the sight
FACTS:
The petitioners, Churchill and Tait, are involved in billboard advertising business.
Upon complaints of the BrItish and German consuls and by the orders of the Collector of
Internal Revenue, the billboard owned by said petitioners in Rizal were removed since the
billboard complained of was said to be offensive to the sight and therefore considered as a
nuisance.
The petitioners were challenging the constitutionality of Act 2339 on the ground that it is a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
 Act No 2339, Section 100 Subsection (b) specifically confers the power to remove any sign,
signboard or billboard upon the Collector of Internal Revenue on the grounds that it is
offensive to the sight or otherwise a nuisance.
ISSUE:
Is Act 2339 constitutional? And is there a valid or legitimate exercise of police power
contemplated in Subsection b Section 100 of the said law?
HELD / RATIO:
Act 2339 is constitutional and there is a valid exercise of police power in the regulation of
billboards.
Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public
to self-protection. For this reason, its scope expands and contracts with changing needs.
The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope of the
police power are only interesting as illustrations of its rapid extension within comparatively
recent years to points heretofore deemed entirely within the field of private liberty and
property rights.
Advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which areoffensive to the sight, are not
disassociated from the general welfare of the public. Moreover, if the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the
comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything
which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. Such a power is
merely regulatory.
People v Fajardo by Aragon, Jyn
Aug. 29, 1958
DOCTRINE:
UNDEFINED AND UNLIMITED DELEGATION: Where a municipal ordinance lacks standards
and thus confers arbitrary and unrestricted power to the mayor, such ordinance is invalid
as it is an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity
which is per se lawful.
A municipal ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to permanently
deprive the right to use the property without just compensation.
RECIT READY: An ordinance was passed giving the mayor the power to deny construction
permits if the building to be constructed would destroy the view of the plaza. Appellants
were convicted for constructing a building which destroyed the view of the plaza. The
ordinance was held invalid as it permitted the arbitrary discretion of the mayor to deny or
grant permits. The ordinance did not have any standards to guide or limit the mayor's
action on the permits. In addition, the ordinance hinders appellants from using their
property which is tantamount to a taking from the government. They are entitled to just
compensation and a hearing.
FACTS:
1. The municipal council of Camarines Sur passed an ordinance ordering the acquisition of
a written permit from the mayor before construction of a building. The penalty of removal
of the building is imposed if the same destroys the view of the public plaza.
2. Appellants filed written requests to the mayor for construction of a building which were
all denied on the ground that the it would destroy the view of the plaza.
3. Appellants proceeded with construction without the permit.
4. Appellants were convicted by the Justice of the Peace court for violation of the
ordinance.
5. The CFI affirmed the conviction.
6. The CA forwarded the records to the SC as it attacks the constitutionality of the
ordinance.
ISSUE: whether or not the ordinance is valid? No, the ordinance is NOT valid and the
conviction should be overturned.
HELD: The ordinance is null and void. Appellants acquitted.
RATIO:
1. The ordinance is not valid as it fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to
guide or limit the mayor's action. The ordinance allows the mayor absolute discretion and
arbitrary power to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance states no conditions for the grant
or refusal of a permit. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING in this case.
2. The refusal of the permit on the ground that the building will destroy the view of the
public plaza is oppressive. It operates to permanently deprive appellants the right to use
their own property and amounts to a taking without just compensations. The state should
not be allowed, under the guise of police property, permanently divest owner of the
beneficial use of the property as this is tantamount to confiscation. If the property is to be
taken, appellants are entitled to just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
Balacuit v CFI by Rosales, Andrew
Doctrine/Take-Away: The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business using police power.
Recit Ready
FACTS
The Municipal Board of Butuan City enacted Ordinance No. 640 requiring people in the
business of selling admissions tickets to only charge half the admission price for children 7
to 12 years old. The petitioners are managers of the theaters assailing the constitutionality
of the ordinance as being ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power.
ISSUE
WON Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and
constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.
HELD
NO. The SC held that to invoke police power, not only must it appear that the interest of
the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
 oppressive upon individuals. The legislature under the guise of public interest may not
arbitrarily interfere with private business. The proper exercise of police power is not
conclusive and it subject to supervision of the courts.
For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
Facts:
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969,
penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of
selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for
tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.
Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint
before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special
Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power.
Therefore, void and unenforceable.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan
constitutional and valid.
Issue:
WON Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and
constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
NO. It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places
of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police
power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a
valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is
equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation.
The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix
what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person
who did not approve could stay away.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public
policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
Agustin v Edu
by Consolacion, Ray
February 2, 1979
Doctrine: The State, through its police power, may mandate the use of Early Warning
Devices to promote road safety and is not violative of due process.
Recit-Ready:
President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229 which mandated all owners, users or
drivers of motor vehicles to have at least 1 pair of early warning devices, the Letter of
Instruction was issued by virtue of the Philippines undertaking under the Vienna
Convention to enact local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and signals. .
The EWDs shall be used whenever the motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or parked for 30
minutes or more on any street or highway in order to avoid any fatal or serious accidents.
Accordingly, the implementing rules and regulations was issued by Respondent Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner. Petitioner Agustin filed a case with the Supreme
Court assailing the validity of the Letter of Instruction as violative of due
process for being oppressive and a burden on motor vehicle owners. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, held that the Letter of Instruction and its IRR was a valid exercise
of police power to promote the general welfare which in the instant case is to prevent fatal
accidents arising from stalled, disabled or parked cars along highways during nighttime.
Facts:
The validity of a letter of Instruction providing for an early seaming device for motor
vehicles is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional
guarantee of due process
The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 1974,
reads: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious
accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor
vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal
approaching motorists of their presence; Whereas, the said Vienna Convention which was
ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of
local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.
The Letter of Instruction provided further that; 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor
vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning
device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at
least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is
stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway,
including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall
cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to
the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked.
The Letter of Instruction was later amended to include that The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at
the registration of his vehicle, one pair of reflectorized early warning device.
Furthermore, the implementing rules and regulations state that all persons are required to
have their EWDs meet the specifications under Administrative Order No. 1.
Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model
13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking
 lights before and after, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of
the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land
transportation Commission," alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended,
"clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power. For him they are
"oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory. He argued that the Letter of Instruction
and the IRR are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to
P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional as being compulsory and confiscatory
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety
device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's.
Issue:
Whether the letter of instruction mandating the use of early warning devices is oppressive
mounting to a violation of due process.
Ruling:
No, according to the Supreme Court, the Letter of Instruction was issued in exercise of the
police power which is the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. The Supreme Court
also held that the petitioners allegation of oppressiveness cannot be accepted and that
the Solicitor General was correct in saying that Such early warning device requirement is
not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already
equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2) "battery-
powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front and
rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) *
* * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400
meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or
expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion
of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled
or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist
who sees any of the aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps
will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that
blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an
ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase,
rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
Opinions:
Teehankee (dissenting)- Justice Teehankee alleges that the Letter of Instruction has yet to
show the public necessity of the EWD considering that "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the
prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor
vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end
collisions," as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost
900,000 vehicles throughout the country.
Magtajas v Pryce by Hermoso, JJ
July 20, 1994
Doctrine:
Test of a valid ordinance: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any
statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. It must not be partial or
discriminatory. 3) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 4) It must be
general and consistent with public policy. 5) It must not be unreasonable.
Recit-ready:
The planned operation of a PAGCOR casino caused widespread opposition in CDO.
The local council, with the support of Mayor Magtajas, enacted 2 ordinances
prohibiting gambling and penalizing such practice. Pryce Properties and PAGCOR,
as intervenor, assailed the ordinances in the CA which ruled in their favor.
The issue is W/N the questioned Ordinances are unreasonable and inconsistent
with the laws?
The Court held that the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue; it is not
illegal per se. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved
only by the legislative and executive departments. Moreover, for an ordinance to
be valid the test is that it must: 1) not contravene the constitution or any statute;
2) not be unfair or oppressive; 3) not prohibit but may regulate trade; 4) be
general and consistent with public policy; and. 5) not be unreasonable.The
apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869.
However, the decree allows the operation of gambling and empowers PAGCOR to
regulate them. Therefore, it does not contravene it.
Facts:
A massive opposition from various sectors (with Mayor Magtajas at the forefront) occurred
in 1992 at Cagayan de Oro City (CDO) when PAGCOR decided to expand its operation of
casinos in the city. It leased a portion of a building owned by Pryce Properties for this
project.
The local Sangguniang Panglungsod issued 2 ordinances prohibiting the operation or for
any establishment to allow casinos, and providing penalties in violation of which.
Pryce, and PAGCOR as intervenor, assailed the ordinances before the CA.
CA held: ordinances invalid, enforcement of ordinances prohibited, and reconsideration for
the decision is likewise denied.
Mayor Magtajas and the SP raised this to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
W/N the questioned Ordinances are unreasonable and inconsistent with the laws?
YES
Held:
P.D. 1869 created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue; it is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, even mentioning it at all.
It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are
not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive
departments. That function is exclusive.
Jurisprudence has consistently held these substantive requirements of a valid ordinance:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute 2) It must not be unfair or
oppressive. It must not be partial or discriminatory 3) It must not prohibit but may regulate
 trade 4) It must be general and consistent with public policy 5) It must not be
unreasonable.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and
public policy as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising their power.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that
cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. For all their praiseworthy motives,
these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and
are therefore ultra vires and void.
Padilla (separate)
The ordinances cannot modify or repeal PAGCORs authority. However, despite the
casinos legality, gambling in any form runs counter to the governments own
efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which is generally
perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. That the PAGCOR contributes
greatly to the coffers of the government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because this will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino
moral character. It is to be remembered that, 1) what is legal is not always moral
and 2) the ends do not always justify the means.
Davide Jr. (Separate)
The nullification by the CA of the ordinances as unconstitutional because it
contravenes P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not
necessarily a contravention of the constitution. However, it is obvious that the
government and the people of CDO are strongly against the opening of the
gambling casino. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general
welfare of the inhabitants. PAGCOR, must consider the valid concerns of the
people and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary manner.
Bennis v Michigan by Bundalian, Albert
Catchy Phrase - Forfeiture and Naughty Bennis in Michigan
DOCTRINE/KEY TAKE AWAYS: "It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures
of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in
violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
RECIT RAPIDO: The State of Michigan wanted to abate the car jointly owned by Tina
Bennis and her husband on the ground that the car was a public nuisance. It was in that
parked car along the street of Detroit that Tinas husband was caught by Detroit Police in
flagrante delicto with a prostitute. Husband was convicted of gross indecency. Tina
(petitioner) defended her car from abatement saying that she entrusted her husband to
use that car and did not know that his husband would do this. The US Supreme Court
affirmed Michigan Supreme Courts reinstatement of Wayne County Circuit Courts decision
in subjecting Tinas car in forfeiture/abatement and that Tina was not deprived of the
proper due process accorded to every US citizen (notice of the complaint and opportunity
to be heard). The US Supreme Court cited several cases illustrating that the state has the
power to confiscate properties used in illegal activities by persons not the owner if such
effects are judicially and properly proven to be used in illegal activities and crimes against
the laws of the state.
Facts
-Tinas husband getting it on with a prostitute in their car in the streets of Detroit.
-Detroit PD caught them in flagrante delicto
-Tinas husband got caught and convicted of gross indecency
-Forfeiture/abatement proceedings was executed by the State of MIchigan re- Tinas car
where the crime happened for being that of public nuisance
-Tina defended the car from such proceedings saying that despite her trust to her husband,
she had no knowledge that the car would be used in violation of Michigans indecency laws
(malamang tangina expected mo bang pagtaksilan ka ng asawa mo...)
-Consideration of Wayne County Circuit Court = e may kotse pa kayong isa so di naman
kayo maabala kung i-forfeit itong kotse na ginamit ng asawa mo to violate our indecency
laws... markado na ito... public nuisance
-Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision
-Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the decision of lower court
-Tina alleged that she was denied the notice and opportunity to be heard in which the
Michigan SC answered negatively.
-Michigan SC concluded as a matter of state law that the episode in the Bennis vehicle was
an abatable nuisance. Rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation, the court then
announced that, in order to abate an owner's interest in a vehicle, Michigan does not need
to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used in a manner
proscribed when she entrusted it to another user.
-the court confirmed the trial court's description of the nuisance abatement proceeding as
an "equitable action," and considered it "critical" that the trial judge so comprehended the
statute
-another admiralty forfeiture decision 17 years later, Justice Story wrote for the Court that
in in rem admiralty proceedings "the acts of the master and crew . . . bind the interest of
the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to
whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their
unlawful or wanton wrongs... kumbaga siyang gawa ng captain at crew ng barko... whether
guilty or hindi yung may-ari ng barko... makukumpiska yun kung kinakailangan... base sa
acts ng mga complement nito
-The dealer allowed an associate to use the automobile, and the associate used it for the
illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor. The State brought a forfeiture action pursuant
to a Kansas statute, and Van Oster defended on the ground that the transportation of the
liquor in the car was without her knowledge or authority.
-It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent
owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States
is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
- Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses "both by preventing further illicit use of the
[property] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior
unprofitable."
-The State here sought to deter illegal activity that contributes to neighborhood
deterioration and unsafe streets. The Bennis automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and
was used in criminal activity.
-Raising the 5th Amendment re- confiscation/forfeiture or Tinas car cant hold water since
the govt is not required to give just compensation to Tina by the very nature of why the
car is confiscated in the first place (used in violation of state laws)...
-The government may not be required to compensate an owner for property which it has
already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the
power of eminent domain
Issue: WON is the action of the State of Michigan in which it subjects Tinas car
to forfeiture proceedings on the ground of it being a public nuisance
constitutional?
Held: YES

Ople v Torres by Sebastian, Lui
DOCTRINE: Any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by the Court
to strict scrutiny.
RECIT-READY:
The petition is Sen. Blas F. Oples effort to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy by
praying for the invalidation of AO308. AO308 was issued to provide citizens with a
decentralized Identification Reference System (with the use of biometrics) that will enable
them to efficiently avail of government services while reducing/eradicating fraudulent
transactions and representations. He argues that it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenrys protected zone of privacy and in turn violates the Bill of Rights. The Court ruled
in favor of Sen. Ople stating that AO308 cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is
narrowly drawn. The lack of proper safeguards against the possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the biometrics, computer technology, etc. threaten the right of privacy and the
very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
FACTS:
According to the revered Justice Brandeis, the right to privacy is the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
AO308 was issued by President Fidel Ramos on December 12, 1996; its purpose is
to
(1) provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility (a computerized system)
to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities;
(2) to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services
AO308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
and January 23, 1997.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies the heads
of the government agencies, as members of the InterAgency Coordinating Committee
(IACC), are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308
On April 8, 1997, a TRO was issued enjoining its implementation
Petitioners contend, among others, that the implementation of AO 308 insidiously
lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the Bill of Rights
Respondents counter-argue, among others, that AO 308 protects an individuals
interest in privacy
ISSUE:
WON the implementation of AO308 threatens to violate the Bill of Rights by impermissibly
intruding on the citizenrys protected zone of privacy
HELD: YES
AO308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
facially it violates the right to privacy, the essence of which is the right to be let alone.
The right of privacy and its other facets are recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized and protected in various
provisions of the Bill of Rights (Sections 1-3, 6, 8, and 17).
The Civil Code (zones of privacy), The Revised Penal Code (violation/revelation of
secrets), special laws (invasion of privacy/Anti-Wiretapping Law), and The Rules of Court
(privileged communication) also recognize and protect the right of privacy.
A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, it cannot
pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn.
Should it be implemented, the broadness, the vagueness, and the overbreadth will
put our peoples right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a common reference number to establish a linkage among
concerned agencies through the use of Biometrics Technology and computer
application designs
o It provides precise confirmation of an individuals identity through
physiological/behavioral characteristics: finger-scanning, retinal scan, artificial nose
Considering the options available to the implementors of A.O. No. 308 with regard
to what specific biological characteristics/biometrics technology shall be used to identify
citizens, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
The potential misuse of the data cannot be underplayed given that data may be
gathered for gainful and useful government purposes the existence of this vast reservoir
of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be
too great to resist.
AO308 fails to assure that personal info will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. Lack of proper safeguards may interfere with
the individuals liberty of abode & travel by enabling authorities to track down
his movement it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
info and circumvent the right against selfincrimination
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual
lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded they threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent
The use of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the level of
reasonably expected privacy decreases.
The reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends on a two-part
test:
(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy and
(2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
The factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of the
expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices
of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.
Authorities must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and
that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses This approach is
demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect human
rights
While the Court strikes down AO308, it is not against the use of computers in
handling data. The right of privacy is not intended to stifle scientific/tech
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such
intrusions.
Any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by the
Court to strict scrutiny.
Acebedo Optical Co. v CA
by Perez, Paolo
Doctrine: While the local government may impose conditions upon granting a business
permit, the conditions must not be unreasonable, oppressive, discriminating which will
amount to the derogation of a common right. In this case, the conditions set by the City
Mayor were so unreasonable as to amount to the deprivation of Acebedos right to the
conduct of its lawful business.
 Recit-Redy: Office of the City Mayor of Iligan granted Acebedo Optical a business permit
but was subjected to several conditions. This permit was later revoked because Acebedo
allegedly violated the conditions upon which the permit was granted to it. The issue at
hand is whether or not a City Mayor, who undoubtedly has the power to grant/deny
business permits, can validly set conditions in granting/denying corporations business
permits as a valid exercise of police power. The SC ruled that A cebedo was applying for a
business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being
within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is
ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application. Neither is it a valid exercise of
police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of
permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are
ultra vires
Facts:
Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan
which the latter granted subject to several conditions, namely:
1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial
store;
2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients,
because these are functions of optical clinics;
3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first
been made by an independent optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical
clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, RayBan
and similar eyeglasses;
4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise RayBan and
similar glasses and frames; and
5. Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.
On December 5, 1998, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOPI) filed
a complaint against Acebedo before the Office of the Mayor, praying for the revocation
and/or cancellation of Acebedos permit for violation of the conditions set forth in its
business permit.
The Office of the Mayor, through City Legal Officer Leo Cahanap, conducted an investigation
regarding the complaint and found Acebedo guilty of violating all the conditions. It was
further recommended that Acebedo be disqualified from operating its business in Iligan
City.
City Mayor then sent a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit to
Acebedo.
Acebedo brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction against respondents (Mayor, Legal Officer and
SOPI) before RTC of Iligan City.
In Nov 1989, Writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted by RTC but the same was later
dissolved by the trial court.
In Jan 1991, CA dismissed Acebedos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
hence the present petition
Issue: W/N City Mayor has the power to validly impose several conditions in granting
business permits as a valid exercise of police power.
Held: NO
Respondents contend that as a valid exercise of police power, respondent City Mayor has the
authority to impose, as he did, special conditions in the grant of business permits.
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare
of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant
business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within
the ambit of this power.
[T]he power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process
and equal protection of the law.
While a business may be regulated, such regulation must, however, be within the bounds
of reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right.
In the present case, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to
engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to
engage in the practice of optometry.
A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of businesses and the Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession because
such a function is within the domain of the Professional Regulations Commission and, in
this case, the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
The conditions set by the City Mayor in the issuance of the permit, being ultra vires, has no
legal application. Respondent Mayor was ordered to reissue Acebedos business permit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR SP No. 22995 REVERSED; and the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to
 reissue petitioners business permit in accordance with law and with this
disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.
J. Kapunan, Concurring Opinion:
The scope of regulations of trades and occupation is determined by the principle that an
exercise of the police power must confer public benefit commensurate with the burden
imposed upon private rights and property, and the means adapted must be suitable to the
end in view, impartial in operation, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
J. Vitug, Dissenting Opinion:
A license or permit is not a contract between the sovereign and the granteefor a permit
to be impressed with a contractual character, it must be clearly demonstrated that the
very administrative agency, which is the source of the permit, can place that burden on
itself as such.
Lawrence v Texas by Damasco Ty, Don
(Male-Male anal)
Recit Ready:
Houston Police were dispatched to the private residence of petitioner in response
to a reported weapons disturbance. At the residence, the police saw that lawrence and
another male person were engaged in anal sex. They were arrested, charged, and then
convicted by virtue of the Anti-Sodomy Law. The constitutionality of such law is in question
before the Court.
The Law violates substantive due process. It undermines the liberty to engage in
private conduct. It seems to be arbitrarily promulgated in that it does not protect any state
interest. It demeans the lives of homosexual persons. Though a small crime, criminal
conviction carries accessory penalties such as notations on job application forms among
others.
Facts:
In Houston, Texas, police officers were dispatched to the private residence of petitioner
John Lawrence in response to a reported weapons disturbance.
The police observed Lawrence and another man engaged in a sexual act. They were
arrested and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.
The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with
a member of the same sex (man)."
The Texas Penal Code provides that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.
Petitioners exercised their right to a new trial in Harris County Criminal Court (Trial Court
yata nila) challenging the constitutionality of the statue as a violation of the equal
protection clause. This was rejected by the court.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the constitutional argument and affirmed the Harris
County Criminal Court decision. Decision was derived from Bowers (1986) - which held
that the right to privacy does not extend to private, consensual, homosexual sex.
Issue:
W/N Sodomy law violates substantive due process?
Held: Yes
Regarding Substantive Due Process
The Model Penal Code did not recommend or provide for "criminal penalties for consensual
sexual relations conducted in private." It justified its decision on three grounds: (1)The
prohibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing conduct many people
engaged in; (2) the statutes regulated private conduct not harmful to others; and (3)
the laws were arbitrarily enforced and thus invited the danger of blackmail.
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres. [Bowers] continuance as precedent demeans the lives
of homosexual persons.
The fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.
Individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this
protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons."
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners
(Lawrence) are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."
The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.
Regarding Equal Protection (OConnors concurrence)
The Law which seeks to criminalize male-male but not male-female sodomy is violative of
the equal protection clause. The sodomy law which is neutral in application may pass
as a constitutional law.
Thomas dissent
There is no relevant liberty in the Constitution which provides for consensual, homosexual
conduct.
CRUZAN v DIRECTOR
by Fellone, Mich
 DOCTRINE: The Right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraints or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law (Doctrine of Informed Consent). Patients generally possess the right not to
consent, that is, to refuse treatment. If the person is incompetent, a surrogate can exercise
this right. Surrogates action must be proven with clear and convincing evidence that they
conform to the patients wishes while she was still competent.
RECIT READY :
Petitioner Nancy Beth Cruzan sustained severe injuries in a car accident. She now lies in a
Missouri state hospital in a persistent vegetative state (a condition in which a person
exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function). After
some time, it was clear she would not recover and her parents (co-petitioners) decided to
remove the feeding tube that was keeping her alive. The state trial court authorized the
termination of death-prolonging procedures at the instance of the co-petitioners, stating
that she had the fundamental right under the state and Federal Constitutions to refuse or
direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures.
The Court also referred to the doctrine of informed consent, citing the statement Petitioner
made to her housemate that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life
unless she could live at least halfway normally. This suggested that she would not
continue on with her nutrition and hydration.
However, the SC of Missouri reversed the state trial courts decision, stating that the latter
did not observe the procedure that there has to be clear and convincing evidence that
the patient indeed wanted to stop life support and that the state policy strongly favors the
preservation of life.
PETITIONERS: Nancy Cruzan represented by her parents and guardian, Lester and Joyce
Cruzan RESPONDENT: Director of Missouri Department of Health, et al.
FACTS
Petitioner Nancy Beth Cruzan sustained severe injuries in a car accident. She now lies in a
Missouri state hospital in a persistent vegetative state (a condition in which a person
exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function). care.
Hospital employees refused, without court approval, to honor the request of Cruzan's
parents, copetitioners here, to terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration, since that
would result in death
. A state trial court authorized the termination, finding that a person in Cruzan's condition
has a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to direct or refuse the
withdrawal of death prolonging procedures, and that Cruzan's expression to a former
housemate that she would not wish to continue her life if sick or injured unless she could
live at least halfway normally suggested that she would not wish to continue on with her
nutrition and hydration.
The State Supreme Court reversed. While recognizing a right to refuse treatment
embodied in the commonlaw doctrine of informed consent, the court questioned its
applicability in this case. It also declined to read into the State Constitution a broad right to
privacy that would support an unrestricted right to refuse treatment and expressed doubt
that the Federal Constitution embodied such a right. The court then decided that the State
Living Will statute embodied a state policy strongly favoring the preservation of life, and
that Cruzan's statements to her housemate were unreliable for the purpose of determining
her intent. It rejected the argument that her parents were entitled to order the termination
of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume that choice for an
incompetent in the absence of the formalities required by the Living Will statute or clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.
ISSUE:
W/N the State of Missouri had the right to require "clear and convincing
evidence" in order for the Cruzans to remove their child from life support.
HELD/ RATIO:
YES.
The United States Constitution does not forbid Missouri to require that evidence of an
incompetent's wishes as to the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment be proved by clear
and convincing evidence.
A competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing
unwanted medical treatment
However, the question whether that constitutional right has been violated must be
determined by balancing the liberty interest against relevant state interests. For purposes
of this case, it is assumed that a competent person would have a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. This does not mean that an
incompetent person should possess the same right, since such a person is unable to make
an informed and voluntary choice to exercise that hypothetical right or any other right.
While Missouri has in effect recognized that under certain circumstances a surrogate may
act for the patient in electing to withdraw hydration and nutrition and thus cause death, it
has established a procedural safeguard to assure that the surrogate's action conforms as
best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent.
Missouri has a general interest in the protection and preservation of human life, as well as
other, more particular interests, at stake. It may legitimately seek to safeguard the
personal element of an individual's choice between life and death. The State is also
entitled to guard against potential abuses by surrogates who may not act to protect the
patient. Similarly, it is entitled to consider that a judicial proceeding regarding an
incompetent's wishes may not be adversarial, with the added guarantee of accurate
factfinding that the adversary process brings with it.
The State may also properly decline to make judgments about the "quality" of a particular
individual's life and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life
to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual. It is self
evident that these interests are more substantial, both on an individual and societal level,
than those involved in a common civil dispute. The clear and convincing evidence standard
also serves as a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed
between the litigants.
Missouri may permissibly place the increased risk of an erroneous decision on those
seeking to terminate lifesustaining treatment. An erroneous decision not to terminate
results in a maintenance of the status quo, with at least the potential that a wrong decision
will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated by an event such as an advancement
in medical science or the patient's unexpected death. However, an erroneous decision
to withdrawal of such treatment is not susceptible of correction. Although
Missouri's proof requirement may have frustrated the effectuation of Cruzan's
notfullyexpressed desires, the Constitution does not require general rules to
work flawlessly.
The State Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in concluding that
the evidence adduced at trial did not amount to clear and convincing proof of
Cruzan's desire to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn. The trial court had not
adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard, and Cruzan's observations that she did
not want to live life as a "vegetable" did not deal in terms with withdrawal of medical
treatment or of hydration and nutrition.
The Due Process Clause does not require a State to accept the "substituted judgment" of
close family members in the absence of substantial proof that their views reflect the
patient's.
 Nancy Cruzan's parents would surely be qualified to exercise such a right of "substituted
judgment" were it required by the Constitution. However, for the same reasons that
Missouri may require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes, it may also
choose to defer only to those wishes rather than confide the decision to close
family members.
Missouri SCs decision AFFIRMED. The requirement of clear and convincing evidence
is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Beltran v Secretary of Health
by Castigador, Niqui
RECIT READY:
RA 7719 or the National Blood Services Act was passed seeking to provide an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country. Commercial blood banks were ordered to be phased out.
Petitioners, directors of an association for commercial blood banks are assailing the
constitutionality of the Act on the ff grounds: it constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power, violates the equal protection and non-impairment clause, and it is not a valid
exercise of police power.
Court disagrees. RA 7719 is complete in itself, the standard being the promotion
of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood
donation. It does not violate the equal protection clause because all the bases for its
reasonableness were present. It constitutes a valid exercise of police power because the
promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State and attaining that
objective requires the interference of the State. It does not violate the non-impairment
clause provided by the Constitution because individual rights have to give way to police
power exercised for public welfare.
FACTS
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of
Blood Banks, an association composed of free standing blood banks.
RA 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was passed seeking to provide an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country and providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks
The law was passed after a study on the Philippine blood banking system by the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation deducing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood
Under RA 7719 petitioners were granted by the Sec of Health their licenses to open and
operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of
the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of
the act on the grounds that it (1) constitutes undue delegation of legislative power; (2) it
violates the equal protection by discriminating against commercial or free standing blood;
(3) it violates the non-impairment clause because the phase out of the commercial blood
banks will be disadvantageous to them; and (4) it is not a valid exercise of police power
ISSUES
WON RA 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
WON RA 7719 violates the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause
WON RA 7719 constitutes deprivation of personal liberty and property and is an invalid
exercise of police power
HELD: NO for all issues
RA 7719 was complete in itself because it is clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated
several measures to attain this objective. The law has sufficiently provided a definite
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is,
the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through
voluntary blood donation.
It does not violate the equal protection clause. Class legislation, discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basisbased on
distinctions, germane to the purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions and
applies equally to each member of the classand not made arbitrarily or capriciously is
permitted.
All of the reasonable bases are present in the law: It was based on substantial distinctions
non-profit blood banks operate for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service
while commercial blood banks are motivated by profit; germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather
than a commodity; Legislature intended for the general application of the law; law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
RA 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of police power. The promotion of public health is a
fundamental obligation of the State. The Act was enacted in the exercise of the States
police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Attaining the
objective of protecting public health requires the interference of the State given the
disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
It does not violate the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution. Settled is the
rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the government. Individual rights to contract and to property have to give way
to police power exercised for public welfare.
Ong v Sandiganbayanby De Jesus, Mark
Doctrine: Preliminary Investigation is a substantive due process right in
criminal proceedings. In this case however, while Forfeiture of property in RA
1379 may be considered penal in nature, its application is limited to public
officials. Therefore Nelly Ong, not being a public official, cannot claim the right
to preliminary investigation under RA 1379.
Facts:
BIR Commissioner Jose Ong was charged with violation of RA 1379 for allegedly
amassing properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income. He
was questioned on his acquisition of properties totaling to P21.47M when his
lawful income from public employment and other sources only amounted to
P1.06M. His annual salary was only P200K.
In his counter-affidavit, he explained that his properties were lawfully acquired;
these were from his P7.8M retirement pay from SGV & Co., money market
placements, proceeds of his loan from Allied Bank and one property was from
his brother-in-law.
The Office of the Ombudsman thereafter ordered him to submit in writing the
pertinent documents to prove his claim, i.e. documents on loan availment,
records of the retirement benefit, documents on money market placements and
ITR.
Instead of complying with the Order, Ong filed a Motion alleging that
questioning the Order for being violative of his right to be presumed innocent.
Motion was denied. In his petition before the SC, he raised the ff. relevant
ARGUMENTS:
a.RA 1379 is unconstitutional for disregarding the presumption of innocence
b.It also violates the right against self-incrimination

OSG: the presumption of innocence clause refers to criminal prosecutions and
not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions in rem. The Constitution is
likewise not violated by RA 1379 because statutes which declare that as a
matter of law a particular inference follows from the proof of a particular fact,
one fact becoming prima facie evidence of another, are not necessarily invalid,
the effect of the presumption being merely to shift the burden of proof upon the
adverse party.
Issue: WON there was a violation of due process when Nelly Ong was deprived
of Preliminary Investigation
Held: No. Forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379 are civil in nature and not penal
or criminal in character, as they do not terminate in the imposistion of penalty
but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the
State. Hence, unlike in criminal proceeding, there is to be no reading of the
information, arraignment, trial and reading of the judgment in the presence of
the accused. However, in the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, the Supreme Court
declared that forfeiture to the State of property of a public official or employee
partakes of the nature of a penalty and proceedings for forfeiture of property,
although technically civil in form, are deemed criminal or penal.
In this case, the preliminary investigation assailed by the petitioners are
anchored in the statutory privilege considered a component part of due process
in criminal justice. It is argued however, that even if RA1379 is considered a
criminal proceeding, Nelly Ong is still not entitled to a preliminary investigation
because the law itself withholds such right from a respondent who is not himself
or herself a public officer or employee, such as Nelly Ong
Manalo v PNP Chief (2007)
by Serpa Juan, Dustine
Doctrine: Restrictive custody which is, at best, nominal restraint is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpusit is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of
the remedy prayed for. Restrictive Custody is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the Philippine National Police (PNP) authorities that the police officers concerned
are always accounted for because although the PNP is civilian in character, its members
are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, PNP under the National Police
Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere with
valid acts of police officials. The police organization must observe self-discipline and obey
a chain of command under civilian officials.
Recit Ready:
This is a petition for habeas corpus due to the restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of petitioners, who are police officers from the PNP. The
petitioners are being implicated in the burning of an elementary school in Taysan,
Batangas during the 2007 national elections. The petitioners were formerly police
operatives assigned at the Regional Special Operations Group, PNP Region 4-A, Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. They were detailed at the Regional Headquarters Support
Group under a restrictive custody status at the same Camp, when their petition was
filed. On May 2007, 5 unidentified malefactors with high-powered firearms suddenly
appeared at the barangay Pinagbayanan Elementary School in Taysan Batangas. The said
school was converted into a polling area for the 2007 national and local elections. These
armed men forcibly entered the Polling Precinct 76-AS and poured gasoline over a ballot
box Then they fired several rounds of ammunitions at the premises. The conflagration
caused the death of a school teacher and a poll watcher while 9 others were injured as a
result of the fire. The petitioners were alleged to be the perpetrators due to several
statements from eyewitnesses. The PNP hierarchy issued 3 memoranda, which defines
and circumscribes the scope of petitioners restrictive custody status. Petitioners pray
that a writ of habeas corpus be issued, commanding the respondents to produce the
bodies before the Court, to explain the lawful cause of their detention and deprivation of
physical liberties and for the Court to adjudge their respective custody status as illegal and
to set them free.
The issue in this case is W/N the petitioners are unlawfully detained or restrained of their
liberty under restrictive custody status.
The Court held NO it is evident that petitioners are not actually detained or restrained of
their liberties. What was ordered by the PNP is that their movements, inside and outside
the camp be monitored. It is crystal clear that petitioners are free to go in and out of the
Camp as they please. The only limitation imposed upon them is that their movements
within the premise of the camp shall be monitored; that they have to be escorted
whenever the circumstances warrants that they leave the camp; and that their ETD and
arrival shall be entered in the logbook. Even petitioners themselves admit they are not
actually detained or imprisoned. Moreover, the restrictive custody complained of
by the petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that could call for the grant of
the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. Although the PNP is
civilian in character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief, PNP
under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction, review, overrule or
otherwise interfere with valid acts of police officials. The police organization must observe
self-discipline and obey a chain of command under civilian official
Facts:
Filed on August 7, 2007, this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus assails the
restrictive custody and monitored movements of petitioners SPO2 Geronimo Manalo, PO3
Leo Morcilla, PO3 Rico Landicho, PO2 Romeo Medalla, PO2 William Relos, Jr. P/Isp. Roberto
D. Marinda, by the PNP. Region 4-A, after they were implicated in the burning of an
elementary school in Taysan, Batangas at the height of the 2007 elections.
Petitioners were formerly police operatives assigned at the Regional Special Operations
Group, PNP Region 4-A, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. When their petition was filed,
they were detained at the Regional Headquarters Support Group at the same Camp under
a restrictive custody status.
Respondents Oscar Calderon, Geary Barias, Nicasio Radovan, Aaron Deocares Fidel, and
Luisito De Leon were, at the time of filing of the petition, the Chief of the PNP, the
Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management, the Regional Director, and Police
Sr. Superintendents, respectively.
On May 2007, 5 unidentified malefactors with high-powered firearms suddenly appeared at
the barangay Pinagbayanan Elementary School in Taysan Batangas. The said school was
converted into a polling area for the 2007 national and local elections. These armed men
forcibly entered the Polling Precinct 76-AS and poured gasoline over a ballot box Then they
fired several rounds of ammunitions at the premises,. The conflagration caused the death
of a school teacher and a poll watcher while 9 others were injured as a result of the fire.
The petitioners were alleged to be the perpetrators due to several statements from
eyewitnesses.
The PNP hierarchy issued 3 memoranda, which defines and circumscribes the scope of
petitioners restrictive custody status. The petitioners contend that the May 22, 2007
Memorandum; that although technically speaking, petitioners as PNP officer are not
detained or imprisoned, their physical movements are, however, limited only within Camp
Vicente lim, Calamba, Laguna, they cannot go home to their respective families and if they
could leave the Camp, they need to be escorted; that petitioners restrictive custody status
is illegal, and not sanctioned by any existing provision of our constitution and laws; that it
is degrading, summarily and arbitrarily imposed on the basis of mere suspicion and it
 actually makes PNP members enjoy lesser rights than what are actually enjoyed by
ordinary citizens.
Petitioners further posit that what is only sanctioned is preventive suspension under which
they can enjoy liberty and go home to their families pending administrative investigation.
Hence, they urge, this practice by the PNP organization should be put a stop.
Petitioners pray that a writ of habeas corpus be issued, commanding the respondents to
produce the bodies before the Court, to explain the lawful cause of their detention and
deprivation of physical liberties and for the Court to adjudge their respective custody
status as illegal and to set them free.
ISSUE/S
I. W/N the petitioners are unlawfully detained or
restrained of their liberty under restrictive custody status - NO
HELD:
The writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity, was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best
and efficient defense of personal freedom. The main thrust of the special proceeding of
habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of ones detention. More specifically, its vital
purpose is to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may
be imprisoned without sufficient cause and to deliver then from unlawful custody
The petition, on its face, fails to convince us that petitioners are actually and unlawfully
detained and restrained of their liberty. Sambong v. CA teaches us that for the writ of
habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. More importantly, the prime specification of
an application for a writ of habeas corpus is an actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. To the mind of the Court, petitioners are not
illegally and involuntarily deprived of their freedom of action.
Firstly, the assailed memoranda during the monitoring of their movements cannot be
considered as a form of curtailment of their freedom guaranteed under our Constitution.
Perusing the assailed memoranda, it is evident that petitioners are not actually
detained or restrained of their liberties. What was ordered by the PNP is that
their movements, inside and outside the camp be monitored in the following
manner, to wit:
a. All their movements within the camp should be mentioned
b. When the situation warrants their movement outside camp, they should be properly
escorted on one-on-one bases; and
c. A logbook should be maintained to record the accounting of said PCO and PNCOs, their
place of destination, name of escort, Estimated Time of Departure, and Estimated Time of
Return to Station
It is crystal clear that petitioners are free to go in and
out of the Camp as they please. The only limitation imposed upon them is that
their movements within the premise of the camp shall be monitored; that they
have to be escorted whenever the circumstances warrants that they leave the
camp; and that their ETD and arrival shall be entered in the logbook. Even
petitioners themselves admit they are not actually detained or imprisoned.
Secondly, the restrictive custody complained of by the
petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of
habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that could call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.
If said custodial procedure were not taken, respondent police
superiors themselves would have been exposed to charges of conspiracy,
negligence or laxity in the enffirece of internal disciline. If the petitioners get lost
are able to go abroad or figure in another untoward incident, respondents would
have to explain why they did not observe the needed precaution, else they would
also be administratively liable.
Clearly, placing the police officers facing a grave administrative
case under restrictive custody is a disciplinary measure authorized under the PNP
law. Thus, petitioners claim that their restrictive custody is an illegal practice not
sanctioned by any existing provision of our constitution and laws is not true. It
must fail.
Lastly, petitioners contend that placing them under restrictive
custody, they are made to suffer lesser rights than those enjoyed by private
citizens. On this score, the Courts pronouncement in Canson v. HIdalgo is
categorical. It was held there that although the PNP is civilian in
character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Chief, PNP under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by
injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere with valid acts of
police officials. The police organization must observe self-discipline and
obey a chain of command under civilian officials.
Lucen Grand Terminal v JAC Liner by Lu, Kyle
Doctrine:
Ordinances characterized by overbreadth, ordinances where there was a clear invasion of
personal or property rights but guised under police power, are unconstitutional.
The weight of popular opinion must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.
Recit-ready:
The City of Lucena enacted ordinances 1631 and 1178 to ease the traffic congestion by
only having 1 terminal for the city. Ordinances 1631 granted Lucena the franchise to
construct a common bus and jeepney terminal in the city of Lucena while barring the City
of Lucena to grant any third party the privilege or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus-
and/or jeepney terminal. Ordinance 1778 on the other hand prohibits the entrance of bus,
mini-bus, and jeepney to the city and directs them to the common city terminal. Moreover,
ordinance 1778 declared temporary terminals in the city as inoperable from the effectivity
of the ordinance. Respondent JAC liner was one of the affected parties by the ordinance for
it had maintained a terminal.
The RTC of Lucena ruled that section 4, the provision barring the City of Lucena to grand
concession to third parties of Ordinance 1631, as unconstitutional. Moreover, it ruled that
Ordinance 1778 as unconstitutional for an invalid, oppressive, and unreasonable exercise
of police power. The petitioner Lucena Grand Terminal appealed to the SC but the case was
referred to the CA by the SC. The CA affirmed the challenge orders.
ISSUE: WoN the city of Lucena properly exercised its police powers when it enacted the
subject ordinances. - NO.
The Court held that for a local government to validly exercise its police powers, there must
be a concurrence of a 1. lawful subject and a lawful method. In the case at hand, the lawful
subject was met for traffic congestion is a legitimate concern following jurisprudence.
However, the requisite of lawful method was not met because the questioned ordinances
were characterized by overbreadth or the violation of personal and property rights under
the guise of police power.
Facts:

The City of Lucena enacted ordinances 1631 and 1178 to ease the traffic congestion by
only having 1 terminal for the city. Ordinances 1631 granted Lucena the franchise to
construct a common bus and jeepney terminal in the city of Lucena while barring the City
of Lucena to grant any third party the privilege or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus-
and/or jeepney terminal. Ordinance 1778 on the other hand prohibits the entrance of bus,
mini-bus, and jeepney to the city and directs them to the common city terminal. Moreover,
ordinance 1778 declared temporary terminals in the city as inoperable from the effectivity
of the ordinance. Respondent JAC liner was one of the affected parties by the ordinance for
it had maintained a terminal.
The RTC of Lucena ruled that section 4, the provision barring the City of Lucena to grand
concession to third parties of Ordinance 1631, as unconstitutional. Moreover, it ruled that
Ordinance 1778 as unconstitutional for an invalid, oppressive, and unreasonable exercise
of police power. The petitioner Lucena Grand Terminal appealed to the SC but the case was
referred to the CA by the SC. The CA affirmed the challenge orders.
Issue:
WoN the city of Lucena properly exercised its police powers when it enacted the subject
ordinances. - NO.
Ruling:
The Court held that for a local government to validly exercise its police powers, there must
be a concurrence of a 1. lawful subject and a lawful method. In the case at hand, the lawful
subject was met for traffic congestion is a legitimate concern following jurisprudence.
However, the requisite of lawful method was not met because the questioned ordinances
were characterized by overbreadth or the violation of personal and property rights under
the guise of police power.
Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject
ordinances were
enacted: As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State, and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought
to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. The
questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of
the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the
indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city
proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses
obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or
help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals
lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers
on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of
terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are
unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which
might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all. The grant of an exclusive franchise to petitioner has not been shown
to be the only solution to the problem.
As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven
effective in easing traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue
different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were
measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
happen to be effective.
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operator v Manila by Tolentino, Hazel
Doctrine:
Standard of due process - responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience, and to
the dictates of justice.
Recit-ready:
The City of Manila enacted an ordinance to regulate hotels, motels, and lodging areas
within the city. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators assail the ordinance as
unconstitutional because it is unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, and violative of due
process. The Supreme Court, however, held that the ordinance was constitutional. This is
because due process has no controlling and precise definition. Its standard, both to
procedural and substantive due process, is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience, and to the dictates of justice. The ordinance fell within this standard because it
wasnt created with no reason - its purpose was to curb and prevent immoral and
illegitimate use of these premises.
Facts:
The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which allowed the city to regulate motels.
Petitioner Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators assail that the ordinance, specifically
section 1 and section 2 thereof, were unconstitutional for being unreasonable, arbitrary,
oppressive, and violative of due process.
Section provided that a Php 6,000 fee per annum would be charged to first class motels
while a Php 4,500 one would be charged for second class motels. It also required the
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of the hotel/motel/lodging area
to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest without having them fill up a prescribed
form that asked for the guests personal information.
Section 2, on the other hand, stated that certain minimum facilities (i.e. telephone in each
room, a dining room or restaurant, and laundry) was required of first class motels. It also
 stated that minors would not be allowed into these hotels without a parent or legal
guardian and that a room should only be leased twice every two hours.
Issue:
WON the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of due process.
Held:
NO, ordinance is constitutional and is not violative of due process. The Supreme Court said
that there is no controlling and precise definition of due process. Its standard, both to
procedural and substantive due process, is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience, and to the dictates of justice. In the case at bar, the court held that the
stipulations of the ordinance were not transgressions against due process. Neither were
they unreasonable nor arbitrary. This is because the ordinances intention was to curb the
opportunity for immoral and illegitimate use of hotels and motels, since they can be, and
are currently being devoted to such.
City of Manila v Laguio by Fabia, Johan
Doctrine: In exercising police power it should be prove that there is a general interest that
requires interference with public rights and that the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not duly oppressive upon
individuals
Recit Ready: THe case is about the ordinance No. 7783 which is about prohibiting the
establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of entertainment where
women are used as tools in entertainment in the Ermita Malate area, prescribing penalties
for the violations thereof and other purposes. This ordinance prohibits certain forms of
businesses like motels to conduct business around the area since it adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community. The ordinance prohibits granting or renewal of
licenses of the mentioned establishments and these businesses will be given 3 months to
wind up or transfer to other locations or change these businesses to allowed businesses.
Failure to do so would cause to fine and eviction.
Relevant Issues of the case
1. Mistake in the inclusion of motels and inns since they do not provide entertainment or
serve as facilities for amusement using women or annoy/ disturb the community .
2. The ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power (closing these
businesses has no relation to the municipal interests.
3. Confiscatory and consists of invasion of property rights
4. denial of equal protections clause by prohibiting motels and inns but not hotels, pension
houses and other similar establishments.
Main Issue
The ordinance infringes the due process clause: Recite first half of section 1
Substantive due process connotes whether the government has an adequate reason for
taking away a persons life, liberty or property.
1.
Essential Requisites of Police Power
2.
1.It must appear that interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a
particular class require an interference with private rights
2.The means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lacking in concurrence shall be struck down as arbitrary intrusion to private rights- a
violation of substantive due process.
It can only be attained by reasonable restriction on private rights and not absolute
prohibition. The closing, transferring or converting of businesses have no reasonable
relation with the accomplishment of its purpose.
These business are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the community like
that of places of ill repute. As long as immorality exists, you will just transfer the problem
and not solve it. Instead of regulating property, regulate human conduct.
(Please read the entire case The entire case is rich of sources of question about section
1. Worth basahin tbh.
City of Manila issued Ordinance no. 7783 which is about prohibiting the establishment or
operation of businesses providing certain forms of entertainment where women are used
as tools in entertainment in the Ermita Malate area, prescribing penalties for the violations
thereof and other purposes.
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation is engaged in the business of
hotels, motels, lodging and the like. They own Victoria COurt in malate which was
accredited by the DOT as a hotel.
Filed in the lower court a case against city council of Manila et al for the unconstitutionality
of the said ordinance. Judge Laguio of RTC of Manila issued an ex parte TRO and writ of
preliminary injucntion and afterwards rendered a decision which held that the ordinance is
null and void.
Filed a case in the supreme court.
Issues:
WON it contravenes the constitution especially article 3 Section 1 on right to life, liberty,
property and violation of due process.
Held:
Yes, it violates right to property since the means placed are restrictive/prohibitive even
though they are lawful pursuits.
It violates due process
The ordinance infringes the due process clause: Recite first half of section 1
Substantive due process connotes whether the government has an adequate reason for
taking away a persons life, liberty or property.
Essential Requisites of Police Power
It must appear that interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a
particular class require an interference with private rights
The means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lacking in concurrence shall be struck down as arbitrary intrusion to private rights- a
violation of substantive due process.
It can only be attained by reasonable restriction on private rights and not absolute
prohibition. The closing, transferring or converting of businesses have no reasonable
relation with the accomplishment of its purpose of removing the social ills like being of ill
repute. The means do not answer the goal of the ordinance.
These business are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the community like
that of places of ill repute. As long as immorality exists, you will just transfer the problem
and not solve it. Instead of regulating property, regulate human conduct. If you prohibit
any place where such immorality might exist, then every place might as well be restricted.
White Light v City of Manila by Hernandez, Justine
G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.
DOCTRINE
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.
The exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected
RECIT READY
Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 which prohibits short-time
admission, short-time admission rates and wash-up rate schemes in hotels, motels and
other similar establishments in the city. Malate Tourist and Development Corporation filed
a complaint for declaratory relief with a prayer for a TRO. White Light and other
corporations filed a motion to intervene and were granted. In order for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only comply with the procedure prescribed by law but it must also
conform with the following substantive requirements:
1. Must not contravene with the Constitution or any statute
2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy
6. Must not be unreasonable
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which includes
the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The object of
the ordinance is to curtail sexual behavior. However, governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. The Ordinance would
proscribe or impair other legitimate and lawful activities and uses of the wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of business profits. A reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking such, the ordinance must be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights.
FACTS
Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 which prohibits short admission
(admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or
the renting out of rooms more than twice a day).
Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint interventions on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in hotels and motels in Manila.
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDCs motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a
TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance. The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is
a legitimate exercise of police power.
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to
desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. A month later, on March 8, 1993, the
Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
The RTC noted that the ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the Ordinance. First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that
admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power
is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse
effect on the establishments is justified by the well being of its constituents in general.
Finally, as held in Ermita Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila,
liberty is regulated by law.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of
its guarantees to the people.
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of
sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments have
gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they
provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and seekers. Whether
or not this depiction of a miseen scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that
legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case.
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more
than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel
whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to
wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels
or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces
for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
ISSUE
W/N Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional as it violates substantive due process clause?
HELD
No, Ordinance 7774 is not a valid exercise of the police power. Ordinance No. 7774 is
violative of substantive due process clause.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment,
for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police
power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as
curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would
be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers
and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their
customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The
State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the
lives of its citizens.
However well intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
KMU v Dir Gen by Dy, Mon
Doctrine:
Right of privacy does not bat the adoption of ID systems by the Govt
Recit ready
PGMA passed EO 420 requiring all Govt agencies and GOCCs
which currently have ID systems to adopt a uniform data
collection and to harmonize their ID systems in the govt.
Petitioners claim that EO 420 is (1) a usurpation of legislative power by the President and
(2) it infringes on the citizen's right to privacy.
EO 420 is not unconstitutional due to infringement of right to privacy
- Has safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected.
- Right of privacy does not bar the adoption of ID systems by the govt
- Data collected is of confidential nature, not open to the public
Facts:
Two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus under
rule 65 or the Rules of court, seeking the nullification of Executive
Order 420 (EO 420) issued by Pres. GMA ,on the ground that it is
unconstitutional
EO 420 requires all govt agencies and GOCCs to streamline and
harmonize their identification systems (ID Systems) and authorizing for
such purpose the Director General and NEDA to implement the same
and for other purposes
PGMA directs them to adopt a uniform data collection and format for
their existing ID systems.
Was assailing EO 420 was unconstitutional because it usurped
legislative functions by the executive branch of the govt.
Was also assailing EO 420 because they alleged that it infringes on the
citizens right to privacy
Issue: Is EO 420 unconstitutional due to infringement of right to privacy
Held:
EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can
be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government
entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data
collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data
collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated not only as strictly confidential but also
personal matters. The data treated as "strictly confidential" under EO 420 being private
matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or
the press.
MMDA v Viron by Geraldez, Nico
Doctrine
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC,
and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the
one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or
cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative
entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the
one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
RR
Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport
System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA
cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus terminals that were threatened
to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation
units over their respective terminals Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of
police power. Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power,
let alone legislative power. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions,
the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence
it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It
follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the respondents terminals.
The exercise should have been done through the DOTC which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project
such as the Project in question.
Facts
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in
2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by
eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and
providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go
signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that
the MMDA didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing
so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924.
They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In
the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether
1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct
provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus
terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent
with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be
deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they be required to use
the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its
Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power";
that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the
power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the
E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable
controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions
or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of
Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication
from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their
bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government
agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property
along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by
the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not
between third persons.
Issue
WON the EO is Constitutional
Held
Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private
investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and
communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in
the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC,
and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the
one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or
cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative
entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the
one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies
concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of
all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to
enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of
authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been
validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the
contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the
safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of
vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs
to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow
of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from
that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance
of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better
than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions
of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose
such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the
public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or
privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct,
maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.
SEC v Interport by Bautista, Paolo
Recit ready summary
Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) approved a memorandum of agreement with Ganda
Holdings Berhad (GHB) to acquire 100% of the capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc.
(GEHI), which was to own and operate a 102MW power generating barge. The output of
this barge was then to be purchased by National Power Corporation for 5 years. In
addition, IRC was to acquire 67% of the caital stock of Philippine Racing Club.
According to SEC, IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of such negotiations. Also,
some of IRCs directors heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material information.
However, the CA issued a permanent injuction that stopped SEC from making further
investigations. According to the CA, the SEC failed to promulgate the IRR of Sec. 30 of the
Revised Securities Act (RSA) and thus, no action could be taken against IRC without
violating their right to due process and equal protection.
The SC reversed the CA decision and held that IRRs were not necessary in order to make
the Revised Securities Act binding and effective. The Court did not see any vagueness or
ambiguity in the RSA. Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to
promote full disclosure in the securities market and prevent unscrupulous individuals, who
by their positions obtain non-public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed
public. Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act prevented the unfair use of non-public
information in securities transactions, while Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the
transactions entered into by corporate officers and directors as regards the securities of
their companies. These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves. Their
requirements are specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are determinable.
Doctrine/Key takeaway
In relation to substantive due process, the Revised Securities Act intended to protect the
interests of the investing public by regulating the conduct of insiders who can potentially
manipulate the market through the non-public information that they possess. The Act was
capable of reasonabe construction and did not need any IRRs to make them binding and
effective.
Facts
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement
with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired
100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), 2 which would own
and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating barge. The agreement
also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National
Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-generating barge was 97% complete and
would go on-line by mid-September of 1994. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the
expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par
value of P488.44 million.3
On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club,
Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real estate property in Makati. Under the
Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of Companies in Malaysia, shall
extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI. 4
On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936,
when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC
pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions
involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised
Securities Act
Respondents claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when it ordered that
the respondents appear before the SEC and "show cause why no administrative, civil or
criminal sanctions should be imposed on them," and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to
the respondents.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision 19 on 20 August 1998. It determined that
there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or
any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly
violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the
SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may
possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to due process and
equal protection.
The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the
PED, which took effect on 14 April 1990, did not comply with the statutory requirements
contained in the Administrative Code of 1997. Section 8, Rule V of the Rules of Practice
and Procedure Before the PED affords a party the right to be present but without the right
to cross-examine witnesses presented against him, in violation of Section 12(3), Chapter 3,
Book VII of the Administrative Code
CA ruled that:
The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent and, accordingly, [SEC] is
hereby prohibited from taking cognizance or initiating any action, be they civil, criminal, or
administrative against [respondents]
Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO STATUTORY
AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER FOR PETITIONER SEC TO INITIATE AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY
CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGAINST RESPONDENT CORPORATION AND ITS
DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN
TRADING) AND 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE
REVISED SECURITIES ACT;
Held
Note: As the case was pending, the RSA was repealed by the Securities Regulation Code
(SRC)
I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the
enactment of implementing rules to make them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of
the Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had
against the respondents without violating their right to due process and equal protection.
This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and
binding. The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions
of law, where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given.
This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be
understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Sec. 30. Insider's duty to disclose when trading. - (a) It shall be unlawful for an insider
to sell or buy a security of the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect
to the issuer or the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider proves
that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party to the transaction (or his agent)
is identified, (a) the insider proves that the other party knows it, or (b) that other party in
fact knows it from the insider or otherwise.
The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and
undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the
protection of investors against fraud, committed when an insider, using secret information,
takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose material
information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his corporation. This
duty to disclose or abstain is based on two factors: first, the existence of a relationship
giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone; and second, the inherent
unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to promote full disclosure in
the securities market and prevent unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions obtain
non-public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed public. No individual
would invest in a market which can be manipulated by a limited number of corporate
insiders. Such reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities market. To
avert the occurrence of such an event, Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act prevented
the unfair use of non-public information in securities transactions, while Section 36 allowed
the SEC to monitor the transactions entered into by corporate officers and directors as
regards the securities of their companies.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that no
civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents in
connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the absence of
implementing rules. These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves.
Their requirements are specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are
determinable. In particular, Section 8 55 of the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward
enumeration of the procedure for the registration of securities and the particular matters
which need to be reported in the registration statement thereof. The Decision, dated 20
August 1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent IRC from such
requirements. The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of these
provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC from
exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation of Section 8 of the Revised
Securities Act.
 Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails,
Meralco v Lim by Sarte, Ross and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).
Doctrine
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
of Bulacan. Demanding that he be given full disclosure of the data or information about
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged
of the aggrieved party.
threat to her safety and security the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection.
Recit Ready:
By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their
Petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource staffing issued a
continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged
memorandum directing the transfer of respondent Roario G. Lim (Cherry Lim) from its
report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security
Bulacan sector to its Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa in light of the receipt of an anonymous
amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by
letter denouncing Cherry Lim and several threats and accusations directed against her by
habeas data.
unknown individuals. Cherry lim requested for a dialogue in order to voice her concerns on
the matter. She cited that the transfer was of a punitive nature and constitutes a denial
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
of due process. However, MERALCO did not entertain her request so she filed a petition for
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
a writ of habeas data with the RTC of bulacan praying to be furnished with information
regarding the accusations and threats against her allegedly received by MERALCO
RTC ruled in favor of respondent Lim. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that,
management. RTC ruled in her favor citing that writ of habeas data should not only apply
recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extralegal killings
to political activists or victims of extrajudicial killings but also ordinary private individuals
and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and
whose right to security is being threatened. Hence current petition. Petitioners go on to
security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on
point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only
the reported threats to her person. Hence current petition.
against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance
partys person, family or home and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not
of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities
engaged in such activities. SC ruled in favor of petitioner (MERALCO) citing that there was
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
no violation of the right to privacy in the case at bar and that to argue that
aggrieved partys person, family or home and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not
petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
engaged in such activities.
respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.

ISSUE: WON Petitioners violated Respondent Lim's right to privacy when they refused to
Facts
disclose information regarding alleged threats and accusations against her.
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
Held:
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Section 1. Habeas Data.The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
assigned, denouncing respondent. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of
act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged
MERALCO linesmen.
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Thereafter, Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, issued a
memorandum directing the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in
There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
Muntinlupa in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy visvis the
directed against her from unknown individuals.
right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a
Respondent, appealed her transfer with MERALCO's Human Resource Administration and
violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these
requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter,
threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlierquoted portion of her July
claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process.
 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at
all.18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the
real intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor related.
*More on Writ of Habeas Data
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons
for her transfera legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones
employmentare what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data
Pollo v Constantino by Mordeno, Gia
Doctrine
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Government employees are not exempt from searches imposed on them by their
government employers. In imposing such searches, the government acts as employers and
not as law enforces.
A search is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will produce
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Recit Ready
CSC Chairman David received a letter-complaint alleging that one of the employees in CSC
Region IV office was lawyering. David conducted a search in said office and retrieved files
from petitioner Pollos computer. Director Unite of CSC ROIV informed petitioner of the
investigation through text since Pollo was on vacation.
Pollo denied the allegations. He claimed that the search violated his right to privacy. He
pointed out that though the computer was government property, the temporary and
ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal use
CSC found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 and was dismissed from office.
Whether or not the legality of the search violated his right to privacy. NO.
The constitutional guarantee of right to privacy is not a prohibition of all searches and
seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.
As stated in American Jurisprudence, there must be a standard of reasonableness to
determine in the case of searches. Such standard weighs government interests against
employees reasonable expectation of privacy.
Petitioner failed to prove that he had reasonable expectation to privacy. His office was not
secluded and his computer did not have passwords to prevent access. On the contrary, he
mentioned that he allowed other people to enter his office.
A search is justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will produce
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Facts
CSC Chairperson David received a letter-complaint read that a person has been lawyered
by one of the lawyers in the Region IV office and that he is the chief of the Mamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na program.
David conducted an investigation and backed up all the files in the computes found in the
Mamamayan Muna and Legal Division. Director Unite of CSC ROIV texted petitioner of the
ongoing copying of computer files as petitioner was still on vacation. The computer files
contained draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and
other tribunals. David issued the Show-Cause Order dated January 11, 2007, requiring the
petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within 5 days from notice.
Petitioner denied the allegations. He claimed that the actions of the investigating team
violated his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though the computer was government
property, the temporary and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of
Reciept is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including
its use for personal use. He also claimed that files obtained without his consent were
inadmissible.
CSC issued Resolution No. 070382 charging petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713.
Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days. Petitioner was found guilty
of such charges and was dismissed from office
ON the issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioners computer, CSC ruled
that the warrantless search of the employees office was upheld as valid because a
government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an
investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception
and scope. Petitioner does not have reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the
computer he was using.
Issue
Whether or not the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the
copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent violated his constitutional
right to privacy
Held
The right of privacy is accorded in Sec. 2, Art III which provides
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court referred to the following cases:
Katz v. United States the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
made by petitioner in a telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a
search and seizure. The existence of privacy involved a two-fold requirement: (1) a
person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and (2) the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Mancusi v. DeForte recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy against intrusions by police
OConnor v. Ortega individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment right merely because they
work for the government instead of a private employer. Public employer intrusions should
be jduged by the standard of reasonableness where the government interests are weighed
against the employees reasonable expectation of privacy.
In applying standard of reasonableness, the Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that
he had an actual expectation of privacy in his office. He did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office, which he did not share with anyone. Instead, he maintains that
he allows other people to enter his office. He also does not use passwords to prevent other
employees from accessing his files.
 The CSC implemented Office Memorandum No. 10 which provides that employees have no
expectation of privacy in anything they store in the office computer and that the CSC may
monitor the use of the computer. Such negates petitioners claim to an expectation of
privacy.
The investigation conducted was work-related misconduct. A search is justified when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will produce evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.
Carpio - Separate Concurring Opinion
CSC regulations provide that any private use of a government property is prohibited by
law. A government employee cannot expect any privacy when he uses a government-
owned compute because he knows he cannot use the computer for any private purpose.
Constitutional guarantees of privacy and reasonable search are unavailing against
inspections or investigations stored in government-owned property.
CSC office regulation is infirm as it excludes CSC commissioners solely by reason of their
rank and not by the confidential nature of the electronic data they generate. CSC data are
comparable to SC decisions and they enjoy confidentiality. The classification of CSC
commissioners fails the equal protection analysis.
Bersamin - Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
In Ortega v. OConnor, a person is deemed to have a lower expectation of privacy in his
workplace. The decrease in expectation does not mean that there is no expectation.
In this case, even if there was no Office Memorandum regarding computer usage, the
petitioner has a reduced expectation of privacy. The issuance was meant to inform
employees of their limitations of privacy and the Commission has legitimate reasons to
monitor such.
The petitioner did not absolutely his right to privacy. OM No. 10 provides that employees
are allowed to use the computers for personal purposes after office hours provided that no
unlawful material are involved.
Petitioner has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding communications done after
office hours. Therefore, he can invoke his right to privacy regarding such communications.
Davids order to backup files should only cover those made during office hours.
Sto. Tomas v Paneda by Santiago, Monch
This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No. 152710, G.R.
No. 167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad,
sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from
regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the
Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that recruitment agency in
the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5
years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was passed in 1995,
hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies
should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars regulating the recruitment of
workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this
case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was
passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the
validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the definition
by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties
for simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing
inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of
at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file
the criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed.
PASEI argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of Court which
provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to
be in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this
automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative
of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said
provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the
RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-
licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they
commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who
engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of
the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said
penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the
law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself,
provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws.
Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an alternative venue for
violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make
them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they
were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
conduct of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her
parents received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the
Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and
placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen
was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of RA 8042), it
shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of
RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and solidarily liable
with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene.
They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not
automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily
and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows that they
were personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins
case.
De Lima v Gatdula
by Dalumpines, Mikey
Doctrine:
Writ of Amparo is an an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the
people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. It is issued as an
exercise of the Supreme Courts power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The procedure was devised to afford swift but
decisive relief due to the delicate and urgent nature of the controversies such as extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Recit Ready:
Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in RTC directed against De
Lima et. al. The case was filed to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake
ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to
the alleged ambush incident.
Judge Pampilo, instead of deciding whether the issuance of the privilege is proper,
required for De Lima et. al. to file an answer. Counsel of De Lima manifested that a
Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases. Judge Pampilo noted that
the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo case and the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. Judge proceeded with
the hearing of the case and required them to submit a memoranda.
On March 20, RTC granted the issuance of Writ of Amparo including the interim reliefs
prayed for. Motion for reconsideration applied for was denied thus, De Lima et. al. filed a
petition for Review on Certiorari via rule 45. Thus the issue whether the said petition for
review on certiorari is the proper remedy.
The court held that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an equitable and extraordinary
remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security. The procedure
was devised to afford swift but decisive relief due to the delicate and urgent
nature of the controversies. The judge/justice makes an immediate evaluation of the
facts alleged and decides if the issuance of the writ is proper. Return is required to serve
as responsive pleading to the petition and not an answer. Only after the return is filed
should the summary hearing proceed. Once allegations are proven, can the judgment of
issuance of the writ be made which is appealable via rule 45.
The four irregularities made by RTC led to the mode of appeal use to elevate the case to
court. Thus, the orders made by RTC were nullified and the case was remanded for Judge
Pampilo to decide in 48 hours whether the issuance of the writ of amparo is proper.
Facts:
Feb. 27, 2012
Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo in RTC which was directed against petitioners Justice Sec. Leila De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National
Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity).
petition was filed to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula
for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against
Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident.
Judge of the Case: Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.
Judge Pampilo 1) issued summons and ordered De Lima et. al. to answer. and 2) set
hearing to Mar. 1
Hearing
held allegedly for determining whether a TPO may be issued
counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an
Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases
Mar. 2
Judge Pampilo insisted [s]ince no writ has been issued, return is
not the required pleading but answer.
judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo
case and the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an
Answer
Mar. 7
proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case
ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five
(5) working days
Judge waited for their Answer before issuing the memorandum
since the period to file has not lapsed yet
Mar. 20
RTC decision
granted the issuance of Writ of Amparo
also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary
protection, production and inspection orders.
Oct. 8
RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration applied for
 Thus, this petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45 filed by the
petitioners.
Sec. 19 - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x x
Issue:
Can the petitioners avail of the petition for certiorari after the issuance of writ of amparo?
Held:
No
the Decision dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo
is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule hence Petition for
Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of
Amparo to put its procedures in the proper context.
Writ of Amparo
an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty
and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
issued as an exercise of the Supreme Courts power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
aims to address concerns such as extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances
the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief due to the delicate and urgent
nature of the controversies
it is initiated through a petition to be filed in RTC, SB, CA or SC.
the judge/justice makes an immediate evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition
and the affidavits submitted with the attendant circumstances detailed.
after evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately
dismiss the case
Dismissal: proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the
petitioners right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are
not unlawful
issuance of the writ: itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection
court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the
grounds for more permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.
Return
Respondents are REQUIRED TO FILE A RETURN, which serves as the responsive pleading to
the petition, after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court.
Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying the issues in the
case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If respondents are P. officials/employees -> required to state the actions they had taken
to:
1. verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
2. recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition;
3. identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance;
4. determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and
5. bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
Summary Hearing
only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition and whether interim
reliefs are warranted
if return is not filed > hearing will be done ex parte
court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision.
Granting the privilege of writ
once allegations are proven, such will be granted together with the proper reliefs
appropriate
judgment:
contains measures which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case
detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by
the respondents
this is the judgment SUBJECT TO APPEAL TO SC VIA RULE 45
Termination
After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied
In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life, liberty and security cease
to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment.
may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed either
criminal or civil.
the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the
protection of constitutional rights
Case at hand
Decision dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or
final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
This Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18
The Decision is thus an interlocutory order
The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be
granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered
Procedural Irregularities by RTC - irregularities that affected the mode of appeal used in
elevating the matter to court
1. Insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate
Return serves as responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy
remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to
be violated.
insisting on issuing summons and requiring an answer > utter disregard of the Rule of
the Writ of Amparo
Basis for requiring an answer: 1991 Revised Rules of Summary procedure applying only to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs, NOT RTC
also, writ of amparo is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING, not CIVIL or CRIMINAL. It is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.
hence, application of rules on summary procedure is misplaced
2. Holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a
Return - if there is no return, issues could not be properly joined
3. it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a
hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after.
 A memorandum, s a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading
usually required before the case is submitted for decision. This is a prohibited
One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit
4. Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed
for by the petitioner (give the impression that decision was a judgment)
PRIVILEGE of the writ of amparo is different from the ACTUAL ORDER called writ of amparo
Privilege: includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07912SC, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The judgment should detail the required acts from the
respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the
petitioners life, liberty or security.
Judgment granting the privilege of the writ can't be executed because it is tantamount to a
failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.
Judicial responses cant be tragically symbolic or ritualistic as granting the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo.
Counsels Responsibility: raise issues using the proper procedure at the right time.
Procedural rules: meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the
substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge himself who disregards the
rules of procedure, delay and confusion result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as Decision dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other
hand, is prohibited. Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave
injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by
the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the
Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
1. NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.
after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
2. DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within fortyeight (48) hours from his receipt of this
Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the
petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper
guidance together with a WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the
procedure set in A.M. No. 07912SC shall be meted with severe consequences.
Fernando v St. Scholastica by Yarra, Johan
Doctrine:
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance, in the exercise of police power, must
pass the ff. reqs (Social Justice Society v. Atienza Jr.): (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2)
means employed are reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. There must be concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method.
Recit Ready:
On Sept. 30, 1994 the City of Marikina enacted Ordinance 192 which contains the assailed
provisions in this petition (Sections 3.1 and 5). Section 3.1 requires that fences shall not be
more than 1 meter in height. Fences in excess shall be of an open fence type, at least 80%
see-thru. While Section 5 requires that in no case shall walls and fences be built within the
5-meter parking area allowance located between the front monument line and the building
line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions.
Primarily this was to provide a more effective and efficient enforcement of laws on public
safety and security, and to to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of
prohibited or unlawful acts. Other objectives include beautification etc.
This was enforced against herein respondent SSC who owns land property located in
Marikina Heights. Located within are SSA Marikina, residence of the sisters of the
Benedictine Order, etc. They refused to accede and thus filed before the RTC a petition for
prohibition and for writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. While petitioner claims a valid
exercise of police power, respondents contend that the ordinance is tantamount to an
appropriation of property without due process of law. RTC ruled in favor of herein
respondents and held that the petitioners cannot hide under the guise of police power to
avoid just compensation (for taking of property), and that the 80% see-thru fence could
run counter to privacy rights. The CA affirmed the lower court and held that Ordinance No.
192 did not justify exercise of police power as it was involved in the taking of respondents
property without due process of law. ISSUE: w/n Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance 192 are
valid exercises of police power by City Government of Marikina.
RULING: No. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity,
there are the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. Under the rational
relationship test, an ordinance, in the exercise of police power, must pass the ff. reqs
(Social Justice Society v. Atienza Jr.): (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) means
employed are reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. There must be concurrence of a lawful subject
and lawful method.
Setback requirement (Sec 5): The Court agrees with the CA that the real intention of
this rule is to set up a parking area not exclusively for respondents, as what herein
petitioners noted, but for public use. This contravenes Sec 9 Art 3 of 1987 Constitution, a
provision on eminent domain, which provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Also, anent the objectives of prevention of
concealment of unlawful acts and un-neighborliness, it is obvious that providing for a
parking area has no logical connection to and is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of these goals. Regarding the beautification purpose, it has long been
settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest
owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement: Section 3.1 also fails the rational relationship test.
The ultimate goal is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security
(lawful purpose). However, the means (has to be a lawful method) employed is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose. Petitioners have not
adequately shown that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection or serve as
a more satisfactory criminal deterrent than a tall solid concrete wall. In contrast, what
actually appears is that the respondents concrete wall has served as more than sufficient
protection over the last 40 years. It is then a clear encroachment on their right to property,
which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their property. Also
important is its invasion of privacy rights, considering that the residence of the
Benedictine nuns is also located within the property. Hence, Section 3.1 is invalid. Petition
GRANTED.
Facts:
Respondent SSC is the owner of 4 parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 sqm.
located in Marikina Heights. Located within it are SSA Marikina, residence of the sisters of
the Benedictine order etc (others not really relevant). Petitioners are officials of City
Government of Marikina. Its Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance 192 entitled
Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina. Sections
7 and 5 thereof were amended by the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 217 and 200
respectively.
It is an ordinance to empower Sangguniang Bayan to prescribe reasonable limits and
restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the municipality. Some of the
more relevant purposes as stated in its Preamble: (1) makes imperative the adoption of an
ordinance which shall embody up-to-date and modern technical design in the construction
of fences of residential, commercial and industrial buildings. (2) Whereas such technical
standards shall provide more efficient and effective enforcement of laws on public safety
and security (3) to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or
unlawful acts etc. The ASSAILED and pertinent provisions are:
(1) SEC 3.1 Fences on the front yard shall be no more than 1 meter in height. Fences in
excess shall be of an open fence type, at least 80% see-thru (2) SEC 5 In no case shall
walls and fences be built within the 5-meter parking area allowance located between the
front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and
educational and religious institutions.
Pursuant to the Ordinance, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to respondents
ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80%
see-thru, to move it back about 6 meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park.
However, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before RTC. They assert that
Ordinance 192 contravenes Sec 1 Article 3 since demolishing their fence and constructing
it 6 meters back would result in the loss of at least 1,808 sqm. worth about PhP9M and at
least 1954 sqm worth PhP9,770,100 along East Drive. It would also result in the
destruction of the buildings, facilities situated in the restricted area (PE area, multipurpose
hall, garbage room, etc). It is tantamount to an appropriation of property without due
process of law. Petitioners contend that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power
by virtue of which they can restrain property rights for the protection of public safety,
health, morals, or the promotion of public inconvenience and general prosperity.
RTC ruling (petition of herein respondents granted): Ordered writ of prohibition
commanding petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance
192. RTC agreed to respondents in the argument that the act of appropriation by the State
can only be executed through eminent domain as stated in the Constitution. Ruled that
they cannot hide under the guise of police power to avoid just compensation, and that the
80% see-thru fence could run counter to the right to privacy. It also found that the
respondents were able to prove that the danger to security had no basis in this case (tall
concrete walls were sufficient). Sec. 7 providing for retroactive application of the
Ordinance cannot be upheld since retroactivity should not impair substantive rights over
the perimeter walls and strips of land along the walls, along with the buildings thereon.
CA ruling (herein petitioners appeal denied): Affirmed RTC decision. Ordinance No. 192 did
not justify exercise of police power as it was involved in the taking of respondents
property without due process of law. Respondents were bound to lose beneficial use of
their structures, and total of 3762.36 sqm of property. Noted that although petitioners
complied with procedural due process, they did not do the same with substantive (failure
of respondents to attend public hearings to raise objections or question the validity of the
ordinance). CA found that real intent was to make the parking space free for use by public,
being outside of school premises.
Issue: Whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance 192 are valid exercises of police power by
City Government of Marikina.
Ruling: (We have already discussed police power and how its delegated to local
government units through their power to enact ordinances generally for the public
welfare). Meanwhile, the test of a valid ordinance still requires the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene Constitution or any statute, (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive, (3) must not be partial or discriminatory, (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade, (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, (6) must not be
unreasonable (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila)
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an
ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, there are the
rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. Using the rational basis examination,
laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate government interest.
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the
availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is
on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Ordinance 192 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the
City of Makatis purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights. Under the
rational relationship test, an ordinance, in the exercise of police power, must pass the ff.
reqs (Social Justice Society v. Atienza Jr.): (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) means
employed are reasonable necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. There must be concurrence of a lawful subject
and lawful method. Lacking concurrence, the police power measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
Setback requirement (Sec 5): The Court agrees with the CA that the real intention of
this rule is to set up a parking area not exclusively for respondents, as what herein
petitioners noted, but for public use. This contravenes Sec 9 Art 3 of 1987 Constitution, a
provision on eminent domain, which provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. In this case, there would be taking of 3,762.36 sqm
of respondents property for public use without just compensation. Also, anent the
objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and un-neighborliness, it is
obvious that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to and is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of these goals. Regarding the beautification
purpose, it has long been settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement: Section 3.1 also fails the rational relationship test.
The ultimate goal is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security
(lawful purpose). However, the means (has to be a lawful method) employed is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose. Why unreasonable?
Petitioners have not adequately shown that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better
protection or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent than a tall solid concrete wall.
It could even entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, as it would be easier to
bypass. In contrast, what actually appears is that the respondents concrete wall has
served as more than sufficient protection over the last 40 years. It is then a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide
how best to protect their property. Also important is its invasion of privacy rights,
considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property.
Hence, Section 3.1 is invalid. Petition GRANTED.
Ligot v Republic
by Polinar, Cass
Doctrine:
The effectivity of a freeze order may be extended by the CA for a period not
exceeding six months
Recit Ready:
An investigation by the Ombudsman has found herein petitioner Lt. Gen. Ligot and his
family to be in possession of more or less P54 million worth of undeclared properties and
bank accounts among many other things. Taking into consideration the fact that the
familys main source of income is drawn from Gen. Ligots salary as an AFP officer, the
same Ombudsman inferred that the Ligots abovementioned properties and assets were
procured illegally. It was found that Mrs. Ligots brother was in possession of some of their
properties, and has served as a dummy for the purposes of registration. It was also found
that the Ligot family was in possession of various bank accounts with several financial
institutions. Due to all of the foregoing, a freeze order was issued against them. The said
freeze order has a 20-day period of validity attached to it. Eleven days after its issuance, it
was extended for an indefinite period of time. The Ligots filed a motion to lift this freeze
order, assailing that it deprived them of their property without due process and punished
them before their guilt could be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This motion was denied
by the appellate court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a probable cause exists to support the freeze order issuance
2. Whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in the issuance of the indefinite extension of the freeze order.
HELD:
1. YES. Probable cause in this regard refers to the sufficiency of the relation between the
unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument in question. It was undisputed
that the Ligots harness their support solely from the salary of Lt. Gen. Ligot as an AFP
officer. His salary in this profession is not in line with the more or less P54 million found to
be in their name and possession. This finding is sufficient enough to be deemed as a
probable cause for the procurement of a freeze order in the instant case.
2. YES. In 2006, it was declared that freeze orders are only allowed a life span of six (6)
months. In connection with this, the issuance of an indefinite extension of the freeze order
filed against the Ligots is therefore illegal. This is because it has effectively denied the
Ligots of their substantive right to due process. Moreover, it has also effectively infringed
on their right to be presumed innocent.
Facts:
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Anti Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent ExParte Application for the issuance of a freeze order with
the CA against certain monetary instruments and properties of the Ligots under RA 9160
or the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001
Lt. Gen. Ligot served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 33 years and 2
months. He declared in his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) that as
of December 31, 2003, he had assets in the total amount P3,848,003.00 compared to his
SALN in 1982 which is only P105,000.00.
The Ombudsman also found that he and his family has other properties amounting
to P54,001,217.00, which are undeclared assets.
The Ombudsman declared that the assets registered in Lt. Gen.s name, as well as
his wifes and childrens names, to be illegaly obtained and unexplained wealth under RA
1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been
Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings
Therefor) considering that the main the main source of his income was his salary as an AFP
personnel and that his wife and children have lack of substantial sources of income.
They also have various bank accounts with several financial institutions
Yambao
Mrs. Ligots younger brother.
The records of the Social Security System (SSS) revealed that Yambao had been
employed in the private sector from 1977 to 1994.
Based on his contributions to the SSS, Yambao did not have a substantial salary
during his employment.
His company only had a net income of P5,062.96 in 2002 and P693.67 in 2003.19
Yambao had no record of any annual Individual Income Tax Return filed for the
calendar year 1999 up to the date of the investigation.
However, the Ombudsman found that he has real properties and vehicles under his
name amounting to P8,763,550.00 which he acquired from 1993 onwards.
o They also observed that in the documents it examined, Yambao declared three of the
Ligots addresses as his own.
CA: granted the application in its July 5, 2005 resolution, ruling that probable cause existed
that an unlawful activity and/or money laundering offense had been committed by Lt. Gen.
Ligot and his family, including Yambao, and that the properties sought to be frozen are
related to the unlawful activity or money laundering offense.
- It also issued a freeze order against the Ligots and Yambaos various bank
accounts, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of
issuance.
The Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing
that if the bank accounts, web accounts and vehicles were not continuously frozen, they
could be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement authorities and the governments
efforts to recover the proceeds of the Ligots unlawful activities would be frustrated.
CA: granted the motion extending the freeze order until after all the appropriate
proceedings and/or investigations have been terminated.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a probable cause exists to support the freeze order issuance
2. Whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in the issuance of the indefinite extension of the freeze order.
Held:
1. YES. Probable cause in this regard refers to the sufficiency of the relation between the
unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument in question. It was undisputed
that the Ligots harness their support solely from the salary of Lt. Gen. Ligot as an AFP
officer. His salary in this profession is not in line with the more or less P54 million found to
be in their name and possession. This finding is sufficient enough to be deemed as a
probable cause for the procurement of a freeze order in the instant case.
2. YES. In 2006, it was declared that freeze orders are only allowed a life span of six (6)
months. In connection with this, the issuance of an indefinite extension of the freeze order
filed against the Ligots is therefore illegal. This is because it has effectively denied the
Ligots of their substantive right to due process. Moreover, it has also effectively infringed
on their right to be presumed innocent.
Without doubt, the CA followed the law to the letter, but it did so by avoiding the
fundamental laws command under its Section 1, Article III.
These periods of extension are way beyond the intent and purposes of a freeze
order which is intended solely as an interim relief
a freeze order is meant to have a temporary effect it was never intended to
supplant or replace the actual forfeiture cases where the provisional remedywhich
means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an incident to the main actionof asking for the
issuance of an asset preservation order from the court where the petition is filed is
precisely available.
As a due process concern, we do not say that the sixmonth period is an inflexible
rule that would result in the automatic lifting of the freeze order upon its expiration in all
instances.
o An inflexible rule may lend itself to abuseto the prejudice of the States legitimate
interestswhere the property owner would simply file numerous suits, questioning the
freeze order during the sixmonth extension period, to prevent the timely filing of a money
laundering or civil forfeiture case within this period.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: we GRANT the petition (of Ligots) and LIFT the freeze
order issued by the Court of Appeals
Republic v Roque by Santiago, Monch
Key Takeaway:
Requisites for Declaratory Relief
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third ,
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an
actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth ,
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding
FACTS
On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition6 for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, 7 for being
void for vagueness;8 (b) Section 7,9for violating the right to privacy of communication and
due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships; 10 (c)Section 18,11 for
violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 12 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;13 (d) Section 26,14 for violating the right to travel; 15 and (e) Section 27,16 for
violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 17
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings, 18 averring that certain petitions (SC
petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality have been lodged before the
Court.19 The said motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007. 20
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision 21 in the Southern Hemisphere
cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss, 22 contending that
private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they
averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the
Southern Hemisphere cases.
In their Comment/Opposition,23 private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not
resolve the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions
were dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory
relief were met.
The RTC Ruling
On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order 24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss,
finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private
respondents petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order
dated July 31, 2012.26 The RTC observed that private respondents have personal and
substantial interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse
consequences of the aforesaid laws implementation considering that the case is of
paramount impact to the Filipino people.
ISSUE: WON Private respondents have met the requirememts for Declaratory
relief?
HELD:
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first, 35
second,36 and third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth
requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or
the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain
some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not
far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private
respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which
the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would
remain untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private respondents fear of
prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were
addressed to the general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these remarks
tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the
implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or
imminent threat to any of them.
BAP v Comelec by Hernandez, Justine
G.R. No. 206794. November 27, 2013
DOCTRINE
A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded. (Though the intent [i.e., to curb vote buying and selling] is
laudable, the means employed is not reasonably necessary and is oppressive on
an individuals rights.)
RECIT READY
COMELEC issued a Money Ban Resolution which prohibited the withdrawal of cash,
encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8 to
13, 2013 exceeding P100k, possession, transportation and/or carrying of cash exceeding
P500k, and that all withdrawals of cash or encashment of checks or series of withdrawals
or encashment of checks in cash involving a total amount exceeding P500k within 1
banking day from date of the publication of the resolution until May 13, 2013 shall be
presumed to be for the purpose of accumulating funds for vote buying and election fraud
and shall therefore be treated as a suspicious transaction under Republic Act No. 9160 or
the Anti Money Laundering Act of 2001
The petitioners also claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates a number of
constitutional rights. The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process of law. The Money Ban Resolution violates an
individuals due process rights because it unduly and unreasonably restricts and prohibits
the withdrawal, possession, and transportation of cash
Though the intent (i.e., to curb vote buying and selling) is laudable, the means employed is
not reasonably necessary and is oppressive on an individuals rights.
The Comelec defends the Money Ban Resolution as a reasonable measure that is not
unduly oppressive on individuals. It merely limits transactions involving cash (withdrawal,
encashment, possession, etc.), but does not affect other noncash transactions such as
those involving checks and credit cards. Hence, only the medium or instrument of the
transaction is affected; the transaction may proceed using noncash medium or instrument.
There is, therefore, no impairment of rights and contracts that would invalidate the Money
Ban Resolution.
FACTS
The petitioners, Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe, assail the
constitutionality and legality of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelecs)
Resolution No. 96881 dated May 7, 2013, entitled In the Matter of Implementing a Money
Ban to Deter and Prevent Vote Buying in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections (Money Ban Resolution).
The Assailed Resolution
Under the Money Ban Resolution, the Comelec resolved:
1. To prohibit the withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary
instrument into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013 exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00)
2. To prohibit the possession, transportation and/or carrying of cash exceeding Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
3. All withdrawals of cash or encashment of checks or series of withdrawals or encashment of
checks in cash involving a total amount exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) within one (1) banking day from date of the publication of this resolution
until May 13, 2013 shall be presumed to be for the purpose of accumulating funds for
vote buying and election fraud and shall therefore be treated as a suspicious transaction
under Republic Act No. 9160 or the Anti Money Laundering Act of 2001 as amended by
Republic Act No. 9194
The petitioners also claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates a number of
constitutional rights.
The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property
without due process of law.9 The Money Ban Resolution violates an individuals due
process rights because it unduly and unreasonably restricts and prohibits the withdrawal,
possession, and transportation of cash. The prohibition effectively curtails a range of
legitimate activities, and hampers and prejudices property rights. Though the intent (i.e.,
to curb vote buying and selling) is laudable, the means employed is not reasonably
necessary and is oppressive on an individuals rights. The limitation on withdrawal also
goes against the non impairment clause because the prohibitions and restrictions impair
the bank's contractual obligations with their depositors.
Finally, the petitioners claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates the constitutional
presumption of innocence because it declares that all cash being transported and carried
exceeding [P500,000.00] shall be presumed for the purpose of vote buying and electoral
fraud in violation of the money ban.10 There is no logical connection between the proven
fact of possession and transportation of an amount in excess of P500,000.00 and the
presumed act of vote buying because there are many other legitimate reasons for the
proven fact.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Money Ban Resolution is unconstitutional as it violates the individuals
due process rights?
HELD
The Comelec lastly defends the Money Ban Resolution as a reasonable measure that is not
unduly oppressive on individuals. It merely limits transactions involving cash (withdrawal,
encashment, possession, etc.), but does not affect other noncash transactions such as
those involving checks and credit cards. Hence, only the medium or instrument of the
transaction is affected; the transaction may proceed using noncash medium or instrument.
There is, therefore, no impairment of rights and contracts that would invalidate the Money
Ban Resolution.
Manila Memorial Park v DSWD (Dec 3, 2013)by Mordeno, Gia
J. Del Castillo
Doctrine
Police power has primacy over property rights.
In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the
use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public
welfare.
in this case, there was a regulation to promote the welfare of the elderly to
which the Constitution affords preferential concern.
Recit Ready
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7432 as amended by RA 9257 and the IRR of
the DSWD and DOF. The IRR of the DSWD and DOF provides that the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as the deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted.
Petitioners posit that the IRR contravene Sec. 9, Art III of the COnstitution which provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. They
claim that the 20% discount is an exercise of eminent domain which requires a
reimbursement.
Whether or not RA 7432 is an exercise of police power or eminent domain
yes. Eminent domain, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private
property for public use such an exercise requires just compensation. Police power, on the
other hand is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty
and property for public welfare. In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired
by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to
promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of
just compensation is not required.
The 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishment to price their
products and services towards senior citizens for which the Constitution affords
preferential concern. This affects the income of a private establishment. It is not meant to
burden the properties of the establishment but regulate the pricing of goods. Such
regulation is an exercise of police power.
Whether or not RA 7432 conforms with the standards of police power
YES. The discount has not been shown to be unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory.
There has no evidence to establish that such discount would render petitioners to operate
at a loss due to the regulation.
Manila Memorial Park v DSWD
by Sarte, Ross
Doctrine
Police power may be used to regulate or restrain the use of property so long is its exercise
is not arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory
Facts
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens 20% discount in
different establishments such as hotels, restaurants, drug stores, etc. provided that private
establishments may claim the cost of the discount as TAX CREDIT.
On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 amended certain provisions of RA 7432. Particularly,
Section 4 which granted the tax credit to establishments for discounts given to senior
citizens. In the new Section 4 under RA 9257 the tax credit initially given to petitioners,
was substituted with a TAX DEDUCTION scheme.
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4 2006
and the DSWD likewise issued its own Rules and Regulations.

Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the present recourse,
praying that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257, and the implementing rules
and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. In support of their position, petitioners cite Central Luzon
Drug Corporation (court would later on rule that this was a mere obiter) where it was ruled
that the 20% discount privilege constitutes taking of private property for public use which
requires the payment of just compensation and Carlos Superdrug Corporation v.
Department of Social Welfare and Development, where it was acknowledged that the tax
deduction scheme does not meet the definition of just compensation.
Petitioners' contentions rest on the theory that the discount is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain, the valid exercise of which has different standards from that of the police
power. If it is police power, no just compensation is warranted. But if it is eminent domain,
the tax deduction scheme is unconstitutional because it is not a peso for peso
reimbursement of the 20% discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it constitutes taking of
private property without payment of just compensation.
Issue(s):
1. Whether the assailed section 4 of RA 9257 and its implementing rules or regulations
constitutes an exercise of the power of eminent domain or police power.
2. If the latter, does the assailed provision concur with standards required for a valid
exercise of police power?
Held:
1. Exercise of Police Power, NOT Eminent Domain
Eminent domain, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate private property
for public use such an exercise requires just compensation. Police power, on the other
hand is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and
property for public welfare. In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by
regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote
public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just
compensation is not required. The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be
reasonable, not oppressive.The State is authorized to interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare as long as the
interference is reasonable and not arbitrary.
The issue has been previously settled in the Carlos Superdrug Corporation that the 20%
discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State.
The obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, however, describes the 20% discount as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain and the tax credit, under the previous law,
equivalent to the amount of discount given as the just compensation therefor. It
presupposes that the subject regulation, which impacts the pricing and, hence, the
profitability of a private establishment, automatically amounts to a deprivation of property
without due process of law. If this were so, then all price and rate of return on investment
control laws would have to be invalidated because they impact, at some level, the
regulated establishments profits or income/gross sales, yet there is no provision for
payment of just compensation. It would also mean that government cannot set price or
rate of return on investment limits, which reduce the profits or income/gross sales of
private establishments, if no just compensation is paid even if the measure is not
confiscatory. The obiter is, thus, at odds with the settled doctrine that the State can
employ police power measures to regulate the pricing of goods and services, and, hence,
the profitability of business establishments in order to pursue legitimate State objectives
for the common good, provided that the regulation does not go too far as to amount to
taking.
Further, the subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are
traditionally regarded as police power measures. These laws generally regulate public
utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect consumers
from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed by controlling
the rate of return on investment of these corporations considering that they have a
monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the general public.
2. The 20% senior citizen discount has not been shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory.
Court adopted a similar line of reasoning in Carlos Superdrug Corporation when we ruled
that petitioners therein failed to prove that the 20% discount is arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory. We noted that no evidence, such as a financial report, to establish the impact
of the 20% discount on the overall profitability of petitioners was presented in order to
show that they would be operating at a loss due to the subject regulation or that the
continued implementation of the law would be unconscionably detrimental to the business
operations of petitioners. In the case at bar, petitioners proceeded with a hypothetical
computation of the alleged loss that they will suffer similar to what the petitioners in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation did. Petitioners went directly to this Court without first
establishing the factual bases of their claims.
Carpio Dissent:
1. Justice Carpio believes that the allowable taking of property in police power is limited to
the taking of property in order to be destroyed or placed outside the commerce of man in
the interest of the general welfare. However, Justice Del Castillo refutes this argument by
stating that there is another class of police power measures which does not involve taking
of property but mere regulation. The minimum wage law, zoning ordinances, price control
laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours to
eight, and the like would fall under this category.

2. Justice Carpio also believed that the permanent reduction in a private establishments
total revenue, arising from the mandatory discount, is a taking of private property for
public use or benefit, hence, an exercise of the power of eminent domain requiring the
payment of just compensation. He regards the 20% discount as part of the gross sales
and, hence, private property belonging to business establishments. However, as previously
discussed, the 20% discount is not private property actually owned and/or used by the
business establishment. It should be distinguished from properties like lands or buildings
actually used in the operation of a business establishment which, if appropriated for public
use, would amount to a taking under the power of eminent domain. Instead, the 20%
discount is a regulatory measure which impacts the pricing and, hence, the profitability of
business establishments.
Velasco Concurring
RA 7432 is a regulation of the right to profits of certain taxpayers in order to benefit a
significant sector of society. It is a valid exercise of police power.
The right to profit is not subject to expropriation. It is a right solely within the discretion of
the taxpayers that cannot be appropriated by the government.
The 20% discount is only realized upon the purchase of senior citizens and it is not vested
with the taxpayer before the purchase. Therefore, there is no taking of property.
Legaspi v City of Cebu
by Yarra, Johan
Facts:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance
No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic
Code of Cebu City).
The pertinent provisions read:
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES. Any vehicle found violating any provision of
any existing ordinance of the City of Cebu which prohibits, regulates, or restricts the
parking of vehicles shall be immobilized by clamping any tire of the said violating vehicle
with the use of a Denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other gadget designed to
immobilize motor vehicles. For this articular purpose, any traffic enforcer of the City (PNP
or from Cebu City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to immobilize
any violating vehicle as herein above provided.
Penalties, besides those in accordance with the penalties imposed in the ordinance (801,
or any other existing ordinance) so violated, include the payment of fines and receipts
presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau (Traffic Violations Bureau) responsible
for the release of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise released by any of the
following officers (CITOM Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology Chairman,
Asst. City Fiscal Belcina), towing to the impounding area for unattended immobilized
vehicles that constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic, etc.
Atty. Bienvienido Jaban and his son Jaban, Jr. brought suit in the RTC of Cebu City against
herein respondents seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for
being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages. They claim
that there were instances when they properly parked their car in areas where their car was
immobilized by a steel clamp and forced to pay the fines without any court hearing and
without due process of law (not informed of the reason for the immobilization). Legaspi,
likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu to demand delivery of personal property,
declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City and damages. His car was also
clamped by the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM) representatives after leaving
it occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make
way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be allowed to unload his
materials and equipment from the front of the residence. While unloading he went inside
the house to answer a phone call and upon returning after a short while, his son in law
informed him that unknown persons had clamped the front wheel of his car. And that
subsequently, it was towed even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic. On the other
hand, the City of Cebu and its co-defendants presented similar defenses, essentially
stating that the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law, and that Ordinance No. 1644
enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and validity.
Ruling of RTC: Declared the assailed ordinance as null and void, and granted awards for
damages to Legaspi and to Jaban Sr. and Jr. Due process contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting ones person or property
(Daniel Webster). The taking or deprivation of ones life, liberty or property must be done
upon and with observance of the due process clause of the Constitution and non-
observance thereof is unconstitutional. Under Ordinance No. 1644, the owner shall have to
undergo all these ordeals (clamping, impoundment, towing, payment of penalties and for
release) at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance mandates, is the
arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector. The owner of the immobilized motor
vehicle is deprived of his right to the use of his/her vehicle and penalized without a
hearing by a person (traffic enforcer, PNP personnel or Cebu City traffic law enforcement
personnel) who is not legally or duly vested with such rights, power or authority.
Ruling of the CA: Overturned the RTC and declaring Ordinance No. 1644 as valid. It is
deemed a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
City of Cebu granted to it by the Local Government Code. The ordinance is designed to
improve traffic conditions in Cebu City and thus shows a real and substantial relation to
the welfare, comfort, and convenience of the people of Cebu. It is not in violation of those
restrictions as declared in Salaveria (must be reasonable, consistent with national laws and
policies, not discriminatory).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: The issues are w/n Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the
legislative powers of Cebu City, and w/n the ordinance complied with the requirements for
validity and constitutionality.
Ruling: The petitions have no merit.
Remember the tests for a valid ordinance stated in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. The formal
test (whether ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether
it was passed in accordance with procedure prescribed by law) and the substantive:
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
2. must not be unfair or oppressive
3. must not be partial or discriminatory
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. must be general and consistent with public policy
6. must not be unreasonable
First as to the compliance of Ordinance No. 1644 with the formal requirements (formal
test), the answer is in the affirmative. Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law
for the delegation to the various LGUs of the States great powers, namely: the police
power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. In particular, police
power is unquestionably the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make,
ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the
same (Commonwealth v. Alger). In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of
delegated police power. Refer to the pertinent provisions of the LGC:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition.
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Sec. 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities shall:
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public
places
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon
and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of
encroachments
The Congress delegated to the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of
traffic congestions. Indeed, the LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traffic
codes because of their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their communities. Their
traffic regulations must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the constitutional
limitations and statutory safeguards.
Second as to compliance with the substantive requirements. The due process clause of
the Constitution can further be divided into two: procedural and substantive. Procedural
due process refers to the procedures that government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property (notice and hearing) while substantive due process asks
whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or
property. In this case, the contentions of the Jabans and Legaspi (no formal court hearing
before penalizing, sole discretion given to traffic enforcers) as also favored by the RTC
ruling, cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the
substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy.
The terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad
enough to include illegally parked vehicles, to ensure a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in
all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times (Section 1). Considering that traffic
congestions were already retarding growth and progress of the country, the plain objective
of Ordinance No, 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare of
Cebu City.
On fairness and reasonableness. On the assertion that the owners affected were not
accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, impounding of vehicles, or even
to be heard and to explain prior to the immobilization, thereby making the ordinance
oppressive and arbitrary, the Supreme Court disagrees. Firstly, any driver or vehicle owner
penalized could actually protest such action to the Chairman of CITOM, among other
officials named in Ordinance 1664 itself (Sec. 3). The release could be ordered by any of
such officials at no cost. That none of the petitioners resorted to such recourse did not
diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance.
Secondly, the rationale behind clamping was only to prevent the transgressor from using
the vehicle to escape due sanctions. It is not necessary if the driver or owner was around
at the time of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. Lastly, the towing away
was designed only to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic so as to
ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of
his property.
On procedural due process (notice and hearing). The clamping of petitioners vehicles
pursuant to Ordinance No. 1664 was of the same character as the established exceptions
(cancellation of a passport of a person being sought for commission of a crime, preventive
suspension of a civil servant, arrest of a person in flagrante delicto, etc.) dispensing with
notice and hearing. The immobilization was again necessary because the transgressors
were not around at the time of apprehension. Nevertheless, the chance to reverse the
apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing.
Petition denied, CA affirmed.
Remman Enterprises v PRB by Dalumpines, Mikey
Doctrine:
No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade
has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of
the State particularly when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental
functions, the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals. To
pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to
ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the
practice of various trades or professions.
Recit-ready:
RA 9464 or Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines was signed into law which aims to
professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners in the country. REI and
CREBA, real estate developers, filed a petition to declare said law as void and
unconstitutional because: 1) violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real
estate developers most basic ownership rights 2) violates the equal protection clause as
no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group
mentioned. These issues were brought to SC, however were found to be of no merit. It
does not violate the DPC since there is no restriction on their use and enjoyment of
property is caused by the implementation but only an added restriction to secure the
services of a licensed real estate broker which is within the police power of legislature. As
to the EPC, there was also no violation since the classification is reasonable and relevant to
its legitimate purpose. Thus the petition was denied.
Facts:
RA No. 9646 Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines
signed into law June 29, 2009 by PGMA
aim: professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing,
registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners in the country
 authority: from DTI through Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection -> now
transferred to PRC through Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)
created under this law
IRR of RA 9464
- promulgated on July 21, 2010
Dec. 7, 2010 - Remman Enterprises Inc. (REI) and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA), both real estate developers, instituted Civil Case in RTC of Manila to
declare as void and unconstitutional the certain provisions of the said law:
Sec. 28 (a) with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;
Sec. 29 unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure examination given by the
Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid certificate of
registration, and professional identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly
issued to him/her by the Board and the Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers
and private appraisers, they have paid the required bond as hereto provided.
Sec. 32 No partnership or corporation shall engage in the business of real estate service
unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the
persons authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all duly registered and
licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants
Sec. 32 (b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in
marketing or selling any real estate development project in the regular course of business
must be headed by full time registered and licensed real estate brokers.
Petitioners alleged that RA 9646:
1. violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution that [e]very bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof
2. is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 - transferred e. jurisdiction of NHA
to HLURB in regulating the real estate trade and business
3. violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers most basic
ownership rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428
of the Civil Code
4. Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial
distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned
since both are property owners dealing with their own property.
Summary hearing: trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
RTC decision: Petition denied. Responses per issue raised:
1. assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate the
practice of real estate service in the country by ensuring that those who engage in it shall
either be a licensed real estate broker, or under the latters supervision
2. found no real discord between E.O. No. 648 and R.A. No. 9646 as the latter does not render
nugatory the license to sell granted by the HLURB to real estate developers, which license
would still subsist. DIFFERENCE with new law: real estate developers will now be compelled
to hire the services of one licensed real estate broker for every twenty salespersons to
guide and supervise the coterie of salespersons under the employ of the real estate
developers.
3. questioned provisions do not preclude property owners from using, enjoying, or disposing
of their own property because they can still develop and sell their properties except that
they have to secure the services of a licensed real estate broker who shall oversee the
actions of the unlicensed real estate practitioners under their employ.
4. does not violate equal protection clause because exemption of real estate developers was
anchored on reasonable classification aimed at protecting the buying public from the
rampant misrepresentations and to prevent unscrupulous and unethical real estate
practices from flourishing
Hence appeal with SC:
Issue/s:
(I included the equal protection clause issue kahit part ng substantive due process tong
case just to be sure)
1. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of
real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and
2. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural
or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their
own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause
Held:
Petition has no merit
NO VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
Argument of Petitioners: assailed provisions are unduly oppressive and infringe the
constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law. It becomes
burdensome for real estate developers to employ licensed real estate brokers to
sell, market and dispose of their properties.
Such contention has no basis.
There is no deprivation of property because there is no restriction on their use and
enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation
alleged burden is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure
The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as
a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State particularly when
their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation
of the State, public health and welfare and public morals.
Where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider.
Through the law, legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks
of real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical
standards as real property transactions are susceptible to manipulation and corruption,
especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons working under an ineffective
regulatory system.
R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the States police power.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object
Police Power
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same
would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will
suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.
 For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
NO VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Argument of Petitioners: this provision (the one exempting natural and juridical persons
from its coverage and and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in
insolvency on bankruptcy proceedings) violates the equal protection clause because it
unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from those exempted persons who
also own properties and desire to sell them. No substantial distinctions exist between
ordinary property owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more
capable of entering into real estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed
real estate brokers.
We sustain the trial courts ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection
clause.
Ichong v. Hernandez on equal protection of the law clause
it is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
not intended to prohibit legislation,
does not demand absolute equality but it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within such class,
and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
EPC does not forbid classification but it is imperative that the classification be based on
real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation
EPC not violated if classification is:
germane to the purpose of the law,
concerns all members of the class, and
applies equally to present and future conditions,
To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and manipulations
perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,
P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate development projects.
Legislature recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to ALL
real estate service practitioners including and more importantly, those real estate service
practitioners working for real estate developers.
2 kinds of sellers: 1) individual or entities having isolated transactions over their own
property and 2) real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the
ordinary course of business
Due to the substantial distinction between ordinary property owners, who are exempt, and
real estate developers, court held that the classification is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose.
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management:
all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law
may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional
(Since no strong basis was given to destroy constitutionality > law remains valid)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10124776 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
UE v Pepanio
by Fabia, Johan
NOTE: better to use postgraduate degrees than masters
Doctrine : The operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The
government has a right to ensure that the only qualified persons, in possession of
sufficient knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions.
Government regulation in the field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only
the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the
required specific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or
to possess postgraduate degrees as a prerequisite to employment.
Recit Ready:
This case is about the employment status of college teachers with no postgraduate
degrees. In 1992, DECS required college teachers to have postgraduate degrees as
minimum educational qualification to attain regular status. In 1994, a CBA was passed
giving those who doesnt have the requirement sem to sem probationary appointments.
Bueno and Pepanio are given some time by the dean to furnish the said requirements but
the respondents failed to do so. When they failed to get an extension, respondents claim
that according to the old CBA, they should be treated as regular employees since they
have 6.5 and 3.5 years of full load. UE denied their claims thus they filed a case of illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbitrators against UE. The labor arbitrators found UE guilty of
illegal dismissal which prompted UEs appeal to NLRC. NLRC commented that the old CBA
did not grant them the right to be regularized making the masters requirement under the
manual of regulations necessary. Thus they appealed to the Supreme court. Pepanio et al
alleged that the 1994 CBA is in place which requires only full time, three consecutive years
of service and satisfactory service as sufficient to be regularized. They failed to realize that
the manual of regulations requiring the masters degree is already in place during 1992.
CBA may take a form of a contract but it should not be against public policy. Educational
institutions involve public interest, CHED being authorized to set minimum standards for
tertiary education makes the necessity of requiring masters degree valid. It is to protect
the public from ill equipped teachers who are lacking in the specific required scientific or
technical knowledge. Regulation valid.
Facts:
Bueno and Pepanio are teachers in UE
1994 CBA says that they need to have served for 3 straight years, full time and
satisfactory service to be regular
Pepanio was hired 2000 while Bueno 1997
2001 CBA requires them to have postgraduate degrees so they were given some time to
pursue these degrees
They failed to get these requirements despite numerous extensions.
They allege illegal dismissal because they were not given any laod.
They made the defense that 1994 CBA gave them the right already enjoyed and its the
CBA that is applicable to them not the 2001 CBA.
They won with the labor arbiters
Lost with NLRC
Thus they come to SC.
Issue: WON the manual of regulations which contains the requirement of having a masters
degree is valid to be regularized is valid
Held: YES
The manual was created 1992. It was before 1994 making that CBA against public policy.
Tertiary education is vested with public interest. Only qualified persons are allowed to
 teach in educational institutions. In tertiary education, it is reasonable to have masterals
since CHED has to protect the public from ill equipped teachers lacking the specific
knowledge and skills.
Garcia v Drilon
by Polinar, Cass
Doctrine:
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
the protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such,
but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them.
Recit-ready:
Rosalie Garcia was married to the Petitioner in 2002. During their marriage, the petitioner
started to become abusive and dominant. He even forbade Rosalie to pray. Their
arguments because of the affairs of the petitioner resulted to physical and emotional
abuse to Rosalie. Rosalie wanted to file a separation case against the petitioner but she
failed to do so because of the fear of not getting financial supports. Rosalie with her three
children filed a petition for the issuance of Temporary Protection Order
RTC issued the TPO and financial support in favour of Rosalie and her children
Rosalie requested for the extension of TPO because of the failure of the petitioner to give
financial support and for the showing new acts of harassment
Petitioner challenge RA 9262 for being violative of the due process and equal protection
clause
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant
to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already
have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. The
classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The classification is not limited to
existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members and is not limited to the existing
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the
safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
Therefore, RA 9262 does not violate the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalie Garcia and Petitioner were married in 2002. They have three
children together. During the course of their marriage however, petitioner showed signs of
dominance over his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and
deliberately isolated her from her friends. He often trivialized her ambitions and prevailed
upon her to just stay at home. He took on an affair and this spawned a series of fights
where private respondent was left physically and emotionally wounded. Private respondent
was then determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support as he had previously warned her
that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.
On March 23, 2006, Private respondent filed for herself and in behalf of her minor children
a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod for the issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband pursuant to R.A. 9262 on the grounds of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence. Finding reasonable belief of an imminent danger of
violence against her and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued the TPO,
effective for 30 days, ordering petitioner, among others, to remove all personal belongings
in their conjugal dwelling, to stay away from petitioner and her children from a distance of
1,000 meters, to surrender his firearms and to provide financial support for the petitioner.
Petitioner was not able to fully comply with the conditions and so private respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion for Renewal of the TPO on the grounds that
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing but the TPO was
renewed and extended again for 30 days. Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive
them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts
of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application
24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The TPO was extended for another 10 days and in its
order, the Court gave petitioner around 5 days to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended or modified. After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for
renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility. Petitioner filed
before the CA a petition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of
the due process and equal protection clauses. The CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this
present petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether R.A. 9262 is violative of the due process clause when the TPO is granted ex
parte.
2. Whether R.A. 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause by unduly discriminating
against men.
RULING:
1. NO.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant
to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already
have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
the protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security. When the TPO is issued ex parte, the court order that the notice be
immediately given to the respondent, directing him to file an opposition within 5 days from
the service. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds without
an inkling of what happened is a mere product of an overactive imagination as the
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit evidence, which includes pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
Petitioner also contends that the Order of TPO was virtually a blank check issued to the
wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The pertinent rule under the R.A. 9262 on
the reliefs available to the offended party clearly provides for the removing and excluding
of the respondent from the residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the latter.
2. NO.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such,
but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. The Constitution does
not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial
distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender
bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification
under the law. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction
between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children. The classification is not limited to
existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members and is not limited to the existing
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the
safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
Garcia v Drilon
by Dy, Mon
Nagkakaisang Maralita
by Bautista, Paolo
Recit ready summary
By virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos Garcia reserved parcels of land in
Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation which later on
became Fort Bonifacio.
Ferdinand Marcos issued a proclamation amending Proclamation 423, which excluded a
certain area of Fort Bonifacio to be known as Libingan ng mga Bayani. He then issued
another proclamation (Proclamation 2476) excluding barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open
for disposition. At the bottom of this proclamation was a handwritten addendum which said
that Western Bicutan was also to be excluded. However, the Proclamation was published in
the Official Gazette without including such addendum.
Nagkakaisang Maralita and Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, who were occupants
of lots in Western Bicutan filed a petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP). They sought the reclassification of the areas they occupied in Western
Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land and the eventual sale of such
land. The COSLAP granted the petition, but was later on reversed by the CA.
The issue is whether the lots in question can be considered alienabe and disposable by
virtue of the handwritten addendum of President Marcos which was not included in the
publication of Proclamation 2476.
SC held that the written addendum which was not included in the publication did not
acquire the force and effect of law. The requirement of publication is indispensable to give
effect to law. An omission of the publication requirement would offend due process as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Doctrine/Key takeaway
The requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to law. An omission of the
publication requirement would offend due process as it would deny the public knowledge
of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Facts
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation
No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio
and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for
disposition
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads:
"P.S. This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published,
but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274
and 730.
Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western
Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 and Lot 7 respectively of
Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and
(3) the Land Management Bureaus facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject
lot to its bona fide occupants.
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienabe and disposable.
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral
part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the
COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division granted MSS-PVAOs
Petition
Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law
Held
It is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies
in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the
force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to
the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Hermano Oil v TRb
by Geraldez, Nico
Facts
The petitioner owned a parcel of land located at the right side of the Sta. Rita Exit of the
NLEX situated at Barangay Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan in its name registered in registry
of deeds.3 The parcel of land was bounded by an access fence along the NLEX. The
petitioner requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of
right of way, contending that it had been totally deprived of the enjoyment and possession
of its property by the access fence that had barred its entry into and exit from the NLEX.
On September 26, 2001, however, the TRB denied the petitioners request
Thereafter, the petitioner sued the TRB and Engr. Jaime S. Dumlao, the TRBs Executive
Director, in the RTC,6 demanding specific performance, the grant of the easement of right
of way and damages. The petitioner alleged in its amended complaint that the access
fence had totally deprived it of the use and enjoyment of its property by preventing
ingress and egress to its property; that the only access leading to its property was the road
network situated in front of its property; that it was thereby deprived of its property
without due process of law and just compensation; and that it was also denied equal
protection of the law because adjacent property owners had been given ingress and egress
access to their properties.
RTC denied
The present action against the defendants Toll Regulatory Board and its Executive Director,
Engr. Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could be considered as a suit against the state without its
consent as among the reliefs prayed for in the complaint is to require the said defendants
to pay, jointly and severally, a just and reasonable compensation of the plaintiffs property
which, if awarded in the judgment against said defendants, would ultimately involve an
appropriation by the state of the amount needed to pay the compensation and damages
so awarded. Moreover, as pointed out by the defendants-movants, defendant Jaime S.
Dumlao, Jr. is sued in his official capacity so that the instant complaint against him is
tantamount to a claim against the state which cannot be sued without its consent.
Suffice it to say that the main relief sought by the plaintiff is beyond the jurisdiction of this
court to grant as provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1818 and Republic Act No.
8975 which essentially prohibit the courts from issuing temporary restraining orders and/or
writs of injunction against government infrastructure projects, and which expressly
declares any such TRO or writ of injunction void under Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975.
CA affirmed RTC decision adding:
The law is clear. Plaintiff-appellant does not deny that the NLEX is a limited access facility.
Neither did it put forward any reason why it should not be covered by the said law.
Plaintiff-appellant, therefore, cannot expect any court to issue a decision in its favor in
violation of an existing law.
When plaintiff acquired the property from the old owner NLEX was already in existence and
therefore, the acts or mistakes of the past owner transferred to the new owner.
It is settled that to be able to demand a compulsory right of way, the dominant estate
must not have adequate access to a public highway. Coming now to PNCC although it is
not strictly a government agency, its function is a necessary incident to a government
function and, hence, it should likewise enjoy immunity from suit
Issue
WON THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REPUGNANT TO THE DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN OUR CONSTITUTION AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE. - NO
Ruling
The putting up of the access fence on the petitioners property was in the valid exercise of
police power, assailable only upon proof that such putting up unduly violated constitutional
limitations like due process and equal protection of the law. 25 In Mirasol v. Department of
Public Works and Highways, the Court has further noted that:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A tollway is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to
certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public
interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not
apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of
transport could use it.26
Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the petitioners
property given the location thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX. Although
some adjacent properties were accorded unrestricted access to the expressway, there was
a valid and reasonable classification for doing so because their owners provided ancillary
services to motorists using the NLEX, like gasoline service stations and food stores. A
classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not
unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.
Lastly, the limited access imposed on the petitioners property did not partake of a
compensable taking due to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. There is no
question that the property was not taken and devoted for public use. Instead, the property
was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to secure the general
safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and valid exercise
of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on October 27, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.
Chavez v Romulo (June 9, 2004)
by Panaligan, Celina
Recit ready:
Petitioner Chavez is assailing the constitutionality of the guidelines issued by the PNP Chief
implementing the ban on carrying firearms outside of residence, which was issued after
then president Arroyo delivered a speech to the PNP regarding the need for a nationwide
gun ban and ordering PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). According to petitioner, it violated the
constitutional right to life and property rights, as well as the right to carry firearms, and
was violative of due process because of the revocation of existing licenses without just
cause. Petitioner also argued that it was beyond the PNP Chiefs power to issue said
guidelines, and that the nationwide ban was an invalid exercise of police power as it
unduly curtailed constitutional rights to life and property.
The Supreme Court ruled against petitioner, stating that the right to carry firearms is
merely statutory in nature. The need for a license connotes that citizens have no vested
rights over carrying firearms and is merely a privilege. And just like any license, it may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions and such as may be reasonably imposed. It was not
an invalid exercise of police power as the basis for the issuance of the gun ban was the
need for peace and order in society and even assuming arguendo that the right to carry
firearms is a property right, it is still not beyond the scope of the states police power since
it is not absolute.
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
filed a petition for prohibition and injunction before the SC against the Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence issued on
January 31, 2003 by Hermogenes Ebdane, who was the PNP Chief at the time. The
Guidelines were issued shortly after then president GMA delivered a speech before PNP
officials stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban and instructing the PNP chief to
suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), after
rising incidents of criminality and threats to security from the NPA. The assailed
Memorandum and Guidelines implementing the same did not entirely restrict and merely
prohibited the use of firearms outside private residences. Additionally, those applying for
PTCFOR had to follow stricter guidelines and had to have a valid reason for being issued
the same (e.g. if someone were a diplomat, member of Gun Clubs, guards with Duty Detail
Orders). Authorised holders of PTCFOR prior to the issuance of the guidelines were
required to apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the above mentioned conditions.
According to Chavez, GMA exceeded her authority when she imposed a gun ban through
mere speech, which violated the peoples right to protect life and property right to carry
firearms. He said the PNP chief also did not have the power nor authority to issue the
guidelines implementing the ban. It was also violative of due process because carrying
firearms is a constitutionally protected property right which cannot be taken away without
due process of law and without just cause. The guidelines, according to him, were unjust,
oppressive and unfair because they were implemented long before they were published
and that the ban was an invalid exercise of police power because the means employed
was unnecessary for the accomplishment of its purpose, which is to deter crime.
Issues:
W/N
1. the right to carry firearms is a constitutionally protected property right
2. the gun ban and guidelines implementing the same violated the right to due process
3. The gun ban was an invalid exercise of police power and that the PNP chief had no
authority to issue the guidelines implementing the ban
Held:
1. No. It is a mere statuary privilege, not a constitutional right. A license authorising a person
to enjoy a certain privilege is neither property nor property right; it doesnt create a vested
right. The test whether the statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on
the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority; in this case, the PNP Chief is
granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR considering the guidelines compelled
applicants to submit numerous requirements and undergo many tests before being issued
 a license. Even after being issued a license, they were not allowed to display their guns in
public or bring their guns to public or commercial places
2. No. A PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution. Just
like any license, it may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right but only a
personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions and such as may thereafter
be reasonably imposed.
3. No. Assuming for the sake of argument that the PTCFOR is a property right, it is not
absolute and is not beyond the reach of the States police power. All property in the state
is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general
welfare.
The two requisites for the valid exercise of police power are the following:
a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power
b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
The basis for the issuance of the gun ban was the need for peace and order in society.
Thus, the two requisites are deemed present in this case.
As for the authority of the PNP Chief, a look at the history of gun ban laws in the
Philippines is in order. Prior to RA 8294 and PD 1886, Act No 1780 and Act No 2711 had
already regulated gun use in the Philippines. The IRR of PD 1866 (the chief law governing
possession of firearms in the country issued by Marcos) specifically states: The Chief of
Constabulary may in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as
he may impose, authorise lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.
At present, the PNP Chief is the equivalent of the Chief of Constabulary.
GSIS vs. Montecarlos
Doctrine: Rights to benefits is a vested right
The proviso was held unconstitutional because it violates DPC and denies EP of the law.
Right to benefits is a vested right protected by the DPC.
The proviso is contrary to Sec 1 Art 3 because it:
- is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three- -
year prohibited period.
- outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving
spouse an opportunity to be heard.
- undermines the the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated
social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their dependents in
the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government employees.
Recit Ready:
The GSIS are assailing the decisions of the RTC and the CA that granted Milagros
Montescarlos eligibility for survivorship pension as the surviving spouse of Nicolas
Montescarlos, a retitred member of the Sangguniang Bayan. The GSIS contest that under
Section 18 of PD 1146 (The Revised Government Service Insurance Act), a surviving
spouse is ineligible for survivorship pension if the marriage with the pensioner was
contracted within three years of before the pensioner became eligibile for pension. It is
undisputed that Nicolas married Milagros in 1983, and the former was only granted
eligibility for pension in 1984. Despite Milagros withdrawing her application, the GSIS
insisted the Court to rule on the issue for future application. The Court held that section 18
of PD 1146 is unconstitutional for it constitutes a taking of property without due process.
The court held that retirement benefits are compensation for the work provided by the
government workers to the public. Also, such pension are derived from mandatory
contributions from the government employee. The court held that these constitutes
property interests over the pension. The outright denial of survivorship pension under
Section 18 constitutes a deprivation of a right to property without due process. Even if the
purpose of Section 18 is to prevent sham marriages for monetary gain, it does not provide
a valid and reasonable classification in contrast of legitimate marriages. Therefore,
Milagros is eligible for survivorship pension.
Facts:
Petitioner: GSIS
Respondent: Milagros Montescarlos
Statute in Question: PD 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977
July 10, 1983
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) at 72 years old, married
Milagros Orbiso (Milagros) who was 43 years old
Jan. 4, 1985
Nicolas files with GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective Feb. 18, 1985 under
PD 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977
Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary
Feb. 17 - last day of actual service
Jan. 31, 1986
GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a
lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity thereafter.
Apr. 22, 1992
Nicolas died :(
Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146
June 8
GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has
no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
to GSIS: they wed one year from date of retirement
Oct. 2
Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the
validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension
Nov. 9, 1994
Trial court decision: rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship
pension.
ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including interest
 retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which
the pensioner has contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous
acquisitions.
since it is a property of the petitioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal
property
Prohibition in Sec. 18 PD 1146: deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family
Code, a later law.
Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights
GSIS appealed > CA affirmed TC decision
Hence, this petition.
Jan. 10, 2003
Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS decision disqualifying her from
receiving survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.
GSIS: the Court must decide the case on the merits.
The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves
not only the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving spouses who are similarly
situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the proviso. Social justice and
public interest demand that we resolve the constitutionality of the proviso.
Issue:
W/N Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;
Held:
Pertinent Provision:
Sec. 16 Survivorship benefits: When a member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall
be entitled to survivorship benefits provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen
hereunder. It consists of
1. Basic survivorship pension: fifty percent of the basic monthly pension
2. Pension not exceeding 50% of basic monthly pension payable in accordance with the rules
and regulations
Sec 17: Death of a member: Primary beneficiaries shal be entitled to:
1. basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years
2. basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and the dependents
pension
At the end of such guaranteed periods, survivorship pension shall be paid
1. Spouse only survivor: receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he remarries
2. Children are the only survivors: entitled to survivorship pension as long as they are
dependent while the spouse receives the basis survivorship pension
3. Absence of beneficiaries: secondary beneficiaries entitled to:
1. cash payment equivalent of survivorship pension
2. cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average monthly compensation for each
year he paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos
Sec. 18: Death of pensioner: the primary beneficiaries shall receive the applicable
pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That,
the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the
pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension
Primary Beneficiaries:
1. dependent spouse until he/she remarries
2. dependent children
Secondary Beneficiaries
1. Parents and legitimate descendants aEXCEPT dependent children
Dependent
the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or illegitimate child who
is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over
twenty-one years of age but physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self -
support.
also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the member, and the
legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support
Issue: W/N Sec. 18 PD 1146 which prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension
Held:
Unconstitional!
violates DPC
discriminatory and denies EP of the law
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the
government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
Prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where
the pension is part of the terms of employment
Reason for providing retirement benefits: to compensate service to the government, to
reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.
where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause
Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under preexisting law
Pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under
the terms of the public employees pension statute
No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is,
without notice and opportunity to be heard
PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government employees
and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of
survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension following the demise of
her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that
[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
It is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three- -
year prohibited period.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the
surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard.
It undermines the the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and
integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government
employees.
Purpose of PD 1146
1. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System
2. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him
3. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made
available to him and his dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits
expanding disability benefits
introducing survivorship benefits
introducing sickness income benefits
extending compulsory membership to all government employees irrespective of status
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the
deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic
effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner
(in case) Violation of EPC
some statutes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain
period before death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain.
the classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages
where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person
becomes eligible for benefits.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law
Requirements for a valid and reasonable classification
1. it must rest on substantial distinction
2. it must be germane to the purpose
3. it must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. it must apply equally to all members of the same class
Case at hand
the proviso does not satisfy the requirements
it discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner
within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for the pension
even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the
pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension.
such is vague because there is no reason or purpose for such prohibition
the classification does not rest on substantial distinction thus is discriminatory and
arbitrary
This is the reason why congress deleted the proviso in RA 8291 or GSIS Insurance Act of
1997 (revising the old charter of PD 1146)
the surviving spouse who married the member immediately before the members
death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves that
the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.
present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years
before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of
survivorship benefits
does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who
contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the members retirement
or death
law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the marriage mainly to
receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence.
law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate
surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social
legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative
of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso
in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that the dependent
spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. The Government
Service Insurance System cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for
survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
Chaves vs. COMELEC
Doctrine:
Requisites of valid exercise of police power
Primary Objective: to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one
hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other
This is a valid reason to exercise police power. This objective is of special importance
and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in
income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the
prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty line.
Recit Ready:
Petitioner assails the Section 32 of Resolution No 6520 of the COMELEC. The assailed
resolution requires the removal of all campaign propaganda and/or public advertisements
of candidates after 3 days of its effectivity. Failure to comply constitutes premature
campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Prior to the
resolution, Petitioner entered into formal agreements with certain establishments for the
endorsement of their product. For such endorsements, a total of 4 billboards were put up
in different places. Afterwards, the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator.
After that, the assailed resolution was implemented. The COMELEC directed him to comply
with the resolution. Petitioner asked for an exemption, but the Comelec directed him to
remove the ads or to cover them from public view while his request is pending. Hence, the
petition. [Issue of police power as most related to sdp] The petitioner assails that the
resolution is an invalid exercise of police power. For valid exercise of police power, it must
be: 1) for the general public interest and; 2) the means must be reasonably necessary for
the purpose of the law and must not be duly oppressive. In the case at hand, the primary
purpose of the resolution is to equalize the situation between rich and popular candidates
with the poor and lesser-known ones. The statute prevents the undue advantage of
exposure on account of their resources and popularity. The COMELEC is also empowered
by the Constitution to regulate all media communication and information to ensure equal
opportunity. Even if the petitioner insists that such ads are not campaign materials, they
constitute an indirect publicity for the petitioner. This falls under the definition of election
campaign or partisan political activity under the Omnibus Election Code. Therefore, the
court dismissed the petition.
Facts:
Petitioner: Francisco I. Chavez
Respondent: COMELEC
Statute in Question: Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004.
Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004
 Sec. 32: All propaganda materials showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, Feeling aggrieved, Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing
who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office the assailed provision. He urged court to declare the provision unconstitutional as the
shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or same is allegedly:
television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; gross violation of the non-impairment clause
otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to invalid exercise of police power
have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election in nature an ex-post facto law
Code. contrary to the Fair Elections Act
Invalid due to over breadth
Chavez entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their
products Petitioners Arguments:
billboards, while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all announce his candidacy for
Aug. 18, 2003 any public office nor solicit support for such candidacy from the electorate
he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and image for 96 North, a clothing they are mere product endorsements and not election propaganda.
company Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of
the COMELEC
Oct. 14
signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Issue:
Corporation and Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police power?

Nov. 10 Held:
signed Endorsement Agreements with G Box Court takes a contrary view.

3 billboards were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway
1 showed Chavez promoting plastic products of Konka
other 2 showed Chavez endorsing the clothes of 96 North
1 more was setup in Roxas Boulevard
showed Chavez promoting the game and amusement parlors of G-box
Dec. 30 1.
Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng
Pagasa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and Aksyon 2.
Demokratiko
Police power
inherent attribute of sovereignty
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people
Determine validity of a police measure, two questions asked
Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of police power?
Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals?

Jan 6, 2004 Primary objectives of the Provision

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision assailed
herein
Jan 21
petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELECs Law
Department
Jan. 29
replied by requesting COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the
assailed provision
Feb. 23
sent another letter, asking COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of SEC 32,
considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be
construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules
Feb. 27
answer: ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them
from public view pending the approval of his request.
to prohibit premature campaigning
to level the playing field for candidates of public office,
to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-
known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity (Such is a valid reason to exercise police power.)
National Press Club vs. COMELEC
questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited
the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaigning or other political
purposes, except to the COMELEC
obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich
and poor candidates
Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country
which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the
economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of
our population falling below the poverty line
Cant claim that the billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor
solicit any support for his candidacy

Omnibus Election Code defines Election campaign/Partisan Political activity:

 an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
to a public office.
includes
Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate
Holding political conferences, meetings, etc. for the purpose of soliciting votes
Making speeches, announcements or commentaries
Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials
Directly/indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate
Even if he entered in such contracts as a private individual, when he filed his candidacy,
the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because
the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Thus, COMELEC was acting well within its
scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject
billboards. Allowing such would give more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates.
Sec. 80 Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period.It shall
be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity
except during the campaign period.
Article 9 C 4: COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time,
and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.
It is not a gross violation of the non-impairment clause
Non-impairment clause must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government
Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the public.
State duty: to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest.
Contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a
postulate of the existing legal order
Power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare
Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power
(IN CASE) Not an Ex-post facto law
Offense pertains to: the nonremoval of the described propaganda materials three (3) days
after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520.
(IN CASE) Not a violation of Fair Elections Act
The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit
billboards as lawful election propaganda.
It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as
practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from
gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity
by regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing
its duty under the law
Invalid because of Overbreadth
statute/regulation is void/overbreadth: when it offends the constitutional principle that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State
regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms
there is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements
these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to
achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of
opportunities among all candidates
provision is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is
declared valid and constitutional. The prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.
Bayan v Ermita
by Ignacio, Quina
RECIT READY:
PETITIONERS - 1) Bayan et al 2) Jess del Prado et al 3) Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
RESPONDENT - Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita (and many others, notably Mayor Lito
Atienza and DILG Sec Angelo Reyes)
This is a case consisting of three consolidated petitions of the three petitioners. All three
petitioners alleged that they were taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines, and that their
rights as organizations and individuals were violated, when the three conducted rallies
(independently and at different dates and places) and was abruptly dispersed by the police
force, which led to many of their members being injured and arrested. All three also
question the constitutionality of BP 880 and the CPR (Calibrated Preemptive Response)
released by Exec Sec Ermita. BP 880 enforces violent dispersals due to the no permit, no
rally policy and the CPR policy which directed the PNP and the LGUs to strictly comply
with the no permit, no rally, by authorizing arrests of violators in lieu of maximum
tolerance. Petitioners also aver that the Constitution sets no limits on the rights to
assembly, and that BP 880 cannot require a permit as a pre-requisite to such right.
Petitioners also contend that it is in violation of the UDHR and the ICCPR.
ISSUE:
Constitutionality of BP 880? CONSTITUTIONAL
CPR valid? NO
HELD:
- There is no question of the petitioners standing & rights to assembly and to petition
grievances. Such rights are protected by the Constitution and are primarily protected by it.
- However, such right is not absolute, as stated in Primcias v. Fugoso: [...] for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate such
and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power [....]
- It was further stipulated in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the justification for limits on this
constitutional right: [...] The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right,
so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.
- BP 880 actually codifies the ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing, wherein people have to apply for
permit to assembly, stating the date/place/time it is to be held in. If the place is private,
the only consent that is needed is that of the owner. Otherwise, it should be filed with the
appropriate public official-- in this case, the mayor. The mayor can refuse or modify the
permit if he is of the view that there is clear and present danger or that there is such an
 imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. In such cases he must inform the
applicant and the applicant must be heard, after which the mayor will render his decision.
Applicants can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. BP 880 provides for this,
including the applicants rights to be heard.
- The same limitations can be found in the UDHR and in the ICCPR.
- CPR must be struck down as the Court held that in view of the maximum tolerance
mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as
maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be
followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance,
which specifically means the following: [...] the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly
or in the dispersal of the same. It allows for police to justify abuses and only confuses the
people. The Court further states that the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom.
- AS TO THE MAYORS WHO DO NOT IMMEDIATELY ACT ON PERMITS FOR
ASSEMBLIES -- The Court rules that as long as the applicants can show a duly filed
application to the police authorities in absence of a permit issued, within two days from
such filing CAN HOLD THEIR ASSEMBLY WITHOUT NEED OF A PERMIT, having presumed to
have been granted under the law. It shall be the burden of the authorities to show that
there was a denial of the application.
- AS TO PLACES WHERE RIGHTS TO ASSEMBLY CAN BE EXERCISED WITHOUT
PERMIT -- before this case, BP 880 authorized the exercise for such right in freedom
parks designated by every city and municipality. In light of this case, however, it appears
that only Cebu City has declared a freedom park-- even when BP 880 was issued over 20
years ago. The Court rules that from 30 days from the finality of this decision, no prior
permit shall be required for the exercise of the right to assembly and petition in any public
park or plaza of any city or municipality until it has complied with such requirement (of
designating a freedom park). If the Court were to rule otherwise would be a grave
deprivation of such right.
ADDITIONAL INFO (read this its important to remember in case she asks):
- Bayan et al rallied on October 6 2005 and were violently dispersed by policemen
- Jess del Prado et al held a peaceful mass action on September 26, 2005 and that they
were injured, arrested and detained, as they were violently and preemptively dispersed by
the police; AND on Oct 5 2005 marched to Malacanang in protest and were violently
dispersed by policemen as well
- KMU claim that on Oct 4 2005 a KMU co-sponsored rally was to be held at Mendiola bridge
but was violently dispersed; and the same was met as well when they organized a march
from UST Espana to Mendiola which they co-sponsored on Oct 6 2005.
- Some of the contested portions of BP 880 are
- Secs 4 - when permit is required
- Sec 5 - application requirements
- Sec 6 - action to be taken on application (by mayor)
- Sec 12 - dispersal of public assembly without permit
- Sec 13(a) - no permit, no rally policy
- Sec 14(a) - penalty of imprisonment of one month and one day to six months for violation
of Sec 13(a)
- BP 880 was passed on OCTOBER 22 1985
- CPR was passed on SEP 21 2005 by Exec Secretary EDUARDO ERMITA
St. Lukes Medical Center Employees Association-AFW vs. National Labor
Relations Commission
RECIT READY:
Maribel Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of
private respondent St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC). After 8 years, Congress
passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the Radiologic
Technology Act of 1992. Said law requires that no person shall practice or
offer to practice as a radiology and/or xray technologist in the Philippines without
having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of
Radiologic Technology. SLMC demanded the petitioner to take the exam and
submit the proper certificate of registration. Failing to submit the requirement
after numerous demands and considerations given by SLMC (early-retirement
benefit, and efforts to transfer the petitioner in other departments) the
petitioner received a Notice of Separation from the Company She filed a
complaint in the NLRC which dismissed her case. The same dismissal was
affirmed by CA. SC held that the acts of SLMC do not constitute an illegal
dismissal as it only obeys the requirement of the law. While the right of workers to
security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be
reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard
health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare
of the people. RA 7431 is a valid exercise of Police Power by the state.
FACTS:
Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as XRay Technician in the Radiology department
of private respondent St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) on 1984
On 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the
Radiologic Technology Act of 1992. Said law requires that no person shall practice
or offer to practice as a radiology and/or xray technologist in the Philippines without
having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic
Technology.
The Assistant Executive Director Ancillary Services and HR Director of private respondent
SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply
with the requirement of Republic Act No. 7431 by December 31, 1995 otherwise,
the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a license to
practice if a slot is available.
Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
requiring the latter to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by taking and passing the
forthcoming examination scheduled in June 1997 otherwise, private respondent SLMC
may be compelled to retire her from employment should there be no other position
available where she may be absorbed.
Director of the Institute of Radiology, AEDDivision of Ancillary Services issued a
memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos directing the latter to submit her PRC
Registration form/Examination Permit per Memorandum dated March 4, 1997.
On March 13, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum
to petitioner Maribel S. Santos advising her that only a license can assure her of her
continued employment at the Institute of Radiology of the private respondent
SLMC and that the latter is giving her the last chance to take and pass the
forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998 otherwise, private
respondent SLMC shall be constrained to take action which may include her separation
from employment.
On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a notice to
petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing the latter that the management of private
respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay.
On November 26, 1998, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC issued a
Notice of Separation from the Company to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective
December 30, 1998 in view of the latters refusal to accept private respondent
SLMCs offer for early retirement.
 The notice also states that while said private respondent exerted its efforts to transfer
petitioner Maribel S. Santos to other position/s, her qualifications do not fit with any of the
present vacant positions in the hospital.
In a letter dated December 18, 1998, a certain Jack C. Lappay, President of the Philippine
Association of Radiologic Technologists, Inc., wrote Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of
private respondent SLMC, requesting the latter to give due consideration to the
organizations three (3) regular members of his organization (petitioner Maribel S.
Santos included) for not passing yet the Board of Examination for Xray Technology, by
giving them an assignment in any department of your hospital awaiting their chance to
pass the future Board Exam.
On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC again issued a
Notice of Separation from the Company to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/submit her appeal for
rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board
examination which she took and failed.
Petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint against private respondent SLMC for illegal
dismissal and nonpayment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She
likewise prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.
In the meantime, petitioner Alliance of Filipino Workers (AFW) requested the SLMC to
accommodate petitioner Maribel S. Santos and assign her to the vacant position of CSS
Aide in the hospital arising from the death of an employee more than two (2) months
earlier.
Labor Arbiter: ordered private respondent SLMC to pay petitioner Maribel S. Santos the
amount of One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P115,500.00) representing
her separation pay. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner perfected an appeal with the public respondent NLRC.
NLRC: promulgated its Decision affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It likewise
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners in its Resolution promulgated on
December 27, 2002.
CA: affirmed NLRC decision
ISSUE:
Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and circumstances on petitioners
legal claim in relation to the complaint for illegal dismissal.
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and erred in not resolving with
clarity the issues on the merit of petitioners constitutional right of security of tenure.
HELD:
1. NO
No malice or illwill can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner
Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute.
It is undeniable that her continued employment without the required Board certification
exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner Santos
despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its business. This notwithstanding, the
records bear out the fact that petitioner Santos was given ample opportunity to qualify for
the position and was sufficiently warned that her failure to do so would result in her
separation from work in the event there were no other vacant positions to which she could
be transferred.
Despite these warnings, petitioner Santos was still unable to comply and pass the required
exam. To reiterate, the requirement for Board certification was set by statute. Justice,
fairness and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations
where it had no participation or control.
2. NO
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its
exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general
welfare of the people.
Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring
scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite
to engaging in their chosen careers. The most concrete example of this would be in the
field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by
the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice
medicine. The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and
xray technology. The clear and unmistakable intention of the legislature in prescribing
guidelines for persons seeking to practice in this field is embodied in
RA 7431, Section 2 of the law: Sec. 2. Statement of Policy.It is the policy of the State to
upgrade the practice of radiologic technology in the Philippines for the purpose of
protecting the public from the hazards posed by radiation as well as to ensure safe and
proper diagnosis, treatment and research through the application of machines and/or
equipment using radiation.
Sec of DND v Manalo by Damasco Ty, Don
Key-take away:
Right to security of person yield various permutations of the exercise of this right
It is freedom from fear. In the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to
security is actually the freedom from threat.
It is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. When force is
employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate
incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological
integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will
It is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government.
Recit-Ready:
On February 14, 2006, Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted from their home
in Bulacan by elements of the CAFGU. They were brought to several places (most of which
are military camps), detained there and were constantly tortured by soldiers. Eventually,
they were able to escape to Manila where they executed affidavits and on August 2007,
respondents filed in the SC for a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO for protection
from their captors. Meanwhile, on October 2007, the writ of amparo took effect and
respondents changed their petition into an amparo petition. The SC remanded it to the CA.
The CA granted the petition. Hence, petitioner filed for a petition for review.
The SC held that the candid account of Raymond Manalo was enough proof for the
grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo. Only substantial evidence is required by
express provision of the law. It further held that there is a continuing violation of
respondents right of security as the circumstances and evidence show that there is a high
probability that respondents may yet again be abducted and subjected to more torture.
The probability of such actually became higher now that respondents have impleaded
specific names of the AFP. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
Facts:
 On February 14, 2006; noontime; in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, several armed soldiers forcibly
took Raymond Manalo from his house and into a white L300 van. Raymond recognized
some of the men who took him and that they were members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
Another person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond; it was his
brother Reynaldo. They were beaten and brought to a house, and put in different rooms
where they were beaten again. They were repeatedly asked regarding their affiliation with
the NPA, the whereabouts of the NPA, and how many soldiers they have killed. Both
respondent brothers denied that they were NPA members.
The soldiers continued to interrogate respondents. On the third week of detention, two
men doused respondents with urine and hot water, hit their stomachs with a piece of
wood, hit them with a .45 pistol and burnt some parts of their bodies with a burning wood.
The following night, Raymond tried to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk and
escaped. Some soldiers spotted him and he was captured once again. They tortured him
and returned him to Fort Magsaysay and was detained there for 3 months in a house.
They were sometimes detained in a Division Training Unit (DTU) where they were
examined by doctors who advised them to drink plenty of water. DTU Master Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso gave respondents medicines including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic
acid. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. Respondents later found out
that Gen. Palparan ordered soldiers to monitor and take care of them.
One day, Hilario (the driver of the L300 van) fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle and
brought to a house Pinaud, Bulacan where they were again beaten up. Then, from Pinaud
they were brought to a house in Sapang, Bulacan. In Sapang, they were brought to a
basketball court to talk to General Palparan. Palparan told them that they should tell their
parents to stop attending rallies and hearing on Human rights and to help them make a
certain Bestre surrender.
They were brought to their parents but only Raymond spoke to the parents since Reynaldo
could not move due to the beatings. After relaying Palparans message, they went back to
Sapang where the respondents witnessed Palparan leaving in his white car. Palparan left
medicine for the two brothers named Alive (35 pesos each) which made respondents
sleepy when they took some.
After a few days, Hilario took Reynaldo. Raymond remained in Sapang and was ordered to
introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee.
After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson. While there, he was
abducted again and blindfolded, then chained in the barracks. He met a certain Sherlyn
Cadapan, UP student, who was also tortured but was also raped. One week later at Camp
Tecson, Reynaldo was also brought to the camp.
On Novermber 22, 2006, respondents were transferred to a camp in Bataan where they
were again beaten. They were also made to clean, cook, and help raising livestock. There
respondent witnessed a lot of cruelties that he witnessed such as burning a certain Manuel
(a co-detainee) alive.
On June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan to raise poultry for
Donald (Caigas). From here, Raymond made enough money to purchase a phone to
exchange texts with a girl who lived nearby. More importantly, this is where they saved
enough money to escape.
They boarded a bus to Manila and executed an affidavit regarding the incident. They were
inspected by Dr. Benito Molino who was a specialist in handling human rights violations,
particularly where torture was involved. The doctor confirmed that both respondents were
indeed subjected to torture.
This case was originally a petition for prohibition, injunction, and TRO filed before the SC
on August 23, 2007. While the petitioner was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took
effect on October 4, 2007. Thereafter, respondents filed before the SC a manifestation to
treat the existing petition as Amparo petition.
The Amparo petition was remanded to the CA. The Amparo petition was granted by
the CA and required 1) Sec of National Defense to furnish to the Court all reports of the
investigation regarding respondents case; 2) to confirm in writing the present places of
official assignment of Hilario and Caigas; 3) to produce all medical reports, records,
treatments prescribed to respondents and a list of medical personnel who attended them.
Hence this petition for review.
Issue:
1. W/N the evidence presented is enough to satisfy the degree of proof
required?
2. W/N there is a continuing violation of respondents right to security?
3. W/N the reliefs provided by the CA are proper? (underlined above)
Held:
What is the writ of Amparo
Originated in Mexico. In Spanish, it means protection.
The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and
curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
1. Yes, mere substantial evidence is required to grant the writ of amparo.
Section 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that the parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence. If allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with
countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to
escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. We affirm the
factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalos
affidavit and testimony. Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the
affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by
forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries
inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they
endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in
Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col.
Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit, firms up respondents story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility.
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the
ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements.
In a case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The
Commissions findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible
 statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal (Ortiz v.
Guatemala)
2. Yes, there is a continuing violation of respondents right to security.
Right of Security yields various permutations of the exercise of this right:
Right to security of person = Freedom from fear
This is located in the whereas clauses of the UDHR to which the Philippines is a signatory
to.
Right to security of person = guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
psychological invasion
No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
Right to security of person = guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government.
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in
detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent,
moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not
only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have
disappeared. The factual circumstances of respondents abduction, detention,
torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent
threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.
These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for
a writ of amparo.
There was a policy directive issued by the Secretary of National Defense addressed to the
AFP Chief of Staff stating that there should be rules of action in the even a writ of Amparo
is issued against members of the AFP. The rules on the said policy directive are the
following:
o bringing of the suspected offenders before a court.
o determination of the cause, manner location and time of death or disappearance.
o recovery and preservation of relevant evidences
To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have
not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through
the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
3. Yes, the reliefs granted by the CA are proper and relevant for a petition for writ of
amparo.
Petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the
characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites (found in codal
provision) for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of
the production order.
The Court held that instead of likening it to a search warrant, the amparo production order
may be likened to a subpoena duces tecum (production of documents or things).
The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the
search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the
subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution (Material Distributors Inc. vs.
Natividad)
Further, petitioners argue that the disclosure present places of assignment of Hilario and
Caigas is irrelevant in the resolution of the petition for writ of amparo.
The Court held that such information is very relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents
by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction.
Roxas v GMA by Aragon, Jyn
September 7, 2010
Doctrine:
Doctrine of Command Responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes the
liability, and by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-responded
in an amparo petition. The application of command responsibility presupposed an
imputation of individual liability. Rather than the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in a
summary amparo proceeding, responsibility, or at least accountability can be used.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of
the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in
order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or
threats thereof had transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for
such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law. It is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. An indispensable
requirement before the privilege of the writ maybe enforced is the showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim.
RECIT-READY:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent who enrolled in an exposure program
to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. In April of 2009, she volunteered to join members
of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission.
Petitioner was abducted and released. Petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data, impleading public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents
who were behind her abduction and torture.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in absolving public respondents from abduction and
torture based on command responsibility.
NO. The writ of amparo is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings. Command responsibility is different from responsibility and
accountability.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in denying to her the return of her personal belongings.
NO. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves,
unreliable and doubtful
3. Whether or not the CA erred in the denial of an inspection order and production order.
NO. An order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. Matters of
liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding
4. Whether or not the CA erred in the granting of the writ of Habeas data.
YES. No sufficient evidence to hold the respondents accountable
FACTS:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent who enrolled in an exposure program
to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. In April of 2009, she volunteered to join members
of BAYAN-Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission.
May 19, 2009: After doing survey work, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), were in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr.
Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.
1:30 pm: 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes (exception the
leader), wearing bonnets to conceal their faces forcible barged inside. 5
armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands.
Petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc,
already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van.
Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner
towards the van bruising her arms, legs and knees. Before being
blindfolded inside the van, petitioner was able to see the face of one of
the armed men sitting beside her.
After 1 hour - the van stopped. Petitioner was separated from
Carabeo and Jandoc after she was informed that she is being detained
for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Peoples Army (CPP-NPA. She was escorted to a room that she believed
was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. From there, she could
hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing
and some construction bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the
military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
5 days of torture followed. The thrust of the interrogations was to
convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of
returning to the fold. The torture consisted of taunting, choking, boxing
and suffocating the petitioner.
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was able to
learn the names of three of her interrogators (Dex, James and RC) RC
old petitioner that those who tortured her came from the Special
Operations Group, and that she was abducted because her name is
included in the Order of Battle.
May 25, 2009: Petitioner was released, but was given cellular phone with a SIM [ card, a slip
of paper containing an e-mail address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and
books,the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.
Petitioner warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.
After release, she continued receiving calls from RC
She threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
June 1, 2009: Petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data,
impleading public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police
hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind
her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit Rose, Dex and RC.
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that respondent:
(1) be enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family;
(2) be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7 th Infantry Division, Fort
Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija;
(3) be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner
including
(4) be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document connected
to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same
(5) be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop
computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope,
medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.
June 9, 2009: Court issued desired writs and referred to CA for hearing, reception of
evidence and appropriate action.
June 18, 2009: OSG filed a Return of the Writs.
Response of Public respondents:
1. Alleged abduction and torture: staged managed
a. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo told petitioner and companions to avoid leaving the
house.
b. Nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at
the time they were supposedly abducted.
c. Medical Certificate is not consistent with torture. Only shows abrasions in wrists and
knee cap.
2. Insists on dismissal of Amparo and habeas on the following grounds:
a. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has immunity from suit,
b. as against all of the public respondents: absence of any specific allegation in the
petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such
atrocities.
 account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
Police Action: petition.
1. May 19, 2009 (day of abduction) at 1:30 pm: learned about the abduction a. Rubrico v. Arroyo:
2. Launched an initial investigation on the abduction i. Hague Conventions (1907): command
3. 5 pm of the day: sent FLASH message to different police stations in La Paz Tarlac. responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
Negative result. superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
4. May 20, 2009: Initial investigation were included in the Special Report submitted to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
Tarlac Provincial Office. Follow-up investigation followed.
5. Creation of Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to ii. Since the application of command
conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc. responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a
No definitive findings. full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.

Military Action:
1. Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, issued a
Memorandum Directive addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter,
among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military
involvement in the abduction.
2. The Investigation Report described petitioners allegations as opinionated Military is
cleared from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.
b. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting
of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in
order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or
threats thereof had transpired, the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for
such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law.

CA: i. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo: The

1. Believed in the abduction and torture of petitioner remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
2. Disregarded public respondents claim as stage-managed. only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner. It is
3. Recognized the existence of ongoing threats against security of the petitioner not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
4. Extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full
extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction and exhaustive proceedings.
5. Observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner
a. Existence of records of investigations that concerns the petitioner as a suspected c. Commanders maybe impleaded not on the basis of Command Responsibity but on
member of the CPP-NPA the ground of their responsibility or accountability.
6. Not convinced that military or government were responsible i. Razon vs. Tagitis:
7. Denied to the petitioner: 1. Responsibility: extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
a. prayers for the return of her personal belongings have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance,
b. An inspection order and production order as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
8. Extended to the petitioner the writ of Habeas data appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts
2. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should
be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
ISSUE: imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden
of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
5. Whether or not the CA erred in absolving public respondents from abduction and diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
torture based on command responsibility. d. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable
6. Whether or not the CA erred in denying to her the return of her personal belongings conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained
7. Whether or not the CA erred in the denial of an inspection order and production order. at Fort Magsaysay.
8. Whether or not the CA erred in the granting of the writ of Habeas data
i. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may
HELD/RATIO: be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely
on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of
NO. CA did not err in absolving public respondents from abduction and torture based on directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity,
command responsibility. when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns
a. Doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true
respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
 ii. Evidentiary gaps (no direct evidence) make it
virtually impossible to determine the responsibility of respondents.
NO. CA did not err in denying to her the return of her personal belongings and the denial
of an inspection order and production order.
a. An order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the
petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself
is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents
has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. Matters of liability are not determinable
in a mere summary amparo proceeding.
No. Whether or not the CA erred in the denial of an inspection order and production order.
a. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the
claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a
decision.
b. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves,
unreliable and doubtful.
Yes. CA erred in granting the writ of habeas data.
a. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. The writ
operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in
the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.
b. No sufficient evidence to hold the respondents accountable.
Caram v Segui
by Fellone, Mich
Doctrine: Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of
the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or
omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee
the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
FACTS
Ma. Christina and Marcelino had an amorous relationship which made Ma. Christina pregnant. She,
however, did not disclose her pregnancy to Marcelino, as she intends to put up her child for adoption by
the Sun and Moon Home for Children to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation.
When she gave birth to Baby Julian, it was the adoption agency who shouldered her hospital expenses.
Ma. Christina then voluntarily surrendered her child to the DSWD by way of a Deed of a Voluntary
Commitment. The DWSD, on November 27, 2009, issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as Legally
Available for Adoption. A local matching conference was held where Baby Julian was matched to
spouses Vergel and Filomena.
Meantime, on November 26, 2009, Marcelino died of a heart attack. During the wake, Ma. Christina
narrated that she had a baby with Marcelino and that she gave up the baby for adoption due to financial
distress and embarrassment. Taken aback by the revelation, Marcelinos family vowed to help Ma.
Christina to recover and raise her baby. Thus, on May 5, 2010, Ma. Christina wrote the DWSD asking
that the adoption proceedings be suspended and that she intends to take her baby back and make her
family whole again. Also, Marcelinos brother, Noel sent a letter to the DSWD, informing them that a
DNA testing is scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the UP. The DSWD replied to Noel that they are no longer
in a position to stop the adoption process as the procedures taken to make the baby legally available
for adoption were followed to the letter. Thus, if Ma. Christina wants to take custody of Baby Julian, she
should institute appropriate legal proceedings herself.
Thus, Ma. Christina filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo, alleging that DSWD and the other
respondents blackmailed her into surrendering custody of Baby Julian to the DSWD utilising an invalid
certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all
legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.
After several hearings, the Regional Trial Court denied the writ of amparo, hence Ma. Christina elevated
the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of law, the issue being whether or not the writ of
amparo is a proper remedy to recover parental custody of a minor child.
The Supreme Court:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., this Court
held:
ISSUE: Whether or not writ of Amparo is the proper remedy available to the Petitioner.
HELD:
T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr.
v. Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined
only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what
constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No.
9851 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her enforced separation
from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an enforced disappearance within the context of
the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed
Baby Julians whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWDs May 28, 2010
 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that
the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no enforced disappearance as used in the context of
the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a
ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically
to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.
Petition denied.
Mison v Gallegos (2015)
by Serpa Juan, Dustine
Doctrine:
The fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details
concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an
aggrieved party. The Writ of Amparos present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law.
On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among
which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits
Recit Ready:
Interpol Seoul asked the Philippine government for assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent, Ja Joon for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund
of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. The Korean Embassy also wrote letter requests to petitioner,
Hon. Siegfred mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the arrest and
deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Ku filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo and Judge Gallegos granted his request as he found the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance. He also granted Ku a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO). The petitioner, Hon. Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI),
challenged the orders of Gallegos since the Court intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku
of the writ of amparo given that he was validly arrested and placed under the jurisdiction
and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or
enforced disappearance.
The issue in this case is W/N Kus circumstance is within the parameters of the Writ of
Amparo.
The Court held NO because The Writ of Amparos present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without
due process of law. In this case, Ku was not able to present substantial evidence that he
was exposed to life threatening situations and as Ku and his whereabouts were never
concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of
amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the
enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never
hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the
case at bar.
Facts:
On December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) of Seoul,
Korea send notices to Interpol Manila requesting for assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve
fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. The Korean Embassy also wrote letter requests to petitioner,
Hon. Siegfred mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the arrest and
deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.
On 1 January 2014, Kus visa expired.
On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public
interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711. This finding was approved by the BI Board of
Commissioners which, on 16 January 2014, issued a Summary Deportation Order. BI
officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District Warrant and Subpoena Section,
arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained.
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Kus passport.
Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
Interim Remedies
On 22 January 2014, he also filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo. Finding said supplemental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge
Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo
On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO).
In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ. He was then
notified that a hearing on the TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was
already submitted for resolution. Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014.
On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos granted the TPO and entrusting Kus custody to the
Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the
PNP Police Security and Protection Group (PNPPSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate
family.
On 29 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the
transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNPPSPG.
Petitioner challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari
On 4 February 2014, the Court issued TRO enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated
28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku, as well as requiring Ku
to comment on the petition. In issuing this resolution, the Court intimated the possibility of
misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was validly arrested and placed under
the jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be categorized as one of
extralegal killing or enforced disappearance.
Owing to the Courts Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11 February
2014 before the trial court, petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo
petition. On 18 February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued the third assailed order
denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Thus, petitioner appealed the matter to
the
 On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order addressed
to the Office of the President (OP).
On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of
the writ of amparo
Issue/s:
I. W/N Kus circumstance is within the parameters of the Writ of Amparo - NO
Held:
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule. It was an exercise for the
first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances,
Its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.
On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Kus circumstance
does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary
disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on
the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information
on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove
Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.
Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that
he was not read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for
his arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest and detention, the
arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Kus arrest, they introduced
themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed
him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa.
More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his
whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Kus arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was
not obscured as, in fact, these were well documented as evidenced by the Return of
Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 201448 and the After Mission Report dated 17
January 2014.49 More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to
the trial court that Ku was in the custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation
and a Summary Deportation Order.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among
which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long
period of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases
against him to hold him under detention.53 According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in
filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his person against the actions of
some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions and use the
power of the government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in
confinement the more he is exposed to life threatening situations and the further the
violation of his guaranteed rights.
The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires
the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. Other than making unfounded
claims, however, Ku was not able to present evidence that he was exposed to life -
threatening situations while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the
records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTCs grant of the privilege of the
writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never
concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were
unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental
function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning
the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As
Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance
of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
Zarate v Aquino by Sebastian, Lui
Zarate v Aquino by Bernardo, Ivy
Doctrine:
Recit Ready:
Facts:
Before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Amparo and a Writ of Habeas Data filed
by petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List Representative Carlos Isagani Zarate, etc.
Petitioners aver they are members of various progressive party-lists and/or national
and religious organizations that have been wrongfully tagged by the military and the
police as communist front organizations
Sometime in March 2014, the Government commenced the intensified military
offensives in Talaingod, Davao del Norte under the rubric of counterinsurgency, which
allegedly led around 1,300 Manobos to evacuate to Davao City a month later.
The evacuees returned to their communities in May 2014 but some started going
back to Davao City beginning January 2015.
By July 2015, about 700 Manobos were at the United Church of Christ in the PH
(UCCP) Haran to seek refuge due to the militarization of their communities and forcible
recruitment to the paramilitary group, Alamara.
Certain Manobos claimed that they were deceived into going to Davao City and
they were deprived of their freedom of locomotion upon reaching UCCP Haran. They also
claim that they were held there against their will in February 2015.
During the Manobos stay in UCCP Haran, they were allegedly forced to listen to
lectures and join rallies. They said that they were only allowed to leave when one of the
tribe members was found dead hanging lifeless on a tree inside the compound.
On May 12, 2015, the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) forwarded
to the Davao City Prosecutor a complaint filed by Datu Kalumpot Dalon, etc. for violation of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2013.
Complainants were shown two lists from which they purportedly identified the
defendants 1st list: De Jesus, Marian, Casino, and Anover; 2 nd list: Zarate, Palabay, Balaba,
and Ruiz
Petitioners aver the following:
o That the inclusion of their names and photos in the lists indicates that they are and
have been the subject of State surveillance, coupled with harassment, attempts to
incriminate them in fabricated criminal charges, and insinuations of their links with the
NPA
o That their inclusion in the lists are threats to their life, liberty, and security warranting
the protection of the writ of amparo
 As there is no basis for the inclusion of their names and photos in the lists, that
respondents should be compelled via the writ of habeas data to disclose and provide
copies of all info and evidence pertaining to petitioners, and for such info to be destroyed
HELD
WRIT OF AMPARO
- A remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or
of a private individual or entity
- Intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the Rules of Court,
or as a remedy supplemental to the Rules (Tapuz v. Del Rosario)
- A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) requires that every petition to state the
right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits
o Requires substantial evidence (Section 17) that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or
violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
charged
- Available not only for violations of life, liberty and security but also against threatened
violations of such.
o Only actual threats, as may be established from all facts and
circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation
APPLICATION
- Mere membership in the aforestated organizations or sectors cannot equate to an actual
threat that would warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
- A remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party."
- Section 6 of A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provides that the
petition should aver "the manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party."
APPLICATION
- In the present petition, petitioners fail to show how their right to privacy is violated given
that the information contained in the "lists" are only their names, their positions in their
respective organizations, and their photographs. All these data are of public knowledge
and are readily accessible even to civilians, especially since petitioners are known
personalities who are often featured in news reports.
Equal Protection of the Law
People v Cayat
by Bundalian, Albert
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho by Cabochan, Jonas
[10 November 1978] (Ponente: Fernandez)
DOCTRINE: Once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process
of law.
RECIT-READY: Mayor Villegas signed an Ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed
in Manila without a permit costing P50.00. Hiu Chiong filed a petition for writ of injunction
and judgment that the ordinance be null and void since it is discriminatory and violates the
equal protection of the law. Such was granted by the CFI, but petitioner now seeks to
reverse that decision. The issue is WON such an ordinance is violative of the equal
protection of the law. Yes it is, since the amount is fixed and does not consider the
substantial differences between different resident aliens. To add, it does not lay down a
criterion for the mayor to exercise his discretion. This is tantamount to denying a means to
engage in livelihood, since once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without
the equal protection of the law.
FACTS:
On 27 March 1968, Mayor Villegas signed City City Ordinance No. 6537 entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY
KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST
SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES."
Where section 1 prohibits prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or
participate in any position or occupation or business without first securing an employment
permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical
assistance programs of PH Government, and foreign government and those working in
their households.
Violation of this ordinance: 3-6 months imprisonment, or a fine of not less than
100, but not more than 200 pesos, or both.
On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a case
in the CFI for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the enforcement of the ordinance as
well as for judgment to declare it null and void on the grounds that it:
1) discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) it makes no distinction between useful and nonuseful occupations,
imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit;
3) arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens
who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and
therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses.
On 17 September 1968: CFI Judge Arca granted such petitions
On 27 March 1969: Mayor Villegas filed that the respondent judge erred in his
decision.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 6537 is violative of the equal protection of the law?
HELD: YES.
 The P50.00 fee fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is
invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an
activity per se lawful.
This is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines
to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law.
Justice Teehankee Concurring:
[T]hat the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and
regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials and agencies
concerned and not to local governments
In Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a
subordinate body to the Insular (National Government ...). When the Insular (National)
Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify but they
must be consistent with the general law and public policy of the particular state.
Dumlao v Comelec
by Chung, Lyn
January 22, 1980
Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his
certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of
January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution which provides that .Any retired elective
provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified
to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. He likewise alleges that
the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on purely arbitrary grounds,
therefore, class legislation.
Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 52 is valid.
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial,
city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and
what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself
tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither
result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny
equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the
same class.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby
declared valid.
Facts:
Dumlao was the former governor of nueva vizcaya and he has retired from his office, as
well as receiving retirement benefits therefrom
He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections
However, BP 52 was passed and it provided a disqualification for candidates like
Dumlao.
So, Dumlao assailed the constitutionality of the said BP saying that it a class legislation
hence, unconstitutional for VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
o ano bang sabi ng BP 52??? it prohibits retired elected officials over 65 years old from
seeking re-election for the same position from which he retired.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section
10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in
existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of
the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has
received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired
Igot and Salapantan also assailed BP52
o why? because BP52 also provides that it prohibits persons charged with crimes from
seeking public office.
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State,
including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other
similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the
offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a
civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima fascie evidence of such fact.

Issue: Is BP52 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection of laws?
HELD:
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification
o If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from anoher class.
o In this case, for purposes of public service, employeess65 years old have been validly
classified differently from younger emoloyees.
Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, as the purpose of
the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local government,s
o SO.. this paragraph of BP 52 is valid. .
As regarsa the case of Igot and Salapantan, the SC held that the assailed provision
contravenes the constitutional orovision on presumption of innocence and in effect
classifies those merely charged with those already convicted.
o a person charged cannot be put in the same level as a person already convicted for the
purpose of disqualifying him from office and it is an invalid classification.
ACCUSATION GUILT.
Legislative or administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa
Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of
Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in
existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the
elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall
have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring
If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts
to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a
sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is
not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in
rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and
the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative
determination of what disqualifications to impose
For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in
the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on
the rest. It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not
directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he falls within the-
proscribed class.
The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded in the
above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative
body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the challenged legislative
provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local
officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits
once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was
enacted.
A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance:
"It was confronted with a situation that caned for correction, and the legislation that
was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it
stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not
stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to
the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not
excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by the Constitution to
adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner
of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing ."
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences that would justify the special disqualification of
petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who
have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they
seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such presumption is sheer conjecture. The
mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that
he would be more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition
er who has had experience on the job and who was observed at the hearing to appear to
be most physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient
Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of
the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81 years of age
and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has
ever had
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the
most, a minimum age to hold public office has been required as a qualification to insure a
modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present batas), but no maximum age
has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win
of the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his
age has always been recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause
which mandates that all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities
imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege
on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of in quality on the other.
The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application
insofar as it would disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his
province.
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C,
section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second
paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of
charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of
commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify
him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify
bona fide candidates who seem to be headed for election and places in the hands of the
military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any
candidate who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against
him.
Goesart v Cleary
by Lu, Kyle
Goesart v. Clearly (Very Short Case)
335 US 464 (1948)
J. Frankfurter Majority Opinion
Facts
This case is an appeal to the decision of the district court in Michigan denying an
injunction to restrain the application of the Michigan Law regarding the licensing of female
bartenders.
Section 19a of Act 133 of the Public Act of Michigan 1945 that as part of the Michigan
system for controlling the sale of liquor, bartenders are required to be licensed in all cities
having a population of 50,000 or more but no female may be so licensed unless she be
the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment.
The petitioners claim that Michigan cannot forbid the licensing of female bartenders
and at the same time making an exception in favor of the wives and daughters of the
owners of liquor establishment.
Issue
Whether the the Michigan Law generally forbidding female bartenders to be licensed
and at the same time making an exception to wives and daughters of the owners of liquor
establishment is in violation of the equal protection clause or the 14 th amendment.
Ruling
No. The Court held that regulation of liquor traffic is one of the oldest and most
untrammeled legislative power. Despite the vast change in the social and legal landscape
of the status of women, the state is not precluded from drawing a sharp line between the
sexes especially in the matters of liquor traffic.
The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States precludes
irrational discrimination between persons and groups in the incidence of the law.
Since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral
and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature need
not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that, as to a defined group of females,
other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce the moral and social problems
otherwise calling for prohibition. Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured
through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may
confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight.
J Rutledge Dissenting Opinion
Facts and Issue are the same
Ruling (Whole decision cited because its short)
The statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners of liquor
establishments. A male owner, although he himself is always absent from his bar, may
employ his wife and daughter as barmaids. A female owner may neither work as a barmaid
herself nor employ her daughter in that position, even if a man is always present in the
establishment to keep order. This inevitable result of the classification belies the
assumption that the statute was motivated by a legislative solicitude for the moral and
physical wellbeing of women who, but for the law, would be employed as barmaids. Since
there could be no other conceivable justification for such discrimination against women
owners of liquor establishments, the statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal
protection.
Ormoc Sugar v Ormoc City
by Alejandro, Ritz
Doctrine:
Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable
where:
1. it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
2. these are germane to the purpose of the law;
3. the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present;
4. the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
Recit-Ready:
Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc
City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United
States of America and other foreign countries. Ormoc filed a complaint alleging that such
ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause. Both CFI of Leyte and CA held that it
did not violate such constitutional limit. When raised to SC, the court held otherwise. Equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where:
1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; 2) these are germane
to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but
also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; 4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. It is true that Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax.
Facts:
Jan. 29, 1964 - Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964,
imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. paid but on protest a total of P12,087.50 for the months of
March and April.
June 1, 1964 - filed a complaint before the CFI of Leyte against City of Ormoc as well as its
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor,
1. alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of:
 the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and
the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution),
aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
2. further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc
City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise
known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the
3. tax amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of
Republic Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
Response: tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local
Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
CFI decision: upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power
of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other
forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Appeal direct to SC: alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the
aforesaid taxing ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states:
"There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Incorporated, in Ormoc City, a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and
other foreign countries."
For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the
sugar produced is exported.
Section 2 of Republic Act 2264 effective June 19, 1959,
gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public
purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas
No inconsistency between Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2
of Republic Act 2264 because the former have been repealed by the latter.
Issue:
Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection
clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
Held: Ordinance is declared unconstitutional
Sec. 1 Art. 3
". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Felwa vs. Salas
equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation
a classification is reasonable where
1. it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
2. these are germane to the purpose of the law;
3. the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present;
4. the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
The questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
It is true that Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions
as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of
the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected. At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to
preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is
declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the
P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest.
Himagan v People
by Reyes, Meg
DATE: October 7, 1994
DOCTRINE:Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
RECIT READY:
(This is from Jech Tiu digest)
Preventive suspension for more than 90 days for PNP (valid and reasonable classification)
Himagan, a member of the PNP, was implicated for the killing of Benjamin Machitar Jr. and the attempted
murder of Barnabe Machitar and informations were filed with the RTC.
Himagan was preventively suspended on the basis of the DILG Act (RA 6975) for such period until the
termination of his case.
Himagan contends that the 90-day maximum period for preventive suspension under the Civil Service Law
(PD 807) should apply to him since the PNP is under the Civil Service
The SC held that there is ample distinction between members of the PNP and other ordinary people
charged with offenses
In this case, policemen carry weapons and a badge that can be used to harass or threaten witnesses.
The SC also held that the legislative intent, based on the record of deliberations of the BCC, is clear.
The 90-day preventive suspension period was not meant to apply to members of the PNP charged with
crime
Their suspension is valid for such period prior to the termination of their case
The SC finally held that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality, as it merely
requires that all persons in the same class shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
A distinction based on reasonable considerations and related to a proper legislative purpose is neither
unreasonable, capricious, and unfounded
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ishmael Himagan, is a policeman was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar and
attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar.
 The informations were file at the RTC of Davo City on September 16, 1992.
Court then issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case which was based
on RA 6975 of the DILG Act of 1990 which provides:
Section 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by
law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until
the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days from arraignment of the accused.
Over a year after the issuance of the order of his suspension (October 11, 1993) petitioner filed a
motion to lift the order of his suspension.
Petitioner assailed that his suspension must only be limited to 90 days relying on Section 42 of P.D.
807 of the Civil Service Decree.
Section 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative
case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining
authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the
delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of
delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Petitioner claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47 of RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) violates equal protection clause for imposing
a different period of preventive suspension for PNP officials.
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The special law for police men is justified by their status. (From the Bernas Primer)
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among
men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause does not forbid classifications for as long as the classification is:
based on real and substantial differences
germane to the purpose of the law
applies to all members of the same class
applies to current as well as future conditions.
A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as
that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Petitioner:
The requirements in Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975
a. "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the
succeeding sentence,
b. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused"
are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days,
the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
Supreme Court:
The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no
other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense
where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The
suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or
limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be
lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be
terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive
suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the
Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability.
If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a
speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to
dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his
liberty by habeas corpus.
Sison v Ancheta
by Olivarez, Shannin
FACTS:
The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory relief or prohibition
proceeding 1 on the validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 depends upon a
showing of its constitutional infirmity. The assailed provision further amends Section 21 of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or
residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c) royalties, prizes,
and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary
benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e)
dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f)
adjusted gross income.
Antecedent Facts:
Sison, a taxpayer, alleged that Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, since he would be unduly
discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from
the exercise of his profession, in relation to those which are imposed upon fixed income or
salaried taxpayers
He characterizes Section 21 of Blg. 135 as arbitrary, amounting to class legislation,
oppressive and capricious in character
Sison claims that there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation
The Court, in a resolution of January 26, 1982, required Ancheta (the acting
commissioner of the BIR), to file an answer within 10 days from notice
Ancheta stated in his answer to Sisons complaint was that Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 is a
valid exercise of the States power to tax. In addition to this, Ancheta also prayed for the
dismissal of the petition for lack of merit
ISSUE:
Whether or not Batasang Pambansa Blg. 135 violates the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the rule on uniformity in taxation
RULING:
No. Petition must be dismissed.
Power of Taxation (according to Justice Malcolm): an attribute of sovereignty. It is
the strongest of all powers of government.
The power to tax is regulated and controlled by the provisions stipulated in the
Constitution
Sisons argument that BP. 135 is an arbitrary statute is not sufficient. There must be a
factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. There is a need for of such persuasive
character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of
validity must prevail
Equal protection Issue: same formulation of the equal protection doctrine should
apply to taxation measures
Sison invoked that taxation should be grounded on the concept of unity: this
ground is met according to Justice Laurel in Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco, which was a
case that was decided in 1940, when the tax operates with the same force and effect in
every place where the subject may be found. It should also be noted that the rule on
uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this
is hardly unattainable
As clarified by Justice Tuason, where the differentiation complained of conforms to the
practical dictates of justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this
clause and is therefore uniform
What misled Sison, is his failure to take into consideration the distinction
between a tax rate and a tax base: there is no legal objection to a broader tax base or
taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the
applicable tax rate
It is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real
differences
In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in BP. 135, the discernable basis of
classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules
removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced
tax rates to be applied to all of them
Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class: these
taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are
in the same situation more or less
In the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no
uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income
There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the
gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the
system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
This is a frivolous suit. While the tax rates for compensation income are lower than those
for net income such circumstance does not necessarily result in lower tax payments for
these receiving compensation income. In fact, the reverse will most likely be the case;
those who file returns on the basis of net income will pay less taxes because they claim all
sort of deduction justified or not I vote for dismissal
Phil Judges v Prado
by Carlos, Von
Doctrine: Equal protection clause require equality among equals of a valid classification.
Recit ready:
Petitioners are assailing sec 35 of RA 7354 for removing the franking privilege for the
judiciary and a few other agencies. It contests that the withdrawal of the privilege while
retaining the same for the President and Vice President, the Senators and House
representative violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection clause require
equality among equals of a valid classification. Since the court found that there was no
valid classification in deciding who gets keep the franking privilege, it held that sec 35 of
RA 7354 is unconstitutional.
Facts:
Sec 35 of RA 7354 as implemented by the Philippine postal Corporation through its
Circular no. 92-28.
It withdrew the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, The
RTC, MetroTC, MTC, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of deeds, aand
certain other government offices
It retained the same for the President, VP, Senators, House Reps, Comelec, Former
President, widows of former President, National Census and Statistics Office, and the
general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers
Issue: WN Sec 35 of RA 7354 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.
YES
Held:
Equal Protection of the laws prevents unfair discrimination and arbitrariness
What it requires is that all things or persons similarly situated should be treated alike or
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification
The classification is the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars
If the classification for the grant of the privilege is the need for it, all the more that the
Judiciary should be given this privilege
If the reason for the withdrawal is the considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary,
then it is like saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do
not need it very much
If it is to increase revenues, then it should be withdrawn across the board
Since there is no valid classification for the removal of franking privilege, it violates the
equal protection of the
Tiu v CIA
by Santos, Patrick
International School v Quisumbing
by Bernas, Claud
RECIT READY:
petitioners assail the validity of the point-of-hire classification that the International School
practices. this classification grants foreign-hires certain benefits and a salary 25% higher
than what local-hires receive. Court ruled in favor of petitioners stating the equal pay for
equal work principle. they further said that the grants and benefits that they receive is
enough to compensate the dislocation factorof foreign-hires
FACTS
Petitioners are local-hire teachers in international school
There are two types of hires done in said school: local- hires and foreign-hires
Some grants of the school regarding foreign hires include:
o Housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowance
o Salary rate 25% more than local hires
Justification for such grants: dislocation factor and limited tenure
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995,
petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the
difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the
question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the school is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries constitutes racial
discrimination
The school states that such grants are given in order to attract foreign hires
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary
rates:
o The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the
present case. The international character of the School requires the hiring of
foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among
the student population.
o We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits
accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We
agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to
entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain
competitive in the international market.
employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity
therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms
and conditions of employment which include the employment contract.
ISSUE:o Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of
WON the classification between the foreign-hires and local-hires is valid thus
justifying the difference in salaries
HELD: NO
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article
on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
The foregoing provisions (provisions from the labor code, IDHR, etc were mentioned
by the court) impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism
of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This
rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform
work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an
employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience.
If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain
why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain
why the employee is treated unfairly.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not
be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same
services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the
same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot
serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited
tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded
them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs,
taxes and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local
hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy
and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
De Guzman v COMELEC
by Consolacion, Ray
Recit Ready:
The petitioners in this case are either City or Municipal Election Officers who were
reassigned to different stations following the enactment of The Voters Registration Act of
1996. Voters Registration Act contains a provision which directs COMELEC to reassign City
or Municipality Election Officers who has held office for more than 4 years in the said City
or Municipality. The petitioners file a case with the Supreme Court assailing the provision in
the Voters Registration Act as unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection
clause of the Constitution and their security of tenure. The Court held that purpose of the
law is to prevent widespread anomalies in the elections and
Facts:
At bar is a petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 otherwise known as
The Voters Registration Act of 1996 which was enacted on June 1996 and
approved by President Fidel V. Ramos.
Section 44 thereof provides: Reassignment of Election Officers.No Election Officer
shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any
 election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto,
has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically
be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 970002 and 970610 for
the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives
reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to
different stations.
Petitioners filed the present petition with the Supreme Court assailing the validity of
Section 44 of RA 8189. They argue that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the
City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding
office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They argue
that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC
officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of
the provision of law under attack.
Issue:
W/N SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.
W/N THERE IS A VIOLATION OF SECURITY OF TENURE OF THE PETITIONERS
Held:
NO, singling out of election officers in order to ensure the impartiality of election officials
by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The 1987
Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:
Classification must rest on substantial distinctions
Classification must be germane to the purposes of the law
Classification must not be limited to existing conditions only
Classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all
the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils
sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be seen that the
legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking
an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link
thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or
authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that
without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters
can hardly be carried out.
Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the
registration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality
would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC.
As to the issue of security of tenure, the Court held that there is NO violation. The Court
held that security of tenure is not a guarantee of perpetual employment, it only means
that an employee can only be dismissed or transferred from service by causes provided by
law and that the employed be accorded due process. What it seeks to prevent is
capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the lawmaking authority
itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no
such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a
perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.
Farinas v Executive Sec
by Castigador, Niqui
Recit Ready:
Petitioners contend that Sec 14 of RA No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act which repeals
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Under Sec 66 and 67, appointive and elective officials respectively shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from their current position if they choose to run for another
office. With the repeal of Sec 67 however, elective officials will no longer be considered
ipso facto resigned. According to petitioners this gives undue benefit to elective officials
as against the appointive ones because the repeal does not include appointive officials and
therefore they will still be considered ipso facto resigned. The court ruled that the repeal
does not violate the equal protection clause because substantial distinctions exist between
elective and appointive officials. By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of
officials differently.
Facts:
Petitioners are members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of RA No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. The petitioners assert that
Section 14 of RA No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code only leaving intact Section 66 thereof
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials.
Section 67 and 66 state that elective and appointive officials respectively who run for
office other than the one he is holding is considered ipso facto resigned from their position
upon filing his certificate of candidacy for another office. By the repeal of Section 67, an
elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom; elective officials continue in public office even as
they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.
On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive
officials remainsthey are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy.
Respondents claim that it was not a violation of the equal protection clause because a
substantial distinction exists between these two sets of official: elective officials occupy
their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive
officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as
the former.
Issue: WON Section 14 of RA No. 9006 which repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code violates the equal protection clause
Held: NO
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to
an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office
in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.
 Under the Administrative Code of 1987, appointive officials, as officers and employees in
the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or
officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part
in political and electoral activities
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect
to the effect of filing of certificates of candidacy for any position other than those currently
occupied by them.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of RA No. 9006. i.e., elected officials vis avis
appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the
persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
Central Bank Employees v BSP
by Perez, Paolo
Facts:
In July 1993, RA 7653 (The New Central Bank Law) took effect. It abolished the old Central
Bank of the Philippines and created the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Article II Sec 15(c) of
said RA classifies employees of the BSP into two categories:
1. The officers, who were exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL);
2. The rank-and-file employees (salary grade 19 and below) who were not exempted from the
coverage of the SSL
In 2001, the Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. filed a petition for prohibition
against the BSP and the Office of the President in which petitioners sought to have the
implementation of Section 15(c) of RA 7653 on the ground that it violated the equal
protection clause and was, therefore, unconstitutional.
Petitioners argue that the classification was not reasonable, but arbitrary and capricious
for it was prejudicial to around 2,900 rank-and-file BSP employees. It is contended that this
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position.
BSP, on the other hand, argues that the provision was constitutional and should be read in
harmony with other parts of the law which provided for, inter alia, the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of BSP; and with the mandate of the Monetary Board to
establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with the sound
principles of management.
Solicitor General, for the Executive Secretary, defended the questioned provision and
contends that the classification was based on actual and real differentiation and, further,
that it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish excellence within the BSP subject to
prevailing laws and policies of government.
Issue: W/N Section Art. II, Sec. 15(c) of the New Central Bank Law is unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws.
Held:
YES.
The Court ruled that while the proviso in question does not violate the equal protection
clause on its face, subsequent laws which amended the charters of seven other
Governmental Financial Institutions (GFIs) had the effect of discriminating against the
rank-and-file employees of the BSP.
It is settled in Constitutional Law that the equal protection clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate so long as the classification is not unreasonable and is made on substantial
grounds.
Requisites for valid classification:
1. It must be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It must apply to each member of the class.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the exemption of officers from the SSL was intended to
address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in attracting competent officers and executives.
It was not intended to
Phil Telegraph v NLRC
by De Jesus, Mark
Mirasol v. DPWH
By Hannah Angeles
Date: June 8, 2006
Doctrine: Standard in exercising Police Power is reasonableness
Recit ready digest: Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of administrative
issuances of the DPWH for being inconsistent with RA 2000, Limited Access Highway Act.
One of which is AO1, requiring that motorcycles should have engine displacement of at
least 400cc. Court partly granted petitioners decision since AO1 does not impose
unreasonable restrictions.
Facts:
2001 petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with
application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction. Petition sought the declaration
of nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the
provisions of RA 2000 or the Limited Access Highway Act:
1. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;
2. DPWH Administrative Order No. 74, Series of 1993;
3. Art. II, Sec 3(a) of the Recised Rules on Limited Access Facilities
promulgated in 199[8] by DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB).
In 1998, pursuant to RA 2000, DPWH issued Department Order No. 215 declaring the
Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.
In 2001, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for the declaration of nullity of the
administrative issuances, and prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles
along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite
(Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215
 Trial Court granted petitioners application for preliminary injunction, abd issued a writ of
preliminary injunction
DPWH, thru TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside toll ways.
In 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring
DO 123 invalid. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition
but trial court denied.
Issues: Whether the administrative order introduces an unreasonable classification by
only specifying motorcycles, which violates the right to travel
Held: PETITION IS PARTLY GRANTED
The Administrative Order does not impose unreasonable restrictions since it just
outlines several precautionary measures wherein motorists using the toll way must follow.
The rules laid out were to ensure public safety and inhibited flow of traffic within limited
access facilities.
The states police power enables it to regulate the use of public highways by motor
vehicles.
o Police power is far-reaching in scope and is the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of all governmental powers.
o The standard in exercising Police Power is reasonableness
Parreno v COA
by Galang, Maan
Doctrine: If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
FACTS:
Salvador Parreno served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for 32 years. In 1932, he
retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2 nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed
and received a lump sum pension equivalent to 3 years pay. In 1985, he started receiving
his monthly pension.
Petitioner then migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen which
prompted the AFP to stop paying his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD
1638 as amended by PD 1650. This provision provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but it was denied by the Judge Advocate General
of the AFP.
He then filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension but was
denied for lack of jurisdiction because they are not vested with authority to rule on the
constitutionality of laws. When he filed for a motion for reconsideration, the COA denied it,
reiterating its lack of jurisdiction and further ruled that even if they assumed jurisdiction
over the case, petitioners entitlement to retirement benefits must necessarily cease
pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1683, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of PD 1638 violates the equal protection because it
discriminates against AFP retirees who changed their nationality
HELD:
No.
The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to
reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification:
a. must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
b. must be germane to the purpose of the law;
c. must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. must apply equally to each member of the class.
There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference between
retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by
naturalization in another country, such as petitioner in the case before us.
The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military
service necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired
from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his
allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship
constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain
their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
Republic Act No. 7077 (RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a Citizen
Armed Forces. Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that citizen soldiers or reservists include ex-
servicemen and retired officers of the AFP. Hence, even when a retiree is no longer in the
active service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus, we do not find the
requirement imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, oppressive, discriminatory,
or contrary to public policy. The state has the right to impose a reasonable condition that is
necessary for national defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interest of
the state.
Minor issue:
Was he denied due process? No.
When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly
pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner had the
opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he requested for
reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the termination of
his pension. The Judge Advocate General denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD
1638, as amended.
Ycasuegi v Pal
by Tolentino, Hazel
Serrano v Gallant
by Erbon, Roni
Brit Am Tobacco v Camacho
by Reyes, Phoebe
Summary:
British American Tobacco assailed the validity of Section 145 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) and its related implementing regulations for being violative of the
equal protection and uniformity clauses of the Constitution.
Paragraph (c) of Section 145 provides for four tiers of tax rates based on the net retail
price per pack of cigarettes. New brands shall be classified according to their current net
retail price, while existing or "old" brands shall be taxed based on their net retail price as RTC denied the application for TRO, holding that the courts have no authority to restrain
of October 1, 1996. the collection of taxes. Respondents filed an MR. RTC upheld the constitutionality of
Section 145 of NIRC and its related implementing regulations.
WON Section 145 of NIRC is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and
uniformity clause Petitioners brought the petition to SC.

ISSUE: WON Section 145 of NIRC is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally protection and uniformity clause
related to achieving some legitimate State interest. A legislative classification that is
reasonable does not offend the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws.
The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: RULING:
No.
(1) it rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; Petitioner contended that the continued use as the tax base of existing brands of
(3) it applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and cigarettes gives undue protection to said brands which are still taxed based on their price
(4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class. as of October 1996 notwithstanding that they are now sold at the same or even at a higher
price than new brands like Lucky Strike. Thus, old brands of cigarettes such as Marlboro
and Philip Morris which, like Lucky Strike, are sold at or more than P22.00 per pack, are
FACTS: taxed at the rate of P10.88 per pack, while Lucky Strike products are taxed at P26.06 per
Congress passed RA 8240 amending some provisions of NIRC. Section 145 provided four pack.
tiers of tax rates based on the net retail price per pack of cigarettes. New brands shall be
classified according to their current net retail price, while existing or "old" brands shall be This unequal tax treatment between Marlboro and Philip Morris, on the one hand, and
taxed based on their net retail price as of October 1, 1996. Lucky Strike, on the other, is the crux of petitioner's contention that the legislative
classification freeze violates the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the
To implement RA 8240, the BIR issued Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, which classified the Constitution.
existing brands of cigarettes as those duly registered or active brands prior to January 1,
1997. New brands, or those registered after January 1, 1997, shall be initially assessed at While the petition was pending, RA 9334 (An Act Increasing The Excise Tax Rates Imposed
their suggested retail price until such time that the appropriate survey to determine their on Alcohol And Tobacco Products, Amending For The Purpose Sections 131, 141, 143, 144,
current net retail price is conducted. 145 and 288 of the NIRC of 1997, As Amended), took effect on January 1, 2005. One of its
provision imposed a legislative freeze on the classification of cigarettes introduced into the
In June 2001, petitioner British American Tobacco introduced into the market Lucky Strike market between January 2, 1997 and December 31, 2003.
items, with a suggested retail price of P9.90 per pack. Pursuant to Sec. 145, the Lucky
Strike brands were initially assessed the excise tax at P8.96 per pack. The legislative deliberations show that the classification freeze provision was intended to
generate buoyant and stable revenues for government. The reason for this is that the
On February 17, 2003, Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003, amended Revenue Regulations previously classified cigarette brands would be prevented from moving either upward or
No. 1-97 by providing, among others, a periodic review every two years or earlier of the downward their tax brackets despite the changes in their net retail prices in the future
current net retail price of new brands and variants thereof for the purpose of establishing and, as a result, the amount of taxes due from them would remain predictable. The
and updating their tax classification. classification freeze provision would, thus, aid in the revenue planning of the government.
The classification freeze (in lieu of periodic adjustment policy) is not arbitrary but
Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 was issued on March 11, 2003, prescribing the motivated by legitimate state interests.
guidelines and procedures in establishing current net retail prices of new brands of
cigarettes and alcohol products. The rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed
law in the face of an equal protection challenge. It has been held that "in the areas of
Subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 22-2003 was issued on August 8, 2003 to social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
implement the revised tax classification of certain new brands introduced in the market lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge
after January 1, 1997, based on the survey of their current net retail price. Respondent if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
Commissioner of the BIR thus recommended the applicable tax rate of P13.44 per pack the classification."
inasmuch as Lucky Strike's average net retail price is above P10.00 per pack.
Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally
Petitioner filed before RTC of Makati petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a related to achieving some legitimate State interest.
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Said petition
sought to enjoin the implementation of Section 145 of the NIRC, Revenue Regulations Nos. In addition, the uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation as
1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 on the ground that long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the
they discriminate against new brands of cigarettes, in violation of the equal protection and categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things
uniformity provisions of the Constitution. being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies
equally well to all those belonging to the same class. (see Tan vs. Del Rosario, Jr)

The classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all newly introduced brands in the
market, whether imported or locally manufactured. It does not purport to single out
imported cigarettes in order to unduly favor locally produced ones.
Section 145 of the NIRC, as amended by Republic Act No. 9334, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
(2) Section 4(B)(e)(c), 2nd paragraph of Revenue Regulations No. 1-97, as amended by
Section 2 of Revenue Regulations 9-2003, and Sections II(1)(b), II(4)(b), II(6), II(7), III (Large
Tax Payers Assistance Division II) II(b) of Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003, insofar
as pertinent to cigarettes packed by machine, are INVALID insofar as they grant the BIR
the power to reclassify or update the classification of new brands every two years or
earlier.
People v Siton
by Rosales, Andrew
Doctrine/Take-Away: Art 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause because it
is a public order law
Recit Ready: Siton and Sagarano were charged with vagrancy under Art. 202(2) of the
RPC. They wandering and loitering the streets of Davao city without any visible to support
themselves nor lawful & justifiable purpose. Respondents filed motion to Quash on the
ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overboard but was denied
on the premise that it was enacted to pursuant to the States Police Power and justified by
salus populi est suprema lex. RTC held it unconstitutional hence the petition for
certiorari with the SC. ISSUE: Art 202(2) of RPC is unconstitutional as vioative of the Equal
Protection Clause. Held: NO. It doesn't discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed.The law is a public order law which doesnt punish people for their status but
rather for their conduct which could endanger the public peace. Being poor or unemployed
is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Facts:
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy
pursuant to Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations.
Accused were found wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of
Davao City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.
Respondents filed separate Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overboard.
The municipal trial court denied the motions,directed respondents to file their respective
counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the
States police power (or the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property) and justified by the Latin maxim salus populi
est suprema lex (which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of
the greater number).
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal
protection clause.
The RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art. 202
(2)unconstitutional.
Issue:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?
Held:
NO. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed.
Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the
public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or
unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral
conduct
Quinto v Comelec
by Hermoso, JJ
February 22, 2010
Doctrine: The equal protection clause is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification.
Recit-ready:
COMELEC assailed a decision of the Supreme Court which declared provisions in
RA 9369, Omnibus Election Code, and COMELEC Resolution 8678 as violative of
the equal protection clause. It contended it does not violate such and that the SC
decision allowed the participation of public appointive officials in partisan political
activity, contrary to the constitution,
The issue is W/N the assailed provision violate the equal protection clause?
The Court held that it does not. The equal protection clause is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. That a legislative classification is
underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There is
no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to
which it might be applied that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of
regulating all or none. It is the Legislature that is given the authority to balance
competing interests and make policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the
times.
Facts:
Eleazar Quinto and Gerino Tolentino Jr. filed a case which led the Supreme Court to declare
that Section 13 of RA 9369,Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4 of
COMELEC Resolution 8678 as unconstitutional. It held that they violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth.
COMELEC filed for a motion for reconsideration contending that: the SC decision
contravenes the constitutional proscription against participation of public appointive
officials and the military in partisan political activity; the provisions assailed do not violate
the equal protection clause and do not suffer from overbreadth; and there is a compelling
need to reverse the decision for public safety and interest.
Issue:
W/N the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause? NO
 Held:
This Court has already ruled on these provisions in Farias v Executive Secretary that the
equal protection clause is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.
It was held that substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former hold office due to the electorate and are allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities. The latter hold office due to a designation by an
appointing authority and are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political
activity.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. It simply requires equality among equals determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence is that of
reasonableness: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to
the purposes of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed Decision held that the provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites.
However, it considered that the differential treatment of appointive and elected officials is
not germane to the purpose of the law. This conclusion ignores the long-standing rule that
to remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at
once; it may proceed one step at a time.
In addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby
creating some inequity as to those included or excluded. That a legislative classification is
underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious. There is no
constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or
none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that
the law creates a classification that is palpably arbitrary or capricious. Here, the petitioners
failed and the Decision was likewise silent.
It is the Legislature that is given the authority to balance competing interests and make
policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is within the Legislatures power
to make the assailed provisions applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that
the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the
balance in favor of expanding the class. The Court cannot and should not arrogate unto
itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people the best state of affairs from a
public policy standpoint.