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2.)Jurisdiction over
criminal actions
arising from
violations of P.D.
957 is vested in
the regular
courts
Jurisdiction is
conferred by law
and determined
by the material
averments in the
complaint as well
as the character
of the relief
sought
The scope and
limitation of the
jurisdiction of the
HLURB are well-
defined. Its
precursor, the
National Housing
Authority (NHA)
was vested under
P.D. 957 with
exclusive
jurisdiction to
regulate the real
estate trade and
business,
specifically the
registration of
subdivion or
condominium
projects and
dealers, brokers
and salesmen of
subdivision lots
or condominium
units, issuance
and suspension
of license to sell;
and revocation of
registration
certificate and
license to sell. Its
jurisdiction was
later expanded
under P.D. 1344
of 1978 to include
adjudication of
certain cases,
such as the
following:
a.) Unsound real estate
business practices;
b.) Claims involving
refund and any
other claims filed by
subdivision lot or
condominium unit
buyer against the
project owner,
developer, dealer,
broker, or
salesmen; and
c.) Cases involving
specific
performance of
contractual and
statutory
obligations filed by
buyers of
subdivision lot or
condominium unit
against the owner,
developer, dealer,
broker, or salesman
The primordial
function of the
HLURB, is the
regulation of the
real estate trade
and business and
NOT the
conviction and
punishment of
criminals
Administrative
agencies being
tribunals of
limited
jurisdiction can
only wield such
powers as are
specifically
granted to them
by their enabling
statutes
Section 38.
Administrative Fines
The Authority may
prescribe and impose
fines not exceeding ten
thousand pesos for
violations of the
provisions of this Decree
or any rule or regulation
thereunder. Fines shall be
payable to the Authority
and enforceable through
writs of execution in
accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of
Court
Under Section 38 of
P.D. 957, the grant
of power to the
former NHA, now
HLURB, over the
imposition of fines
to those which do
not exceed ten
thousand Pesos, it
is clear that the
power in relation
to criminal
liability
mentioned in the
immediately
succeeding
provision, to
impose, upon
conviction, fines
above ten
thousand pesos
and/or
imprisonment,
was not
conferred on it.
Section 39, unlike
Section 38,
conspicuously
does not state
that it is the MIA
that may impose
the punishment
specified therein
---
Dispositive:
Wherefore, the petition is
granted, the assailed
October 2, 2002 and
January 13, 2003 Orders
of the Regional Trial Court
of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch
54, are reversed and set
aside. The said Court is
directed to proceed with
the arraignment of the
respondent and to hear
the case with dispatch.
Separate Opinions:
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition.
This is a frivolous suit. While the tax rates for compensation income are lower than those for net income such
circumstance does not necessarily result in lower tax payments for these receiving compensation income. In fact, the
reverse will most likely be the case; those who file returns on the basis of net income will pay less taxes because they
claim all sort of deduction justified or not I vote for dismissal
Serrano v. Gallant:
Serrano argued that the subject clause impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs
differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) for putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum
salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same
monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate
treatment is not reasonable and there is no substantial distinction between the two groups
Serrano also assailed the decisions of CA and of the labor tribunals, since they did not follow jurisprudence which
sets the rules on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs (Triple Integrated Services Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission)
On R.A. 8042: the insertion of subject clause for this particular Act does not serve any purpose, but to enable the
local agencies to benefit from it. It has been said by the Solicitor General that local agencies, being solidarily
liable, are obliged to shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign
employer is not acquired by the court, or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Therefore, to protect
them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers,
liability for money claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. 8042
Serrano argued that mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, results in sacrificing the well-being of
the OFWs. In addition to that, section 10 of R.A. 8042 makes foreign employers better off than local employers
because foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired
employment contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees
Section 10 also violates the due process clause deprivation of salaries and other emoluments that he is entitled
to under his fixed-period employment contract
Issue: whether or not Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 violates the equal protection law? Does it violate Section I, Article III of
the Constitution and Section 18, Article II and section III, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector?
Ruling: Yes
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to
place of deployment, full protection of rights and welfare
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic
security and partiy: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category,
while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances
The court held that this particular case employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, since it perceives in
the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs
Section 10 is considered to be discriminatory in two levels:
o OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year, vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one
year or more
o Among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year
o OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a specific classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage
o The subject clauses is under a strict scrutiny to determine whether it serves a compelling state interest
through the least restrictive means
o What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history; it is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which is some
individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical
standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern
o Court has concluded that section 10 of RA 8042 does not serve any compelling state interest; the
government has failed to discharge its burden in proving the existence of a compelling state
interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the
subject clause
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
Opinions:
Issue: whether or not Section 145 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and uniformity clause?
Held/Ruling:
No
The assailed law does not violate the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses
o The case neither involves a suspect classification nor impinges on a fundamental right
o Rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an
equal protection challenge
o It has been held that in areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification
o Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to
achieving some legitimate State interest
Petitioners contention that the assailed provisions violate the uniformity of taxation clause is similarly unavailing;
a tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. It
does not signify an intrinsic but simply a geographical uniformity
o A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it is not intrinsically equal and uniform in its
operation; the uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation
Doctrine: void-for-vagueness doctrine a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social orders as an aspect of police power
The requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for, absent
this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse; grounds of suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive; Article 202 (2) of the
RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and
unemployed
Offenders of public order laws are punished for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community
Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct
Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC (October 7, 1994)
1.)Recit-Ready:
Keywords: (Gun Ban; Resolution 2327 (setting up of checkpoints); Arellano only followed orders of the Sergeant-
at-Arms of the HoR)
Aniag jr. is a Congressman of Bulacan, who has a driver named Arellano. The Sergeant-at-Arms of the House
of Congress sent a letter to Aniag Jr., requesting the return of the firearms, which belonged to the House of
Congress. Aniag Jr. instructed Arellano to give back the firearms to the Sergeant-at-Arms immediately. Meanwhile,
due to the upcoming synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, COMELEC issued the Gun Ban Law, along with
Resolution 2327, implementing a checkpoint area that is twenty (20) meters away from the Batasan. Upon the
arrival of Arellano in the Batasan, he was apprehended by a group of policemen, saying that he violated the Gun
Ban Law. Aniag Jr. filed a petition and prayed to absolve Arellano, and stated that the warrantless search of his car
was violative of Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. In addition to this, Aniag Jr. also filed a petition
declaring R.A. 2327 as unconstitutional.
The issue in the case at bar is whether or not Aniag Jr. can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver,
Arellano, to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his car. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Aniag
Jr. stating that the implementation of Resolution No. 2327 was sudden, and it came as a shock to most of the
motorists crossing the area of the checkpoint because the PNP did not set up signs indicating the checkpoint and
its purpose. In addition to this, Arellano (Aniag Jr.s driver and private employee) did not have any knowledge
about the checkpoint, and the behaviour of Arellano as well as how the guns were packed does not trigger any
suspicion at the part of the PNP.
2.)Doctrine:
Article III Section 2: protection of the privacy and sanctity of the person and of his house and other possessions
against arbitrary intrusions by State officers
Prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
Searches and seizures are normally unreasonable, unless authorized by a validly issues search warrant of
arrest
3.)Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the COMELEc
issued on December 11 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the Gun Ban,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms or other
deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security
agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period
December 26, 1991: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gun-running, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and
establishing spot checkpoints
January 10, 1992: pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote Aniag Jr. who was then the Congressman of the 1 st District of Bulacan, requesting
the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives
Upon being advised of the request on January 13, 1992 by his staff, Aniag Jr. immediately instructed his
driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress
About 5 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the PNP headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero
set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance
About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it
approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases
and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car
Arellano was then apprehended and detained; he explained that he was ordered by Aniag Jr. to get the
firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives
The police then referred Arellanos case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest; the referral did not
include Aniag Jr. as among those charged with an election offense
January 15, 1992: City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latters sworn explanation
merito-rious
January 28, 1992: City Prosecutor invited Aniag Jr. to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in
Arellanos sworn explanation
Aniag Jr. not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellanos statement, but also wrote
the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano (to absolve Arellano); he explained that Arellano did
not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning
the firearms to Congress; and, that he was Aniag Jr.s driver, not a security officer nor a
bodyguard
March 6, 1992: Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended
that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the unofficial charge against Aniag Jr. be also
dismissed
April 6, 1992: upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued a resolution directing for
violation of Section 261, paragraph (q) of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, and Aniag Jr. to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33
and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Section 52 paragraph (c) of B.P. Blg. 881
April 13, 1992: Aniag Jr. moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings
as well as the filing of the information in court
April 23, 1992: the COMELEC denied Aniag Jr.s motion for reconsideration
Aniag Jr. questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327; he argues that the rules and
regulations of an administrative body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus
Election Code provides for the disqualification of any person or candidate from running for or
holding a public office; that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not withinthe letter or spirit of the provisions of the
Code; that the resolution did away with the requirements of final conviction before the
commission of certain offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate
may be disqualified from office in situations (a) when the criminal charge is still pending, (b)
where there is no pending criminal case, (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all
contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding
public office under the Omnibus Election Code (proof beyond reasonable doubt); As a result,
Aniag Jr. concludes, Resolution No. 2327 as violative of the fundamental law rendering it fatally
defective
But the issue on disqualification of petitioner from running in the May 11 1992 synchronized elections was
rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued; Consequently, it is
now futile to discuss the implications of the charge against him on his qualification to run for public office
On the issue on warrantless search: Aniag Jr. strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP
conducted the search; according to him, without a warrant and without information the driver of his
fundamental rights, the policemen searched his car
The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano, but were neatly
packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car; thus, the search of his car
that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Sections 2 and 3,
paragraph (2) Article II of the Constitution
Aniag Jr. disputes the charge that he violated Section 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for
public office during the election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of
security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but a
civilian employee assigned to him as a driver by the House of Representatives
Aniag Jr. further argues that Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in
compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the Gun Ban Law thus, no law was in
fact violated
COMELECs response:
COMELEC claims that Aniag Jr. is charged with violation of Section 261 paragraph (q) in relation to
Section 263 of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined
in the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses
It points out that it was upon Aniag Jr.s instruction that Arellano brough the firearms in question outside
Aniag Jr.s residence, submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City
Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellanos possession of the firearms
Aniag jr. also filed a sworn written explanation about the incident
It also claimed that violation of the Gun Ban is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is
immaterial (since its a special penal law)
4.)Issue:
Whether or not Aniag Jr. can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver, Arellano, to return to the Sergeant-
at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered
from the warrantless search of his car
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority.
However, this is not absolute; aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted
at police or military checkpoints which we declare are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a
visual search
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched
The checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce
Resolution No. 2327; there was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so
because a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching
the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms
or in organizing special strike forces
6.)Opinions:
1.)Recit-Ready:
Keywords: Pollo; CSC; government laptop; personal documents; right to privacy; pleadings
2.)Doctrine:
3.)Facts:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct
Present case: a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the CA; the CA denied the
petition for certiorari which was filed by Birccio Ricky A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713 and penalized him with
dismissal
Pollo is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-In-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na program of the CSC
January 3, 2007: an unsigned letter-complained addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked confidential and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a
certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records
Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office
Following office practice in which documents marked Confidential are left unopened and instead sent to
the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David
The content of the letter were as follows:
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an
employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused govt employee having a pending case in the CSC. I
honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief
of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the
CSC. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly because
our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information and
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically
to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions
After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon their arrival, the team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo
and Director III Engelbert Unite of Chairperson Davids directive
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and legal Services Division (LSD) was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said
activity
Director Unite sent text messages to Pollo and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the
time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC
Chair
Pollo replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just
get a lawyer
The following morning, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein; several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard
disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes
were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA)
It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the
computer assigned to and being used by Pollo, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order dated January 11, 2007,
requiring Pollo, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice
Observations of Chairperson David-Constantino: Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings
or docuents that are related to or connected with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as
pending either in the CSCRO No. Iv, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals; most of the
cases are administrative ones; these cases gives a notion that the person who prepared the pleadings was
knowingly, deliberately and wilfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of
the CSC as a central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeance and malfeasance
in the government service; the number of cases found also show that the person who prepares them does
it in a regular basis; and that these files were obtained from Pollos assigned laptop
Pollo filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint
which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with
cases in the CSC
Pollo accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his
right against self-incrimination
Pollo asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave and
even mentioned that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives,
friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their stealing, copying, duplicating and printing
as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure
Pollo pointed out that even though the laptop was government property, the temporary use
and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal
purposes
As to the anonymous letter: Pollo argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the
requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus
inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree
February 26, 2007: the CSC issued Resolution No. 070382 finding prima facie case against Pollo and
charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
Pollo was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he
elects a formal investigation
Pollo filed an Omnibus Motion assailing the formal charges as without basis having proceeded from an
illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the
court
Pollo reiterated that he never aided people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files
found in his computer were prepared not by him, but by certain persons who me permitted, at one time or
another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship
Pollo contended that the case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal
complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom Pollo believes has instigated
this administrative case; he also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him (in
which the CSC has denied)
Since Pollos motion for reconsideration has been denied by the CA, Pollo brough this appeal arguing that:
the Honorable Court grievously and committed palpable errors in law amounting to grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner Pollo cannot invoke his right to privacy, to
unreasonable search and seizure, against self-incrimination, by virtue of office memorandum
No. 10 S. 2002, a mere internal memorandum signed solely and exclusively by respondent
David-Constantino and not by the collegial commission considering that policy matters
involving substantial rights cannot be covered by an office memorandum which is limited to
procedural and routinary instruction
4.)Issue
Whether or not the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent was illegal, which resulted to a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy?
No.
5.)Held/Ruling
Pollos claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail; his other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities
The fact that the documents such as the pleadings were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises
the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said
computer
Did Pollo have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?
o No. Pollo failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files
o Pollo did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors; neither did he allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files; he even
mentioned that he would usually have guests in his office, whom he even allows to use his computer (he
describes his office to be full of friends and unknown people)
o Office Memorandum No. 10 S. 2002: waiver of privacy rights section states that the users waive any
right to privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any
other computer network; it is understood that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor the
use of its Computer Resources
o Office Memorandum which pertains to the use of computers has placed its employees on notice
that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means; this implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes
Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on Pollos
computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
o Yes. The search of Pollos computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC
o A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct
o The search conducted on Pollos computer was justified at its inception and scope
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a fact of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Article 3, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
U.S. jurisprudence (Katz v. United States): the U.S. SC held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy
and constituted a search and seizure; because petitioner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area
o Concurring opinion of Justice Harlan: existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: 1.) That a person ahs exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; 2.) That the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective)
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace
(OConnor Doctrine): Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks and file cabinets, like
similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices
and procedures, or by legitimate regulation; an office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by
supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees; it is the nature of government
offices that others such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general
public may have frequent access to an individuals
6.)Opinions:
1.) Recit-Ready:
2.) Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11
of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981
From 1982 to 2006: the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes
1990: the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 24
of said instrument provides that the State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, especially
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breasfeeding