Republic of the Philippines changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name BORBON be
SUPREME COURT deleted and instead place therein the name ELEOSIDA, which is
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 130277 May 9, 2002
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her
minor child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner,
vs.
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the
petition of Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth
certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The birth certificate shows, among
others, that the child's full name is Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He
was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos
Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that the child's parents
were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas City.2
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the
following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first,
the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date
of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's
name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E.
Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for
to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father,
the presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore
illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition
impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as
respondents.3
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
"Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes
Barrientos Eleosida, praying that the entries in the Certificate of
Live Birth of her minor child, Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon, be
Page 1 of 46
the surname of his mother-petitioner; the entry "January 10, 1985
Batangas City", be likewise deleted, since the petitioner and
respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at the time of the minor's birth
were not legally married; and the surname BORBON of petitioner
Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under the column Informant, be also
deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on
June 26, 1997 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall
of this Court sitting at the Ground Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice,
Quezon City, which is ordered published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation and
published in Metro Manila, to be selected by raffle, at the expense
of the petitioner, at which date, time and place, the petitioner shall
appear and prove her petition, in that all other persons having or
claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show cause
why, if any, they have, the petition shall not be granted.
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together
with copies of the petition, respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the
Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Solicitor
General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, within
which to file their opposition thereto, if any. In the event that the
Solicitor General may not be able to appear on the scheduled
hearing, to designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear
for and in behalf of the State.
SO ORDERED."4
"Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the
Solicitor General as contained in the notice of hearing dated April
23, 1997 requiring that office to file their opposition, if any, to the
petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of minor
child Charles Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be allowed to
present compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and at the
same time initially present evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning."5
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. It ruled:
"It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF
A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name,
occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject of a judicial
order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code),
authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the
CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS
INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the
petitioner will ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES
CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to Direct the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that
of BORBON; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12,
respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the
ground that she was never married to respondent CARLOS
VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in ITEM 14,
respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES E.
BORBON to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of
petitioner's intention and device to establish that CHARLES
CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to
secure judicial order, which would authorize a change in the civil
status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this Court, finds the action
improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed by
petitioner cannot be considered falling under the ambit of the
words 'clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.'
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU
PROPIO (sic) dismissed."6
Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether
corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412
of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be
allowed even if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. 7
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.
The OSG submitted that even substantial errors in the civil registry may be
corrected provided that the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the
Page 2 of 46
petition seeks the correction and eventual change in the civil status of
Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as long as all the
parties who may be affected by the entries are notified and
represented.8 Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the other hand, failed to
submit his comment on the petition despite several notices from this
Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court dispensed with the filing of
respondent Borbon's comment and gave due course to the petition. 9
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or
adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil
register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.10 This
is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia11 where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered. The Court further laid down the
procedural requirements to make the proceedings under Rule 108
adversary, thus:
"The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once
in a week for three 93) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
 cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to
days from notice, file his opposition thereto. oppose the same.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil August 25, 1997 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the
register are(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or petition at bar is set aside. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing further proceedings.
of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to(1) issue an
order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and SO ORDERED.
(2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
Davide, Jr., Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the
petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition

for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth
even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court can no longer be described as 'summary'. xxx"12

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by

petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones
as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian.
Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records show
that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing
setting the hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118,
Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise ordered the publication
of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila.
The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during said
hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall
also appear and show if there is any reason why the petition should not be
granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the
notice of hearing together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997,
the trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to
show compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to present
evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The foregoing satisfy all
the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was
therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu
proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her

Page 3 of 46
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170340 June 29, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN,
HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and
KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which
affirmed the September 4, 2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of respondents Carlito I. Kho
(Carlito), Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-
Serrano for the correction of entries in their birth certificates as well as
those of Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and
Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in
their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of
his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries
in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of
the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as
the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage
of parents" because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania),
were allegedly not legally married.
Page 4 of 46
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their
respective birth certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy
Nona, and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that
the date of his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to
January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition3 in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of "John" be deleted from
his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in
his (Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan
Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks 4 in
Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after
which it was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil
registrar5 stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed
corrections in the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no
objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the
counsel for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) had yet to enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial
court thus reset the hearing to October 9, 2001. 6 On September 14,
2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an authorization to the city
prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case and render assistance to it
(the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence
showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition.
They also presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of
Carlito and his mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional
correction in the birth certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the
effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to
"Marivel."
By Decision8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil
registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of
Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese"
to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his name; and (3) delete the word
"married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction
was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates
of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito
and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27,
1989, and the name "Maribel" as "Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the
corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos
father from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latters citizenship from
"Filipino" to "Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries
in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the
minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient
evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned
"married" status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the latters
citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name
"Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners
appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines
the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, was observed in the case.
Regarding Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held
that the correction of their mothers first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel"
was made to rectify an innocuous error.
Page 5 of 46
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit
the CA conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date
would not affect the minors filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate"
considering that at the time of their respective births in 1991 and 1993,
their father Carlitos first marriage was still subsisting as it had been
annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlitos legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they
were born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the
CA went on to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to the
case, the minors having been represented by their father as required
under Section 5 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied
nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in
the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for
correction of entry in Carlitos birth record, it noted, falls under letter "o"
of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought
by respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted
through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as
Marivel and respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change
Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not
satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior
three-year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the
petition did not state Carlitos aliases and his true name as "Carlito John I.
Kho." Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to
the change of name of Carlitos father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the "married" status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings
respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of
Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature.10 Rather, the changes entail substantial
and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in
his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and
effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of
the offspring.11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents
were "married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," with
significant implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic12 explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the
books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the
civil register could be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who
may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door to
fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia,13 however, this Court ruled, and has since
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108. 14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well
as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
xxxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law
Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding["] as follows:
Page 6 of 46
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning
to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x
x 15(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known
as "An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or
Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of
Judicial Order," has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the
judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of
a petition under Rule 108.16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito17 observed that the obvious
effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative
correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or
nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction
of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial
proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed,
the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial
corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. 18 The pertinent
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial courts Order19 setting the petition for
hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to
oppose it was posted20 as well as published for the required period; that
notices of hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city
prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and that trial was
conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public prosecutor, acting
in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining Carlito and
Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and
Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary
proceeding and the trial courts judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 21 That case
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of
a minor, June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father
(Armando Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her surname. The
petition was granted by the trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo,
however, sought to annul the trial courts decision, claiming that she
should have been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to
implead her deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the
order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead
an indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the
civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate
adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
xxxx
Page 7 of 46
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
wards share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to
the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a
thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only
the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear
and decide it.22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel
or respondents parents should have been impleaded as parties to the
proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the
hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as
representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-inclusion
of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of
the proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates,
especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court eHe were
all sent to the residence23 she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition
to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about
the facts recorded therein.24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate
of marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000,
not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date
"April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not
married to Marivel at the time his sons were born because his previous
marriage was annulled only in 1999.26 Given the evidence presented by
respondents, the CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth,
hence, the correction would bring about no change at all in the nature of
their filiation.
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in
1959.27 Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his
siblings birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of
marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on
November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van
Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living together as
common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted marriage
legally.28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of
marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. 29 Under the circumstances, the
deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of marriage of parents"
is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from
"Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation
or correction of entries involving changes of name falls under letter "o" of
the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108: 30
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
Page 8 of 46
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(o) changes ofname. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs
petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from the Urious
College in Butuan City,31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service
Commission,32 and voter registration record33 satisfactorily show that he
has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise
from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as
appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that
during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not
deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction
prayed for, which certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way
change the adversarial nature of the proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings
uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the
correction in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would
perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who
are unquestionably born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of
the name of Carlitos wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is
clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is
also obvious to the understanding34 considering that the name reflected in
the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing the appellants
Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a
clerical error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to
Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which
can be granted through a summary proceeding.36The same ruling holds
true with respect to the correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his
fathers name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in said marriage
certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the birth vs.
certificates of Carlito and of his siblings. 37 CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar
OSCAR B. MOLO, Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. DECISION

SO ORDERED. TINGA, J.:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Associate Justice
Revelation 3:5

On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,

represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of
entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought
to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.

The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.

The RTC established the following facts:

Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet
married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son
Republic of the Philippines so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
SUPREME COURT Lin Carulasan Wang.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG,
to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN
WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG, Petitioners,
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a
long time because they will let him study there together with his sister
named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries
a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are
brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds
funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter
"R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the

Page 9 of 46
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian
Lin Wang.1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The
trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in
the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against
when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within
the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change
sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an
interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken
from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court
added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could
then decide whether he will change his name by dropping his middle
name.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was
denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.4The trial court maintained that
the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify
the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends
to study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to
giving due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not
prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would
not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is
itself not reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule
45)6 arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 7 of the Family
Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith globalization and mixed marriages,
there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of
family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency
and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest
of the child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason
for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
Petitioner points out that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him
undue embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be
an obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have
Page 10 of 46
denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of
majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous
cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of
name.10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment
on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court
correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that
under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to
bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be
denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the
OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name
"Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is
not sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation
of entry.12 The OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any
compelling reason to justify the change of name or the dropping of the
middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use
of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more
imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised before the
trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only trigger
much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence,
while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no
confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even
assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has
also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually
proscribed by Singaporean law.13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so
that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or
reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. 14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper
and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. 15 To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest. 16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court.
The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all
the best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the
sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts.17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it
does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and
adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether.
Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name
usually deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful
of cases involving requests for change of the given name 18 and none on
requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow
one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to
answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this
point. We quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used
merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are
descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential
thing and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a
variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
Page 11 of 46
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute,
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is
fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does
not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle
names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well
as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given
name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother,21 while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they
may bear the fathers surname.22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized
by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and
does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate
child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child
is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged
by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that
he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate.
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name,
and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle
name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself
into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which, however, are not apropos
both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother,
Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to
change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The
Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other
siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their
mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname
there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;
and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a
fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in
her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the
surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The
Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be
granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court
took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to
eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued
to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that
justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to
improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not cause
prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of
the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of
the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could
use only one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon,
the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and
Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to
Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her
school records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her
petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364
Page 12 of 46
of the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally
use the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose
to use the surname of herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the
Court found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to
avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention
would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could
not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners
were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name.
Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and
judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the
presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court,
in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that
time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the
fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the
Court granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since
childhood by a name different from her registered name and she had not
used her registered name in her school records and voters registration
records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed
by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this
case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of
majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest
in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name,
gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner
therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient
is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the
matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when Republic of the Philippines
he reaches the age of majority.26 As he is of tender age, he may not yet SUPREME COURT
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and Manila
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights
under our laws.
FIRST DIVISION

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
Certiorari is DENIED.

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and

SO ORDERED.
JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
concur. OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented
by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C.
TITULAR, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr.
(Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4,
1978. The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle
Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo 4 on
June 4, 1980.

Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West

Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the

Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-
respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's
son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she
obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR

Date of Birth : 01 January 1996

Page 13 of 46
 jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a
DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
adversarial action.

Father : Pablito S. Braza

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of
November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.
Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997
Civil Registrar :
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries
Annotation : "Late Registration"
in the civil registrar. Citing Cario v. Cario,11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial errors,
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito such as those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the
Braza on January 13, 1997"
subject of a petition under Rule 108.14

Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent

marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at
Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known
as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation.

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that
Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-
petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the entries in the
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and
Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's
birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive
to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as
stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patricks Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by
Order9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court,
which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil
Code15 charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be
cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may
generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as
a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that
petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the
ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with
which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patricks birth records 17 and that the rest of the prayers are
merely incidental thereto.

Page 14 of 46
Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek
the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous
and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition
should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cario v. Cario was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife
for the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after
the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with
the husband while the latters marriage to the first wife was still subsisting,
the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to
the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention
that the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts
were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their
records of birth but to establish that they are not the latters children,
hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the
cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners mother
and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological
mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as
adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the
correction of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that
they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese,
because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that
the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely
Page 15 of 46
innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different
from those obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind!
North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the
reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and
slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the
other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong)
and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas
and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does
the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs
and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP
Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to
the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4,
1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand.
He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for
three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were
established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-
Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner.
Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
Page 16 of 46
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with
his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would
be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity.
With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a
female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to
deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition
and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that
there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor
of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis.
There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the
Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of
the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
petition. regulations.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may
be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in
female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We
any of the following cases:
disagree.

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
pronounce;
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
judicial authority.

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil
change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first
or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned

Page 17 of 46
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change
of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as
the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It
was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name
does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To
Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection,
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
Page 18 of 46
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name
or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the
Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something
else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct.
No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and
judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those
acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is,
the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after
the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or
by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to
the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents
or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f)
such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is
a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register
Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being
no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as
"the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is
"the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons

Page 19 of 46
who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to
the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued
that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex
Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition
would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to
his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-
female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
Page 20 of 46
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to
do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-
based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature
intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex,
it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when
a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 166676
Petitioner,

- versus -

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, September 12, 2008

Page 21 of 46
 Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following
changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer
Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to
male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before the RTC,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound
where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped
growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Page 22 of 46
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation
for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by
the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued
a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as
CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her
body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally
and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this
condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her
mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would
be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January
12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court
very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his
petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body
produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his
action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be
male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil
Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
 a) By changing the name from Jennifer
Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female
to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school
records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION,
i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE
HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering
the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her
sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
Page 23 of 46
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not implead the
local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three
(3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. [7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local
Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the
Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil
Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on
December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of
the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his
birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,
[9]
change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, [10] and respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name
shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his
name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and
shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of
such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient
in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall
deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within
thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of
the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court
on the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable
Page 24 of 46
cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with
the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the
civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested
in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
 persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because
respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3,
Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is
an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case
can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified
Page 25 of 46
of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short
of the requirements of the rules. [13] The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may
have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.
[14]
Respondent, however, invokes Section 6, [15] Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote
their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of
the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this
connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without
the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from
the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries
in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407
of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. [20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early
or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like
respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually
has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an
ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal
internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, andfailure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with
CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy.
[21]
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to
apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.
[22]
The term is now of widespread use. According
to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of
a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively
male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Page 26 of 46
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to
conform to either a male or female gender role. [23] Since the rise of
modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with
ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
resemble either male or female genitals. [24] More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is
almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by
taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should
not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some
middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals
who are neither truly male nor truly female. [25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as
a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female,
then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific
development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically
male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the
phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically
or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the
of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of unique circumstances in this case.
male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents
with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change
taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken
its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision
characteristics. dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and
SO ORDERED.
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment
in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force Republic of the Philippines
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the SUPREME COURT
mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the Manila
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of THIRD DIVISION
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified
the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
DECISION

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of PERALTA, J.:
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed
out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
Page 27 of 46
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA)1Decision2 dated February 18, 2011
and Resolution3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The
assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines and, consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special
Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of
Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy;
while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her
Certificate of Live Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8,
1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay6 Her
Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact
she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay."
She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the
name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate
child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow
the surname of her mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino
citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay
and are all Filipinos.11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the
corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not
bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order finding the petition to be
13
sufficient in form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the
directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at
least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of
respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office for their
information and guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent
complied with the publication requirement.
Page 28 of 46
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person
acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or
change of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioners name
and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioners name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the
government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy
Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially
since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction.
Considering that respondent has continuously used and has been known
since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC
granted the petition to avoid confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held
that respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured
upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by
serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the
City Prosecutors Office.17 As to whether the petition is a collateral attack
on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering
that her parents were not legally married and that her siblings birth
certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their
citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is
dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule
108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
Page 29 of 46
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth
certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and
citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which
she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents
such as passport and school and professional records. She likewise relied
on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname
"Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of
"Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere clerical as they
touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname
from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the
surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate
to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the
same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes
are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v.
Valencia20 that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 The
pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well
as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law
Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning parties.
to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding.22 In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was
impleaded as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Courts conclusion in RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent,
Republic v. Kho,23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Appeals,25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by
the publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed
the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue
respondents failure to implead the minors mother as an indispensable
involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has
party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108,
addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v.
because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was
Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33
unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth
certificates especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never
court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27
legally married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name
from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial
his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng."
courts decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by
The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and there being
respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by petitioner.
no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default and
In that case, petitioners mother and guardian was impleaded in the
eventually granted respondents petition deleting the entry on the date and
petition for correction of entries, and notices were sent to her address
place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to
appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was returned
"Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting
unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she
the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The
allegedly learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment
Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on
of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the petition for
the grounds that the corrections made on respondents birth certificate had
correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that acquisition
the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and
of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required
must only be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The
and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial courts
Court nullified the RTC decision for respondents failure to comply strictly
compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. 29
with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from
the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he
whether the court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the
indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead the
failure to implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the
indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by case.
compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by
publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and
petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties
annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the
whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It
same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and,
emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply
therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein.
with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the notice of
Page 30 of 46
The RTC issued an order setting the case for hearing with a directive that
the same be published and that any person who is interested in the
petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the
scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of
Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified
respondents birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition
for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were
not notified of the petition and the trial courts decision, hence, the latter
was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process.
The Court annulled the trial courts decision for failure to comply with the
requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent
herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1wphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction
of entries in the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her
name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her
civil status from "married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage
from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The Court modified the trial courts
decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the change of
petitioners civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was
the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was
summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she
is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay.
In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name
and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her
citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have
impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her
parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by
the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not
change the nature of the proceedings taken. 37 A reading of Sections 4 and
5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets
of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons
named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
Page 31 of 46
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. 39
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead
and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the
publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure
was likewise excused where the interested parties themselves initiated the
corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or presumptive
awareness of the existence of the interested parties;42 or when a party is
inadvertently left out.43
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is
mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate
action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified
or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the
consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. 45
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated
July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for
Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr.
Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
SUPREME COURT Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Manila Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for
the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

The Facts
xxxx

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents.
for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
they lost contact with each other.
election of the petitioner. x x x

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Page 32 of 46
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay,
can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended
that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied
only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply
Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,
difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in
relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a
duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage"
and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
Page 33 of 46
to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial
court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept
of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition
under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as
a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did
not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal
of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by
the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as
well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification
and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under
the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on
the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial
court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous
marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of
the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
Page 34 of 46
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also
affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the
Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry
of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven
as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v.
De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a
void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with
the directive for them to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the
ground of bigamy.
 (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in
Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
Page 35 of 46
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom
it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does
not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition
and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that
"the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting
the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce
involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
persons life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted
by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
Page 36 of 46
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation
of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse
to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most
of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real
party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to
cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
Page 37 of 46
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied
on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding
civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case
for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws
do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may
file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is
still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Page 38 of 46
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code
and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent
to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of
a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39
of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of
the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will
be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment Republic of the Philippines
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal SUPREME COURT
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, Manila
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of
the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the THIRD DIVISION
Philippine archipelago."
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011
and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
DECISION
107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
PERALTA, J.:
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
SO ORDERED.
of Court are the Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009
and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for
cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed
order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of
the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a

Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she
did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a Petition
for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries
in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she
could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed
solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
Page 39 of 46
because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but
she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as
she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. 6 Respondent also
presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC,
Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared
was definitely not respondent. 7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that
the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor
of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City
is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged
marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was
not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latters prayer
to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision
on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office
of the Solicitor General, the petitioners counsel, and all concerned
government agencies.
Page 40 of 46
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by
an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would
not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE
ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR
CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE
PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be
cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of
marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters
personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the
wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the
marriage null and void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by
respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the
guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court
from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only
questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when
the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which
does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of
the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies
the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily,
petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
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correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file
his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic
v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under
Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and
properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may
be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person
in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that
the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was
not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent
made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband
Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the
procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The
Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in
turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents
were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondents signature appearing in
some of her government issued identification cards. 23 The court thus made
a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was
established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was
celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru
Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
Page 42 of 46
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage.1wphi1 Rather, respondent showed by
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she
was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is
the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already
been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth
by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court
did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order
dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014

FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIAS
CITY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders 1 dated October

7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201,
Las Pias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC
dismissed the case filed by petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of
entries in his certificate of live birth.

Page 43 of 46
 The antecedent facts follow:
Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live
birth before the R TC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is
the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC
Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were married. His
birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is Tely and that his
first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth
certificate be corrected as follows:
Entry From
Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol
First name of his mother Tely
His first name Franc Ler
In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for
correction of entries on the ground thatit is insufficient in form and
substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first
correction is substantial in nature and would affect petitioners status as a
legitimate child. It was further held that the correction in the first name of
petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname
in the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this
Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioners parents were not
married on December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in
ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother
can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether
the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioners birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to
"not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings;
(3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of
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entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that
petitioners parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial
correction of entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have actually
ruled that substantial changes in the civil registry are now allowed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise adds that proof that his parents
were not married will be presented during the trial, not during the filing of
the petition for correction of entries.
To In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the
RTC correctly dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out
that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru
Not Married
administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the
entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on
Matilde
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction
affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial
Francler proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.
We deny the petition.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner
and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the
city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer
contested the RTCs ruling on this point. 4 Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A.
No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can
be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city
civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as
amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.
No entry in a civil register shall be changed or correctedwithout a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name
or nickname, the day and month in the dateof birth or sex of a person
where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or
mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned
city or municipalcivil registraror consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the established under Rule 108 [of the Rules of Court]provided the parties
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and the proceeding. x x x
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan,7 we said that under xxxx
R.A.No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by
judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules
petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones
ofCourt the correction of clerical or typographical errors. Thus petitioner
as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and
can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his and his
Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian.
mothers first name.
Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided that the
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis
the entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on supplied.)
December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction
requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will
We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry
affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an
in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the
illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we held that corrections of entries in
local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction
the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or
of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,involve substantial alterations.
be affected by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of
Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
the Rules of Court:
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversaryproceedings.9
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
correction of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
ruling that the correction he sought on his and his mothers first name can
be done by the city civil registrar. Under the circumstances, we are
In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the
constrained to deny his prayer that the petition for correction of entries
Rules of Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to
before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition includes the correction
make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy,12 we
he sought on his and his mothers first name.
have similarly ruled that when a petition for cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
We clarify, however, that the RTCs dismissal is without prejudice. As we
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
said, petitioner can avail ofthe administrative remedy for the correction of
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
his and his mothers first name.1wphi1 He can also file a new petition
requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition,
before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth
petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol.
the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.
This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City: 10
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on
the last issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that

Page 45 of 46
his parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new No pronouncement as to costs.
petition for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October
7, 2010 and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Pifias City, in Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered Associate Justice
by the Regional Trial Court is, however, declared to be without prejudice.

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