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Lising, Ieuan C.

Jurisdoctor 2B
Special Issues on International Law

Calme vs Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 116688, August 30, 1996
WENEFREDO CALME, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former 10th Division with HON.
ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ as Chairman and HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA and HON. RAMON
MABUTAS, as members, respondents.
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Ship/s involved:

M/V Cebu City


Ships Country of Registry: Philippines
Owners Country of Registry: Philippines

Place/Date of Incident:

Presumably, 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, May 12, 1991.

Facts:

Petitioner and four other persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by allegedly throwing
him overboard the M/V Cebu City owned and operated by William Lines, Inc., while the vessel was
sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991. Petitioner impugned the Oroquieta
RTCs jurisdiction over the offense charged through a motion to quash which, however, was denied by
Judge Conol of RTC, Br.12, Oroquieta City. Petitioner Calmes petition for certiorari and prohibition was
denied due course and dismissed by the CA in its decision dated 10 December 1993. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied in the CA resolution of 14 July 1994.

Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took place while the vessel was in transit, the
general rule laid down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court is
the applicable provision in determining the proper venue and jurisdiction and not Sec. 15(c) (now
Section 14) thereof since the exact location where the alleged crime occured was known, and that the
proper venue is Siquijor because, according to the Marine Protest filed by the vessels captain the ship
was 8.0 miles off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he received the report that a passenger
jumped overboard. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner.

Ruling:

Yes. Oroquieta RTC has jurisdiction. The exact location where the alleged offense was
committed was not duly established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the vessel was within the
waters of Siquijor Island when the captain was informed of the incident, which does not necessarily
prove that the alleged murder took place in the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually
committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it occurred while the vessel was in transit. In transit
simply means on the way or passage; while passing from one person or place to another, in the course
of transportation. The applicable provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 which
provides that where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.

Dispositive Portion:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.


Lising, Ieuan C.
Jurisdoctor 2B
Special Issues on International Law

U.S. vs Look Chaw


G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Supreme Court of The Philippines

Ship/s Involved:

Steamship Errol
Ships Country of Registry: United Kingdom

Place/Date of Incident:

Wharf of Cebu, August 19, 1909.

Facts:

Between 11-12 a.m. on August 19, 1909, several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and
Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found large quantities of
processed opium, which was under the defendant's control, who freely admitted that this sack,
belonged to him. Defendant also stated voluntarily, that he had bought the seized opium in Hongkong
with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz. Two complaints were then filed
against the defendant. The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes
of opium," and that "he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."

A complaint for the unlawful possession of opium was filed against the defendant. The defense
moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and
the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal,asked that the maximum penalty of the
law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court
ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the
wharf of Cebu.

During trial, It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came
from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu. After the
deliberation, of the case, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 5 years of imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed
one third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in
favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case. From this judgment, the
defendant appealed to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant can be held liable for the unlawful possession of opium.

Ruling:

Yes. Although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by
the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine
Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said
place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
Also, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the present case, was
considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on the
subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.

Dispositive Portion:

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000,
respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
Lising, Ieuan C.
Jurisdoctor 2B
Special Issues on International Law

Okamoto vs Collector of Customs


G.R. No. L-39969, July 11, 1934
KISAJIRO OKAMOTO, captain of the Japanese motor fishing sampan, Hosho Maru, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Ship/s Involved:

Revenue Cutter Arayat


Ships Country of Registry: N/A
Owners Country of Registry: N/A

Hoshu Maru
Ships Country of Registry: Japan
Owners Country of Registry: Japan

Place/Date of Incident:

Within waters of Salomague Island, December 14, 1932.

Facts:

About noon of December 14, 1932, revenue cutter Arayat sighted a Japanese fishing boat
named the Hosho Maru, anchored a short distance away from Salomague Island, a small island off the
cost of Northern Luzon. A boarding party was put aboard the fishing vessel and found fishing yields and
equipment, but no articles of commerce or passengers. Upon a report being made to the Insular
Collector of Customs, that official directed the seizure of the Hosho Maru and, after administrative
proceedings, decreed the forfeiture of the vessel and directed its sale at public auction for the benefit of
the Government, due to the violation of customs and quarantine laws and regulations.

Capt. Okamoto appealed the case to the CFI of Manila. That court held that the Hosho Maru
took refuge in Philippine waters on account of stress of weather, that the it was not engaged in the
importation of merchandise in any Philippine port, and that nothing had been found indicating that the
fishing vessel unlawfully violated any customs or quarantine law or regulation. Therefore the order of
confiscation and forfeiture was reversed and the vessel ordered returned to its owner, with costs
against the Insular Collector of Customs. The Solicitor-General brings this appeal and asks this court to
reverse the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila and affirm the decision of the Insular
Collector of Customs.

Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Customs erred in ordering the seizure of the Hoshu Maru.

Ruling:

Yes. Since there were no Philippine statute enacted at the time to govern the case at bar, the
Court referred to the laws of US and UK. Both in England and in the United States confiscation of a
vessel for violation of a customs law cannot be had administratively but only by court proceedings.
Section 1363 of the Administrative Gode provides for the forfeiture of vessels engaged in certain
specified illegal actions, none of which apply in this case. It therefore must be held that the Collector of
Customs was without authority to order the forfeiture of the vessel. The right of asylum from stress of
weather is a right well recognized by international law and is in accordance with the dictates of
Christianity. The only limitation is that the weather must be such as to create an honest belief in the
mind of a skillful and firm mariner.As the Solicitor-General is unable to point out the specific law or
regulation that he claims the Hosho Maru violated, further proceedings are deemed unnecessary.

Dispositive Portion:

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed with the modification that costs in both
instances will be de oficio. So ordered.
Lising, Ieuan C.
Jurisdoctor 2B
Special Issues on International Law

Dela Fuente vs De Veyra


G.R. No. L-35385 January 31, 1983
ALFREDO DE LA FUENTE, as Collector of Customs, Port of Sual, ROLANDO GEOTINA, as
Commissioner of Customs, HILARIO RUIZ, as Flag Officer In Command, Philippine Navy, and
GIL FERNANDEZ, as Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, petitioners, vs.
HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XIV, LUCKY STAR SHIPPING COMPANY, and TENG BEE ENTERPRISES CO. (HK) LTD.,
respondents.
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Ship/s Involved:

M/V Lucky Star I


Ships Country of Registry: Panama
Owners Country of Registry: N/A

Place/Date of Incident:

Off the coast of Zambales approximately 30nm east of Scarborough Shoal or 23nm east of the
International Treaty Limits, June 16, 1972.

Facts:

On June 16, 1972, at 6pm, the crew of a Q-boat of the Philippine Coast Guard spotted the M/V
Lucky Star I, owned by the private respondent Lucky Star Shipping Co., unloading cargo to several
small watercrafts alongside it, off the coast of Zambales. As the Q-boat was approaching the M/V Lucky
Star I, it was met by gunfire from the smaller watercrafts which immediately fled from the scene. Only
the M/V Lucky Star I was apprehended. Upon boarding, the PCG officers discovered cases of foreign
made cigarettes allegedly owned by Teng Bee Enterprises Co. (HK) Ltd., co-respondent herein. The
officers, also saw on board a certain Deogracias Labrador, Filipino Captain of the domestic watercraft,
M/L Sangbay, one of the boats seen alongside the M/V Lucky Star I.

The captain of the Lucky Star I, Li Tak Sin, was not able to present documents or papers for the
cigarettes. They were arrested for smuggling. Thereafter, a warrant of seizure and detention was issued
by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Sual-Dagupan against the vessel and articles seized for
violation of the Tariff and Customs Code. Subsequently, the Acting Provincial Fiscal filed before the CFI
of Zambales, an information against Li Tak Sin, the crew of Lucky Star I, Labrador, and other persons
for violation of the same, penalized R.A. 1937, as amended by R.A. 4712: Meanwhile, the private
respondents filed before the CFI of Manila, presided over by respondent judge, Hon. de Veyra. a
complaint for injunction and recovery of personal property against the petitioners praying for the return
of the goods seized and the release of the M/V Lucky Star I.

Respondent Judge did not grant the injunction prayed for and ruled that The Bureau of Customs
cannot forfeit the vessel. It ruled that it could only impose a fine against the owners of the vessel.The
petitioners asked for a reconsideration of the aforequoted order insofar as it required them to inform the
respondent court of the maximum fine that may be the basis for a bond that would entitle the private
respondents to repossess the vessel, but to no avail. As the respondents counter, they allege that the
seizure of the ship was illegal and against the accepted principles of international law for the following
reasons: 1) the ship is a foreign vessel registered under the laws of the Republic of Panama and flies
the Panamian flag; 2) the crew is composed of aliens; and 3) the ship was seized outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs is without power to enforce the Philippine
Customs law. Consequently, it is argued that the proper forum for the private respondents to obtain
relief for the release of the vessel is the ordinary court, more specifically, the Court of First Instance.
The petitioners contend, on the other hand, that the M/V Lucky Star I was apprehended at a point 23
miles east of the International Treaty Limits, well within the territory of the Philippines as defined in
Article I of the 1935 Constitution, the Treaty of Paris, and Republic Act No. 3046. The petitioners state
that the vessel was caught in the act of smuggling. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint which is the subject
of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs of the port of Sual-
Dagupan.
Lising, Ieuan C.
Jurisdoctor 2B
Special Issues on International Law

Ruling:

No. It is well-settled that the exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the
Collector of Customs precludes a CFI from assuming cognizance over such cases. Jurisprudence
provides that, the CFI should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The Jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later
than the Judiciary Act of 1948. Moreover, on grounds of public policy, it is more reasonable to conclude
that the legislators intended to divest the CFI of the prerogative to replevin a property which is a subject
of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, Otherwise, actions
for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device
of replevin.' The judicial recourse of the owner of a personal property which has been the subject of a
seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Collector of Customs is not in the CFI but in the Court of
Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies in the Bureau of Customs.

The Collector of Customs constituted itself as a tribunal to hear and determine among other
things, the question of whether or not the M/V Lucky Star I was seized within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. If the private respondents believe that the seizure was made outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, it should raise the same as a defense before the Collector of Customs
and if not satisfied, follow the correct appellate procedures. A separate action before the Court of First
Instance is not the remedy.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The questioned orders of the respondent court
are set aside. The preliminary injunction dated August 24, 1972 is made permanent and the respondent
court is ordered to desist from further proceeding in Civil Case No, 87435.
Lising, Ieuan C.
Jurisdoctor 2B
Special Issues on International Law

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