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Title Facts Issue Held/Ruling

Respondent Kenneth Yap Yes. The Regional Trial


is the president of Court has jurisdiction
Primetown Property over a criminal action
Group, Inc. On November Whether or not a Regional arising from violation
1996: petitioner Ma. Luisa Trial Court has jurisdiction of P.D. 957.
G. Dazon entered into a over a criminal action
contract with Primetown arising from violation of ---
for the purchase of Unit P.D. 957?
No. C-108 of the The petition has merit.
condominium project.
Dazon v. Yap Dazon made a 1.) The DOJ
G.R. No. 157095 downpayment and several Resolution dated
instalment payments June 14, 2002
P.D. 957 and jurisdiction which totalled to 1, 114, which ordered
of HLURB and the RTC 274. 30 Pesos. the withdrawal of
the information
Unfortunately, Primetown was based on the
was not able to finish the finding that the
condominium project. On HLURB, and NOT
March 22, 1999: Dazon the regular court,
demanded for the HAS jurisdiction
refund of her payments over the case
from Primetown,
pursuant to Section 23 A perusal of the
of Presidential Decree allegations in the
No. 957 of 1976 (The complaint-affidavit
Subdivision and would show Dazons
Condominium Buyers grievance against
Protective Decree). Yap, was the
failure of Yaps
firm to refund the
payments Dazon
Even though Dazon made for one of
demanded for the refund, the unites in the
Primetown failed to give aborted Mactan
back Dazons money. Condominium
project in the
On October 26, 2000, yap total amount of
filed a criminal complaint P1, 114, 274.30
with the Office of the City Solid Homes, Inc.
Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu vs. Payawal: the SC
City against Dazon, for had ruled that the
Recitation-Ready Digest

Title Facts Issue Held/Ruling

Respondent Kenneth Yap


is the president of Yes. The Regional Trial
Primetown Property Court has jurisdiction
Group, Inc. On November over a criminal action
1996: petitioner Ma. Luisa arising from violation
G. Dazon entered into a of P.D. 957.
contract with Primetown
for the purchase of Unit ---
No. C-108 of the Whether or not a Regional
Dazon v. Yap condominium project. Trial Court has jurisdiction The petition has merit.
G.R. No. 157095 Dazon made a over a criminal action
downpayment and several arising from violation of 1.)The DOJ
P.D. 957 and jurisdiction instalment payments P.D. 957? Resolution dated
of HLURB and the RTC which totalled to 1, 114, June 14, 2002
274. 30 Pesos. which ordered
the withdrawal of
Unfortunately, Primetown the information
was not able to finish the was based on the
condominium project. On finding that the
March 22, 1999: Dazon HLURB, and NOT
demanded for the the regular court,
refund of her payments HAS jurisdiction
from Primetown, over the case
pursuant to Section 23
of Presidential Decree A perusal of the
No. 957 of 1976 (The allegations in the
Subdivision and complaint-affidavit
Condominium Buyers would show Dazons
Protective Decree). grievance against
Yap, in connection with Yap, was the
the resolution finding failure of Yaps
probable cause, filed a firm to refund the
Petition for Review payments Dazon
with the DOJ. On June made for one of
14, 2002, the DOJ the unites in the
rendered a Resolution aborted Mactan
ordering the trial Condominium
prosecutor to cause project in the
the withdrawal of the total amount of
Information. Therefore, P1, 114, 274.30
the prosecutor filed a Solid Homes, Inc.
Motion to Withdraw vs. Payawal: the SC
Information with the had ruled that the
RTC. Housing and Land
Use Regulatory
The result was that Yaps (HLURB) has
Motion to Withdraw exclusive
Information was granted. jurisdiction over
This meant that the cases involving
Information filed against real estated
him is withdrawn and was business and
transmitted back to the practices under
City Prosecutors Office of P.D. 957 (*this
Lapu-Lapu City. statement has also
been proven by
other jurisprudence)
---

2.)Jurisdiction over
criminal actions
arising from
violations of P.D.
957 is vested in
the regular
courts

Jurisdiction is
conferred by law
and determined
by the material
averments in the
complaint as well
as the character
of the relief
sought
The scope and
limitation of the
jurisdiction of the
HLURB are well-
defined. Its
precursor, the
National Housing
Authority (NHA)
was vested under
P.D. 957 with
exclusive
jurisdiction to
regulate the real
estate trade and
business,
specifically the
registration of
subdivion or
condominium
projects and
dealers, brokers
and salesmen of
subdivision lots
or condominium
units, issuance
and suspension
of license to sell;
and revocation of
registration
certificate and
license to sell. Its
jurisdiction was
later expanded
under P.D. 1344
of 1978 to include
adjudication of
certain cases,
such as the
following:
a.) Unsound real estate
business practices;
b.) Claims involving
refund and any
other claims filed by
subdivision lot or
condominium unit
buyer against the
project owner,
developer, dealer,
broker, or
salesmen; and
c.) Cases involving
specific
performance of
contractual and
statutory
obligations filed by
buyers of
subdivision lot or
condominium unit
against the owner,
developer, dealer,
broker, or salesman

The primordial
function of the
HLURB, is the
regulation of the
real estate trade
and business and
NOT the
conviction and
punishment of
criminals

Administrative
agencies being
tribunals of
limited
jurisdiction can
only wield such
powers as are
specifically
granted to them
by their enabling
statutes

P.D. 957 makes the


following specific
grant of powers to
NHA (now HLURB)
for the imposition
of administrative
fines, and it also
mentions
penalties for
criminal cases:

Section 38.
Administrative Fines
The Authority may
prescribe and impose
fines not exceeding ten
thousand pesos for
violations of the
provisions of this Decree
or any rule or regulation
thereunder. Fines shall be
payable to the Authority
and enforceable through
writs of execution in
accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of
Court

Section 39. Penalties


Any person who shall
violate any of the
provisions of this Decree
and/or any rule or
regulation that may be
issued pursuant to this
Decree shall, upon
conviction, be punished
by a fine of not more than
twenty-thousand pesos
and/or imprisonment of
not more than ten years:
provided, that in the case
of corporations,
partnership, cooperatives,
or associations, the
President, Manager or
Administrator or the
person who has charge of
the administration of the
business shall be
criminally responsible for
any violation of this
Decree and/or the rules
and regulations
promulgated pursuant
thereto

Under Section 38 of
P.D. 957, the grant
of power to the
former NHA, now
HLURB, over the
imposition of fines
to those which do
not exceed ten
thousand Pesos, it
is clear that the
power in relation
to criminal
liability
mentioned in the
immediately
succeeding
provision, to
impose, upon
conviction, fines
above ten
thousand pesos
and/or
imprisonment,
was not
conferred on it.
Section 39, unlike
Section 38,
conspicuously
does not state
that it is the MIA
that may impose
the punishment
specified therein

Not having been


specifically
conferred with
power to hear and
decide cases which
are criminal in
nature, as well as to
impose penalties
therefor, we find
that the HLURB
has no
jurisdiction over
criminal actions
arising from
violations of P.D.
957 (it is the RTC
that has
jurisdiction over
criminal cases
arising from
violations of P.D.
957)

In the present case,


the affidavit-
complaint alleges
the violation of
Section 23 of P.D.
957 and asks for
the institution of a
criminal action
against respondent
Yap, as President of
Primetown; The
office of the City
Prosecutor found
probable cause
for the filing of
an Information
for the subject
offense. The DOJ
made no reversal of
such finding of
probable cause.
Instead, it directed
the withdrawal of
the information
on the erroneous
premise that it is
the HLURB which
has jurisdiction
over the case. It
is not the HLURB
but the RTC that
has jurisdiction to
hear the said
criminal action

---

Dispositive:
Wherefore, the petition is
granted, the assailed
October 2, 2002 and
January 13, 2003 Orders
of the Regional Trial Court
of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch
54, are reversed and set
aside. The said Court is
directed to proceed with
the arraignment of the
respondent and to hear
the case with dispatch.

Title Facts Issue Held/Ruling


Respondent spouses Heracleo and 1.) CA gravely The petition is partly meritorious.
Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a erred in
parcel of land with an area of 7, granting The instant case stemmed from an
DPWH v. Sps 268 square meteres located in San just action for recovery of possession with
Tecson Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan. The parcel compensati damages filed by respondents against
G.R. No. of land was among the properties on to petitioners. It, however, revolves
179334 taken by the government spouses around the taking of the subject lot by
sometime in 1940 without the Tecson, petitioners for the construction of the
owners consent and without considering MacArthur Highway. There is taking
necessary expropriation the highly when the expropriator enters private
proceedings and used for the dubious and property not only for a momentary
construction of the MacArthur questionabl period but for a permanent duration,
Highway e or for the purpose of devoting the
In a letter dated December 15, circumstanc property to public use in such a
1994: spouses Tecson demanded es of their manner as to oust the owner and
the payment of the fair market alleged deprive him of all beneficial
value of the subject parcel of land. ownership enjoyment thereof.
Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras, of the
then the District Engineer of the subject The Court concludes that the issue
First Bulacan Engineering District property regarding the prescription period and
of DPWH, offered to pay the 2.) The CA the laches are not proper issues for
subject land at the rate of P0.70 gravely resolution, since they were already
per square meter per Resolution of erred in included in the pre-trial order.
the Provincial Appraisal Committee awarding
(PAC) of Bulacan just
Spouses Tecson were not satisfied compensati To be sure, the pre-trial order explicitly
with the offer; they demanded for on to defines and limits the issues to be
the return of their property or the spouses tried and controls the subsequent
payment of compensation at the Tecson, course of the action unless modified
current fair market value because before trial to prevent manifest
Since their demand was still not their injustice.
granted, spouses Tecson filed a complaint
Complaint for recovery of for recovery Even if we squarely deal with the
possession with damages against of issues of laches and prescription, the
petitioners, praying that they be possession same must still fail. Laches is
restored to the possession of the and principally a doctrine of equity which
ubject parcel of land and that they damages is is applied to avoid recognizing a right
be paid attorneys fees; the already when to do so would result in a clearly
respondent spouses claimed that barred by inequitable situation or in an injustice.
the subject parcel of land was prescription This doctrine finds no application in
assessed at P2,543,800.00 and laches this case, since there is nothing
On the other hand, the petitioners 3.) The CA inequitable in giving due course to
moved for the dismissal of the gravely respondents claim. Both equity and
complaint on the following erred in the law direct that a property owner
grounds: affirming should be compensated if his property
1.) That the suit is against the the RTCs is taken for public use. Neither shall
State which may not be sued decision prescription bar respondents claim
without its consent ordering the following the long-standing rule "that
2.) That the case has already payment of where private property is taken by the
prescribed just Government for public use without
3.) That spouses Tecson have no compensati first acquiring title thereto either
cause of action for failure to on based on through expropriation or negotiated
exhaust administrative the current sale, the owners action to recover the
remedies market land or the value thereof does not
4.) If respondents are entitled to value of the prescribe."
compensation, they should be alleged
paid only the value of the property of When a property is taken by the
property in 1940 or 1941 spouses government for public use,
June 28, 1995: the RTC issued an Tecson jurisprudence clearly provides for the
Order granting spouses Tecson a remedies available to a landowner.
motion to dismiss based on The owner may recover his property if
the doctrine of state immunity its return is feasible or, if it is not, the
from suit (therefore, even aggrieved owner may demand
damages that were demanded are payment of just compensation for the
waived) land taken. For failure of respondents
When elevated to the CA, the to question the lack of expropriation
appellate court did not agree proceedings for a long period of time,
with the RTC and found they are deemed to have waived and
instead that the doctrine of are estopped from assailing the power
state immunity from suit is not of the government to expropriate or
applicable, because the the public use for which the power
recovery of compensation is was exercised. What is left to
the only relieve available to respondents is the right of
the landowner: to deny such compensation. The trial and appellate
relief would undeniably cause courts found that respondents are
injustice to the landowner entitled to compensation. The only
The CA reversed and set aside issue left for determination is the
the dismissal of the complaint propriety of the amount awarded to
and, consequently, remanded respondents.
the case to the trial court for
the purpose of determining Just compensation is "the fair value of
the just compensation to the property as between one who
which spouses Tecson are receives, and one who desires to sell,
entitled to recover from the x x x fixed at the time of the actual
government taking by the government." This rule
The case was then remanded back holds true when the property is taken
to the RTC, and released a before the filing of an expropriation
dispositive demanding the DPWH suit, and even if it is the property
to pay said complainants the owner who brings the action for
amount of one thousand five compensation.
hundred pesos (P1,500) per
square meter for the lot The issue in this case is not novel.
subject matter of this case in
accordance with the As in said cases, just compensation
Resolution of the Provincial due respondents in this case should,
Appraisal Committee dated therefore, be fixed not as of the time
December 19, 2001 of payment but at the time of taking,
On appeal, the CA affirmed the that is, in 1940.
above decision with the
modification that the just The reason for the rule has been
compensation (which is P1,500 clearly explained in Republic v. Lara,
per square meter), should et al., and repeatedly held by the
earn interest of six percent Court in recent cases, thus:
(6%) per annum computed
from the filing of the action on "The value of the property should be
March 17, 1995 until full fixed as of the date when it was taken
payment and not the date of the filing of the
In its appeal before the CA, proceedings." For where property is
petitioners DPWH raised the issues taken ahead of the filing of the
of prescription and laches, which condemnation proceedings, the value
the CA brushed aside on two thereof may be enhanced by the
grounds: public purpose for which it is taken;
1.) That the issue had already the entry by the plaintiff upon the
been raised by DPWH when property may have depreciated its
the case was elevated before value thereby; or, there may have
the CA the first time been a natural increase in the value of
2.) The issues proper for the property from the time it is taken
resolution had been laid down to the time the complaint is filed, due
in the pre-trial order which did to general economic conditions. The
not include the issues of owner of private property should be
prescription and laches. Thus, compensated only for what he
the same can no longer be actually loses; it is not intended that
further considered his compensation shall extend beyond
DPWH insist that the action is his loss or injury. And what he loses is
barred by prescription having been only the actual value of his property at
filed 54 years after the accrual of the time it is taken.
the action in 1940; they stated
that the court can just Both the RTC and the CA recognized
automatically dismiss the that the fair market value of the
complaint if they see that it has subject property in 1940 was P0.70/sq
already exceeded the prescription m. Hence, it should, therefore, be
period used in determining the amount due
respondents instead of the higher
value which is P1,500.00. While
disparity in the above amounts is
obvious and may appear inequitable
to respondents as they would be
receiving such outdated valuation
after a very long period, it is equally
true that they too are remiss in
guarding against the cruel effects of
belated claim. The concept of just
compensation does not imply fairness
to the property owner alone.
Compensation must be just not only to
the property owner, but also to the
public which ultimately bears the cost
of expropriation.

Clearly, petitioners had been


occupying the subject property for
more than fifty years without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings.
In taking respondents property
without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and without payment of
just compensation, petitioners clearly
acted in utter disregard of
respondents proprietary rights which
cannot be countenanced by the Court.
For said illegal taking, respondents are
entitled to adequate compensation in
the form of actual or compensatory
damages which in this case should be
the legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum on the value of the land at
the time of taking in 1940 until full
payment. This is based on the
principle that interest runs as a matter
of law and follows from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good
position as money can accomplish, as
of the date of taking.
Title Facts Issue Held/Ruling
Whether or not No. Petition must be dismissed.
The success of the challenge Batasang
posed in this suit for Pambansa Blg. 135 Power of Taxation
declaratory relief or violates the due (according to Justice
prohibition proceeding 1 on process and equal Malcolm): an attribute of
Sison v. Ancheta the validity of Section I of protection clauses, sovereignty. It is the strongest
G.R. No. L-59431 Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 and the rule on of all powers of government.
depends upon a showing of its uniformity in The power to tax is regulated
constitutional infirmity. The taxation and controlled by the
assailed provision further provisions stipulated in the
amends Section 21 of the Constitution
National Internal Revenue Sisons argument that BP. 135
Code of 1977, which provides is an arbitrary statute is not
for rates of tax on citizens or sufficient. There must be a
residents on (a) taxable factual foundation of such
compensation income, (b) unconstitutional taint. There is
taxable net income, (c) a need for of such persuasive
royalties, prizes, and other character as would lead to
winnings, (d) interest from such a conclusion. Absent
bank deposits and yield or such a showing, the
any other monetary benefit presumption of validity must
from deposit substitutes and prevail
from trust fund and similar Equal protection Issue:
arrangements, (e) dividends same formulation of the equal
and share of individual protection doctrine should
partner in the net profits of apply to taxation measures
taxable partnership, (f) Sison invoked that taxation
adjusted gross income.
should be grounded on the
Sison, a taxpayer, alleged concept of unity: this ground
that Batas Pambansa Blg. is met according to Justice
135, since he would be unduly Laurel in Philippine Trust
discriminated against by the Company v. Yatco, which was
imposition of higher rates of a case that was decided in
tax upon his income arising 1940, when the tax operates
from the exercise of his with the same force and effect
profession, in relation to those in every place where the
which are imposed upon fixed subject may be found. It
income or salaried taxpayers should also be noted that
He characterizes Section 21 the rule on uniformity
of Blg. 135 as arbitrary, does not call for perfect
amounting to class legislation, uniformity or perfect
oppressive and capricious in equality, because this is
character hardly unattainable
Sison claims that there is a As clarified by Justice Tuason,
transgression of both the where the differentiation
equal protection and due complained of conforms to
process clauses of the the practical dictates of justice
Constitution as well as of the and equity it is not
rule requiring uniformity in discriminatory within the
taxation meaning of this clause and is
The Court, in a resolution of therefore uniform
January 26, 1982, required What misled Sison, is his
Ancheta (the acting failure to take into
commissioner of the BIR), to consideration the
file an answer within 10 days distinction between a tax
from notice rate and a tax base: there is
Ancheta stated in his answer no legal objection to a broader
to Sisons complaint was that tax base or taxable income by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 is a eliminating all deductible
valid exercise of the States items and at the same time
power to tax. In addition to reducing the applicable tax
this, Ancheta also prayed for rate
the dismissal of the petition It is enough that the
for lack of merit classification must rest upon
substantial distinctions that
make real differences
In the case of the gross
income taxation embodied in
BP. 135, the discernable basis
of classification is the
susceptibility of the income to
the application of generalized
rules removing all deductible
items for all taxpayers within
the class and fixing a set of
reduced tax rates to be
applied to all of them
Taxpayers who are recipients
of compensation income are
set apart as a class: these
taxpayers are not entitled to
make deductions for income
tax purposes because they are
in the same situation more or
less
In the case of professionals in
the practice of their calling
and businessmen, there is no
uniformity in the costs or
expenses necessary to
produce their income
There is ample justification
then for the Batasang
Pambansa to adopt the
gross system of income
taxation to compensation
income, while continuing
the system of net income
taxation as regards
professional and business
income

Separate Opinions:
AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition.

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

This is a frivolous suit. While the tax rates for compensation income are lower than those for net income such
circumstance does not necessarily result in lower tax payments for these receiving compensation income. In fact, the
reverse will most likely be the case; those who file returns on the basis of net income will pay less taxes because they
claim all sort of deduction justified or not I vote for dismissal
Serrano v. Gallant:

Content of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042:


In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less

Arguments of Petitioner Serrano:


Serrano is comparing the OFWs to the local workers, in terms of the lump-sum money that they receive due to
R.A. 8042; OFWs have caps in the amount that they get for illegal dismissal, whereas local workers have no limit
monetary award

Serrano argued that the subject clause impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs
differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) for putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum
salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same
monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate
treatment is not reasonable and there is no substantial distinction between the two groups

Serrano also assailed the decisions of CA and of the labor tribunals, since they did not follow jurisprudence which
sets the rules on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs (Triple Integrated Services Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission)

On R.A. 8042: the insertion of subject clause for this particular Act does not serve any purpose, but to enable the
local agencies to benefit from it. It has been said by the Solicitor General that local agencies, being solidarily
liable, are obliged to shoulder the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign
employer is not acquired by the court, or if the foreign employer reneges on its obligation. Therefore, to protect
them and to promote their continued helpful contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers,
liability for money claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. 8042
Serrano argued that mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, results in sacrificing the well-being of
the OFWs. In addition to that, section 10 of R.A. 8042 makes foreign employers better off than local employers
because foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months of the unexpired
employment contract while local employers are liable for the full lump-sum salaries of their employees

Section 10 also violates the due process clause deprivation of salaries and other emoluments that he is entitled
to under his fixed-period employment contract

Issue: whether or not Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 violates the equal protection law? Does it violate Section I, Article III of
the Constitution and Section 18, Article II and section III, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector?

Ruling: Yes

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to
place of deployment, full protection of rights and welfare
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic
security and partiy: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category,
while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances
The court held that this particular case employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, since it perceives in
the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs
Section 10 is considered to be discriminatory in two levels:
o OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year, vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one
year or more
o Among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year
o OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a specific classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it
with a peculiar disadvantage
o The subject clauses is under a strict scrutiny to determine whether it serves a compelling state interest
through the least restrictive means
o What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history; it is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which is some
individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical
standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern
o Court has concluded that section 10 of RA 8042 does not serve any compelling state interest; the
government has failed to discharge its burden in proving the existence of a compelling state
interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the
subject clause
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional

Opinions:

1.)Justice Carpio - Separate Concurring Opinion:


a. Agrees that Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional: provision violates the prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; invalid exercise of police power
b. Right to work and the right to earn a living necessarily includes the right to bargain for better terms
in an employment contract and the right to enforce those terms
c. Assailed provision is unduly oppressive, unreasonable, and repugnant to the Constitution: it
undermines the mandate of the Constitution to protect the rights of OFWs and to promote their welfare

2.)Justice Brion - Concurring Opinion:


a. The provision should be struck down in favour of labour and substantive aspect of due process clause; there
is no necessity in invoking the equal protection clause
b. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 defeats the very purpose of the Act, and it also violates the Constitutions
standards: it diminished rather than enhanced the protection the Constitution envisions for OFWs

British American Tobacco v. Camacho (2009):


Taxation; Constitutional Law Equal Protection Clause: The assailed provisions do not infringe the EPC, because
the four-fold test is satisfied. In particular, the classification freeze provision has been found to
rationally further legitimate State interests consistent with rationality review
o The points raised by petitioner with respect to alleged inequitable taxation perpetuated by the classification
freeze provision are a mere reformulation of its equal protection challenge

Petitioner insists that the assailed provisions of R.A. 8240:


o Violate the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution
o Contravene Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution on unfair competition
o Infringe the constitutional provisions on regressive and inequitable taxation

Issue: whether or not Section 145 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and uniformity clause?

Held/Ruling:
No
The assailed law does not violate the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses
o The case neither involves a suspect classification nor impinges on a fundamental right
o Rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an
equal protection challenge
o It has been held that in areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification
o Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to
achieving some legitimate State interest
Petitioners contention that the assailed provisions violate the uniformity of taxation clause is similarly unavailing;
a tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. It
does not signify an intrinsic but simply a geographical uniformity
o A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it is not intrinsically equal and uniform in its
operation; the uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation

Four-fold test of uniformity of taxation:


o The standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary
o The categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose
o The law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions
o The classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class
In the instant case, there is no question that the classification freeze provision meets the geographical uniformity
requirement because the assailed law applies to all cigarette brands in the Philippines
The classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all cigarette brands whether existing or to be
introduced in the market at some future time; it does not purport to exempt any brand from its
operation nor single out a brand for the purpose of imposition of excise taxes

People of the Philippines v. Siton:

Doctrine: void-for-vagueness doctrine a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social orders as an aspect of police power

The requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for, absent
this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse; grounds of suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive; Article 202 (2) of the
RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and
unemployed
Offenders of public order laws are punished for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community
Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct
Aniag, Jr. v. COMELEC (October 7, 1994)

1.)Recit-Ready:

Keywords: (Gun Ban; Resolution 2327 (setting up of checkpoints); Arellano only followed orders of the Sergeant-
at-Arms of the HoR)

Aniag jr. is a Congressman of Bulacan, who has a driver named Arellano. The Sergeant-at-Arms of the House
of Congress sent a letter to Aniag Jr., requesting the return of the firearms, which belonged to the House of
Congress. Aniag Jr. instructed Arellano to give back the firearms to the Sergeant-at-Arms immediately. Meanwhile,
due to the upcoming synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, COMELEC issued the Gun Ban Law, along with
Resolution 2327, implementing a checkpoint area that is twenty (20) meters away from the Batasan. Upon the
arrival of Arellano in the Batasan, he was apprehended by a group of policemen, saying that he violated the Gun
Ban Law. Aniag Jr. filed a petition and prayed to absolve Arellano, and stated that the warrantless search of his car
was violative of Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. In addition to this, Aniag Jr. also filed a petition
declaring R.A. 2327 as unconstitutional.

The issue in the case at bar is whether or not Aniag Jr. can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver,
Arellano, to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his car. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Aniag
Jr. stating that the implementation of Resolution No. 2327 was sudden, and it came as a shock to most of the
motorists crossing the area of the checkpoint because the PNP did not set up signs indicating the checkpoint and
its purpose. In addition to this, Arellano (Aniag Jr.s driver and private employee) did not have any knowledge
about the checkpoint, and the behaviour of Arellano as well as how the guns were packed does not trigger any
suspicion at the part of the PNP.

2.)Doctrine:
Article III Section 2: protection of the privacy and sanctity of the person and of his house and other possessions
against arbitrary intrusions by State officers
Prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
Searches and seizures are normally unreasonable, unless authorized by a validly issues search warrant of
arrest

3.)Facts:
In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the COMELEc
issued on December 11 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the Gun Ban,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms or other
deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security
agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period
December 26, 1991: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gun-running, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and
establishing spot checkpoints
January 10, 1992: pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote Aniag Jr. who was then the Congressman of the 1 st District of Bulacan, requesting
the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives
Upon being advised of the request on January 13, 1992 by his staff, Aniag Jr. immediately instructed his
driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress
About 5 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the PNP headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero
set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance
About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it
approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases
and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car
Arellano was then apprehended and detained; he explained that he was ordered by Aniag Jr. to get the
firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives
The police then referred Arellanos case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest; the referral did not
include Aniag Jr. as among those charged with an election offense
January 15, 1992: City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latters sworn explanation
merito-rious
January 28, 1992: City Prosecutor invited Aniag Jr. to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in
Arellanos sworn explanation
Aniag Jr. not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellanos statement, but also wrote
the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano (to absolve Arellano); he explained that Arellano did
not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning
the firearms to Congress; and, that he was Aniag Jr.s driver, not a security officer nor a
bodyguard
March 6, 1992: Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended
that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the unofficial charge against Aniag Jr. be also
dismissed
April 6, 1992: upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued a resolution directing for
violation of Section 261, paragraph (q) of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, and Aniag Jr. to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33
and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Section 52 paragraph (c) of B.P. Blg. 881
April 13, 1992: Aniag Jr. moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings
as well as the filing of the information in court
April 23, 1992: the COMELEC denied Aniag Jr.s motion for reconsideration

Aniag Jr. questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327; he argues that the rules and
regulations of an administrative body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus
Election Code provides for the disqualification of any person or candidate from running for or
holding a public office; that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not withinthe letter or spirit of the provisions of the
Code; that the resolution did away with the requirements of final conviction before the
commission of certain offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate
may be disqualified from office in situations (a) when the criminal charge is still pending, (b)
where there is no pending criminal case, (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all
contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding
public office under the Omnibus Election Code (proof beyond reasonable doubt); As a result,
Aniag Jr. concludes, Resolution No. 2327 as violative of the fundamental law rendering it fatally
defective

But the issue on disqualification of petitioner from running in the May 11 1992 synchronized elections was
rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued; Consequently, it is
now futile to discuss the implications of the charge against him on his qualification to run for public office

On the issue on warrantless search: Aniag Jr. strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP
conducted the search; according to him, without a warrant and without information the driver of his
fundamental rights, the policemen searched his car
The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano, but were neatly
packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car; thus, the search of his car
that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Sections 2 and 3,
paragraph (2) Article II of the Constitution
Aniag Jr. disputes the charge that he violated Section 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for
public office during the election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of
security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but a
civilian employee assigned to him as a driver by the House of Representatives
Aniag Jr. further argues that Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in
compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the Gun Ban Law thus, no law was in
fact violated

COMELECs response:
COMELEC claims that Aniag Jr. is charged with violation of Section 261 paragraph (q) in relation to
Section 263 of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined
in the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses
It points out that it was upon Aniag Jr.s instruction that Arellano brough the firearms in question outside
Aniag Jr.s residence, submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City
Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellanos possession of the firearms
Aniag jr. also filed a sworn written explanation about the incident
It also claimed that violation of the Gun Ban is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is
immaterial (since its a special penal law)

4.)Issue:
Whether or not Aniag Jr. can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver, Arellano, to return to the Sergeant-
at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered
from the warrantless search of his car

5.) Held/Ruling: No.


There was also no indication from the package or behaviour of Arellano that could have triggered
the suspicion of the policemen; therefore, the search could not be valid
The action of the policemen unreasonably intruded into Aniag Jr.s privacy and security of his property, in
violation of Section 2 Article III of the Constitution
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of Aniag Jr.s right against warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any proceeding
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that guidelines
shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority, and that the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints
shall be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel
created under Section 5 of Resolution No. 2323
The checkpoint was not announced it did not even carry signs informing the public of the purpose
of its operation; as a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever
about the reason behind the instant exercise
In the case of Aniag Jr., only his driver (Arellano) was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection;
driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint; in the face of 14 armed policemen
conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of Aniag Jr. could not
have marshalled the strength and the courage to protect against the extensive search conducted
in the vehicle

As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority.
However, this is not absolute; aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted
at police or military checkpoints which we declare are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a
visual search
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be
searched
The checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce
Resolution No. 2327; there was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so
because a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching
the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms
or in organizing special strike forces

6.)Opinions:

Justice Cruz (concurring):


I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent in the
case of Valmonte v. De Villa: . . . the bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of
national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the
State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that searches and seizures
are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much
less the required warrant . . .

Justice Vitug (concurring):


He concurs with the ratio decidendi of the Court in Valmonte v. De Villa
The question has been asked: between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the
one hand, and the constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which
should be held to prevail? There is no choice to my mind not for any other reason than because there is,
in the first place, utterly no need to make a choice. The two are not incompatible; neither are
they necessarily opposed to each other. Both can be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is
the strength of the other
There are ways to discipline and combat the ills of society; although disregarding the constitutional
mandates or abusing the citizens is not the way to improve things
Justice Vitug also mentioned that even in the times of monarchy, even the king cannot go above the rights
of man, and that the fundamental or basic rights of men were deemed respected at all times

Justice Regalado (concurring and dissenting):


I joint Mr. Justice Davide Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with respect to
petitioner Aniag Jr., Resolution No. 92-0829 of COMELEC should be set aside, not because of an
unconstitutional warrantless search but by reason of the fact that he was not actually charged as a
respondent in the preliminary investigation of the case
In the case of Arellano (Aniag Jr.s driver), although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner in the case, the
nullification of said resolution necessarily applies to him and redounds to his benefit
I dissent from the rationale submitted stating that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a
warrant; the pertinent facts stated by the majority readily yield the conclusion that there was consent on
the part of Arellano to the search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage compartment
where firearms were discovered. As it was held in People v. Excela, et al., consent to a search may
be given expressly or impliedly, and as early as People v. Malasugui, the settled rule is that a
search may be validly conducted without a warrant if the person searched consented thereto
I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he was
acting in obedience to what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the
instructions of his employer, petitioner Aniag Jr., who was himself acting upon and in compliance with
Resolution No. 2323 of COMELEC which was implemented by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives

Justice Davide, Jr. (concurring and dissenting):


I regret that I can concur only in the result . I am unable to agree with the specific disposition declaring
(a) illegal the warrantless search conducted by the PNP on January 13, 1992, (b) inadmissible in evidence in
any proceeding against Aniag Jr. the firearms seized during such warrantless search, (c) unconstitutional
COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829
Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327 because this petition may be
resolved without passing upon this particular issue. This court may no longer inquire into the
constitutionality of the spot checkpoints authorized to be established thereunder; and whether the
warrantless search conducted by the PNP at the checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have
been, provided there existed a probable cause therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this case
is either procedurally premature, or one which this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve considering the
obvious paucity of the facts before it
The search was not in connection with the crime of illegal possession of firearms, which would
have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms involved were licensed and were
duly issued to Aniag Jr. by the House of Representatives, but for the violation of the gun ban
which was validly decreed by COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall
January 13, 1992 (the day when Aniag Jr. instructed Arellano to get the firearms at his house in
Valle Verde), was already within the election period, which commenced the day earlier
pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2314
I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in directing and filing of an information against Aniag Jr. for the violation of
paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Ommibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No.
7166

Polio v. Constantino-David (October 18, 2011):

1.)Recit-Ready:

Keywords: Pollo; CSC; government laptop; personal documents; right to privacy; pleadings

2.)Doctrine:

3.)Facts:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct
Present case: a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the CA; the CA denied the
petition for certiorari which was filed by Birccio Ricky A. Pollo to nullify the proceedings conducted by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713 and penalized him with
dismissal

Pollo is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-In-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na program of the CSC
January 3, 2007: an unsigned letter-complained addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David which was marked confidential and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a
certain Alan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records
Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office
Following office practice in which documents marked Confidential are left unopened and instead sent to
the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David
The content of the letter were as follows:

As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an
employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused govt employee having a pending case in the CSC. I
honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.

I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief
of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the
CSC. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly because
our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information and
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically
to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions
After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon their arrival, the team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo
and Director III Engelbert Unite of Chairperson Davids directive
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and legal Services Division (LSD) was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said
activity
Director Unite sent text messages to Pollo and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the
time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC
Chair
Pollo replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just
get a lawyer
The following morning, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein; several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard
disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes
were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA)
It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the
computer assigned to and being used by Pollo, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals
On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order dated January 11, 2007,
requiring Pollo, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice
Observations of Chairperson David-Constantino: Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings
or docuents that are related to or connected with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as
pending either in the CSCRO No. Iv, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals; most of the
cases are administrative ones; these cases gives a notion that the person who prepared the pleadings was
knowingly, deliberately and wilfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of
the CSC as a central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeance and malfeasance
in the government service; the number of cases found also show that the person who prepares them does
it in a regular basis; and that these files were obtained from Pollos assigned laptop

Pollo filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint
which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with
cases in the CSC
Pollo accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his
right against self-incrimination
Pollo asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave and
even mentioned that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives,
friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their stealing, copying, duplicating and printing
as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure
Pollo pointed out that even though the laptop was government property, the temporary use
and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal
purposes
As to the anonymous letter: Pollo argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the
requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus
inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree

February 26, 2007: the CSC issued Resolution No. 070382 finding prima facie case against Pollo and
charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
Pollo was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he
elects a formal investigation
Pollo filed an Omnibus Motion assailing the formal charges as without basis having proceeded from an
illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the
court
Pollo reiterated that he never aided people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files
found in his computer were prepared not by him, but by certain persons who me permitted, at one time or
another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship
Pollo contended that the case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal
complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom Pollo believes has instigated
this administrative case; he also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him (in
which the CSC has denied)

Since Pollos motion for reconsideration has been denied by the CA, Pollo brough this appeal arguing that:
the Honorable Court grievously and committed palpable errors in law amounting to grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner Pollo cannot invoke his right to privacy, to
unreasonable search and seizure, against self-incrimination, by virtue of office memorandum
No. 10 S. 2002, a mere internal memorandum signed solely and exclusively by respondent
David-Constantino and not by the collegial commission considering that policy matters
involving substantial rights cannot be covered by an office memorandum which is limited to
procedural and routinary instruction

4.)Issue
Whether or not the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent was illegal, which resulted to a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy?
No.
5.)Held/Ruling
Pollos claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail; his other
argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate
intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited
authorities
The fact that the documents such as the pleadings were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises
the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said
computer
Did Pollo have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?
o No. Pollo failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files
o Pollo did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors; neither did he allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files; he even
mentioned that he would usually have guests in his office, whom he even allows to use his computer (he
describes his office to be full of friends and unknown people)
o Office Memorandum No. 10 S. 2002: waiver of privacy rights section states that the users waive any
right to privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any
other computer network; it is understood that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor the
use of its Computer Resources
o Office Memorandum which pertains to the use of computers has placed its employees on notice
that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means; this implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes

Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on Pollos
computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
o Yes. The search of Pollos computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is
supposedly lawyering for individuals with pending cases in the CSC
o A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty
of work-related misconduct
o The search conducted on Pollos computer was justified at its inception and scope

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a fact of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Article 3, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
U.S. jurisprudence (Katz v. United States): the U.S. SC held that the act of FBI agents in electronically
recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy
and constituted a search and seizure; because petitioner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the
enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area
o Concurring opinion of Justice Harlan: existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: 1.) That a person ahs exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; 2.) That the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective)
On the matter of government employees reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace
(OConnor Doctrine): Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks and file cabinets, like
similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices
and procedures, or by legitimate regulation; an office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by
supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees; it is the nature of government
offices that others such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general
public may have frequent access to an individuals

6.)Opinions:

Justice Carpio (Separate concurring opinion):


Any private use of a government property, like a government-owned computer, is prohibited by law
Consequently, a government employee cannot expect any privacy when he uses a government-owned
computer because he knows he cannot use the computer for any private purpose
The CSC regulation declaring a no-privacy expectation on the use of government-owned computers
logically follows from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used solely for a public
purpose

Justice Bersamin (Concurring and dissenting opinion):


At the outset, I state that the right to privacy involved herein is Pollos right to informational privacy in his
workplace, specifically his right to work freely without surveillance or intrusion
Even without Office Memorandum No. 10 series of 2002 being issued by respondent Karina Constantino-
David as Chairman of the CSC, the employees of the Commission, including Pollo, have a reduced
expectation of privacy in the workplace; the objective of the issuance of OM No. 10 has been only to
formally inform and make aware the employees of the Commission about the limitations on their privacy
while they are in the workplace and to advise them that the Commission has legitimate reasons to monitor
communications made by them, electronically or not
I hold, instead, that Pollo is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the communications
created, stored, sent or received after office hours through the office computer, as to which he must be
protected
Thus, I vote to uphold the legality of OM No. 10; I hasten to add, to be very clear, that the validity of the
seizure of the files should be limited to the need for determining whether or not Pollo unjustly utilized
official resources of the Commission for personal purposes, and should not extend to the reading of the
files contents, which would be violative of his right to privacy
Right to privacy is referred to as a right to be enjoyed by the people, the State cannot just sit back and
stand aside when, in the exercise of his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the
detriment of the national interest
Although interests of capital or public service do merit protection, a recognition of the limitations of man as
a being needful of some extent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during work hours, is
most essential in order to fully maximize the potential by which his services was obtained in the first place;
the job should not own him the whole time he is in the workplace; even while he remains in the workplace,
he must be allowed to preserve his own identity, to maintain an inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to
keep certain thoughts, judgments and desires hidden
Pharmaceutical v. Duque III (October 9, 2007)

1.) Recit-Ready:

2.) Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11
of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981
From 1982 to 2006: the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes
1990: the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 24
of said instrument provides that the State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, especially
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breasfeeding

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