Bear Trap by Brigadier Mohammad Yousuf

Important paragraphs from the book:

I had to fight a guerrilla war of a thousand cuts. I knew my enemys sensitive spots
the Salang Highway, aircraft on the ground, the power supply, the dams, the
bridges, the pipelines, the isolated posts or convoys and, at the centre of them all,
Kabul. I knew whre to wield the knife, but knowing what to do is a far cry from doing
it. Selecting a target, deciding a prticular move would be effective, or pinpointing
and opponents weakness is the easy part of generalship. The hard part is
assembling your force in sufficient strenght; getting it well trained under reliavle
leaders; ensuring it is adequately armed, equipped and fed; making certain it
understands the plan; and then moving it, covertly, to the right place at the right
time. This is the real test of generalship. (chapter 3: page no: 82-84)
In mid 1984, the CIA came up with an offer of the Swiss designed 20mm
Oerlikon anti aircraft guns. General Akhtar and I requested furhter details of their
characteristics, which the CIA had somehow forgotten to include. After much
discussion within ISI we said it was not suitable for Afghanistan. We explained that
the weapon weighed 1,200 pounds and was therefore far too heavy. It would require
some tewenty mules to transport a section of three guns; it would impede the
Mujahideens mobility and was more suited to positional defense of strong points.
There was no way mules could use the steep mountain trails,, making its
deployment so restricted as to make the weapon more of a liability than an asset.
We also pointed our that the long, heavy, cumbersome barrel could not be loaded
lengthwise along a horses or mules back. It had to be positioned across the
animal, making it impossible to go through narrow defiles, whrer it snagged on
every bush. Then we pointed out that this weapon had a high rate of fire, control
would mean excessive ammunition expenditure. With bullets costing $50 each, and
a rate of fire of 1000 rounds a minute, I thought this would be a telling point for
cost-conscious Americans. Finally, it was explained that the Oerlikon cres would
need lenghty special training. (chapter 4: Page no:95-96.for financial observation)

I could not , however, prevent the ceaseless stream of CIA sponsored visitors
from Washington who arrived with commendable regularity every two weeks. They
appeared to have bever ending supply of officials, experts, technicians and
analysts, who all felt they could help win the war. Some did make valuabel
contributions but not all. I remember one man who spoke at length on the benefits
fo the use fo electrical power by the Mujahideen in their bases in Afghanistan. He
ferlt it was valuable for the radios. He showed no knowledge of the envirionment,
no comprehension of the lack of repair faciliteis for generators, shortages of fuel,
the effects of winter on operation, or the total absence of trained techinicians in the
field. (chapter 4 page No:101)

I was always fascinated by the Americans technical ability. In the communications

field this was truly astounding. I was told, for example, that in the US their
computers would record the converstation of a Soviet pilot in his aircraft on flight
around Moscow. Seemingly all pilots have certain recognizable ways of speaking,
either of accent, pauses, words used for expressions. It is their signature. The
Americans would give each pilot a code number, so if pilot X was later picked up
speaking in Kabul, intelligence would know that eihter the individual had been
posted or his squadron had moved. It was a simple matter ot establish which. In
such a way an updated Soviet Air Force order of battle in or near Afghanistan was
maintained. (chapter 4: Page NO: 104)

For every thought that a commander bestows upon his enemy, he probably directs
a hundred anxious glances to his own supply line in his rear. I would endorse that
comment. (chapter 5: page No:110)

Concentration and cooperation are two immutable principles of war. Success in

battle is often dependent on both being applied simultaneously at the right time
and place. (chapter5: page no:116)

My officer wanted to find out as much as possible about the man and his following.
The Commander was photographed, he was queried on his Party affiliation, the
exact location of his base, the extent of the area in which he operated, the strenght
of his force, details of the heavy weapons already issued, any previous training, and
recent operations. Aslo, we wanted information on the other Commanders within a
50 km radius his base, and we asked if he was willing to cooperate with them. We
built up a pen picture of the man, with an assessment of his potential. In this case
we discussed his likely objective Bagram and received a favourable response. As
the years passed we built up a library of information on individuals, and in most
cases knew far more about the Commanders than their Party Leaders. (Chapter 6:
Page No:138)

The thirty Mujahideen received intensive training on the handling and firing of the
MBRL. The course was entirely practical, starting with assembling and
disassembling, preparation of the rockets, estimated ranges, setting the bearing
and elevation, loading and firing. They learnt that MBRL was heavy, its main
disadvantage, as it took three men ot manpack its three components (wheels, stand
and barrels) and this was only practical for short distances. For the Bagram
operation mules would be necessary. They learned to make up gun teams of three,
one aiming and setting, two loading, cranking (it was fired by a crank handle), and
firing (by pressing a button). Although it had twelve barrels the rockets were fied
singly, not in one braodside. They had to learn to spot the fall fo shot and estimate
whether it had gone too far, left or right, or short of the target. For this they use
binoculars, they had to shout corrections drop 100, up 300, or left 200, to the
crew, so that adjustment could be made. They were becoming artillerymen.
(Chapter 6: Page No:139)

Being a new broom, General Hamid Gul wanted to start sweeping immediately. He
also needed time to settle in, to meet the leaders, to start to understan the Afghan
way, and so be able to soty out what was possible and what was not. At the
beginning Gul sometimes found this difficult. As a soldier with a cavalry (armoured)
background he was a forthright advocate of an army having a mobile, hard hitting
task force as a reserve a formation that could move at speed to a crisis point,
influence the battle at the right moment, and with which to exploit success. A fine
idea, essential for success in a conventional war, desirable perhaps in a guerilla
war, but an impossibility for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. (page No:242)

Letter to New York Times by Commander Abdul Haq on june 1 st, 1989, Referring to
the US government he wrote: Your Government always claimed to suport the
resistance against the puppet regime of the Soviets. That puppet regime is still in
Kabul, President Najibullah was nto the minister of health or education, he was the
minister of torture and killing (as head of the KHAD). Since he became President, we
have had thousands more victims More than one and a half million people have
been killed, 70% of all the country has been destroyed? And five to six million
people have become refugees. It is said we should make a broad-based government
with President Najibullah and his cronies. Yet American wont give a visa to Kurt
Waldheim because he was alleged to have a role in war crimes more than 45 years
ago. But you want us to compromise with the Hitler of our country. (page NO:244)

One of the most difficult decisions that a guerrila commander has to make once his
forces begin to get the upper hand is the precise moment in the campaign when he
should go on the offensive, when he should progress from guerrila to conventional
strategy and tactics. It is a matter of shrewd judgement. He has to assess the
enemys position with care. Is he sufficiently weakened numerically and materially?
Is he demoralized, collapsing from within? Does he lack the means to keep his units
adequately supplied? If the answer to these question is yes, then perhaps the time
is ripe to shift to the conventional pahe of guerrilla war. But before doing so the
commander must alos examine his own forces. Are his men sufficiently trained to
adopt coordinated conventional attacks, and if so on what scale? Are they well
equipped with heavy support weapons? Can they cope with the enemys ikely
control of the air? Can the scattered groups be supplied, concentrated, and then
cooperate in joint offensives? Again if the answers are affirmative, then, probably, it
is time to launch the offensive that will end the war.

There are numerous instances in military history when the guerrilla

commander has moved into the conventional phase too soon, got a bloody nose,
and as a result the campaign has been set back for months, even years. General
Giap made this error in the early fifties against the French. The Communist Tet
offensive in early 1968 in Vietnam failed, with losses of around 45,00 men, because
their assaults were badly coordinated, communications were poor, the South
Vietnamese Army fought well, and there was no demoralization within it ranks, or
among the South Vietnamese population. Both the French and Americans lost
eventually, but their opposing high commands had misjudged the timming of raising
the stakes. (page No: 259)
The Jehad has never recovered from Jalalabad. The Mujahideen had showed the
world that they had courage and skill to apply the pressures of guerrilla warfare to
bring about the retreat of a superpower. Given the means to fight, given the cause
fo Jehad, and given a modicum of sensible military leadership, they could not be
defeated. Take away these props and no army can win. Military history is a great
teacher for both soldiers and politicans. It lessons are few and of repeated. The
problem lies in the learning. (page No:267)