5. Testimonial Knowledge
The Petition is devoid of merit.The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of
Sec. 36 Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded
[ABON] Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014
FACTS:
On June 24, 1997, an Information charging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed
before the RTC. That in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y
Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station DZMM,
was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of his house in Imus, Cavite
by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting
car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the
crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty.
Dizon that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case.
Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes
(Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite,
respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas
yang si Berbon. Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14,
1997. Eventually, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial
testified on these facts during the trial.
The victims widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to her,
sometime in the athird week of February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he could
transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward consequence
that may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the death of Sabinas
husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00 and promised to help him in
applying for the witness protection program. This was affirmed on the witness stand by
Sabinas brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that, however, Reyes never came back.
On August 31, 1999, the trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder.
The CA affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court; the CA found petitioner
guilty only of homicide instead of murder.Nevertheless,dissatisfied, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in its Resolution dated September 14,
2007.
Hence, this petition.Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the Decision
of RTC as the latter erred: x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative value to
Exhibit A, the Sinumpaang Salaysay of [Reyes] because [he] was not presented in Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero Ayaw
court to confirm, affirm and authenticate the contents of his sworn statement; [in
convicting] the [petitioner] based on unproven, inadmissible circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in admitting, considering, and giving probative value to
Exhibit A, the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes. statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness
HELD:
No.
Appeals sufficiently support petitioners conviction.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the light of the
standards discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons deserve our acceptance of the
circumstances upon which petitioners conviction was based, to wit:
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the
latters statement into writing declaring, among others, that in the morning of December
15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng
bukas yang si Berbon and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite,
respectively, before boarding a red car. The CA gave weight to Reyes sworn statement
in this wise:
The probative value of Romeo Reyes sworn statement as to the words spoken by
appellant to his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of December 15, 1996
cannot be disputed. x x x33
Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said sworn
statement belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He
asserts that its contents were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks
probative value.
The Court is unconvinced.The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought
to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by
another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of
such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what
is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not
apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making
of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.34 This is
known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating
ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon and that he saw the two (petitioner and
Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a
red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent
Segunials testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for
the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn
oral testimony.36 Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes statement.37 Verily then, what the
prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts
in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the
testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement
where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and
falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible
as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply .Moreover, the written statement of
Reyes is a notarized document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in
evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima
facie evidence of the due execution of this instrument or document involved
pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v.
Mendoza-Plaza,39 a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to
overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of
Reyes sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
[ABON] Gulam v. Spouses Santos, G.R. No. 151458, August 31, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondents entered into a Contract to Sell on January 1994, whereby
the latter agreed to sell to petitioner a 72-square meter parcel of land located in
Sampaloc, Manila, for the price of P1,700,000.00, including a 2-storey townhouse to be
constructed by respondents on the property. The terms of payment were as follows:
P500,000.00 to be paid on the first month of construction, another P500,000.00 to be
paid on the second month of construction, the remaining balance to be added on the full
payment of the contract price; and a reservation of P50,000.00 shall be paid by
petitioner. A final deed of sale shall be executed by respondents upon full payment of
the contract price, with petitioner bearing the costs of the taxes.Two years after the
execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner filed against respondents an action for
Specific Performance, asking the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 50, to
order respondents to execute a final deed of sale, plus damages and costs.
Petitioner contended that he already fulfilled his end of the bargain by paying the
stipulated amount, including the taxes, or a total of P2,050,000.00.Respondents denied
petitioners allegations, claiming that petitioner is yet to fully pay the agreed price, having
paid only P1,000,000.00, exclusive of the P50,000.00 reservation fee.
On September 17, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint and
ordering the rescission of the Contract to Sell.The RTC sifted through the evidence on
record, testimonial as well as
documentary, to determine the veracity of petitioners claim that there was overpayment,
due to the alleged issuance of several checks and cash payments to respondents, and
ruled that petitioner failed to prove his claim of overpayment. It was the RTCs finding
that the receipt acknowledging the payment of the sum of P500,000.00, which allegedly
was signed by respondent Ricarda Santos (Santos) on March 9, 1994 and which was
examined by the NBI, cannot be given any credence because Santos denied having
furnished any specimen signature from which the signature in the receipt may be
compared, in violation of Sections 20 and 22 of the Rules of Court. Instead, the RTC
gave weight to the conclusion of the PNP Crime Laboratory that the documents were
written by two different persons.. The RTC also observed that the issuance by petitioner
of UCPB Check No. CMR0 19635 dated January 19, 1994 for P500,000.00 is actually
the payment acknowledged in the contract as it coincides with the stipulation in the
contract wherein petitioner had to pay P500,000.00 on the first month of construction,
which in fact, started in January 1994. The RTC also ruled that petitioner cannot testify
on the alleged receipt of these contested amounts as he was not present during the
time that it was made, since according to petitioner himself, it was his wife Norhaya who
allegedly made the payments.[14] The RTC, meanwhile, gave credence to respondents
claim that petitioner is yet to pay the full amount of the purchase price, relying on the
two letters sent by petitioners wife Norhaya to Santos admitting that the amount of
P1,100,000.00 has already been given to respondents, and a balance of P446,036.00 in
the purchase price remains, exclusive of the cost of labor and improvements, and which
Norhaya seeks to reimburse from respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with modification as to the amount of
damages.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that petitioner's testimony with regard to the
payments made by his wife was hearsay.
HELD :
No.
It is a hornbook doctrine of evidence that a witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from
his perception. A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule
is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay
evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation
and, more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity, and articulateness of the out-of-court
declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court
statement depends.
True, petitioners statements may be considered as independently relevant statements
and may be admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been
thus uttered. However, the admissibility of his testimony to such effect should not be
equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. In this case, both the RTC and the
CA refused to give credence to petitioners testimony, and the Court finds no reason to
doubt the assessments made by both courts. Even assuming that his wife, indeed, told
him that payments were made on these dates, still, it does not follow that it is sufficient
proof to establish his claim of overpayment.
.These should be weighed vis--vis the other evidence on record, which, as appraised by
the RTC and the CA, do not support petitioners claim.
Although Norhaya testified, she did not, however, give any credible testimony regarding
these alleged payments. In fact, Norhaya failed to testify on the alleged separate
payment made in the amount of P500,000.00, which was annotated on the Contract to
Sell.[22] With regard to the alleged payment and receipt made on March 9, 1994,
respondent Santos categorically denied having received any payment on said date.[23]
Moreover, the RTC and the CA chose to ignore her testimony, and instead gave weight
to the testimony of the PNP Crime Laboratory Document Examiner that the signature
appearing on the receipt was not made by respondent Santos based on her standard
signature.[24] On this score, the Court will not interfere with the judgment exercised by
the RTC and the CA since it is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. As
such, its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect.[25]
Finally, petitioner laments the disregard made on the NBI finding that the signature of
respondent Santos appearing on the March 9, 1994 receipt was genuine. On this score,
it should be stressed that although they may have probative value, reception in
evidence of expert testimonies is within the discretion of the court. [26] The RTC and the
CA did not commit any error in disregarding the NBIs finding since it was convincingly
shown that the specimen signature of respondent Santos from which the signature on
the receipt was compared, was not actually supplied by Santos but by petitioner. Thus,
as correctly stated by the CA:
A fortiori, We agree with the trial court that the NBI expert is considered to have no
adequate knowledge of the genuine signatures of the parties whose signatures are
claimed to be forged, for this witness was not in possession of the genuine signatures of
the appellees. Moreover, opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding
upon the courts, the experts function being to place before the court data upon which
the court can form its own opinion. x x x
Verily, the RTC and the CA did not err in dismissing petitioners complaint and ordering
the rescission of the Contract to Sell.
[ANACTA] Bayani v. People, G.R. No. 155619, August 14, 2007
Bayani vs People
G.R. No. 155619 August 14, 2007
FACTS:
Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in
an Information. That the Philippine Savings Bank, Candelaria Branch, has issued to the
accused check booklet with the Check No. 054924 as one of those included in said
booklet of checks; That the said Check was drawn and issued payable to Cash in the
amount of P10,000.00; and it was made to apply to the account of the accused,
Leodegario S. Bayani whose name appears therein in bold print at the upper portion of
the said check. The check in question is postdated, issued and drawn on August 20,
1992, and dated August 26, 1992. It was presented to complaining witness, Dolores
Evangelista, for encashment by Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the check
was deposited with the bank, it was returned to Evangelista for insufficiency of funds
(Exh. "A-5"). Thereafter, she pursued the to demand payment of the value of the check.
After the confrontation at the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco, Evangelista has had
another confrontation with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia at Candelaria municipal
building before Brgy. Captain Nestor Baera, but again the accused and Rubia pointed to
each other for the settlement of the amount involved in the check in question. But all
what the accused Leodegario Bayani could say were flat denials of having talked with,
or otherwise met Evangelista, regarding the latters claim of payment of the value of
Check No. 054924, admittedly from the check booklet of the said accused Bayani
issued by PS Bank, Candelaria Branch.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in confirming the conviction of the accused
petitioner of the violation of BP 22 based on hearsay evidence by the trial court.
HELD:
NO. The Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioners conviction by the RTC.
It has been held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted."Since no objection to the admissibility
of Evangelistas testimony was timely made from the time her testimony was offered
and up to the time her direct examination was conducted then petitioner has
effectively waived any objection to the admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to
have her testimony excluded for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
While Evangelistas statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not necessarily
follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight. Admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. In this regard, it has been held that
although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the
adverse partys counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value, unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exception to the hearsay evidence
rule.
In this case, Evangelistas testimony may be considered as an independently
relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is
merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that it
has been made is relevant.When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it was
petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista was only
testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the truth or veracity of
Rubias statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not presented in court to
attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding the making of such
independently relevant statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement
itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of that fact.20 Indeed, independent of its truth or falsehood, Evangelistas
statement is relevant to the issues of petitioners falsehood, his authorship of the check
in question and consequently, his culpability of the offense charged.
Petitioners conviction did not rest solely on Evangelistas testimony. There are other
pieces of evidence on record that established his guilt.
[ANACTA] Lea Mer Industries Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., G.R. No. 161745,
September 30, 2005
LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 161745 September 30, 2005
FACTS:
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for
the shipment of 900 metric tons of silica sand valued at P565,000. Consigned to Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be transported from Palawan to
Manila. On October 25, 1991, the silica sand was placed on board Judy VII, a barge
leased by Lea Mer. During the voyage, the vessel sank, resulting in the loss of the
cargo.
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo. To
recover the amount paid and in the exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan
demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer, which refused to comply. Consequently,
Malayan instituted a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila on
September 4, 1992, for the collection of P565,000 representing the amount that
respondent had paid Vulcan.
On October 7, 1999, the trial court dismissed the Complaint, upon finding that the cause
of the loss was a fortuitous event. The RTC noted that the vessel had sunk because of
the bad weather condition brought about by Typhoon Trining. The court ruled that
petitioner had no advance knowledge of the incoming typhoon, and that the vessel had
been cleared by the Philippine Coast Guard to travel from Palawan to Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the survey report of the cargo surveyor, Jesus Cortez, can be admitted
in evidence to prove the alleged facts cited in the said report.
HELD:
That witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial, and that their
testimonies must be confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on
evidence, from which we quote:
"Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules."
On this basis, the trial court correctly refused to admit Jesus Cortezs Affidavit, which
respondent had offered as evidence.Well-settled is the rule that, unless the affiant is
presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay
An exception to the foregoing rule is that on "independently relevant statements. "
A report made by a person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth,
of the statements.Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the
report, the fact that it has been made is relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not
apply.
In the instant case, the challenged Survey Report prepared by Cortez was admitted only
as part of the testimonies of respondents witnesses. The referral to Cortezs Report
was in relation to Manlapigs final Adjustment Report. Evidently, it was the existence of
the Survey Report that was testified to. The admissibility of that Report as part of the
testimonies of the witnesses was correctly ruled upon by the trial court.
At any rate, even without the Survey Report, petitioner has already failed to overcome
the presumption of fault that applies to common carriers.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
6. Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
Sec. 37. Dying Declaration
[ANG] People v. De Las Eras y Zafra, G.R. No. 134128, September 28, 2001
PEOPLE VS ZAFRA ALYAS JERRY
FACTS: Alias Gerry was found guilty of the murder of Ursula Calimbo. The conviction
was made with the declaration of the victim prior to her death that the identity of her
assailant to be Gerry.
Prior to the attack, Gerry was found hiding behind the fence of the victim's
house. The victim's pension of 3k php was stolen, and Ursula suspected Gerry to be the
culprit. On the evening of Feb 17, 1992, Gerry was within the vicinity of the house of the
victim. The victim's daughter testified that she heard her mother cry after being struck
bloodied near the door. Upon asking who the cuplrit was, she replied "Gerry, the son of
Pepe and Corning struck her (gibunalan siya)." Gerry's parents are Felipe, nicknamed
Pepe, and Cornelia Zafra de las Eras. Ursula was rushed to the hospital, but after one
hour, she died.
The accused-appellant raised as issue the prosecution's failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that the trial court erred in relying heavily
on the dying declaration of the deceased and other circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Victim's dying declaration is admissible
HELD: YES. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to her death
constitutes evidence of the highest order25of the cause of her death and of the identity
of the assailant. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a dying declaration is
admissible provided the following requisites are present: (1) the statement concerns the
crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) at the time it was
made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) the
declarant would have been competent as a witness had he survived; and (4) the
declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the
declarant was the victim. When asked by her daughter Hilaria Binatero and policeman
Luisito Redulla, the victim pointed to accused-appellant Gerry de las Eras as her
assailant. This qualifies as a dying declaration.
[ANG] People v. Pea, G.R. No. 133964, February 13, 2002
PEOPLE VS PENA
FACTS: Ramil Pea was charged with murder in an Information. In the early morning of
December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver working the
night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When they reached their destination,
he ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then, accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his
money and repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground
unconscious. Accused-appellant shot him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating that a
man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1
Jose Sta. Ana rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a
stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method, which
he took down on two sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio
affixed his thumbmark on both sheets. In his statement, Pelagio related how accused-
appellant inflicted his injuries on him.
The owner of the tricycle, Wilfredo Lampa, after being informed that Pelagio had been
shot, proceeded to the hospital. There, Pelagio told him that it was accused-appellant
who shot him and took away his tricycle.
Francisca Pelagio, Jimbo Pelagios mother, also rushed to the hospital. Upon advice of
the doctors, Francisca brought her son to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. On
February 6, 1996, Jimbo Pelagio expired.
Accused-appellant next claims that the evidence relied upon by the trial court is hearsay
and inadmissible. He argues that said evidence does not constitute res gestae.
Particularly, he emphasizes that "it was imperative on the part of the lower court that it
should have appreciated the principle ofr es gestae on the basis of the contents of
Jimbo Pelagios statement reduced in handwritten form by SPO1 Bautista, and not on
the dying declarations made by Jimbo Pelagio to SPO1 Bautista, Wilfredo Lampa and
Francisca Pelagio because these prosecution witnesses had all the time to contrive and
improvise on what was actually told them, allegedly by Jimbo Pelagio.
ISSUE: whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses on the victims declaration can be considered as part of the
res gestae, hence, an exception to the hearsay rule.
HELD: YES. The declaration made by the victim is not a dying declaration for the first
element is missing. (no consciousness of impending death) However, it may be
nonetheless admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae. The requisites for the
admissibility of the victims ante mortem statement as part of the res gestae and also as
a dying declaration are present in this case, hence the same should be admitted under
both exceptions to the hearsay rule. While the admissibility thereof would naturally not
be affected whether viewed under either or both considerations, the advantage of
resting the issue on the aforesaid dual bases is that its admission would be invulnerable
to a theorized absence of an element of one of said exceptions. This is particularly
important in this case, considering that the very identification of the assailant and the
accuracy thereof are essentially based on the declaration of the victim.
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the
res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
Pelagios declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly
after a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances,
the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.
[BERNARDO] People v. Norrudin, G.R. No. 129053, January 25, 2002
FACTS: PO3 Akib Norrudin, together with fellow policemen, went to Casa Blanca, a
pension house, restaurant and videoke bar located in Surigao City. According to several
witnesses, the victim Vidal Avila, Jr., who was a customer of Casa Blanca, was shot
when he left the restaurant. According to Maritess, a GRO working at Casa Blanca and
live-in partner of Norrudin, the accused (Norrudin) fired a warning shot. Afterwards, the
accused left the restaurant with Maritess. Three to four minutes after the said gunshot
was fired, a man riding a motorcycle stopped in front of them and asked for help.
Thereafter, the man fell down from his motorcycle. Llorado recognized the man as Vidal
Avila, Jr., an employee in the Office of the City Engineer of Surigao City. Llorado and
one of his friends then hailed a tricycle and rushed to the city police station. Llorado
cradled Avila, Jr.'s head on his lap and asked the latter who shot him. Avila, Jr. replied in
a weak voice that a policeman shot him. Llorado was shocked upon hearing Avila, Jr.'s
answer, but since they were inside a police car at that time together with some
policemen, he refrained from further asking questions. Deguino and PO3 Marcial Tinio
proceeded to the hospital where Avila, Jr. was brought to ask the latter some questions
regarding the shooting. Upon arriving there at around 3:00 a.m., they found another
policeman surnamed Cabada trying to interview Avila, Jr. Sensing that Avila, Jr. was
dying, Deguino requested Cabada to allow him to ask the questions as he and the
victim were friends. Deguino then placed his mouth near Avila, Jr.'s ear and spoke
loudly: "Jun, this is your friend Bebot." Avila, Jr. opened his eyes and raised his head
toward Deguino. The latter then asked Avila, Jr., "Do you recognize the person who shot
you?" After Deguino repeated the question three times, Avila, Jr. replied yes. Deguino
then asked: "Kinsa man? (Who) Who, a policeman?" Avila, Jr. said yes again. Deguino
asked the latter a third question: "Was it Akib?" Deguino had to repeat the question
several times before Avila finally said yes. Norrudin was arrested and charged.
Subsequently, the RTC found Norrudin guilty of the crime of murder. On appeal,
Norrudin contended that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution. He argues that the alleged dying declaration is
inadmissible because it was not reduced into writing. The victim's alleged declaration
was testified to only by PO3 Deguino, and such testimony was not corroborated by any
other witness. Accused-appellant further states that even assuming that the victim's
dying declaration is admissible on that score, the trial court should not have admitted
the same because the prosecution failed to establish that at the time the victim told
Deguino who killed him, he was conscious that he was at the brink of death.
ISSUE: Whether or not Avilas dying declaration is admissible since it was not reduced
in writing.
HELD: The Court affirms the trial court's ruling. In the case at bar, the lower court did
not err in ruling that there is direct as well as circumstantial evidence to prove accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Anent the issue as to whether the responses
uttered by Avila, Jr. shortly before his death identifying accused-appellant as the one
who shot him satisfies the requisites of a dying declaration, the rule is that the following
elements must concur for said declaration to be admissible in evidence: (1) the dying
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
impending death; (3) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness;
and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in
which the declarant was the victim.
Although Avila, Jr. did not expressly state that he was dying when he made the
declaration, the circumstances surrounding such declaration show that the same was
uttered by him under the consciousness of impending death. It has been held in a
number of cases that even if a declarant did not make a statement that he was on the
brink of death, a dying declaration may be admissible if there are circumstances from
which it may be inferred with certainty that such was his state of mind. A dying
declaration made in the form of answers to questions put by the person to whom the
declaration is made is admissible in court, and may be proved by the testimony of the
witness who heard the same or to whom it was made. Thus, the trial court did not err in
admitting the following testimony of Deguino in whose presence Avila, Jr. made the
dying declaration.
Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest
[BERNARDO] Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari on the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in a complaint for partition filed by Lazaro, et al against Agustin, et al. with the MTCC of
Laoag City alleging as follows:
That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants of the late Simeon C.
Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a parcel of land
situated in the Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra., Municipality of Laoag, designated as Lot
No. 10675 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag. The children of Simeon consented that the
subject lot be titled in the name of Basilisa Santos, being the eldest, although it did not
and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of
this parcel of land. That there is a residential house constructed on the lot described in
paragraph IV of this complaint and in the construction of which plaintiff Alejandra
Santos, then still single, spent the amount of P68,308.60, while Basilisa Santos and her
children spent the amount of P3,495.00. Afterwards, Alejandra Santos got married to
Isauro M. Lazaro and made some additional constructions were made on the residential
house and lot such as a bedroom, azotea, two (2) toilets, two (2) kitchens, a car garage,
the money spent for these additional constructions came from the earnings of the
spouses Alejandra Santos-Lazaro and Isauro M. Lazaro. That without the knowledge
and consent of the Alejandras heirs, the title of the lot was transferred into another title
which is now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20695 in the names of the Agustin
siblings who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin who are herein named
as defendants. It was alleged that during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin,
Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the Basilisa Santos-Agustin, who are sisters, that the
transfer of the title covering the lot in the name of Basilisa Santos into the names of her
children would erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa
Santos-Agustin's children, but Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied [to] plaintiff Alejandra
Santos-Lazaro not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her
recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and
her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth () share of the lot.
Subsequently, the children of Basilisa refused and opposed the partition of the lot
claiming that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the lot being that the lot is now
titled in their names, and hence there was no settlement as shown by the certification of
the barangay court. That plaintiffs now invoke the intervention of the court to partition
the lot in accordance with the law on intestate succession and to partition the residential
house.
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that Basilisa's sworn statement which
recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed property is a declaration against interest
which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that
since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court without
further proof of its due execution and authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa's
nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which could
overthrow such notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same
document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized documents worthless
and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa S. Agustin is a declaration
against interest which establishes the co-ownership of the subject lot by and among the
parties as heirs of the late Simeon C. Santos.
HELD: At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that
Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a
declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.1avvphi1Indeed,
there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations against
interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or
by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations
against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity
with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and
is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven
genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against interest.
[BUCOY] Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006
Doctrine: The theory under which declarations against interest are received in
evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion
renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability
of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral
interest. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration
unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his
children's interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
Facts: Herein respondent Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner, Parel alleging that he is the owner of a two-
storey residential house located at Forbes Park National Reservation Baguio City; that
such property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his name
under Tax Declaration; that when the second floor of said house became habitable in
1973, he allowed petitioner's parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to
move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction of the ground floor was
on- going to supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials; that when the
construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent allowed petitioner's
parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat and that it was done out
of sheer magnanimity. In November 1985, respondent wrote Florentino a notice for
them to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and he needed the
place to which petitioner's parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986;
however, without respondent's knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully entered
and took possession of the ground floor of respondent's house; petitioner's refusal to
vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the instant
action for recovery of possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental
of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates the said
premises and surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and cost of suit.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleges that his parents are the co-owners of the said
residential house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor
pertains to petitioner's parents; he is occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of
his father, Florentino, with respondent's full knowledge; his parents spent their own
resources in improving and constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners
thereof.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that the house and land in issue is owned in
common by the late Florentino Parel and Simeon Prudencio, as such Prudencio cannot
evict Parel. RTC rejected the affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as
owned by respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to determine
the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of an advisement addressed
to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer concerning the property's tax assessment
and Florentino, thought then that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes;
and that the affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.
The CA reversed the trial court and declared respondent as the sole owner of the
subject house and ordered petitioner to surrender possession of the ground floor thereof
to respondent immediately. The CA found the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 of
Florentino, petitioner's father, stating that he is not the owner of the subject house but
respondent, as conclusive proof of respondent's sole ownership of the subject house as
it is a declaration made by Florentino against his interest.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay?
Held: No. The court agrees with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence
to support his complaint for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject
house as the exclusive owner thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit dated
September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino and sworn to before the Assistant City
Assessor of Baguio City. Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC.
38. Declaration Against Interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-
interest and against third persons. The theory under which declarations against interest
are received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the
occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the
reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral
interest. The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner's father and had
adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said
affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential
building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in
Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such declaration unless
he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children's
interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino's lifetime, from
1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no
showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass
to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino) and petitioner in 1988
regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of
evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latter's will and held that
the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment; and even when a
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988
which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent's action should be an
accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father
had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and
this fact, taken with the other circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the
conclusion that respondent is the sole owner of the house subject matter of the
litigation.
[BUCOY] Phil. Free Press Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132864, October 24,
2005
Doctrine: Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the
exception under the declaration-against-interest rule. In context, the only
declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as
adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering
to acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary
to his own interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant
possessed the authority to speak and to act for the President of the Republic can
hardly be considered as a declaration against interest.
Facts: Sometime in 1963, petitioner bought a parcel of land situated at Pasong Tamo
Street, Makati, which consequently became its main office, which housed various
machines, equipment, office furniture and fixture. Upon the election of the late President
Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 and prior to the imposition of Martial law on September 21,
1972, [petitioner] printed numerous articles highly critical of the Marcos administration,
exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime. The [petitioner] likewise ran a series
of articles exposing the plan of the Marcoses to impose a dictatorship in the guise of
Martial Law. In the evening of September 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the Free Press
Building, forced out its employees at gunpoint and padlocked the said establishment.
The soldier in charge of the military contingent then informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr., the
son of Teodoro Locsin, Sr., the President of Philippine Free Press, Inc, that Martial Law
had been declared and that they were instructed by the late President Marcos to take
over the building and to close the printing press. Teodoro Locsin, Sr. was arrested
[and] . . . . was brought to Camp Crame and was subsequently transferred to the
maximum security bloc at Fort Bonifacio. Locsin, Sr. was informed that no charges were
to be filed against him and that he was to be provisionally released subject to the
following conditions, to wit: (1) he remained under 'city arrest'; . . . (5) he was not to
publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say or write anything critical of the
Marcos administration. Consequently, the publication of the Philippine Free Press
ceased. The subject building remained padlocked and under heavy military guard. The
cessation of the publication of the . . . magazine led to the financial ruin of
[petitioner] . . . . [Petitioner's] situation was further aggravated when its employees
demanded the payment of separation pay as a result of the cessation of its operations.
[Petitioner's] minority stockholders, furthermore, made demands that Locsin, Sr. buy out
their shares. Locsin, Sr. was approached by the late Atty. Crispin Baizas with offers from
then President Marcos for the acquisition of the [petitioner]. However, Locsin, Sr.
refused the offer stating that [petitioner] was not for sale. Locsin, Sr. was contacted by
Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, the former aide-de-camp of then President Marcos concerning
the sale of the [petitioner]. Locsin, Sr. requested that the meeting be held inside the
[petitioner] Building and this was arranged by Menzi. During the said meeting, Menzi
once more reiterated Marcos's offer to purchase both the name and the assets of
[petitioner] adding that "Marcos cannot be denied". Locsin, Sr. refused but Menzi
insisted that he had no choice but to sell. Locsin, Sr. then made a counteroffer that he
will sell the land, the building and all the machineries and equipment therein but he will
be allowed to keep the name of the [petitioner]. Menzi promised to clear the matter with
then President Marcos. Menzi thereafter contacted Locsin, Sr. and informed him that
President Marcos was amenable to his counteroffer and is offering the purchase price of
Five Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand (P5,750,000.00) Pesos for the land, the
building, the machineries, the office furnishing and the fixtures of the [petitioner] on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis. The Board of Directors of [petitioner] held a meeting and
reluctantly passed a resolution authorizing Locsin, Sr. to sell the assets of the
[petitioner] to Menzi minus the name "Philippine Free Press. The parties [petitioner, as
vendor and private respondent, represented by B/Gen. Menzi, as vendee] met . . . and
executed two (2) notarized Deeds of Sale covering the land, building and the
machineries of the [petitioner].
On February 26, 1987, [petitioner] filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against
[respondent] Liwayway and the PCGG before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
146 on the grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price. On
motion of defendant PCGG, the complaint against it was dismissed on October 22,
1987.
RTC dismissed petitioners complaint. CA affirmed the decision.
Petitioner delves at length on the vitiation issue and, relative thereto, ascribes the
following errors to the appellate court:first, in considering as hearsay the testimonial
evidence that may prove the element of "threat" against petitioner or Mr. Locsin, Sr., and
the dictatorial regime's use of private respondent as a corporate vehicle for forcibly
acquiring petitioner's properties. The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to
the testimonies of Messrs. Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. (the Locsins, collectively),
which, in gist, established the following facts: 1) the widely circulated Free Press
magazine, which, prior to the declaration of Martial Law, took the strongest critical stand
against the Marcos administration, was closed down on the eve of such declaration,
which closure eventually drove petitioner to financial ruin, among others. Per the
Locsins, it was amidst the foregoing circumstances that petitioner's property in question
was sold to private respondent, represented by Gen. Menzi, who, before the sale,
allegedly applied the squeeze on Mr. Locsin, Sr. thru the medium of the "Marcos cannot
be denied" and "[you] have no choice but to sell" line.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the evidence adduced by the
petitioner are hearsay?
Held: NO. Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a testimony is
hearsay if offered against a party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the party against whom it is presented
is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. And there can be no quibbling that because death
has supervened, the late Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos subalterns,
Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot cross-examine the Locsins for the threatening
statements allegedly made by them for the late President. Like the Court of Appeals, we
are not unmindful of the exception to the hearsay rule provided in Section 38, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. The
declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons. However, in
assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzi's supposed declaration against interest,
i.e., that he was acting for the late President Marcos when he purportedly coerced Mr.
Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we are loathed to give it the evidentiary
weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us. For, the Locsins can hardly be
considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from the
annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should,
like fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay
rule by invoking the exception under the declaration-against-interest rule. In context, the
only declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as
adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to
acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his
own interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant possessed the
authority to speak and to act for the President of the Republic can hardly be considered
as a declaration against interest.
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree
[BULLECER] Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
DOCTRINE: DNA evidence has already been accepted in the Philippine jurisdiction,
subject to the basic principle that in the assessment of its probative value, courts
should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
FACTS:
May 14, 1998 Then only 13 y/o, ROSENDO Alba, represented by his mother
ARMI Alba, filed a petition for compulsory recognition, support, and damages
against his alleged father, Rosendo HERRERA, before the RTC of Manila.
Aug. 7, 1998 In his answer with counterclaim, Herrera denied paternity of
Rosendo. He also denied having any physical contact with Armi.
Rosendo moved for the taking of DNA paternity testing.
Rosendo presented as expert witness Dr. Saturnina Halos, a molecular
biologist and professor at DLSU and UP, who had experience heading a DNA
analysis laboratory in UP.
Dr. Halos testified to the process of DNA paternity testing and asserted that it
was 99.9999% accurate in establishing paternity.
Herrera opposed the motion, arguing that DNA paternity testing has not gained
acceptability, and that it violates his right against self-incrimination.
Feb. 3, 2000 The RTC granted the motion. Herrera was ordered to undergo
DNA paternity testing.
Herreras MR was denied.
Herrera filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA.
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is a valid probative tool to determine filiation under Philippine
law (YES, but subject to relevant standards)
HELD:
PRELIMINARY: OVERVIEW OF THE PATERNITY AND FILIATION SUIT
Filiation proceedings are instituted not only to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure legal rights associated with paternity, e.g., support or inheritance.
BURDEN OF PROOF is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child
4 SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
o PRIMA FACIE CASE
exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father.
corroborative proof is required to shift the burden of proof to the putative
father
CASE AT BAR: Armi asserted that Herrera is the biological father of
Rosendo. She presented corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures.
o AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
two are available to the putative father: incapability to have sexual relations
(due either to physical absence or impotency) or proof that the mother had
sexual relations with other men around the time of conception.
CASE AT BAR: Herrera raised both defenses, denying that he ever had
intercourse with Armi.
o PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
A child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate (FC 165, 167).
The presumption may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by
law.
o PHYSICAL RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN PUTATIVE FATHER AND CHILD
trial technique unique to paternity proceedings
may be offered as evidence of paternity
although likeness is a function of heredity, no quantitative formula or
standard can be used to measure likeness. This kind of evidence appeals to
the emotions/senses of the judge.
CASE AT BAR: Armi submitted pictures of Rosendo and Herrera side by
side, to show how much they resemble each other.
AS OF 2002, THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
USE OF DNA ANALYSIS AS EVIDENCE
Prior to 2002, SC was of skeptical stance with respect to DNA analysis as
evidence, as reflected in Lim v. CA (1997) and People v. Tijing (2001),
although in the latter case, the SC recognized that UP had already set up a
laboratory capable of performing STR analysis and DNA analysis will prove
useful in the future.
The Vallejo case, decided in 2002, represented the change in the SCs stance.
Vallejo was meted the death penalty, partly because of the match between the
DNA profile of the sample taken from the victim and the DNA profile of Vallejo.
Said the Court in that case: In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.
Thus the SC was no longer talking about admissibility, but has moved on to
analyzing the probative value of DNA evidence. It was no longer about the
official recognition of DNA evidence, as the issue is now the observance of
the procedures in conducting DNA analysis.
GUIDELINES ON THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA EVIDENCE
With respect to paternity:
o In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these
variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing
next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the
mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological
father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal
types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father.
o It is not enough to state that the DNA profiles of the putative father
and the child match. A complete match of DNA profiles does not
necessarily establish paternity.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.
57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the
facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.|||
[BULLECER] Dela Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
DOCTRINE:
The Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing
the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein
an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant
and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown
to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence.
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela
Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
(Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.
They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and
Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. On
September 4, 2005, Dominique died.
After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live
with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
 Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname
Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of
which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and
Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch
Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that
his paternity had never been questioned.
Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which
Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent
portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING
20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET
BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I
HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY
FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS
RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER
IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS,
THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD
COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL.
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration
of the childs name. In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father
because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child
(either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname
of the Father).
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of
name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof.
The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs
name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,
[10] which provides: Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use
the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Issue: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of minor
christian dela cruz can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a private
handwritten instrument within the contemplation of article 176 of the family code, as
amended by r.a. 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his fathers surname.
Held: Petition granted.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant
matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to
the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Third, Jenies testimony
is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo
Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could
be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in
his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule
130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to
him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of
its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received
as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence
to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the
issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article
278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and
the writing must be the writing of the putative father.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other
relevant facts extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living
together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child
they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following
rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant
and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown
to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence.
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is
to petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the
now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
[CANA] Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, 161634, 161824,
March 3, 2004
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald
Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2)
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a
year after the birth of FPJ.
Issue: won his aunt is competent to testify on the issue regarding his pedigree
Held: YES. Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must
be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and
the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more
popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital,
Magdalena Street, Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando
Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald,
Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house
on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945,
except for some months between 1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children
after Ronald Allan Poe.
xxxxxxxxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan
Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Declarant
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
[CANA] People v. Gallano y Jaranilla, G.R. No. 184762, February 25, 2015
FACTS: Private complainant, AAA, and her brother lived with their maternal aunt, BBB,
BBB's husband, herein appellant, their children and BBB 's brother in Baranggay
Guimbala-on, Silay City (TSN, October 6, 2003, pp. 3-4).
On January 2, 2003, BBB went to the hospital to take care of her father and stayed
there for days. AAA was home and was about to make her brother go to sleep. She
went inside the bedroom to a mat when appellant took her aside, undressed her and
laid her down on the bed. Standing over her, appellant pointed his penis at her and
warned her not to tell her mother, otherwise, he would kill her. When appellant's penis
touched AAA's vagina, she felt pain and instinctively kicked him away. Feeling
distraught, AAA ran outside and cried (TSN, October 20, 2003, pp. 5-7).
On January 8, 2003, BBB's brother went to the hospital, he told BBB that he saw AAA
and appellant inside the room, standing and facing each other. This prompted BBB to
ask AAA about the incident. At first, AAA hesitated and refused to talk but later admitted
that she was raped. BBB brought AAA to the city health officer for examination on
January 9, 2003.
The City Health Officer who examined AAA found hymenal lacerations on AAA's private
part.6
Gallano denied the charge, and asserted alibi, insisting that on the day the rape was
committed he had been working in the sugarcane field, having left home for that
purpose at 5:00 a.m. and returning only at 5:00 p.m.; that he had brought his lunch then
because he would take an hour to walk from the sugarcane field to his house; and that
he had learned of the charge of rape against him only after his arrest and detention.
ISSUE: won the testimonies of AAA and BBB suffice to prove AAA' s minority even if
coupled with Gallano's supposed admission of the same?
HELD: NO. BBB, who was AAA's aunt, was qualified to testify on AAA's pedigree, like
her age and her date of birth.1wphi1 Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
expressly stated so. Conformably with Pruna, BBB's testimony would have sufficed
considering that the information alleged that AAA was 12 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, and the Prosecution was trying to prove that AAA was below
18 years old for the purpose of qualifying the rape committed by the accused. Yet,
Pruna dictated that BBB's testimony must be clear and credible. BBB's testimony failed
this test. Although BBB recalled that she had taken AAA under her wing when the latter
had been nine months old, BBB was apparently contradicted by AAA' s declaration that
she had been staying with BBB and her family for about four years reckoned from the
time she gave her testimony in court. Galiano complicated the contradiction between
BBB and AAA by attesting that AAA had started staying with them when she had been
only seven years old. The effect of the contradictions was to cast doubt on BBB's
personal knowledge of AAA's age and date of birth, rendering BBB's testimony on AAA's
minority unreliable.
Nevertheless, the OSG submits that AAA's testimony was enough to prove her age
because Gallano admitted to the same during crossexamination.
We disagree with the State. The guidelines under Pruna require that the accused's
admission of the age of the victim must be express and clear. That was not the case
herein, for not only did Gallano declare that he did not know how old AAA was at the
time of the commission of the crime, but also that he had been vague and indefinite on
the matter as borne out by his tentative response of "12 or 13 years old" when asked
during cross-examination if he knew AAA's age in 2003. In other words, Gallano's
admission was not express and clear enough to establish AAA' s minority beyond moral
certainty.
With the State not having established AAA's minority with absolute certainty, the Court
rules out qualified rape as the crime committed by Gallano. We reiterate that in the
prosecution of rape in its qualified form, the victim's minority must be averred and
established "with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself." As a consequence,
Gallano committed only simple rape, thus precluding the application of R.A. No. 9346.
Pursuant to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
It further appears that despite already entertaining doubt about AAA' s minority, the CA
still affirmed Gallano's conviction for qualified rape by depending on the "certainty" of
the RTC's findings on AAA's minority. Such affirmance by the CA was unwarranted
because it was contrary to the guidelines defined by the Court in Pruna.The affirmance
should be treated as another reversible error on the part of the CA, considering that all
doubts in a criminal prosecution should be resolved in favor of the accused.
The modification of Gallano's civil liabilities is another consequence of the Prosecution's
failure to establish AAA's minority. To conform to prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
civil indemnity must be reduced to P50,000.00. The award of moral damages is similarly
reduced to P50,000.00 in view of prevailing jurisprudence. Meanwhile, the award for
exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.The
amounts of damages awarded should earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid.
Sec. 41. Common reputation
[CASTILLEJO] Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, October 19,
2004
FACTS:
Magdalena's sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an
application with the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school.
One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school
premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer assigned to conduct the
inspection was not present, respondent, Belagan volunteered his services. Sometime in
June 1994, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of the
inspection, while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded,
she muttered, "Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng
values?" Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other
people in the area. Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her
husband might harm respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.
Thereafter, Belagan issued the permit to Magdalena.
Months after Magdalena read from a newspaper about a harassment charge against
Belagan filed by a subordinate. She then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities
and harassment to the DECS Secretary.
DECS ruled to suspend Belagan. On appeal, CSC affirmed DECS.
Respondent appealed to the CA.
Respondent presented as evidence, 22 criminal cases filed before the MTC and 23
complaints filed before the barangay chairman against Magdalena.
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on
her character, integrity, and credibility.
ISSUE: W/N Magdalena's derogatory record is sufficient to discredit her
credibility?
RULING: NO.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts
committed in the 80's, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed
with the Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts
complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense
was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer reliable
proofs of Magdalena's character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in
according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of one's
character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the
commencement of the suit. Hence, to say that Magdalena's credibility is diminished by
proofs of tarnished reputation existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair
to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can
never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal
cases specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of
jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that
he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the
purpose of impairing his credibility.
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae
[CASTILLEJO] DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Co. v. Radio Mindanao Network,
Inc., G.R. No. 147039, January 27, 2006
FACTS: Respondent, Radio Mindanao Network, owns several broadcasting stations all
over the country. Provident covered respondent's transmitter equipment and generating
set under Fire Insurance Policy, while petitioner covered respondent's transmitter,
furniture, fixture and other transmitter facilities under Fire Insurance Policy.
In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondent's radio station was razed by fire causing
damage. Respondent sought recovery under the two insurance policies but the claims
were denied on the ground that the cause of loss was an excepted risk excluded under
condition no. 6 (c) and (d), to wit:
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or
through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following
consequences, namely:
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations
(whether war be declared or not), civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution,
military or usurped power.
The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was
caused by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army
(CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied the claims. Hence, respondent was
constrained to file Civil Case against petitioner and Provident.
The only evidence which the Court can consider to determine if the fire was due to
the intentional act committed by the members of the New People's Army (NPA), are
the testimony of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo Rochar who
were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their testimony was limited to
the fact that an investigation was conducted and in the course of the investigation
they were informed by bystanders that "heavily armed men entered the transmitter
house, poured gasoline in it and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting
"Mabuhay ang NPA". The persons whom they investigated and actually saw the
burning of the station were not presented as witnesses. The documentary evidence
do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning were members of the NPA.
Exhibit "5-B" which is a letter released by the NPA merely mentions some
dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the media in Bacolod. There
was no mention there of any threat on media facilities.
ISSUE: w/n the testimonies of the bystander witnesses can be considered as part
of the res gestae?
RULING: Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations
and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae
applies when the declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the
witness who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may
concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling
occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously
by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both
SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders' statements while they were
making their investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that
when these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time and
opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention
theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where
hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these
utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not
remote.
At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements
were made may be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the
course of their investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the
fact that they had been thus uttered.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and
sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while
the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it
was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it
does not follow that such declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be
calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted that
there is a need for additional convincing proof, viz.:
The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of
the fire was the intentional burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an
act of insurrection, rebellion or usurped power. Evidence that persons who
burned the radio facilities shouted "Mabuhay ang NPA" does not furnish
logical conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that their act was
an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be
 submitted. Defendants failed to discharge their responsibility to present
adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk excluded.
[DLC] People v. Lobrigas, G.R. No. 147649, December 17, 2002
FACTS:
The victim Felix Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden. On
February 19, 1996, he asked for permission not to work for it was raining and he had to
go to the store of Teodorico Mante. At 4:00 p.m., Felix returned to Castor Gudens
house with bruises on his face and injuries all over his body. He told Castor that he was
mauled by accused-appellant Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante at
the store. Felix spent the night in Castors house and left the following morning to go to
the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his cousin, to heal his wounds in the saltwater.
However, the next day, Felix Taylaran died.
Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day after the
mauling, her father came to her house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank
Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante. He told her that he was in pain and felt
weak. He then went to the house of Lorie Aguilar apparently to recuperate. Dr. Tito
Miranda of the Municipal Health unit of Loon, Bohol conducted an autopsy on the body
of the victim and concluded that the immediate cause of death was internal hemorrhage
caused by the severe beating and mauling on the chest portion of the victims body.
On the other hand, accused-appellant had a different version of the events. He
denied the accusation and alleged that he was asleep at the time the incident took
place. He admitted that he was at the store of Teodorico Mante having a drinking spree
with his companions, Dennis Palma, Mario Granderos, Marlito Lobrigas and Rufo Creta,
Jr. They were later joined by the victim, Felix Taylaran. When Felix had too much to
drink, he became rowdy and drew his knife. This was snatched from him by Mario
Granderos and turned over to Mante, who was a barangay councilman. Mante
admonished Felix and accused-appellant told him to go home. When Felix left, Mante
and Marlito Lobrigas followed him. Accused-appellant stayed behind and lay down on a
bench outside the store until he fell asleep. He only learned about the mauling incident
later from Mario Granderos.
Accused-appellant likewise denied that he left his house to evade arrest. He
claimed that he did not know about the charge against him. He did not leave his house
for one month after the incident upon his fathers advice, for he might be investigated by
the police. He went to Cebu City on March 10, 1996 to work at Southern Island Hospital.
When he came home months later to attend the fiesta celebration on May 15, 1996, it
was then that he came to know of the case filed against him. Then on May 18, 1996, he
was arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of Loon. Two months and four days
later, he left his cell as the door was opened by a co-prisoner and nobody was guarding
them at that time.
Trial court found Lobrigas guilty of murder; hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the ante-mortem declarations made by the victim to the prosecution
witnesses (Castor and Rosa) pointing to the accused as one of the maulers can be
considered as part of res gestae
HELD:
YES. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All
these requisites concur in the case at bar. The principal act, the mauling of the victim,
was a startling occurrence.The declarations were made shortly after the mauling
incident while the victim was still under the exciting influence of the startling occurrence,
without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating accused-appellant. The
declaration concerns the circumstances surrounding the mauling of Felix Taylaran.
However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not satisfy the second
requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present. Nevertheless, we
hold that Rosa Solartes testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent
relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity
thereof, but as proof of the fact that they had been uttered.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.
The hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact.
[DLC] Capila y Rayuma v. People, G.R. No. 146161, July 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Pepito Capila was a security guard of the Lanting Security and
Watchman Agency (Agency) assigned in the Meralco Collection Office on J.P. Rizal
Street,Makati City. On May 9, 1992, Ariel Arellano and Lani Imperio, both employees
of the Pilipinas Bank, Libertad Branch in Pasay City, went to the Meralco Collection
Office to receive and deposit cash collections from Meralcos 27 collectors. The total
collection for that day amounted to P1,292,991.12. They then placed the money
inside a duffle bag table and had it padlocked. Then they waited for the Pilipinas
Banks armored car to arrive. The security guard posted at the Meralco Collection
Office at the time was Dimas dela Cruz, also from the Agency.
Before the armored car could arrive, two armed men suddenly entered the
Meralco Collection Office. They hit Dimas on the nape with a handgun. Then they
ordered Ariel and Lani to lie on the floor face down and immediately took the duffle
bag containing Meralcos cash collections. They also seized three .38 caliber
revolvers, valued at P6,000.00 each, owned by the Agency, including the service
handgun issued to Dimas. After the malefactors fled, Dimas told Ariel that petitioner
was one of those who robbed the office. Then Dimas called the Makati Police Sub-
Station, the Meralco Security Division, and the Agency to report the incident.
The Makati Police dispatched SPO4 Romualdo Maximo to investigate the
robbery, while the Agency instructed its intelligence officer, Edgardo Irigayen, to talk to
the guard on duty. SPO4 Maximo, accompanied by a police photographer, a
fingerprint technician, and another policeman, arrived within ten minutes at the
Meralco Collection Office. He questioned Ariel and Lani, but they could not identify the
robbers as they were lying face down on the floor. Upon inquiry by SPO4 Maximo,
Dimas told him that one of the robbers is petitioner, also a security guard of the
Lanting Security and Watchman Agency assigned in the Meralco Collection Office.
Thereafter, SPO4 Maximo invited Dimas, Lani and Ariel to the police station for the
purpose of taking their sworn statements. Irigayen, the intelligence officer of the
Agency, also questioned Dimas. The latter reported that Pepito Capila is one of the
robbers.
After the incident, petitioner fled to his hometown in Palapag, Northern
Samar. The Agency then requested SPO4 Maximo and his team to go to Northern
Samar to apprehend Capila. In Northern Samar, the police operatives, with the
assistance of the CAFGU, arrested petitioner, his brother Bonifacio Capila, and
Deogenio Caparoso. The police found P5,000.00 in possession of petitioner allegedly
part of the loot. All the suspects were arrested without warrants. SPO4 Maximo
interrogated petitioner who admitted that he participated in the commission of the
crime; that his share of the loot is P45,000.00; and that Dimas is the mastermind.
The trial court rendered its Decision acquitting all the accused, except
petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA, CA affirmed the decision. Hence, the petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the statement of Dimas is part of res gestae
HELD:
YES, all the requisites of the rule on res gestae are present. The principal act,
which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling occurrence, is the robbery of which
petitioner is being charged. Immediately after the robbery, Dimas dela Cruz, the security
guard then on duty, informed Ariel that one of the perpetrators is herein petitioner.
Dimas likewise reported at once the incident to the police and to the security agency.
When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas, who was still shocked, named petitioner
herein as one of the robbers. His statements to Ariel and SPO4 Maximo were made
before he had the time and opportunity to concoct and contrive a false story. We note
that Dimas personally knows petitioner considering that both worked in the same
security agency and assigned in the same office.
Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means things done. As an
exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those exclamations and statements by either
the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or
immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that
the statements were made as spontaneous reactions or utterances inspired by the
excitement of the occasion, and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and fabricate a false statement.The reason for the rule is human experience. It has
been shown that under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, the
state of nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator may produce a spontaneous
and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by the
external shock. As the statements or utterances are made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, such
statements or utterances may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as
to the facts he just observed. The spontaneity of the declaration is such that the
declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather
than the declarant speaking for himself
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must
be met: (1) that the principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or immediately or subsequent
thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
[EVIDENTE] People v. Palanas, G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015
FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Palanas of the murder of
SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio (SPO2 Borre).
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five
(5)-month-old grandson outside his residence in Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta
(PO3 Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television
when four (4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open
door of SPO2 Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers
standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to
SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2)
assailants fled on a motorcycle.
PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil),
brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital,
SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe
Palanas" referring to his neighbor, Palanas who shot him. This statement was
repeated to his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who followed him at the
hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died due to
gunshot wounds on his head and trunk.
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
In a Decision dated October 20, 2010, the RTC convicted Palanas of the
crime of Murder. The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt that Palanas and his companion were the ones who killed SPO2
Borre through the positive identification of the eyewitnesses to the incident.
Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements that Palanas shot him constituted an ante
mortem statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as
evidence against Palanas.
Palanas appealed his conviction to the CA but the appellate court affirmed
the RTC's ruling with modification increasing the amounts awarded to the heirs of
SPO2 Borre.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Palanas's conviction for the crime of Murder should be
upheld.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA and the RTC convicting
Palanas for the crime of murder.
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that Palanas killed
SPO2 Borre, and that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the same.
The records show that SPO2 Borre was outside carrying his grandson when two (2)
assailants shot him. During the attack, SPO2 Borre had no opportunity to raise any
meaningful defense against his assailants; and consequently, he suffered multiple
gunshot wounds on his head and trunk, causing his death.
The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre's statements on his way to
the hospital as evidence, both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence
rule, four (4) conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time the
declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.
On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and
thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration,
given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking
into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be reasonably
presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was
already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and
is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations
to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in
court.
In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form
part of the res gestae. "Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony." In this
case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot
by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had
no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was
made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the
crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately
proven by the prosecution.
On the other hand, the Court does not find credence in Palanas's defense of
alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an inherently weak defense, and may only be
considered if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was somewhere else
when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. In this case, the RTC correctly
observed that aside from the admission that travel from Paraaque City to Pasig
City only takes about one (1) hour, the incident occurred on a Sunday when traffic
is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas had access to a motorcycle that allowed
him to travel faster on the date and time of the incident. Under the circumstances,
there is the possibility that Palanas could have been present at the locus criminis at
the time of the shooting. Accordingly, his defense of alibi must fall.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04925 finding accused-appellant
Bernabe P. Palanas alias "Abe", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder as defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and ordered to pay the
heirs of SPO2 P2,464,865.07 as actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.
[EVIDENTE] People v. Palmones, G.R. No. 136303, July 18, 2000
FACTS:
Brothers Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones were
both charged with murder. That allegedly accused-appellants shot SPO2 ASIM
MAMANSAL, in a dark place, together with his paramour, while riding home in
Kidapawan, Sultan Kudarat last April 27, 1997. The inflicted gunshot wounds on the vital
parts of MAMANSAL'S body caused of the death of the victim.
The prosecution witnesses presented on trial were Sonny Boy Redovan, the
nephew of the victim. He testified that in that same evening in the emergency room of
Kidapawan Doctors Hospital the victim declared that his perpetrators were Juany and
Tony Palmones which were the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. Another
witness presented was Police Inspector Alexander Tagum, who came in the emergency
room about an hour later also testified that he was able to ask the victim, about the
identity of his perpetrator, and that were Juany and Tony Palmones.
The conviction of the two accused-appellants was based largely on the alleged
dying declaration of the victim made to the two witnesses of the prosecution.
Hence, this appeal by the accused-appellants to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM
MAMANSAL as an exception to the hearsay rule.

2. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM
AMAMNSAL as part of the Res Gestae Rule.
HELD:
1. Yes, it was error for the court to consider Mamansal's statement as dying declaration
for failure to prove that the declaration was made under a consciousness of impending
death which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to
die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction
that death is at hand, or there must be a settled hopeless expectation.
Sec. 31. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.
As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement
are: (a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants
death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration
was offered in a criminal case for murder, murder or parricide win which the decedent
was the victim.
In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the
statements of the declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his
death were made under the consciousness of impending death.
2. Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of
the res gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either
the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of
spontaneity is critical. The following factors have generally been considered in
determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been
made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was
made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence
or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative
thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed
to the victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae.
When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable
amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was
shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30
minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the
scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the
trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that
could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation.These circumstances, taken
together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the
requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of
the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar
Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are
being held for some other legal grounds.
[GUTIERREZ] Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc., G.R. No. 172031,
July 14, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon Maritime and
Allied Services, Inc. (private respondent) and was assigned to M/V Phoenix Seven, a
vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation (Hansu) which is based in Korea. His
one (1)-year contract of employment commenced on 15 October 1996 and stipulated
the monthly wage at $900.00 with a fixed overtime pay of $270.00 and leave pay of
$75.00.6
Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always discriminated against and
maltreated the vessels Filipino crew. This prompted him to send a letter-complaint to
the officer-in-charge of the International Transport Federation (ITF) in London, a
measure that allegedly was resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was
dismissed on 21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October
1999.7
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily disembarked the vessel
after having been warned several times of dismissal from service for his incompetence,
insubordination, disrespect and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an
incident involving petitioners incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route
at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner who was then supposed to
be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a fax message, sent to it on the date
of incident, reporting the vessels deviation from its course due to petitioners neglect of
duty at the bridge,8 as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the
master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.9
Private respondent stated that since petitioner lodged the complaint before the Labor
Arbiter two (2) years and nine (9) months after his repatriation, prescription had already
set in by virtue of Revised POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996 which
provides for a one-year prescriptive period for the institution of seafarers claims arising
from employment contract.10
On 5 November 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioners
complaint, holding that he was validly dismissed for gross neglect of duties. The Labor
Arbiter relied on the fax messages presented by private respondent to prove petitioners
neglect of his duties, thus:
x x x The fax message said that the Master of M/V Phoenix Seven received an
emergency warning call from Japan Sisan Sebo Naika Radio Authority calling attention
to the Master of the vessel M/V Phoenix Seven that his vessel is invading other route
[sic]. When the Master checked the Bridge, he found out that the Second Officer
(complainant) did not carry out his duty wathch. There was a confrontation between the
Master and the Complainant but the latter insisted that he was right. The argument of
the Complainant asserting that he was right cannot be sustained by this Arbitration
Branch. The fact that there was an emergency call from the Japanese port authority that
M/V Phoenix Seven was invading other route simply means that Complainant neglected
his duty. The fax message stating that Complainant was not at the bridge at the time of
the emergency call was likewise not denied nor refuted by the Complainant. Under our
jurisprudence, any material allegation and/or document which is not denied specifically
is deemed admitted. If not of the timely call [sic] from the port authority that M/V Phoenix
Seven invaded other route, the safety of the vessel, her crew and cargo may be
endangered. She could have collided with other vessels because of complainants
failure to render watch duty.11
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and declared the
dismissal as illegal. The dispositive portion of the NLRCs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and set aside and a new one entered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as
illegal. Respondents Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc. and Hansu Corporation are
hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay complainant the amount equivalent to his
three (3) months salary as a result thereof.12
The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged misbehavior and
neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value and are self-serving. It added that
the ships logbook should have been submitted in evidence as it is the repository of all
the activities on board the vessel, especially those affecting the performance or attitude
of the officers and crew members, and, more importantly, the procedures preparatory to
the discharge of a crew member. The NLRC also noted that private respondent failed to
comply with due process in terminating petitioners employment.13
Private respondent moved for reconsideration,14 claiming that the complaint was filed
beyond the one-year prescriptive period. The NLRC, however, denied reconsideration in
a Resolution dated 30 August 2002.15 Rejecting the argument that the complaint had
already prescribed, it ruled:
Records show that respondent in this case had filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of prescription before the Labor Arbiter a quo who denied the same in an Order dated
August 1, 2000. Such an Order being unappealable, the said issue of prescription
cannot be raised anew specially in a motion for reconsideration. (Citations omitted)16
It appears that respondent received a copy of the NLRC Resolution17 on 24 September
2002 and that said resolution became final and executory on 7 October 2002.18
Private respondent brought the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Certiorari19 on 8 October 2002. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. Sp. No. 73521, was
dismissed on technicality in a Resolution dated 29 October 2002. The pertinent portion
of the resolution reads:
(1) [T]he VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING was
signed by one Florida Z. Jose, President of petitioner Falcon Maritime and Allied
Services, Inc., without proof that she is the duly authorized representative of petitioner-
corporation;
(2) [T]here is no affidavit of service of the petition to the National Labor Relations
Commission and to the adverse party;
(3) [T]here is no explanation to justify service by mail in lieu of the required personal
service. (Citations omitted)20
An entry of judgment was issued by the clerk of court on 23 November 2002 stating that
the 29 October 2002 Resolution had already become final and executory.21 Meanwhile,
on 12 November 2002, private respondent filed another petition before the Court of
Appeals,22 docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 73790. This is the subject of the present
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the fax messages can be deemed part of the res gestae
HELD: No. Section 42 of Rule 130 40 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form
part of the res gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In
spontaneous exclamations, the res gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal
acts, the res gestae are the statements accompanying the equivocal act. 41 We find that
the fax messages cannot be deemed part of the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal
act be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.42
Assuming that petitioners negligencewhich allegedly caused the ship to deviate from
its courseis the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements
contained in the fax messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In
addition, no dates have been mentioned to determine if these utterances were made
spontaneously or with careful deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity,
the fax messages cannot be admitted as part of the res gestae of the first kind.
Neither will the second kind of res gestae apply. The requisites for its admissibility are:
(1) the principal act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must
be material to the issue; (3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4)
the statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act.43
Petitioners alleged absence from watch duty is simply an innocuous act or at least
proved to be one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is
nevertheless not accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements
adverted to as parts of the res gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to
determine whether the fax messages were made simultaneously with the purported
equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route
encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only from the
Japanese port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double
hearsay.
[GUTIERREZ] People v. Preciados, G.R. No. 122934, January 5, 2001
FACTS: Appellant and Antonio Hilbero, the victim in Criminal Case No. 7888, are
second cousins. Both are residents of Ubujan, Sagbayan, Bohol. Appellant is also a
cousin of Primo Hilberos mother-in-law. Primo Hilbero is the victim in Criminal Case No.
7887.
During the May 11, 1992 elections, appellant and Antonio supported rival mayoralty
candidates of Sagbayan. Appellant was a supporter and poll watcher of Arthur Aana,
while Antonio, a barangay councilman of Ubujan, was a partisan of Narzal Ermac.
Appellants co-accused were also identified with Aana who won.
At around 11:00 p.m. of May 12, 1992, Antonio with his common law wife and their two
children, his brother, Primo and his wife, Helen with their three children, Antonios
mother, Dominga, and another brother, Severino were at the second floor of the old rice
mill at Ubujan. Except for Helen, the clan had retired for the night. She was about to go
to sleep when she noticed Antonio go downstairs. Minutes later, her husband Primo,
followed him. Then she heard someone utter, Dont move. Alarmed, she rose from her
mat and peeped through a two-inch hole in the floor. The ground floor was illuminated
by moonlight. She saw appellant holding a hand grenade while his other arm was
locked in a stranglehold around the neck of Antonio who knelt on the floor. Nearby stood
Angel Preciados with a gun pointed at Antonio. She then heard Emigdio Villamor say
Dont move so that your family will not die. She saw the latter forcing Primo to swallow
an object. The other accused held her husband to prevent him from struggling.
Shocked, Helen then soundlessly cried and embraced her children. Shortly afterwards,
Helens mother-in-law, Dominga, was awakened by the barking of the family dog.
Dominga went downstairs where she saw Primo lifeless on the floor, reeking of poison.
Antonio was nowhere to be found. Dominga rushed upstairs and woke up Severino, all
the while shouting for help. Minutes later, the barangay captain and some neighbors
responded to her shouts for assistance. They found Primo dead on the floor. Informed
that Antonio was missing, they searched the immediate surroundings for him but to no
avail.
Early in the morning of May 13, 1992, the search for Antonio was resumed. He was
finally found by his uncle, Simeon Degamo, holding on to rock in a natural well, some
300 meters away from the rice mill. A rope was thrown to him and he was pulled out
from the well. Noticing that he smelled of some poisonous chemical, his rescuers made
him drink coconut milk. He was weak and appeared on the verge of death and brought
to the hospital at Clarin, Bohol for emergency treatment.
The next day, prosecution witness Zosimo Viva, a defeated municipal councilor
candidate in the same slate of Ermac, Antonios common law wife, and two police
investigators transferred Antonio to the Gov. Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital in
Tagbilaran City. According to prosecution witness Dr. Mayda Reyes who admitted
Antonio to the hospital, Antonio told her that the latter was forced to drink a certain
liquid, which smelled like insecticide. Another physician, Dr. Maria Luisa Tage, who
attended to Antonio diagnosed, Poisoning, Etiology not determined, Brief reactive
psychosis.
Since Antonio appeared to be dying, prosecution witness PO3 Leonardo Inoc, a police
investigator, took his ante-mortem statement in which he named the aforementioned
accused as the persons responsible for poisoning him and dropping him in the well.
Meanwhile, Ermac asked the NBI to conduct an investigation. The toxicological
examination of Primos body revealed the presence of methamidophos, the active
ingredient of the insecticide Tamaron in Primos organs. The NBI also recovered two
empty bottles, at the scene of the incident. Chemistry tests on them revealed that the
Hoechst bottle was positive for deltamethrine, an insecticide, while the other bottle
revealed traces of methamidophos.
Appellant denied any involvement in the poisoning incident. He claimed an alibi. He said
he spent the whole night of May 11, 1992, in the municipal hall of Sagbayan, as a
watcher for the party of Mayor Aana. He went home early morning of May 12, 1992 and
spent the whole day repairing his pigpens even if he had not slept the previous night. At
around seven oclock P.M. his wife and he went to the house of his co-accused Angel
Preciados to attend the birthday party of the latters son. Afterwards, they returned home
and went to sleep. He woke up at around 9:00 A.M. and learned about the incident. He
went to the old rice mill to find out more about the poisoning incident and saw the
Hilberos. When he asked Helen what happened, she said she knew nothing about the
death of her husband. Later that day, he returned to Cebu City where he worked as a
crane operator. He could not think of any reason why he would be suspected for
committing a crime, as he was on good terms with the victims.
The defense offered a different version of the poisoning incident. According to the
defense, Antonio and Primo agreed to commit suicide by taking poison.
Testifying for the defense, P/Col. Benjamin Absalon, of the Bohol Provincial Command
of the Philippine National Police, testified that the police investigation revealed that
Primos death by poison was not due to foul play. He declared that they did not finish
their investigation because Antonio disappeared from the hospital before they could
interview him.
To rebut Antonios testimony, Dr. Mayda Reyes was called anew to confirm what Antonio
had told her, that he was forced to drink poison by several men. SPO1 Leonardo Inoc
testified again that he took Antonios ante-mortem statement. Apolinario Libranza,
barangay captain of Ubujan, Sagbayan was presented to refute Antonios claims
regarding Zosimo Viva. Antonios mother, Dominga, testified that her son was not afraid
of either Viva or Ermac[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif]and affirmed the truthfulness of
Helens testimony.
In sur-rebuttal, Antonio maintained the veracity of his suicide account.
Finding the prosecutions version more credible, the trial court on January 2, 1995,
convicted appellant of the crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 7887 and 7888.
On July 25, 1995, appellant filed his notice of appeal to this Court. On November 20,
1996, the Office of Legal Aid of the U.P. College of Law entered its appearance as
counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the purported ante-mortem statement part of the res gestae
HELD: No. Where a victims statement may not be admissible as an ante mortem
declaration, it may nonetheless be considered as part of the res gestae, if made
immediately after a startling occurrence in relation to the circumstances thereof and
when the victim did not have time to contrive a falsehood. For res gestae to be allowed
as an exception to the hearsay rule, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) that
the principal act or res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is
spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the
statement is made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto;
and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
In this case, the element of spontaneity is lacking in the alleged ante-mortem statement.
Antonios statement was taken by PO3 Inoc at around 3:00 oclock P.M., May 14, 1992 or
some thirty-nine (39) hours after the incident. Thirty-nine hours is too long a time to be
considered subsequent immediately (stress supplied) to the startling occurrence. Even
as contemplated by the rules, statements given a day after the incident in answer to
questions propounded by an investigator cannot be considered part of the res gestae.
Furthermore, the testimony of the declarant, that the statement was made under threats
and with coaching from losing candidates Ermac and Viva in order to get even with the
winning candidate, Mayor Aana, is uncontroverted.
Dying declarations and statements which form part of the res gestae are exceptions to
the hearsay rule, thus they must be strictly but reasonably construed and must extend
only insofar as their language fairly warrants. Thus, doubts should be resolved in favor
of applying the hearsay rule, rather than the exceptions. Under said rule, Antonios so-
called ante-mortem statement should not have been admitted in evidence, for it is
neither a dying declaration nor a part of res gestae.
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business
[FULLANTE] Jose, Jr. v. Michaelmar Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 169606, November 27,
2009
FACTS: Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. (MPI) is the Philippine agent of Michaelmar
Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI). In an undertaking and an employment contract, MSSI
through MPI engaged the services of Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) as oiler of M/T
Limar. In connection with the employment contract, Jose, Jr. signed a declaration
stating:
"In order to implement the Drug and Alcohol Policy on board the managed vessels the
following with [sic] apply:
-All alcoholic beverages, banned substances and unprescribed drugs including but not
limited to the following: Marijuana Cocaine Phencyclidine Amphetamines Heroin
Opiates are banned from Stelmar Tankers (Management) Ltd. managed vessels.
Disciplinary action up to and including dismissal will be taken against any employee
found to be in possession of or impaired by the use of any of the above mentioned
substances.
-A system of random testing for any of the above banned substances will be used to
enforce this policy. Any refusal to submit to such tests shall be deemed as a serious
breach of the employment contract and shall result to the seamans dismissal due to his
own offense.
-Therefore any seaman will be instantly dismissed if:
xxx
- They are found to have positive trace of alcohol or any of the banned
substances in any random testing sample."
A random drug test was conducted on all officers and crew members of M/T Limar at the
port of Curacao. Jose, Jr. was found positive for marijuana. Jose, Jr. was informed
about the result of his drug test and was asked if he was taking any medication. Jose,
Jr. said that he was taking Centrum vitamins.
M/T Limar reached the next port after the random drug test and Jose, Jr. was
repatriated to the Philippines. Jose, Jr. asked MPI that a drug test be conducted on him.
MPI ignored his request. On his own, Jose, Jr. procured drug tests from Manila Doctors
Hospital, S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic, Inc., and Maritime Clinic for International Services,
Inc. He was found negative for marijuana.
Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and MSSI for illegal dismissal with
claim for his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract. Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and that termination from employment was
valid and lawful. Jose, Jr. appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC. Jose, Jr.
claimed that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that he was
dismissed for just cause. NLRC ruled that Jose, Jr.s dismissal was illegal and ordered
MPI and MSSI to pay Jose, Jr. his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract.
MPI and MSSI filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 March 2004 Resolution, the
NLRC denied the motion for lack of merit. MPI and MSSI filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition[17] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Court of Appeals denied
the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition.
In a motion, MPI and MSSI prayed that they be substituted by OSG Ship Management
Manila, Inc. as respondent in the present case. In a Resolution, the Court noted the
motion.
ISSUE: W/N the drug test result constitutes entries made in the ordinary or regular
course of duty.
HELD: YES. CA held that:
Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of
admissibility. There are kinds of evidence known as exceptions to the hearsay rule
which need not be invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him
because of necessity and under circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of
the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are called entries in the course of business,
which are transactions made by persons in the regular course of their duty or business.
We agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test result constitutes entries made in the
ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer of the vessel. The tests
administered to the crew were routine measures of the vessel conducted to enforce its
stated policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued and
released by the medical officer. The ships physician at Curacao under whom the tests
were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his name and with his
handwritten comments that the report on the respondent came out, and there is no
basis to suspect that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of his
duty.
As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does not
require additional supporting evidence except if it appears that the drug test was
conducted not in accordance with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says,
has even been suggested in this particular case.
In the present case, Jose, Jr. did not show that the Court of Appeals ruling is violative of
any law or jurisprudence. Section 43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for admission in
evidence of entries in the course of business:
(1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify;
(2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
(4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty;
and
(5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2) the entries
were made near the time the random drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a
position to know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in his
professional capacity and in the performance of his duty; and (5) the entries were made
in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
[FULLANTE] Land Bank of the Phils. v. Monet's Export and Manufacturing Corp.,
G.R. No. 184971, April 19, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and Monet's Export and
Manufacturing Corporation (Monet) executed an Export Packing Credit Line Agreement
under which Monet was given a credit line in the amount of P250,000.00, secured by
the proceeds of its export letters of credit, the continuing guaranty of the spouses Tagle
and the third party mortgage executed by Mendigoria. The credit line agreement was
renewed and amended several times until it was increased to P5,000,000.00. Owing to
the continued failure and refusal of Monet, notwithstanding repeated demands, to pay
its indebtedness to Land Bank, which have ballooned to P11,464,246.19, a complaint
for collection of sum of money was filed. Monet and the Tagle spouses alleged that
Land Bank failed and refused to collect the receivables on their export letter of credit
against Wishbone Trading Company (Wishbone) of Hong Kong in the sum of
US$33,434.00, while it made unauthorized payments on their import letter of credit to
Beautilike H.K. Ltd. (Beautilike) in the amount of US$38,768.40, which seriously
damaged the business interests of Monet. RTC recognized the obligation of Monet, et
al. to Land Bank but granted the counterclaim against Land Bank ($30k). Land Bank
filed an appeal with the CA. CA affirmed the RTC (and denied the MR) and held that
due to the non-collection Wishbone and the unauthorized payment Beautilike, Monet
suffered from lack of financial resources sufficient to buy the
necessary materials to fill up standing orders from customers.
ISSUE: W/N RTC and the CA acted correctly in denying petitioner Land Banks motion
to reopen the hearing to allow it to present the banks updated Consolidated Billing
Statement that reflects respondents Monet and the Tagles remaining indebtedness to it.
HELD: NO. RTC and the CA did not realize is that the original RTC decision was an
incomplete decision since it failed to resolve the main issue that the collection suit
presented: how much Monet and the Tagles exactly owed Land Bank.
The RTC held that Monet still owed Land Bank only P2.5 million as reported in the
banks Schedule of Amortization (Exhibit 39). But that schedule covered only one
promissory note. The Court rejected Exhibit 39 as basis for determining Monets total
obligation, given that it undeniably took out more loans as evidenced by the other
promissory notes it executed in favor of Land Bank.
Although the bank presented at the trial its Consolidated Statement of Account for
covering Monets loans, the Court needed to know how the balance of P2.5 million in
Exhibit 39, which the RTC regarded as true and correct, impacted on that consolidated
statement that the bank prepared a year later. The Court thus remanded the case so the
RTC can receive evidence that would show, after reconciliation of all of Monets loan
accounts, exactly how much more it owed Land Bank.
The CA of course places no value on the Consolidated Billing Statement that Land Bank
would have adduced in evidence had the RTC granted its motion for reconsideration
and reopened the hearing. Apparently, both courts believe that Land Bank needed to
present in evidence all original documents evidencing every transaction between Land
Bank and Monet to prove the current status of the latters loan accounts.
But a bank statement, properly authenticated by a competent bank officer, can serve as
evidence of the status of those accounts and what Monet and the Tagles still owe the
bank.
Under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries prepared in the regular
course of business are prima facie evidence of the truth of what they state. The billing
statement reconciles the transaction entries entered in the bank records in the regular
course of business and shows the net result of such transactions.
Entries in the course of business are accorded unusual reliability because their
regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit
of precision. If the entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited.
In actual experience, the whole of the business world function in reliance of such kind of
records.
[GO] Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464, [June 27, 2006]
Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Gan
Facts:
In 1981, respondent Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner at its Soler
Branch in Santa Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with
respondent wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his current account and
he could draw checks on said account provided there were sufficient funds to cover
them. Furthermore, under a special arrangement with petitioners branch manager then,
Mr. Qui, respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another persons
account also within the same branch.
Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his
account, the overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78. According to petitioner,
respondent refused to heed petitioners repeated demands for payment. For the period
December 14, 1982 to September 15, 1990, the total obligation of respondent reached
P297,060.01, inclusive of interest
in 1991, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover the
P297,060.01 with 12% interest. Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said
amount. He contended that the alleged overdraft resulted from transactions done
without his knowledge and consent.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioner was not able to prove that
respondent owed it the amount claimed considering that the ledger cards it presented
were merely hearsay evidence. On petitioners appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts
decision.
To prove its claim, petitioner presented Patricio Mercado who was the bookkeeper who
handled the account of respondent and recorded his transactions in a ledger. Based on
this ledger, respondent allegedly had a negative balance of P153,757.78. This resulted
from transfers of funds from respondents current account to another persons account.
These transfers were made under the authority of Qui.11 Respondent categorically
denied that he ever authorized these "funds transfers.
Issue: Whether or not the entries made by Mercado in the ledger were competent
evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was incurred.
Ruling: NO
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in
corporate books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.15
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
Mercado, petitioners bookkeeper who prepared the entries, was presented to testify on
the transactions pertaining to the account of respondent. It was in the course of his
testimony that the ledger entries were presented. There was, therefore, neither
justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who made
them was available to testify in court.16
Moreover, Mercado had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entries,
particularly those entries which resulted in the negative balance. He had no knowledge
of the truth or falsity of these entries. For the entries to be prima facie evidence of
the facts recorded, the Rule interpose[s] a very important condition, one which
we think is truly indispensable to the probative worth of the entries as an
exception to the hearsay rule, and that is that the entrant must be "in a position to
know the facts therein stated."
Sec. 44. Entries in Official Records
[JULARBAL] DST Movers Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp., G.R. No.
198627, January 13, 2016
FACTS:
In a Complaint for Sum of Money filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
PGIC alleged that at about 10:30 p.m. on February 28, 2002, along the South Luzon
Expressway and in the area of Bilibid, Muntinlupa City, a Honda Civic sedan with plate
number URZ-976 (sedan) was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck with plate number
UAL-295 (truck). PGIC underscored that the sedan was on a stop position when it was
hit. The sedan was then allegedly pushed forward, thereby hitting a Mitsubishi Lancer
CMM-373. The driver of the truck then allegedly escaped.
In support of its recollection of the events of February 28, 2002, PGIC relied on a Traffic
Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas (PO2
Tomas) of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police.
As a result of the February 28, 2002 incident, the sedan's owner, Fidel Yuboco, filed a
total loss claim with PGIC in the amount of P320,000.00. PGIC paid Fidel Yuboco the
entire amount of P320,000.00.
Asserting that it was subrogated to Fidel Yuboco's rights and that the proximate cause
of the mishap was the negligence of the driver of the truck, PGIC, through counsel, sent
DST Movers demand letters. PGIC demanded from DST Movers the amount of
P90,000.00, which represented the difference between the P320,000.00 paid by PGIC
to Yuboco and the salvage price of P230,000.00, at which PGIC was supposedly able to
sell what remained of the sedan.
Its demands not having been satisfied, PGIC proceeded to file its Complaint for Sum of
Money before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
In its Answer, DST Movers acknowledged that it was the owner of the truck. However, it
claimed that the truck did not make any trips on February 28, 2002 as it was undergoing
repairs and maintenance. In support of this affirmative defense, DST Movers attached
as Annexes "1" to "1-F"copies of invoices, receipts, and cash vouchers relating to
repairs and maintenance procedures that were undertaken on the truck on specific
dates, which included February 28, 2002.
Metropolitan Trial Court Manila rendered its Decision favoring PGIC's version of events
and finding DST Movers liable. It was affirmed in toto by Branch 47 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the
Metropolitan Trial Court. It also denied DST Movers' Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
W/N it was an error for the Metropolitan Trial Court to admit and lend evidentiary weight
to the piece of evidence chiefly relied upon by respondent People's General Insurance
Corporation: the Traffic Accident Investigation Report prepared by PO2 Tomas.
HELD:
Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Hearsay Rule.
It renders inadmissible as evidence out-of-court statements made by persons who are
not presented as witnesses but are offered as proof of the matters stated.
The Hearsay Rule, however, is not absolute. Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence enumerate the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Of these,
Section 44regarding entries in official records is particularly relevant to this case:
SECTION 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
Precisely as an exception to the Hearsay Rule, Rule 130, Section 44 does away with
the need for presenting as witness the public officer or person performing a duty
specially enjoined by law who made the entry. This, however, is only true, for as long the
following requisites have been satisfied:
(a that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
) enjoined by law to do so;
(b that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
) other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
) by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.
It is plain to see that the matters indicated in the Report are not matters that were
personally known to PO2 Tomas. The Report is candid in admitting that the matters it
states were merely reported to PO2 Tomas by "G. Simbahon of PNCC/SLEX."47 It was
this "G. Simbahon," not PO2 Tomas, who had personal knowledge of the facts stated in
the Report. Thus, even as the Report embodies entries made by a public officer in the
performance of his duties, it fails to satisfy the third requisite for admissibility for entries
in official records as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
[JULARBAL] Barcelon, Roxas Securities, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 157064, August 7, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) is a
corporation engaged in the trading of securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner filed its
Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation conducted
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for deficiency income tax in the amount of
P826,698.31 arising from the disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses and
allowances in the amount of P1,219,093,93 as part of the deductible business expense
since petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and allowances to withholding
taxes. This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-
000649 dated 1 February 1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner
through registered mail on 6 February 1991.However, petitioner denies receiving the
formal assessment notice.
On 17 March 1992, petitioner was served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to
enforce collection of the deficiency income tax for the year 1987. Petitioner filed a
formal protest, dated 25 March 1992, against the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy,
requesting for its cancellation. On 3 July 1998, petitioner received a letter dated 30 April
1998 from the respondent denying the protest with finality.
On 31 July 1998, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA found the
BIR records submitted by the respondent immaterial, self-serving, and therefore
insufficient to prove that the assessment notice was mailed and duly received by the
petitioner.
On 6 June 2000, respondent moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but
was denied by the CTA in a Resolution dated 25 July 2000. Thereafter, respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 August 2001. In reversing the CTA decision, the
Court of Appeals found the evidence presented by the respondent to be sufficient proof
that the tax assessment notice was mailed to the petitioner, therefore the legal
presumption that it was received should apply.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolution dated 30 January 2003.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari .
ISSUE:
W/N respondents right to assess petitioners alleged deficiency income tax is barred by
prescription.
HELD:
What is essential to prove the fact of mailing is the registry receipt issued by the Bureau
of Posts or the Registry return card which would have been signed by the Petitioner or
its authorized representative. This Court does not put much credence to the self-serving
documentations made by the BIR personnel especially if they are unsupported by
substantial evidence establishing the fact of mailing
The respondent presented the BIR record book where the name of the taxpayer, the
kind of tax assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing were noted.
The BIR records custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified that she made the entries
therein. Respondent offered the entry in the BIR record book and the testimony of its
record custodian as entries in official records in accordance with Section 44, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, which states that:
Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal
knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared and
mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic
notes how and from whom she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she did not
attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty to submit
the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present case. Thus,
the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence.
Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment
notice, or a certification from the Bureau of Posts, could have easily been obtained. Yet
respondent failed to present such evidence.
In the present case, the evidence offered by the respondent fails to convince this Court
that Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 was released, mailed, or sent
before 15 April 1991, or before the lapse of the period of limitation upon assessment
and collection prescribed by Section 203 of the NIRC. Such evidence, therefore, is
insufficient to give rise to the presumption that the assessment notice was received in
the regular course of mail. Consequently, the right of the government to assess and
collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription.
[LINGAHAN] Dimaguila v. Spouses Monteiro, G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014
Facts:
On July 5, 1993, respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro, filed a Complaint for
Partition and Damages before the RTC against the Dimaguilas, together with the
Borlazas, alleging that the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot in Laguna covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. The
Monteiros anchored their claim on a Deed of Sale Executed in their favor by the heirs of
Pedro Dimaguila.The Dimaguilas argued that there was no co-ownership at all since the
property had long been partitioned to Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, with Perfecto
becoming owner of the southern half and Vitaliano owning the northern half. The
defendants claim that they are Vitalianos heirs and further averred that the Monteiros
claim to the property is null for they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the RTCs orders which
denied several of their motions and the proceedings were suspended while such
petition was pending.
The CA upheld the RTCs orders and, upon resumption of the proceedings, the spouses
Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint which
was granted by the RTC.The Monteiros admitted in the amended complaint the
defendants allegation of a partition and aver that a third of Perfectos share was sold to
them through a Bilihan; and that, upon their attempt to take possession of that portion,
they found that the Dimaguilas were occupying it.
The Dimaguilas, in their answer to the amended complaint now contravened their
original answer that the subject property was actually divided into northern and southern
halves, replacing it with a division into two and share and share alike. This resulted to
an admission of a co-ownership, contrary to their original position. According to the
Dimaguilas, the Bilihan also violated Article 1485 of the Civil Code for not specifying
the metes and bounds of the property sold and that, even if it was specified, the sale
was still void since a co-owner can only sell his undivided share in the property.
To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented the following: (1) the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the
brothers Perfecto and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484,15 dated
August 6, 1976, showing that the subject property had been divided into southern and
northern portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876 and 877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's
records showing that the said lots were respectively claimed by Buenaventura and
Perfecto.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a
cadastral map of Liliw, Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the
property had indeed been partitioned into southern and northern portions. The RTC
concluded that the Dimaguilas were stopped from denying this partition and the Bilihan
document was regular and authentic absent any evidence to the contrary. The
Dimaguilas appealed their case to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision.
The evidence aliunde considered by the RTC, consisting of the cadastral map and the
list of claimants, were timely objected to during the trial as hearsay and a violation of the
best evidence rule.
Issue:
Whether or not the cadastral maps are subject to the exception of the Hearsay Rule.
Held:
Yes, under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries in official records, such
as cadastral maps, are exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. The rule provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify
to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document's
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department
tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is,
therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as
entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As
such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no
evidence to contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the
admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of
evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject property.
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like
[LINGAHAN] Manila Electric Co. v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 127598 (Resolution),
February 22, 2000
FACTS:
Members of the Private Respondent union (MEWA) were not satisfied with the terms
and conditions of its employment with MERALCO. The parties in this case were ordered
by the Secretary of Labor to execute a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
petitioner, wherein the CBA allowed for the increase in the wages of the employees
concerned.
The petitioner (MERALCO), however, warns the Court that if the wage increase of
P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the
cost covering such increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of
electricity. It uses the All Capitol Report, a newspaper, as its basis for its argument.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the All Asia Capitol Report is an admissible evidence as an exception to
the Hearsay Rule under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
No, the All Asia Capitol Report is inadmissible and does not fall under the exception of
the Hearsay Rule.
The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding
the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of
wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:
"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to
persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter
so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally used and relied upon by them therein."
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be
admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein." As correctly held in
our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere newspaper account and
not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries no
persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were
presented. Neither did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmen generally rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no
evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in
touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same
manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when
the source of the reports is available. With more reason, mere analyses or projections of
such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of the report in this case can
be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance with
certain governmental requirements.
Sec. 46. Learned treatises
[MACAVINTA] Paje, et al., v. Casio, et al., G.R. Nos. 207257-76, 207282 & 207366,
February 3, 2015
Facts:
On February 2006, subic bay metropolitan authority (SBMA) a government agency duly
organized by Philippine Law entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with
Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) expressing their intention to build a power
plant in subic bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
Industrial Park (SBIP)
In such undertaking, the proposed plan was to build a COAL FIRED POWER PLANT
and identified 20 hectares of land situated in Sitio Nagalotore, Mt. Redondo, Subic Bay
Freeport Zone as a suitable area for such project. This had a lease value of 3.50 Dollars
per square meters payable in 10 equal 5-year installments.
SBMA issued an environmental compliance certificate (ECC) in favor of taiwan
cogeneration international corporation, a subsidiary of TCC for the construction and
installation and operation of the COAL FIRED THERMAL POWER PLANT.
On june 6, 2008 TCC assigned all its rights and interests under another MOU to
Redondo Peninsula Energy Inc (RP ENERGY) a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the philippines with the primary purpose of building, owning, and
operating power plants in the Philippines, among others.
However, concerned for the environmental implications of said project, several
Sangguniangs opposed the project, such Sangguniangs included are those belonging to
Olongapo and Zambales.
These sangguniangs (CASINO GROUP) filed before the court a petition for WRIT OF
KALIKASAN against Relondo Peninsula Energy Inc. (RP ENERGY), SBMA and Hon
Ramos P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Casino group presented THREE WITNESSES namely, (1) Raymond Paletino, a 2 term
rep of the kabataan partylist in the house of representatives (2) Alex Hermoso the
convenor of zambales-ologanpo City Civil Society Network (3) and Ramon Lacbain, the
vice-governor of the province of Zambales
THE COURT OF APPEALS, rendered a decision DENYING the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan and the application for an environment protection order due to the FAILURE
of the Casino group to prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology was violated or threatened.
Unsatisfied with its decision, the parties appealed to the supreme court
Its arguments in essence, stated that IT IS ENTITLED TO writ of kalikasan, and it was
able to prove that the operation of the power plant would cause environmental damage
and pollution, and that this would adversely affect the residents of provinces of bataan
and zambales. It alleges that acid rain may occur in the combustion of coal, leading to
asthma attacks among residents among other things.
The supreme court however agreed with the decision of the appellate court stating that,
the three witnesses presented by the CASINO group are NOT experts on the CFB
technology or on environmental matters. These witnesses even ADMITTED on cross-
examination that they are not competent to testify on environmental impact of the
subject project.
What is wanting in their testimonies is their technical knowledge of the project, they
admitted that they did NOT personally conduct any study on the environment or the
health effects of a coal-fired power plant, but ONLY ATTENDED SEMINARS and
CONFERENCES pertaining to climate change, and that the scientific studies mentioned
in their pleading is BASED ON READINGS ON THE INTERNET and SEMINARS
ATTENDED FROM UNNAMED EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
Issue: Whether or not these facts presented by the witnesses are considered as
hearsay or may be exempted under LEARNED TREATISES under section 46 rule 130
of the rules on evidence.
Held:
NO
The court stated that:
Learned treatises under section 46 are those published treatise, periodical or pamphlet
on a subject of history, law science, or art that is admissible as tending to prove truth of
a matter stated therein, if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject.
The alleged scientific studies mentioned in the petition CANNOT be classified as
learned treatises. We cannot take judicial notice of the same, and NO witness expert in
the subject matter of this case testified, nor are the writers of the said scientific studies
recognized in their profession or calling as experts in the subject.
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
[OFALSA] Ilao-Quianay, et al., v. Mapile, G.R. No. 154087, October 25, 2005
FACTS
Subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in Sta. Cruz, Manila in the name of the
deceased Simplicio Ilao (Ilao). In the course of the judicial settlement of Ilao's estate, his
heirs found out that the title of the subject property had an annotation of adverse claim
filed by a certain Juanito Ibarra (Ibarra). Respondent herein, Atty. Rodolfo Mapile
(respondent), filed a motion to exclude the property from the inventory on the ground
that the same no longer formed part of Ilao's estate having been disposed of during the
latter's lifetime in favor of Ibarra. It appears that in 1974, Ibarra filed a petition for the
issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of the title of the subject property, claiming
that he was in possession of said owner's duplicate but that he lost the same in a fire.
This allegation was, however, uncovered by the trial court to be false when, upon the
court's subpoena, Ilao's heirs appeared and presented the certificate of title Ibarra
claimed to have been lost. Respondent filed a case for Specific Performance and
Declaration of Nullity of Contract, claiming that the subject property had been sold by
Ilao to Ibarra pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale (deed of sale) and that Ibarra, in turn,
sold the property to him. Petitioners question the probative value given by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals to the notarized deed of sale. They stress that the trial court
even went to the extent of admitting in evidence the transcript of the testimony of the
notary public who purportedly notarized the document in which petitioners were not
named parties. They assail as hearsay the factual findings of the trial court on the
circumstances surrounding the sale of the property to Ibarra which were based only on
respondent's narration, without Ibarra actually testifying thereon. On the objection to
the admission in evidence of the testimony of the notary public taken in another case
and as regards the hearsay nature of his testimony on the circumstances surrounding
the sale of the property to Ibarra, respondent cites the decision of the appellate court
ruling that these testimonies may be admitted as independently relevant evidence and
as part of respondent's narration.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in admitting as evidence the transcript of the testimony of the notary
public who purportedly notarized the document in which petitioners were not named
parties.
HELD
The petitioners' objection to the admission in evidence of the testimony of the notary
public who supposedly notarized the deed of sale taken in another case in which
petitioners were not parties is persuasive. Such testimony does not qualify as an
exception to the hearsay rule under Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given at a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to
cross-examine him.
None of the circumstances for the admission of the testimony given at a former
proceeding obtains in this case. Not only were petitioners not parties to the former
proceeding and hence without opportunity to cross-examine the notary public, there was
also no proof that the notary public was already deceased or unable to testify. Hence,
the testimony should not have been accorded any probative weight.
The same cannot be said, however, of the testimony of respondent relevant to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of sale between Ilao and Ibarra. It
should be noted that what was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was
actually admitted in evidence, was the fact that the statements were made by Ibarra, not
necessarily that the matters stated were true. The utterances are in the nature of
independently relevant statements which may be admitted in evidence as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof.
[OFALSA] Ambray, et al., v. Tsourous, et al., G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016
FACTS
The subject matter of the present controversy is a parcel of land in the name of
petitioners Damaso T. Ambray (Damaso) and Ceferino T. Ambray, Jr. (Ceferino, Jr.;
collectively, petitioners). Petitioners and respondents are siblings. With the exception of
Sylvia, they are the children of the late Ceferino Ambray (Ceferino, Sr.) and Estela Trias
(Estela), who passed away.
During their lifetime, Ceferino, Sr. and Estela owned several properties, one of which
was a parcel of land located in San Pablo City, Laguna. On December 28, 1977,
Ceferino, Sr. mortgaged Lot 2 with Manila Bank. The mortgage was discharged. Prior to
the discharge of the mortgage , Lot 2 was subdivided into three (3) lots: Lot 2-A, Lot 2-
B, and the subject property, Lot 2-C. Lot 2-C was registered in Ceferino, Sr.'s name.
Maristela discovered that the TCT covering Lot 2-C had been cancelled and in its stead,
another TCT was issued in the name of petitioners. It appears that by virtue of a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale) dated Ceferino, Sr., with the consent of
Estela, allegedly sold a portion of lot 2 to petitioners. The Deed of Sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds of San Pablo City only on February 5, 1996. This prompted
respondents to file a criminal case for falsification of public document against
petitioners, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Damaso T. Ambray and Ceferino T.
Ambray". The MTCC acquitted petitioners of the charge for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, respondents filed the instant
complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against petitioners and
Estela (defendants), alleging that TCT No. T-41382 and the Deed of Sale were null and
void because the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela thereon were forgeries. In a
motion to dismiss, defendants claimed that the issue on the authenticity of the
signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale had already been passed
upon in the falsification case where petitioners were eventually acquitted; hence, the
matter was res judicata. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the case on said
ground. CA reversed the said disposition finding that res judicata does not apply. Thus,
it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The RTC nullified the Deed of
Sale as well as TCT No. T-41382 in the name of petitioners and rendered judgment in
favor of respondents. The RTC found that respondents were able to prove, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the Deed of Sale executed by Ceferino, Sr. conveying
Lot 2-C in favor of petitioners was spurious and of dubious origin.
With respect to the issue of forgery of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the
subject Deed of Sale, the RTC took note of the CA's opinion that the MTCC, in the
falsification case, made no categorical finding as to the existence of falsification.
Instead, the MTCC merely concluded that the prosecution failed to establish petitioners'
participation in the alleged falsification.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC's nullification of the Deed of Sale.
HELD
The petition is meritorious.
Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by respondents and the
testimony given by Estela in the falsification case in support of petitioners' defense, the
Court finds greater evidentiary weight in favor of the latter.
While the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, as
espoused by petitioners, is of doubtful application in this case considering that the
MTCC, in the falsification case, failed to categorically pronounce that the Deed of Sale
was not falsified and merely concluded that petitioners had no participation in any
alleged falsification the Court nonetheless observes that petitioners, through the
testimony of Estela thereat, were able to establish the genuineness and due execution
of the subject Deed of Sale which effectively conveyed title over Lot 2-C to them.
Estela's testimony constitutes direct evidence of the authenticity of the signatures on the
Deed of Sale, having personal knowledge thereof, which undeniably prevails over the
written findings of a purported handwriting expert that can only be considered indirect or
circumstantial evidence.
Notably, the admissibility of Estela's former testimony in the present case finds basis in
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that
in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by
the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. The
reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former
testimony can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor, i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of testimony
in the realm of admissible evidence.
Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these proceedings before the
RTC. Her death transpired before the presentation of the parties' evidence could ensue.
However, she was able to testify on direct and cross-examination in the falsification
case and affirmed that the alleged forged signatures appearing on the Deed of Sale
were, indeed, hers and her deceased husband, Ceferino, Sr.'s. The parties in the
falsification case involved respondents and petitioners herein, and the subject matter
therein and in this case are one and the same, i.e., the genuineness and authenticity of
the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela.
Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsification case, being admissible in
evidence in these proceedings, deserves significant consideration.
In fine, the CA and the RTC both erred in finding that the Deed of Sale was of spurious
origin. The authenticity and due execution of the Deed of Sale must be upheld against
the assumptions made by the RTC in its Decision.
7. Opinion rule
Sec. 48. General Rule
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness
[PATAWARAN] Marcos v. Heirs of Late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr., G.R. No. 198240,
July 3, 2013
FACTS: Spouses Andres Navarro Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958
and 1993 respectively. They left behind several parcels of lands including a 108.4
Hectare Lot (Subject Lot) in Cayabon, Masbate. The spouses were survived by their
daughters Luisa Marcos (Petitioner) and Lydia Grageda, and the Heirs (Respondents)
of their only son Andres Navarro Jr.
Petitioner and her sister subsequently discovered that the respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership over the subject lot by virtue of an affidavit of transfer of real
property where Andres Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres Jr. 4 years before his
death.
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through an assistant fiscal, requested
the handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary
Grace Alvarez found that Andres Sr.s signature on the affidavit and the submitted
standard signatures of Andres Sr. are not written by the same person.
The sisters filed an action for the annulment of the deed of donation before the RTC.
After pre-trial, the respondents moved to disqualify the expert witness arguing that the
RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit and that presenting
the expert witness would violate their constitutional right to due process as no notice
was given to them.
The RTC GRANTED the respondents motion and DISQUALIFIED the expert witness as
a witness stating that PO2s testimony is hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of
the alleged handwriting of Andres Sr.
On appeal for certiorari with the CA, the court DISMISSED their petition on the ground
that the dismissal of the civil case has mooted the issue of PO2s disqualification. The
CA likewise denied their MR and refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which REINSTATED the civil case. The CA held that a CA Justice
cannot take judicial notice of decisions pending before another court where he/she is
not a member.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PO2 Alvarez is disqualified as an expert witness to testify on
the matter.
HELD: NO. The expert witness is not disqualified. The CA ruling is REVERSED.
The SC is unable to agree with the CAs refusal to take judicial notice of the Decision of
another CA Division which reinstated the civil case. Subsequent proceedings were even
held in the reinstated Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders issued by the RTC which were
already submitted to the CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that
cannot be ignored.
The SC also agreed with petitioner that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
The SC ruled that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage.
Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party.
Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known
her perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She
cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications
specified under the Rules. Respondents' motion to disqualify her should have been
denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification.
More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the deed of donation executed
by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the resolution of the case.
[PERENA] Tabao v. People, G.R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011
FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts:
At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his Toyota Corolla
car bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street
towards Nagtahan when it suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle
Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into
the middle of the road on her back. Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez speeding blue Toyota
Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over Rochelles body. Bystanders armed
with stones and wooden clubs followed Mendez car until it stopped near the Nagtahan
Flyover. Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to
hurt Mendez. Cielo went inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers license, and
ordered him to move the car backwards. Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the
center island twice while backing up. Cielo went out of the car and approached the
sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelles body inside Mendez
car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST
Hospital, where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic
injuries.
The defense presented a different version of the incident.
The petitioner narrated that at around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he was driving
along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street when his car ramped on an island at
the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but failed to do
so. He alighted from his car and then saw that its two rear wheels had been elevated.
He returned inside his car to turn off its engine; he then noticed that many people were
approaching his car. He again alighted from his vehicle and saw a person lying on the
road. He looked at his left side and saw a car that was running fast like a wind pass by.
He approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she was still breathing
and moaning. Afterwards, he saw Mendez car backing up; he carried the victim towards
that car.Thereafter, he, Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the USTHospital.
Mendez, for his part, testified that at around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he
left his girlfriends house in Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As he was driving along
Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street on his way home, he saw a vehicle that had
ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another vehicle overtook his car from the right
and cut his lane. He slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like object fall from the car
that overtook him, and stopped when he realized that what had fallen was a persons
body. When he moved his car backwards to help this person, many people approached
his car. He alighted from his car and inquired from them what had happened. The
people replied that someone was run over; some of them pointed to him as the culprit.
He denied having run over the victim when they tried to hurt him. The petitioner carried
the victim and placed her inside Mendez car. Thereafter, the two of them brought the
victim to the UST Hospital.
The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and thereafter charged the
petitioner and Mendez with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Manila.
The fact of Rochelle Lanetes death was stipulated during pre-trial, as well as duly
established during trial.What remain to be proven beyond reasonable doubt are the
inexcusable lack in precaution on the part of the petitioner and the direct link of his
negligence to the victims death.
An eyewitness account established that the petitioners vehicle actually hit Rochelle
Lanete. Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive of the
success or failure of the prosecution. One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor Soriano,
unfortunately for the petitioners cause, saw the incident in its entirety; Victor thus
provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime.]In his September 1, 1994 testimony, Victor positively identified the petitioner as
the person who drove the car that ramped on an island divider along Governor Forbes
corner G. Tuazon Street, and hit Rochelle.
The RTC, in its decision dated September 15, 2003, found that it was very clear that
both accused are responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete, and convicted the two
(2) accused of the crime charged.
The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 28401. The
CA, in its decision dated July 27, 2007, agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and
affirmed its decision with the modification that the petitioner be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
years, nine months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution of March 17, 2009.
The petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the
courts a quoerred in convicting him of the crime charged. As earlier stated, we denied
this petition for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision to
warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising
substantially factual issues.
The petitioner now comes to us via the present motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court when it disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior
Inspector Danilo Cornelio who testified that the petitioners car could not have bumped
the victim because the latters body was not thrown in line with the car, but on its side.
The petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly qualified in the field of traffic
accident investigation, and as such, his statements are backed-up by [the] principles of
applied physics, engineering, and mathematics.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the PSI DAnilo Cornelio may be given
credence by the Court.
HELD:
The petitioners arguments fail to convince us.
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness
on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown
to possess, may be received in evidence. The use of the word may signifies that the use
of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound by the
testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be construed
to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist
the court in the determination of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to
adopt depending on its appreciation of the attendant facts and the applicable law. It has
been held of expert testimonies:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place
whatever weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts
of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within
the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by
which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which
deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily
rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in
the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given
controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation
of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not
reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion.
We emphasize that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his
testimony was merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar
Reyes who himself did not witness the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp.
Cornelios testimony did he conclusively state that the petitioner could not have been
involved in the incident.
From the foregoing, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not discount the possibility
that the victim could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted that the
location of an accident victim in relation to the vehicle would also depend on the speed
of the vehicle and the point of impact.
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses
[RAMOS] Dela Llana v. Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013
Facts:
30 March 2000: Juan delaLlana (Juan) was driving a car along North Avenue, QC
with his sister, Dra. Leila delaLlana (Dra. delaLlana) at the front passenger seat and a
certain Calimlim at the backseat.
While stopped across Veterans Hospital, a dump drunk driven by Joel suddenly
rammed the car from the rear, violently pushing it forward.
The cars rear collapsed and its rear windshield shattered. Apart from a few minor
wounds caused by the glass splinters, Dra. delaLlana did not appear to have suffered
other visible physical injuries.
May 2000: Dra. delaLlana started to feel pain on the left side of her neck and
shoulder, which eventually became unbearable to the point that she could no longer
move her arm.
Upon consultation with Dr. Milla, she was diagnosed as having suffered from a
whiplash injury. Extensive physical therapy proved to be futile and she had to undergo
cervical spine surgery after consultation with other doctors. As a result of the surgery,
Dra. delaLlana was incapacitated from the practice of her profession.
8 May 2001: Dra. delaLlana sued the owner of the truck, Rebecca Biong (Rebecca),
for damages after the latter refused to compensate her for the injuries she sustained.
At trial, Dra. delaLlana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile
witness. She testified that she lost the mobility of her arm due to the vehicular accident.
She identified and authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla which stated
that she suffered from a whiplash injury. In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra.
delaLlana was physically fit when they met days after the accident, and that she
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Joel.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Dra. delaLlana. It held that the proximate cause of the
whiplash injury was Joels reckless driving. It declared that Joels negligence gave rise
to the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Joel. Accordingly, it found Rebecca vicariously
liable, and awarded Dra. delaLlana the amounts of P570,000.00 as actual damages,
P250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit.
CA: Reversed the ruling of the RTC. It held that Dra. delaLlana failed to establish a
reasonable connection between the accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance
of evidence. It ruled that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there
is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact
in issue. (Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. CA) Moreover, it held that courts cannot take judicial
notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It also declared as fatal to her
claim her failure to present an expert witness. No weight was given to the medical
certificate, it having no explanation how and why the accident caused the injury.
Issues:
1. WON Dra. delaLlana has established by preponderance of evidence that
Joels negligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury.
2. WON the medical certificate has probative value.
3. WON Dra. delaLlanas opinion (as testified by her) has probative value.
4. WON the SC can take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries.
Ratio:
1. NO, Dra. delaLlana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.
a. Dra. delaLlana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three
elements of quasi-delict before the Court can determine Rebeccas liability as Joels
employer. (see Art. 2176, NCC) She should show the chain of causation between Joels
reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the
presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of Joel arise. Only after the negligence, damages and
proximate causation are established can the Court proceed with the application of par.
5, Art. 2180, NCC.
b. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who
alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or
greater weight of credible evidence. Mere allegations are not evidence.
2. NO, it doesnt. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not
admitted in evidence.
a. The RTC did not admit in evidence the medical certificate, hence, the CA erred in
even considering it in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence which has
not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their
judgments.
b. Even if it is considered, it has no probative value for being hearsay. Evidence is
hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but
on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence.
c. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The
former depends on its relevance and competence, while the latter pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
3. NO, her opinion has no probative value.
a. Under the RoC, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and
an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence
regarding: (a) identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a
handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person
with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on
his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. On the
other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess.
b. Even if admitted as expert testimony, the Court does not immediately accord it with
probative value. Its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the
courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the
reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.
c. Dra. delaLlana was not presented as an expert witness but as an ordinary witness.
As such, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of
whiplash injury.
4. NO, courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries.
a. This is not public knowledge, nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration, nor
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
WHEREFORE, assailed decision and resolution of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED and
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
[TAN] People v. Duranan, G.R. Nos. 134074-75, January 16, 2001
Facts:
Accused was charged twice for the crime of rape of private complainant AAA who is
retarded in the RTC. At the trial, the prosecution presented testimonial evidence of the
complainant, her mother BBB and a physician who claimed that AAA was raped twice
by accused on 2 separate days. After a failed 3rd attempt, AAA told BBB about the 2
rapes and so she was examined by a physician who confirmed that AAA had recently
lost her virginity.
Due to this, the RTC charged accused with the rapes and so the latter appealed.
Issue:
WON the RTC validly ruled on AAAs mental condition despite the lack of a competent
medical experts testimony.
Held:
Yes. As held by Rule 130, Section 50:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given may be received in evidence regarding ---
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she
knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is
suffering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.
In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her
mother, the trial courts observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior, and her
intelligence, while the fact of sexual intercourse is proven by the medico-legal
certificate. In addition, the prosecution proved the presence of force and intimidation,
and the court appreciated such. intimidation, in this case, is constituted by the threats
that accused-appellant made to the complainant, not to mention the force employed by
accused-appellant in placing his arm on the complainants neck and holding her hands
while undressing her.
[UY] Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 & 169217, August 7, 2009
Facts: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to
the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter
died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care
of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C.
Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited
valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50
million in 1997).
Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and
studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu
stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.
Upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.
Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix
continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Felix died in 1993,
petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and
petitioners undertook various "projects" involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix
allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the
Marilou Subdivision. In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare in
Montalban, Rizal property was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of
attorney6 (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on
her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said
property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked
Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford
Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at
her disposal.
Sometime thereafter, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin,
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating
her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of
petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400
for her food and medication.
Due to unhygienic and inhumane treatment to Lulu by her 2nd family, she developed
several illness and diseases.
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate
from petitioners. However, the demand was ignored.
Respondent filed a petition for guardianship in the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo,
Rizal. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her
estate because she was of weak mind.
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same.
Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late
husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their
conjugal partnership.
Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been
settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and
maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage.
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and aware of the consequences of
executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the
scope of their respective authorities could not be determined in a guardianship
proceeding, such matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action.
Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was
among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family. However, because
the "sale" between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its
legality were already barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no
longer be impugned, or so they claimed.
During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and
experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described
her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting
tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by
the Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious" lifestyle. When asked to explain this
allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was
made to ride a tricycle.
Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations that not only
she had several diseases but also unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence
level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care
for herself and self-administer her medications.
RTC declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the
person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond.
MR was filed but the same was denied.
CA affirmed the decision and It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to
prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed
assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of
her estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA
found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal
guardian. Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint
someone Lulu clearly trusted.
While Lulu was transferred to Marikina she was abducted but petitioners allegedly said
that she voluntarily went with Natividad.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA alleging that petitioners
abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez,
Rizal. CA granted the petition for HC. MR was filed but the same was also denied.
Issue: WON petitioners contention that
opinions of Lulu's attending physicians regarding her mental state were inadmissible in
evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry.

Held: It is of without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his
opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them
to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below
average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in
evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary. The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person's state of mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given ample
opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC.
[MANIQUIS] Sps. Lim, et al., v. Chuatoco, et al., G.R. No. 161861, March 11, 2005
FACTS:
Spouses Jose and Leoncia Chuatoco were registered owners of land in Binondo. They
built Hospital and School, reserving the building's second floor as the family residence.
Jose died. TCT (spouses) replaced by TCT (Leoncia and children). Leoncia died. Son
Jorge took over as sole administrator of the school later joined by Son Rafael's wife,
Teresita.
Rafael allegedly obtained title in his name by fictitious deed of sale, purportedly by
respondent brothers and deceased Leoncia in favor of Rafael. TCT (Leoncia and
children) was cancelled and new TCT was issued in Rafaels name.
Jorge allegedly discovered this and to protect their interests, he convinced Rafael to
surrender the certificate to him for safekeeping and Rafael agreed. However, Rafael
through wife Teresita had the TCT reconstituted alleging it was lost. After reconstitution,
Rafael, through wife, sold property to the Lims (petitioners here).
After the Lims refused to heed the demands of respondents for reconveyance, a
complaint was filed.
RTC dismissed declaring sale was void only as to undivided shares of Eduardo, Jorge,
and Felipe Chuatoco, whose signatures were proven forged (signatures of mother
Leoncia and brother Francisco were not proven forged; hence, sale of their shares were
valid). Nonetheless, the court ruled for Lims per mirror doctrine and innocent purchase
for value principle; also because of respondents admission that they met with the Lims
asking and offering mutual restitution, negating respondents claim of lack of notice. CA
reversed finding the Lims were not buyers in good faith. CA ordered the Lims to
reconvey 4/5 of the property (only sale of Rafaels share was valid [1/5]).
ISSUE: Were the signatures of Leoncia and Francisco genuine and hence the sale of
their aliquot shares valid, as RTC ruled?
HELD:
NO. Both RTC and CA concluded that forgery attended the Deed, albeit in varying
degrees. The Court is persuaded by the CA's conclusion that all the signatures were
forged, and not just that of Eduardo, Jorge, and Felipe. RTC declared that the forgeries
of these three signatures had been established by the NBI. While the NBI expert had
not formed an opinion on the genuineness of the signatures of Leoncia and Francisco, it
was merely because the specimen signatures submitted to him were insufficient.
However, the CA correctly ruled that even in the absence of expert testimony, the
falsity of the signatures of Leoncia and Francisco had been sufficiently
established by Francisco's direct repudiation of his signature, as well as the
denials by Eduardo and Jorge of their mother's signature.
While the testimony of a person, disavowing the genuineness of his signature
may seem self-serving at first blush, it cannot be ignored that such person is in
the best position to know whether or not the signature on the check was his, and
averments he would have on the matter, if adjudged as truthful, deserve primacy in
consideration. On the other hand, the denials of Eduardo and Jorge of their mother's
signature may be properly appreciated in evidence, as S50, R130 allows the opinion of
an ordinary witness to be received in evidence regarding a handwriting with which he
has sufficient familiarity. The appellate court committed no error in ruling that Eduardo
would probably be the most reliable witness to testify on the handwriting of his mother
because he had worked closely with and exchanged papers and communications with
Leoncia on a regular basis, the latter being then the administrator of the properties left
by Jose.
On the substantive aspect, SC ruled: Even though the Lims concede having met with
Eduardo in the US, it is not evident that they did so with the intent of negotiating with
Eduardo, with the perception that he was a co-owner whose consent was indispensable
to the sale. The Court is not prepared to deem with any conclusiveness the fact of this
meeting. Presumption of good faith cannot be overcome by haphazard conjectures
premised on a disputed fact. Also, the Lims had no obligation to look beyond the face of
the Torrens title. But they even went beyond the face of the certificate of title by
checking out the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Good faith upheld, CA
set aside, RTC reinstated.
8. Character evidence
Sec. 51.
[MELCHOR] People v. Lee, G.R. No. 139070, May 29, 2002
Facts: On May 27, 1998, an Information was filed against accused-appellant charging
him with the crime of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of September 1996, in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one JOSEPH
MARQUEZ y LAGANDI, with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the
latter serious physical injuries, which ultimately caused the victims death.
CONTRARY TO LAW
The prosecution established that on Sept. 26, 1996, Joseph and his mother, Herminia
were watching TV in the living room of their home when the assailant, Noel Lee, shot
the deceased through the window, hiting the latter on the head. Afterwards, suspect fled
to the direction of his house. Meanwhile, Herminia, assisted by neighbors, brought the
victim to MCU Hospital, where he died. At the trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (a) Herminia, the victims mother; (b) Dr. Corpuz, a doctor at the
MCU Hospital; (c) PO2 Ortiz, who examined the crime scene; and (d) Dr. Cosidon, a
medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Lab. Accordingly, an Information was filed and a
warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant and effected by NBI agents. For his
defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a) Bermudez, a neighbor; and
(b) himself. He denies killing the victim, claiming that he was in his house having some
drinks with Bermudez, and his driver, Columba. They were drinking and singing with the
videoke. Also in the house were his wife, children and household help. At 10:00 P.M.,
Bermudez and Columba went home and accused-appellant went to sleep. He woke up
at 5:30 in the morning of the following day and learned that Joseph, a neighbor, was
shot to death, and that he is accused as the killer. Accused is known around town as
formerly charged with frustrated homicide and attempted murder, while the victim is
known as a thief and drug addict, who only a week before his death, attempted stealing
the formers car stereo. The court found the accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him
to death, as well as ordering him to pay civil indemnity and damages. The accused
appealed, stating that the testimony of Herminia is self-serving and that he was hastily
tagged as the killer based merely on Herminias testimony, without regard to Josephs
shady past.
Issue: WON the guilty verdict on the accused is proper?
Held:
Yes, the verdict is proper. Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence.
"Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:--
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability
or improbability of the offense charged.
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. There are
exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused
may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this
strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and reputation
are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit the crime charged.
Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character
of the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the
accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a
person of bad character. The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege
of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to
produce such evidence. Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the
prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the defendants bad character. Otherwise,
a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a license to unscrupulously impose a
false character upon the tribunal.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence
of the accused. And this evidence must be "pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged," meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane
to the kind of the act charged. Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to
the character of the offended party. Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved "if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged." In homicide cases, a pertinent
character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence of the
deceaseds aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. In the
instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the
victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his death in the
hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that
because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any one of those
from whom he had stolen, is pure speculation.
Rule 131 Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Sec. 1. Burden of Proof
[SANTOS] Supreme Transliner, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
125356, November 21, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioners Supreme Transliner Inc. and Felipe Sia are the registered owners of a bus
driven by co-petitioner Novencio Flores. The bus collided with a passenger jeepney
carrying private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. At the time of the incident, the
jeepney was owned and registered in the name of Marcelino Villones and driven by
Reynaldo Decena.
As a result of the collision, private respondents who were on board the jeepney suffered
injuries. They sued for damages against petitioners based on quasi-delict and against
Villones and Decena for breach of contract. Petitioners, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against Country Bankers Insurance Company, insurer of the Supreme
Transliner bus.
Decena recounted that he was driving a passenger jeepney bound for Candelaria,
Quezon. Upon reaching Sampaloc, Sariaya, Quezon, a Supreme Transliner bus coming
from the opposite direction, suddenly appeared on a curved portion of the road and
overtook another jeepney, which it was then following. Thereafter, the bus collided with
Decenas jeepney.
Petitioners testified that the passenger jeepney was running very fast when the accident
occurred.
The trial court rendered its judgment, finding that the plaintiffs [have] established by
preponderance of evidence the allegations of the complaint.
The trial court declared that Flores was negligent in operating the bus, while Sia failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice, supervision and
direction of his employees.
The trial court ordered Country Bankers to pay third-party plaintiffs an amount not
exceeding P50,000.
The CA affirmed the decision and found that there was competent and preponderant
evidence which showed that driver Novencio Flores negligence was the proximate
cause of the mishap and that Felipe Sia failed to perform the required degree of care in
the selection and supervision of the bus driver. It also found that the actual damages
representing the medical expenses incurred by private respondents were properly
supported by receipts.
ISSUES:
1. Who has the burden of proving herein petitioners liability?
2. May the evidence presented by Decena and Villones be considered in
determining preponderance of evidence against herein petitioners?
HELD:
1. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law, which is preponderance
of evidence in civil cases. The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who
asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a
favorable judgment. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is
not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but one
which, if established, will be a good defense i.e. an avoidance of the claim. In
this case, both private respondents as well as the jeepney driver Reynaldo
Decena and its owner Marcelino Villones claim that the bus driver, Novencio
Flores, was liable for negligently operating the bus. For private respondents,
the claim constitutes their cause of action against petitioners which said private
respondents must prove by preponderance of evidence. At the same time, the
same claim is a matter of affirmative defense on the part of Decena and
Villones who are impleaded as co-defendants of petitioners. Therefore, both
private respondents as well as the said co-defendants had the burden of
proving petitioners negligence by the quantum of proof required to establish
the latters liability, i.e. by preponderance of evidence.
1. We rule in the affirmative. The evidence presented by the jeepney owner and
its driver, Villones and Decena, forms part of the totality of the evidence
concerning the negligence committed by petitioners as defendants in quasi
delict case. Preponderance of evidence is determined by considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of
who actually presented it. Petitioners liability were proved by the evidence
presented by Decena and Villones at the trial, taken together with the evidence
presented by the victims of the collision, namely herein private respondents
Gloria and Lotis Brazal. We find petitioners reliance on Sections 34 and 35 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court misplaced. Petitioners cited these rules to
support their allegation that evidence by Decena and Villones should not be
considered in private respondents favor since the latter did not adopt much
less offer them in evidence. Nothing in Section 34 requires that the evidence
be offered or adopted by a specific party before it could be considered in his
favor. It is enough that the evidence is offered for the courts consideration. We
find, moreover, no pertinence in petitioners invocation of Rule 35, on when to
make an offer, except to indicate to us petitioners reliance on inapplicable
technicalities that betray the lack of merit of their petition. WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is DENIED.
[SANTOS] People v. Kinok, et al., G.R. No. 104629, November 13, 2001
FACTS:
The accused was charged for the killing of William Aguipo. Upon arraignment, the two
accused pleaded NOT GUILTY.
After taking supper at around 8:00 oclock in the evening of September 23, 1989, Luz
Aguipo, together with four of her five children, went upstairs in her house at Kimlawis,
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, while her husband, William Aguipo proceeded inside the store
in the first floor and slept therein. At around 8:30 oclock of the same evening, Luz heard
two persons calling out to buy rise. She went down the house and saw accused Julius
Kinok and Tapante Saligan.
At around 12:30 oclock past midnight, Luz was awakened by a muffled gunburst. She
immediately got up, looked over the window and saw the two accused both holding
guns which were pointed at where her husband, William, was later found dead. She was
able to identify the two as the moon and stars were shinning brightly and besides there
was a pile of woods and bamboos (bagacay) which were burning around eight (8)
meters away from where the two accused were. Not long after, the two accused ran
away. Thereafter, Luz went back to lie down on her bed. She could not go back to sleep
because she was scared that the two would come back to strafe their house and kill
them all.
While all these were going on, Ronel Mande, the 13-year old nephew of the couple, who
was sleeping in the first floor with the other child, Rommel Aguipo (on the other side of
the wall of split bamboos from where William was sleeping), was himself awakened by
the noise coming from the horse and pigs. When he tried to look at the place where the
horse and pigs were, he saw the two accused both holding firearms which were directed
and poked at the walling of the store where William was sleeping. He saw both accused
clearly since the moon was shining brightly and the pile of woods he had previously set
fire earlier in the evening was burning just around eight (8) meters away from where the
accused were. Upon noticing that both accused had pointed their guns toward the store
where his uncle William was sleeping, he tried to look at the wooden railings. As he was
looking, he heard a muffled gun burst. Thereupon, he ducked and lay down on the floor.
Feeling very much scared, he covered himself with a blanket.
The trial court find the accused Julius Kinok alias Yos Bla-an and Tapante Saligan alias
Tapante Bla-an guilty of the crime of murder as charged.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the court erred in finding that the evidence for the prosecution has
established the identity of the killers;
HELD:
Incidentally, during the pendency of this appeal, or on July 24, 1994, appellant Tapante
Saligan died due to cardio respiratory arrest while confined at the National Bilibid Prison
in Muntinlupa hence this Court dismissed the appeal with respect to him for being moot
and academic.
Ronel Mande, prosecution witness, positively identified appellants in the direct
examination.
Instead of controverting the above testimonies and defending themselves, appellants
merely chose to remain silent. They relied solely on the testimonies of their barriomates
who claimed that Luz Aguipo and Ronel Mande did not inform them of the names
of the perpetrators.
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt
not only the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum
of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof
does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the trial.
However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by
presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the
information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the burden of
evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in
order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.
As we held in People v. Resano: But when the prosecution has already established a
prima facie case, more so when the offense charged is grave and sufficient enough to
send the accused behind bars for life or may even warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death, then in order to meet and destroy the effects of said prima
facie case and so as to shift the burden of producing further evidence to the
prosecution, the party making the denial must produce evidence tending to negate the
blame asserted to such a point that, if no more evidence is given, his adversary cannot
win the case beyond reasonable doubt. In such a situation, it may be necessary for
the accused to have a complete destruction of the prosecutions prima facie case,
that he take the stand since no hardship will in any way be imposed upon him nor
advantage be taken of him.
Appellants unexplainable silence, in the midst of the overwhelming evidence
established by the prosecution against them, leads to no other conclusion than that they
are guilty as charged.
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions