J. B. Conacher (Auth.) - Britain and The Crimea, 1855-56 - Problems of War and Peace-Palgrave Macmillan UK (1987)

BRITAIN AND THE CRIMEA, 1855-56
By the same author

THE ABERDEEN COALITION, 1852-1855
THE PEELITES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, 1846-52
FROM WATERLOO TO THE COMMON MARKET: Borzoi History of England,
Volume V
THE EMERGENCE OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (editor)
Britain and the Crimea,
1855-56
Problems of War and Peace
J. B. Conacher
Professor Emeritus
University of Toronto
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-19001-0 ISBN 978-1-349-18999-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18999-1
J. B. Conacher, 1987
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1987
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly & Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010
First published in the United States of America in 1987
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Conacher, J. B.
Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Crimean War, 1853-1856---Diplomatic history.
2. Crimean War, 1853-1856---Peace. 3. Great Britain-
Politics and govemment-1837-1901. 4. Great Britain-
Foreign relations--1837-1901. I. Title.
DK215.C74 1987 947' .073 87-13053
ISBN 978-0-312-01242-7
Contents
List of Maps and Illustrations vii
Preface ix
1 The Palmerston Coalition, February 1855 1
2 The Vienna Conference of 1855 and its Parliamentary
Repercussions 29
3 Parliamentary Politics in the Summer of 1855 57
4 The Crimean Campaign of 1855 to the Death of Raglan 79
5 The Conclusion of the Crimean Campaign and the War
on other Fronts 105
6 The Drift to Peace 136
7 The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 176
8 Finale 207
Notes and References 230
Bibliography 263
Index 270
v
List of Illustrations
1 NOW FOR IT! 7
A Set-to Between 'Pam, the Downing Street Pet', and
'The Russian Spider'.
[Punch, 17 February 1855]
2 Map 1: The Black Sea 78
3 Map 2: The Upland 92
4 WHAT IS THE PRICE OF PEACE? 139

Austria. 'Please to tell me the price of a peace?'
Palm. 'We haven't the article on hand at present.'
[Punch, 15 December 1855]
5 STAYING PROCEEDINGS 181

Mr Bull. 'Tell Russia, if he doesn't settle at once, I
shall go on with the action.'
[Punch, 6 February 1856]
6 SWINDLING THE CLARENDON (By a Distinguished

Russian) 203
Mr Bull (Landlord of the British Lion). 'What! Quite the
Gentleman! Why, he has left nothing but a portmantel
full of bricks and stones, and gone off without paying
the bill!'
[Punch, 12 April 1856]
vii
Preface
In my Aberdeen Coalition, 1852-1855 I dealt at some length with
the Eastern Question, Crimean War diplomacy and the failure of
wartime military administration as well as with the politics of the
Coalition and its domestic achievements and setbacks. The book had
to come to an end with the fall of the Aberdeen administration and
consequently had to leave the diplomatic and military problems that
it examined unresolved. The present book, long postponed because
of other commitments, seeks to resolve those problems of war and
peace and, as originally conceived, to study the continuing relation-
ship between Peelites and Liberals during the latter part of the
Crimean War when Palmerston became Prime Minister, but the
result was a book too long to be financially viable in these days of
high publishing costs. Consequently I have had virtually to eliminate
the second theme and to make other quite drastic cuts elsewhere,
especially in sections dealing with the Anglo-American recruitment
crisis and the controversial Kars campaign.
My approach, as in the Aberdeen Coalition, remains a narrative
one. History so written can be regarded as a branch of literature and
the historian can tell a story for its own sake if the events he deals
with are worth recording. At the same time, while presenting his
research in the form of a narrative, there is no reason why he cannot
perform his analytic function, explaining as far as the evidence allows
him, why as well as how the events of which he writes happened
and with what consequences. His point of view should emerge from
his selection and presentation of the evidence and from the gloss
that he will put on it from time to time as he chooses. I tell the story
as it seems to make sense to me, but do not wish to over-emphasise
what seems to me to be obvious, and am quite satisfied if the reader
comes to different conclusions from the evidence that I have put
before him. In my view, virtually all historical events are the result
of a multiplicity of causes and while the historian is free to make it
clear that he considers some more important than others and perhaps
one the most important he is unwise to be categorical or doctrinaire
for the evidence is rarely if ever all in.
The narrative approach, as I suggested, has its disadvantages as
well as its advantages, as for instance the necessity it imposes in this
book of plodding through the long negotiations leading up to the
ix
X Preface
preliminaries of peace and the weary weeks of the peace conference

itself. There is much to be said for the equally legitimate topical
approach of Temperley and Baumgart, but on the other hand the
narrative, if properly presented, gives the reader a sense of develop-
ment and an appreciation of the stages the preliminary negotiations
and the peace conference went through. The challenge to the writer
is to avoid repetition as much as possible and to distil lengthy argu-
ments into their essentials.
I wish to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty the
Queen to consult and quote from the Papers of Queen Victoria and
Prince Albert in the Royal Archives in Windsor Castle and the royal
correspondence with Lord Palmerston in the Palmerston (Broad-
lands) Papers. I also wish to thank the Trustees of the Broadlands
Archives Trust for permission to consult and quote from the Palmer-
stan Papers deposited with the Royal Historical Commission, the
Earl of Clarendon for similar permission for the papers of the Fourth
Earl in the Bodleian Library and the Earl of Shelburne for the
Papers of the Third Marquis of Lansdowne at Bowood. I must
likewise thank the heirs and custodians of all the other private collec-
tions listed in the bibliography. I should also like to express my
appreciation to the staffs of all the archives and libraries in which I
have worked and to a variety of typists, both in Canada and in
England, who have typed parts of the book at various stages over
too many years. I am grateful to the Council of the Navy Records
Society, London, for permission to base the maps on originals repro-
duced in vol. 83 of the Society's publications. I am further indebted
to the Canada Council, the Social Science and Humanities Research
Council of Canada and the University of Toronto for research grants,
to the Social Science Federation of Canada for an aid-to-publication
grant and to the Nuffield Foundation for very pleasant accommo-
dation on Prince Albert Road, London, while working in England.
I am also indebted to two former graduate students who gave me
useful bibliographic leads, Mr D. R. Thompson on the Anglo-Amer-
ican enlistment crisis and Mr George Urbaniak on some aspects of
Crimean War diplomacy. Professor J. C. Cairns and Professor C. P.
Steacy each kindly read several draft chapters and gave me much
appreciated advice and support, while an old friend, Major J. C.
Newlands, was good enough to read much of the final typescript and
catch some slips that might otherwise have been missed. I am greatly
indebted to several good friends who between them gave an
additional reading to all the proofs which proved most valuable.
Preface Xl
Finally, I must acknowledge the great debt I owe to my wife who

has cheerfully put up with the long hours over the years in which I
have isolated myself in my study and helped me with proof reading
in the final stages.
Garden Island, Ontario J. B. Conacher

1 The Palmerston
Coalition, February
1855
I THE QUEEN'S SEARCH FOR A PRIME MINISTER-
DERBY, LANSDOWNE AND RUSSELL
The sudden collapse of Lord Aberdeen's Government at the end of

January 1855 precipitated a constitutional crisis in the middle of a
great war. Aberdeen's Liberal-Peelite coalition had lasted longer and
been more effective during the two years of its existence than many
contemporaries had expected. It had been a strong ministry in terms
of personnel, containing four members who at one time or another
were prime ministers and five who were foreign secretaries.
Considering the Cabinet was made up of former political opponents
the ministers had worked well together with the exception of the
wayward Lord John Russell (1792-1878). He had antagonised his
former Whig colleagues as much as his new Peelite ones by resigning
when the government was challenged. He could not reconcile himself
to the fact that as titular leader of by far the largest party in the
coalition he was not the prime minister, although he had been prom-
ised the succession by the elderly and unambitious Aberdeen.
Unfortunately, however, it had been difficult to reconcile the views
of Lord Aberdeen (1784-1860) and Lord Palmerston (1785-1865),
long antagonists in the field of foreign affairs, and the Government's
involvement in the Crimean War may in part be attributed to the
resulting compromises between their two points of view, though
by no means all the Whig ministers shared Palmerston's aggressive
outlook. The coalition government with the Duke of Newcastle
(1811-64) as Secretary for War and Colonies, Sidney Herbert
(1808-61) as Secretary at War and Sir James Graham (1792-1861)
as First Lord of the Admiralty, all Peelites, had done a good job in
co-operation with the French Government of Louis Napoleon in
putting together an expeditionary force for the support of Turkey.
The Allied armies had been successfully landed in the Crimea
following the Russian withdrawal from the Danubian Principalities,
1
2 Britain and the Crimea, 1855-56
but after initial victories everything had gone wrong and Sebastopol
had not been captured before winter had set in. The fact was, as
Sidney Herbert had once said, the British Army was no more than
a collection of regiments, and it was sadly lacking in effective senior
officers capable of leading and administering larger formations. The
loss of crucial supplies in November as the result of a devastating
hurricane and the lack of a passable road connecting the inadequate
port of Balaclava with the plateau outside Sebastopol where the
besieging armies were now stranded led to chaos in the winter
months and a heavy death toll from disease and inadequate diet.
The consequent outcry in the press, represented for the first time
on the field of battle by reporters, and especially the devastating
despatches of W. H. Russell in The Times, resulted in a great uproar
among the public and in the House of Commons. The Government
had been defeated by a vote of 305 to 148 on a motion of the
maverick Radical, John Roebuck, demanding the appointment of a
Committee of Inquiry. Eighty-five of the Government's usual
supporters joined the Opposition on this vote .1
It is impossible to be absolutely precise on party standings in the
House of Commons in early 1855 since contemporaries themselves
differed in their estimates, but the following figures corrected for by-
elections to the end of February should give a reasonably accurate
picture;
Derbyite Conservatives 266

Independent Conservatives 34
Total Conservatives 300
Pee lites 39
Whigs, Liberals 197
Radicals 76
Total Liberals 273 (including
the Speaker)
Irish Brigade 40
Disfranchised, vacant or
unaccounted for 6
Total 658
Lord Derby claimed to have 270-280 reliable supporters, but of the

300 Conservatives (other than Pee lites) whom I have identified in
February 1855, 34 had independent voting records in this Parliament
The Palmerston Coalition, February 1855 3
up to 30 January 1855. Of the 39 Peelites, one, John Walters, voted

against the Government on 29 January, but as a Liberal dissident,
who remained on the Government benches. (In the next election he
still called himself 'Liberal Conservative'.) Of the 40 Irish Brigade
probably a quarter were only nominal and might better be classified
as Liberal, thus bringing the Liberal total into the 280s. Of the
76 Radicals only about 40 formed the hard core. The Liberals by
themselves, even with the Radicals remaining loyal, had no possi-
bility of finding a majority in this Parliament in which a Conservative
Government and a Liberal Peelite coalition had been defeated. It
was not clear what would come next. 2
Lord Aberdeen resigned on the afternoon of 30 January 1855,
and the Queen wasted no time in summoning the leader of the
Conservative Opposition, Lord Derby (1799-1869), who called on
her the next morning. He told her that while his 280 dependable
followers made the most compact group in the Commons 'he should
not be able to present an Administration that would be accepted
by the country unless it was strengthened by other combinations'.
Although he personally thought Lord Palmerston 'totally unfit' to
form a government himself, he thought it would be necessary to
include him to appease public opinion and 'satisfy the French
Government' and consequently proposed to offer him the lead in
the House of Commons, which Disraeli was prepared to relinquish.
He also considered it necessary to include some Peelites such as
Gladstone and Sidney Herbert, 'without whom he would not be
able to form a creditable Government'. When he proposed Lord
Ellenborough for the War Office, the Queen and her husband told
him frankly they thought Ellenborough was 'almost mad' and
proceeded to defend the war administration of the previous Govern-
ment, by telling him 'some of the real facts and difficulties of the
case'. Derby admitted that 'the chief fault lay at headquarters in the
Crimea' and proposed to recall Lord Raglan, but soften the blow by
offering him a seat in the CabinetP
Palmerston must have realised that his great moment was near at
hand, for even Derby privately admitted that 'the whole country
cried out for him', but he had to play his cards carefully. To refuse
Derby outright, he admitted to Gladstone, might be interpreted as
'contemplating another result'. Therefore, when Derby approached
him he agreed to sound out Gladstone and Herbert but proposed that
the new Government should be a broader coalition with Clarendon
remaining at the Foreign Office, views that did 'not seem to suit
Lord Derby at all', according to the Queen. Neither Herbet nor

Gladstone welcomed the proposal when Palmerston approached
them and Clarendon told him that 'so profoundly did he detest Lord
Derby's want of principle, that he felt he could not join them without
compromising his own character'! Consequently, that same evening,
Palmerston, Gladstone and Herbert all sent Derby negative replies. 4
On receiving these letters Derby travelled down to Windsor Castle
next morning, 1 February, to inform the Queen that he would be
unable to form an effective government and expressed the hope that
it would not be said he had attempted to do so. Later in the day he
told the Lords that he was unable to offer the Queen the necessary
assurances and so had no commission at present. According to
Greville he spoke with his characteristic levity, 'jeering at the late
Cabinet and chaffing Newcastle'. Greville also noted that at the same
sitting Newcastle made a 'prodigious' impression on the House in
defending himself against the criticisms Russell had levelled against
him in the Commons the previous week.5
The Queen then sought the advice of the Marquis of Lansdowne
(1781-1863), the eldest and most respected of the Whig ministers,
whose official experience went back to the Ministry of All Talents
of 1806-7. Lansdowne, who arrived at Windsor late in the evening
of 1 February, doubted whether Russell could form a government,
but thought he would have to be convinced before any other strong
government could be formed and that even then it was widely
thought that Russell would have to be a member. In response to a
query from the Queen he said that 'he had neither the youth nor
the strength to make an efficient Prime Minister', but he suggested
that Clarendon might form an administration with Russell going to
the Lords as Foreign Secretary and Palmerston leading the House
of Commons. The royal couple did not think much of this proposal
and in the end it was agreed that Lansdowne should return to London
and canvass the views of Palmerston, Russell and the Pee lites. 6
Gladstone told Lansdowne he was opposed to a new coalition and
advocated a Derby Government, but if that was not possible an all
Whig Government under Lansdowne. In his old age, however, he
confessed that he thought it one of the greatest errors of his political
career that he had declined to serve under Lansdowne. Palmerston
and Russell, on the other hand, both seemed ready to accept the
task of forming a ministry, but both were reluctant to serve under
the other. Lansdowne admitted to the Queen (now at Buckingham
Palace) that both were ready to serve under him, but pleaded that
'he was seventy-five years old, and crippled with gout, and could not
possibly undertake such a task' with any hope of success. He advised
Victoria first to call Russell 'and hear from himself what he could
do'. This the Queen did that same afternoon, 2 February.?
While he admitted that 'the country cried out for Lord Palmerston
at the War Office', Lord John told the Queen that he did not think
'the Whigs' would join a Palmerston administration and that he
would have preferred a government led by Lansdowne or Lord
Clarendon (1800-70) with Palmerston leading the Commons and he
himself sitting on 'the Fourth Bench'. He placed great importance
on the participation of the Peelites, especially Gladstone. When
asked whether he thought he could form a government, after some
reflection he said he thought he could, but that it would be 'difficult
without the Peelites and next to impossible without Palmerston'. It
was agreed that he would discuss the matter further with Palmerston
and Lansdowne and that the latter would return to the palace with
the results of their deliberations. Lansdowne did so at nine-thirty
that evening and reported that Russell and Palmerston 'both seemed
to wish to form a government', but he agreed with Prince Albert
that, in view of Derby's failure, the Queen should take the consti-
tutional course of going first to Lord John Russell who shared the
responsibility for Aberdeen's resignation. According to the Queen,
Lansdowne 'fully believed Lord John would fail, and the trial, the
disapppointment and mortification he would feel at being refused by
his friends ... would be a wholesome and necessary lesson .... 's
When the Queen formally invited Russell to attempt the formation
of a government he immediately accepted, evidently not realising
how great an antipathy he had created among his former colleagues,
Whig as well as Peelite, by his desertion of them in their hour of
peril. It was only three years since 'Pam' had turned 'Johnny' out of
office on the Militia Bill vote in revenge for his dismissal from the
Foreign Office a few weeks earlier, but Palmerston was the first
person to whom Russell now turned. They had, after all, been
colleagues again under Aberdeen and had somewhat similar views
on the Eastern Question and the war. Palmerston appeared to be
remarkably magnanimous and agreed to lead the Commons with
Russell going to the Lords, but he was not taking much risk for he
must have known Russell could not succeed. The Peelites, Glad-
stone, Sidney Herbert, Sir James Graham and the young Duke of
Argyll (1823-1900) all refused to join, Graham who had known
Russell the longest 'taxing him roundly for his vexatious conduct'
towards Aberdeen for the past two years. Lord Cranworth

(1790-1868), the Whig Chancellor, said he did not see his way to
joining without the Peelites, but Lord John's greatest shock was his
failure to get any of his own Whig friends of whom he had told the
Queen he 'had not the smallest doubt that they would cordially co-
operate with him'. When he found Clarendon hesitant he asked the
Queen to speak to him, but in an interview with her that afternoon
Clarendon said he was not prepared to step over the 'dead bodies'
of former colleagues who had been honourable to him and to join
'the man who had killed them'. 'The attempt of Lord John ought
not to succeed', he said, 'if public morality were to be upheld in this
country.' Meanwhile Lansdowne had written to Russell to say that
he was not available and 'Sir Charles Wood declared he had no
business to be where Lord Lansdowne refused to go'. Sir George
Grey told Russell to his face 'that he thought a government formed
by him (Lord J.) would not stand and would not possess the
confidence of the country' .9
Before finally throwing in the sponge, Russell had a curious
meeting with Palmerston and Clarendon that same evening (3
February). Clarendon was more circumspect than he had been in
talking to the Queen, but he warned Russell that he would only
damage himself if he carried on the attempt and told him that
'moderate and right-minded Liberals' disapproved of his conduct.
Palmerston is said to have sat silently 'screening himself from the
fire with a newspaper' during this conversation until appealed to by
Clarendon, when he ' "hummed and hawed in his usual way", and
said to Lord John, "told you you would meet with some trouble" '.
In the end both Palmerston and Clarendon supplied Russell with
written refusals and Lord John wrote to the Queen the following
morning, 4 February, surrendering his commission. He also wrote
plaintive letters to at least two of his old colleagues, Grey and Wood,
protesting about the way in which he had been treated. They in
turn denied the charge of disloyalty and stressed how 'pained and
distressed' they had been by the whole affair. 10 The poor Queen
was getting fed up with these fruitless interviews and observed to
Clarendon: 'Lord John Russell may resign and Lord Aberdeen may
resign, but I can't resign. I sometimes wish I could!'
II PALMERSTON THE CABINET-MAKER: PEELITE

RELUCTANCE
Immediately after hearing from Lord John, the Queen asked Palmer-
stan whether he could undertake to form a Government which would
command the confidence of Parliament. When he replied in the
NOW FOR IT!

A Set-to between " Pam, the Downing Street Pet," and " The Rnssian Spider."
affirmative he received her commission and late in the afternoon of

5 February he informed Her Majesty that Lansdowne, Clarendon,
Granville, Charles Wood, George Grey and Cranworth, all Whig-
Liberal members of the Aberdeen Coalition, had agreed to serve,
providing that he could form an administration broad enough to
'give a fair prospect of duration'. Graham, Gladstone, Herbert and
the Duke of Argyll, however, had initially declined on account of
their attachment to Lord Aberdeen, who, with Newcastle, they
considered had been the victim of the vote in the House of
Commons. Russell had also refused office in the course of a long
and friendly conversation in which they had discussed other appoint-
ments, including that of Lord Panmure to the War Office. 11
Palmerston told Clarendon, whose retention of the Foreign Office
he considered essential, that he was not disposed to throw over his
task, 'even if Gladstone and some of his friends were to stand aloof',
for he knew the country was behind him. Only as a last resort, he
declared, was he prepared to consider junction with the Conserva-
tives, but it 'ought to be effected towards us', he added, 'not towards
them'. 12
Graham and Gladstone were the main opponents to remaining in
office out of distrust of Palmerston in matters of peace and war
and of attachment to Aberdeen who they hoped might yet lead a
reorganised coalition. Herbert and Argyll were readier to accept
office. 'My instinct tells me that this is a moment when we ought to
be helping and not obstructing,' Herbert had written to Gladstone.
'. . . Our friends, some few of whom I have seen, cannot even
understand our doubts.' Yet he was not prepared to accept without
his two close friends. Next day, however, after much pressure from
all quarters, including Aberdeen, Newcastle and other Peelites, they
relented and agreed to join, but with great reluctance on the part
of Graham and Gladstone. Through Aberdeen they had received
reassurances as to continuity in foreign policy, but strangely they
seem to have made no stipulation about refusing to accept Roebuck's
Committee of Inquiry.13
Thus the great ministerial crisis of 1855 seemed to be at an end.
All the cabinet ministers of the old Coalition except Aberdeen,
Newcastle and Russell remained although a few changed offices, as
Herbert went to the Colonial Office on the abolition of his old post
of Secretary at War {which was merged with that of the Secretary
for War) and Sir George Grey {1799-1882), the former Colonial
Secretary, replaced Palmers ton at the Home Office. At this point,
the Whig members of the previous government were clearly anxious

to maintain the connection with their Peelite colleagues and warm
in their thanks to Aberdeen for making it possible. 14
Even in the Whig camp Cabinet making had not been entirely
plain sailing for Palmerston. He had decided to invite Lord Panmure
to replace Newcastle as War Secretary, but had received a strong
protest from Clarendon who wrote: 'Panmure is an honest good
fellow but by no means of the calibre for such an office at such a
moment and I am sure he is and will be thought inferior to New-
castle.' Clarendon urged Palmerston before vetoing Lord Grey to
consult his cousin, Sir Charles Wood (1800-85), who himself was
to remain at the India Office. Nevertheless, Palmerston persisted,
claiming that Panmure's knowledge of the officers of the Army would
be of great service. He told Grey, who had vetoed his appointment
as Foreign Secretary in 1845, that he thought their different opinions
on army patronage and discipline and on war and peace policy
precluded his joining the Government and Grey seemed to agree.
There was even some talk about bringing Newcastle back in another
capacity but it came to nothing.t 5
Panmure had no sooner accepted office than he began to voice
the anti-Peelite feeling of a section of the Whig Liberal party. On
hearing that Gladstone was trying to persuade Palmerston to bring
Edward Cardwell into the Cabinet as having equal claims to Lord
Canning, Panmure wrote to Palmerston: 'If it be so I pray you to
reconsider your decision, because I will not consent to see you in a
position ... [in which] you will be at the mercy of a party in a
cabinet who have no following in the Country.' He went on to say
that if Palmerston took on Canning or Cardwell then he must be
balanced by a Whig 'such as Stanley of Alderley whose knowledge
of mankind and parties would be of no small service' .16
This attitude may have seemed presumptuous in a Cabinet recruit
of twenty-four hours, but Panmure (1801-74) had held office in all
Whig governments since 1835 (he was Secretary at War in Russell's
ministry) and earlier served for twelve years in the army. He was
one of those excluded in 1852, although he had then told Russell
that he was glad for private reasons to be out of office. Nevertheless,
he probably represented a fair segment of Whig opinion. At any rate
Palmerston was at pains to answer his charges. He apologised for
forgetting to tell Panmure about Canning's appointment, which he
said would strengthen the Government in the Lords. No other
colleague in that house had objected, and in any case he did not
regard Canning as a Peelite, apparently since Canning acted separ-

ately from them. (Gladstone certainly regarded Canning as a Peelite,
although an independent one.) Palmerston assured Panmure that he
had not proposed Cardwell (who remained at the Board of Trade)
for the Cabinet, although Gladstone had urged it and he disputed
Panmure's counting of heads since he had failed to include Granville
(whom he had considered half a Peelite), Cranworth and Molesworth
(1810-55), a Benthamite baronet, among the Whigs, who by Palmer-
ston's count outnumbered the Peelites by nine to five, even counting
Canning as a Peelite. 'Surely, if we are to be a Coalition Govern-
ment,' he concluded, 'which it has been felt to be so important that
we should be, the foregoing proportions cannot be deemed to give
an unfair preponderance to those who have joined us. '17
Panmure's was an unimpressive appointment, which betrayed the
lack of talent among the Whigs. The editors of his papers treat it
defensively when they write:
For without claiming for Panmure any exceptional gifts or talents,
it may be argued that his strength of character, energy, workman-
like spirit, breadth of view and sound common-sense were qualities
of perhaps greater value than, say, the enthusiasm, charm, and
lofty mindedness of such a statesman as Sidney Herbert.
This is not very convincing. Herbert appears to have been a harder
working minister than Panmure whose alleged energy was certainly
impaired by his health and the sequel scarcely supported the claim
regarding his 'breadth of view'. Panmure was, however, a man of
character who suffered thirty-six years of estrangement from his
father and consequent financial hardship because he had the courage
in his youth to refuse to abandon his badly treated mother .1s
It remained to be seen how the new ministry would be received
by the rank and file of the Liberal party. Even Panmure's 'half
Peelite' Granville (1815-91) warned Palmerston that 'the Whigs (pur
sang)' were 'very angry and unreasonable at the Peelite character of
the Government'. He advised the Prime Minister, if he could, to
break up the 'strong and compact body' that Russell was likely to
gather around him, suggesting that Lord Carlisle in particular would
'neutralize many persons in both Houses' .19 Palmerston was not
unaware of the problem which he summed up with great objectivity
when he wrote to his brother:
We have many discontented men behind us, because the body of
the Whigs are angry that the Peelites have joined me, and have
occupied places which the Whigs hoped to have themselves; but
if the Peelites had not joined me, we should have had an equally
numerous band of discontented, only with this difference that they
would have consisted of more able men. Aberdeen and Newcastle
behaved in the most friendly and honourable manner possible in
persuading their friends to remain in the Government, but I see
that the Peelite section still continues to make itself a little separate
section. 20
Hostility towards the Peelites was voiced from both sides of the
House on 6 February as petulant questions were asked for reasons
about a further adjournment without any ministerial announcement.
G. F. Muntz, a Radical, said that the people believed they 'were
waiting for two or three aristocratic families to adjust their differ-
ences', and asked whether there were not men enough to govern the
country 'without entering the charmed circle of these aristocratic
relationships'. R. Malins, an independent Conservative, joined the
protest against the long delay and said the House should get on with
the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry as proposed by the
Roebuck motion. Roebuck explained that he was waiting to know
what members of the House would be in office before proposing
names for his Committee. As for Palmerston's alleged difficulties in
forming a Government, Roebuck argued that it was the country
which had chosen Palmerston and so he should tell those who were
making the difficulties to stand aside while he formed an adminis-
tration, 'regardless of party considerations, and regardless of
personal considerations', made up of individuals who already had
the confidence of the country or who would attain it through him
(men, perhaps, like Roebuck and Muntz).2 1
By next day, of course, the crisis was over and ironically the
spokesman for the Government on a routine vote on account for
Ordnance expenditure was Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exch-
equer, who had been singled out for vilification in the attacks of the
previous day. The new Prime Minister and other Ministers taking
new offices (Sidney Herbert and Sir George Grey) were not present
since the law required their re-election. Consequently, it fell to Lord
Granville as President of the Council to announce the formation of
the new ministry in the House of Lords. He took the opportunity of
Lord Aberdeen's presence to pay tribute to the late Prime Minister
as 'one of the most generous minded, liberal, just and courageous
men' with whom he had the good fortune to be associated. He

promised the new government would be guided by the same prin-
ciples in internal affairs as the old one and that the war would be
vigorously prosecuted until a 'just and honourable peace' could be
secured. 22
Granville was followed by Derby and Lansdowne. The former
made an over-elaborate explanation of his failure to form a govern-
ment in a speech in which Malmesbury (who was to have been his
Foreign Secretary) thought he praised the Peelites and disparaged
his own friends. He said that he had turned to Palmerston for whom
there was a loud demand in the country and two of his colleagues,
Gladstone and Herbert, who 'from their previous connection with
the great Conservative party' might have had least difficulty in joining
his administration. He explained that much as he respected Lord
Clarendon he had not invited him because of his political connec-
tions. He did not explain the difference between Clarendon's political
connections and those of Palmerston who had been in Whig minis-
tries a good deal longer, even though he was once a Tory. Perhaps
he held it against Clarendon (who had in his veins the blood of two
great seventeenth century antagonists, the original Earl and Oliver
Cromwell) that his younger brother Charles Villiers was a leading
free-trade Radical. Lansdowne followed with his account of the late
ministerial crisis and his own role in it. He spoke 'with affection and
respect' of Aberdeen and Newcastle and said they could only gain
from an inquiry 'as far as it will be found that they have nothing at
all to fear from all that has been falsely, rashly, unjustly and partially
attributed to them' .23 Before the House adjourned, Panmure, despite
his anti-Peelite mutterings to Palmerston, spoke well of his prede-
cessor, saying he succeeded to his office 'without any antagonism';
'and I do not know', he added, 'that I can bring to it more zeal,
more industry, or more honesty of purpose than that with which his
whole political career has been marked. ' 24 This was a handsome
tribute from such a stout partisan.
III DEMISE OF THE PALMERSTON COALITION
With the ministerial problem apparently settled by the adhesion of

the Peelites, the Government was able to take up again the problems
of war and peace which had been left in suspense for the better
part of two weeks. At the same time, Palmerston found a way of
neutralising the threat posed by the presence of an independent Lord

John Russell in the House of Commons in command of the votes of
an undetermined number of Liberals who might remain loyal to him.
Following the signature of a treaty of alliance with Britain and France
in December, Austria had proceeded to resurrect the Four Points
on which the Allies had earlier agreed to discuss peace terms with
Russia. Britain and France had agreed to an elaboration of these
points in terms that they thought would deter Russia from agreeing
to a peace conference. They now required Russia to abandon her
claim to a protectorate over the Principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia
and Serbia (Point 1) and to renounce any attempts to revive her
former treaties with Turkey (Point 4). They also provided for the
free navigation of the Danube (Point 2) and the abandonment by
Russia of her preponderance in the Black Sea (Point 3). Conse-
quently, when Russia agreed to negotiate on these terms Clarendon
suspected a ruse.zs Nevertheless, a peace conference was to be held
in Vienna in early March and the British Government had to appoint
a delegate.
The Government had little confidence in its ambassador in Vienna,
Lord Westmorland. Palmerston agreed that they had to make a bona
fide appearance, but thought it scarcely probable that the Russian
Emperor would accede to their terms. He dismissed a proposal from
the Palace that Clarendon should go, saying he could not be spared
and that there was no parallel between the Conference and the
Vienna Congress attended by Castlereagh. Clarendon, who had no
wish to go to Vienna, proposed the appointment of Russell as a
special plenipotentiary. 'His political position would save Westmor-
land from mortification [always an important point with the aristo-
crats who ruled England in those days],' Clarendon wrote to Palmer-
ston, 'the people of England would be satisfied with any peace that
he made under your auspices or with any reason he gave for breaking
off negotiations, and it might be an honorable mode of relieving him
from his position in the House of Commons which cannot under
any circumstances be an agreeable one.' The next day he further
elaborated the idea which he now attributed to Lansdowne:
We cannot leave the negotiations in Westmorland's hands and it

is useless to send some minor diplomat who knows nothing of
what has been done or of the implications that each of the 4
Bases involves, but Lord John's position will give a dignity to the
negotiation whatever be its issue. He is thoro'ly acquainted with
the whole subject, he is quite incapable of making a peace that

would be inglorious or unsafe and he would know too well the
responsibility he would incur to act upon doubtful points without
consulting the Government .... 26
Clarendon should have known Russell better.
Palmerston did and accepted the proposal without enthusiasm:
There is a great deal in what you say about John Russell for
Vienna [he replied]. The reasons against are his habits of acting
upon sudden impulse, his rather dry and stiff habits, his aptitude
to be swayed by others, and the circumstance that if he came back
with success he would be more inconvenient to the Government
than he would otherwise be .... Nevertheless I have no objec-
tions, and if he would go to the House of Lords on his return,
with an olive branch around his temples, that would be a good
arrangement. 27
Other members of the Cabinet approved the proposed appointment
warmly, Wood most extravagantly calling it 'the greatest deed that
can be done for the country, for Europe and the Government'.
Later the French Government followed suit by sending their foreign
minister as a special plenipotentiary as well. 2s
The magnanimous Aberdeen told Clarendon that he thought the
appointment very desirable, that he had talked over the proposed
terms of peace with Russell and that they were in full agreement.
'In the question of peace', he added, 'my reliance is mainly on your
good faith.' After some deliberation Russell agreed to undertake the
mission, making two stipulations, that Prussia should not be excluded
and that Austria should not be alienated. The acceptance helped to
rehabilitate the ex-leader of the Liberal party in the eyes of his
former followers and colleagues. 'All Brooks' yesterday was ringing
with praises of John and his appointment, and his manner of taking
it! What a change!' commented one loyal friend.29
Thus by the time he had been re-elected and was able to address
the House of Commons for the first time as Prime Minister on 16
February Palmerston seemed to have settled the main threats to the
stability of his ministry. But his first speech in the House from his
new seat was not very impressive. 'The temper of the House seemed
to be anything but good', Greville observed. The Times, he noted,
had gone into 'furious opposition' and he expected that soon the
entire press with the exception of Palmerston's Morning Post and
the Peelite Morning Chronicle, neither of which had 'any circulation

or any influence', would be against Palmerston.30
On 10 February the Cabinet considered and approved a set of
proposals from the new Secretary for War that indicated he had not
wasted much time in picking up the threads. They included provision
for the immediate appointment of two commissions of inquiry to be
sent out to the Crimea immediately. Otherwise they did not mark any
sharp deviation from the policy of the previous ministry, although in
announcing them in Parliament Palmerston indicated that he had
not replaced Herbert as Secretary at War since it had been decided
to absorb the duties of that office into those of the Secretary for
War, a proposal Russell had made in December, which Palmerston
had then opposed, perhaps because of the Cabinet personnel impli-
cations. In reporting the Cabinet decisions to the Queen, Palmerston
made it clear that they were anxious to divert the demand for the
appointment of Roebuck's committee by showing that 'the objects
for which the enquiry would be instituted' might and would 'be
accomplished without it'. Yet when he made the proposals in the
Commons in the following week, Gladstone felt that he failed to
present the decisions regarding the despatch of commissions of
inquiry to the Crimea sufficiently forcefully as an alternative to the
appointment of a Roebuck Committee.31
Palmerston did, however, attempt to dissuade the House from
proceeding with the appointment of the committee of inquiry as a
clumsy and unnecessary instrument of doubtful constitutional
propriety. Ironic cheers greeted his rather heavy-handed quip that
he would play the role of Richard II who promised to take the place
of his discontented subjects' lost leader, and to promise that the
Government itself would undertake the inquiry. Disraeli in 'a bitter
speech' had little difficulty in ridiculing this proposal, saying that
Palmerston showed scant respect for the House, whose leader he
had become, in comparing its members with Wat Tyler's rabble. 32
In a letter to Raglan written on 12 February, Panmure had referred
to the sacrifice of Aberdeen and Newcastle. 'I have most reluctantly
come here - ', he wrote, 'not because I expect to do any better than
my predecessor, but because I wish to protect, as far as possible,
the interests of the Army, and to stand between you and those who
are so angry at all that has happened.' He went on to say that he
could never excuse General Airey (the Quartermaster General) for
failing to maintain better communications with Balaclava. He
thought that the House of Commons must be persuaded to 'put
down' Roebuck's Committee, but that they would not do this unless
they saw some movement on the part of the administration. 'But
your staff must be changed', he insisted. A week later he admitted
that the Committee could not be stopped, but promised that he
would resign rather than allow it to deal with the Army and its
discipline _33
The official announcements about steps taken suggested that the
new Government was not resting on its oars, but the House and
the press did not appear to be appeased. According to Greville,
Palmerston's 'entreaty to postpone the committee was greeted with
a sort of scorn and manifestation of hostility and distrust'. Of the
ten members who expressed an opinion in the short debate that
followed only two supported Palmerston's proposal to drop the
Committee and of the seven who asked for a continuation of the
Committee four were Liberals. Writing to the Queen that night,
Palmerston reported that it was generally believed that the appoint-
ment of the committee would be carried by a 'very great majority'
and that consequently the best way of meeting it was to move some
instruction 'limiting the range of its enquiry'. 34
The Cabinet discussed the matter on 16 February. Wood and Grey
were inclined to go ahead with the committee since it had been
affirmed by such a large majority before the restructured cabinet
resumed office, providing it was appointed by the committee of
selection and instructed to confine its investigations in the first
instance 'to the conduct of the Government Departments'. Graham
doubted whether such an instruction would be effectual, while Glad-
stone said he could accept a committee so limited, but not otherwise.
He thought it was 'impossible to agree to any inquiry by committee
into the state of the Army in the Crimea while the expedition [was]
in progress' and argued vehemently 'upon the breach of duty which
it would involve' on their part 'towards those holding responsible
commands'. According to Gladstone 'Panmure said that if the
Committee were granted he would not answer for it that the army
would not be in a state of mutiny within a month' and asserted that
he 'would say this in his place in the House of Lords'. Molesworth
believed the House would insist on a committee without limitation
but supported its being named by the committee of selection. Gran-
ville proposed dissolution but did not press it on getting no suppport.
Argyll and Herbert were strongly opposed to the committee, while
Canning, Clarendon, Cranworth and Lansdowne were silent,
presumably because they were all peers. The long discussion ended
inconclusively and the final decision was postponed to a later

meeting. To Gladstone's disgust Palmerston seemed to have made up
his mind to giving way despite 'what he had said the night before'. 35
In the Commons on 19 February the redoubtable Layard made a
fierce attack upon the new administration (which he had not been
invited to join despite rumours to the contrary), singling out two
ministers who had hitherto been largely excluded from blame, the
Foreign Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty. He empha-
sised the intense dissatisfaction in the country and doubted that the
proposed commission would be of much use. He suggested that they
should take a leaf out of the book of the French Revolutionary
Assembly which sent out some of its own members to determine
what was wrong with the Army, 'men who had no party consider-
ations, who cared not for aristocratic influences, who went out deter-
mined to sacrifice those who were guilty, regardless of persons. They
did so. The result was that in a few months that army achieved deeds
that were unparalleled in the history of the world.' When he looked
at the great material achievements of England, the wealth and
resources, 'unequalled in the history of the world', he refused to
believe that it was impossible to find the necessary leadership, but
he did not look for it from a man who was 'seventy years old,
a member of Brookes's, and one who has always voted with the
Government.' He went on to ridicule the proposals that Palmerston
had laid before the House the previous week as quite inadequate.
In particular he objected to 'the system of favouritism and the general
system at the Horse Guards .... The men to command armies
should be men of iron will and unflinching determination - men
ready to sacrifice relations, private friends - even all they hold dear
in the world, if it be necessary to do so'. He decried the failure to
make use of the experience of those who had served in India, who
were passed over because they were in the service of the East India
Company.
And for that reason [he said] you pass by men who have led their
troops to glory, who have seen great campaigns, and you sent out
men of seventy years of age, who have never seen war, and who
scarcely know how to put a regiment through its evolutions, but
who happen to possess Parliamentary influence or family connec-
tion. Such a state of things in the present age is monstrous- it is
intolerable.
While denying that he was trying to pull down the aristocracy, he
gave it as his opinion that 'This country is coming to the opinion

that you have sacrificed its dearest interests because you will not
allow men of talent to come between you and your nobility.' The
country had called for Lord Palmerston, but were disappointed with
the result. 'They do not wish to see the same parties in power over
and over again.' Therefore he called on the noble Lord to change
his course before it was too late.36 There was much in what Layard
said, but it was too extreme to influence what was still a quasi-
aristocratic assembly. It was less effective than the speech made in
the same House eighty-five years later by L. S. Amery who quoted
not French Jacobins but England's home-grown revolutionary,
Oliver Cromwell.
Palmerston attempted to respond with ridicule but in Graham's
opinion his answer was feeble. Later in the evening the ultra
Conservative Newdegate made a spirited defence of the aristocracy
against Layard's attack. 'The noblemen and the gentlemen who were
officers in the Crimean army', he said, 'had done their duty ...
failure had befallen the army for want of food, for want of the means
of transport, for want of medical assistance and organization. Were
the duties of the Commissariat, the transport duties, discharged by
members of the aristocracy?' he asked. 'Was the medical department
in the hands of the aristocracy?' Palmerston congratulated him for
showing that the system had broken down; 'it has happened not
where the gentry were, not where the aristocracy were, but where
there were persons belonging to other classes of the community - in
the medical department, the commissariat department, the transport
service, which have not been filled by the aristocracy or the gentry. ' 37
Again there was some truth in these protests, but they ignored the
responsibility of the commander-in-chief and his aristocratic staff
officers for the conduct of these services and the fact that there were
also serious failures in leadership on the field of battle where the
leaders were drawn from the aristocracy.
On the same day Greville expressed his views on the chaotic
political situation in the House of Commons:
Palmerston has no authority there, and the House is in complete

confusion and disorganization, and (except the Derbyites, who are
still numerous and act together in opposition, in hopes of getting
into power) nobody owes any allegiance or even any party ties,
or seems to care for any person or anything .... For the first time
in my life I am really and seriously alarmed at the aspect of

affairs .... 3s
The Cabinet discussed the matter of the committee again on the

20 and 21 of February. Palmerston now abandoned his opposition
to it, taking the view that the Commons were determined to have a
committee and that the government would be defeated overwhelm-
ingly if tl..~y opposed it. According to Gladstone he argued that 'to
dissolve upon it would be ruinous' and 'to resign a fortnight after
taking office would make them the laughing stock of the country'.
Graham and Gladstone remained strongly opposed on constitutional
grounds because of the executive government's responsibility for the
army in the field and to its French ally. They argued that the
Commons' continued insistence on the committee indicated that the
government lacked its confidence. Gladstone had proposed an
inquiry by the Crown, but he felt that the commissions proposed by
Palmerston and Panmure were an insufficient substitute. He
reminded Palmerston that on 6 February he had indicated his inten-
tion of opposing the committee, but by this time most of the Cabinet
had come to the conclusion that acceptance was inevitable. Between
the two meetings Prince Albert attempted to persuade Gladstone to
change his mind, but without success.39
Despite great pressure put on them by their Whig colleagues,
some of whom said their resignation would be equivalent to that of
Russell's from the previous ministry, Graham and Gladstone
remained obdurate when the Cabinet met again on 21 February.
They claimed that the ministry would be stronger without them,
Graham arguing that 'a larger reconstruction and liberalizing of the
government would perhaps bring it the confidence of Parliament'.
Sidney Herbert, who had unfortunately missed the previous meeting
because of illness, reluctantly followed their lead, saying that he had
no objection to an inquiry in England into the government offices
involved in the administration of the war, but that in that case he
should resign as one of the responsible ministers. It may be noted
that although they refused to remain in his Cabinet the resigning
ministers paid tribute to Palmerston's friendly conduct throughout
the crisis. Argyll and Canning, however, did not agree with their
Peelite colleagues and chose to remain in office as did five other
Peelites who either remained or accepted new appointments in the
Household or in offices outside the Cabinet. Six Peelites outside the
Cabinet resigned including Cardwell, who heroically refused a seat

in the Cabinet in Gladstone's post at the Exchequer. 40
On this occasion the Peelite triumvirate acted without the advice
of their old chief. 'Although lamenting and disapproving the course
they have taken', Aberdeen wrote to Clarendon, 'I did not feel
entitled again to make their remaining in office a matter of personal
entreaty from myself, and against their strong convictions.' Clar-
endon and most of his Whig colleagues greatly regretted the depar-
ture of the three Peelites and the Foreign Secretary wrote to Aber-
deen: 'The withdrawal of the three best men in the Cabinet may
please a few hungry Whigs, but whatever they [Graham, Gladstone
and Herbert] may say, they cannot think the government will be
stronger, but they know their places cannot be supplied.' There was
no Whig exclusiveness here, but at Brooks's, according to Greville,
there was much rejoicing. 'These stupid Whigs', he commented,
'were very sorry P. did not leave them out when he formed his
Government ... ; and they are entirely indifferent to the consider-
ation that the greater part of the brains of the Cabinet is gone out
with these three'. 41
On 23 February the three ministers who had resigned from the
Cabinet made their explanations from 'the upper end of the second
bench below the gangway' (on the ministerial side) by arrangement
with Bright, Cobden and Gibson who usually occupied that bench.
'We shall be glad to see you on our bench,' Bright told Gladstone,
'although under present circumstances we should have preferred
your remaining in office.' Graham said that with the formation of a
new Government under Palmerston and the announcement of great
administrative reforms including the appointment of Commissioners
to go to the Crimea he had presumed that the public and the House
would have been satisfied. He argued that action on the part of an
executive that had the confidence of the House was bound to be
more effective than the appointment of a committee of inquiry. As
it was he considered the existence of such a committee would retard
the proceedings of the executive and 'cramp their operations'.
Herbert said that he could have accepted a committee to investigate
the government departments at home, but that he could not accept
a committee to investigate the Army before Sebastopol, whose report
in any event would be 'waste paper' by the time that it was made.
Both he and Graham, however, paid warm tribute to the colleagues
from whom they were parting and with whom they had served for
two years, as Herbert said, 'in a spirit of the most perfect harmony
and with the most perfect sympathy'. Gladstone spoke later in the
evening at unnecessary length, covering much of the same ground
as his two colleagues. In response to a Conservative spokesman he
denied that it would be either prudent or constitutional to 'instruct
a Select Committee to investigate the state of the army pending a
great military operation'. Therefore he concluded, they found it their
duty 'to resist and protest against this measure ... with great pain
and with wounded feelings . . . but with a fixed and immoveable
determination', which public interests and their own consciences
required. He made no promises of continued support for the Govern-
ment as had his two friends, but he did bring himself to express a
warm regard for Palmerston. 42
Palmerston responded briefly, saying that he would not criticise
his departed friends and was sorry to lose them. He said that he
had thought the committee would have been dropped following the
change of government, but that he would not have accepted office
if it had meant that he had to insist on the House rescinding its vote.
' ... I think it would be a greater evil', he said, 'if this country should
present to the world the lamentable spectacle that, in consequence
of personal differences, and in consequence of the fragmentary
division of parties, we should for one month or six weeks be unable
to find any set of public men who could present themselves to the
country as a government, and undertake the conduct of the public
affairs of the nation. ' 43
Disraeli concentrated his attack on Palmerston rather than on the
Peelites, asking whether he still had a government and how he
could reconcile his opposition to the committee last Friday with his
acceptance of it today, but he also took issue with Gladstone's denial
of precedents. 44
Of the other contributions made to the debate the most memorable
was Bright's famous 'angel of death' speech, in which he said that
he did not condemn Graham and his friends since they were acting
from a sense of what was right and wrong, but that he regretted
their resignation, because he was concerned that Palmerston's
Government should survive to secure peace, an objective on which
Palmerston reassured him. 45
Of the nine remaining speakers, five were critical of the committee.
These included two Conservatives, Lord Seymour and General Peel,
who reluctantly accepted nomination to it, Robert Lowe, a leader
writer of The Times, soon to accept office, and G. E. H. Vernon, a
Peelite, who said that party 'might now be called defunct', and who
promised to support the government. 46
The House then proceeded to the appointment of the committee
although several members attempted unsuccessfully to postpone the
matter, or to impose some limitation on the committee's role. The
Prime Minister indicated that he was satisfied that the members who
had been nominated could be trusted to avoid the dangerous topics
mentioned during the debate and he did not propose any limitation.
Roebuck said that the nominations had been made in consultation
with the Prime Minister, that the committee's task was a difficult
one, but that the House could have confidence in its good judgement.
When a member suggested the addition of a Mr Miles because he
was connected with Lord Raglan by marriage, Roebuck observed
that 'this was the first time he ever heard that a member of the jury
ought to be a relation of the prisoner in the dock', a phrase not
calculated to inspire confidence in his good judgement.47
The history of the ministerial crisis of 1855 is not very creditable
to the Peelite triumvirate who first resisted joining the Palmerston
administration, then accepted office and finally withdrew less than
three weeks later. Their original hesitation was to be explained by
their over-sensitive regard for their excluded colleagues, Aberdeen
and Newcastle, combined with a certain distrust of Palmerston as
Prime Minister, but neither of these reasons really justified their
initial refusal to help meet the emergency. Was loyalty to friends to
be placed before duty to the state in time of war, especially when
the friends themselves urged them to join? They may have had good
reason for reservations about Palmerston, but he was the only person
who had proved himself capable of forming a government, he was
doing his best to maintain the coalition, which had worked well for
the previous two years, and he had made important commitments in
the field of foreign policy. Personal relations between Whig and
Peelite ministers had been better than the relations in some one-
party cabinets. Graham, Gladstone and Herbert should not have
hesitated so long before accepting office and should have been more
determined to play their part once they had done so. It was generally
agreed that they were three of the ablest ministers in the Cabinet,
both as administrators and as parliamentary debaters. They were
bound to carry weight in the Cabinet, especially since they had
colleagues who shared their views regarding the desirability of a
reasonable peace settlement.
Their hesitation in accepting office was regrettable in that it
prolonged and accentuated the crisis unnecessarily, but their decision

to resign over the issue of the Roebuck committee was really indefen-
sible, although they seemed to think that they were perfectly
justified. Their arguments against the committee were sound and
indeed shared by their colleagues, but when the Prime Minister and
the majority of the Cabinet came to the conclusion that the thing
could not be avoided it is difficult to see any great principle at stake
that forced them to refuse to accept the majority decision. Remaining
would have been the lesser of two evils. Palmerston might have
handled the matter better, but at least he made an attempt, if a ham-
fisted one, to get rid of the committee. They should have made the
best of it and saved their ammunition for more important targets.
By resigning they seriously weakened the peace party in the Cabinet.
Gladstone later said that they would not have been able to resist
Palmerston, Clarendon and Lansdowne, but Argyll, Granville, Grey,
Wood and Canning would probably have supported them if they had
demanded that Russell's advice at Vienna should be followed. If
they did fail at least that would have been a better issue on which
to resign. As it was they unnecessarily weakened a government that
needed their talents. The arguments that they used to sustain their
position were mainly debating ones that under the circumstances
failed to bear the weight of their decision.
Gladstone, who was a firm believer in party government, but who
was not yet ready to call himself a Liberal, argued in favour of a
homogeneous government. 48 He was probably over-sensitive to the
back-bench hostility to the Peelites in the Liberal party - it could
not have been any stronger than the back-bench hostility to himself
in a large section of the Conservative party, or for that matter than
the hostility of many Conservatives to Disraeli who lived to overcome
it. The Radical wing of the Liberal party could scarcely have been
much pleased with the Whig replacements of the Peelites who on
most issues were generally more liberal minded. It is evident that in
this crisis the Peelite triumvirate had their priorities wrong. By
resigning they were not stopping Roebuck's committee, they were
only weakening the Government at a time when patriotism should
have made them willing to put aside their tender sensibilities. The
appointment of the committee may have been impolitic, its consti-
tutionality may have been questionable, its usefulness nil, but it is
difficult to see that there was any great moral issue of principle
involved requiring their resignation as a matter of honour. They did
not like it, wanted to make it clear that they took no responsibility
for it, and were apparently not anxious to remain in office, but in
this situation the more patriotic decision would have been to have
swallowed their pride and to have accepted the majority decision of
their colleagues. Their great objective was a peace settlement and
this might have been achieved sooner had they remained. Long
afterwards, Gladstone was less certain that they had been right and
he admitted that they were severely and generally condemned.
One of Palmerston's biographers has suggested that the departure

of the Peelites came as a relief to him, since it allayed the criticisms
of the jealous Liberal party members. 49 Yet, as we have seen, the
first person to whom Palmerston offered the Exchequer was
Cardwell. 'Even Brooks's was unanimous last night on the import-
ance of securing him', Clarendon told Russell. In fact, replacing the
Peelite ministers was not an easy task, as Clarendon, Wood and
Greville knew when they deplored the resignations. According to
Canning the Cabinet were at a deadlock following the refusal of
Cardwell, until Grey suggested trying Russell again. They all agreed
to this proposal and Palmerston wrote to Russell who was in Paris
on his way to Vienna, offering him the Colonial Office. 50
A few weeks earlier Russell had been quite unwilling to take a
second place position without even the lead in the House of
Commons, which he had held in Aberdeen's ministry, but now
Palmerston had begged his help in a crisis and under the circum-
stances he said he felt bound to give his assistance, perhaps flattered
by Clarendon's accompanying note telling him that 'no Government
calling itself Liberal' had a chance of standing without him. More-
over, by this time he must have become very conscious of his isolation
and have found it easier to take office, knowing that he would not
have to meet the House for several weeks. He accepted, but would
not give up his peace mission and it was arranged that Sir George
Grey would take responsibility for the Colonial Office until his
return. 51
Russell's acceptance was something of a coup for Palmerston, since
an independent Russell might have retained an uncertain number of
Whig followers (as he later did), readier to take his lead than that
of the new Prime Minister, himself a former Tory. Palmerston could
not afford to risk any Liberal votes, especially now when it remained
to be seen how many of the forty or so Peelites he could still rely
on.
The replacement of Gladstone was more difficult. 'This is not so

easy', Russell wrote to Clarendon, 'as it would have been, if Glad-
stone's first refusal to join had been accepted. Men like Lord Grey,
and Baring may hesitate to join a firm which seems on the verge of
bankruptcy. Yet without Lord Grey and Baring it would be useless
to appear before the House of Commons.' Palmerston had no inten-
tion of inviting Lord Grey, who had tried to veto his appointment
as Foreign Secretary in 1845. Grey was a man of undoubted ability,
but a difficult colleague and he had radical ideas about army reform
that went further than Palmerston or the Crown were prepared to
accept. He did, however, approach Sir F. T. Baring, who had been
an ineffective Whig Chancellor in the last days of the Melbourne
administration. Baring apparently declined, for next day the Cabinet
agreed that they should turn to Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Claren-
don's brother-in-law. Lewis was a former Poor Law Commissioner,
who had entered Parliament in 1847, held junior office in the Russell
ministry, lost his seat in 1852 and became editor of the Edinburgh
Review, which he found a thoroughly congenial occupation. He was
the son of Sir Thomas Frankland Lewis, a Peelite MP, 1847-55. G.
C. Lewis (1806-1863) had just succeeded to his father's title and
parliamentary seat; he was a first generation Liberal and conse-
quently not the most obvious candidate from the point of view of
Brooks's. On Clarendon's advice he consulted Gladstone who
refused to advise him but promised to give all the assistance he
could, and on this basis Lewis accepted. He was an intelligent man,
but not a distinguished Chancellor of the Exchequer.s2
Palmerston seems to have been readier to consult his colleagues
about Cabinet appointments than most Prime Ministers, perhaps
because of the political weakness of his position as an ex-Tory leader
of the Whig Liberal party, and something of a loner who had few
close connections, except Lady Palmerston's son-in-law, Lord Shaf-
tesbury, whom he twice invited to take office; but each time he had
to withdraw the offer on Whig pressure. In the end, after refusals
from Lords Elgin and Seymour, the Duchy went to Lord Harrowby
(1798-1882), a cross-bencher and consequently not a likely favourite
with the back-bench Whigs, who accepted with a seat in the
Cabinet. 53 Lord Carlisle (1802-1864), an active Whig peer who had
served under Melbourne and Russell succeeded the Peelite Lord St
Germans as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.
The Whig pressure to get Baring continued and on 24 February
Wood suggested to Palmerston that he should offer Baring the
Admiralty protesting that he would not want to be 'the means of

excluding an old and dear friend'. Alternatively, he suggested that
Carlisle might replace Granville as Lord President, that Granville
should go to the India office and Lord Stanley of Alderley take the
Duchy leaving the Board of Trade for Baring. In the end, however,
Stanley of Alderley (1802-1869), went to the Board of Trade, Wood
took the Admiralty and was replaced at the India Office by Vernon
Smith (1800-1873), 'quite against the opinion of the Cabinet', Clar-
endon commented, 'as he is unpopular in the House and brings no
strength - the votes were all in favour of Labouchere for that
office' .54 Granville had urged the appointment of Robert Lowe,
whom Greville considered just the man 'to meet the prevailing senti-
ment about old connnexions and new men', but he would not have
placated the Whigs at Brooks's. 55 There were in fact at least three
different forces in the Liberal party pressing their views on the Prime
Minister, the old Whigs at Brooks's who wanted to put the clock
back, more radical middle-class Liberals (backed by The Times), fed
up with the cliquishness and, as they saw it, the inefficiency of
the aristocracy, and a small group of more enlightened Whigs like
Granville and Clarendon who saw that this view should be appeased
to some extent and that ability, not connection, was the more
important criterion in making appointments.
Russell tended to favour the Brooks's point of view, but was not
unaware of the need to conciliate the Radical pressure. 'I should
like to see Labouchere [another Whig veteran] in office', he told
Clarendon, 'but I do not know that he has to be preferred to Vernon
Smith.' He did suggest that M. T. Baines, who had been Chief
Commissioner of the Poor Law Board since 1853, might be promoted
to the cabinet. 'He is not of the aristocracy and has good sense and
moderation', Russell commented. 'However I know how much envy
is raised by these distinctions, and Stanley of Alderley might take it
ill', he added. 56
To the Queen's annoyance and that of some of the individuals
concerned, Palmerston was very slow in getting all the minor offices
filled. Russell asked for Layard, one of the severest critics of the
war administration of the Aberdeen Government, as his under-
secretary at the Colonial Office, but that redoubtable frondeur
refused to go anywhere but the War Office, which was not open.
Palmerston suggested Sir Robert Peel, from whom he had had to
withdraw an offer of a clerkship of the Ordnance when it did not
become vacant as expected. Peel's 'social position and hereditary
name' made it desirable in Palmerston's view 'that he should be

brought into the public service'. Peel, who had a reputation for being
erratic, was willing, but Russell vetoed the appointment. Eventually
Russell had to settle for John Ball, whose appointment was necessary
for political reasons Palmerston told him, after refusing to take Lowe
who, he thought, would write against him in The Times. Meanwhile
on 8 March Palmerston told the Queen that Peel, although disap-
pointed, had readily agreed to go to the Civil Board of the Admiralty.
A day later Wood and Grey suggested another switch that would
enable Peel to become under-secretary at the Foreign Office, but
Clarendon refused to accept him. Lewis then agreed to take Peel as
a Secretary of the Treasury to replace Wilson who was to be
promoted to the Board of Trade, but Wilson was unwilling to vacate
his existing appointment for fear of losing his seat. Palmerston then
recommended that Frederick Peel should be made Vice President of
the Board of Trade leaving the under-secretaryship of the War Office
for his older brother, but this fell through. In the end, both Peels
remained where they were and E. P. Bouverie, a Whig, became
Vice President of the Board of Trade.57
The Palmerston Ministry that emerged was therefore rather a
reconstruction of the old Russell Whig Ministry than of Aberdeen's
Coalition. It may have been more homogeneous, as Gladstone
suggested it would be, but it was clearly weaker in debating and
administrative talent without the Peelite component. Nor did it
satisfy the demand from The Times and from the radical benches for
the abandonment of the aristocratic principle in government. When
asked by the Prince, Gladstone replied he did not think the reorgan-
ised ministry would last a twelvemonth, saying:
It is a Cabinet without a head. Lord Palmerston is an eminent

member of it, superior to all others in knowledge and authority
on one great class of questions, feeling and acting energetically on
several classes, and on the others disposed to fall in with the
majority; but nowhere has he that peculiar guiding influence which
my experience of Sir R. Peel taught me to associate with the
idea of premiership and which was not wholly wanting in Lord
Aberdeen. 58
Palmerston's ministry got away to a slow start and was weakened,

especially in the House of Commons, by the loss of the Peelites. Sir
D. Le Marchant, Chief Clerk of the House of Commons and long
intimate with Whig ministers, expressed his views of the situation in

a letter to Russell following the latter's departure for Vienna:
At first either from indisposition or the pressure of hard work,
Lord P. was very much below himself- and of course he had little
support from his colleagues. He has not yet succeeded in catching
the tone of the House .... He has derived no strength from his
appointments. Vernon Smith's unpopularity has blazed out with a
violence that I hardly anticipated. The Irish were furious at
Horsman's appointment [as Irish Secretary] .... George Lewis is
rather nervous but I think will do .... I wish I could say the same
of Frederick Peel.
Greville, a hostile witness, initially commented that in his conduct
of affairs Palmerston inspired 'neither respect nor confidence', that
he was 'totally unable to manage the House of Commons', and that
his speeches were 'feeble and bad'. By the end of March, however,
he had to admit that the Government on the whole seemed 'in
somewhat better condition'. 'They say Palmerston speaks better than
he did,' he reported, 'and his good humour and civility please. '59
Indeed Palmerston proved to be a more successful Prime Minister
than many observers expected and with the exception of seventeen
months in 1858-9 occupied that office for the remaining decade of
his life. It was easy to point to his failings, but he was the man the
public wanted in 1855 and when the war was over he caught the
mood of the so-called age of equipoise that followed it better than
any of his rivals could have done. His first responsibilities, however,
were the prosecution of the war which he took up with enthusiasm
and sooner or later the conclusion of a peace for which he was in
no hurry. For reasons beyond his control his freedom was severely
curtailed in both these areas, as we shall see, but his leadership was
in marked contrast to that of poor Lord Aberdeen whose heart was
never in the war and who longed for an early peace.
2 The Vienna Conference
of 1855 and its
Parliamentary
Repercussion s
The story of the failure of the Vienna conference, although it has
been well told from the Palmerstonian point of view by Gavin Hend-
erson, and from the European point of view by Professor Schroeder,'
bears re-examination in the light of its political repercussions in
Britain and its relationship to the final peace negotiations. The
prolonged and intense diplomatic activity that preceded the Crimean
War was scarcely abated throughout its duration. The explanation is
to be found largely in the anxiety of Britain and France to find allies,
especially Austria, and the corresponding anxiety of Austria to avoid
direct involvement while preserving her vital interests in the area
and consequently to find a peaceful solution. This continuing resort
to diplomacy, which affected both sides, also reflected the general
lack of enthusiasm for the war that all the parties involved had vainly
tried to avoid. Indeed it was a false sense of national honour which
largely contributed to the outbreak of hostilities and now to their
prolongation. It was a great indignity for Russia to have lost control
of the Black Sea and to be subjected to an invasion of her territory,
which she seemed incapable of repelling, despite the limited numbers
of the invaders. On the other hand the Western Allies saw their
resources in men and money being frittered away, with the capture
of Sebastopol remaining unrealised and the end of the war not in
sight. Yet with the Russians withdrawn from the Principalities and
much of their Black Sea Navy sunk in Sebastopol harbour, the
original aims of the war seemed to have been secured in the eyes of
the peace promoters in Britain and France. The war parties in both
countries, however, believed that a lasting peace could only be
secured by the decisive defeat of Russia and were reluctant to engage
in peace negotiations until this was achieved, despite the insecure
position of their armies and the incompetence of their generals. Yet
they were committed to attending a peace conference in Vienna
29
because Austria, the reluctant ally whom they were hoping to bring
into the war, had unexpectedly persuaded the Emperor Nicholas I
to accept the Four Points as a basis of negotiation. Nicholas had
died suddenly in early March, and his son, Alexander II, although
less rigid and himself anxious for peace, was not prepared to make
it on terms he considered dishonourable for Russia.
The crucial issue was the Third Point regarding the revision of the
Treaty of 1841. In negotiating their alliance with Austria in
December Britain and France had agreed to an elaboration of this
Point to the effect that the Treaty of 1841 should be revised to end
Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, with precise arrangements
to be left pending the events of war. 2 Britain and France had,
however, at the same time secretly agreed between themselves that
Sebastopol and possibly other Russian fortresses on the Black Sea
must be destroyed and Russia limited to four warships in those
waters. 3 When Russia had agreed to the Vienna negotiations (to the
surprise of Britain and France) neither she nor Austria was aware
of this secret qualification on the part of the Western Allies, which
did not contradict the published definition of the Third Point but
carried it further than the Russians were likely to go. Consequently
the British Government entered the Vienna Conference in the spring
of 1855 with little expectation that it would reach a successful
conclusion.
I LORD JOHN RUSSELL AND THE VIENNA

CONFERENCE OF 1855
The situation was transformed by the appointment, as the senior

British plenipotentiary, of Lord John Russell, a member of the late
Government and a former Prime Minister, who by the time he
reached Vienna was again a Cabinet Minister. He obviously could
play a larger role than an ambassadorial representative - indeed he
had a free hand in revising his own instructions - and his presence
made the conference more significant. While these instructions indi-
cated that the maintenance of an allied force in the Black Sea or the
mere limitation of the Russian Navy to the size of other navies were
not palatable solutions and that the restriction of Russian naval
power in the Black Sea must be imposed to give Turkey protection,
they left it up to Russell to decide whether it would be expedient to
discuss with the other two powers means to reach 'some general
The Vienna Conference of 1855 31
understanding' that might, indeed, 'be modified by future circum-

stances as to the form which that basis should ultimately assume' .4
The problem was how to abrogate Russian supremacy in the Black
Sea after the war was over.
It so happened that Russell's appointment was decided upon while
the Peelites were still in the Cabinet and it had Aberdeen's full
approval. It has been argued, 5 not unreasonably, that in order to
maintain the Peelite alliance Palmerston at this point was forced to
follow a more pacific course than Aberdeen had been able to do;
but before Russell reached Vienna (via Berlin where he unsuccess-
fully sought to secure the involvement of the Prussian Government)
the Peelites had resigned and thus the brake on the more warlike
inclinations of Palmerston - and of Clarendon - had been released.
The situation was further complicated when Louis Napoleon
proposed that he should go to the Crimea to take over the command
of the Allied armies in order to bring the campaign to a speedy
conclusion. This intention shocked all his advisers, military and
civilian, for he had no military experience (other than as a volunteer
policeman helping to guard London against the Chartists in 1848),
and in Clarendon's view the result would have been suicide.6 In the
end the Emperor was persuaded not to go, but as long as he threat-
ened to do so his advisers were more inclined to support the idea of
an early peace. One diversion that helped to keep him out of mischief
was a state visit to England in April.7
While in Paris Russell had a conversation with Louis Napoleon
who brought up the Polish question, a frequently recurring one
throughout the Crimean War, which Palmerston tended to raise in
his more exuberant moments, but which could hardly be pressed by
the Allies as long as they were tied down in the Crimea. Russell said
that if the Four Points were accepted by Russia in the way the Allies
understood them then they had 'no right at present to put forward
Poland as an obstacle to peace', but if Russia refused the third point
then he thought it could be raised legitimately. 'But then if the Poles
should join us', he added, 'we must continue the war till we get
terms for Poland. This is a grave affair and must be gravely thought
of.' Although Louis Napoleon continued to hanker after a solution
to the Polish question it never became a recognised Allied war aim. 8
Russell arrived in Vienna on 4 March, followed shortly afterwards
by his wife and five children, attended by two doctors. He remained
for eight weeks during which some progress was made, but after his
departure at the end of April the Conference was stalemated until
it was finally closed on 4 June. Lord John got along well with Buol,
the pro-Western Austrian Foreign Minister, and Bourqueney, the
able French Minister in Vienna, with whom he fully discussed the
course of action they should take when the Conference opened on
15 March. Once in Vienna it was clear that he was genuinely anxious
to achieve a settlement if it was at all possible. Russell was relieved
to find there was no evidence, as had been feared, of prior agreement
between Buol and Gortchakov and good progress was made on the
first two points respecting the Principalities and freedom of navi-
gation on the Danube. He was chagrined, however, when Clarendon
objected to a proposed five-power guarantee as likely to lead to
eventual Austro-Russi:m dominance of the Principalities. In a blunt
despatch the Foreign Secretary told Russell that there were no
grounds 'for consenting to make peace on terms that would neither
be honourable for the Allies nor safe for Europe,' and Palmerston
added his bit in a private letter, claiming that it would be impossible
for himself or for Clarendon to stand up in Parliament and justify a
treaty with the stipulations Russell was proposing. He realised that
there was a danger Russell would be unwilling to return empty-
handed and told Clarendon they 'must keep him up to the mark'. 9
Palmerston and Clarendon remained highly sceptical of success
and suspicious of Buol. Clarendon, whose moods seemed to oscillate
between aggressive defiance and gloomy pessimism, refused to be
impressed by Russell's reports of progress, but had to admit to
Palmerston that there was 'something ridiculous in insisting on the
demolition of Sebastopol which we cannot take and the limitation
of a naval force we cannot get at'. Palmerston was more robust. He
thought that the negotiations were premature because they must
first capture Sebastopol. When Russell wrote (in terms worthy of
Aberdeen) to say he did not think they could 'do more than urge
the diminution of the Russian fleet' and that he could not 'bear the
thought of carrying on the war till [their] armies had won a great
victory,' Palmerston commented: 'Nobody ought to wish to continue
the war for the mere sake of obtaining some brilliant success but we
must unfortunately continue the war until we can obtain that future
security for which we began the contest.' Palmerston had only agreed
to the negotiations because he wanted to keep the Austrian alliance,
but solutions that might seem reasonable to Russell would be quite
unacceptable to him. Clarendon, although less confident, was content
to accept Palmerston's lead, believing that was the course that public
opinion favoured.to
Colloredo, the Austrian Minister in London, sensed Clarendon's

hostility and regretted the departure of Aberdeen who always took
him into his confidence. He complained to Buol of Clarendon's
disagreeable manner and failure to keep him properly briefed. He
also gave the Austrian Foreign Minister an unflattering account of
England's military position which he asserted with much truth could
not be maintained without the help of France. Indeed he reported
that the English were greatly humiliated every day as they learnt
how their military affairs were being conducted in the East. 11
The main difficulty inevitably developed over the Third Point for
the Western Allies were unable to agree with Austria on a formula
to propose to Russia. Britain and France wanted to limit Russia to
a very small number of warships on the Black Sea. Austria did not
reject the idea of some sort of limitation but would not make it a
casus belli, preferring a policy of counterpoise (that is, the admission
of a sufficient number of allied warships into the Black Sea to balance
the Russian fleet). Her chief interest lay in the other articles. Russell
was uncertain what to do, for he regarded the proposals that Buol
was prepared to make as inadequate, yet at the same time he was
fearful of the precarious military situation. He told Clarendon that
Russia hoped to separate Austria from the Allies and so stressed the
importance of acting jointly with Buol if they were to persuade
Gortchakov to yield. 'For this purpose', he wrote, 'it is essential that
our proposals should be as moderate as we can make them.' Some
memoranda in the Russell Papers indicate that he gave serious
consideration to the various counterpoise proposals that were being
made, weighing the pros and the cons, but they do not necessarily
'illustrate Russell's conversion' to Buol's proposals as Professor
Schroeder suggests. They only show that Russell had an open mind
and was prepared to give Buol's ideas serious consideration and
perhaps, if limitation failed, to support them in some form.l 2
Since the British and French governments refused to allow their
representatives to consider the Austrian proposal of counterpoise,
Buol suggested limiting the Russian fleet to its existing number. This
was not an unreasonable proposal since a large proportion of that
fleet had been sunk in the harbour at Sebastopol and Russell
recommended its acceptance as a compromise. Indeed he mentioned
this possibility in a private conversation with Prince Gortchakov who
did not rule it out of consideration and promised to lay it before his
master. Palmerston allowed 'that something might be made of that
idea', but not if there were still seven or eight ships of the line afloat.
Clarendon rather contemptuously supposed that Russell had not

thought to ask how many Russian ships were still afloat. 13 The Allied
Governments never gave their approval to this promising suggestion.
Gavin Henderson is critical of Russell's indecision, but Clarendon
also reflected some uncertainty when he wrote to Palmerston on 24
March complaining that Austria's refusal to enter the war if Russia
rejected the idea of limitation would result in Russia pouring troops
into the Crimea that had been tied up on the borders of the Principal-
ities, thus diminishing Allied hopes of taking Sebastopol; 'it seems
impossible to submit to Buol's miserable proposal', he wrote, 'and
we don't even know whether that would be accepted by Russia, yet
we must well weigh our chances of success in war before we take a
final decision. It is an awkward fix!' 14 Palmerston never showed such
pessimism.
In his letters and despatches to Russell Clarendon took a tough
line, complaining that the sort of peace Buol would 'hustle' them
into would 'destroy [their] prestige all over the world' and warning
that the French wanted 'to make peace a tout prix.' He was evidently
trying to put more backbone into Russell, and Lansdowne wrote
privately to the same effect, arguing that 'to end the war without
either a diplomatic or a military success as respects the Black Sea
would produce a disastrous impression' and that to do so defeated
'would be humiliation'. Russell did not take this advice kindly and
tartly reminded the old peer that a country's prestige also rested on
keeping its engagements, a maxim that would have warmed Aber-
deen's heart. 'If the 4 Points were not thought sufficient guarantees
for peace,' he observed, 'they should not have been brought forward.
If it is intended after using them as a bait for Austria, to throw them
aside and forfeit our word, I am not the man to employ on so
discreditable a task. '15
Clarendon also tried to humour his sensitive envoy by insisting
that he sympathised with Russell 'ab imo corde' for the difficult
position in which he was placed and explaining that he sent stiff
instructions to relieve him of the responsibility of taking a hard line
with Austria. 'It grieves me,' he wrote, 'that you should not return
with an olive branch but you may be sure that the people of England
will be satisfied that you have done all that was humanly possible
for peace and pleased that you should not have yielded to Russian
dictates or Austrian cowardice. ' 16
In Russell's view the Allied plenipotentiaries were beginning to
make some progress in the matter of limitation when Bourqueney
received a despatch from Paris instructing him to propose a new plan

of neutralisation, but Buol was very unwilling to entertain it. The
result was that when the conference held its sixth session on 26
March, Buol suggested that Russia and Turkey should be invited to
put forward their views as to how the Third Point regarding the
reduction of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea might be
implemented. Russell then proposed a suspension of the regular
conference and an airing of the various projects under consideration
in an informal conversation for the information of the Russian plen-
ipotentiaries. Bourqueney introduced the idea of neutralisation
which Gortchakov dismissed as impossible, while Russell explained
the objections to a plan of counterpoise. He thought the problem
might be solved, however, if the Russian Emperor were to declare
at the time of signing the preliminaries of peace that Russia would
not increase the number of ships of war beyond those she then had
available in the Black Sea. In a separate despatch Russell said that
Buol had put the argument for limitation to Gortchakov by pointing
out that it would be an improvement over the present situation where
the entire Russian naval force in the Black Sea was ineffective.
Gortchakov reluctantly agreed to refer Buol's proposal to his
Government, but since the Western Allies were reluctant to proceed
to the Fourth Point until the Third was settled, the Conference was
adjourned until17 April except for some procedural sessions. 17
A further impediment to the progress of the discussions arose from
the lack of instructions to the Turkish ambassador and the late arrival
of the special Turkish envoy, Ali Pasha. This difficulty was attributed
by both Russell and Clarendon to the malign influence of Stratford
de Redcliffe, who had been instructed by Clarendon to keep Russell
fully informed, an instruction he was slow to fulfil. Forwarding some
of Stratford's despatches to Palmerston Clarendon had commented
with fatalistic exaggeration: 'it is clear that Stratford won't allow the
Porte to make peace - on the contrary he doesn't think we have
made sacrifices enough and he wants a much more magnificent war
and a guarantee for the remainder of the Turkish loan'. If he really
believed this, Clarendon should have insisted on Stratford's recall
since throughout the Eastern crisis he had blamed the ambassador
for failing to co-operate, while probably exaggerating his influence
with the Porte. He and Palmerston, however, feared that if recalled
Stratford would be too dangerous in the Lords.ts
In the meantime the Allied representatives discussed what they
should do if Russia refused the proposal of limiting the Russian fleet
in the Black Sea to its present size, which, as we have seen, Gort-
chakov had also referred to St Petersburg. Russell said that in that
case it was time for Austria to implement the Treaty of 2 December,
that is, to enter the war. Buol demurred and instead proposed that
Austria should offer a guarantee in the Balkans and that Turkey
should be permitted to call in her allies if the Russian fleet in the
Black Sea reached a certain number. Russell therefore asked Clar-
endon whether they could settle for anything less than limitation. 'I
should not mind any clamour in England if I could think such a
peace as Buol suggests creditable or safe', he wrote. 'But I cannot
think it would be either.' He was becoming weary of the Conference
and in the same letter asked for a replacement if the discussions
went on to the Fourth Point.19
Meanwhile the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, had
been discussing a new approach with Clarendon and after a visit to
London on 30 March to get the final approval of the British Govern-
ment he proceeded to Vienna to lead the French delegation himself,
with the result that Austria, Britain and France were now all
represented at the Conference by senior cabinet ministers, scarcely
the occasion for window-dressing. The essence of Drouyn's new
proposal was the neutralisation of the Black Sea except for police
boats, with the limitation of the Russian and Turkish navies on the
Black Sea to four sail of the line and four frigates each as a less
desirable alternative.2o
Russell was furious at Clarendon's failure to keep him in the
picture - he had first heard of the new project from the French
ambassador on 26 March - and at a letter written by Palmerston on
28 March, disparaging what progress had been made. Russell replied
to the Prime Minister saying that he had only joined his Cabinet to
help out in a crisis, but now that things had settled down he thought
that Palmerston should look for a new Colonial Secretary since he
was anxious to get out. Palmerston knew that a Russell letter of
resignation did not have to be taken too seriously and dismissed it
in his next letter in his most breezy manner. 'As to giving away the
seals,' he wrote, 'that would be giving away the apple of our eye.'
Russell had already sent off a brief to Clarendon claiming that he
was too angry to write, but allowing himself a sharp closing sally.
'Perhaps for the sake of the public service', he wrote, 'you will
think it advisable not to lower your Special Envoy too much in the
estimation of foreign courts.'21
When Lord John finally received Clarendon's despatch regarding
the new policy of neutralisation he acknowledged it curtly by saying,

'Of course, if insisted upon, it puts an end to any glimmering hope
of peace.' A few days later, however, he wrote again to say that he
was relieved to hear that limitation was to be an alternative to
neutralisation, for he had 'been preaching to Buol that limitation
was the only secure system'. In this letter he suggested that Clar-
endon himself should come and take over the negotiations from him.
Drouyn, with whom Russell had had a 'very satisfactory conver-
sation' on 10 April, apparently put the little man in better humour.
The two worked closely together, putting pressure on the reluctant
Buol, who, Russell said, was 'ready to do anything short of war',
but who had his arms tied 'by superior authority' .22
As Drouyn was arriving in Vienna with his alternative proposal,
the Austrian ambassador in London was reading to Clarendon a
formal despatch from Buol making it clear that Austria still preferred
a policy of counterpoise and could not make Russia's refusal of
proposals for limitation a casus belli. There was nothing to surprise
Clarendon in this declaration, but he told Colloredo that he 'had
listened to Count Buol's despatch with equal surprise as concern, as
it was nothing short of an announcement that Austria would not
adhere to the Treaty of December 2, if the Western Powers persisted
in carrying the third basis into effect, for Count Buol must be aware
that his proposed system of counterpoise was both inadequate and
impracticable. '23
In Vienna Buol listened to Drouyn's proposals without
enthusiasm. He reluctantly agreed to their being put forward when
the time came, but said he was sure Russia would not accept them
and made it clear that Austria would not go to war to enforce them.
Russell, arguing that Austria's plan of counterpoise would not only
be ineffectual but that it would also be humiliating to Turkey, said
that Britain could not always guarantee to have a fleet available to
come to Turkey's assistance. At a subsequent meeting, however,
Buol, while refusing to make the Allied demands a casus belli, agreed
to do so if Russia failed to adhere to a guarantee of Turkish integrity.
He later proposed to combine this guarantee with a limitation of the
Russian Black Sea fleet to its pre-war size, but Russell and Drouyn
were not prepared to go beyond the number still afloat. If all else
failed Russell wanted to propose a compromise between the limi-
tation and the counterpoise plans, but Clarendon vetoed it.24
In England, meanwhile, the attention of the public and of the
Government was distracted by the state visit of the French Emperor
from 16 to 21 April. He made a good impression, especially on

Queen Victoria, who warmed to him surprisingly. The visit helped
to cement the alliance and gave the opportunity to discuss Louis
Napoleon's proposed plan of campaign, designed to bring the
Crimean stalemate to an end.25
When the Conference resumed on 17 April Prince Gortchakov
reported that his Government declined the invitation to make
proposals on the Third Point but that he was authorised to listen to
any proposals that might be put forward, providing that they did not
entail any infringement of Russian sovereignty over its own territory.
The Allied representatives expressed their disappointment at this
negative announcement after such a long wait and despite Russian
objections adjourned to confer among themselves. 26 The Austrian,
British, French and Turkish delegations met the following day and
all appeared to be in a conciliatory mood since Austria was reluctant
to isolate herself by alienating Britain and France whose representa-
tives in turn were worried by the waste of lives and money entailed
in a continuation of the war. Consequently Buol suggested that they
first put forward the limitation proposal that Drouyn had brought
from London with an alternative limiting Russia and Turkey to the
number of ships Russia had at the end of the war, with a provision
allowing Britain and France each to send warships into the Black
Sea up to half the number in the Russian fleet. If these proposals
failed he suggested a third plan which would provide for:
(1) a general engagement to guarantee the territorial integrity of

Turkey:
(2) an amendment to the 1841 Treaty to allow the Sultan to permit
Britain and France each to send warships into the Black Sea up
to half the strength of the Turkish fleet;
(3) the admission of consuls into Russian ports on the Black Sea;
(4) an Austrian engagement to make any increase of the Russian
Black Sea fleet over its 1853 strength a casus belli.27
After discussing these proposals with Drouyn, Russell wrote to Clar-

endon in his official despatch:
I confess that it appears to me that if this third system can be
made an ultimatum by Austria it ought to be accepted by the
Western Powers. In saying this, I may appear to contradict my
former opinions. But in fact I do not retract those opinions. The
system of limitation I believe to be far better than that of counter-

poise. But the question is between an imperfect security for Turkey
and for Europe, and the continuance of the war.
If the Cabinet did not want to accept this proposal, Russell asked
that he might be heard in person before a final decision was made.
In a private letter Russell reiterated his request that no final decision
should be made before he reached England on 29 April and added:
'It is with great hesitation I say the 3d system ought to be accepted',
but he tied it to an Austrian readiness to go to war. Palmerston liked
none of this and on reading the despatches commented to Clarendon:
'I am very glad that John Russell is coming away. The truth is as
Drummond said of him in 1851 he is a man who seldom sees the
consequences of his own acts. '28
The Conference met again on 19 April and, with some reservation
on the part of Gortchakov, agreed to a statement regarding the
territorial independence and integrity of Turkey and her membership
in the European system. Reminding Russia that all treaties placed
some curtailment on national sovereignty, Drouyn then proceeded
to make the limitation proposal (allowing Russia and Turkey each a
maximum of four ships of the line and four frigates). After much
discussion the meeting adjourned to 21 April when Gortchakov
declined to accept the proposals, saying that they were derogatory
to the sovereign rights of the Russian Emperor, 'contrary to the
European equilibrium, and dangerous to the independence of the
Ottoman Empire'. Instead he suggested that the Black Sea should
be open to all fleets. The British, French and Turkish delegates,
however, protested that they were not authorised to discuss such
proposals. According to Russell a spirit of recrimination character-
ised both meetings, as Gortchakov, elated by news of Allied setbacks
in the Crimea, attempted to arouse Turkish suspicions of Britain and
France. 29
Austria was now prepared to put forward her alternative plan
(see above) which Russell immediately forwarded to London with a
request for instructions, repeating his hope that the Austrian
proposal would not be rejected without his being present; although
recognising the urgency he did not actually ask for a delay.3o
On receiving news of the latest Austrian proposal or 'ultimatum',
as it was called, from Drouyn, the French Emperor was disposed to
refuse it and to break off relations, but he first asked the British
Government what they meant to do. Clarendon told the French
ambassador that they had refused the Austrian terms, but he

preferred to consult Palmerston on the matter of suspending or
breaking off the negotiations. 'If there was any decent excuse for
suspending it might tell better for our moderation afterwards', he
wrote to Palmerston, 'but on the other hand if J. Russell and Drouyn
come away a suspended conference would be rather absurd.' Palmer-
stan suggested that they should place the matter before the Cabinet
where a decision seems to have been postponed until Russell's
return. 31
Meanwhile, on 22 April, the day before he left Vienna, Russell
had an audience with the Emperor who was keen to keep up the
alliance and 'willing to go as far as possible to comply with the terms
of the Treaty he had signed,' Russell wrote, but not 'to go to war
for eight ships of the line, more or less'. Russell warned that the
Czar would send fresh reinforcements to the Crimea, if he were
relieved of any fear of hostilities on the part of Austria. The Emperor
said he was sorry, but could not go beyond the ultimatum he had
proposed. Russell commented that he believed him 'to be faithful to
the alliance, and firm to his own convictions'. 'The neutrality of
Prussia, the attachment of his own nobility to the Muscovite cause,
the disorder of the finances, and the desire for repose after so many
and such severe internal troubles, may all influence the mind of the
Emperor', Russell concluded. Nevertheless he was sure that Francis
Joseph meant well by the Allies and therefore deserved 'consider-
ation and respect' .32 The Austrians would have been surprised if
they had known that the envoy of Lord Palmerston could assess their
position in such compassionate terms.
Just before leaving Vienna on 23 April Russell worked out with
Drouyn a formula 'to make the Austrian proposal more palatable'.
Buol and the Emperor approved the projected terms of a treaty to
guarantee Turkey against aggression based on the formula Drouyn
had devised with Russell. The Austrian Emperor said that while he
was not ready to go to war over the number of ships Russia should
be allowed in the Black Sea, 'for a permanent system in defence of
Turkey he was quite ready to go to war with Russia'. In a last note
before he departed, Russell warned Clarendon that if he wanted
Austria to execute the Treaty of 2 December he would have to
accept a version of the Austrian proposal. 'It seems to me,' he
concluded, 'you will have to consider in this or some other shape
one of the gravest questions ever submitted to our own or any other
government. '33 Russell also pointed out to Palmerston that the plan
had 'the merit of binding Austria to the Western Powers' and he

urged the Cabinet to give it very serious attention.3 4
II DEATH OF A CONFERENCE
When Russell and Drouyn left Vienna there seemed to be a possible

chance of success if they could persuade their governments in
London and Paris and if Russia was prepared to consider the
amended Austrian proposal as a reasonable basis of a settlement
(which was not too likely). Indeed Clarendon and Palmerston were
unimpressed by Russell's final letters and despatches which arrived
in London ahead of him. Russell's arguments, the Foreign Secretary
commented sourly, were 'as frivolous and fallacious as Drouyn's'.
Palmerston told him that he might 'positively and distinctly say that
Her Majesty's present Government cannot and will not accept
Drouyn's proposals. If it is to be adopted it must be by a government
under some other head'. In a long letter to Queen Victoria he
denounced them as a 'mockery'. He reported that the Cabinet
members thought likewise, but deemed it best to take no step until
Russell's return. The Queen, now quite warlike, said that it was
beyond her comprehension 'how Russell and Drouyn could
recommend such proposals' .35
Russell arrived in London on Sunday 29 April and called at the
Foreign Office the next day. He seemed 'in very good humour' and
was most anxious to know what the Ministers thought of the Austrian
proposals. He told Clarendon 'that if the Government refused to
make a peace as was now within their reach they would commit the
greatest blunder that any Government ever committed.' 'He justified
this,' Clarendon wrote to Palmerston, 'by reference to our war pros-
pects, the cowed state of the French army, the improbability of our
taking Sebastopol or of getting away safely from the Crimea and the
possibility of our having to get worse terms from Russia after another
campaign.' Clarendon warned the Prime Minister that Russell would
require 'delicate handling by the Cabinet'. 36 He was uncertain
whether Lord John was determined to stand by his opinion, but did
not think he 'brought any member of the Cabinet to agree with him'.
As always Clarendon showed his remarkable sensitivity to public
opinion. 'It is an anxious moment,' he wrote to Lord Cowley, the
British ambassador in Paris, 'for I can't disguise from myself that
the public is every day getting more anxious for peace as they see
the chances of success in war diminish and if we reject (as we must

do) terms that our P. Ps. declare to be good the responsibility will
be increased- however that can't be helped.'3 7
The Cabinet and the Court began to waver, when a modification
of the Drouyn-Buol proposals arrived from Paris, where Drouyn on
his return from Vienna had some initial success with the Emperor.
Clarendon sent Cowley a frank and detailed account that deserves
quotation in part.
The Cabinet has lasted till 7 [he wrote] ... - the project as
amended by the Emperor has been considered and discussed in
all its different bearings . . . but the affair is so grave and the
consequences at home and abroad so momentous of giving up
what we have been contending ... that it is impossible to come
to a hasty decision -we will consider it again and again and I hope
the Emperor won't be annoyed at the delay ....
. . . I must tell you in confidence that the Cabinet is divided and
Lord John would probably leave it on the question- the neutrality
of Austria would leave Russia at liberty to bring all her forces
against us and lastly that the greatest evil of all we have Generals
in the Crimea not worth their salt. In short it is the most tremen-
dous fix that ever a government was placed in, but as yet I cannot
bring myself to swallow even the amended form. 38
Clarendon even sent a copy of the proposal to Aberdeen whom he

had regularly kept informed of the progress of the negotiations,
admitting he did not like it since it involved abandoning what they
had been fighting for, but confessing he was uncertain what to do in
view of the military situation. Aberdeen, of course, warmly approved
of the project and promised the support of himself and his friends,
but he warned that 'the rejection of peace upon such terms, would
be subject to very sharp criticism. '39
Russell urged that the amended terms signed by Drouyn and
himself should be sent to Vienna for transmission to St Petersburg
with an ultimatum. 'Perhaps for the peace of the world,' he wrote
to Clarendon, 'the establishment of an opinion that Russia is against
us powerless for aggression but invulnerable for defence is not a very
bad thing.' Palmerston, however, remained opposed to any plan of
counterpoise. 'The evacuation of the Crimea by 180,000 allied troops
with Sebastopol untaken and the Russian Army untouched,' he
declared, 'would undoubtedly be a moral and military triumph for
Russia which would raise instead of making to cease her preponder-

ance in the Black Sea. ' 40
The hesitation of some members of the Cabinet and their sensi-
tivity to the winds of public opinion was well expressed by Granville
who asked himself what would happen if the proposed terms were
accepted by all parties. He concluded that some would rejoice, that
more would feel relief but that the general feeling would 'be one
of disappointment and mortification,' because of the extravagant
expectations that had been aroused. 'They will be dissatisfied not at
the terms of peace,' he thought, 'but at our leaving off without the
triumph that attended the conclusion of the last war.' Indeed, he
anticipated the possibility of their being 'hooted' from their places
if they made peace, but he was gloomy as to the prospects if they
continued the war and anticipated the formation of a peace party,
'strong enough to take away all appearances of unanimity in the
country for a war in which the religious feelings and the material
interests of the country are not concerned'. Moreover in France he
believed public opinion was 'unanimously in favour of peace'. He,
therefore, had reluctantly come to the opinion that the revised
Austrian proposals should be accepted. 41
On 4 May Clarendon again wrote to Cowley to say that although
the Cabinet had debated the 'Austro-Gallic proposal' for a long time
there was still no decision. 'Lord John was favorable to it,' he wrote,
'but nobody liked it very much - some disliked it very much. Others
thought it a penalty for our military failure and the price to pay for
the escape of our armies, but all were of the opinion that the elements
for arriving at a final judgement were wanting as we did not know
what the real wishes and intentions of the Emperor were.' Palmer-
stan had a long conversation with Walewski, the French ambassador,
who undertook to send a courier to find this out and so the decision
was deferred again. Clarendon himself hoped the plan would be
rejected for he considered it would be a national humiliation and he
preferred to stand the chances of war. Yet he admitted he could not
shut his eyes to the danger their Armies and 'incompetent Generals'
would be exposed to if they broke with Austria and allowed Russia
'to concentrate the whole of her forces in the Crimea'. He was also
most apprehensive of the anticipated heavy loss of life in the summer
months from bad sanitation and feared the Government would be
blamed either way. 42
The next day, to Clarendon's great relief, Walewski presented him
with a telegram from the Emperor saying that after full reflection he
had decided to abandon the last proposal and to return to the first
project of limitation, a decision he presumed would be in accord
with the wishes of the British Cabinet. At the following Cabinet
discussion some members regretted abandoning altogether a scheme
that, if amended, might have led to peace, for which, Clarendon
admitted, there was 'a growing desire' in the country, but he claimed
there was at last 'no difference of opinion about declining the
proposal of Austria'. Nevertheless, he wanted it clearly understood
that the earlier French plan had not been rejected by the Cabinet;
'the state of public opinion is such here now,' he wrote, 'that we
must be able to shew that we have not absolutely closed the door to
peace. ' 43 Clarendon was sensitive to the winds of public opinion from
whatever direction they blew.
Lord Cowley, who, to the chagrin of Hubner, the Austrian
ambassador, had extraordinary influence with LouisNapoleon, was
largely responsible for the dramatic change in the Emperor's views.
All along he had been highly critical of the conciliatory line that
Russell and Drouyn had adopted in Vienna and had expressed his
views strongly in a private letter to Clarendon who, he was confident,
agreed with him. 'I cannot understand Lord John', he wrote on
1 May, 'nor can I conceive a more dishonorable peace than that
which he proposes.' When he met Drouyn following the latter's
return from Vienna he strongly disagreed with the French Foreign
Minister's arguments in favour of the proposed settlement and wrote
again to Clarendon urging that the British Government should tell
the Emperor 'that our honour as well as our interests prevent our
going further'. He was shocked by Clarendon's letter of 2 May
regarding the Cabinet's indecision and again wrote privately
protesting the idea of their accepting such terms. 'It is allowing
Russia to limit us in place of our limiting Russia,' he wrote. 'If Lord
John can find a majority in the Cabinet to back his views, for God's
sake resign yourself.' He claimed that the Emperor had been
deceived by Drouyn 'who makes him believe that Austria has prom-
ised to go to war - immediately - but Drouyn's real opinion is that
Russia will accept the ultimatum'. Indeed, in a subsequent despatch
Cowley alleged that Drouyn's deliberate intention had been to
sacrifice the British alliance. 44
On 3 May Cowley was given the opportunity to intervene when
the Emperor summoned him to the Tuileries to seek his views.
Cowley gave Clarendon three separate accounts of this fateful inter-
view and its sequel, first in a private letter, then in a brief despatch
relating the bald facts of the case and finally in a confidential despatch
explaining his own role. He told the Emperor that he could only
express his own appreciation of the situation since he had not yet
received instructions from his Government, but admitted that he did
not see how the French modification made the Austrian plan any
more acceptable. He found that the Emperor was under the
impression that Russia was to be required to consent to a limitation
of her fleet to the number . . . 'actually afloat' and assured the
bewildered man that this was not the case and that the arrangement
was merely one to be made with Austria. On hearing this the
Emperor said that he would consult Drouyn, but not trusting the
French Foreign Minister Cowley 'boldly' asked that he might be
present at the interview. The Emperor agreed and when they met
again that afternoon Cowley was glad to see that Marshal Vaillant,
the French War Minister, had also been invited, but in the meantime
Drouyn had again convinced his master on the matter of limitation.
Cowley and Vaillant, however, had the better of the argument and
Drouyn, who, according to Cowley, lost his temper, had to admit
that the proposal placed no direct limitation on Russia. Cowley asked
'whether having solemnly declared that their intention was to cause
the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea to cease, they were
prepared to re-establish that preponderance,' while Marshal Vaillant
stated 'that the Army would not be satisfied with a peace on those
terms'. Cowley's question was a misleading one and it is doubtful
whether Vaillant spoke for Canrobert, commanding the French army
in the Crimea, but the Emperor was persuaded by them. He said he
'despaired of finding terms that would suit the honor of the
belligerent powers' and at the same time be acceptable to Russia
and consequently concluded that they should abide by the terms
originally proposed by the Allies at the Conference. After the
meeting Drouyn de Lhuys resigned, but Cowley protested that there
had been no intrigue. Nevertheless Clarendon warned him that he
should 'never mention to a human being' that he had been consulted
by the Emperor. 45
Walewski replaced Drouyn, and Persigny, a lightweight Bonapar-
tist, replaced Walewski as ambassador in London. Clarendon was
unenthusiastic about both appointments, telling Cowley that while
Walewski (an illegitimate son of Napoleon Bonaparte) was loyal to
the alliance his intellect was 'not of an order to fit him for the
management of the foreign affairs of France at a moment of great
crisis. ' 46 Before long he would have cause even to doubt the new
Foreign Minister's good intentions towards Britain.
When he heard of Drouyn's resignation Russell felt that he should
do likewise. 'It is painful to leave a second Cabinet, and will injure
my reputation, perhaps irretrievably,' he wrote to Clarendon. 'But
I see no other course.' A little later he qualified his position, saying
that his own resignation was a matter of honour if he was responsible
for Drouyn's resignation, but if Drouyn was only resigning as a result
of a personal quarrel that was another matter. In that event he was
ready to reconsider, realising that since Louis Napoleon had now
changed his mind Britain could no longer accept the Austrian
proposals. 'The state of domestic affairs makes it necessary that we
should do everything possible to keep together,' he concluded.47
Thus unfortunately in the end the combined appeals of Clarendon
and Palmerston persuaded Russell to withdraw his resignation. He
had in fact been misled by Clarendon who had failed to tell him of
the intervention of the British ambassador in Paris that had resulted
in Napoleon's abandonment of Drouyn. Thus remaining in office put
Russell in a very anomalous position when subsequently he had to
defend in Parliament a policy he had opposed in the Cabinet. The
year 1855 was a bad one for Lord John.
The Vienna Conference was not formally ended until early June,
but with the resignation of Drouyn and the surrender of Russell it
no longer had any chance of success. On 26 April, just after Russell's
departure, the Allied ambassadors had declared the Russian proposal
for opening the Straits to all fleets as unacceptable. As an alternative
Gortchakov then proposed that the Straits should remain closed, but
that the Porte should reserve the right of inviting the fleets of any
foreign powers to enter 'whenever she should consider her security
menaced'. The Allies also found this alternative unacceptable, but
Buol thought that it was an improvement over the previous Russian
proposal and that it admitted discussion. 48
Buol did not provide a text of the Austrian proposals in writing
until mid-May by which time he had extended them to include the
principle of limitation of the Russian fleet to the number of ships
afloat at the end of the war. If Russia rejected them, as he antici-
pated, then he would formally bring the conferences to a close, but
he did not consider that Austria would be required to take up arms
since the Allies had rejected the previous proposals in which Austria
had indicated the terms under which she would do so. The British
Government decided not to accept these revised proposals, since
Austria was not prepared to make them a casus belli and since, if
Russia refused them, as seemed likely, acceptance now would
weaken the allied position in future negotiations. Palmerston and
Clarendon, however, were anxious to avoid a rupture with Austria,
'for as long as her ultimate course remains at all doubtful,' Palmer-
ston observed, 'she makes a valuable diversion in our favor. ' 49 Clar-
endon feared that Russell and several other ministers might have
qualms about breaking off relations altogether and this was certainly
true of Argyll, who was so despondent that at one point he told his
wife he had almost made up his mind 'to cut the cable'.5 The peace
party in the Cabinet was weak, but it existed and would have been
much stronger if the Peelite ministers had not resigned so quickly.
Despite his earlier apprehension that there was a growing public
demand for peace, Clarendon now declared that the war feeling in
London was on the rise, fanned by rumours of the negotiation of a
'bad peace', by suspicions of Austria, and by the news that the peace
party was 'waxing stronger every day at Paris'. When Walewski
proposed reopening the Conference to invite the Russians to recon-
sider the matter of limitation, the British Cabinet, called to decide
on what Clarendon termed 'these miserable French and Austrian
projects', was 'quite determined not to submit to the humiliation of
begging Russia to reconsider the decision she announced in the
Conference'. Nevertheless they recognised that they could not
separate themselves from France and strenuous efforts were made,
by Clarendon writing directly to Walewski, and the Queen and
Palmerston to Louis Napoleon, putting forward the British
position. 51
Persigny, the new French ambassador, who, in Clarendon's view,
although a great talker had more imagination than his predecessor,
assured the Foreign Secretary that nothing could 'disturb the
alliance'. He admitted that the French Government as well as public
opinion had 'been enervated by a fear of the Emperor's journey to
the Crimea' and consequently converted to the idea of 'paix a tout
prix' as the lesser evil. Nevertheless, he asserted that he and others
had 'always intended to recommence the war in 6 months sur le
Rhine ou autre part, and that the Emperor although he
recommended to [Britain] the last proposals made by Austria hoped
[the British] would refuse them.' 'Well may Cowley say,' Clarendon
sanctimoniously observed to Russell, 'that in politics Frenchmen
cannot distinguish between right and wrong. ' 52
In the end, at 'great sacrifice', according to Walewski, and in order
to maintain harmony between the allies, France agreed to support

Britain in declining the Austrian proposals and winding up the
Conferences. A final meeting was held on 4 June at which Gort-
chakov, while undertaking to refer the Austrian proposals to his
Government, warned that Russia would not be dictated to regarding
the size of her fleet. Consequently the Turkish plenipotentiary
refused to forward them to his Government, the British and French
declined to discuss them further and the Conference was concluded. 53
It had actually ceased to have any real significance by the beginning
of May with the failure of Drouyn and Russell to persuade their
Governments to compromise. 5 4 Since then the centre of interest had
shifted to Westminster.
III PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON WAR AND PEACE
Meanwhile Parliament had become anxious to know what was

happening at Vienna. On 23 April, in reply to a question from
Bright, Palmerston had indicated the virtual breakdown of the
Conference with Russia's refusal to accept the Allied proposals for
limitation or neutralisation in the Black Sea, and a few days later he
undertook to publish the Protocols of the meetings that had taken
place. On the 30th he acknowledged that the Russians had made
some counter proposals that were unacceptable. On the same day
Russell, just returned from Vienna, gave a brief factual summary of
what had happened in reply to a question from Disraeli. Palmerston
refused to make the publication of the Protocols, which were eventu-
ally tabled in mid-May, the subject of an address as Disraeli
demanded, because the negotiations were not yet closed, but only
adjourned sine die. It was for the House to decide when they saw
the papers what they wanted to do. Two members of Parliament
wasted no time in tabling motions, the one, Milner Gibson, regretting
the failure of the Government to accept the Russian interpretation
of the Third Point, the other, A. H. Layard, demanding the vigorous
prosecution of the war. In the House of Lords, Lord Grey also gave
notice of a motion similar to Milner Gibson's. 55
Graham, Gladstone and Cardwell in consultation with Aberdeen
decided to support the Gibson motion, but Herbert, who was not
there at the time and whose heart was always much more in the war,
strongly dissented when he heard of his friends' decision, arguing
that Peelite support for the Manchester School would only drive the
Government into the hands of the war party. Consequently they all
agreed to try to persuade Gibson to withdraw his motion if the
Government could assure them that the negotiations were not closed.
When Milner Gibson's motion came before the House on 21 May
Palmerston, in answer to a question from Herbert of which he had
been given notice, asserted that if any proposal was made 'which
was considered likely to lead to a satisfactory result the [Vienna]
conference would be ready to be reassembled'. (It was a misleading
answer, if technically accurate.) Gladstone then declared that this
put a new light on the situation and urged Gibson to withdraw his
motion which, after a brief debate, Gibson and his seconder reluc-
tantly agreed to do. Disraeli made the most of the occasion,
denouncing Herbert and Gladstone for their temerity and Palmerston
for his pusillanimity and asking the Prime Minister why he placed
the papers on the table if he did not want them discussed. Palmerston
replied that he had provided Parliament with the papers it was
entitled to see, but that he disapproved of the motion because he
'thought it would be shutting the door on future negotiations' (not
an entirely honest explanation) and because it infringed on the func-
tions of the executive. Russell said the Allied representatives were
all agreed that there was no basis of accommodation in the Russian
proposals, but that he expected that the Austrian government would
make further proposals which would either be rejected or lead to
further negotiations. Again this was a misleading statement since the
Cabinet had already decided to reject Buol's proposals. 'The Tories
were furious at the idea of postponement', Palmerston wrote to
Clarendon after the debate, 'because they evidently expected that the
discussion would enable them to establish some shade of difference
between different members of the Government.' He complimented
Russell for speaking 'shortly and discreetly'. 'We studiously
abstained', he dryly observed, 'from any mention or allusion to
recent communications with Austria. '56
In the Lords on 26 May Lord Grey insisted on going on with
his motion, deploring the failure of the negotiations and referring
favourably to the Russian proposal. He made a long and contentious
speech which sounded more friendly to the Russians than to the
Allies and consequently antagonised his hearers on both sides of the
House. The Dukes of Argyll and Newcastle, the Bishop of Oxford
and Lords Clarendon, Derby, Granville and Malmesbury all spoke
against his motion and Lord Lyttelton, Mrs Gladstone's brother-in-
law, alone gave him support ,57
Meanwhile in the Commons on the day after the withdrawal of

Gibson's motion Disraeli expressed his concern over what had taken
place the previous evening. He evinced a disinclination to support
the motion for an 'adjournment of an unusual period' for the Whitsun
recess, without the House getting a clearer understanding of the
country's position 'with regard to the great question of peace and
war' and without some means being taken, to quote his strange
rhetoric, 'by which . . . the heart of the country may be reanimated'.
(Disraeli often sounded like a character from one of his novels and
it must have been difficult sometimes for his followers to take him
seriously.) He proposed to lay resolutions before the House and
persuaded Layard to surrender his time on the following Thursday
for the purpose. He reminded the House that in the summer of
1853 they had accepted the Government's pleas for forbearance and
adjourned without information, only to see the country drift into a
disastrous war. He was determined that this time they should not be
allowed to drift into an 'ignominious peace'. Palmerston compli-
mented Disraeli on his play acting, which he said, to the delight of
his followers, far exceeded the scene that had taken place on the
previous evening, and assured the House that no peace would be
concluded that was not honourable.ss
The Government was sufficiently alarmed by Disraeli's threat to
call a meeting of its followers on the morning of Thursday 24 May.
In his report to the Queen Palmerston made a point of telling her that
Graham and Herbert were among the 220 members who attended the
meeting, as well as Bright and Cobden who were regarded as equally
independent on the radical wing of the party, although on this issue
they held views similar to the Peelites. The Liberals planned to meet
Disraeli's motion with an amendment, to be moved by Sir Francis
Baring, deleting the objectionable words in the motion and replacing
them with an expression of regret at the failure of the Vienna nego-
tiations. Palmerston told the Queen that the majority of Government
supporters attending the meeting seemed to find his explanation
satisfactory, 'but of course', he added, it was 'not to the peace party'.
The former Peelite ministers were not satisfied with the proposed
amendment and were planning with Milner Gibson and Sir William
Heathcote (a liberal conservative and a close friend of Gladstone's)
a sub-amendment introducing their more peaceful point of view. 59
There were also divisions among the Conservatives. A meeting
held at Lord Derby's and attended, it was said, by only a hundred
members of the Opposition was less successful. One of them told
Lord Granville that it was exceedingly stormy and that Disraeli

threatened to resign his leadership of the Conservatives in the
Commons. He was attacked for allying himself with Layard and
Roebuck. 60 That afternoon in the Commons, however, thanks to
the co-operation of Layard, Disraeli introduced his motion, which
criticised the Government's 'ambiguous language and uncertain
conduct ... in reference to the great questions of peace and war',
and promised every support in the prosecution of the war until 'a
safe and honourable peace' was obtained. 61 A lengthy debate ensued
that lasted for six nights until 8 June.
Disraeli, in introducing his resolution on 24 May, made a provoca-
tive speech, full of debating points that do not all stand the passage
of time, but which were calculated to embarrass the Government
and encourage his followers. It was a party political speech, although
Disraeli made a point of saying that it was not. The fact is, as his
official biographer admits, Disraeli had earlier been prepared to
accept a peace settlement. Since the Conference had obviously failed,
however, he was quite prepared to lash out at the Government for
their inept diplomacy and their failure to get on with the war. In
particular he criticised the choice of Russell as a peace envoy, a man
with no experience in diplomatic negotiation, who had just been
responsible for upsetting the Aberdeen Government because it was
not sufficiently warlike. Was this the man, he asked, to play the role
of 'the dove sent out to the troubled waters of Europe'? With some
reason he criticised the Government for its failure to clarify its
position with respect to the issues of war and peace and the abortive
negotiations in Vienna, and shrewdly exploited the differences he
detected in statements of Palmerston and Russell as to the continu-
ation of those negotiations. While critical of the Government's orig-
inal decision to extend the war by the decision to invade the Crimea
he attacked them for believing that you could make war effectively
while carrying on peace negotiations indefinitely. Having determined
on an aggressive war the only course was to pursue it aggressively
and stop wasting time and sapping the national spirit with fruitless
attempts to find a diplomatic solution. He wanted the House 'to
say in distinct language that the time for negotiation' had passed.
Consequently he asked it to support his motion and not to evade
the issue by listening to the 'shabby amendment' behind which the
Government was trying to hide.62
Sir Francis Baring introduced his amendment with no apology,
saying that it was clear that Disraeli was attempting to combine an
address to the Crown in support of the vigorous prosecution of the

war with an attack upon the Government. His amendment accepted
the former but rejected the latter aspect of the motion, but he wished
the House to declare, contrary to Disraeli's expressed desire, 'that
the door to all further negotiations was not shut forever'. 63
Heathcote then rose from the Opposition benches to say that it
was impossible for him to support Disraeli's Resolution because of
its terms and especially because of the speech in which it was intro-
duced. He was more in sympathy with the amendment, but found it
ambiguous and urged Baring to add a clause indicating the House's
desire that the communications in progress might 'arrive at a
successful issue'. He reminded the House that the original object of
the war, the arrest and repulsion of Russian aggression on Turkey,
had been achieved and that the second object, the establishment by
treaty of a system to supercede former treaties and make such
aggression less likely had been largely achieved except for 'one part
of one point' on which there was still disagreement. He went on to
argue that the differences on this one point were not sufficient to
warrant the abandonment of negotiations and so asked Baring to
accept his proposed addition to the amendment. 64 This of course did
not fit in at all with Palmerston's view of the situation and conse-
quently Baring, as Palmerston's agent, ignored the suggestion.
The initial debate on Baring's amendment lasted for two days and
was only concluded at 2.30 am on the morning of 26 May. Five
Conservatives spoke against the amendment and in favour of Disra-
eli's motion, while five supporters of the Government, Russell,
Palmerston, Layard, Lowe and a Radical, Wilkinson, opposed the
original motion and supported Baring. Three Peelites, Gladstone
and two personal friends, J. G. Phillimore and Roundell Palmer,
spoke from the Government benches in support of Heathcote's
pacific proposal. They argued that the original aims of the war had
been achieved, and that the terms the Russians were prepared to
accept were not unreasonable. Gladstone's speech was particularly
powerful, although overlong. It was moderate and carefully
reasoned, based on a close study of published protocols of the Vienna
Conference, contrasting sharply with Disraeli's pyrotechnics. His
approach, however, was an unpopular one at that time, both in the
House and in the country. Russell, who spoke next, while rejecting
Gladstone's argument regarding Russia, complimented him on the
'manner worthy of himself and of this House' in which he had
discussed the question and in a spirit, Russell said, 'totally different
from that of the right bon. Gentleman opposite [Disraeli] who

seemed to lose sight entirely of the great question which ought to
occupy us'. 65
Robert Lowe, an independent Liberal, took a much more warlike
approach and sought to amend Baring's amendment in the opposite
direction to Heathcote by proposing to add a clause tying the failure
of the Vienna Conference to Russia's refusal 'to restrict the strength
of her navy in the Black Sea'. He refused to accept Gladstone's
argument that the objects of the war had been obtained because in
his view such a peace as had been proposed would have given no
security to Turkey. Layard, another independent Liberal, who called
himself a 'no party man', supported Lowe in a strongly anti-Russian
pro-Turkish speech. He rejected the Four Points and vigorously
attacked Russell, whose speeches had been called 'mouthfuls of
moonshine', Gladstone and his friends, who had been silent on these
issues while in office, but were 'so contaminated after sitting a few
nights near the representatives of the school in whose close neigh-
bourhood they had taken their places', and last but not least Palmer-
stan himself, whose accession to office had been such a disappoint-
ment. 'The country was sick at heart', he said, 'not sick of the war
... but they were sick, heartily sick, of those who had the conduct
of the war. ' 66
Palmerston wound up the debate for the Government in a rela-
tively brief speech, but the hour was late and to his annoyance he
was interrupted in the middle by the summons of Black Rod to hear
the Royal assent given to certain bills. (The Lords had finished their
business at an unusually late hour and were not prepared to wait
longer for their Whitsun adjournment.) The Prime Minister rejected
Disraeli's charge of ambiguity and questioned the Opposition's
ability to form a government which the mover of the motions seemed
to wish, although his motion was badly drawn for the purpose. He
spent more effort in refuting the arguments of Gladstone whose
speech he heard 'with admiration, no doubt, but also with consider-
able pain'. For if the party of peace, as he described those who
supported Heathcote's proposed amendment, were to form a govern-
ment, it would be doubtful if any of them would be re-elected to
Parliament. So looking around the House he could see no-one to
replace the present Government which events would soon prove had
fully done its duty. It was not a very powerful speech, but it was a
jaunty fighting one and, according to the Annual Register, was
greeted with much cheering throughout. After a jeering rejoinder
from Disraeli the House divided and supported Baring's amendment

by 319 votes to 219. There were 31 Peelites, including Gladstone,
Graham and Herbert, in the majority and, according to Derby, 21
Conservatives. 67
Lord Derby sent Lord Ellenborough the following interesting
analysis both of the division and of his estimate of party strengths
in the Commons:
For Disraeli's motion Against Disraeli's motion
Conservatives 208 Liberals 298

Ditto pairs 21 Ditto pairs 21
,, tellers 2 , tellers 2
Liberals 11 Conservatives 21
242 342
Excluding the Speaker and allowing for six vacant seats, he put the
total strength of the Conservatives in the House of Commons at
292 with the Liberals at 359, including the Peelites and the Irish
Independents. He explained that he did not count members as
Conservative 'who do not receive notes from Joliffe, and who would
not support a Conservative Government, though they may not always
go with a Conservative opposition'. 68
The division had actually been on the motion to delete the objec-
tionable words in the original motion, but when the second question
was put to insert Baring's additional clause which would have
completed the transformation of the original motion from one of
lack of confidence to one of approbation Lowe proposed his amend-
ment to shouts of 'Adjourn' and 'Divide'. Palmerston said he had
no objection to the first part of Lowe's amendment, which blamed
Russia for the failure of the negotiations, because it was a matter of
fact, but opposed the concluding words which would be an inter-
ference with the prerogatives of the Crown. After some argument
as to the continuation of the debate, the House adjourned at 3.15
am to Monday, 4 June.69
On the very day the Vienna Conference ended, the parliamentary
debate was resumed, nominally on Lowe's proposed amendment
placing the blame for the breakdown of peace negotiations on
Russia's 'refusal to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black
Sea'. The advanced war party supported the amendment with
enthusiasm, but Palmerston, as we have seen, opposed it on the
ground that it 'interfered with the prerogative of the Crown'. The

news that the Vienna Conference was coming to a close, of course,
threw a new light on the debate and forced Heathcote to abandon
his intended amendment. Nevertheless many members were anxious
to express their views on the issues of war and peace and the debate
was continued for another four nights. Some 40 members partici-
pated, 25 from the Government side of the House and 15 from the
Opposition benches. 70 The peace party was in an undoubted
minority, but had 14 spokesmen in the debate, 4 of them from the
Opposition benches,7 1 4 Peelites (Cardwell, Graham, Herbert and
G. E. H. Vernon), the Manchester School triumvirate of Bright,
Cobden and Gibson, an Irish independent and two other Liberals
(Sir Harry Vane and F. Crossley). Eleven other Conservatives
(Disraeli and Walpole were the only front benchers) took the oppor-
tunity of generally criticising the Government to a greater or less
degree, but they were by no means united in their attitude to the
peace negotiations and in their enthusiasm for the war. One
Conservative (J. L. Davies) spoke in open support of the Govern-
ment. Five Liberals of what may be called the advanced war party
(including Roebuck) criticised the Government either for the conduct
of the peace negotiations or of the war itself. Ten speakers on the
ministerial side of the House clearly supported the Government,
opposing Lowe's amendment. These included one Peelite, Lord
Elcho (who said he was unable to support the views of his friend,
Gladstone), one Irish independent (Serjeant Shee), and only three
Cabinet ministers, Palmerston, Russell and, to Cobden's 'astonish-
ment', Molesworth. n
The speeches of Graham and Russell were of particular interest.
Graham pulled the curtain hiding Cowley's secret, noting that it was
rumoured Drouyn had pressed his proposal on the French Emperor
but 'that its rejection took place in consequence of the influence of
the English Government being actively exerted both in London and
in Paris against it', with the result that Drouyn had resigned his office
as Foreign Minister. 'I think', he declared, 'that a golden opportunity
has been lost for securing this [peace on honourable terms] the
greatest of all blessings without the sacrifice of one particle of
national honour. I hear much about fighting for prestige', he
continued. 'I must say that a more dangerous doctrine was never
broached. ' 73
Russell, who followed Graham, was in a very difficult position
since he could not admit that recently he had been inclined to agree
with Drouyn and Buol. He explained the significance of the agree-

ment reached on the first two Points which had been dismissed by
Disraeli as of no importance. He denied that the Russian proposal
of 26 April allowing the Sultan to call up the fleets of his allies 'would
have effected any real difference in the preponderance of Russia in
the Black Sea'. Quoting the Duke of Wellington, an opinion not
lightly ignored, he suggested that Russia in Constantinople might
obtain command of the Mediterranean. This seemed more than
unlikely when Russia in Sebastopol was unable to command the
Black Sea. At this point both he and Palmerston suggested that the
most sensible course would be to adjourn the debate until the proto-
cols of the final meeting of the Vienna Conference could be
published. Disraeli and Bright strenuously objected, however, and
the debate continued for another two nights.74
It finally came to a rather lame end without any division in the
early morning of 9 June. In his concluding speech Palmerston
recommended the negativing of Lowe's amendment and the unani-
mous passage of the main motion as amended by Baring. This course,
Palmerston told the Queen, 'was acquiesced in by Mr Walpole and
Mr Gladstone and was adopted by the House' ,75 a strange conclusion
to such a long and lively debate. The problems of war and peace,
however, remained before the House to the end of the session.
3 Parliamentary Politics in
the Summer of 1855
I THE RESIGNATION OF LORD JOHN RUSSELL
Count Buol was naturally surprised and annoyed at Russell's failure

to make public his support for the Austrian proposals, especially
after Russell's belligerent speech of 24 May. Consequently he sent
a circular to all the Austrian representatives at foreign courts in
which he revealed that the English and French Ministers had given
decided support to his proposals prior to their departure from
Vienna. This of course created a sensation when on being asked in
the House on 29 June Lord John admitted that it was a fact. Milner
Gibson raised the question most inappropriately on 3 July when the
House was considering resolutions to grant annuities to Lord
Raglan's widow and heirs, and returned to it three days later.
Complimenting Russell on his efforts for peace, Gibson asked him
how he could remain in office in the present Government if he still
retained these views. He also asked what were the real views of the
French Emperor and complained about the lack of information and
of any clear declaration of the Government's objects in continuing
the war. It was even said, he claimed, that these included the inde-
pendence of Poland and Hungary .1
Russell quickly denied the last suggestion but agreed that Parlia-
ment was entitled to some explanation of the recently tabled corre-
spondence with the Austrian Government. He dwelt on the extreme
difficulty of prosecuting a war against Russia and also of finding
satisfactory guarantees to justify a peace. He explained the reasons
for objecting to a policy of counterpoise and insisted that the
Austrian and Russian propositions were very different. Although
inferior to the Allied proposal of limitation (rejected by Russia), he
thought the Austrian proposal provided a 'means to concluding the
war with honour' since Austria was prepared to guarantee Turkey's
independence and integrity. However, after giving his statements full
weight the Cabinet had come to the conclusion 'that the peace terms
proposed would not be a safe peace, and that they could not
recommend its adoption'. He insisted that the French Emperor had
57
rejected the proposals before he received the decision of the British

Government, but did not mention the pressure put upon Napoleon
by the British ambassador which Clarendon may never have revealed
to him.z
As for his remaining in the Government he pointed out that he
went to Vienna as a Plenipotentiary, not a Cabinet Minister; in the
latter capacity he yielded to the majority of his colleagues. He
referred to his first resignation and the great difficulty of finding
another ministry, because of the current 'tendency of the public
mind - a tendency much to be feared - to run down all authority'.
Under the circumstances he considered it his duty to support the
Prime Minister, for he believed any more partial changes would be
a misfortune.3
The statement was not well received and some members wasted
no time in taking advantage of the opportunity to respond.
He spoke without a cheer [Lord Broughton commented in his
diary], Cobden answered him very bitterly and Hayter thought
fairly. Palmerston's defence of him was weak .... Le Marchant
told me that Russell spoke with much confidence but he shrank
under Cobden's attack and pulled his hat over his eyes .... We
all agree about Russell's conduct. If I had not known him long
and well and been aware that his overweening self confidence has
given him a morality of his own I should think him a very base
and audacious politician- or else mad. 4
' ... I have never heard a speech which struck me with such astonish-
ment and grief', Cobden told the Commons. 'The noble lord seems
to have abdicated his reasoning faculties', he said, and argued that
it was such conduct that created the lack of confidence in public men
of which Russell complained. If Russell promised to support Count
Buol's propositions, then, Cobden argued, 'he has abandoned his
duty, forfeited his trust, and abdicated the high position he has
hitherto held, by not resigning his seat in the Cabinet when he found
it would not carry out his views'. 5
Palmerston denounced Cobden's practice of discrediting the
honour of statesmen and lectured him on the principle of Cabinet
solidarity. He claimed that after earnest and anxious deliberation
the Cabinet had come to the conclusion that the Austrian proposals
did not promise 'future security' for and the 'reality of peace'. In
reply to Milner Gibson he said: 'The object of the war is to crush
the ambitious designs of Russia in regard to Turkey, to establish a
Parliamentary Politics, Summer 1855 59
state of peace for the security of Turkey, and through Turkey for
the security of Europe. '6
Roebuck predictably agreed with Cobden regarding Russell's
conduct and with Palmerston on the validity of the war. He recog-
nised the need for some compromise within a Cabinet, but not such
a compromise as Russell had made, which was 'inconsistent with all
those principles of political honesty which ought to govern the
conduct of public men'. He went on to rebuke Russell for staying
so long in Aberdeen's Cabinet, allowing an army 'to dwindle into
nothing' when he knew that the conduct of the war was 'in hands
unfitted for the task' .7 It appeared poor Lord John was in the wrong
whatever he did.
Disraeli did not let the opportunity pass. In a speech that
Broughton described as 'coarse and violent' and that Le Marchant
said none of his supporters cheered, he mocked Russell for remaining
in the Cabinet as the Minister of Peace, but recommending 'the
vigorous prosecution of the war in his place in the House'. He
thought the reasons given by Lord John for 'this extraordinary
course' seemed 'no less singular than his conduct' and solemnly
opined that 'the question of peace and war' could not be an 'open
question'. Given the Government's acceptance of the Four Points,
he queried their repudiation of their Plenipotentiary. Sir George
Grey, the only other spokesman for the Government, briefly endeav-
oured to rebut Disraeli's interpretation of what had happened at
Vienna. 8
Russell's speech came as a shock to some of his colleagues as Sir
Charles Wood explained to his cousin Lord Grey with little thought
for Cabinet confidentiality. On 9 July he wrote:
Johnny certainly was demented on Friday night for he said what

left an impression directly the reverse of the fact i.e. that he urged
a peace on certain terms was overruled by his colleagues and
nevertheless remained in office.
He stated certainly an opinion on his first arrival that certain
propositions afforded a prospect of peace but he never pressed
that opinion, on the contrary we had all every reason to suppose
that he had abandoned it, and I was to a certain extent influenced
in my own views by believing that he had abandoned his ....
You may suppose how thunderstruck we all were by his declar-
ation . . . and today he entirely admits the accuracy of the story
which I tell you!!!!!!!!9
Aberdeen told Graham he was not surprised at Russell's 'extraordi-

nary declaration'; 'he had clearly expressed himself to me in the
same terms [he wrote]; but the whole House and even his colleagues
were astonished. I am assured that he never pressed the adoption of
the Austrian proposal in the Cabinet, but only signified his own
personal approval of it.' In a letter to Cobden, Bright claimed: 'it is
known that George Grey, Wood and Lewis and probably Granville
and certainly Argyll were with Lord John for peace' and he suggested
that Gibson 'ought to bring them before the House for a specific
question and see if he cannot break them up also' .1o
The Government now agreed to the publication of despatches
dealing with the final stages of the Vienna Conference, but Palmer-
stan deprecated Clarendon's attempt to tone them down by diplo-
matic omissions, arguing that it was 'most important' to show 'the
firmness of language' used and that they owed 'no delicacy to Austria
after the ill turn which Buol had done us about John Russell' .11
On 10 July Disraeli's friend and colleague, Sir Edward Bulwer-
Lytton, gave notice of a motion of censure on Lord John. 'I think
the move is safe,' Disraeli wrote to Derby. 'We can gain a good
deal: I think we can lose nothing. If we can reduce their majority to
50 it will be a considerable advantage at the end of the session, and
much more is on the cards .... In the present instance the feeling
is strong and general against them.' Two days later Palmerston tabled
the collection of papers entitled 'Communications with the Austrian
Government, 3 April-19 June 1855', and suggested that Bulwer-
Lytton's motion might be postponed to give members time to read
them, a course to which Disraeli objected. 'Really, Sir', Palmerston
responded, 'I think the Right bon gentleman has made "much ado
about nothing" ', and went on to explain the time-table problem.
Bulwer-Lytton, best known for his literary talents, reminded Palmer-
stan that 'Much Ado about Nothing' came just after 'The Comedy
of Errors'. He accepted Palmerston's suggested postponement, but
proposed to turn his motion into a substantive one.12
Faced with Bulwer-Lytton's motion Russell told Clarendon he
thought it best that he should resign, but added: 'I shall however do
as Palmerston and my colleagues think best.' His Cabinet colleagues
remained loyal but many party members outside the Cabinet thought
otherwise. 'I found Brooks's in a state of insurrection', Greville
recorded. The Attorney General told him 'the Liberal party were
resolved to go no further with J. R. and that nothing but his resig-
nation could save the Government'. A group of junior ministers met
and agreed to make a representation to Palmerston, demanding

Russell's immediate resignation. E. P. Bouverie, Vice President of
the Board of Trade, who claimed to be a friend and admirer of Lord
John's, refused to be a party to this manoeuvre, but undertook to
tell him what was afoot. The result was Russell's renewed offer of
resignation which this time was accepted. 'It has become obvious',
Russell wrote to Palmerston, 'that my continuance in office would
only embarrass and endanger your administration. It is for the advan-
tage of the Queen's service, therefore, that I should retire.' Palmer-
stan expressed his regret, but agreed that under the circumstances
this was the right thing to do, telling Russell that resistance would
'only increase irritation' _13
'John Russell has yielded to the storm which has swelled to a
hurricane, and could not be withstood ... ', Palmerston told Clar-
endon. 'Not only all our supporters but nearly all the members of
the Government out of the Cabinet had come to the opinion that
this step was necessary.' Clarendon thought that Russell had 'no
other course open to him' but that the Government would be
damaged. Despite Clarendon's advice to the contrary Palmerston
was prepared to let Russell announce his own resignation in his own
way, but proposed to let the information out to the press prior to
the debate on Bulwer-Lytton's motion, believing, as he told the
Queen, that the knowledge of the resignation would avert defeat.
Indeed when he heard of the resignation Derby wrote to Disraeli
urging the withdrawal of the motion, saying that Russell's colleagues
did not share his views and that 'Clarendon's language throughout
has been such as to do him great credit'. Russell told Palmerston he
intended to make a full statement, but promised to put right 'the fact
about the Cabinet agreeing unanimously not to adopt the Austrian
proposals', which he had failed to do in his previous statement. 14
The next day, 16 July, Russell informed the Commons that his
resignation had been accepted by the Queen. He went on to give a
fuller account of his conduct, so recently under attack, which he
described as 'perverted by malice'. He again acknowledged that he
had promised Count Buol to use his influence 'to secure the accept-
ance of certain Austrian propositions which were to be an ultimatum'.
(The last point had not been made in his previous statement.) 'It is
not true, however. . .', he continued, 'that I engaged to state to the
Cabinet the views I entertained, but it is true I promised to lay those
propositions before the Cabinet in the most favourable manner.'
(Such a fine distinction was worthy of Gladstone.) He admitted that
the Cabinet had rejected the propositions on 30 April, the day after
his return, but explained that 'there were circumstances which arose
in the course of these discussions which made it appear to my mind
impossible to urge the acceptance of these propositions upon the
Government ... circumstances quite independent of the merits of
the propositions themselves, and did not in the least alter my opinion
of the merits of those propositions.' He also said that when he left
Vienna he understood that the propositions would be enforced by
an Austrian ultimatum to St Petersburg and that if a treaty were
concluded Austria would enter an alliance to 'prevent and to resist
any future aggression on the part of Russia against Turkey'. The
Cabinet had concurred, 'some for one reason, some for another', in
Clarendon's despatch of 8 May (which had thrown cold water on the
Austrian proposals and called on her to fulfil her engagements under
the treaty of 2 December). Westmorland's despatch, he explained,
indicated that Austria had no intention of making a Russian rejection
of its ultimatum a casus belli and therefore Her Majesty's Govern-
ment then saw no point to going on, when it was nearly certain
Russia would reject the proposals which were less favourable to the
Allies than those proposed by Drouyn de Lhuys and himself. It
would, however, have been improper, he argued, to have made any
premature announcement, in view of the fact that uncertainty as to
Austria's intentions was tying down a large part of the Russian Army.
He again reiterated his reasons for not resigning in May although he
had offered to do so. A few days ago he had repeated his offer of
resignation which Palmerston was still unwilling to accept, but when
he had found he could not remain with advantage to the Government
he had insisted on going and Palmerston had concurred. Russell said
he was highly appreciative of the way he had been treated by his
Cabinet colleagues, but added that there were other 'friends' who
... when they once perceive
The least rub in your fortunes, fall away
Like water from ye, never found again
But when they mean to sink ye.
These he regarded with contempt but remained impervious to slander
and calumny.ls
Lord Broughton, who listened to the speech in the peers' gallery,
was not impressed. He recorded that Russell spoke 'less audibly than
usual' and that 'he was occasionally cheered- somewhat faintly'.
Perceptively he noted that Russell made no explanation of his change
of mind in the first days of May. Indeed the speech was misleading
from its omissions, but Lord John had great powers of self-deception.
Lord Grey, writing in response to Wood's account, was more severe.
Johnny's conduct [he wrote] has indeed been strange and would
indeed be unaccountable did we not know how he had acted
before ... I am thoroughly convinced on looking at his whole
political career with the light thrown upon it by recent events that
from the first vanity and selfishness have been the only guides of
his conduct.16
The judgement is a harsh one (reflecting as much on Grey as on
Russell) and undoubtedly is exaggerated, but it is not without some
truth. Yet there must have been something about Russell that made
other people, more generous than Grey and with more cause for
hostility, to forgive him, or at least to put up with him in the way
people put up with a spoilt child.
Bulwer-Lytton said that under the altered circumstances he would
make his statement as temperate as possible and then went on to
make one of the most scathing attacks ever delivered by one front
bench politician against another. Lord John, he said, did not seem
to comprehend how his position was viewed by others. Here was a
man who shortly before had broken up a government by his sudden
and solitary desertion 'accompanied by a denunciation of two of his
colleagues so startling, that it was without parallel in the records of
the House'. But he had the good excuse that the question involved
the fate of armies which made it impossible for him to conceal his
sentiments. Then a few months later he brought back from Vienna
'propositions for peace which he did conscientiously recommend as
likely to end the war', yet he turned around and abused the office
he took from the Sovereign 'and the confidence that the people
placed in his honesty and truth', by going with his colleagues in
urging a continuation of the war, excusing himself by saying that he
might have damaged the Government otherwise. The speaker went
on to broaden the attack to include Palmerston who, he declared,
shared the blame and who had failed to keep his promise to adhere
to Lord Aberdeen's foreign policy. He attributed the delay in the
answering of Westmorland's despatch of 19 May to differences in
the Cabinet, suggesting that Russell did not stand alone and that
Clarendon did not represent all the Ministers. He said he would like
to hear the opinion of other ministers, especially of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer (Lewis) and the First Lord of the Admiralty
(Wood). He concluded by saying that he withdrew his motion since

the noble Lord's retirement from office had so far effected its object,
but it had not cancelled his error.17
Palmerston, who followed, briefly declared he had 'never heard a
speech more full of inconsistencies and contradictions' and charged
Bulwer-Lytton with ignoring the point that circumstances had
changed in the few days following Russell's return. (But neither he
nor Russell ever elaborated this point.) 'I am astonished', he said,
'that the han. Gentleman should have condescended to resort to
such a Parliamentary manoeuvre' and yet to talk about insincerity.
He denied that Russell was forced to resign and asserted that the
Government had been quite prepared to face the motion.ls
Disraeli attacked Palmerston for his response to Bulwer-Lytton's
'admirable speech' and asserted that the Resolution had been
levelled against the whole Government. He said he had reason to
believe that the views Russell brought from Vienna were favourably
received by his colleagues, and that nothing but difficulties raised by
France prevented its acceptance. He added that he made the state-
ment on information which he believed 'to be of the highest auth-
ority'. Indeed he was so close to the truth that this seems to have
been the case. He quite likely gleaned the information from French
sources, for he went on to ask whether the French ambassador had
not received a favourable reply from his Government and whether
the Cabinet had not felt for a time that the terms would have to be
accepted.l 9
Gladstone spoke briefly, confining himself to what he had found
in a careful study of the recently tabled despatches. He observed
that the Government had summarily rejected the Austrian proposal
put by their ambassador on 21 April, despite Russell's plea that they
should wait until he could be heard, and that the second Austrian
proposal had apparently been rejected in the week of 30
April-5 May. Yet on 21 May Sidney Herbert had been told that the
Government did 'not consider all the modes of solution of the ques-
tion at issue as exhausted'. He admitted a government's right to
reserve information, but not to mislead. 20
Greville expressed his 'indignation and disgust' at the debate
following Russell's statement, criticising Bulwer-Lytton's speech as 'a
tissue of foul abuse and the grossest and most wilful representations',
Disraeli's as being in the 'same tone' and Palmerston's as being 'very
bad'. Although initially critical of Russell's speech, on reflection he
became more sympathetic on hearing the Duke of Bedford explain
that Lord John could not have resigned on his return from Vienna
because he would have been accused of wishing to trip up Palmerston
in order to 'get his place'.zl
Following Russell's departure, Wood wrote a letter to Palmerston
urging him to strengthen the Cabinet along Whig lines, pointing out
that neither Molesworth nor Lewis were ready speakers, while he
himself had too heavy a departmental load to take on other subjects
with the result that Palmerston had to rely too heavily on George
Grey whose health was poor. He continued:
This is a weak corps. There is the opposite side and on our own
there is the war party and the peace party, the Pee lites and perhaps
Lord John. We really want all the speaking power that we can
raise or enlist. The readiest speaker in this way is Labouchere ....
It is right that I should say to you that I am not very comfortable
at the exclusion of so many of our old friends. Now that Lord
John has gone his place might well be taken by one of them ....
We have had a large infusion of new blood which is alright but
we have not added much weight to the Government. It is imposs-
ible that a Government can go on long losing one after another
of its good men and not adding some weight in the House of
Commons and we have been going through this for much too
long. 22
It was a curious but revealing letter reflecting an old Whig viewpoint,

but the 'large infusion of new blood' was not easily identifiable.
Palmerston replied that he greatly lamented Russell's retirement
'upon private, personal, official and public grounds'. He told Wood
that there was 'a great deal of force' in what he said, but that after
weighing all considerations he had decided to put Molesworth in the
Colonial Office and to replace him at the Board of Works by Sir
Benjamin Hall, who was one of the leading rebels demanding
Russell's resignation.z3
Russell was not impressed by this arrangement. 'I am afraid Moles-
worth's accession to the Colonial Office', he wrote to Clarendon,
'will be considered as a proof that the whole object of abusing me
in the Times was to put him in my place. That newspaper must in
the future be considered not the organ but the organizer of the
Ministry.' He elaborated his views of the 'rascally motives' of The
Times, insinuating that there was a direct line of communication
between the Cabinet and Delane:
Phinn a jackal of that paper [he wrote] is made Secretary of the

Admiralty, Molesworth an intimate friend to the editor Secretary
of State, a place was intended for Lowe, a constant contributor
[it was announced shortly afterward]. . . . These are not matters
of indifference in the government of an Empire; they are lowering
very fast the character of the administration and will stain all who
belong to it.24
Russell's tone was somewhat hysterical and he was obviously
smarting from the wound to his injured pride. His charges were
undoubtedly exaggerated, but not without an element of truth for,
in his letter to Wood, Palmerston had dwelt on the advantages of
getting Lowe (who wrote regularly for The Times). 'He is a man of
evident ability', he had written, 'and is a ready and good speaker,
and would be a link for other support. ' 25
Lord Minto, Russell's father-in-law, told Russell that he thought
that there were 'symptoms in the country against the mischievous
influence of the Times, and the excess of administrative meddling of
the House of Commons'. He also gave Lord John some fatherly
advice in view of all that had happened, warning him against allowing
himself to be put forward again as a party leader.
I have no doubt [he wrote] that it may be very true that many
may look to you as leader of the Whigs - that is to say as a name
under which they may seek shelter when discomfitted. But in the
first place as a party are [we] to look for the Whigs? and secondly
in talking of you as the leader, do you believe they are ready to
follow and not to goad you on before them in their own dirty
roads? 26
II THE REPORT OF THE SEBASTOPOL COMMITTEE
The Sebastopol Committee had completed its hearings towards the

end of May; ' ... no ill consequences have come of it', Greville
commented, 'and the evidence has benefited instead of injuring both
the Government and those who were most bitterly abused, especially
Hardinge and Newcastle, about the latter of whom there has been
a considerable reaction of opinion'. A few weeks later the Report
was completed and presented to the House of Commons on 18 June.
The Committee had accumulated a mass of evidence published in
three volumes, but was only able to interrogate witnesses who were
in England, including some officers who had returned from the

Crimea. Lord Aberdeen, the Duke of Newcastle, Sir James Graham
and Sidney Herbert had been called as witnesses, but not Lord
Palmerston, who as Home Secretary had been responsible for the
militia, and who, with Lord John Russell, had played a major role
in policy making with respect to the war. 27
The evidence was inevitably incomplete, some of it would have
been inadmissable in a court of law, and many of those maligned
were unable to appear in their own defence. Moreover, all matters
involving relations with their French ally were regarded as outside
the scope of the Committee's inquiry. Roebuck was himself incapable
of drafting a satisfactory report and so this task was taken on by
Lord Seymour, a Whig peer and heir to the Duke of Somerset, who
produced a draft which was, in the opinion of Lord Stanmore, 'on the
whole judicious and temperate' in tone. 28 The Chairman, however,
proposed an additional paragraph which was only adopted by his
casting vote (a double vote according to Stanmore). It attributed the
sufferings of the army mainly 'to the circumstances under which
the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken and executed'. The
administration was blamed for ordering it without adequate infor-
mation as to the strength of the fortresses or the resources of the
country and for failing to make preparation for a winter campaign
since they expected an early success. 29 An earlier sentence proposed
by Roebuck, which contained a sweeping censure of all concerned
from the Commander-in-Chief down, was rejected by all the
members of the Committee with the exception of Layard. 30 This is
referred to obliquely in the speeches of some of the Committee
members in the subsequent debate.
Roebuck gave notice of a motion which asserted that 'the conduct
of the Administration was the first and chief cause of the calamities
that betel [the] army' and which censured 'with severe reprehension
every member of the Cabinet whose counsels led to such disastrous
results' .31 The Duke of Newcastle, who was about to leave England
to visit the Crimea, thought the Roebuck motion would be 'a flash
in the pan', but Lord Aberdeen took a more serious view of it and
urged him to postpone his departure on the grounds that it would
be misconstrued. Newcastle, however, refused to do so for more
than a day or two. As it was, the debate on the motion was postponed
several times and did not begin until 17 July. This gave the other
censured ministers time to reflect on its possible consequences and
to discuss what course they should take. Gladstone was inclined not
to vote on the motion, but Herbert and Graham thought otherwise.

The former advocated attacking the errors and misconduct of the
committee such as
their leading questions, their acceptance of gossip and hearsay
evidence, ... their bullying Old Bailey tone to Dr. Menzies and
the small fry contrasted with their civility to Newcastle, etc.; ...
their condemnation of Dr. Hall, who is unheard; ... their depar-
ture from the evidence in some respects in their Report, and their
condemnation implied of everything which, however successfully
done, was a departure from routine and office forms. 32
There was some difference of opinion among the Conservatives as
to whether they should support the Roebuck motion. Disraeli was
keen to do so and before he left London Derby settled with him,
'without any communication with the rest of the party', according to
Malmesbury, to turn out the Government on it. Stanley, on the
other hand, addressed a paper to Disraeli strongly arguing against
any official Conservative support of the motion.33
Roebuck opened the debate. 34 The 'first and chief cause of the
calamities which befell' the Army, he claimed, was the decision of
the Government to undertake the invasion of the Crimea without
adequate information and without making provisions for 'a
protracted struggle'. Aberdeen and Newcastle, he said, were
excluded by the resolution of the House (presumably because they
belonged to the other House), but he proceeded to lay the blame
on those whom he called the important members of the Cabinet,
Palmerston, Russell, Graham, Gladstone and Herbert; the rest were
sheep who followed the leaders. (Excluding the peers, this left Moles-
worth, Lewis and Wood as the sheep.) He went on to indict them
on six charges: they had failed to make due preparations when war
was imminent to meet contingencies they must have known to be
certain; they took no steps to provide a reserve before the expedition
was undertaken; they entrusted the task to incapable persons (this
charge was no longer popular following the tragic death of Lord
Raglan at his post in the field); they took insufficient steps to gain
necessary information regarding the Crimea; they failed to make
adequate preparations for land and sea transport; and finally the
medical provisions were incomplete and insufficient. He singled out
Palmerston for blame for failing to take necessary steps with respect
to the militia as a source of reserves. He charged that the Cabinet
had not met for the two critical months from early August to early
October and that only three or four ministers had remained in

London. (At this point Gladstone interjected: 'Quite untrue.')
Where, asked Roebuck, was Russell; where was Palmerston, where
were they all when the battle was being fought? 'The Army dwindled
away .... You were not at your posts to administer to their wants',
he cried. (This charge was easily refuted since the first autumn
Cabinet was held on 8 October before the serious hardships began.)
He asked the House whether it would 'stand idly by and witness
such a dereliction of duty'. 'The thought', he said, 'is monstrous - it
makes my blood boil.' He accused them of sending out an army
armed with the weapons of thirty years ago, notably the Brown Bess.
(General de Lacy Evans, a returned officer who was in the House,
corrected him, saying that only one fifth of the force was so armed.)
Lord Aberdeen and his friends had been driven from office,
Roebuck said, but all the guilty ministers should be punished, those
who still sat on the Treasury benches. He then went on to every-
body's amazement to speak kindly of the Peelite service ministers
who had left office. The Duke of Newcastle, he said, had been made
a scapegoat. 'He acted according to the best of his ability; he was
always at his post; and he was ever intent upon the honour of
England and the welfare of the Army which was submitted to his
care.' The blame heaped on him was 'an act of injustice'. The same
was true of Sidney Herbert, of whom he said:
No man could have been more intent than that right hon.
Gentleman had always been upon the honour of his country and
on performing the duties of his office. I do not mean that he did
not often do wrong. I think he did; but then I draw the distinction
between him and other members of the Administration, that he
was conscientiously endeavouring to perform his duty and was
always at his post, and his kindliness of spirit was always pervading
the office to which he belonged.
As for Sir James Graham, Roebuck thought he made some mistakes,
for instance in building large ships of war instead of marine batteries
(a charge rejected by Palmerston), 'but at the same time there was
about him a desire to do his duty that does not appear to me to have
been evinced by the. other Members of the Administration'. It was
no satisfaction, he said, that these men were out. 'I want all who
have done wrong to be out.' It was a matter of complete indifference
to him if the result was a transfer of power to the other side of the
House. All he wanted was 'justice'!35
It was an extraordinary speech. The speaker had ample ammu-

nition from his committee's Report but he shot it off ineffectively,
by so exaggerating the charges as to make rebuttal easy, and in the
end by appearing to contradict himself in his chivalrous remarks
about the Peelite ministers and to make it appear that it was the
present Ministry and not the Aberdeen one that was under attack.
Yet this was the man who had brought down one government and
was now threatening another in the middle of a war! Perhaps he
thought that he should have been offered office.
Roebuck was followed by General Peel, brother of the late Sir
Robert and an independent Conservative, who had been a member
of the Committee. As an amendment he moved the previous ques-
tion, saying that he had voted against the paragraph in the Report
on which the Resolution was based, because he did not agree on the
condemnation of the policy of sending an expedition to the Crimea.
In war if you never acted without full information, he argued, nothing
would ever be done. 'No great object', he said, 'can be gained
without running some risk.' Indeed a sudden assault on Sebastopol
at the beginning might have been successful. Action was necessary
to raise morale in the army and public opinion demanded action.
He claimed that the Government undertook the task with insufficient
means owing to the reduced state of the establishments. They were
unwise to give way to the cry raised in the House, throughout the
country and in the press, but he would not condemn them on that
ground since their motive was to win the war and he preferred that
to the more peaceful spirit evinced by some Ministers. He went on
to criticise the conduct of the House 'in constantly interfering with
the executive Government' and to complain of an army in the field
being harassed by a host of newspaper reporters. He was seconded
by Lord Robert Cecil (the future Lord Salisbury), who noted the
inconsistency in Roebuck's speech which 'had reference almost
entirely to the misdeeds of the present Government'. He pointed
out that Roebuck spoke of Sidney Herbert as a perfect model
statesman and yet included him in the motion. 'The gentlemen whom
they now proposed to censure', Cecil argued, 'were not chargeable
with anything more than errors of judgement. ' 36
If Disraeli had been hoping to beat the Ministers on Roebuck's
motion these two speeches in favour of the saving amendment made
from his own side of the House assured its defeat. The Ministers
who had been attacked scarcely needed to speak. General Peel had
often voted with the Peelites over the years, but he now identified
himself as a follower of Disraeli and made it clear he spoke with no

party motives.
After five or six other members had spoken, Sir James Graham
finally rose to say that he had been waiting for some member of the
Government to speak to indicate the course they had decided to
take. He said that he did not think the evidence substantiated the
motion, but that it was not proper to ignore the Report of a
Committee appointed by a large majority of the House by carrying
the previous question. By the admission of the Committee itself the
inquiry had been incomplete and consequently unsatisfactory. The
Committee had considered the broader allied strategy as unsatisfac-
tory and yet condemned the inadequacy of the British force. He
himself intended to oppose the amendment even though the result
on the main motion might be adverse and rose merely to explain his
vote.3 7
Lord Seymour spoke briefly to explain his differences with
Roebuck and to point out that Roebuck's resolution departed from
the Report by laying the sole blame for what went wrong on the
Administration, whereas the Report had said the sufferings of the
troops were aggravated by 'dilatory and insufficient arrangements'.
He also objected to Graham's stand by saying 'if there was no
evidence for condemnation, how could there be evidence for
acquittal?' He considered Roebuck's motion as pointless; 'if the
Government were prepared hereafter', he said, 'to attend to the
wants of the army with earnestness and zeal the country would be
willing to forget and forgive all that had recently taken place. '38
Seymour was followed by Sir John Pakington, another member of
the Committee and the first spokesman from the Opposition front
bench, who said that he too had been waiting for the Government
to state its position. He applauded Graham's manliness in refusing
to hide behind a vote on the 'previous question'. Last night the
Government had sacrificed a member to avoid a vote of censure.
What would they do tonight? He denied that the Report was incom-
plete or unsubstantiated and claimed that the attack upon the Crimea
'violated every rule of war every dictate of prudence'. He would
support Roebuck's motion with great reluctance, regretting that he
must censure not only H. M. Ministers to whom he was politically
opposed, but others, ex-ministers of high character. 39
In a brief speech Sir Charles Wood denied that the Government
feared to meet either Milner Gibson's or Roebuck's motions, but
said they supported the amendment for the reasons given by General
Peel, namely that the enquiry was not and could not have been
complete, the same reason for which they had opposed the appoint-
ment of the Committee. On a motion for adjournment Palmerston
said that he had hoped to conclude the debate in one evening, but
on pressure from Bright and Disraeli, who blamed the adjournment
on the failure of the Ministers to speak earlier, he agreed to it. 40
When the debate was resumed two days later the Attorney
General (Cockburn) made a spirited defence of his chief, Lord
Palmerston. Lord John Russell said that every member of the Aber-
deen administration, including the Home Secretary, was responsible
for the expedition and its conduct as long as he remained in office.
He pointed out that the motion of Roebuck (a Radical), would
disqualify them all from office and turn over the Government to the
party which had opposed Catholic Emancipation, the Reform Act
and the repeal of the Corn Laws. He also noted various inconsisten-
cies and contradictions in Roebuck's speech as did so many other
speakers and in particular the impossibility of judging the sufficiency
of the force and the wisdom of Raglan's actions without considering
the role of the French Government and the French army. He vigor-
ously defended the decision to invade the Crimea in view of the
general situation. The risks of war had to be taken and an early
victory might easily have been achieved. He made it clear that his
criticism was not of the deficiencies of individuals but of the weak-
nesses of the military organisation. 'It was not that the Duke of
Newcastle was deficient in the conscientious discharge of his duties,
or that he was not a most laborious Minister', he said; 'on the
contrary I believe that he was both conscientious and laborious and
... a man of sound judgement. But it appeared to me that he did
not have sufficient authority .... ' Nevertheless despite the defects
in organisation great activity was shown in despatching all that was
required to the Crimea. A 'fine army' had been sent out at the
beginning of the war which was initially successful in battle and it
was not fair to condemn Lord Aberdeen's administration because of
'the various accidents and the various fortunes which befall warlike
expeditions'. As for the lack of Cabinet meetings he argued that no
important decisions were required from mid August to early October
when the first full reports of operations were beginning to come in. 41
John Bright said that he had not voted for the Committee because
he thought that Roebuck's original motion was something of a
conspiracy against Aberdeen and his Peelite colleagues. But now
there was a Report before the House that could not be ignored. He
defended Roebuck's speech against the criticism of Russell and asked

why the present Ministers, and especially the Prime Minister, should
escape blame. It was not one of Bright's better speeches - he said
he would only speak for a few minutes, but he managed to fill sixteen
columns of Hansard without saying very much. Sir de Lacy Evans,
a Peninsular veteran who had returned from the Crimea where he
had commanded the 2nd Division, thought Roebuck's censure too
sweeping, but did not think the Report could be ignored as Peel's
amendment proposed. His main criticism was the failure of the Minis-
ters to provide sufficient reinforcements to carry on the war with
Russia, and he pointedly asked why use had not been made of the
Queen's army in India. 42
Sidney Herbert made one of the fullest defences of the censured
Ministers. Like Graham he refused to take refuge in Peel's amend-
ment and said the Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry had every
right to test the opinion of the House. He proceeded, however, to
tear Roebuck's arguments to pieces, pointing out that the Allied
army was a single force and that it was impossible to make judge-
ments without considering the whole. He noted various contradic-
tions between charges in the Report and evidence contained in the
appendices and asserted that there was more evidence in existence
than the Committee asked for. He was particularly critical of the
insinuations that were made in the Report against people who had
not the opportunity to defend themselves. He claimed that the
Report's assertions regarding lack of provisions and of reserves were
incorrect, and that 10,000 men (admittedly rather young) had been
sent when Raglan asked for them. He noted that the Report had
taken no notice of the Duke of Newcastle's establishment of a Land
Transport Corps and of a separate hospital staff, changes incorrectly
attributed by the Attorney General to Lord Panmure who had
himself given credit to his predecessor. He denied that the Ordnance
Corps had been dilatory in sending out huts, clothing and stores, but
admitted that there had been delays in shipping arrangements. He
did not deny that great errors had been committed, but submitted
that it was impossible for the government at home to make a full
defence while quite properly an inquiry had not been made in the
field. As to the decision to invade the Crimea he noted that it had
been made six weeks before The Times demanded it - so much for
being led by public opinion as Bright had charged. Moral certainty
was impossible in making decisions of war, but all considerations
made it a wise one. 43
Palmerston made a short speech towards the end of the debate,

re-emphasising the contradictions in the arguments of Roebuck and
of his supporters. He said it was 'one of the most extraordinary
Motions that have ever been made' in Parliament. He asked to where
else but the Crimea might the army have gone? Should it have gone
'wandering off through the vast steppes of the interior of Russia'?
He was prepared to take his full share of responsibility, denied that
the preparations were inadequate and asserted that the Duke of
Newcastle had done everything possible. No army, he claimed, had
ever left the shores of this country in so short a period 'so well
equipped, so perfectly organized in every respect'. Nor had reinforce-
ments been neglected; fifty regiments of militia had been embodied
between April and December 1854 which had produced 18,000
recruits for the regular army. Why should the present government
be attacked when the army was in fine condition; there were not the
slightest grounds for impeachment. Surely if parties were blamed for
doing wrong they might be praised for doing right. The public was
not likely to approve of the time wasted on such debates. It was
more important to get on with the war! 44
Disraeli attacked both the tone and the arguments of Palmerston's
speech and contrasted the Prime Minister's cheery picture of the
state of the army with that presented by Sir de Lacy Evans. He said
the motion was not a party one and chided Palmerston for taking
refuge in the previous question instead of facing it head on as Herbert
and Graham were doing.45
The Opposition speakers were almost evenly divided, six opposing
the previous question and five supporting it, but the Liberals were
also divided with seven supporting and four opposing the previous
question. The four Peelites who spoke divided evenly, two on either
side, but of course Graham and Herbert did not oppose the previous
question in order to support Roebuck as did the other opponents.
In the ensuing vote 289 supported the previous question and 182
opposed it. The four former Peelite ministers, Cardwell, Gladstone,
Graham and Herbert were in the minority along with 57 Liberals and
120 Conservatives. Many Conservatives and 24 Peelites (or former
Peelites) were in the majority.46
Palmerston, in reporting the Government victory, as it was
regarded, to the Queen, remarked that 'A great many of the most
respectable of the Conservatives voted with the Government, as did
almost all the Peelite Party excepting the four leaders. ' 47
There was undoubtedly much room for debate on the Crimean
situation as revealed in the Report and its evidence, although the

defendants were quite right in arguing that the evidence was inevi-
tably incomplete. They were also justified in claiming that the orig-
inal expedition had been well equipped, but they were less happy in
trying to defend the lack of foresight and mismanagement that
followed. The heaviest charge against both Governments was
undoubtedly the failure to supply a sufficient stream of trained
reinforcements, a problem we shall return to in the next chapter.
Gladstone had given a silent vote on the Roebuck Report, but since
their resignation from office he had been by far the most vocal of
the four former Peelite ministers in the Commons and had spoken
as often as the other three combined. 48 In addition to the great issues
of peace and war he took his usual independent line on related issues
that interested him such as the repayment provisions for a new war
loan, new proposals for administrative reform and the Government's
proposals for a Turkish loan.49
The mismanagement and inefficient conduct of the war effort inevi-
tably produced a demand for administrative reform on the part
of business-minded middle classes who blamed it on aristocratic
inefficiency. In 1855 this was reflected outside of Parliament in the
activity of the recently founded Administrative Reform Association
and in the Commons by radicals such as Layard, independent
Liberals such as Lowe, and independent Conservatives such as
Bulwer-Lytton. 50 As the promoter of Civil Service reform when he
was a minister Gladstone was prepared to support reasonable
demands for administrative reform, while not necessarily agreeing
with all the charges of the reformers.
On 15 June Layard invited the House of Commons to support a
motion attributing the sorry state of the country which threatened
national discredit and great disasters to 'the manner in which merit
and efficiency have been sacrificed, in public appointments, to party
and family influence, and to a blind adherence to routine'. While
many members must have sympathised with the sense of frustration
that led to the making of this motion, few would have been prepared
to go so far and in such a negative direction. Consequently an
amendment was proposed by Sir Bulwer-Lytton, from the Oppo-
sition front bench, which substituted for Layard's harsh language a
resolution urging upon the ministers a careful revision of establish-
ments, the introduction of 'judicious tests of merit', and the removal

of obstruction to fair promotion.s 1
While welcoming the feelings which prevailed in and out of the
House regarding the need for civil service reform, which he himself
had promoted so zealously as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Glad-
stone thought that Layard was too ready to blame the aristocracy.
On the other hand, misjudging Bulwer-Lytton's intention, to his
later regret he criticised the latter's alternative wording, which,
however, was accepted by the Government after La yard's version
was defeated by a large majority.s 2
Gladstone also took a lead in opposing a proposed guarantee to
a Turkish war loan which only passed the Committee of the Whole
by three votes with Graham, Herbert and Cardwell joining him,
Cobden and various Radicals in the Opposition lobby. He continued
such interventions to the end of the session and, although they
were generally well thought out, he was only making himself more
unpopular than ever in the existing climate of opinion. When the
session finally ended early in August he withdrew to Hawarden to
lick his wounds and, as he told Aberdeen, to enjoy the happiness of
home, 'reading Homer about the Sebastopol of old times, and all
manner of other fine fellows'. 53
The Duke of Newcastle had stood rather apart from his old friends
since the resignation of the Aberdeen ministry and had not normally
taken part in their frequent consultations since that time. In July he
had left England in his private yacht to visit the Black Sea theatre
of operations and while there sent Clarendon long and interesting
accounts of the military situation. In replying Clarendon expressed
his strong views on public affairs at home. 'I am sure', he wrote,
'you will have been as much disgusted as myself with the proceedings
in Parliament and the revolting rivalry among men who should know
better.' He was particularly critical of the attitude of some of the
Peelites in the Commons. In lighter vein he said that he would not
'send coals to Newcastle by writing about the siege', but he then
went on to talk gloomily about the prospect of another winter in the
trenches and the inadequacy of the English and French generals.
Much of what Clarendon wrote was unfair to the Peelites but it was
not surprising since it may be presumed that he believed in the policy
that he and Palmerston were following, and in the end it worked
out better than might have been expected. 54
The session of 1855 had been a traumatic one for the former
Peelite Ministers. Within a week of the reopening of Parliament
towards the end of January they had been forced to resign office.
Within another few weeks three of the Peelites who had accepted
Cabinet offices in Palmerston's ministry and six who had accepted
other offices had again resigned. Their position was an anomalous
one since they had resigned on the appointment of the Roebuck
committee which had been supported by the Opposition. It is true
that they were suspicious of Palmerston's intentions with regard to
the war, but they still sat on the Government side of the House, and
received the Government whip. They had no connection with the
official Opposition and more often than not supported the Govern-
ment in the division lobbies, most of them fairly faithfully. As the
session developed it was clear that with respect to the question of
peace their position was similar to that of the Manchester School on
the left wing of the Liberal party, a position that was partly shared
by some independent members of the Conservative Opposition.
Gladstone saw no objection to working with Milner Gibson and his
friends but Herbert abhorred it. The Peelites were no longer a
cohesive group. Indeed seven still held government appointments,
two in the Cabinet, and for all intents and purposes those Peelites
had now identified themselves as orthodox party members; even
most of those who held aloof from the Government may now be
regarded as independent Liberals. Liberal governments were well
used to having to put up with a dissident or independent tail.
t
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Map 1 The Black Sea

4 The Crimean Campaign
of 1855 to the Death of
Raglan
I THE NEW ADMINISTRATION: PALMERSTON,
PANMURE AND THE CRIMEAN COMMISSIONS
The Crimean campaign is a familiar story, but generally told out of

its political context. Our concern in this chapter will be to consider
the overall direction of military affairs by the new team of Palmerston
and Panmure, the steps taken to restore military efficiency, the
unhappy leadership of Lord Raglan, the fruitless Allied debates over
military strategy, and the disappointing course of the campaign of
1855 to Raglan's death at the end of June.
The terrible sufferings of the first Crimean winter following the
hurricane of November 1854 continued into January of 1855, but by
the end of that month the living conditions of the troops were begin-
ning to show some improvement with the arrival of warm clothing
and of other supplies replacing those lost in the autumn storm. The
distribution of supplies from the port of Balaclava was, however,
still slow and uneven and the building of adequate hutments was not
completed before the winter weather began to abate. In fact, most
of the major steps to ensure recovery had been taken before the
Aberdeen Government fell and the change in administration did not
greatly affect the situation. 1 Palmerston did indeed take a closer and
more active interest in the conduct of the war than did Aberdeen
and his letter books for the period remind one a little of the barrage
of memos with which Churchill bombarded his staff and his
colleagues in the Second World War almost a century later. 'I am
afraid that among military and naval men there is too great a dispo-
sition to object to and set aside everything that they are not already
used to,' he wrote to the Lieutenant-General of Ordnance on one
occasion, 'but this sticking to the beaten track must be given up,
unless we mean to be beaten also.' Like Churchill, he was fascinated
by the possibilities of new inventions, whether it be for a 'submarine
vessel', a 'floating battery' or a new type of mortar; 'we are squan-
79
dering millions in unemployed transports, in shying millions of shot

and shell at earthen banks and stone walls, in all kinds of local
blunders and mismanagement by subordinate officers at home and
abroad', he wrote to Panmure on one occasion, 'and I cannot think
it unwise to risk a sum of about ten thousand pounds in an exper-
iment [with a new mortar] which if it succeeds would give us a very
important weapon of war.' Panmure, however, was no improvement
over Newcastle, nor do his colleagues seem to have thought so,
although he may have had a better rapport with the military. 2
Fox Maule was born in 1801 and succeeded his father as second
Baron Panmure in 1852. He had taken a commission in 1819 and
served twelve years before retiring with the rank of captain. He
was elected to Parliament in 1835, served as an under-secretary in
Melbourne's second administration and as Secretary at War under
Russell, entering the Cabinet in 1849. He was one of the Whigs
passed over in the formation of the Aberdeen coalition. Panmure
took over the War Office in 1855 with a lifetime of military and
political experience behind him, but he lacked his predecessor's great
industry and was hampered by severe attacks of gout. Indeed, his
Whig colleagues generally seemed to have respected Newcastle,
perhaps because he was so industrious and a duke with liberal views
and an historic Whig title. Panmure, often referred to as Mars, they
seemed to regard as a figure of fun, although on one occasion he
had a violent quarrel with Palmerston that almost led to his resig-
nation. Sir G. C. Lewis, who had entered the Cabinet at the same
time, later told Greville that he 'was much struck with the mediocrity
of Panmure, who was one of the dullest men he ever knew'. Granville
told him the same thing 'and that he was by far the least able man
in the Cabinet and as bad as possible as Minister of War- prejudiced,
slow and routinier. '3 'It is evident,' Greville commented, 'that New-
castle was a much abler man.' Nevertheless, despite his failings,
Panmure had a certain native shrewdness that comes out in some of
his letters to Raglan.
On 16 February Palmerston and Panmure had presented the new
Government's military plans to Parliament to indicate that no time
had been wasted in getting down to the business of conducting the
war and making the necessary changes to ensure improvements in
the Crimea. The Ordnance was to be reorganised, the civil business
and the Ordnance departments being put immediately under the
The Crimean Campaign to the Death of Raglan 81
War Secretary, while the discipline and patronage of the Artillery

and the Engineers were to be placed under the Commander-in-Chief.
A commission of three civilians was to be sent out to examine the
sanitary conditions in the hospitals, in the camp and on the ships in
the Black Sea theatre. A corps of labourers was to be recruited in
Turkey to proceed to clean up the camp, to quote Palmerston, 'to
cleanse it from that accumulation of various things, which every man
who knows anything of the habits of a camp ... must know are
perpetually accumulating'. Sir John McNeill, a civil servant and
former diplomat, was to head a commission to examine commissariat
and port arrangements in the Black Sea theatre. Major General
James Simpson, a veteran of the Peninsular War, of Waterloo and
of service in India, was to go to the Crimea as Chief of Staff,
a European concept now being introduced into the British army,
apparently in an attempt to force Raglan to deal with his Quarter-
master and Adjutant Generals more effectively, for he still refused
to admit that they were responsible for the disastrous defects in army
administration in the Crimea. It was hoped that Raglan would accept
his new Chief of Staff's advice and that it would be the advice the
Ministers were looking for. A chief Engineering Officer, General H.
D. Jones (1791-1866), was being added to Raglan's staff immedi-
ately, and old General Burgoyne who had only gone to the Crimea
in an advisory capacity was being recalled. A new convalescent
hospital was to be set up at Varna on the coast of the Black Sea in
Bulgaria and civilian medical men recruited to staff it. Provision was
also being made for a regular hospital ship service between Scutari
and England to bring more serious cases home to recuperate. Legis-
lation was to be introduced to raise the recruiting age for the army
and to permit short-term enlistments to encourage recruitment.
Palmerston also announced that the First Lord of the Admiralty had
set up a Board to superintend the transport service, indicating that
since France had greater military and Britain greater naval resources,
Britain would convey French as well as British troops while France
would supply a greater proportion of the total. A separate depart-
ment of land transport had also been established. 4
The previous autumn the Aberdeen Government had appointed
a Hospital Commission, the Report of which was published on 23
February. The Commissioners found many deficiencies, but noted
the extremely valuable services of Florence Nightingale and her
nursing sisters. They made various recommendations for improve-
ments and seemed to think that conditions had already begun to

improve since they left.S The two new commissions received their
instructions from Lord Panmure on 19 February and proceeded
immediately to the theatre of operations.
Sir John McNeill (1795-1883), a Scottish surgeon and Poor Law
Commissioner, and Colonel A. M. Tulloch (1803-64) were directed
'to inquire into the whole arrangement and management of the
Commissariat Department'. They remained in the Crimea until the
end of the year, making an interim report in June and a final one in
January 1856. Their Reports confirmed in detail how the supply
system had broken down in the face of the unforeseen difficulties
with which it was faced. Commissary General Filder was evidently
lacking in imagination, unwilling to depart from specified procedures
and to find local substitutes for lost rations, but it was surely the
responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff to see that
such necessary action was taken. The situation was, of course,
improving greatly by the time that the Commissioners made their first
Report. Their presence in the Crimea and their constant prodding
probably did some good, but their restrained criticisms of some
senior officers led to no obvious consequences, beyond the retire-
ment of Filder later that summer. Indeed, when the two Reports
were published early in 1856 the protests of these officers led to the
appointment of a Board of General Officers which largely exonerated
them. 6
Dr John Sutherland's Sanitary Commission remained in the
Crimea until the end of the war and made thorough examinations
of the state of the hospitals on the Bosphorus and in the Crimea as
well as into the sanitary conditions in the camp. They found many
glaring deficiencies in the hospitals and gave immediate instructions,
as they had been authorised, regarding what had to be done, with
the result that marked progress was made in decreasing the mortality
rate. They found deplorable sanitary conditions in the Balaclava
area, especially in the harbour which was one huge cesspool but
gradually these were cleared up and as a result the general condition
of the camp and health of the troops into the second winter were
greatly improved. The appointment of the Sanitary Commission was
undoubtedly of much value despite the shortcomings of senior
medical officers who were not replaced. Indeed Florence Nightingale
asserted that the Sanitary Commission 'saved the British Army'. 7
II PROBLEMS OF COMMAND, REINFORCEMENTS AND

PLANNING
Several weeks before leaving office Newcastle had sent Raglan a

very stiff despatch recommending the replacement of Generals
Estcourt and Airey (his Adjutant General and Quartermaster
Genera!) and demanding an explanation of the reports of 'neglect
or inefficiency' which were flowing in from all sides. No reply had
been received before the Government changed. Within a week of
taking office Panmure addressed an official despatch to Raglan
recalling their long and cordial service together and declaring how
painful it was for him now to have to comment on conditions in the
Crimean army and to require explanations, for they had as yet
received no reply to Newcastle's despatch. Like Newcastle he
complained of Raglan's failure to keep the Government 'acquainted
in a clear and succinct manner, with the operations' and wanted to
know why better communications had not been maintained with the
port of Balaclava, why clothing and medical supplies had not been
distributed and why fresh vegetables had not been obtained from
local sources. He suggested that Raglan had been ill-served by his
staff and that Generals Airey and Estcourt should be replaced. He
told Raglan that it had been decided to send out General Simpson
as a Chief of Staff who was to 'superintend the whole routine of staff
duties' and who would 'test the capabilities of any officer on the
general staff of the Army', and report those whom he considered
unfit. Above all he insisted that Raglan should lose no time in
forming a corps of scavengers to carry out the 'purification and
cleansing of the camp'. 8 This despatch was softened by an
accompanying private letter in which Panmure reiterated his 'strong
advice' that Raglan should get a 'more energetic and efficient officer'
than Airey seemed to be. 'The public are roused', he explained, 'and
the House of Commons has already sacrificed two victims to their
disappointment in the persons of Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of
Newcastle.' He appealed to Raglan not to push too far his 'chivalrous
feeling' that induced him to protect his subordinates. He went on to
warn Raglan that unless he got rid of Airey and Estcourt 'they will
be swept away by Ellenborough, who will succeed me as War
Minister should Lord Derby come in'. He complimented Raglan on
his friendly conduct of relations with their Allies and asked him to
comment on 'the expediency of an assault' and to indicate its possible
consequences. He also asked whether Raglan and Canrobert (the
French commander-in-chief) considered any plan of evacuation. On

19 February he wrote again to say that Simpson was leaving that
day. 'Such a course is the only possible mode left to me of acting',
he explained, 'unless I had at once written to you to remove Airey
and Estcourt. This I was unwilling to do on your account, but I must
do something to satisfy the House of Commons. '9
Raglan answered the latter part of the first letter on 1 March
saying that 'the possibility of success in an assault' was 'not yet ripe
for discussion'. Powerful batteries of some 300 guns were being
constructed, but progress was hampered by the repulse of the French
from an advanced position seized by the Russians on the night of 22
February. As for a withdrawal from the Crimea no such thought had
yet been entertained for there was not enough shipping available,
'nor could such an embarkation be effected with a powerful enemy
close at hand'. The railway was progressing rapidly and the French
had constructed a road from a point a mile north of Balaclava to the
top of the escarpment where the Army was encamped. He spoke
warmly of General Jones, the new Officer in Command of the Royal
Engineers, and of Colonel McMurdo, who had arrived to superin-
tend the new Land Transport Corps, but made no mention of
General Simpson.w
Raglan had already answered the criticisms made in Newcastle's
last despatch of 6 January and repeated in Panmure's first, in a
despatch dated 30 January which was not received in London until
23 February.l 1 In a pained and defensive tone, he wrote:
I grieve indeed that your Grace should have entertained for a
moment an opinion so fatal to the character and reputation of
distinguished officers without inquiry from me or reference to
them; but it cannot fail to be a satisfaction to your Grace to be
informed that the Staff are not chargeable with the grave offences
attributed to them, but are able, zealous and industrious public
servants, devoting themselves to their duty, and to that exclusively,
and therefore entitled to my approbation and support.
The despatch with twenty enclosures prepared by various staff
officers as printed for the use of the Cabinet ran to twenty-five pages.
Each charge was systematically taken up and rebutted or defended.
Raglan wrote as if his conscience was clear. He believed that he and
his officers had done their best, but he lacked the imagination and
insight to see how far they had fallen short of what was expected of
them. Nor did he ever explain why he had left the Government so
long in the dark as to the true nature of the situation and conse-
quently helpless to defend either him or themselves against the many
charges hurled against them from all directions. In the final section
of his despatch Raglan reiterated his indignation at the aspersions
that had been heaped on his hard working staff:
without any attempt having been made first to ascertain from an
officer, like [himself], responsible for their conduct, that they had
in any way exposed themselves to such grave charges, and without
letting them know who their accusers [were] .... The precept
'Audi alteram partem,' so well understood in England, [he
observed] has on this occasion been wholly lost sight of.
He did not deny that there was much that was wanting, but he
blamed it on the organisation of the British Army, which was 'framed
for stationary service in the Colonies, or for home duty', but which
was 'undoubtedly defective for operations in the field'. He continued:
The troops under my command were sent from England without
those means which are essentially necessary for the maintenance
of efficiency in the field. This has been the case with all former
armies: and it did not occur to me to suppose that Her Majesty's
Government would be willing to form establishments upon a large
scale, which could not at once be got up in the midst of the active
operations of a campaign.
Raglan was a humane and cultivated English gentleman and
everyone who came in contact with him seemed to have liked and
respected him, but these lines written ten months after he had been
given command of the expeditionary force suggest that he lacked
the capacity to rise to challenges and overcome them, which is the
characteristic of great generals such as Wellington or Marlborough.
In a further despatch,I2 replying to Panmure's of 12 February,
Raglan again recounted all the trials that he and his army had had
to face and made it clear that he had undertaken the Crimean venture
with misgiving and only because he thought he had no alternative
but to carry out the Government's wishes. He again defended all
that he had done and expressed his full confidence in Generals Airey
and Estcourt. To lose Airey, in particular, he felt would be a serious
loss and he would have great difficulty in replacing him. He
concluded on a note of injured pride:
Having now replied to the several points in your despatch, I must
be permitted, before I close this, to express the pain, the mortific-

ation and I might add surprise, with which the abuse that has been
unscrupulously lavished upon me by unavowed and irresponsible
parties, has been entertained by your Lordship and your
predecessor.
My Lord, I have passed a life of honour. I have served the
Crown for above fifty years; I have for the greater portion of that
time been connected with the business of the army. I have served
under the greatest man of the age more than half my life; have
enjoyed his confidence, and have, I am proud to say, been ever
regarded by him as a man of truth, and some judgement as to the
qualification of officers; and yet having been placed in the most
difficult position in which an officer was ever called upon to serve,
and having successfully carried out most difficult operations, with
the entire approbation of the Queen, which is now my sole solace,
I am charged with every species of neglect, and the opinion which
it was my solemn duty to give of the merits of the officers, and
the assertions which I have made in support of it, are set at naught,
and your Lordship is satisfied that your irresponsible informants
are more worthy of credit than I am.
Panmure responded in a private letter saying how 'harassing' he

found this correspondence and that he only wished Raglan had given
them more information to satisfy the public. 13 'I must say for the
Duke of Newcastle', he continued, 'that he was left by your unhappy
reserve or by your contempt of those whom you considered your
slanderers, without a word to say against the well-concocted and
highly-spiced accusations which were levelled at you. If he denied
them it was on no responsible authority; if he was silent he increased
the reproaches of both parties in the controversy.' When he, himself,
succeeded Newcastle, Panmure continued, he searched the records
to find answers to the various charges that were raised and could
find none, so he had no alternative but to write as he did. And now
he was anxious to convince Raglan, 'that whatever faults may be
laid to the charge of your administration, your character, honour
and fidelity to your Queen and Country are as pure and unsullied
as the driven snow'.
In an official despatch that followed a few days later Panmure
admitted his original scepticism and the great difficulties that faced
Raglan, 'but let me ask you ', he continued, 'whether seeing so fully
the immensity of the undertaking and its risk to your army all the
necessary precautions were taken for maintaining that army in the

most perfect efficiency'. He was glad to hear some of the charges
refuted, but continued to consider that insufficient attention had
been given to the maintenance of a road. He himself would not
dismiss Airey and Estcourt and would rejoice if their reputations
could be reinstated in the confidence of the army and the public. He
rejected Raglan's complaint that he and Newcastle had listened too
readily to Raglan's critics; 'had my predecessor taken this line', he
wrote, 'had he exhibited less of magnaminity in personally
confronting the storm of popular indignation, that storm would have
rolled more heavily on you'. He would defend Raglan, but had to
have his confidence and the necessary information; 'surely I may be
permitted to question your judgement without impugning your
honor', he pleaded. And with that he trusted 'this painful correspon-
dence is done' .14
Writing to Simpson on 30 March Panmure reported that the feeling
against Raglan was 'subsiding', but noted that his personal staff
appeared to have given 'dreadful offence to some of their brother-
officers', with the result that they were very badly spoken of. Yet in
a despatch and a covering letter on 23 April about future operations
he again urged Raglan to reconsider the positions of Filder, Airey
and Estcourt and to authorise the appointment of Colonel Tulloch
as Commissary .15
Otherwise Panmure's correspondence with Raglan seemed to
settle down to a pleasant jog, discussing what he was doing for the
army, relations with the Allies, the plan of campaign, the political
situation in England, and other matters of that sort. On the whole
Panmure seems to have accepted Raglan's protests as to the
reliability of his staff, and General Simpson, who had been sent out
to the Crimea to report on them and, as Chief of Staff, to set the
house in order, soon took the same view. Panmure was disappointed
not to get more information from Simpson, who wrote on 16 April
to say that he was too busy to do much writing. He went on to assert
that Raglan and his staff had been unfairly vilified. 'They seem to
vie with each other', he wrote in a second letter on the 27th, 'in
showing their merit and anxiety for the good of the Service, and I
must say that I have never served with an Army where a higher
feeling and sense of duty exists .... It pervades all ranks, except
among the low and grovelling correspondents of the Times, of whom
there are always some in every army.' (Many letters from the Crimea
describing the dreadful conditions in the camp had been appearing
in The Times.) He also announced that he had ordered the army to

shave off their beards, discard unauthorised dress and restore the
hated stock. 16 Simpson was another officer of the old school and not
the man to give the lead the army so badly needed.
Palmerston, however, remained unsatisfied and in April and May
was still urging the replacement of the incapable staff officers. 'I
have found you a first rate man for the head of the Commissaries in
the Crimea instead of Filder', he wrote to Panmure on 1 May, 'Mr.
Watkins, now manager of the Manchester and Sheffield Railway,
strongly recommended by Paxton and Robert Stevenson,' but a little
later he withdrew the proposal. He also proposed that General
Markham, who had been Adjutant General in India, should replace
Airey as Quartermaster General and that Panmure should find
someone in England to replace Estcourt. Then, he argued, they
could make a 'good defence in Parliament' against the attack that
was coming; 'but I for one', he wrote, 'cannot undertake to get up
in my place in Parliament and defend an inactivity which could leave
our army to be in the ensuing campaign the victim of that knot of
incapables, who in the last eight months, have been the cause of
the disability and death of thousands of our brave men.' Panmure
suggested a ministerial discussion of Palmerston's proposal, but ques-
tioned the wisdom of placing someone of whom they knew nothing
in charge of a 'department intrusted with immense expenditure of
public money'. Nothing seems to have come of the proposal but a
week later Palmerston wrote again, warning Panmure that unless he
'should be able to say that more efficient men than Andrew Smith
[Director of the Army Medical Service], Filder, Airey and Estcourt
[were] appointed or about to be appointed,' the debate would be
damaging to himself and the Government. 'I have often urged these
things upon you without effect', he concluded glumly; 'we shall now
see what our opponents will make of them.' 17
Palmerston's concern was the result of a notice of motion in the
House of Lords by Lord Ellenborough, charging the Government
with mismanagement of the war. This was done with a view to
forcing the resignation of the Ministers and with the full support of
Derby who wrote to several peers appealing for party unity and
reassuring them that there was no intention of attacking the Army,
a sacrosanct institution to ultra Tories. The Government took the
threat seriously and Palmerston urged Panmure to announce new
staff appointments in place of Airey, Estcourt and Filder. Aberdeen
advised Newcastle to attend since the Resolutions in his view were
'directed quite as much against the past as the present'. The debate,
which took place on 12 May, turned out to be a fiasco, and the
motion was easily defeated by a vote of 181 to 71 with the help of
Government proxies. Malmesbury noted that Ellenborough's speech
was 'below the expectation and fell flat'. Indeed, according to
Broughton, 'before he had hardly begun' he 'sat down abruptly' to
the astonishment of his hearers, but Panmure was also brief and
missed his opportunity .1s
On 1 June in a long and friendly letter to Raglan about other
matters, Panmure seemed to close the subject in one casual sentence.
'You shall hear no more from me as to your staff,' he wrote; 'I have
told my colleagues that I acquiesce in your reason for not submitting
to a change, and that I will press it no further.' Within two weeks
of receiving the letter, however, Raglan was dead and Palmerston,
spurred on by the cries of the administrative reformers, again began
to demand the replacement of Filder whom he denounced as
'narrow-minded, prejudiced, opposed to every new resource and
improved practice, wedded to routine, and refusing every improved
arrangement'. It was a terrific indictment of an old man who obvi-
ously should not have been appointed in the first place. 'We are not
justified', Palmerston told Panmure, 'in sacrificing the interests of
the Army and endangering the success of our operations out of
delicacy for the feelings of individuals.' With Raglan no longer there
to protect him, Filder, whose health was already failing, was finally
recalled in July and replaced, not by Tulloch, but by Colonel
Pakenham with whom Simpson subsequently expressed himself as
well pleased. 19
It is hard to say where the blame lay for the Crimean fiasco. I
have argued elsewhere that it lay in large part in the system, 20 but
in some areas certain individuals were not up to the job. This was
unhappily true of Raglan himself, for all his good qualities. In a
sense, he was too decent a gentleman to be a really effective military
commander. He had no experience in commanding troops in the
field and by far the greater part of his military career had been
behind a desk in Whitehall. Indeed, he had served as Wellington's
secretary from 1810 to the old Duke's death in 1852, despite the loss
of his right arm at Waterloo. Everybody who was anybody knew
him and liked him; that plus his seniority made him the inevitable
man. Despite the joke that he used to call the enemy 'the French',
harking back to his early career under Wellington, he got along well
with the French generals because he was a civilised man and could
speak their language. He was very different from most of them in

every respect; he was a highly private man, a self-sufficient aristocrat
(the son of a duke), scarcely known by sight to his own troops,
whom he would pass by with no distinguishing uniform and no band
of attendants, unlike the senior French generals, many of them
arrivistes, who believed in fanfare and Ia gloire. He worked very
hard at his job and did more than he was given credit for because
of his reticence, but he lacked the imagination and ruthlessness of a
great military commander. As commander-in-chief of the British
army in the Crimea he has to take responsibility for what went wrong
just as the ministers at home, who likewise worked hard at their
tasks, had to take political responsibility. Too much blame was prob-
ably put on Estcourt and Airey21 by the politicians, but Filder,
Smith (Director General of Army Medical Services) and Hall (Chief
Medical Officer in the Crimea), were clearly in over their heads.
Again Filder worked hard and was not entirely to blame for all that
went wrong with the Commissariat, but Raglan should have seen
that he was not up to such a big job in the first place and sought a
competent replacement. Aberdeen, Newcastle, Panmure and even
Palmerston all lacked the toughness of a Chatham or a Churchill
and Raglan the imagination and the nerve of a Wellington or a
Montgomery.
By the spring the supply situation was largely remedied, the
railway had been built and shortly afterwards telegraphic communi-
cations with England completed, and the health and morale of the
troops greatly improved. But it was not the army that had originally
landed in the Crimea. Too high a proportion of those professionals
were gone, buried in the mass graveyards of the Crimea or Scutari
or, in the case of the more fortunate, invalided home. Their replace-
ments were for the most part young and ill-trained and many of
them had suffered the ravages of disease during the winter. A few
additional regiments were brought in from Mediterranean garrisons,
but the British force was only 25 to 30,000, little more than its
original number, while the French, with a larger standing army and
conscription, increased their numbers to 90,000 with another 23,000
in reserve at Constantinople. Failure to face up to the problem of a
plentiful supply of well trained reinforcements was perhaps one of the
major shortcomings of the Government. The repeal of a seventeenth-
century law forbidding the transfer of soldiers from one regiment to
another would have alleviated the problem, but it would have
offended military traditionalists. In desperation the previous Govern-
ment had taken the unpopular expedient of initiating the recruitment

of foreign mercenaries, but the war was over before they were avail-
able for action. When Sardinia decided to join the Allies the British
Government took responsibility for the 15,000 troops they supplied
and so these came under Raglan's command when they arrived in
the late spring. The French, however, were now the predominant
partner in the Allied force and its fate lay largely in the hands of
the unpredictable Louis Napoleon who had his uncle's name to live
up to. There was also a Turkish army of 55,000 in Eupatoria, on the
west coast of the Crimea, 50 miles north of Sebastopol. In April
Orner Pasha, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, brought some 14,000
of the Eupatoria garrison to join the Allied Army in front of Seba-
stopol. (These were replaced by Egyptian troops. )22
Meanwhile the siege made no progress. The winter was a period
of marking time, indeed of hanging on, and in February the Russians
put an end to some French tunnelling in front of the Flagstaff
Bastion. The French then transferred part of their army to the right
flank of the British in the vicinity of the Inkerman Ridge and in front
of the Russian Malakoff Battery. The Russians, however, again got
the better of them and extended their forward position onto the
Mamelon, some 400 yards in front of the Malakoff, where they
erected the Kamchatka lunette. In March they took the offensive
with minor attacks on both the French and British positions. The
lack of a broader Allied plan of attack was largely the fault of Louis
Napoleon who himself talked of going out to the Crimea and taking
charge of operations, but he was reluctant in the meantime to auth-
orise his generals to go ahead on their own. Indeed he sent a personal
representative, General Niel, to the Crimea, to survey the situation
and make sure that General Canrobert, the French Commander, did
not undertake any unauthorised initiative. In view of his inferior
numbers Raglan felt unable to take any strong lead himself. Towards
the end of February Napoleon proposed to Palmerston a plan of
campaign in which he would lead the French army against the
Russian forces north of Sebastopol while the British held the lines
to the south of the town. Palmerston called a Cabinet to discuss the
proposal saying to Panmure, 'we must try to dissuade him'. Clar-
endon commented: 'How a man who can write so wise a letter as
the Emperor's to you can meditate such an insane act as going to
the Crimea passes my comprehension but I fear that he seriously
intends it. ' 23
Clarendon was persuaded to cross to Boulogne where Napoleon
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was inspecting troops to discuss the proposal with him and to use all
his diplomatic tact to persuade the French Emperor that it would be
unwise for him to go himself to the Crimea. On arriving he
discovered that the French army officers were even more anxious
that the command should not be taken over by a civilian. Clarendon
pointed out that it would take time to convey all the additional
troops the Emperor proposed to take and to make all the necessary
arrangements. He also argued that the campaign would take four
months and that it would be unwise for Napoleon to be that long
away from Paris, a point with which the Emperor fully agreed. He
also urged that the move would be most unpopular in England for
it would appear to reduce the status of the British force and to
threaten the Alliance, which was the last thing that Napoleon
wanted. Clarendon's biographer gives a graphic account of the
conversation:
'I think', said Clarendon, 'your Majesty should not move until
everything is ready, when you may give the dernier coup de main'.
'C'est le mot!', exclaimed the Emperor, 'le dernier coup de
main.' 24
In the end the Emperor did not even do that but he kept his advisors
and his allies on tenterhooks for another two months before he
abandoned the idea.
The British were becoming increasingly restive with Canrobert's
indecision and lack of leadership. An old friend of Panmure's,
Admiral H. Stewart, second in command of the British fleet in the
Black Sea, wrote to him saying that he thought Canrobert was too
cautious, that he considered 'matters in a fix' and that perhaps it
would be best if Louis Napoleon did come. The Allies he feared
were 'nearly at a standstill and every day', he wrote, 'appears to add
to the boldness of the Russians. ' 25
Towards the end of March Lord Raglan wrote a long and revealing
letter to Lord John Russell in Vienna, marked 'private and confide-
ntial' .26 He said he did not think Louis Napoleon would come; 'and
if he do', he added, 'I shall consider it a great misfortune and as
adding vastly to the difficulties'. He thought the French talked boldly
only to promote the peace negotiations, whereas in fact they were
very cautious and used more men than the British for similar oper-
ations. 'It is this display of caution that makes me feel confident that
the French do not consider that they have the ball at their feet, or
that they are in a position to strike a blow which would be decisive,'
he concluded. He did not think that they were likely to win a victory
that would justify the Emperor taking the risk of being 'personally
a party to it'. He went on:
The fact is the Russians are most formidable enemies and having
possession of an arsenal of which the resources are boundless
they have immeasurable advantages over assailants who are many
thousand miles from their base and are composed of more than
one body and commanded by more than one chief; and they have
profited greatly by the experience they have acquired since the
Allies appeared in the Crimea. They have become admirable
marksmen and are very clever in the choice of places whence to
annoy those in our trenches who show themselves even for an
instant.
Raglan overestimated the strength of the Russians in the Crimea and
asserted that there was no chance of driving them out as long as
Sebastopol was in their hands, thus indicating his disagreement with
Napoleon's proposed operation. 'It remains to be seen whether it
can be assaulted with a fair chance of success,' he added. The
bombardment was to begin the following week, 'but', he wrote, 'the
French have not yet stated definitely what the immediate object of
the renewed attack is desired to be, and the "Mamelon" is a bone
of contention that will not be easily acquired'. 'Amidst all these
varying circumstances', he continued, 'I feel that I am guilty of no
imprudence in saying that the question of peace should not be made
to depend upon what may be effected here.' He went on to criticise
the decision, so lightly taken, to invade the Crimea and to speculate
that had they not done so Austria might have declared war on Russia
the previous autumn. 'As it is', he concluded, 'I do not despair of
your success.'
The peace party would have found strong confirmation of their
views had they been able to read this letter, for obviously Raglan
wrote to support Russell's attempt to negotiate a peace settlement,
which Palmerston and his henchman, Clarendon, did not want at
that time. Clarendon's attitude is a puzzling one, for he was becoming
increasingly pessimistic about the military prospects and about the
attitude of their French allies. On 3 April he wrote to Russell about
the fears of the French generals and about their attempt to lay the
blame on the British generals to whom impracticable co-operation
had been proposed, 'for the purpose', he feared, 'of being refused'.
He expected that in another month sickness would increase in the
Allied armies and vast Russian reinforcements would arrive. Never-

theless, he thought it would be 'better to run all chances of war'
than to conclude a premature peace that would undermine the
French alliance and would leave England 'exposed again to war
under circumstances incalculably less favourable in three or four
years time'. 27
Clarendon was even more pessimistic in a letter to Cowley in
which he wrote: 'I cannot, however, shut my eyes to the danger our
armies and incompetent generals will be exposed to if we break with
Austria and allow Russia to concentrate the whole of her forces in
the Crimea.' He had no doubts on the political side, 'but the military
side of it', he continued, 'fills me with apprehension'. Even more
he feared a very high mortality rate from sickness as the summer
approached; 'public indignation would then be overwhelming here',
he commented, ' - so it would be if we concluded a dishonourable
peace - the question is altogether the most difficult one that any
Government ever had to determine.' 28 Clarendon was always the
pessimist and most susceptible to the pressure of public opinion.
Panmure was also worried at the way things were going in the
Crimea, and highly indignant at the attempt of the French military
to blame the English for delaying the planned bombardment. In a
private letter to Raglan written on 23 March, he suggested it would
be necessary to invest Sebastopol to prevent the enemy from sending
any more supplies in. He followed this with a despatch on 26 March,
complimenting Raglan on his success in 'the difficult and delicate
task of maintaining friendly relations with our allies', but warning
him not to allow himself to be imposed upon. In a flamboyant
passage, evidently written for the record, he wrote;
England will ever court the place of honor and the post of danger;
but her strength and resources, and the lives of her gallant sons,
are not to be wasted or sacrificed, merely as a forlorn hope, to an
army of more than treble her number, and which boasts itself to
be our superior also in skill and organization.
The refusal to renew the attack on the advanced works before
the Malakoff Tower, exhibits on General Canrobert's part a
disinclination to expose his troops; while his proposal that we
should attack the Redan, shows a reckless demand upon ours,
which creates a suspicion of his motives, and fills me with doubt,
as to his judgement, and at times shakes my confidence in his good
faith. 29
He was beginning to think that the capture of Sebastopol was 'by

no means so certain as is generally supposed' and suggested that
they 'must look to more extended operations to accomplish its
surrender to strategy, rather than its reduction by force'. He went
on to dwell on the value of cutting off Russian supplies through the
Sea of Azov, a proposal long advocated by Graham when he was at
the Admiralty, 30 and by Wood, his successor.
In a letter on 30 March Panmure warned Raglan he might see
the Emperor. 'He will be a great gene in some respects', Raglan
commented, 'and in others he may stick a spear into Canrobert when
it is much wanted.' Raglan, writing on 3 April, pointed out that 'a
very large army would be required to operate in the field, and to
complete the investment of Sebastopol on the north side'. The
proposed operation 'would require immense preparations, vast
supplies, and abundance of means of transport', all of which would
take a long time. The Sea of Azov expedition was under
consideration. 31
III MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM APRIL TO JUNE 1855
On 9 April the long awaited spring bombardment of Sebastopol

began. It lasted a week, but the French were unwilling to follow it
up with an attack. They had inflicted great damage on the Mamelon
and the Flagstaff Bastion but the English guns had been ineffective
against the Redan. Simpson, writing while the bombardment was still
in progress, gave Panmure a very gloomy account of the operation. If
they did not follow it up with an attack, he said, they might as well
raise the siege, but even if they did he failed to see how they could
hold the town if the Russians remained on the north side of the
harbour. 'The result of my observations since coming here', he wrote,
'is that we are in a regular fix!' adding that it was impossible 'that
any military man of experience could have recommended the descent
of this army in the Crimea.' He went on to contrast the state of the
French with the small and overworked British army. 'The "equipage"
of our allies is marvelous . ... Everything an army ought to possess
is in full working order with the French ... ',he wrote. 'We have no
establishments at all.' McMurdo was doing his best, but Simpson
doubted with the personnel available that the new Land Transport
Corps would be effective. (This was the man sent out to put things
right, who was himself to succeed Raglan in a few months time!)
Admiral Stewart, writing about the same time, commented on

Simpson's despondency and said that he and Canrobert, whom he
called a mountebank, looked 'eagerly to Vienna' for a solution. So
did others such as Lord Burghersh, son of the British ambassador
in Vienna, a young officer on Raglan's staff, who wrote to his parents
on 28 April: 'The Government at home cannot be aware of what
our real position here is - or they would not lose an opportunity of
making peace. '32
The French generals excused themselves from undertaking any
follow-up attack on either the town or the Inkerman heights with
the plea that they were waiting for a new army to be embarked from
Constantinople on 10 May and had been instructed by the Emperor
not to compromise themselves in the meantime. 33 On hearing of this
development Clarendon wrote in disgust to Cowley:
I never believed in the utility of the bombardment or that it would
be followed by an assault or that if the town were taken even with
a most deplorable loss of life that it could be held for 2 days. The
French have always been for it to do something and Raglan I am
sure has been right in opposing it - however the mischief is done
and the weakness of the allies is made more apparent than
before. 34
It is difficult to understand how Clarendon, holding those views, did
not support Russell's peace efforts which he was helping to thwart
at this very time. Clarendon even admitted to Cowley that it would
be an awful risk for Austria to declare war on Russia 'with England
and France in a rat trap from which they can't extricate themselves'.
The Emperor Louis Napoleon and the Empress Eugenie paid a
state visit to England from 17 to 20 April that was intended to
demonstrate the closeness of the Alliance. It was extremely
important to Napoleon to receive this recognition and respect, not
only from the British Government and people, but especially from
the Queen of England. Victoria had long been friendly with Louis
Philippe and consequently had looked upon Louis Napoleon as a
usurper. She had, however, accepted the political necessity of the
Alliance in 1854 and now she accepted the man who ruled France
as she explained in an introspective memorandum35 written shortly
after the visit was over, in which she dwelt upon the great advantage
of a 'permanent alliance between England and France'. 'That he is
a very extraordinary man, with great qualities there can be no doubt',
she wrote, '-I might almost say a mysterious man.' She was much
impressed by his 'wonderful self control, great calmness, even gentle-

ness' and with what she called his 'power of fascination'. Above all
she was struck by his sense of destiny, which she thought explained
the 'apparently inexcusable acts' that followed his coup d'etat. At
any rate the visit was generally pronounced a great success.
While much of the time was given to pageantry and social festivi-
ties, it was also made the occasion of a grand war council to discuss
Allied plans that should have been settled months before. The first
meeting, attended by the Emperor, Marshal Vaillant (French War
Minister), Count Walewski (French Foreign Minister), Prince
Albert, Lords Palmerston, Clarendon, Panmure, Hardinge (British
Commander-in-Chief), Cowley (British ambassador in Paris) and Sir
John Burgoyne (recently returned from the Crimea), failed to come
to any definite conclusions except that, in Panmure's words, 'whatever
might be the result of the bombardment, Sebastopol could not be
ours until completely worsted'! All except Louis Napoleon were
agreed that he should not go to the Crimea. He also wanted to attack
Simpheropol, the nominal capital of the Crimea, a town thirty-five
miles north-east of Sebastopol, by sending an army fifty miles east
along the coast to Aloushta and then marching it inland through a
mountain pass. Panmure not unreasonably considered the proposal
'a wild and impracticable scheme, and one which would so divide
his army as to lead it to inevitable ruin'. At a second meeting rather
more progress was made. It was decided that the major role was to
be given to an allied army of 25,000 British, 15,000 Sardinians and
an uncertain number of French troops all under Raglan's command,
which was 'to take and occupy' the high ground (Mackenzie Heights)
then held by the Russians north-east of Sebastopol. An army of
60,000 French and Turks was to hold the trench system in front of
Sebastopol, while the remaining French forces (over 60,000 after the
French reserve corps arrived from Constantinople) was to form an
army of diversion to operate on Raglan's right. Orner Pasha was to
return to Eupatoria to command a Turkish-Egyptian army of 30,000
on the left. 36
Meanwhile the ultra cautious General Canrobert had reluctantly
agreed to the despatch of an Anglo-French expedition to take Kertch
on the eastern tip of the Crimean peninsula with a view to allowing
an Allied fleet to enter the Sea of Azov. Shortly after the expedition's
departure, however, he insisted, despite Raglan's objections, on its
recall, because he had just received orders from the Emperor to call
up the reserves from Constantinople and embark on the new
offensive as soon as they arrived. According to Cowley the cancel-

lation of the Kertch expedition was 'the result of accident rather
than of premeditation', since the Emperor had sent his orders to
Canrobert before he had received the latter's message about
Kertch.37
Instructions were sent to Canrobert and Raglan on 3 and 4 May
from Paris and London - the telegraph cable from Varna to the
Crimea had recently been completed. Both Governments agreed
that Sebastopol could not be taken until it was fully invested and
that to do this the Russian covering army had to be driven from its
position on the highland north-east of the city. In his communication
Panmure pointed out that the ineffectiveness of the latest bombard-
ment seemed to indicate that the place would not be taken at an
early date by their present methods. Panmure further made it clear
that the allied generals were to give the plan careful consideration,
but that it was for them to decide. There were still differences of
opinion about the role of the French 'army of diversion'. The
Emperor, who had now decided against going himself to the Crimea,
still urged the attack by sea through Aloushta against either Simpher-
opol or Baktchi Sara, another town midway between Sebastopol and
Simpheropol, but the British seemed to prefer either an advance by
land on Raglan's right against Baktchi Sara or one from Eupatoria
against Simpheropol. On the surface it seems strange that the French,
who so greatly outnumbered the British, should agree to a plan in
which the main attack was entrusted to an army predominantly
British and Sardinian, but it is more than likely that Louis Napoleon
really expected that the role of the so-called 'army of diversion'
would be the major one.3s Canrobert was to play the role of Patton
to Raglan's Montgomery, but he lacked the necessary qualities of
leadership. The operation, however, was never to take place.
According to Somerset Calthorpe, Raglan's young aide-de-camp,
Raglan refused to hand over the carefully constructed British
network of trenches in front of Sebastopol to the Turks and he also
expressed the opinion that there should be one commander-in-chief
for the whole operation. Canrobert, a decent man but lacking in self
confidence, offered to serve under Raglan as commander-in-chief.
Raglan was unenthusiastic and laid down conditions that Canrobert
could not accept. Calthorpe understood that Raglan was prepared
to advocate an attack from Eupatoria in conjunction with one on
the Mackenzie Heights, but the French objected that there was
insufficient water in the Eupatoria region and that the Mackenzie
Heights, the objective that the Emperor had assigned to Raglan,

were unassailable!39
At this point Canrobert submitted his resignation to the Emperor,
recommending that he should be replaced by General Pelissier, who
was consequently appointed French Commander-in-Chief on
19 May. Pelissier was a tough and independent-minded soldier, very
different than his predecessor. He had no faith in the Emperor's
plans and believed in pressing the siege, no matter what the cost.
He readily agreed, however, to the resumption of the expedition
against Kertch, which had been recalled by Canrobert to the general
disgust of the British both in the Crimea and at home. This operation
was undertaken by a joint force of over 16,000 British, French and
Turkish troops under the command of General Sir George Brown.
The Russian commander in the Kertchine peninsula, uncertain where
the superior Allied force would land, destroyed his coast batteries
and withdrew from Kertch as well as Yenikale at the entrance to the
Sea of Azov which were occupied by the Allies on 25 May without
opposition. Unfortunately, this success was followed by looting and
disorder, partly committed by the troops and sailors, but also by
Tartar insurgents who swept into Kertch from the countryside. In
the meantime light draft ships of the British and French navies had
entered the Sea of Azov, hitherto a landlocked Russian lake, and
destroyed almost 500 ships and large stores of flour and grain and
other supplies in the ports along its northern coast from Y enitchi on
the west to Taganrog at the mouth of the Don. Despite the oppo-
sition of Louis Napoleon an attack was also mounted against Anapa
on the Circassian coast and the Russian garrison forced to withdraw.
The success of the Kertch expedition greatly raised British spirits at
home and in the Crimea, but Palmerston opposed a proposal to issue
a Proclamation to mark the occasion. 'I have no faith in Procla-
mations,' he wrote to Clarendon with characteristic incisiveness; 'I
believe in nothing but shot and shell and Minie-rifles. ' 40
The French tended to regard these operations as sideshows, but
they were undoubtedly a serious blow to Russian pride, although
the consequences may not have been as serious as Clarendon and
Prince Albert assumed. 41
In the meantime there was renewed activity in front of Sebastopol.
On the nights of 22 and 23 May after two sharp engagements with
heavy losses on both sides the French (on the left flank of the Allied
armies) had occupied some Russian ambuscades threatening the
French positions in the area that had already changed hands several
times. Two days later a French and Turkish force had carried out a
reconnaissance in force to the north-east of Balaclava, crossing the
Tchernaya river by the Trakatir Bridge and pushing the Russians
out of the village of Tchorgoun. 42
Louis Napoleon was much displeased with Pelissier for permitting
the Kertch expedition when he had explicitly instructed him to
concentrate his forces with a view to cutting Sebastopol off from the
rest of the Crimea by attacking the Russians outside the town in
whatever way the generals might decide. Pelissier excused himself
by saying that the Kertch operation was necessary to humour the
English. He continued to ignore the Emperor's directive, however,
because he was convinced that it was essential to pursue the direct
siege of Sebastopol by continuous pressure on the enemy's defences
and eventually breaking through at some point into the city on the
south side of the harbour. 43
With this in view the Allies started another heavy bombardment
on 6 June which did great damage, but as always it was quite extra-
ordinary how much Todleben and his brave workforce succeeded in
repairing under cover of darkness. On the evening of 7 June the
French army after heavy fighting succeeded in taking important
points in front of the Malakoff Battery, in particular the Mamelon,
which changed hands several times in the course of the night, while
the British, with less difficulty, occupied the Quarries to the south
of the Redan. The British were elated by this series of successes,
Kertch, Taganrog, Anapa and now the Quarries ('You spoil us by
giving us a victory almost daily,' Panmure wrote to Raglan on 11
June), but Louis Napoleon was unimpressed because the heavy
casualties suffered by the French seemed to be frittering away the
army he wanted used in another direction. 'He is displeased with
Pelissier's despatches which throw cold water on the imperial plan
of campaign', Clarendon told Russell. 44
The British Ministers tended to agree with Napoleon that the field
of operations should be opened up to the north-east of Sebastopol,
but were less inclined to interfere with the generals. Nor did they
consider the expedition into the Sea of Azov an unnecessary diver-
sion. Indeed they were concerned that the Emperor was doing
'exactly what he said he would not do by commanding the army and
fleet from Paris'. Regarding the Emperor's instructions to Pelissier,
Clarendon wrote to Cowley: 'We think that he and Raglan should
be directed to concert measures together for an immediate forward
movement from whatever base in whatever direction they may think
best for driving the Russians from the north of the harbour.' Two
days later he protested the Emperor's veto of an attack on Anapa.
'It is manifest that the order should only be a caution and not a
prohibition', he wrote; 'pray get this observed to the Emperor. ' 45
Panmure explained the situation to Raglan:
I see by your secret letter of this morning that you and Pelissier
both prefer the pressure of the siege to the exterior movement for
investment. All our information goes to the conviction that the
Russians are weaker than we are, and if we stormed the Inkerman
heights and gained and occupied the M'Kenzie Ridge, we should
compel the enemy to withdraw a great part of his garrison, and
either meet us on the field or retreat to the head of the Crimea.
However, it is easy to wage war on paper, and I rely on your local
information as being by far the best for action. Now it is not so
in Paris, and you may shape your course on the information I give
you, but you must betray me to no one. The Emperor has made
up his mind that Sebastopol cannot be taken by any process of
siege tending to regular approach and final assault. 46
Palmerston blamed the depression in Paris on the activity of financial
speculators and Russian intrigue. 'The Queen is vexed about the
Emperor being so low about our Crimean prospects', Clarendon told
Cowley, but he reported that Panmure agreed with the Emperor
that 'it would be most imprudent to attempt an assault until the
whole of Sebastopol was invested' and he thought Raglan agreed.
On 8 June Panmure sent Raglan a despatch repeating telegraphed
instructions of the 4th, ordering him to concert measures with
Pelissier and Orner to attack the enemy, either across the Tchernaya
or by cutting his lines of communication with Sebastopol, giving
full consideration to the advantages of using Eupatoria as a base.
Nevertheless the 'fullest latitude was left to the generals as to the
means to be employed' .47
The operation of 6-10 June although costly was only a prelude to
an all out attack on the two major Russian fortifications of the
Malakoff and the Redan which began with a very heavy bombard-
ment on 17 June. Unhappily on the following evening everything
went wrong with the ensuing attacks on both these strong points,
which the Russians repulsed. There were very heavy losses all
around, some 4,000 to the Russians, 3,500 to the French and 1,500
to the British. The French Emperor was further enraged by this
continued disregard of his directives and was only persuaded at the
last minute by two of his advisors in Paris to withdraw a letter

virtually relieving Pelissier of his command. 4s
The British reaction was more philosophical. 'I think that Pelissier
has taken the reverse in a becoming and soldierlike spirit ... ', Clar-
endon told Cowley. 'That is quite the feeling here tho there is at the
same time a sentiment of anger mingled with the general grief that
so many brave men should be so often sacrificed without any
adequate results and in the last instance blame is thrown on Lord
Raglan for not having been aware of the ditch or for not having
taken means to provide against such tremendous difficulty.' But
Palmerston recommended:
that Pelissier and Raglan should be advised again and deliberately
to consider whether instead of repeating assaults which cost so
many valuable lives, it would not be better to make an advance
on Simpheropol from Eupatoria, thus utilizing the large Turkish
force there stationed and threatening, or if we took Simpheropol
destroying all the magazines there established.49
The failure of the attack on the Redan was a great blow to Raglan
whose health was already beginning to fail and in the following week
he succumbed to an attack of cholera and died on 28 June. His much
maligned Adjutant General, Estcourt, died of the same disease only
a few days earlier, and Sir George Brown, Raglan's second-in-
command, whose errors in judgement were partly responsible for
the failure of the attack, was invalided back to England after the
battle. This was probably fortunate for, to quote Clarendon, Brown
was 'irrascible, selfwilled, unbending tho very sensible and a good
soldier'. Raglan's death was a great shock both in the Crimea and
at home. 50
We are gloomy and out of spirits today [Clarendon wrote Cowley
on 30 June] and the death of poor Raglan is I understand making
a painful sensation out of doors. His age and his habits may to a
certain extent have impaired his energy and have unfitted him for
the post of unprecedented difficulty he has had to fill but he had
many great and good qualities ... his tact and imperturbable good
temper enabled him to prove practically how well he understood
the importance of the alliance.5 1
Before the question of a successor could be settled an unexpected
Cabinet crisis blew up involving the War Secretary himself. In the
House of Lords on 28 June the Duke of Richmond asked whether
day rooms and separate married quarters might not be made avail-
able in army barracks. Panmure agreed to the desirability of day
rooms to avoid the necessity of soldiers having to cook their food in
their sleeping quarters and also agreed to the undesirability of women
being in the common barrack rooms and seeing all that went on
there, but his preference was to prohibit privates from marrying for
the first ten or twelve years and only providing married quarters for
non-commissioned officers. He went on to talk about the necessity
of making the army attractive since, although they were receiving a
thousand recruits a week, they needed more. He had been advised
against a larger bounty and consequently he indicated that he
intended to double the soldier's pay when they were facing an enemy,
that is as soon as they landed in the Crimea. Panmure made his
announcement in this casual way without any consultation with his
colleagues and Palmerston was furious when he heard of it. 'I
certainly think Panmure's conduct the greatest outrage against
official duty in the history of the country,' Palmerston told the
Queen, 'and taking into consideration the way in which it was done
the magnitude of the matter and the vast public interest concerned
it was an act of absolute insanity.' The Queen and her husband were
as astonished as he was. The result was that he sent Panmure a very
stiff letter that led the War Secretary to tender his resignation.
Clarendon feared this would damage the Government and appealed
to Lansdowne to intervene as the only person who could persuade
Palmerston to withdraw his angry letter at which Panmure took such
umbrage. By the time he heard from Lansdowne, Palmerston had
cooled down and, using Wood as an intermediary, he agreed to
withdraw the letter which had given such offence, saying that he had
'written it in great haste on reading the newspaper' and that they
would consider the matter in Cabinet. 'Like you I wish to avoid a
change', Palmerston wrote to Lansdowne, 'and besides Panmure has
many good qualities for his office, and we have all much personal
regard for him.' As a result Panmure returned the offensive letter
and withdrew his resignation, but warned Palmerston that it would
'depend on the result of the Cabinet deliberations as to the plan
itself' whether or not he would retain his position. Panmure got his
way and an extra field allowance of sixpence a day was approved.s 2
In the meantime, however, the outlook in the Crimea remained
gloomy and the Government was faced with the difficult task of
deciding on a replacement for Raglan.
5 The Conclusion of the
Crimean Campaign and
the War on other Fronts
I SIMPSON AS RAGLAN'S SUCCESSOR
Despite the prolonged bombardment and heavy fighting the Allies

seemed no closer to taking Sebastopol when Lord Raglan died at
the end of June than they had been when the spring offensive opened
early in April. As we have seen when Palmerston came into office
he and Panmure rebuked Raglan but did not replace him. Now
they had to do so. Therefore, in this chapter we must consider the
continuing problem of the leadership of the British Army in the
Crimea, as well as the completion of the campaign of 1855 in that
theatre of war, the second winter and the planning for 1856, and,
more briefly, the war on the other fronts and the Anglo-American
enlistment crisis.
General Simpson, faute de mieux, was appointed as Raglan's
successor. He was 63, a modest man, quite aware of his limitations
and with no ambition to command. He had taken over for the
time being, but urged Panmure to send out a general of distinction
immediately. 'Circumstances urgently demand', he wrote, 'that this
Army should be commanded by the most eminent and best known
soldier we have.' Panmure's friend, Admiral Stewart (who was a year
older than Simpson), concurred in Simpson's estimate of himself.
'General Simpson is evidently oppressed by the responsibility of the
position he finds himself in, and makes no secret of his anxious desire
to be relieved as soon as possible', he told Panmure. 'He is a sensible
old man, sees things in a pretty correct light, but at the same time
is not sufficiently young, active, enterprising, and elastic for the
Crimea.' His nominee was General Jones, the chief engineer officer,
who, in fact, was also a year older than Simpson.!
Simpson, however, was the man Panmure had selected six months
before to set the army right and he now told Palmerston he knew
no better man to succeed Raglan. 'He is good tempered, a sturdy
old man and anxious to earn name and fame for himself', Panmure
105
wrote. 'He will be guided by Jones in siege operations, and be open

to receive advice from home, more patiently than his predecessor.'
This scarcely sounded like the description of a general to win the
war. 'I don't know how you feel but I am very uneasy at General
Simpson's being placed permanently at the head of the army ... ',
Clarendon wrote to Palmerston. 'Has he given any proof of military
capacity since he went out? If not shall we not incur a terrible
responsibility by permitting him to succeed Raglan though at the
same time it must be admitted that no better man has ever been
mentioned for the post except the undiscoverable Markham [who
had just been recalled from India to command the 2nd Division in
the Crimea]. '2
Simpson was an old friend and a fellow Scot to whom Panmure
could write much more familiarly than he did to Raglan, sometimes
scolding, more often encouraging. He began by insisting on 'the
absolute necessity of keeping the Government better informed' than
it had been, but when he found Simpson was overburdened with
paper work he suggested that a once a week mail was sufficient. He
started off with kindly encouragement, writing on 2 July:
I have assured the Government that you have talent and energy
to do the thing, and I fix my faith on you without hesitation. I will
support you in your position, and you can render this an easy task
by avoiding the rocks upon which poor Raglan split, and applying
to many an evil your own good sound Scotch common-sense.
Routine is excellent, nay absolutely necessary, but there are times
when you must set it aside and act for the moment as the moment
requires.
He gave Simpson a free hand regarding his staff but warned him not
'to cumber' himself with any of his predecessor's staff 'out of feelings
of mere kindness'. He urged Simpson 'to maintain the cordial
relations with the French which poor Raglan so eminently succeeded
in doing' and promised to send him a staff officer fluent in that
language. In particular he adjured Simpson to let them know 'every
day by telegraph the condition of the health of the Army, the progress
in siege work ... ; and anything extraordinary'. 'Adieu, my friend',
he concluded this first letter to the new commander, 'and believe
me to watch with sincere anxiety the success of your career. '3
A few days later he assured Simpson that if he ever pressed
something against the General's serious conviction, he would not
take it amiss if Simpson deferred action until he had communicated
The Conclusion of the Crimean Campaign 107
by telegraph. In the same letter he warned Simpson to keep a sharp

eye on the sanitary condition of the camp and to stand up to
Pelissier. 4
It was not long, however, before Panmure began to have second
thoughts about Simpson, whom he accused of despondency, and in
private letters on 14 and 16 July he indicated that he was giving
serious consideration to the General's original recommendation
regarding the appointment of someone else as a successor. Indeed
he had a conference with Palmerston and Hardinge at which they
went over the list of officers of General rank. Lord Seaton they ruled
out because, though still robust, at 76 they considered him as unfit
for service in such a climate. Hardinge (1785-1856) at 70 ruled
himself out because his legs swelled so he could scarcely walk or
ride. The Duke of Cambridge, although only 36, had failed in self-
control at Inkerman and had returned from the Crimea. Lieutenant
General James Fergusson at 68 was considered a possibility, but he
had just been appointed Governor of Gibraltar. Of the Major
Generals they picked Codrington (aged 51) just appointed to
command the Light Division, as the best qualified, with Markham
about to take over the 2nd Division to 'support him'. Unfortunately
Codrington was suffering badly from diarrhoea but expected to
recover. (The Queen was worried that there were four Major
Generals senior to Codrington.) In the end the choice of Simpson
was confirmed but Codrington named as his successor and on 20 July
Panmure sent Simpson formal recognition of his appointment with
a private letter in which he said: 'I confess I was much shaken in my
resolution to confirm you from the desponding tone of your letter
written on the occurrence of Raglan's death, and it was not until I
received your counteracting telegraphic message that I took courage
and brought your name formally before my colleagues' .5
Simpson's letters received after confirmation of his appointment
was made continued to be desponding. Most of his staff were stricken
with illness and two died of cholera within weeks of Estcourt and
Raglan. His letter of 14 July painted a gloomy picture:
The more I see, and reflect upon, the condition of things here,
my Lord [he wrote], the more I am struck with the conviction that
these four armies never can carry on any joint and united oper-
ations in their present condition. We want one great man to direct
the whole.
My second reflection is my own position! for surely I am an
unworthy successor to Lord Raglan, who not only guided the

Army, but from his high rank, his great experience and talents,
he really guided the whole combined armies, for all the
Commanders had faith and confidence in him ....
Of course I continue to do the work as well as I can until you
decide what is to be done. I have been ill this past week with gout
in my ankle and foot, as well as by the vexatious events that have
occurred in the family of our Staff in this house. The correspon-
dence here is sufficient to break down any man. I labour at it from
four in the morning until six in the evening .... My outdoor
military duties are therefore much neglected .... 6
Receipt of this letter must have made Panmure realise what a mistake
he had made and the evidence in it was confirmed by a letter from
Stewart written three days later in which the Admiral reported that
Simpson had 'already grown to look half-a-score years older'. He
claimed that the new Commander-in-Chief was 'completely over-
weighted and much oppressed' and that at two recent conferences
he had not said a single thing 7 - but Raglan himself had been noted
for his taciturnity.
On 28 July Panmure took the bull by the horns and wrote very
frankly to Simpson upbraiding him for his 'disheartening' letters and
telling him that if he was 'weighted down by a sense of [his] own
inability to bear the burden of command' then he 'must write ...
officially and request to be relieved'. It was not fair to either of
them, Panmure urged, to do otherwise. Reminding Simpson that he
himself had faith in him Panmure continued:
But, my good friend, you must lead. You must not be oppressed
by care or daunted by difficulty .... So shake off the black dog
and make yourself respected by the Allies and obeyed by your
own people.s
He went on to inform Simpson that in the event of his being ill and
feeling himself compelled to give up his duties suddenly he was to
be succeeded by General Codrington.
Three days later Panmure sent out Codrington's contingent
commission. In a covering letter he told Simpson he did not imagine
he would lead the army long but that he would be promoted to the
rank of Lieutenant-General.
If you really feel unable to bear the weight of responsibility, which
I am aware is not small, I advise you to give it up, and everyone
will give you credit, and on your retirement a still further mark of
the Queen's favour may be conferred; but I strongly recommend
you not to hesitate in the matter. Either buckle up your reins
vigorously for the work, or at once claim the consideration which
your long and honourable services entitle you to receive. I have
written you plainly as a friend, and you will, I know, accept what
I write as such.9
This was not the language that a Chatham or a Churchill would have
used to a discredited general!
By the time Simpson received Panmure's letter of 20 July,
however, he was in no mood to retire. 'I am glad that at length all
doubts are ended as to my being confirmed in the command', he
wrote in reply, 'because I have now only one fixed object before
me - that of carrying it on to the best of my ability, and I cannot be
otherwise but proud and gratified with the high position I hold, and
with the confidence reposed in me. But I am equally sensible and
deeply impressed at the difficulties surrounding me.' Ten days later
in reply to a letter of 31 July he thanked Panmure for his 'kind and
frank manner' of writing but defended himself against the charge of
despondency, saying 'however sanguine a Commander may be of
the success of any operation, it is incumbent upon him to take every
precaution for the safety of the army in case of failure'. 'If Sebastopol
beats us,' he added, 'depend upon it, my Lord, everything here must
be well weighed and considered beforehand!' 10
Panmure was not neglectful of the needs of his army in the Crimea.
He and Palmerston were constantly harping on the importance of
good sanitation; and, as we have seen, soldiers' pay was increased
sixpence a day. He was particularly concerned with the organisation
and despatch of the Army Work Corps to relieve the army of chores
that were still too heavy a burden in view of the arduous duty in
the trenches. Simpson was unenthusiastic for fear of disciplinary
problems, although he promised to give the Corps 'a good start',
when it finally arrived in mid-August. By early autumn, however,
he was complaining bitterly that they were the worst lot of men to
have come to the Crimea and caused trouble among the soldiers
because of their higher pay.n
On 28 July Panmure sent Simpson a despatch on the necessity of
looking forward to the possibility of the Army having to spend a
second winter in the Crimea and the need 'to make every provision
for its comfort and protection'. He went into details regarding the
provision of winter huts and winter clothing, the erection of storage

depots along the railroad, the redisposition of the cavalry and field
artillery during the winter months, the arrangement of a better
system for the discharging of cargoes and such like matters. 'I do
not understand what you mean by the exhaustion of the men, and
their inability to pass another winter in the trenches', he wrote. 'The
troops are reported to be in good condition, good heart, and fit for
any work, so your view appears to be somewhat desponding. '1 2
In a further despatch of 13 August, while again chiding Simpson
for his despondency regarding the siege, Panmure agreed that the
worst contingency must be prepared for. He went on to make the
interesting comment that was the closest he ever came to criticising
Raglan. 'Forethought and foresight on the part of a commander', he
wrote, 'are qualities fully as valuable and infinitely more rare than
energy and courage - a little more of the first mentioned of these
characteristics of a great General would have saved our gallant Army
infinite suffering during the last winter. '13
The area in which Panmure and Palmerston's Government were
least successful was that which today we call manpower. In the
original expedition the British and French components were equal
in number, but since then the French Army had continually
expanded while the British Army was hard pressed to maintain the
existing force and as we have seen the reinforcements that were sent
out were for the most part under-trained and of much poorer calibre
than the original professionals. With further reinforcements that
were then on their way Panmure reckoned that Simpson should have
35,000 British troops of which 27,000 were infantry, as against a
French force of 120,000. To swell the numbers under British
command he proposed that a Turkish contingent of 20,000 (including
a multi-national Polish legion) being trained by a British General
Vivian should be sent to the Crimea and placed under Simpson, who
did not want them. In addition he .promised the early despatch of
the first contingent of 3,000 Foreign Legionaires that the British
Government was raising in Germany, Italy anp Switzerland, bringing
the British army potentially, he argued, to 58,000 (plus 15,000 Sardi-
nians).14 There was no way of getting around the fact that the British
army was now the junior partner and that it was the French General
Pelissier who made the crucial decisions.
Probably the greatest indictment to be made against the Palmer-
ston Government's conduct of the war was their failure to confront
this problem directly. It is true that in February on introducing a
short term service bill Panmure had threatened that if sufficient

recruits were not forthcoming compulsion might be necessary.
Neither his colleagues nor public opinion, however, were prepared
to accept the modern idea of national service in time of war and
consequently Panmure was driven to the eighteenth-century practice
of hiring foreign mercenaries under the terms of the Foreign Enlist-
ment Act, recently recommended by his predecessor. With good
reason he did not relish the experiment, which raised many problems
of its own and made no obvious military contribution before the war
ended, although more than sixteen thousand foreign troops were
recruited at an expense of more than a million pounds and were
presumably an additional factor to be weighed by the Russians in
the peace deliberations.1s
Despite the acute shortage of manpower Panmure also foolishly
agreed, at the Queen's request, to the formation of a 6th Division,
in order to give Lord Rokeby, a senior Guards officer, a divisional
command! Simpson was disgusted since the existing divisions had
not enough men to perform all the duties required by their
commanders. 16
II THE CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE TO THE FALL OF

SEBASTOPOL
The situation was a difficult. one for the proud British who would
have liked to act independently of the French, 'although', as Palmer-
ston pointed out to Clarendon, 'we must not forget that the combined
action is a wholesome restraint on the French as well as a shackle
upon us'. He would have liked an operation based on Eupatoria but
concluded that it was difficult to change plans at that point and that
they would have to await the result of the operations against the
Malakoff and the Redan.1 7
As the summer wore on Clarendon was becoming increasingly
pessimistic about the lack of progress in the Crimea and unimpressed
by Panmure's administration of the War Department. On 8 August
he wrote to Palmerston saying that the letters of the Admirals, Lyons
and Stewart, confirmed the gloomy apprehensions that he had long
entertained; 'there appears to be no energy, no directing mind,
nothing like united action and above all no plan except to wait for
the winter and for that no preparation seems to be making', he
wrote. Yet it was difficult to suggest remedies, especially regarding
the siege operations in which they were 'dependent upon others'.

Unless more energy was shown by the War Department he foresaw
'fresh disasters and well merited disgrace at home'.
I fear we made a mistake [he concluded] in not at once appointing
Codrington as we have lost six precious weeks under the command
of an old woman but as the campaign is to all practical purposes
over the most important thing now is to secure our communications
with the sea by the railroad.
Two weeks later while accompanying the Queen and Prince Consort
on a state visit to Paris he reported that the Emperor was 'low about
our Crimean prospects' and complained 'that not one original idea'
had been sent them from thence. 'He does not doubt of ultimate
success though he cannot see how it is to be arrived at', Clarendon
added. Clarendon's pessimism was understandable but in the end
events proved him wrong.1s
The siege continued throughout the summer but with no major
engagements for the two months following the rebuff of the 18th of
June. Life in the besieged city and in the Allied front-line trenches
remained hazardous and cholera continued to take its toll in the
Allied camp. Russian daily losses inside Sebastopol during this period
of 'inactivity' were 250, and Admiral Nakhimov, deputy commander
of the garrison, was himself the victim of a French sniper's bullet on
28 June. He, with Todleben, who was badly wounded on 18 June,
had been the mainstays of the Russian resistance.19
On 17 July Simpson reported that the French had made steady
progress towards the Malakoff, but that Pelissier had failed to
communicate his intentions to him. 'He is very close, but I could
wish a little less secrecy with me,' Simpson added pathetically, 'as
no doubt he will call upon me to help in his attack.' He admitted
that the British Army was 'too weak to form any plan of [its] own',
but claimed that they might 'give valuable aid in a general attack',
which he insisted must be soon because of the daily casualties they
were suffering from such close proximity to the enemy. Indeed the
heavy guns were becoming worn out from the prolonged bombard-
ment and those involved in 'long continuous firing' had 'been hushed
more than once' .20
Admiral Stewart, writing at the same time, was no more
reassuring. He was full of praise for the 'indefatigable exertion and
wonderful resources' of the enemy and 'of the persevering, bold and
arduous labours of the Allies; but', he pointed out, 'the adoption of
earthworks makes repair so rapid that the damage of the day is often
made good during the succeeding night'. He expected that they
would eventually fight their way in to the South Side of Sebastopol
harbour, but was concerned 'on account of the probability of divided
councils and command', which had already been responsible for their
lack of success; 'I really believe', he concluded, 'that one indifferent
commander is better than two good ones', a saying he attributed to
the first Napoleon.21
A week later Simpson wrote more optimistically: 'It may be
imagined that our siege operations are languid; but all is going on
favourably, and if the French can succeed in taking the Malakoff,
everything will assume a new shape.' He added the comment that
The Times arrived in Sebastopol before it did in the Allied camp;
'so what with the electric wires and the Times, our enemy has many
advantages over us.' In reply to a query from Panmure he reported
that they were 'by no means idle as regards the destruction of the
buildings in the town', but he was nervous about the supply of shells
running short. In despatches of 15 and 17 July Simpson informed
Panmure that on the advice of General Niel he was abandoning the
direct assault on the Redan, presumably because of the terrain.
Panmure concurred in the decision since 'other modes of approach'
were to be followed, but he criticised the lack of sufficient instruction
to officers in the last attack on the Redan. 'I must impress on you',
he wrote, 'the necessity of entrusting with a knowledge of your plan
of attack the senior officers employed in it. ' 22
The military situation in the Crimea was a strange one. The Allies
had originally landed on the west coast immediately south of Eupa-
toria, a coast town which they held until the end of the war, but on
25 and 26 September they had advanced south to Balaclava and the
Upland to the east and south of Sebastopol, crossing the Tchernaya
River by the Trakatir Bridge below Mackenzie's Farm. By a singular
coincidence the Russian Commander-in-Chief, Prince Menshikov, in
order to keep open his line of communication with the interior, had
led the greater part of his army out of Sebastopol the previous night
to take up positions to the north-east on the Belbeck river, cutting
right across the path taken by the British army the following morning.
Indeed the British force had blundered into and captured part of his
baggage train. Neither the Russian nor Allied Command was aware
of what the other was doing.23
The result was that for the rest of the war the Allied armies
besieging Sebastopol from the Upland were cut off from the interior,
and in a sense were themselves besieged. The large Turkish garrison

that held Eupatoria was completely isolated, although as we have
seen it offered a constant threat to the Russian lines of communi-
cation that was never effectively used. In 1854 the Russians outnum-
bered the Allies, making their position precarious had they lost the
battles of Balaclava or Inkerman, but by the summer of 1855 the
Allies outnumbered the Russians by more than two to one. 24 The
explanation for this surprising fact lay partly in the very long and
difficult overland line of communication of the Russian Army, partly
in their very heavy losses suffered both in the Crimea and in the
case of reinforcing divisions from sickness and disease on the march,
and partly from the malign influence of old Field Marshal Paskevich,
the senior Russian General and the Czar's favourite, who constantly
played down the importance of the Crimea and who opposed the
transfer of troops there from areas he considered more important.zs
It is surprising that the Russians held out as long as they did,
given the difficulties of supply and the dreadful conditions within
Sebastopol as the bombardment continued throughout the summer;
and it says much for the leadership of the Russian Admirals, Kornilov
and Nakhimov, successively commanding the garrison (both of them
eventually killed), for the genius of Todleben, the chief Engineer,
and for the courage of the Russian soldiers and sailors. This
prolonged Russian resistance was accomplished despite the incom-
petence of the Russian Commanders-in-Chief, first of Prince
Menshikov, and then of his successor, Prince M. D. Gortchakov,
who was little better, but not as disagreeable. Neither of them had
any military skill but were appointed because of their noble birth.26
The Allied force commanders were unimpressive and unimagin-
ative but not as completely inept as the Russian high command and
in the end Pelissier's bulldog tenacity resulted in the fall of Seba-
stopol. The Duke of Newcastle, who arrived in the Crimea in August,
wrote to Clarendon a long carping letter27 at the end of the month,
saying he had put it off for weeks because what he had to say would
sound like sour grapes from an ex-Secretary of State. He was highly
critical of Simpson, who was just not up to the job, and even more
of Pelissier, who rode around the camp in an absurd coach and four
with a flock of attendants, and thought La Mamora, the Sardinian
commander, was far superior to both of them. He reported some
improvement in the Commissariat since Filder's departure, but much
remained to be done. The railway, he said, was not solidly
constructed and would probably wash away in the winter. The Land
Transport Corps was progressing, but unfortunate in its English

officers and men; the newly arrived Army Work Corps were a strag-
gling drunken lot. He was particularly caustic about the mal-
distribution of honours and promotions. 'This disregard of merit
and general reward of rank instead of service and the ill
judged promotions of the Lt. Generals', he wrote, 'are doing much
harm in the Army.'
This "..;s the second and gloomiest of half a dozen long letterszs
about the situation in the Black Sea theatre of war. He asked Clar-
endon in a later letter to be careful of what use he made of them,
but the Foreign Secretary, considering them valuable, had already
shown several to the Queen and various colleagues, some of whom
took offence. Palmerston sought to appease Panmure by quoting
Pope's sally against 'Chiefs out of War and Statesmen out of Place' .29
Despite Newcastle's opinion to the contrary, however, Pelissier
did have a plan, which he said he would not communicate to his
own pillow, much less to Simpson. In his view the Allies could accept
a setback such as that of 18 June because they were able to retreat
into their entrenched positions and reorganise themselves, but were
they to leave these positions and engage in battle in the interior
then defeat or even a drawn battle could have much more serious
consequences, 'far from their ports and resources and encumbered
with sick and wounded'.Jo
Consequently Pelissier's plan was simply to maintain the siege,
putting continuous pressure on the Russian defences until eventually
they would collapse, which is what happened. Throughout the
summer the bombardment of Sebastopol went on and the Allies
continued their sapping until the French system of trenches was
within 25 yards of the Malakoff itself. The British, sapping in front of
the Redan, eventually had to stop 200 yards short of the fortification
because of the rocky nature of the ground. As we have seen, all
through July the Russian daily losses were high, but they increased
to 635 per day from 5 to 24 August. The Allied soldiers in the front
line trenches also suffered casualties, but not on the same scale. 31
The grim transformation of the situation in Sebastopol is vividly
illustrated in two stories written by a young Russian officer, Leo
Tolstoi, who was a battery commander in the beleaguered city, and
published in a current Russian magazine, The Contemporary, after
some censorship. In the story entitled 'Sebastopol in May, 1855' we
get a picture of life going on as usual despite all the damage and
shortages, and see civilians and military promenading in the spring
sunshine on a Sunday morning. In the story 'Sebastopol in August,

1855', we see a city in ruins, dead and wounded everywhere, the
civilians all gone, the soldiers hurrying through the streets under
constant fire from the last terrible bombardment.32
On pressure from St Petersburg and despite the divided opinions
of his generals Gortchakov finally decided in mid-August, after the
arrival of reinforcements, to make an attack across the river T~her
naya on the Allied right flank. The battle fought on 16 August was
badly conceived and badly executed and the Russians were decisively
repulsed by the French army, supported by the Sardinians. They
suffered very heavy casualties, 4,315 dead and missing and some
4,000 wounded while the Allied casualties were only about 1,700. 33
After this battle the Allied bombardment was greatly stepped up
and the Russian casualties climbed to 2,000 a day.3 4 On 5 September
after a lull the Allied fire increased in intensity and at noon on the
8th, the hour at which Pelissier had learned the Russians changed
their guard, the French Army broke into the Malakoff, the key to
the Russian defences, which they eventually held after fierce and
prolonged fighting. On the far right the French were repulsed and
on the left the British failed to take the Redan, an even more difficult
target. Instead of employing two relatively fresh divisions Simpson
unaccountably assigned the attack to the 2nd and the Light Divisions,
already bled white, whose raw reinforcements were not equal to the
task.3 5
The occupation of the Malakoff was, however, decisive for its
possession gave the captors full command of the town and the
harbour. Gortchakov had for some time regarded the evacuation of
the south side as inevitable and had constructed a pontoon bridge
across the harbour to the north, although in the last week he had
obstinately determined to hang on. Now, however, he gave the
command for withdrawal to the dismay of many of his soldiers who
thought they had won the battle. The evacuation was skilfully
effected under cover of darkness on that night, while various strong
points and ammunition dumps were blown up and part of the town
set on fire. In the morning the Allies found it deserted and in flames.
Sebastopol, except the suburbs that lay north of the harbour, had
finally fallen after a siege of 339 days. The Russian losses in this final
bloody battle were 12,913, the French 7,567 and the British 2,271. 36
The unexpected fall of Sebastopol was not unlike the sudden
release of a door that has been pressed upon unavailingly for a long
time. Suddenly it flies open, in this case revealing a splendid if badly
damaged room, but one which still gave no access to the rest of the
house. It was only an empty hall that had been broken into. The
Russians had made an orderly evacuation from what had become an
untenable position, but they withdrew to a natural line of defence.
The long roadstead of Sebastopol separated them from the besieging
Allied armies, while to the east the high ground across the Tchernaya
River, which emptied into the eastern end of the roadstead, afforded
them strong defensive positions which they had occupied for the
previous twelve months. The situation was similar to that of the
previous year following the Allied victory on the Alma. Critics
quickly asserted that the Allied armies should have pressed onwards
immediately for the final kill while the enemy was off balance, just
as the year before it was argued Sebastopol lay open if the victors
had only followed through from their initial victory.
Newcastle, who watched the battle, hastened to send Clarendon
his congratulations and to give him an eye witness account, observing
that only now were the conditions fulfilled for an honourable peace
on better terms than those considered by the ill-fated Russell mission
of which he had never approved. The assault on the Redan, he
claimed, was quite unnecessary. Despite 'the pluck and valour' of
the officers, the men would not 'have it'. 'They have been so demora-
lized by this horrid trench work that they [illegible] to gabions as
foxes do to holes.' But he did not blame them for they were raw
boys sent in where experienced men should have been used. He
went on to give a dramatic account of 'the destruction by fire of a
town entirely built of stone', one of the most beautiful cities he had
ever seen. A few days later he wrote again to criticise the failure of
the Generals to follow up the victory. 'Here we are', he wrote,
'stupefied with unexpected and in one sense undeserved success -
paralyzed with victory - so astonished and stunned by our triumph
that we are motionless - apparently incapable of council as we are
of action. ' 37
III THE ALLIED FAILURE TO EXPLOIT THE VICTORY

AND THE REPLACEMENT OF SIMPSON BY
CODRINGTON
Palmerston and his colleagues were also much put out by the failure
of the generals to exploit their advantage. 'There has been a lull
after the victory', Clarendon wrote to Lansdowne, 'and I fear we
shall pay dearly for it. A considerable time might have been required
for reorganizing the armies after such a slaughter, but 15 days of
inactivity are unaccountable and inexcusable.' He presumed the
Russians were now fortifying their positions and would not evacuate
the Crimea 'whereas if the success had been followed up with any
vigour the Russians who were in utter confusion . . . might have
been driven anywhere'. Palmerston's exasperation was reflected in
returning to Wood a letter from Admiral Lyons: 'I'll fire an angry
telegraph at old Simpson today,' he wrote. 'Blow me if I don't-
Lyons letter is enough to provoke a saint. '38
Pelissier and Simpson took a very different view of their situation.
For almost a year their armies had been holding exposed positions
under the fire of enemy guns. The final attack that had led to the
Russian withdrawal had been a costly one, and not without its own
serious reverses. Casualties on both sides had been three times what
they were at the Alma. Pelissier regarded the enemy positions
beyond the Tchernaya as too strong to attack. He had won the prize
that his Emperor wanted and French honour was now satisfied.
Simpson was not the man to disagree. Indeed, in a later response to
Panmure's complaints he bluntly asserted, 'We continue to be, as
we have been ever since I came to the Crimea, a besieged army. . . . '
Indeed, a month after the fall of Sebastopol Simpson informed
Panmure that General Jones advised against the erection of batteries
to fire at the Russians on the North Side as the French were doing
since he was of the opinion that 'the casualties from a superior fire
would more than counterbalance any good result' f39
The bad reports of the British Army's failure to capture the Redan
and Simpson's failure to keep the Government fully informed and
to take any aggressive action after the evacuation of Sebastopol led
the Government to consider replacing him. As early as 10 September
Panmure was suggesting that Simpson should organise a forward
movement from Eupatoria to take the Russians in the rear or to
occupy Kaffa and other places along the coast, and on 15 September
he expressed the hope that Simpson and Pelissier were taking advan-
tage of the presumed demoralisation of the Russians and were giving
the enemy no rest 'till his overthrow or expulsion from the Crimea'
was completed. 'In order to keep this object properly in view', he
wrote, 'you must not suffer your mind to rest upon any expectation
of peace; your duty as a general is to keep your army in the best
condition for offence, and to turn your attention to all means within
your power for so doing.' This was softened by a private letter in
which he informed Simpson that he was to receive a GCB and the

Legion of Honour and that his rank of General was to be made
substantive. (Clarendon cuttingly commented that in addition to
these awards Simpson 'ought to have a Court Martial besides'
because of the British Army's failure at the Redan. )40
Two days later Panmure bluntly complained: 'We cannot tell why
you are resting on your oars. You neither fire nor lay plans for
attack, nor tell us what you are doing with what you have got.'
'Don't waste yourself in idleness', he warned his general, telling him
to act as he saw fit and not play second fiddle to Pelissier. On
22 September he warned Simpson not to delude himself with 'expec-
tations of a second Vienna', for that Panmure considered impossible
while there was a Russian soldier left in the Crimea or a Russian
army in Georgia (from where the Russians were laying siege to
Kars). 'I am most anxious you should not think that you have done
enough', he wrote two days later, and urged Simpson and Lyons to
apply a hot poker to Pelissier, a most unlikely occurrence! Then
on 26 September Panmure sent Simpson a peremptory telegram
complaining that the recently received despatches gave no details or
information regarding the enemy and his designs. 'The public are
getting impatient', he wrote, 'to know what the Russians are about.
The Government desire immediately to be informed whether either
you or Pelissier have taken any steps whatever to ascertain this, and
further they observe that nearly 3 weeks have elapsed in absolute
idleness. This cannot go on and in justice to yourself and your army
you must prevent it. Answer this on its receipt.'41
This was too much for Simpson. After mulling it over for forty-
eight hours he telegraphed his resignation. 'I could not continue in
command while the Government considers that I and my Army are
passing our time in absolute idleness', he explained in a letter written
on the same day. He insisted that he and Pelissier were acting wisely,
arguing that were they to divide their forces with a large operation
from Eupatoria they would leave Balaclava open to a Russian attack.
'Nearly the whole army is employed on the roads', he added. 'It will
be as much as we can do to make them passable before the wet
weather. ' 42
The Government lost no time in accepting Simpson's resignation,
although Panmure was grieved that his 'old friend' should have been
so thin-skinned. 'It would appear nowadays that nothing but honeyed
words are to be accepted,' he commented somewhat tartly on
receiving the telegram of resignation. He was anxious, however,
that, in his own interests, Simpson should resign on grounds of his

health, which was bad, and within a few weeks their differences
began to thaw and Panmure was proposing that they should be
settled over a bottle of claret on the General's return. This, as it
happened, was postponed rather longer than might have been
expected, because of the difficulty of deciding on a replacement. 43
Although Codrington had been secretly designated Simpson's
successor in the event of anything happening to the Commander-in-
Chief, the Government now began to have second thoughts because
of his alleged failure in commanding the attack on the Redan on
8 September. Newcastle, who had earlier recommended Codrington,
wrote again after the battle to say he was 'bound in candour' to tell
them that Codrington 'showed sad lack of the necessary qualities of a
General on the attack on the Redan'. 'The misfortune is', Palmerston
observed to Clarendon, 'that one sees nobody else who would be
better than Codrington.' Knowing Codrington's father well, Palmer-
stan did not believe the General was likely to be a man of genius,
but his brother had the reputation of being a 'good officer' in the
Navy, 'and if our Codrington is only a good officer he will be an
improvement upon what we now have,' he concluded in a sentence
that says much about the military problem in the Crimea. Sir Colin
Campbell, Codrington's senior, who had had a more distinguished
and colourful career, was favoured by the Court, as well as by others
including Argyll and Russell, but Hardinge opposed his appointment
and earlier Simpson had said that he was not fit for independent
command. 'The objections to Sir Colin Campbell', Palmerston
explained to Queen Victoria, 'were want of temper, want of firmness
and of steadiness under responsibility, and old fashioned adherence
to routine and disinclination to all improvement.' Sir Colin was apt
to rub people up the wrong way and was thought to lack the tact
needed for dealing with the French allies, yet two years later he
commanded the British Army that brought the Indian Mutiny to an
end. The Duke of Cambridge and Sir George Brown, who had
recovered from his illness, were both anxious to return to the Crimea,
but neither was regarded a~ suitable. Even Panmure recognised that
Brown was too much of a martinet of the old school, despite other
good soldierly qualities, while the Duke of Cambridge, who had not
shown up well under fire at lnkerman, had no qualifications other
than royal blood. 44
The Cabinet could see no alternative to Codrington (Clarendon
called it a 'Hobson's choice'), but put off a final decision until mid-
October in order to allow time to sound out opinion about him and
his role in the Redan fiasco, which Panmure finally concluded was
not his responsibility. In the end it was decided to appoint
Codrington and Panmure wrote to the three Generals who were
being passed over, asking for their understanding and co-operation.
'It appeared to us that on the whole Sir William Codrington is
the best for the chief command', Palmerston informed the Queen.
'Though perhaps not a man of genius he is a good officer is a
gentleman and intelligent in his manners [sic], speaks French well
and being of a conciliatory disposition though not wanting in firmness
he is the most likely to get on well with the French Commander in
Chief.... ' Simpson, who favoured Brown, the most senior candi-
date, said the three other divisional commanders would want to
resign, but they all accepted the decision. It was made easier for
Campbell, since it was decided at the suggestion of Prince Albert to
break the army up into two corps, one of which he was invited
to command. The other corps fell to Sir William Eyre, its acting
commander pending the arrival of General Markham who died
shortly after he had been appointed. Thus in both this case and that
of the army command Panmure put what he considered merit before
seniority without the threatened resignations. 45
The Queen was most indignant at an article in The Times, criti-
cising the army command which observed that England had not had
a good general in fifty years and did not appear capable of producing
more than one in a century. She even suggested that all persons
connected with The Times should be excluded from 'higher society',
but Palmerston pointed out the difficulties. Clarendon explained that
while Delane was away (visiting the Crimea) the paper was in the
hands of '3 or 4 ignorant men' who were 'completely indifferent' to
the consequences of what they printed and that while Walter, the
proprietor, might have seen the impropriety of the offending leader,
'the policy of the paper [was] never to admit it was in the wrong'! 46
Meanwhile the ministers remained in the dark as to what was
happening in the Crimea. 'The only news that Simpson has vouch-
safed was received last night', Clarendon informed Russell on
18 September, 'viz that they could not commence operations until
they knew what the enemy intended to do!' In mid-October he
undoubtedly reflected ministerial exasperation with the army
command when he wrote to Palmerston:
everything connected with our military system is inferior to the

French and we have by no means improved or profited by experi-

ence as we might and ought to have done during the last 12
months - the war has not brought to light any military talent and
the best proof of that is that in replacing that poor old woman
Simpson who succeeded Raglan of whom we had so much reason
to complain we have only been able to select among the different
grades of incompetency. There is not a letter I see which does not
contain evidence that the discipline of the army is gone and The
Times has taken care to trumpet all over the world that our troops
were panic stricken on the 8th.
We can't help this and the Government can't make inferior men
better than they are but there is no use in concealing from
ourselves our true position in the eyes of foreign nations -which is
far from satisfactory- in fact our prestige has greatly diminished.47
The Court had been particularly critical of Simpson, as the Queen
indicated in a letter to Panmure expressing disappointment in the
General's reports 'showing a total want of energy of mind on his
part'. Prince Albert went much further in an emotional letter written
on 11 October in which he commented that General Simpson's last
despatches were 'really too lamentable!' The victorious Allied armies
now well outnumbered the Russians and yet General Simpson could
write:
The enemy is doing what I always thought he would, strengthening
himself on the North Side, with a view to holding it as well as the
west of the Crimea. We cannot attack his impregnable position in
front; the reconnaissance by Baidar has proved that as we always
thought, his left cannot be turned on account of the ground, and
we dare not divide our Army! for we might be attacked, so we
are making roads!! [Prince Albert's paraphrase.]
'How can a Commander-in-Chief believe that 200,000 men are sent

to Sebastopol to make roads?' the Prince wanted to know. 4B
In the same vein Clarendon complained to Palmerston: 'It is quite
absurd to talk of holding Sebastopol as un gage when we have not
got it and can't go into it and when fresh batteries have been erected
in the north side while none on the south have been prepared to
answer them.' He presumed that Pelissier and his staff were simply
anxious to get back to France. 49
Even if Simpson had been disposed to do so it would have been
difficult for him to play a more active role without Pelissier's co-
operation. The most that Pelissier was prepared to do was to regroup

the French army less one division along the Tchernaya River, to
authorise a reconnaissance of the Baidar Valley, to strengthen the
garrison of Eupatoria with French cavalry and, finally, to agree to a
joint Anglo-French expedition against the port of Kinburn at the
mouth of the Dnieper River. The Baider reconnaissance satisfied
him that the Russian positions in the highlands extending north-east
to Simpheropol were impregnable. The French cavalry operating
from Eupatoria had some minor successes in harrying the Russian
line of communications, but no attempt was made to follow this up
with more extensive operations for the Allied commanders were very
apprehensive of suffering a reverse as a result of dividing their forces.
Simpson reported on 6 October that he had sent a brigade of cavalry
and a troop of artillery to Eupatoria, but resisted pressure to extend
activities in that area by pleading lack of transport and later lack of
water. In early October the French Army also made a reconnaissance
in force along the road from Eupatoria to Simpheropol and made
contact with the Russians. They soon withdrew, however, for lack
of water and forage and the garrison of Eupatoria was subsequently
reduced for the same reason. The Turkish troops there were reported
to be in a deplorable condition.so
In mid-October an Anglo-French seaborne expedition carrying
5,000 British and 4,000 French troops, after making a feint against
Odessa, carried out a brilliantly successful operation against
Kinburn, a fortified place at the end of a long peninsula enclosing
the estuary of the Dnieper River, guarding the approaches to
Kherson and Nikolaev. The troops were landed on the peninsula
several miles south-east of the fortifications to cut off the retreat of
the garrison and to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. Meanwhile
under cover of darkness the narrow entry to the Dnieper estuary
had been reconnoitred and marked with buoys enabling a squadron
of gunboats to pass through the strait and anchor on the north side
of Kinburn. The fortifications were then bombarded from both sides
by the combined fleets until the garrison of some 1,400 survivors
surrendered. A French regiment supported by a naval detachment
was left in possession of Kinburn to retain command of this strategic
point between Odessa and the Crimea. It was the final Allied oper-
ation of the war and a further blow to Russian prestige.sl
Before the end of October the French Emperor ceased to be
interested in the war and was prepared to re-open peace nego-
tiations. Pelissier recommended the withdrawal of the bulk of the
army from the Crimea, leaving only some 50,000 troops to hold the
western Chersonese peninsula as un gage or bargaining counter. The
Emperor was prepared to accept this advice because of difficulties
that faced him at home. 'H.M. has been thoroughly frightened',
Cowley wrote to Clarendon, 'by the Minister of Finance who tells
him that he has only money to carry on the war until the spring,
that a new loan would not take, and that the people would resist the
imposition of fresh taxes.' There were also reports of great distress
in the south of France, where the war and conscription had become
most unpopular. Clarendon thought this might explain the Emperor's
desire to bring the army back, 'as well as to enable him to talk big
to Germany'. 52
Napoleon first warned Cowley on 17 October that Pelissier's views
might make it necessary 'to retire upon the lines of Kamiesch [the
French base port in the Crimea] after completely destroying Seva-
stopol, and either reembark the Army to return home, or make an
attack elsewhere- holding, however, Kamiesch, Kertch, Eupatoria,
and he hopes Kinbourn, and waging a defensive war in the Crimea
until peace [was] made.' Three days later Marshal Vaillant sent
Panmure the concrete French proposals for reducing the Allied army
in the Crimea to 70,000 (30,000 French, 20,000 Turks, 15,000 English
and 5,000 Sardinians). He indicated that the Emperor regarded this
as a matter of urgency, but insisted that they must act in concert.s3
On 22 October Cowley reported further arguments made by the
Emperor:
What was the good of keeping an army together to do nothing?

The men would become demoralized and public opinion would be
excited against both governments. He maintained moreover that
... [if the proposal were carried out] the moral weight of the
Allies would be greater than it is now. Russia would not know
where the next blow was to fall. Austria and Prussia, who now
felt that there was no French Army to menace them, would be
more inclined to listen to the expostulations of the Allies. France
and England would be relieved of an inconvenient expense, for
with their armies gone in part, they could dispense with a part of
their fleets.54
A few days later, Cowley was shown a further pessimistic despatch

from Pelissier, who claimed that the English had a misconception of
the situation.
What conquests can we make in the Crimea or even in Southern

Russia [the General wrote)? Sterile plains which the Russians will
abandon after some battles in which they will lose a few thousand
men, a loss which causes them no decisive damage, whilst at every
step the Allies with a great sacrifice of men and money and with
nothing to gain will risk each day the destinies of Europe.ss
Pelissier evidently could not forget the fate of the French Army the
first Napoleon led into Russia.
Clarendon wasted no time in letting Cowley know that the Govern-
ment was 'dead against the Emperor's notion of withdrawing the
Army from the Crimea', which, he said, would be regarded as a
retreat. Moreover, he added in a further letter, it would be very
inconvenient, for where would the troops go? When Marshal Vail-
lant's formal proposals were put before the Cabinet they were
considered 'most anxiously'. They had no desire to force their views
on the Emperor, Clarendon told Cowley,but they could not justify
in Parliament the withdrawal of half the British Army; 'we should
be utterly disgraced', he wrote, 'and the two parties into which the
country is now divided would join in impeaching us, the war party
for having abandoned the field of battle - the peace party for having
given an advantage to Russia which would encourage her to prolong
the war.' It was generally recognised, he argued, that 'the military
prestige of Russia had received a tremendous shock' and that conse-
quently it would be madness to abandon the Crimea for the decision
would be compared to that of the Russians to withdraw from Seba-
stopol. Cowley, of course, reported these views to the French
Government and Clarendon told him that Persigny had sent a strong
despatch to Paris putting the British view that the Allied armies
should remain 'in the strongest terms'. The Foreign Secretary argued
that positive orders should be given to the generals 'to drive the
Russians out of the Crimea before the season closes - if that is
impossible to harass them in every way during the winter'. 56
In the first week in November Lord Lansdowne visited Paris and
had two long conversations with the Emperor. He told Louis Napo-
leon that it was his 'deliberate conviction that no government in
England could stand any withdrawal of forces from the Crimea' at
that time, a statement which the Emperor made him 'repeat more
than once'. Lansdowne told Cowley he did not think the Emperor
was obstinately bent on withdrawal, but that he felt he must have
something to show for keeping his troops in the Crimea. Cowley
suggested that the Allies should hold a Council of War to plan

future operations, an idea which Clarendon approved and which the
Emperor took up with enthusiasm.57
Gradually after a period of uncertainty the danger of a French
withdrawal passed, just as in the spring the Emperor finally gave up
the idea of taking over command of the Crimean Army himself. On
16 November the Duke of Cambridge, who was representing Queen
Victoria at the close of the Paris Exhibition, informed Clarendon
that the Emperor no longer seemed to be so bent on evacuation
and that he did not think any large withdrawal of troops was now
contemplated. The Emperor told the Duke that he was 'greatly
embarrassed by his position, having no confidence in his Generals',
who rejected his plans but had nothing to offer in their place. He
said he was 'determined not to have a third fruitless campaign in the
Crimea', but that he was anxious to hold 'a great Council of War'
to decide on future operations. 58 From time to time the rumbles
were renewed, as in a receding thunderstorm, but the crisis had
passed. Some front-line French regiments that had been in the
Crimea since the beginning were replaced by fresh troops from
France, but there does not appear to have been any substantial
reduction in numbers except through sickness. Napoleon III kept his
troops in the Crimea, mainly, it would seem, in deference to his
British ally, but their heart was clearly no longer in what they were
doing.
IV THE SECOND WINTER AND PLANS FOR 1856
In the winter of 1855-56 the French Army suffered heavy losses

from illness, while the British remained healthy, thus quite reversing
the situation of the previous winter. The Times correspondent who
had then brought home to the British public the horrors of that
experience now gave a very different picture. The temperature had
fallen to minus 8 degrees, he reported on 21 December, but, in
contrast to the sad situation in the French Army, all was well in the
British camp: 'The whole of our men are well clothed and well
fed and are in capital health and spirits ... ', he wrote. 'Really the
difference between this winter and last is extraordinary.' The only
danger, he claimed with some exaggeration, was from snowballs,
although some officers went perilously close to the line of the Tcher-
naya while out game shooting. 'Civilized amusements' were the order
of the day, as officers of the 4th Division entertained their fellow

officers and select audiences of other ranks to stage productions of
Box and Cox and Married and Settled.S 9
Indeed, with the arrival in the Crimea of reinforcements from
England and Malta and of the British trained Turkish contingent
and the newly formed Foreign Contingent assembling near Constant-
inople, the number of troops under British command was coming
closer to equality with the French. By the end of December,
according to Prince Albert, the British Crimean army consisted of
52,000 British troops, plus the Turkish Contingent of 18,000 and
6,000 men of the Foreign Legion on the Bosphorus, which, with
15,000 Sardinians (financially supported by the British Government),
made a total of 91,000 men (not 80,000 as he put it).60 Therefore
Palmerston and his supporters were anxious to fight another
campaign in order to give the British Army an opportunity of
recovering its military reputation, tarnished in the failure at the
Redan, and of forcing the Russians to accept stiffer peace terms.
The Times' leaders, however, which the year before had so success-
fully attacked Lord Aberdeen's military administration, continued
to fire occasional broadsides at the aristocratic military system that
had survived. The first leader of the new year bewailed the failure
to find a great general.
A deep distrust of our military system has taken possession of all
minds [it pontificated in a heavy piece of Victorian prose] ... a
feeling is abroad which will never be satisfied until the soldier is
treated by the same liberality and fairness as other servants of the
public. The absence of military education among our officers and
their inferiority, as a class, to those of the semi-barbarous Power
to which we are opposed, are painful and humiliating to a nation
not wont to yield to any foreign competition, and the invidious
privileges attached to wealth, to power, to birth, and to interest,
which have recently been so publicly and so injudiciously paraded,
are assuredly not destined long to survive the general condem-
nation of the people.
The next day it attempted to survey the state of the Navy and
the Army. 'The whole spirit of the naval profession seems to have
changed,' it lamented. 'From the most daring it has become the most
cautious, from the most dangerous, the safest of the professions.'
Claiming that great opportunities had been missed it continued: 'The
English navy has its laurels to win and for the English navy not to
win those laurels in two years, is in fact, to lose them.' As for the
army, 'having suffered in 1854 from being too lean, it may suffer in
1856 from being too fat. Then it was starved, now it runs some
danger of being coddled.' It allowed that the men were in 'splendid
condition', but claimed they were in need of 'example and oppor-
tunity', which it would be hard to obtain 'under Generals to whom
everything [was] impossible'. 'A military system that was not robust
enough to bear the trials of a siege', it concluded, 'is not likely to
regain credit in a campaign in the open field.'
Ironically, while The Times correspondent was praising conditions
in the camp, its leader writer decrying the failure of aristocratic
leadership and the Prime Minister taking consolation in increased
numbers, the new Commander-in-Chief in the Crimea was frankly
writing to Panmure about continuing problems that faced the Army,
especially concerning the Land Transport Corps, which needed
drastic reorganisation, and which according to Colonel Wetheral,
the officer in command, was 'in a deplorable state from overwork
and insufficient establishments'. 'By Sir Wm Codrington's account,
it is clear that the army is even now totally unfit to move, which is
a very serious question', Queen Victoria had commented to Panmure
about some earlier proposals received from Codrington regarding the
Land Transport Corps. Returning Codrington's letters, Clarendon
observed: 'they are melancholy as exhibiting a state of things the
result of all the wisdom of England of boundless expense and of two
years experience, an army ill-lodged, over-paid and unable to move!
It is enough to break the heart of everybody both out there and at
home.' He took comfort, however, that Codrington was 'fully alive
to the realities', which was more than he was ever able to say of the
General's predecessors.6J
It may be presumed that the optimistic Palmerston anticipated
that Codrington would have straightened out the Land Transport
difficulties by the spring, but their existence may eventually have
helped the Government to decide on the acceptance of peace terms
that they earlier considered insufficient. The less sanguine Clarendon
may well have been influenced by these considerations at the peace
conference just as Russell had clearly been upset by Raglan's gloomy
advice the preceding year.
On his return to England in December, Newcastle proposed a
British expedition to the Christian provinces at the eastern end of
the Black Sea, an area over which Turkey had surrendered its claims
to Russia earlier in the century, but which the Russians had never
fully subdued. At the same time he warned that England should 'not
commit these poor people by making their country the theatre of
war and then leave them to the vengeance of Russia by taking no
account of them in the terms of peace'. Palmerston had made a
similar proposal to Lansdowne a few days earlier combined with a
French landing either in the Ukraine or in the Baltic against Finland
or St Petersburg. On 3 January 1856 the Cabinet drew up instructions
for its representatives at the Council of War which met in Paris the
following week, favouring the Black Sea plan, but Argyll warned
that it might seem to have 'an Anglo-Indian aspect' and lead to
divisions. 62
The Council of War considered a variety of plans involving the
eastern end of the Black Sea (in which the French showed little
interest) and the Baltic, but the main consideration was given to
driving the Russians out of the Crimea. Subsequently the Emperor
vetoed the British idea of simultaneous campaigns, arguing that all
the Allied forces were needed to complete the Crimean operation.
It was finally agreed that one Allied army, mainly French, led by
Pelissier, would attack the Russian lines of communication from
Eupatoria, while a second army, mainly British, led by Codrington
would hold the line of the Tcheernaya river ready to advance as
opportunity arose. The British Government demanded an early
campaign in order to allow time for a follow-up operation on the
Asian front and for this reason insisted that if an armistice was signed
before then it should have a deadline of 31 March.63
As the peace conference approached, these plans must have
seemed more and more unreal, but some steps to implement them
were taken and may have had some influence on the Russians during
the negotiations. Panmure was one of the last to accept the likelihood
of peace. 'I am neither warlike nor peaceable', he told Granville,
'but I say that if we cannot have an honourable peace, we must have
a bloody war. '64 In December he had told Codrington to ignore all
rumours of peace unless he wrote to the contrary, but on 21 January
he had to admit that in the midst of the current peace negotiations
'one can scarcely bring one's mind to settle definitely upon future
arrangements for war'. 'With the exception of John Bull', he
moaned, 'everybody leans to peace.' Nevertheless, a few days later
in a letter going into details about the anticipated operations he told
the General that peace was still 'but a rumour' and that he was not
to relax any of his preparations for a 'keen and vigorous campaign'.
Palmerston was delighted with his War Minister's attitude and wrote
to him on 3 February: 'You are quite right to go on doing everything

as if there was no prospect of peace; your active preparations will
be as persuasive as the eloquence of our negotiations'. Codrington
was uncertain how far he should go in his preparations, but assured
Panmure: 'There is no truce here, or idea of it, in practice on the
part of the Russians: they fire away.' On 25 February, however,
Panmure had to admit 'Peace progresses apace', and while not giving
any official instructions to Codrington to discontinue any expendi-
tures he suggested, 'still you may quietly so arrange with the Commis-
sary-General that, in the event of peace, we may not find ourselves
burdened with large or extensive contracts'. The next day he
admitted that the peace conference had opened, but added hope-
fully: 'You may rely on this, that, however probable peace may be,
there are depths in these conferences in which the best informed
expectations may founder in a moment.' Finally, however, the
second week in March he had to admit that peace seemed 'now
inevitable'. 'I am drawing in all my horns here as speedily, but as
quietly, as I can', he added ruefully.6s
Before we turn to the events leading up to the signing of a peace
treaty, however, we must first briefly consider the course of the war
on other fronts and the recruitment crisis with the United States.
V THE WAR ON THE OTHER FRONTS
The war with Russia was not confined to the Crimea. In 1855 a
second and larger Allied fleet under the command of Admiral Sir
Richard S. Dundas66 again blockaded the Russians in the Baltic. It
consisted of over eighty British ships, nineteen of them steamships
of the line, and some sixteen French vessels. They penetrated the
Gulf of Finland to the environs of Cronstadt, the main Russian naval
base, less than 30 miles west of St Petersburg, but it proved too
strongly defended to attack. Sveaborg and Fredericksham on the
north coast of the Gulf were bombarded and a fort near Lovisa was
captured by a landing party and blown up. The main achievement
of the fleet in the Baltic, however, was the maintenance of the
blockade on the Russian ports, the destruction of some 80,000 tons
of Russian shipping and the tying down of a large Russian army
along the Baltic ~oastline. A foray was even made by a few British
ships into the remote White Sea, which was to become an all too
familiar battleground for the Royal Navy in the Second World War. 67
Nevertheless, Palmerston was not satisfied with what had been done
and in a letter to Wood caustically observed that this Admiral
Dundas was 'little better suited for the Baltic than his namesake was
for the Black Sea'. He suggested that Admiral Lyons, the other
Dundas's successor, should be transferred to the Baltic since the
Admiral's job in the Black Sea was now confined to supervising
transports. Before the year was finished the Royal Navy was planning
a third Baltic campaign for 1856, which, according to Clarendon,
much impressed the French who anticipated that it would 'double
up Russia'. 68
There were also some desultory naval operations in the north
Pacific in 1855 as there had been in 1854. The Anglo-French squad-
rons in this remote area had little to show for their efforts, but they
forced the Russians to evacuate Petropaulovsk on the Kamchatka
peninsula and bottled up the Russian ships in the area in the mouth
of the Amur River. 69 Even on the far eastern shores of their vast
empire the Russians found themselves on the defensive in the face
of the guns of the ubiquitous Royal Navy. None of these naval
operations in 1855 had any very significant results, but they were a
reminder of British sea power when ships of the Royal Navy could
penetrate Russian waters from the environs of St Petersburg in the
west to those of Vladivostok in the far east and sail unchallenged on
the inland waters of the Black Sea.
Closely connected with operations in the Baltic were prolonged
negotiations for a defensive treaty with Sweden concluded in
November 1855. By this treaty Britain and France guaranteed
Sweden against Russian aggression. There was also a secret annex
providing for Sweden's entry into the war, but the final peace nego-
tiations were begun before this could happen.7
The second land front was in Asia Minor where the Russians had
pressed the Turks in previous wars.7 1 They had occupied eastern
Armenia and the Black Sea coastline north of Batoum in 1828, but
had agreed to withdraw from Erzeroum, the provincial capital, and
the ancient frontier fortress of Kars, by the Treaty of Adrianople in
1829. In 1854, a Russian army based on Georgia again took the
offensive in Armenia and on 4 August defeated the badly led Turkish
army which withdrew to Kars. In the late summer the British Govern-
ment, concerned about the consequences of this offensive, sent out
a British officer, Colonel William Fenwick Williams (1800-83), who
arrived in the area in September. He was shocked by the poor state
of the Turkish troops and by the lack of defence preparations, but
especially by the fraud, corruption and dissoluteness of the senior

Turkish officers, and sent back a stream of despatches to the British
ambassador in Constantinople, indicating all that was wrong and
what needed to be done. Stratford neglected to answer these
communications for some months to Williams' chagrin, but he did
succeed in persuading the Turkish Government to make Williams a
ferik or general in the Turkish army, and to replace the delinquent
Turkish commander by an elderly and inexperienced but respectable
'Mushir', who was instructed to work closely with Williams. Strat-
ford, however, was less successful in persuading the Government to
send out the much needed supplies, reinforcements and cash to pay
the troops. Nevertheless, Williams, who had become the effective
commander, with a small British staff did a remarkable job in
erecting defence work at Erzeroum and Kars and in raising some
food supplies locally. In June an initial Russian reconnaissance of
Kars was repulsed, but the much larger Russian army soon
outflanked the town, cutting off the road to Erzeroum, and by
August had completely invested it.
By July the Turkish Government was finally persuaded that the
relief of Kars must be attempted, but instead of sending troops by
Trebizond over the mountains via Erzeroum, they decided on a
diversionary expedition landing on the Circassian coast which would
strike inland towards Kutais to cut the Russian lines of communi-
cations about a hundred miles north of Kars. This force was to
consist of a Turkish contingent being trained by British officers under
the command of General Robert Vivian and an assortment of
garrison troops drawn from various parts of the Turkish Empire.
Initially the British Government strongly opposed this proposal,
favouring direct relief through Trebizond, but when Orner Pasha
returned to Constantinople and proposed to head the expedition with
some of his Crimean army Palmerston supported it and persuaded a
reluctant Louis Napoleon to do the same. Pelissier, however, failed
to release the Turkish troops from the Crimea until after the fall of
Sebastopol, and Orner's army was not assembled on the Circassian
coast, where they landed unopposed, until October.
Meanwhile, the garrison and inhabitants of Kars were in very
straitened circumstances as their food supplies were nearing exhaus-
tion, but on 29 September the Turkish army under Williams' ,direc-
tion won an amazing victory repulsing a full scale attack on the
citadel by the Russians and forcing them to withdraw with great
losses. It was a noble and dramatic effort, but to no avail. Orner's
force proceeded inland slowly and won one victory over the retiring
Russians, but in face of the onset of winter weather early in
November they were forced to withdraw when they were only a few
miles short of Kutais. By this time some Turkish troops had arrived
in Erzeroum but their commander refused to advance to the relief
of Kars without additional reinforcements. It was then too late for
the inhabitants of Kars were now dying of starvation and on
28 November Williams was forced to surrender.
Nobody came out of the fall of Kars very well except for the brave
Turkish garrison and its European officers. The British blamed the
French for their dilatoriness in agreeing to a relief expedition, and
the Turks for their failure to keep the Kars garrison properly supplied
and reinforced, the Turks blamed the British for their delay in
advancing a promised war loan with which grain supplies could be
bought for Kars. Karl Marx was one of the severest critics of British
policy in England with a scathing series of articles in the Chartist
People's Paper, later published as a pamphlet, which was based on
a slanted study of the recently published Blue Book. Admiral Slade,
the British commander of the Turkish fleet later argued with some
force that the Kars garrison should have been withdrawn before it
was surrounded, but ironically the Russian success made it easier for
the Czar to agree to peace negotiations and as we shall see the place
was eventually returned to Turkey. n
The war was over by the time the Government Blue Book was
published. A private member, J. Whiteside, an Irish Conservative,
provoked a three-night debate with a motion condemning the
Government's failure to take the necessary steps to forestall the fall
of Kars, but he spoiled his case by an overlong speech and the use
of extreme language in attacking Lord Stratford. The Opposition
was somewhat divided and the Government easily survived with a
majority of 127. The fall of Kars has received little attention from
modern historians of the Crimean War, but its fate was a matter of
some consequence in the peace negotiations.73
VI ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE FOREIGN

ENLISTMENT CRISIS, 1855
Anglo-American relations were strained throughout the Crimean

War, despite the British abandonment of her old claims to right of
search in wartime and of a temporary settlement of the outstanding
fisheries question in the reciprocity treaty of 1854 governing Amer-

ican trade with British North America. Throughout the war there
were serious differences over Central America. The Americans
charged that the British claim to control of the Bay Islands south of
Belize and a protectorate over the Indians of the Mosquito Coast
violated the Monroe Doctrine and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of
1850. The British Government denied these charges and denounced
the bombardment of the British settlement of Greytown on the
Mosquito coast by an American sloop of war in 1853.74
A new crisis blew up when early in 1855 the British Government
began to attempt the recruitment of volunteers for the Crimea in the
United States under the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act passed
in December 1854 and their cavalier manner of doing so may in part
be explained by their soreness over the Greytown affair.75 J. F. T.
Crampton, the British minister in Washington, was given the virtually
impossible task of recruiting volunteers for the British Foreign
Legion without infringing the stringent terms of the American
Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818. He worked out a plan with Sir John
Gaspard Le Merchant, Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, who
undertook to set up and advertise a recruiting depot in Halifax. Le
Marchant obtained the enthusiastic assistance of the versatile Joseph
Howe, an able and distinguished Nova Scotia politician. The latter
proceeded to Washington and took over the appointment of agents,
the contacts with consuls and general supervision of recruiting from
Crampton, who provided him with Secret Service funds. Howe was
enthusiastic in the cause, but not too discriminating in his choice of
agents, nor too scrupulous in adhering to the restrictions of the
Neutrality Act. He believed he was doing what was wanted and
shielding the minister who could not have run the risks he was
prepared to take.76
The American authorities soon got wind of what was happening
and began to block the activities of Howe's agents and to make
arrests, while Crampton assured Marcy, the Secretary of State, that
the activities complained of were unauthorised. When Howe had to
return to Nova Scotia in May Crampton virtually took over the
direction of the recruiting, deluding himself, to judge by his letters
to Clarendon, that by acting more cautiously than Howe, he could
remain within the law. He made an extended visit to Nova Scotia
and Canada and unwisely arranged the despatch of a number of
European officers across the border from Canada West to recruit
among their own nationals in Buffalo, Cleveland and Detroit.77
In the meantime Marcy was addressing a protest about the

recruiting through his minister in London, James Buchanan. Clar-
endon replied on 16 July with a bland denial of any wrongdoing and
announced that orders had been sent to Crampton on 22 June to
abandon the project. This was eventually done, although there were
delays and initially some exceptions. The whole operation had been
a sorry mess and despite the great risks that were taken and the
considerable expenditure, no more than 700 recruits were raised.
Most of the agents failed to fulfil their promises and some proved
quite untrustworthy. In connection with the trial of one of them
evidence was given, which Crampton rejected as fabrication, impli-
cating him and three British consuls. Marcy continued to press his
complaints and Clarendon to rebut them until on 28 December the
American Government formally demanded Crampton's recall. This
ominous despatch was not communicated to Clarendon until the end
of January by which time he was preparing to leave for the peace
conference in Paris that was to bring the Crimean War to an end
before the enlistment issue had been resolved.78
6 The Drift to Peace
I THE HOME FRONT AFTER THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL
The Palmerston Government had survived the session of 1855

without too much difficulty. It had suffered from divisions on its own
side of the House but the Opposition was not unanimous. Derby
had missed his chance to form a government and for the time being
there seemed to be no real alternative to Palmerston. Indeed, at this
time the relations between Derby and Disraeli became rather
strained as Disraeli began a move for peace in his newspaper, The
Press. A rumour was spread by The Times about a peace coalition
of Bright, Disraeli and Gladstone, which Bright and Aberdeen separ-
ately described as an absurdity. But early in October Bright had
raised the possibility of the Conservatives taking up the cause of
peace in a letter to Cobden to whom he wrote: 'I would act on that
question with any set of men that would try to put an end to the
war and I am sure that Gladstone would do the same.' Aberdeen
wrote to Edward Ellice in similar terms saying that only as members
might turn to Gladstone's views on peace could it be said that a
coalition de facto existed. 'In like manner,' he added, 'if D'Israeli
should have the sense to arrive at this conclusion earlier than his
neighbours, you may also call this a Coalition if you please.' 1
Lord Derby was much disturbed when he heard of Disraeli's views
from Joliffe, the chief Conservative whip, and wrote to his leader in
the Commons with some sharpness:
You seem to think that a party which has shrunk from the responsi-
bility of carrying on the war is bound to prepare the public mind
for a statesmanlike peace; that a war-opposition and a war-
Ministry cannot co-exist - that nothing can serve the party but
presenting a policy,- and that we should be degraded by stimu-
lating the war after declining to conduct it.
He declared that he did not agree with these views and would have
nothing to do with raising a peace cry for political purposes.
Although he made a somewhat disingenuous attempt to soften his
remarks in a closing sentence and assured Joliffe that he had
'studiously avoided' any unpleasantness, this was a harsh letter and
Disraeli made no response until Joliffe told him one was expected.
136
The Drift to Peace 137
Disraeli then wrote saying that he did not think 'that controversy
between them was desirable or could be agreeable', but politely
claimed that Derby's letter had failed to convince him that his
reported remarks were unfounded. Consequently he maintained that
'silence and inertness' were their wisest course. Disraeli was not
easily put down and two weeks later Derby received another letter
in Disraeli's hand marked 'Secret and most confidential', but signed
'You know who'! It brought news, which later proved to be auth-
entic, of an Austrian peace proposal recommended by France. The
letter also contained an additional tit-bit that Palmerston was plan-
ning to blow up Cronstadt with newly invented 'submarine ships'.
The Derby-Disraeli alliance was a strange one.z
Meanwhile Palmerston was faced with the necessity of finding two
new members for his Cabinet to replace Molesworth, who died in
October, and Canning, who went out to India in November as
Governor General. He was greatly in need of debating talent in the
Commons and, ignoring party considerations, to everyone's surprise,
offered the Colonial Office to Derby's son, Lord Stanley, who, but
for filial loyalty, might have been a Liberal. When Stanley declined
after consulting his father, Palmerston approached Sidney Herbert,
who, he told the Queen, was 'the most promising man of his standing
in the Commons' and who, as a good speaker, would greatly streng-
then the ranks on the Treasury bench. After some friendly
discussion, however, Herbert also declined because of their different
views about peace. In the end Henry Labouchere (1798-1869), an
old Whig politician who had served in the Melbourne and Russell
Cabinets, was appointed Colonial Secretary and, after some other
cabinet shuffles, M. T. Baines (1799-1860, elder brother of the better
known Edward Baines, editor of the Leeds Mercury), was appointed
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The Queen gave her qualified
assent to both appointments which she did not consider 'as strong
an arrangement' as she thought had been intended. Clarendon and
Greville both expressed similar opinions. Palmerston's difficulties
in cabinet making throughout his first ministry indicated its basic
weakness. 3
In November there was some talk of a dissolution. Indeed, Delane,
editor of The Times, approached Clarendon, 'very humbly for such
a potentate', the latter told Palmerston, to urge such a course on
the grounds that all the leaders of the peace party would be defeated
in an election. Clarendon was not convinced and told Delane that
his advocating it in The Times would be the best way of preventing
it. Palmerston concurred, saying that even if Cobden and Bright

were defeated, which he thought unlikely, unless they 'would go to
Australia like Duffy', they would always be making speeches in the
country, whereas in the Commons they could be answered. 'The
only thing which would give the Peace party a pull', he added, 'would
be a great dearness of food ascribed to the war'. 4 By this time,
however, as Disraeli had learned, Palmerston was faced by a move-
ment for peace on the continent that he would find hard to resist.
II THE AUSTRIAN PEACE INITIATIVE
All military alliances are bound to have inward tensions in wartime

and this was particularly true of the Anglo-French alliance after the
fall of Sebastopol. From the beginning of the war the aristocratic
leaders of the British Government and of its armed forces inevitably
looked rather superciliously at the arriviste group of politicians and
generals of the Second Empire. Walewski, in particular, was looked
upon with mistrust and contempt, but not taken very seriously since
until the autumn of 1855 Cowley seemed to have more influence with
the French Emperor than his Foreign Minister did. Louis Napoleon,
although originally regarded as an upstart adventurer, had won a
certain amount of respect for he obviously set great store on the
Alliance, was generally ready to listen to reason and had been most
successful in ingratiating himself with the Queen and Prince Consort,
despite their former friendship with Louis Philippe. As late as
January 1856 Clarendon was able to write: 'I am quite sure that the
Emperor will stick to us because he has made up his mind that we
are the only country that wish him long life and success'. 5 'The
Emperor is a riddle', Palmerston replied a few weeks later. 'Many
things concur to inspire the most complete confidence in him. Some
passages of his life lead one to think he is not devoid of great powers
of dissimulation. But we must take him at his word .... ' In an
earlier letter alluding to the differences between Stratford and Thou-
venel, the French ambassador in Constantinople, Palmerston had
expressed his views about the alliance:
England must stand upon her own bottom, trust to her own
resources and while taking advantage of foreign alliances as long
as they last not reckon upon their permanent continuance ....
The French alliance should be regarded by us as only a summer
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season's. We should make hay while the sun shines but not forget
to prepare for a less genial season. The Emperor will, I think, be
true to us, at least as long as it is in his interest to be so and that
will be for some time but if anything were to happen to him we
should find Frenchmen of today just the same as they always have
been and ready to add more chapters to the voluminous works
entitled Rivalites de Ia France et de 1' Angleterre .... 6
As it turned out, except for the surrender of Kars on the remote

Asian front and the weakly contested capture of Kinburn by the
Allies, the fall of Sebastopol marked the end of significant military
operations in the Crimean War, but this was by no means assumed
to be the case at the time. As we have seen Palmerston and his more
warlike supporters were anxious to restore British military prestige
following the failure at the Redan, while the young Czar was not
prepared to make peace immediately after Russia's painful defeat.
The French loss of interest in the war was, however, crucial. Louis
Napoleon was loath to part from his English ally and for a time
thought to extend the war to reopen the Polish question and the
revision of the 1815 settlement, but the pressure of anti-war senti-
ment among his ministers and the public, and the financial burden
that further campaigns would impose soon had their effect. Although
not ready for peace after the fall of Sebastopol, Britain was not keen
to take up the French Emperor's proposal to extend the objectives
of the war to reviving the kingdom of Poland. 'I regret very much',
Clarendon wrote to Palmerston on 16 September, 'that the Emperor
should now want to make a sine qua non of Poland because the
people of England and France however rejoiced they would be to
see that Kingdom reestablished, even as promised in 1815, will not
make war for that object and I am sure that we at all events should
not get support for it.' He feared that any such undertaking would
only provide ammunition for Gladstone and Disraeli and the peace
party, who, he thought, would be trying to make the most of the
fall of Sebastopol. He himself 'doubted the possibility of making a
safe peace without another campaign'. 7
The Prime Minister agreed with his Foreign Secretary that Russia
had 'not yet been beaten enough to make peace possible'. He warned
that Russia's efforts to avoid another campaign must be baffled and
their friends and agents resisted. 'With Nesselrode's two daughters
one at Paris the other at Brussels, with Morny and all the other
Russian agents acting on the French Government and with Vienna
and Berlin cooperating', he wrote, 'we shall find all our steadiness
and skill required to avoid being drawn into a peace which would
disappoint the just expectations of the country'. s His suspicions were
exaggerated, but not without foundation, and in fact serious peace
talks were closer than he anticipated.
The long drawn out and involved negotiations that eventually led
to the peace settlement of 1856 have been examined in some detail
by many historians, 9 but we may look more closely at the attitude
of the British Government and its representatives and the develop-
ment of British policy in the last six months of the war. In the
autumn of 1855 France, initially unknown to its ally, was beginning
to open up exploratory peace feelers through a number of interme-
diaries, the Prince of Coburg, Baron Seebach, the Saxon Minister
in Paris who was son-in-law of Nesselrode, Count Beust and von der
Pfordten, prime ministers of Saxony and Bavaria. A direct contact
was also entered upon between the Due de Morny, the Emperor's
half-brother, and Prince A.M. Gortchakov, the Russian ambassador
in Vienna, but these were suspended in favour of more concrete
proposals made by Count Buol. The Russians were not yet ready to
sue for peace, but were ready to listen, and in November Beust
informed Nesselrode that Napoleon III would not demand humili-
ating terms, providing Russia accepted the neutralisation of the Black
Sea. 10 Throughout the ensuing months France strove determinedly
to drive the Alliance down the road to peace, while Britain, following
reluctantly, seized every opportunity to apply the brakes and forestall
all precipitous decisions.
France's German soundings may have helped to break the ice, but
the important initiative was taken by Austria. The Austrian Emperor
was much impressed by the Allied success at Sebastopol and was
now ready to listen to the advice of his pro-Western Foreign Minister
rather than to the pro-Russian 'military prophets' who, according to
Elliot, the British charge d'affaires in Vienna, surrounded him. Late
in September Buol suggested to Bourqueney, the French minister
(Westmorland, the rather ineffective British minister, had left
Vienna and his successor had not yet been appointed), that Austria
should present to Russia conditions of peace approved by the Allies
based upon a strengthened Four Points. Bourqueney returned to
Paris at the beginning of October with these proposals, Bourqueney
gave a full account of Buol's views to Cowley who discussed them
with him and the Emperor on 14 October. It was proposed to
neutralise the Black Sea, to force Russia to withdraw from the banks
of the Danube and to build the Principalities up into a defensible

bulwark against her. Buol also suggested that a treaty guaranteeing
Turkish integrity should be signed between Austria, France and
England. Cowley indicated that Austria was now taking the initiative
because she wanted to be involved in the peace settlement, especially
in the settlement of these frontiers, which were of more immediate
interest to her than to the more remote Western Allies. In a later
conversation with Walewski, Cowley warned the Foreign Minister
that even if the terms were considered acceptable it would be unwise
to say so. 11
Clarendon showed guarded interest in Cowley's account of these
developments. 'We might discuss together the terms of peace which
we are now entitled to ask and have general understanding as to
what more may be required if the war goes on to another campaign,
but I can see no use in trying to bind Austria when in fact we should
only be binding ourselves,' he told his ambassador. Warning that
they must avoid the entanglements of earlier negotiations, he
admitted that Buol's proposals might be made the basis of a settle-
ment; 'but we ought to take from Russia the Crimea, Georgia and
Circassia and in another twelve months I have little doubt of our
doing it,' he added in a burst of Palmerstonian bluster that ill-
accorded with his low view of their military leadership. Later he
expressed his fears of France committing them to premature peace
terms and reiterated his concern that they should avoid 'a second
and worse addition of last year's proceedings'. He admitted that
England and France were 'deeply interested in carrying Austria with
them' and should take care not to offend her, but he suggested that
Bourqueney should tell Buol that, while the Allies were determined
to carry on the war, they were ready to make a safe and honourable
peace and would be glad to study terms that Buol might propose to
them in writing. He added that Bourqueney should bear in mind the
importance of protecting Turkey's Asiatic front, which the French
mistakenly seemed to regard as an Anglo-Indian question, and
consider setting up Georgia and Caucasia as a barrier. Palmerston
fully supported Clarendon's cautious reactions to the Austrian
suggestions. 'We have no conditions of peace to propose and no
answers to give Austria to her questions [as to] what we should be
willing to accept,' he wrote. ' ... Let her go to St. Petersburg and
ask the Emperor what conditions he is willing to offer. ... ' Palmer-
stan was becoming more bellicose than ever. Following a conver-
sation with Persigny he told Clarendon he agreed with the French
ambassador 'that next year our operations ought to take a wider

range than the Crimea, and that leaving there troops enough to hold
our defensive positions we ought to strike Russia in other quarters,
in Georgia, Nicolaieff, Cherson, Odessa, Poland, Finland, as may
upon consideration be deemed most expedient. . . .' The experiences
of the past eighteen months seem to have taught him no lessons.1 2
It should be noted that the Austrian peace proposals coincided
with Napoleon's plans for bringing the bulk of the army home from
the Crimea. The Emperor had come to the conclusion, Cowley told
Clarendon, 'that public opinion in France will not support him much
longer in the war, and that if it goes on its object, if not its seat,
must be changed'. He talked wildly of replacing the treaties of 1815
by calling a Congress to redraw the map of Europe, suggesting that
they should have an Eastern peace now and a Western peace next
year. On Cowley's request Bourqueney told the Emperor that a
withdrawal of troops would indispose Austria, to which the Emperor
replied 'there was no immediate intention of withdrawing'. Bour-
queney, in whom Cowley had much confidence, attached 'real value
to a rupture of diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia',
which he thought could be brought about without in any way
compromising the Allies. He told Cowley that the fall of Kinburn
had 'made more impression upon the Austrians than any other event
of the war' .13
Clarendon, however, was becoming increasingly uneasy.
Both Russians and Austrians are reckoning upon effectual aid
from the peace party here [he told Cowley] as well probably as
upon the entourage of the Emperor and the financial difficulties
of France so I expect we shall have a hard fight to maintain the
honor of England and France and to get tolerable conditions of
peace ....
He was even more outspoken to his colleague Wood to whom he
wrote in a moment of great exasperation. 'What with crying stinking
fish and playing second fiddle to the French our influence has dimin-
ished everywhere.' He told Palmerston that he feared France would
be humbugged by Austria into agreeing to peace terms 'and that we
shall be compelled to scout them, for which of course the alliance
will suffer'. The Queen thought differently. She feared great changes
were taking place 'in the whole position of the Eastern Question and
the War, without our having the power to direct them or even a
complete knowledge of them'. Nevertheless she thought that if the
Emperor Napoleon was really determined they would be 'obliged by

common prudence to follow him in his negotiations', while insisting
that military pressure should continue to be exerted on Russian in
the Crimea. 14
Bourqueney returned to Vienna at the beginning of November
and resumed his conversations with Buol about the Austrian peace
proposals, keeping Elliot fully informed. Despite assurances to the
contrary that Elliot sent him, Clarendon feared that Buol was
attempting 'to entrap England and France into a declaration' of
peace terms 'in return for a slippery and unbending understanding'.
'[D]isguise it as we may,' he warned Elliot, 'they will be conditions
offered to Russia by England and France, and that under present
circumstances will in my opinion amount to national degradation.'
He argued that Austria should go to Russia with her proposals and
when she had got them accepted then offer to put them to England
and France; 'but a cookery after the fashion of last year is most
nauseous and it will turn the national stomach in England,' he
asserted, admonishing Elliot to make all this clear to Bourqueney.
On 14 November Elliot sent Clarendon an outline of Buol's proposals
which had just been initialled by Buol and Bourqueney and approved
by the Austrian Emperor. On the 15th he received an 'alarming
telegram' from Cowley announcing that 'satisfactory intelligence' was
on the way. 'I say alarming', he explained to Palmerston, 'not
because I am afraid we shall be hustled into an inglorious Austrian
peace but because I fear that the Buol-Bourqueney concoction will
in the Emperor's present mood sorely try the alliance.'ls
Meanwhile in Paris Cowley was temporarily out of favour with the
Emperor, who ostentatiously singled out Seebach and Hiibner for
attention at the close of the Paris Exhibition, where he spoke of the
desirability of a lasting peace to an enthusiastic audience of 30,000.
'I feel as you do out of heart at all that is going on in Paris',
Clarendon wrote to Cowley. In his view there was 'nothing so certain
to defeat its own object with the Russian barbarians as making them
think we are tired or afraid and that they are not going to be more
licked' .16
Cowley was talking to Walewski in the French Foreign Office on
17 November when the messenger arrived from Vienna with a
despatch and private letter from Bourqueney containing the long
awaited Austrian proposals which Bourqueney had already initialled.
Walewski was delighted and showed them immediately to the British
ambassador, cautioning him not to tell the Emperor that he had seen
them. That evening Cowley had an after-dinner audience at the

Tuileries with the Emperor, whose coldness to him had now passed.
The Emperor presented him with the same documents, telling him
to take them away and return them in the morning but not to tell
Walewski! Cowley did so, had the papers copied and sent them to
Clarendon, admonishing him not to tell Persigny when he came to
inform Clarendon in case Walewski might not have told his own
ambassador everything! 'I blush for diplomacy', Cowley wrote to
Clarendon as he related this strange story and added his own
warning. 17
The Austrian proposals were couched in the form of an Ultimatum
to Russia accompanied by an explanatory Memorandum. The Ulti-
matum was divided into five unnumbered sections with separate
headings. As eventually sent the terms were as follows:
The Danubian Principalities were to retain their privileges and
immunities under the suzerainty of the Porte and the Sultan in
concert with the contracting powers was to grant them an internal
constitution conforming to the wishes of the inhabitants. Russia's
special rights of protection were to be abolished and in return for
Russian territory occupied by the Allies, Russia was to rectify her
border with Turkey by the surrender of territory on the left bank of
the Danube (between Chotyn and Lake Salzyk in the province of
Bessarabia wrested from Turkey not many years before).
Freedom of Navigation on the Danube was to be guaranteed with
provision for the contracting powers each having the right to station
two warships at the mouth as a guarantee.
The Black Sea was to be neutralised and open to merchant marine
of all nations. It was to be closed to all warships except for a number
of light vessels for the protection of commerce to be agreed upon
by the two riverian powers in a convention which, on British insist-
ence, was to be annexed to the general treaty after approval by the
other signatories.
The Christian Populations subjects of the Porte were to have their
immunities sanctioned (consacrees) without injury to the indepen-
dence and dignity of the Sultan.
Particular Conditions: 'The belligerent powers reserved the right
which belonged to them of bringing forward in the interests of
Europe particular conditions over and above the four pledges
(garanties). '1s
The accompanying Memorandum initialled by Buol and Bour-
queney explained the origins of the Ultimatum, which, it said, were
a development of the Four Points (garanties) already accepted in

principle by Russia, and then proceeded to turn the other document
into an Ultimatum by indicating that if the points were not accepted
within three weeks Austria would break off diplomatic relations with
Russia. It was asserted that Austria was 'authorized by the Allies to
declare that an acceptance "pure et simple" would be followed by the
signature of preliminaries of peace'. A Treaty of Alliance between
Austria, France and Great Britain would guarantee the indepen-
dence of Turkey against any encroachment by Russia of the ensuing
Peace Treaty. A Russian refusal, it was claimed, would show the
world that peace had become impossible and the Allies would
consider without delay what course to take. Prussia would be invited
to support the proposals and in the event of a Russian refusal to
join the Allied deliberations, providing she broke off relations with
Russia. 19
Cowley, the most hawkish of the British diplomats, was highly
sceptical. Writing to Clarendon immediately after Walewski had
shown him the papers he admitted that if Austria was earnest the
ground won was 'very valuable', but he added: 'If she is merely
seeking to entrap us [the constant fear he shared with Clarendon]
into further negotiations in hopes that peace may be the result, all
that has been done is worth nothing'. That night he expressed his
suspicions to the Emperor, who was, of course, delighted with the
proposals for he saw them as a way out of the problems that plagued
him. Cowley suggested the Russians might accept the Ultimatum
simply to make time and put the Allies off balance. He said that the
resumption of negotiations was 'a very dangerous proceeding and
that the British dreaded being entangled in negotiations that led to
nothing'. The poor Emperor asked what more could they want and
again urged the necessity of bringing his troops home. 'What
preoccupied him', Cowley wrote, 'was leaving 150,000 men locked
up in a corner when all the Generals said they could do nothing
more.' The British ambassador rehearsed all the old arguments, he
felt with some effect for the first time, and again dwelt on the
advantage of bringing the Generals and Admirals home for a Council
of War. Cowley advised the Foreign Secretary to reply very
cautiously to Walewski, defining conditions. Yet he also urged the
importance of meeting the Emperor's wishes since he felt Her
Majesty's Government opposed everything and proposed nothing.
'Pray excuse the freedom with which I write', he added, 'but you
cannot exaggerate to yourself the delicacy which is now required. '20
'I cannot divest myself of suspicions wherever Austria is
concerned', Clarendon replied, 'but it is impossible to deny that the
Emperor and Buol have made great advances within the last six
months.' He said that he had not expressed much enthusiasm to
Persigny when the French ambassador had read Bourqueney's and
Walewski's enthusiastic despatches, but admitted that the proposals
'might bP. taken into favourable consideration especially as the wishes
of the Emperor had been so strongly expressed'. He also told Palmer-
ston that, despite his normal suspicion of terms emanating from
Austria, he thought they were a great improvement over the earlier
draft. He optimistically suggested that Russia would not be able to
accept them, but that they might serve to breach Russia's diplomatic
relations with Austria, who now clearly thought Russia was at this
time 'sufficiently crippled' to allow Austria to act independently. 'I
am favourably disposed to the terms,' he concluded, 'tho I would
have preferred no such propositions had been made to us provided
we were quite sure of France', which they were not since Louis
Napoleon now had the opportunity of slipping out of the war. 21
Briefing Lansdowne on the eve of a fateful Cabinet meeting, the
Foreign Secretary observed that they had 'not often had to make a
more important decision'.
We may not like the terms (he continued] nor think them as much
as we are entitled to demand or perhaps such as we hope to be in
a position to demand ... but I think the rejection of them would
be difficult as regards the professed objects of the war, dangerous
as regards the alliance with France, where the unpopularity of the
war, the wavering state of the Emperor's mind, and financial
embarrassments with a good deal of popular discontent render the
continuance of steady vigorous cooperation with France doubtful.
Moreover, anticipating a Russian refusal, he expected that as a
consequence Louis Napoleon would agree to press on with the war,
having met the demands of the peace party. The Queen asked Clar-
endon to inform the Cabinet that she thought it would be very unwise
'not to enter fairly and unreservedly into the French proposal'. She
thought the terms of the Austrian ultimatum were 'clear and
complete and very favourable', if accepted by Russia. She shrewdly
pointed out that a Russian refusal would probably lead to war
between Austria and Russia, whereas a British refusal might imperil
the Alliance and leave England 'in a miserable position' .22
Clarendon informed Elliot that at a long Cabinet meeting on
20 November the proposals had been 'most anxiously considered,

and with a sincere desire to meet the wishes of the Austrian Govern-
ment'. He claimed they were not all that might have been wished
and was sure they fell short of what could be obtained by another
campaign; 'but nevertheless', he concluded, 'we shall agree to them
as a whole, though there are some trifling alterations that we desire
to propose. . . .' 23
The 'trifling alterations' or 'slight changes', as Clarendon called
them in another letter, took four weeks to iron out. The stipulations
regarding the Black Sea, he told Cowley, must form part of the final
treaty and not be hidden in an annex; the term 'military arsenals'
must be understood to include naval arsenals; the Sea of Azov, of
course, was to be taken as part of the Black Sea for the purpose of
the treaty. Moreover the Russians should be informed that under the
further conditions the Allies reserved for themselves they intended to
propose that no military establishments should be created or restored
in the Aland Islands (which the Allies had captured with Bomarsund
in 1854), and that the position of the territories east of the Black
Sea (Circassia and Georgia) should be considered. Her Majesty's
Government also reserved the right to amend the wording of the
various provisions where they considered it necessary. He explained
that they considered Austria 'engages to appropriate the Ultimatum
to herself' and that she had no commission from England and France
to do so, although she might state that she had reason to believe
that if the terms were accepted by Russia they would be agreed to
by the Allies.
I think you will consider we have been very moderate [he
concluded] and considering that we have no confidence in Austria
and feel sure she will play us a trick that we haven't sought to
bind her more than was necessary - but pray make the Emperor
understand how much we have deferred to his wishes and how
entirely we have made his position our own - we incur very great
risk and he might appreciate our manner of doing it.24
News of the Austrian proposal quickly appeared in the press and it
was so accurate that Sir Charles Wood presumed it came from an
official French source. Sir G. C. Lewis, however, did not hesitate to
reveal the Cabinet's decision to Greville, saying that they had yielded
to the Emperor since they could not carry on the war alone. As
perhaps the most anti-war member of the Cabinet he said he was
disgusted at 'the pitiful figure' the Government had cut after all their
'insolence, swagger and bravado'; 'all which humiliation', Greville

recorded, 'he justly said was in consequence of our plunging into
war without any reason, and in defiance of all prudence and sound
policy.' Greville was delighted with the news and, although his opti-
mism was short lived, wrote to the Duke of Bedford saying 'if we
were once "drifting" to war we are now in full sail towards peace' .25
It would have been more accurate to have said that they were drifting
towards peace but through water full of rocks and shoals.
Walewski was much disappointed with the reaction of the British
Government as conveyed to him by Persigny and by Cowley. The
latter told him that if they were to make peace they had a right to
put forward what they 'considered necessary'. Persigny thought the
alterations proposed by the British were reasonable, but Walewski
and the Emperor (according to Walewski) did not. The French
Foreign Minister thought the terms 'good and acceptable' and could
not understand how the British could say they accepted them out of
deference to the Emperor and then proceed to change their nature
by the alterations and additions they demanded. He agreed to a
clarification of the term 'arsenals' and sought to meet Cowley's criti-
cism of the neutralisation provisions by adding a stipulation to the
general treaty binding Russia and Turkey, but he objected to the
proposal for including the Sea of Azov, because of its shallowness
and because to specify it, an inland water, would be humiliating to
Russia. He also considered it 'quite unnecessary to apprize Austria
of any other demands which the Allies might have to make'. As to
the particular conditions, Cowley said he 'got on his high horse'. If
England was not prepared to press the case of Poland, why should
France insist on the Aland Islands? Both proposals were desirable,
but should not be made sine qua non conditions for peace. After
responding to these arguments Cowley pointed out that the differ-
ences between the two governments must first be settled, but in
fact Walewski had already informed Vienna of France's complete
acceptance before waiting to hear from her ally. 26
The more Clarendon thought about the Austrian proposals the
less he liked them and still feared a repetition of the abortive nego-
tiations of the previous spring. At one time he reconciled himself with
the thought that the Russians would probably refuse the Austrian
demands, which would enable the Emperor to call on the French
people for 'further sacrifices', and which would give Her Majesty's
Government 'a famous answer to our peacemongers at home', as he
put it to Cowley. At another time he hazarded the guess that the
Russians had already agreed to the Austrian terms and that that was
why Buol was so opposed to making any changes. He was particularly
indignant at Walewski's attitude, at his giving the Austrians an
immediate acceptance, thus putting the onus on London to make
any changes and undermining the Alliance in the eyes of the
Austrians, and at the peremptory way in which an immediate answer
was demanded. 'The whole thing has been concocted without us at
Vienna', he wrote to Cowley, 'our name has been used without our
permission and then our assent is demanded in 4 and 20 hours .... '
He took his time, however, in sending a formal despatch to Paris,
setting out in detail the Government's position which had already
been conveyed through Persigny and Cowley.27
In his despatch Clarendon assured the French Government that
the British Government agreed that Austria had taken 'an important
step towards the Western Powers', that the opinion of the French
Emperor carried great weight with them and that they had no wish
to extend the war. Nevertheless, he declared, they were determined
to avoid any negotiations which did 'not afford a fair prospect of
being carried to a successful conclusion'. He then restated in detail
the modifications already specified, but out of deference to the
Emperor withdrew the stipulation regarding the Sea of Azov. He
maintained that they sought no material changes, but that they
reserved the right to propose amendments. In concluding his long
despatch Clarendon asserted that it did not become the dignity of
England and France to make proposals and that their position was
not to be impaired, that is to say that the proposals were Austria's,
although made in consultation with them. Therefore he trusted that
the French Government would agree to their modifications which
were intended to make the proposals 'more clear and effective'.zs
Meanwhile, immediately after the crucial Cabinet meeting Palmer-
ston had taken the unusual step of writing independently and much
less diplomatically to the French ambassador. Lecturing poor
Persigny on the responsibility of the executive in a parliamentary
regime and the need for official papers before taking such an
important step, he pointed out that as yet they had nothing of that
sort. He went on:
II y a eu a Vienne une negociation a laquelle nous n'avons pas pris

part; on a signe, du mains paraphe, un protocole pour nous, mais
sans nous; on nous communique confidentiellement ce protocole
paraphe, aprendre ou alaisser, en no us dis ant qu'il faut ou le rejeter
ou I' accepter immediatement, bon ou mauvais, sans en discuter Ia

redaction et les details.
In such an important matter, he said, they did not like to act in this
way. They wanted to conform to the wishes of the Emperor, but
they could not approve of peace proposals being made to Russia in
their name without their being in full accord with their form and
their substance. He assured Persigny that the English nation would
be glad to conclude a good peace that achieved the objects of the
war, but they would prefer to continue to fight with Turkey alone
rather than sign a peace with insufficient conditions. 29
Clarendon had warned Palmerston of the need to keep Parliament
satisfied, but told the Prime Minister he thought the last paragraph
of his letter was 'somewhat stiff for imperial consumption' and was
'not likely to improve the relations between the two countries', which
were already 'somewhat shaken'. Nor was the letter quite in line
with what he had already told the French ambassador had been
settled in the Cabinet. Cowley welcomed the letter and, when
Walewski told him that it had made a 'deep but not a favourable
impression on the Emperior', he defended it as a 'friendly avertisse-
ment', not a menace. When he saw the Emperor the next day he
assured him of the Prime Minister's friendly feelings towards him
and explained that Palmerston was unhappy at the way in which the
proposal was pressed on England with the demand for an immediate
acceptance. 3
Persigny complained to Clarendon more of the form than of the
substance of Palmerston's letter, which had concluded with the
peremptory sentence 'Soumettez, je vous prie, ces observations a
Walewsky', but Clarendon told his wife complacently that he had
'calmed the little man'. Although Clarendon had originally thought
the letter too strong he no longer did so after hearing from Cowley
of Walewski's 'insolence'. The Queen was also much upset by the
Prime Minister's letter, which, she told Clarendon, 'was like his worst
ebullitions in the olden time'. Granville, returning from France, told
the Foreign Secretary that the French were unanimous in saying that
if the English wanted to go on with the war they must do so single-
handed. Clarendon was at his gloomiest in a letter to Stratford about
France's reluctance to going on with the war in which he wrote:
This as I need not tell you, with our views and hopes and in the
present state of public opinion which gets more warlike instead of
less so is very embarrassing. We can't carry on the war alone with
all Europe against us, and France having made peace without us,
and the certainty that the States would declare war against us the
moment we were without allies and it will be most difficult, perhaps
impossible to avoid being hustled into a peace we
disapprove. . . .31
So much for Palmerston's bluster about going on alone.

In Paris Cowley was equally gloomy. 'I cannot exaggerate the
anxiety I feel', he wrote to Clarendon. 'We have to deal with a set
of men to whom national honour is of no value ... whose baneful
advice I stand alone to counteract.' Pelissier's last despatch (asserting
that the conquest of the Crimea 'would be without advantage') had,
he said, completed the demoralisation that had already set in. 'The
secret [of the Austrian proposals] is already oozing out here', he
added, leaked, he presumed, by Walewski 'in hopes of putting the
screws on us.' The Emperor should see, he concluded, that the
English were 'his only real friends'. 32
Clarendon was not pleased at the news received from Cowley,
which showed, he told Palmerston, that there was 'a kind of Austro
Russian league against us at Paris'. All Palmerston's suspicions of the
Austrian proposals were renewed and poured forth in four pages
from his vigorous pen, exaggerating the weakness of the Russian
position and warning Clarendon of the likelihood of their trying to
put something over on the allies. In another letter he urged the
Foreign Secretary to stand firm, and proceeded to discuss military
operations for 1856, suggesting that the French might send an army
to the Baltic while the British invaded Georgia. This 'would distract
and divide very inconveniently the Russian forces,' he concluded!33
The British objections to the Austro-French proposals were
sharply debated for several weeks. On 22 November the French
Emperor appealed to Queen Victoria in a friendly letter to accept
this honourable way out of their difficulties, asking how they could
reasonably refuse the Austrian proposal or kill it by 'equivocations
(chicanes) which are equivalent to a refusal'. 'This, Madam', he
wrote, 'is what I cannot understand, for it is not we who make
concessions to gain support of Austria; it is Austria who of her own
accord hoists our flag.' He argued that he could not think it reason-
able 'spontaneously to renounce the support of Austria for micro-
scopical advantages which one could always claim at any time. '34
After consulting her husband, Palmerston and Clarendon, the
Queen replied to the Emperor at great length, pointing out how
different were their constitutional positions, since she had to take

the advice of Ministers who themselves had to be able to defend
their policies in Parliament. She confined herself to asking that her
Government 'should not be bound to the letter of the proposal', of
which they had had 'no opportunity of discussing the meaning or the
import', that Austria should agree to refuse any counter-proposals
and that 'the Neutralisation Treaty should be made a reality'. The
Emperor expressed his satisfaction with this reply, recognised the
right of the English Government 'to take exception to the way the
terms of the Ultimatum had been settled without previous consul-
tation', and acknowledged the importance of some of the modifica-
tions they proposed.35
Palmerston continued to warn Clarendon about 'traps' that were
being set for them. In particular he insisted on standing firm about
the Black Sea stipulations. 'I can fancy how I should be hooted in
the House of Commons if I were to get up and say that we had
agreed to an imperfect and unsatisfactory arrangement about one of
the most important parts of the whole matter as a personal favor to
Count Buol', he wrote. 'I had better beforehand take the Chiltern
Hundreds.' To Walewski's argument that the British demand for
consuls in the Black Sea area would be humiliating he retorted:'The
argument of Humiliation to Russia is utterly out of the question at
the point at which the progress of the war has brought us'. 'We
must not be cajoled and tricked into conditions of peace', he told
Clarendon, 'by the delusive expectation that those conditions will be
refused by Russia and that we shall thus get Austria to break off
relations with Russia. We should be caught in a trap which Austria
is laying for us [the constant obsession].' Clarendon quoted most of
this passage word for word (without attribution) in his letter to
Cowley of the same date. 'We ought always to bear in mind that
Austria has distinct and antagonistic interests from those of England
and France,' he warned his ambassador, pointing out that Articles
1 and 4 were 'artfully' worded in the interests of Austria and Russia.36
It was unfortunate that there was no British minister in Vienna at
this time, although Elliot, the competent charge d'affaires, filled the
gap as well as he could and was kept fully informed by Clarendon,
Buol and Bourqueney as to what was going on. Any negotiation in
Vienna had to await the arrival of the new minister, Sir G. H.
Seymour, former British minister in St Petersburg, on 6 December.
Elliot was charged to tell Bourqueney that the British Government's
object had been 'to make the fewest changes possible in his redaction'
and to explain that those which had been made were 'solely for the
purpose of giving more complete effect to the intentions of those
who drew up the ultimatum'. Clarendon made it very clear that it
would be quite unacceptable to leave the neutralisation of the Black
Sea to a separate treaty between Russia and Turkey. He continued:
If Buol resists our modification, which is indispensible in order to
fulfil the objects of the war, and for the future peace of Europe
. . . and yet insists upon imposing on Russia the sacrifice and
humiliation of ceding the half of Bessarabia and the mouths of the
Danube which will be, I have no hesitation in saying, for the
nearly exclusive advantage of Austria a non Belligerent, it will be
impossible to believe that the proposal has been made to us in
good faith, or that the negotiations will be conducted in any other
spirit by Austria than that of sparing the pride of Russia at the
expense of England and France, who have made such vast sacr-
ifices to save Europe from a danger greater and more imminent
than any by which she has yet been threatened.
Clarendon's harsh tone in this prolix sentence was probably affected
by the existence of a number of diplomatic differences between
Britain and Austria, in particular the recent Austrian arrest and
imprisonment of a former Austrian officer, Colonel Tiirr, now
serving with the British in the Principalities. Two days later, on
29 November, Elliot informed Clarendon that Buol (who had been
apprised of the British views by Walewski) was ready to agree to
some of their proposed modifications, but refused to court a Russian
rejection by specifying the number of coast guard vessels in the main
treaty rather than in a separate Russo-Turkish Convention. This was
a view that led Clarendon to observe to Cowley that Austria was
'cramming her ultimatum down our throats rather than that of
Russia'.37
On 28 November Cowley reported that the Emperor was very
pleased with the Queen's letter and that Walewski had sent Persigny
a reply to Clarendon's despatch recognising the English alterations
as improvements and promising to recommend their adoption to
Buol. In fact, however, on some points Walewski was not prepared
to go the whole way and two days later Cowley reported a conver-
sation that was 'anything but satisfactory or agreeable'. He still
objected to including the number of coast guard vessels in the main
treaty and to any mention of consuls, and raised difficulties over the
organisation of the Principalities. How could he, Walewski asked,
'do otherwise than pronounce that excellent which was his own
work!!! for the fact was', Cowley continued, 'the redaction was
concocted by himself and Bourqueney'. Cowley was indignant that
Walewski should have sent a draft to Vienna without consulting
France's Ally and complained that he now found that he was dealing
with a French rather than an Austrian proposition. Walewski said
'the trouble was the two Governments were no longer united in
their policy, and that everyone knew this', which, Cowley said, was
Walewski's fault. Walewski also warned that unless the Emperor
changed his mind a large part of the French Army would be brought
away from the Crimea and that then either negotiations would lead
to an armistice or the war would be continued under altered circum-
stances; 'and', he added, 'France must be in a position to speak with
authority to Europe'. All this was expressed in civil language, but
with some warmth on both sides. 'I must add', Cowley continued,
'that his [Walewski's] manner was most disagreeable and he seemed
to take pleasure in saying what he knew must be anything but satis-
factory for me to hear.' He thought there was very little that could be
done about Walewski and that the only hope lay with the Emperor. 38
'What an avowal of duplicity was his admission that the Ultimatum
was drawn up by him and sent to Vienna, and then presented by
him to us as the work of Buol!' Palmerston exploded when he read
Cowley's account of his conversation with Walewski. He proposed
to Clarendon that they should stick to their guns on the assumption
that the French Government would not leave them in the lurch. 39
On 29 November Clarendon sent another despatch to Cowley
raising further difficulties about the Austrian Ultimatum. Queen
Victoria had quite understandably expressed great doubts about the
draft of the despatch that had been sent to her for she feared that
it did not correspond entirely to what she had said in her letter to
the Emperor, sent with the concurrence of Palmerston and Clar-
endon. She said it was all very well to make improvements in the
Ultimatum
but that if the responsibility of defeating it fell upon this country,
her position will become a most dangerous one! For there is no
disguising the fact that, if the French Nation is determined not to
support the war any longer in its present condition all attempts to
constrain it to do so must recoil upon us. 40
In a letter to Cowley the day after he had sent this despatch Clar-
endon was a little more conciliatory, saying that 'to meet the wishes
of the French Government' they might agree that, if the number of

ships in the Black Sea was settled before the Treaty to the satisfaction
of England and France, they would accept a separate negotiation
between Russia and Turkey. He also admitted that they could not
force Austria to insert a stipulation in the Ultimatum regarding
consuls. At the same time he complained of leaks in Paris where all
the facts seemed to be known on the Bourse and (despite his
continued suspicion of a Russo-Austrian understanding) spoke of
dealing directly with Vienna, where Seymour would arrive the
following week.41
When Cowley showed Walewski Clarendon's despatch of 29
November the French Foreign Minister said he did not want a copy
of it since he did not want to get into a 'polemic'. That evening,
however, Cowley had a 'highly satisfactory' conversation with the
Emperor, who was under the misapprehension that everything had
been settled, expressed disapproval of Walewski's proceedings when
Cowley explained the real state of affairs, and promised to keep an
eye on his Foreign Minister! He admitted that he himself had been
too precipitate, said he was prepared to make the neutralisation
terms as stringent as they wanted, and asked that Her Majesty's
Government should put in writing the exact terms they considered
on which peace might be made. Cowley had a long talk with
Walewski the following afternoon and found 'his tone was much
lowered'. When Cowley saw the Emperor again on the 4th and told
him they were still not agreed on the number, size and armament
of the coast guard vessels he exclaimed: 'but of course we shall agree
in [sic] any propositions you make on that score- the fewer the
better as long as they are enough fairly to execute the service for
which they are designed .... '42
It took a few more days of feverish negotiation to iron out an
agreement on the phrasing of the proposed revisions, but the heart
was gone from Walewski's resistance and Clarendon made some
concessions in wording. On 6 December Clarendon addressed a
despatch to Seymour (via the British Embassy in Paris to keep
Cowley and the French Government informed), which Seymour was
instructed to read to Buol. It expressed regret for the unfortunate
but unavoidable delay in sending a definitive answer to Vienna and
insisted that the amendments now proposed were only clarifications.
The British Government, it pointed out, had refrained from urging
the inclusion of other conditions under Article 5, recognising that
they had no claim to press upon Austria conditions upon which
the rupture of her diplomatic relations with Russia should depend.

Nevertheless Clarendon went on to claim the right of the belligerent
powers 'to decide upon what conditions they [would) consent to
make Peace'.
Her Majesty's Government trust [the despatch continued] that
Count Buol will see the propriety of making these terms known
to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg for it would be far better not to
enter upon the negotiations at all than that they should be broken
off upon the ground that Russia had been unfairly treated and
that the real intentions of the Belligerent Powers had been kept
from her knowledge.
In a covering letter Clarendon alluded to their great difficulties in
coming to a definitive arrangement with Walewski and urged
Seymour to impress upon Buol that they did not want 'to alter the
nature and character of his ultimatum', or to insert anything in it
'which would secure the rejection of it by Russia'. Queen Victoria,
while approving the purport of the despatch, regretted that the
language of the proposed modifications was not more conciliatory,
for, she argued, 'in the desire to guard us against all ambiguity' sight
might have been lost 'of the natural desire on the part of Austria to
cloth her demands in the language least unpalatable to Russia'.
Clarendon assured her there was really very little difference between
the two versions and that he thought that Austria's was 'rather more
likely to displease Russia'. 43
There was apparently some delay in sending off Clarendon's
despatch to Paris, presumably as the Queen's approval was awaited,
but Clarendon's messenger eventually found Cowley at Compiegne
where he and Walewski were visiting the Emperor. Walewski at first
said that the despatch was unacceptable because of some last minute
changes, but the Emperor considered these were improvements and
only regretted they had not been made earlier. Consequently
Walewski undertook to instruct Bourqueney to give it his support,
but added that if Austria refused it would be necessary to change
the wording. Cowley then sent the despatch on by messenger the
same day. 44
The situation was complicated on 10 December when Seebach
informed the French Government that he was 'authorized to express
the desire of the Russian Government to treat for peace on the basis
of neutralization of the Black Sea', with the exclusion of all warships
except for an agreed number 'for the service of the states bordering
that sea'. When asked whether France would be ready to sign preli-
minaries of peace on this basis, Walewski replied that they must
first consult the English Government. The Emperor attached little
importance to the overture, but was anxious that the Austrian Ulti-
matum should be sent without further delay. Consequently Walewski
urged that the British Government should withdraw their alterations.
which Cowley told him was 'quite contrary to the engagement'. A
similar proposal from Russia was made by Gortchakov to the
Austrian Government a few days earlier, which of course made Buol
all the more anxious to get his own Ultimatum off to St Petersburg.
The British Government wasted no time in declining the Seebach
overture as 'insufficient'. Walewski gave the Saxon minister a nega-
tive reply. 45
On 11 December Clarendon complained to Persigny of Walewski's
'persevering attempts to make us do what we don't think safe or
right and which we feel sure must be productive of serious misunder-
standings hereafter'. Persigny, of course, was delighted to pass on
these comments to his detested Foreign Minister, telling Walewski
that he had 'turned a trifle into a grave affair' and that he was 'looked
upon by the entire Cabinet as being in collusion with Buol', all of
which made Walewski furious. 46 Clarendon was also annoyed by the
Queen's 'continued absence particularly at Osborne' which, he told
Cowley, was 'most inconvenient just now, as she chooses to be
consulted about everything'. Presumably he had just received a letter
she had written him that day expressing her 'anxiety that no punctili-
ousness about . . . similar wordings of clauses should let the Cabinet
overlook the position' in which they should put themselves, 'if
France, tired of refinements, were to agree upon her terms with
Russia'. There was much common sense in what the Queen said,
but it was too much for Palmerston, who protested to Clarendon:
The Queen does not seem to understand what she writes about.
There is no chicane in the case, and we are not standing out about
refinements of words we are objecting to things and things of
great importance ... and we should hear plenty about them in
Parliament if we allowed ourselves to be drawn into the trap laid
for us. 47
Clarendon's life had also been complicated by a state visit of
the King of Sardinia, accompanied by Cavour, that had unpleasant
consequences. Queen Victoria, in a letter to King Leopold, described
the Sardinian King as 'startling in the extreme in appearance . . .
with a very strange, short, rough manner', but at the same time 'so
frank, open, just, straightforward, liberal and tolerant, with much
sound good sense'. She had reason to change her mind about some
of these good qualities before very long, for the King went on to
Paris, where he was most indiscreet in relating conversations with
Prince Albert and Palmerston to the Emperor. Prince Albert was
said to have warned him against an Austrian-French alliance against
England, while Palmerston was reported to have claimed that the
French Emperor 'was in the hands of a parcel of adventurers, that
he would not stand up against them and that yielding to their exig-
encies he was ready to conclude an ignominious peace, that England
did not care a fig for the French, that the Emperor might withdraw
his army from the Crimea if he liked, take it where he liked, but if
the Sardinians would remain firm they and the British troops were
strong enough to carry on the war alone and bring it to an honourable
termination.' Cowley said the Emperor was 'much upset' and he had
never seen him 'more hurt or annoyed'. He did his best to placate
poor Louis Napoleon, stressing the royal couple's affection for him
and Palmerston's admiration. Later Cavour called on Cowley, saying
the King had exaggerated Palmerston's language 'because he had
been set up against him by the Queen and Prince and that Palmerston
had treated H.M. very cavalierly'. Walewski promised to calm the
flames but Cowley feared he would blow the coals whenever it suited
him. The Emperor was most indignant at the charge that he was
pro-Austrian, saying that he had a natural antipathy to Austrian
policy, but the incident may have helped lead to his coming rappro-
chement with Russia. 48
Seymour, who had duly arrived in Vienna on 6 December (with
a bad cold), reported that he had been warmly welcomed by Buol
and that the Austrian Cabinet was waiting for instructions from
London 'with great anxiety'. Count Esterhazy's carriage was packed,
ready to set off on the long journey to St Petersburg; letters had
been prepared for the Kings of Prussia and Bavaria calling on them
to urge the Russian Emperor to accept the terms of the Austrian
Ultimatum; Gortchakov was to be informed of what was happening
two days after Esterhazy's departure, but given no details until the
Austrian ambassador had arrived in the Russian capital. In the 'prob-
able event' of the Ultimatum being rejected Esterhazy and his
mission were to leave St Petersburg immediately. 'In the more
improbable event' of the Ultimatum being considered, Esterhazy
was to warn the Russian Chancellor after ten days that only nine
more remained. Seymour thought the policy of the Austrian Govern-

ment had become 'somewhat impulsive', but was sure that they were
committed to the Allies, since they had courted Russia's lasting
hostility by their demands on Bessarabia, and he urged Clarendon
to act quickly to prevent any abrupt reversal. 49
On 12 December Seymour reported that he had received Claren-
don's despatch of the 6th and discussed it with Bourqueney who
joined him in a meeting with Buol to whom he then read it. Buol
had made little difficulty over the first three alterations, but would
not accept the proposed amendment of the Fourth Point (excluding
Russia from any say in the provision for Christian subjects of the
Sultan) which he considered insulting to Russia. He wondered
whether the British Government was attempting to ensure rejection
of the Ultimatum, and finally went off to consult the Emperor.
Later in the day Seymour and Bourqueney met again with Buol and
proposed an alternative wording to the objectionable amendment
which he accepted. Buol was still reluctant to make any reference
to consuls, the Aland Islands or the east coast of the Black Sea in
his Ultimatum, but was most anxious to know whether Her Majesty's
Government adhered to the arrangements of the Memorandum of
14 November initialled by himself and Bourqueney.5
At this point Clarendon was more conciliatory than Palmerston
and told the Prime Minister he was prepared to accept the formula
sent that day from Vienna. 'We must not either push matters too far
with France', he warned, 'particularly as we have got all we required
about the Black Sea and the Christians.' Telegrams flowed back-
wards and forwards between London and Vienna for the next few
days settling final changes in wording, with each party making some
accommodation, but Walewski continued to make difficulties to the
end, urging Clarendon to desist from pressing his amendments on
Austria. Finally, on 15 December Seymour telegraphed: 'The
Emperor has adopted your changes; Esterhazy and the couriers to
Berlin and Munich will set off tomorrow'. Buol was easier to deal
with than Walewski and more straightforward. 'We must give the
devil his due', Clarendon wrote to Palmerston, 'and admit that we
have nothing to complain of in the manner in which Buol and his
Emperor have dealt with our amendments.' By the 16th the Ulti-
matum had been 'licked into shape' to use Clarendon's words, and
on the same day Count Esterhazy set out for St Petersburg, but
because of ill health he did not arrive until the evening of the 26th
and the Ultimatum was not delivered until the 28th.5 1
Buol was anxious that nothing be made public for nine or ten
days. Clarendon agreed that Her Majesty's Government would make
nothing known, but said he could not be responsible for the papers;
a few days earlier he had instructed Seymour to tell Buol that revel-
ations had already been made on the Bourse with a resultant rise in
the funds. On the 17th the Morning Post carried an account of the
peace terms as set out in the Austrian Ultimatum, which Greville
supposed had been leaked by Palmerston in an endeavour to under-
mine the whole thing by a premature announcement. Clarendon
gave a different account to Queen Victoria, telling her that within
48 hours of the news first reaching Paris the French funds had risen
two per cent and that the Rothschilds both in Paris and in London
were well informed of the situation. He claimed that the Morning
Post, which he said was the organ of the French Government, had
made no secret about it as was evident from their issues of 18 and
19 December and that some of its news appeared to come from
Vienna. He was satisfied that the Cabinet agreement on confide-
ntiality was observed, but thought there might be an advantage in
the truth being known rather than false rumours for he believed the
terms were 'thought good and such as would lead to an honourable
peace' .52
On 18 December Clarendon wrote privately to Seymour, congratu-
lating him on his good work in helping to get the Ultimatum into
shape. Nevertheless he did not expect an early peace and he thought
they might 'look forward to a tremendous campaign in the Baltic
next year'. Seymour himself anticipated that the Ultimatum would
lead to a rupture in Austro-Russian relations rather than an early
peace, and expressed surprise at the peace atmosphere reported in
Paris. Indeed, when he had presented his credentials, the Emperor
had told him he could not believe the Ultimatum would be accepted.
As for Austria's reliability Seymour thought she was militarily well-
prepared, if only her finances were better. In fact on the eve of
the despatch of the Ultimatum the finance minister, unaware of its
contents, had announced cuts in the military budget. A circular had
subsequently been sent around to all Austrian embassies saying that
the military reductions had been exaggerated and would be brought
back within a few weeks. Seymour had no doubts about Buol's
'firmness and honesty' and believed all would be well provided he
was not overborne, but he had to admit that there was still much
prejudice against England and leaning towards Russia in Vienna. 53
III BRITISH RESERVATIONS TO THE AUSTRIAN

ULTIMATUM
The despatch of the Austrian Ultimatum to Russia was clearly an

important turning point in the history of this strange war. The French
Government was so anxious for peace that it persuaded itself that
the Ultimatum would be accepted or, if it was not, that direct nego-
tiations could be opened up. The Austrian Government feared that
the price they would have to pay for ultimate involvement in a peace
settlement would be an immediate rupture of relations with Russia,
but it was hoped that when Russia saw that Austria was in earnest
and backed by Germany she would agree to peace terms rather than
face another campaign. The hard-liners in the British Government,
notably Palmerston, Panmure and ostensibly Clarendon (supported
by their militant ambassador in Paris) hoped Russia would turn the
Ultimatum down and that they could get even better terms after
another campaign was fought. As a result while they continued to
make such difficulties the prospects of peace remained obscure.
Professor P. W. Schroeder, who has made extensive use of English
sources in his Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War (although
his interest is primarily Austrian), is with some reason highly critical
of the conduct of British diplomacy at this time, but he fails to make
allowances for British suspicions, even though they were certainly
exaggerated. The belief that Russia remained a serious threat to
the balance of power in Europe was widely -if mistakenly -held, and
English liberal detestation of the political systems of both Russia
and Austria fanned the feelings of distrust. This is not to deny that
there was undoubtedly an element of arrogant chauvinism in the
conduct of policy by Palmerston and Clarendon, which as we have
seen had its strong critics at home; but as yet the critics were in the
minority and from all accounts public opinion was still very bellicose.
Indeed Clarendon went so far as to suggest to Aberdeen that the
acceptance of peace terms could lead to the overthrow of the
Government.
Palmerston was the strongest advocate of carrying on the war, but
he was prone to exaggeration and was always capable of pulling in
sail when he saw breakers ahead. Clarendon was more of two minds.
He frequently echoed Palmerston's hard-line sentiments, but when
it came down to particulars he was readier to compromise. He felt
that by taking a tough line with Walewski and Buol he had won
worthwhile improvements in the wording of the Ultimatum, although

it is doubtful that they were as significant as he claimed.
It would be a mistake to think that the talk of an 1856 campaign
was bluff, as it may seem in retrospect. Russia's unexpected accept-
ance of the Ultimatum eventually led to an early peace and Clar-
endon, the diplomat, could not really avoid going on with what had
been started, although he gave the impression that his heart was not
in it. Actually he sometimes tended to contradict himself as the
long negotiations continued, withdrawing to positions he had earlier
scorned. This may be a common enough experience for men in public
life, but Clarendon left such a full record of his day to day opinions
in his voluminous private correspondence, he convicts himself all too
easily before the bar of history.
Clarendon's apprehensions about English public opinion were not
without some foundation. The Times correspondent in Paris
reporting on 16 December on the rumours of peace overtures being
made through Vienna, commented:
It is quite well known at St. Petersburg as it is at Vienna what the
feelings of the English people are on the war. It is no secret . . .
that England is determined to make no imperfect peace .... And
it is known at Vienna quite as well as it is in Paris and London,
that to-morrow Lord Palmerston would have much more chance
of being supported by the English Parliament in his demand for
men and money to carry on the war than he would when laying
on the table the propositions for peace.
Yet when the exact terms were reprinted from a Belgian newspaper
on 11 January The Times commented that they seemed reasonable
and moderate, but that the Allies could scarcely demand less.
While the despatch of the Austrian Ultimatum was undoubtedly
a significant milestone on the road to peace, it left some important
questions unanswered that caused serious difficulties before direct
negotiations for peace began. Neither Austria nor Britain had been
fully candid with each other in the final round of discussions before
the Ultimatum was despatched on 16 December. Those discussions
were all about the wording of the Ultimatum and not about the
accompanying Memorandum which the Austrians took for granted
and the British ignored. Britain forewent her demand that the special
or particular conditions to be raised under Point Five should be
included in the Ultimatum, but in his despatch of 6 December Clar-
endon emphasised the importance of Russia knowing what these
conditions were, as we have already seen, and trusted Buol would

see the propriety of making them known. Buol made no reply to the
British request which Clarendon had failed to make a condition to
acceptance of the Ultimatum; nor did the Foreign Secretary immedi-
ately ask Seymour how Buol had responded. But Buol did specifically
ask Seymour whether the British Government adhered to the plan
in the Memorandum of 14 November. Seymour, who had only
arrived in Vienna a little more than a week before, replied that he
had no instructions, but that he 'had no hesitation in expressing [his]
firm belief that such was the case' for he inferred that, since they
had agreed to the Ultimatum as amended, 'the paper which had led
to it was included in the sanction' .54 Strangely he reported Buol's
query but failed to make known his reply at the time, perhaps
because he took it for granted, and being unwell neglected to include
this detail. Clarendon likewise ignored Buol's question. The mutual
misunderstandings that followed smacked more of light farce than
of the serious conduct of diplomacy, but issues of war and peace
turned on them.
At the end of December, Colloredo, the Austrian Minister in
London, in a conversation with Palmerston asked whether the British
Government agreed to the Memorandum initialled by Buol and
Bourqueney, which accompanied the Ultimatum and which asserted
that Austria was authorised to declare that its acceptance 'would be
followed by the signature of preliminaries of peace'. Palmerston
expressed his doubts. 'I said the British nation is desirous of peace
on certain conditions', he told Clarendon, 'but is strongly adverse to
negotiations that lead to no results'; and he did not think that the
memorandum contained all the conditions they thought essential.
He said he was unwilling to sign a treaty which did not spell out
those conditions. As for an armistice, 'winter had already established
one'. In a further letter he was quite categorical, writing: 'We cannot
sign a preliminary peace treaty until Russia has consented to all our
conditions and we must not let Walewski and Buol drag us in the
mire. ' 55 But why had this not been said before the Ultimatum was
despatched?
In a letter to Seymour, Clarendon repeated these reservations,
but said that he was under the impression that England would be
ready to adhere to the Triple Treaty alluded to in the Memorandum.
He pointed out that if Russia agreed to the Austrian conditions and
later rejected theirs they would 'look very foolish at having consented
to an armistice or at having commenced negotiations which would
then have to be broken off'. In the same letter he discussed the

prospects for 1856, saying he expected they would 'see military oper-
ations on a large scale in the spring', but that he did not think they
would 'be interfered with by negotiations for peace'. 56
Seymour was naturally upset when he learnt Clarendon's real view
of the Memorandum of 14 November and set off immediately to
apprise Buol of his mistake, but at the last moment, turned back from
the door of the Austrian Foreign Office, fearing the consequences of
his revelation. 'I could not make up my mind just at this critical
moment to provide these people with a good excuse for backing
out', he later explained to Clarendon. On 8 January Clarendon sent
him a despatch firmly stating the Government's position. He had
told Colloredo that there were portions of Buol's Memorandum to
which they were not prepared to adhere. Buol had expressed the
hope that the Allies' particular conditions 'would not offer insur-
mountable obstacles', but they feared some sort of breakdown as
had occurred the previous year. They had 'again requested that those
conditions should be formally communicated to the Cabinet of St.
Petersburg', but as yet they had had no answer. The signature of
preliminaries to peace 'must all depend upon the acceptance by
Russia of the conditions which the memorandum reserved to the
belligerents the right of bringing forward'. In an accompanying letter
he expressed the hope Austria would 'act boldly and accept the
realities of the position' she had made for herself, remembering that
Russia was 'rapidly exhausting herself' and would 'soon have no
men'. He reiterated the plea that the special conditions 'should at
least be made known to Russia', and warned that the consequences
might be serious if for some unexplained reason they were withheld.
In his reply Seymour revealed for the first time the assurance he had
given Buol prior to Esterhazy's departure: 'it is then only right', he
wrote, 'that I should admit that if the Austrian Government has
exceeded its powers in making the propositions upon which the
Russian Government is now deliberating, the error is to be attributed
to me, and not to Count Buol'. In a private letter he claimed that
had he not reassured Buol regarding the Memorandum, 'Esterhazy's
departure would have been put off at the risk of falling through' .57
When Cowley showed the French Emperor Clarendon's despatch
to Seymour and asked him 'if he had not understood that the extra
conditions were to be introduced into the preliminaries of peace',
the Emperor replied 'that he had not reflected upon the matter,
but he was disposed to think that they ought'. Walewski, how-
ever, took a very different view, claiming that they were bound
just as much by the Memorandum as by the Ultimatum. Cowley
reported that they had a long and 'very disagreeable' conversation,
and promised Clarendon that he would write to the Emperor 'to put
him on his guard against his insidious minister'! In a later conver-
sation with the Emperor, Cowley alluded to all the intrigues under
way attempting to compel the Emperor to make peace. This led the
Emperor to show him a letter that Drouyn had addressed to him in
October 1853, arguing against an English alliance and attempting 'to
show that England had but little respect for France, when her own
interests [were] concerned'. 'Make use of England as long as it suits
you', Drouyn had advised, 'form your continental alliances without
reference to her, and shake her off whenever she stands in your
way'. The Emperor replied that 'the basis of his policy was a straight-
forward understanding with England' .58 What an extraordinary
relationship this was between the French Emperor and the British
ambassador to whom he lamented the failings of his own ministers
(but almost two centuries earlier there had been an English King
who sometimes preferred French advice).
For all his worldly wisdom Cowley was much moved by the
Emperor's declaration as was his correspondent, who replied in the
same emotional vein, expressing the hope that their 'unswerving
course' would continue 'to exercise a wholesome influence' upon the
Emperor and 'keep him from yielding to the sinister counsels of the
dishonest men by whom alone he [was] surrounded'; 'one cannot
help pitying a man', Clarendon added, 'who loves what is true and
honourable who is doomed to consort with liars and rogues'! 59
Meanwhile on 11 January word was received in Vienna of Russia's
acceptance of the Ultimatum with certain reservations. She rejected
the Fifth Point, proposed to return Kars and the occupied portions
of Asia Minor for the Russian territories held by the Allies, rather
than surrendering part of Bessarabia, and asked for a broadening of
the role of the coast guard vessels referred to in the Third Point.
These revisions, Seymour noted, were more objectionable to Austria
and Britain than to France. In any event the French Emperor wasted
no time in writing a private letter to Queen Victoria, which he gave
to Cowley for transmission in order to avoid his own officials! Even
Cowley had to admit to him that the Russian reply accorded more
than he had expected. Indeed the ambassador suggested to Clar-
endon that if Austria was agreeable they might exchange the Russian
territory they occupied for Kars and a reduced piece of Bessarabia
along the Danube, and that in this way an honourable peace might
be secured. 60
In his letter Napoleon III urged Queen Victoria to accept the
Russian revisions. He claimed that French public opinion would say
to him: 'Vous aviez obtenu tout cela non sans d'immenses sacrifices
et cependant vous allez les continuer, comprettre les finances de Ia
France, repandre ses tresors et son sang et pourquoi: pour obtenir
quelques Iandes de Ia Bessarabie!f/'61
Queen Victoria made a restrained but firm reply, pointing out that
they did not yet know the exact terms of the Russian response and
that they should not lose the chance of getting better conditions by
showing a willingness to accede at this moment. It would be better
to wait until Russian relations with Austria were ruptured. The
Queen told Clarendon that her own feelings 'cannot be for peace
now'. 'The honour and glory of her dear Army, is as near her heart
as almost anything', she wrote, 'and she cannot bear the thought
that "the failure on the Redan" should be our last fait d'armes, and
it would cost her more than words can express to conclude a peace
with this as the end.' But more reasonably she added: 'However,
what is best and wisest must be done. '62
Clarendon forwarded the Queen's 'spirited opinion about peace'
to Palmerston with his own sober comment:
If I should feel the least secure that we should be more successful
this year than the last I should be even more averse to peace [than]
she is but I have no such feeling for I think that our military
administration is not such as can render our army efficient and
moveable. 63
Fortunately Buol and his Emperor remained firm and refused to
consider the proposed Russian modifications. Buol even refused
Gortchakov's request for a twenty-four hour extension of the Ulti-
matum. The situation was complicated by Seebach informing the
French Government that if they negotiated directly, independent of
the Austrian Ultimatum, the Russian plenipotentiaries would be
empowered to consider a boundary rectification and the particular
conditions, but the British Cabinet refused to give any answer to
Seebach until Russia~s final reply to Austria had been received.64
Upset by Russia's attempt to suppress the Fifth Point and
suspecting she had never been informed of the British reservations,
Clarendon instructed Seymour by telegraph on 15 January to inform
Buol regarding the contents of his Despatch no. 16 of 8 January.
[F]or some unaccountable reason [he wrote] the conditions, upon

which alone we shall consent to make peace, have been kept in
the background and England and France, who have borne all the
brunt of the war, are required to content themselves not with their
own terms but with those of a power which has not spent a shilling
or spilt a drop of blood in the contest which more nearly concerns
her than it does any other. 65
On the same day Seymour had sent Clarendon a telegram confirming

that no official information had been communicated to Russia about
the Allied 'additional conditions'. He also indicated his fear that if
he made known to Buol the contents of Despatch No 16 it might
lead to an immediate reconciliation between the Austrian Govern-
ment and the Russian mission. 'The party opposed to Count Buol
becomes more audacious', he warned, 'but the Emperor as yet is
firm, because he believed that England and France are acting cordi-
ally with him.' The following day, however, after receiving Claren-
don's instruction, he made the required communication to Buol,
who had expressed 'surprise and regret', but his language was more
measured than Seymour had expected. He had suggested that a
'strong moral obligation had been contracted' and had asked why
the British Government had allowed the Ultimatum to go forward
if they considered their special conditions were sine qua non to
peace. In a further despatch of great length Seymour attempted to
vindicate his conduct, saying that he had never had such a painful
decision to make in his professional life. This is puzzling since the
substance of the communication he hesitated to make had already
been conveyed to Buol through Colloredo, but Seymour was
obsessed by the fear that his revelation would give a portion of the
Austrian Cabinet, 'possibly even the Emperor himself', an excuse
for 'undoing what [had] lately been done'. 66
Thus Austria and Britain appeared to be at an impasse with France
uneasily in the middle, Walewski 'more Austrian than the Austrians',
but his Emperor anxious to support his British ally. Cowley told
Clarendon that there was a growing chasm between himself and the
French Foreign Minister, who was doubtless irritated to find him so
frequently seeing the Emperor alone. Clarendon attempted to put a
brave face on the situation oy saying that it was fortunate that they
had become aware of Austria's intentions before they were again
'entangled in negotiations'. 67 It remained to be seen, however,
whether they could really withdraw at this stage of events.
Then on 16 January came the startling news that Russia had

accepted the Ultimatum without qualification as a basis of peace
negotiations. A combination of circumstances, no doubt, contributed
to the making of this decision. The Russians had been shocked by
the recent announcement of the Swedish Treaty with Britain and
France and suspected that if the war continued Sweden would join in
and possibly Prussia and other German states. Prussia had remained
neutral throughout the war and sympathetic to Russia, but the King
was frightened of the possible extension of the war to the Baltic and
on being informed by the Austrian ambassador of the Ultimatum
had appealed to the Czar to accept it. After the losses they had
already suffered the Russians did not feel they could face a war on
two fronts some 1200 miles apart with an enemy strengthened by
new allies and with much superior lines of communication resulting
from their command of the seas. After the fall of Sebastopol the
young Alexander II had visited his army in the Crimea, had gazed
on the ruins of the fallen citadel from the North Fort and determined
to stand firm against the invaders. On returning to his capital,
however, he had to face reality. His new levies were too young and
untrained, his finances were in disorder and military failures were
precipitating unrest directed at his father's autocratic system of
government. The Czar was probably also influenced by news brought
by Seebach that Louis Napoleon would remain faithful to the English
alliance if the war continued. He had told the Saxon minister he was
prepared to make peace on the Austrian terms or, if they were
refused, 'to continue the war with increased vigor, but that happen
what might nothing should induced him to separate from England' .68
The Russian acceptance was greeted more enthusiastically in
France, where it was first announced on the Bourse with a conse-
quent instant rise in market prices, than in England,69 where The
Times sourly commented that a 'new campaign would be more
advantageous'. Palmerston congratulated Clarendon on the news
from Vienna, complacently assuming that Russia would now agree
to their conditions under Point 5. He suggested it was now time to
define their demands 'as to the Eastern Shores of the Black Sea'
and proposed: 'no reconstruction of fortified ports; free commercial
intercourse with the whole of the coast[;] a treaty of peace between
Russia and the Circassians', but admitted that the last condition
presented a difficulty since they did 'not quite know who could enter
into an engagement on behalf of the Circassians'. In writing to Queen
Victoria about the Russian acceptance Palmerston expressed regret
that they had not another summer to destroy Cronstadt and expel
the Russians from the countries south of the Caucasus, but agreed
with her that it would 'not be right to continue the war for the mere
purpose of prospective victories' .1o
In fact Britain's predicament arising from her insistence on the
acceptance of her special conditions was only accentuated by the
news of Russia's acceptance of the Ultimatum. Palmerston insisted
that they must adhere to the decisions they had taken from the
beginning, claiming that they had accepted Austria's refusal to put
these conditions in their Ultimatum, but had required that she should
make them known to Russia. 'France must give way for we are quite
in the right', he added optimistically, but if they failed to do so, he
asserted: 'we shall not be afraid of appealing to this country and the
world to decide between us and the French'! If they gave way about
this, he told Clarendon, they would be 'dragged down about [the]
armistice and all the conditions of peace' .7 1 In the end, as usual,
despite Palmerston's bluster, they had to compromise. Clarendon's
tone for the next week or more was shrill and self-righteous as he
strove to maintain the demands and avoid unpalatable surrender,
but he was not unaware of the difficulties of their position.
The state of feeling in France renders a continuation of the war
impossible (he admitted to Queen Victoria], but the manner in
which that feeling is exhibited at Paris will make honorable
conditions of peace extremely difficult. Lord Cowley describes the
people as mad, kissing each other on the restoration of peace and
treating Hubner as a sort of saviour.72
Clarendon's petulance was no doubt fed by the knowledge that for
all his protestations to the contrary, it would be impossible for Britain
to go on fighting without France. This view was forcefully presented
by Prince Albert in a long memorandum written for the Cabinet in
which he pointed out the danger of pushing France into abandoning
the Alliance, leaving the British army prisoners in the Crimea and
Britain's shores undefended against a hostile Europe with the Royal
Navy tied up in the Black Sea and the Baltic. Considering the benefits
they had won and the part played by France he continued: 'we have
no moral right, if we had physical power to enforce a single handed
independent determination as to the final settlement'. 73
Yet for a week after the Russian acceptance, the Cabinet under
Palmerston's resolute lead refused to budge, and although Clarendon
admitted that they were 'now standing almost alone', he continued
to send adamant instructions to Cowley and Seymour. In a despatch

to Cowley on 18 January Clarendon was quite explicit with regard to
the Fifth Point, saying they were not willing 'to leave these important
conditions to the chance of negotiation' and that consequently a
'clear understanding' must be reached with Russia before any preli-
minaries to peace could be signed. 'We are in an unpleasant fix and
I don't see our way out of it', he wrote to Seymour a few days later,
'but what I do know is that we won't make peace on anybody's terms
but our own .... 'And as late as 24 January he insisted in a despatch
to Seymour that:
England cannot consent to be told by any foreign Government
that England must sign without hesitation or condition a national
engagement.
England must consult her own interest and her own dignity. We
do not recede from any engagement we have entered into and
only hold the same language as we have held throughout.
This was in response to Buol's 'insuperable' opposition to Seymour's
urgent request that he inform Gortchakov of the special conditions.
'Austria', he had said, 'had undertaken to provide preliminaries of
peace, but was not disposed to charge herself with the execution of
commissions .... She had fulfilled her part of an engagement with a
scrupulous exactness - she had a right to demand that the obligations
implicitly or explicitly taken by others should be observed with the
same good faith. '74
There was an additional problem in that the Russians had captured
Kars after the Austrian Ultimatum had been drawn up and conse-
quently had a bargaining lever of which they were going to make
use. Cowley renewed his not unreasonable suggestion regarding
Bessarabia, which he improperly passed on to Seymour and which
Walewski quickly took up. Providing the Austrians agreed to the
concession, he proposed that the Russian cession of Bessarabian
territory might be reduced to a strip along the Danube, if the
Russians undertook to give up Kars and not to refortify the Aland
Islands. Although it was eventually carried out, Palmerston unfortu-
nately vetoed the proposal at this stage. Despite the fact that the
cession of a large part of Bessarabia to the Principalities, as required
by the Ultimatum, was originally an Austrian demand, made, it was
said, for Austrian interests, Palmerston argued that this territory was
to be taken as a guarantee for the future security of Turkey and in
exchange for those parts of the Crimea held by the Allies. The war
had been fought for the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey

and consequently, he claimed, the Allies could not be expected to
surrender Turkish territory to the Russians. In return for vacating it
Russia would get peace and be spared the invasion and conquest of
Georgia! Moreover, he added, the Russians had been beaten at Kars
and the town only fell into their hands 'by the accident of the
garrison not having enough to eat', a singularly naive argument for a
statesman of Palmerston's long experience.7s
Palmerston was particularly annoyed at being restrained by Buol,
the minister of a neutral state, and himself wrote to Seymour,
pointing out that while they appreciated Buol's friendly and firm
conduct (in refusing Russia's demands for concessions), it was
'Russia rather than the Allies who ought to feel grateful' to him.
'We have no wish to continue the war, for the prospect of what we
may accomplish in another year', he wrote, 'if we can now obtain
peace upon the conditions which we deem absolutely essential', but
he directed Seymour to tell Buol that they would not sign prelimi-
naries until they were fully satisfied. Buol, however, as Seymour
remarked, was a 'formalist' and meant what he said, but he did
promise to support the British demand for the non-fortification of
the Aland Islands, which he was hopeful of getting, hinting that he
was ready to give up some Bessarabian territory. Seymour made it
clear that he thought Austria had some grounds for her insistence
on the signature of preliminaries and undertook 'to be the victim in
case of failure', for which he was admonished by Clarendon for
having 'adopted too much the opinions of Buol' _76
Eventually a way out was found with the assistance of France,
some backing down by Palmerston and a fortunate suggestion from
Russia that her acceptance of the Ultimatum could be regarded as
the basis for preliminaries of peace. Of the original particular or
special conditions the non-fortification of the Aland Islands was the
only significant one since the consuls were by inference included in
the Ultimatum as amended and the insistence on considering the
position of the territories to the east of the Black Sea was too vague
a claim to turn easily into any hard condition. Palmerston himself
admitted to Queen Victoria that this condition had been 'left
purposely vague', since it would be difficult to stipulate a treaty
between Russia and Circassia for lack of a government of that terri-
tory, which had been ceded by Turkey in 1829, although she had
not actually controlled all of it. All that could be asked, Palmerston
thought, was that the coast should not be fortified and that it should
be opened to commerce.77
France was now a weak reed, for as Cowley warned, with the
Russian acceptance of the Ultimatum the Emperor could not if he
wished continue the war. On 18 January, however, Persigny
informed Clarendon that in deference to the wishes of their ally the
French Government would make known the particular conditions to
Russia through the good offices of Seebach. Palmerston and Clar-
endon were anxious to make these conditions sine quibus non to
peace and to so inform Russia before preliminaries were signed, but
Walewski remained hesitant, although he did offer to make the
Aland Island condition sine qua non, if the preliminaries were signed
first.7 8
Things remained at an impasse until 25 January when Cowley
reported that the Emperor was willing to have Walewski inform
Seebach officially, what the Russians already knew privately, namely
the terms of the special conditions on which the British insisted and
further that the French Government was willing to enter a binding
agreement with the British Government not to make peace until the
special conditions were obtained, provided that this stipulation was
kept secret and that the British Government agreed to sign the
preliminaries of peace as drawn up by the Austrian Government
without delay. 79 These preliminaries still presented a difficulty to the
British Government, but at this point Russia inadvertently offered a
solution by proposing they should all simply initial a protocol at
Vienna, indicating that Russia accepted the conditions laid down in
the Ultimatum and providing for the appointment of Plenipotent-
iaries to meet in Paris within three weeks to sign peace preliminaries
and an armistice and begin negotiations. Palmerston welcomed this
proposal and told Queen Victoria that the arguments in Prince
Albert's memorandum would justify them before Parliament for
going ahead in view of France's attitude; on the same day Clarendon
informed the Queen that everything had been settled.so
Walewski continued to make some reservations, but he eventually
transmitted the special conditions in writing to Seebach and by 29
January they had been despatched to St Petersburg. Although they
were already known, the Russian Plenipotentiaries could not now
pretend that they were unaware of them when they arrived in Paris.
The Protocol, which Clarendon described as inconsequential, was
duly signed in Vienna on 1 February and from this time onward,
Austria, the power primarily responsible for dragging the belligerents

to the conference table ceased to play a major role. 81
The British Government supported the Russian proposal that the
peace conference should be held in Paris, despite the doubts of
Lord Cowley who was all too much aware of the peace mania that
dominated that city and of the pro-Russian feelings that were preva-
lent. A Paris Conference also meant a conference with Walewski in
the chair, but Clarendon thought it important that he could keep in
close touch with the Emperor throughout the conference (or
Congress, as it was called) since Louis Napoleon was the only person
they trusted in the French Government. Clarendon himself agreed
to attend the Congress as the leading British Plenipotentiary with
professed reluctance, although Granville maintained that he was
really anxious to participate. At any rate he was strongly opposed
to Palmerston's casual suggestion that they should appoint the sailor
diplomat, Sir Edward Lyons, who had been at sea throughout the
war, except for his participation in the recent Council of War in
Paris, and consequently not privy to the complicated diplomatic
discussions that had characterised the war. 82
It may be asked why the British Government had so persistently
raised difficulties before finally agreeing to the peace conference and
what, if anything, did it gain? The answer to the first question
probably lies in the fact that the hearts of the British policy makers
were never in the negotiations, although they knew that they could
not reject the Austrian proposals out of hand. Perhaps more
important was the fact that they trusted no-one except the French
Emperor and they lacked confidence in his ability to stick with them.
Their pride was hurt for they resented having to accept a peace the
terms of which were drafted by a despised neutral. Their persistent
demand that the special conditions should be made known to Russia
and included in a preliminary agreement preceding the peace confer-
ence was as much as anything a matter of honour. They failed to
get prior Russian agreement to the special conditions, but they did
secure a secret agreement with France, for what it was worth, that
peace would not be concluded unless the only significant condition
respecting the Aland Islands was settled, and also the promise of
support from Austria obtained. On that important issue and on Kars
they eventually got what they sought, although they had to make
concessions elsewhere. The final settlement was a compromise, but
not a dishonourable one in English eyes.
It is difficult to assess public opinion on the question of war and
peace or to say to what extent it was an important influence on British

policy. There is no doubt that Clarendon was always concerned
about it and 'seemed to think that the peace must overthrow the
Government'. Palmerston was of a more optimistic disposition than
Clarendon and more inclined to lead than to follow public opinion.
He certainly sympathised with much that was said in the press which
was generally warlike, but of course he had to deal with realities and
some of his more outrageous outbursts to Clarendon were in the
nature of letting off steam. He was quite capable a few weeks later,
having made his point, of accepting a more moderate line. The peace
loving Greville who spoke in December of the 'wickedness of the
press in practising upon public credulity, and as late as 22 January
pronounced it as violently anti-peace, by the end of the month
observed that it had left off inveighing against peace when peace
seemed inevitable. 83 The warlike views of the press, echoed by many
backbenchers on both sides of the House undoubtedly represented
a not unimportant segment of public opinion and we may conclude
that this opinion was one of the forces restraining the Government
from moving any more quickly along the road to peace. It must have
helped Palmerston and Clarendon to resist any pressure from more
peace-minded colleagues such as Lewis, Grey and Argyll, but the
Cabinet generally seemed to accept the lead of the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Secretary, except for an occasional touch on the
brake. Palmerston and Clarendon wanted to impose the toughest
terms they could on Russia, but by this time they knew there was
no turning back.
7 The Conclusion of
Peace, 1856
I PREPARATIONS FOR THE PARIS PEACE CONGRESS
Granville writing to his friend Canning in India reported that

Londoners of all classes were 'certainly surprised and pleased' at
news of Russia's acceptance of the Austrian Ultimatum and that 'the
funds rose 21!2 per cent' .1 The second assertion was a matter of fact,
but the first a personal opinion. While no one was likely to wish for
war in the abstract, The Times suspected there were many who
thought 'that its continuance for another year would have more of
good than of evil'. Its leader on 18 January continued:
Our preparations are so vast, our army and navy are assuming so
much more promising an aspect than before, and the power of
Russia is so visibly reduced and shaken, that we might reasonably
hope at the end of another campaign not only to dictate terms
much more favourable, but to have for them the best of all possible
guarantees, the utter exhaustion and prostration of our adversary.
Nevertheless, it recognised that in view of Russia's changed attitude
it might be better to take what was offered than to pay the high
price in men and money for something more.
The next day's leader warned that Russia must not think that
Britain was as anxious for peace as she had originally been reluctant
to make war. The nation must be prepared for peace on the terms
Russia had accepted, 'but', it observed, 'there is nevertheless a strong
sentiment which repines at the termination of hostilities before we
have had the opportunity of putting forth our whole strength .... '
It compared the country's situation in January 1856 with what it had
been the previous April, when Gladstone, Graham and Herbert,
supported by Russell, were urging an ignominious peace. Now,
however, it was claimed, thanks to 'the courage, foresight, the unflin-
ching firmness and unsleeping vigilance of Lord Palmerston', they
were in a position, without any cause for shame, 'to conclude a peace
or wage a war' as they chose.z
Doubtless Palmerston was pleased and Clarendon relieved at the
176
The Conclusion of Peace, 1856 177
lead given by the Thunderer, but the strictures on Russell and the
Peelite trio were manifestly unfair. It was certainly open to question
whether the great Joss of life, not to mention high cost, direct and
indirect, was justified by the rather more stringent terms that had
been obtained. When Aberdeen and his friends first learnt of the
terms in December they were critical and sceptical that they would
lead anywhere. In particular they criticised the proposal for neutralis-
ation, which Aberdeen dismissed as 'simply absurd', while he
regarded the cession of Bessarabian territory as an unnecessary
humiliation. Initially he anticipated the rejection of the Austrian
Ultimatum to be 'inevitable', but when the Russian acceptance was
announced he thought it wise not to object to the terms, although
he still regarded them as clumsy and impracticable and bound to be
evaded or to bring a peace that would not last. 3
The new session of Parliament opened on 31 January, shortly
before the protocol was signed at Vienna. The Queen's Speech
announced that 'while determined to omit no effort which could give
vigour to the operations of the war', she deemed it her duty 'not to
decline any overtures which might reasonably afford a prospect of a
safe and honourable peace'. Consequently, the Speech continued,
as a result of the efforts of Austria, negotiations for a peace treaty
were shortly to be opened in Paris. 4
In the House of Commons the address was approved with no
dissent and with only a brief debate. Disraeli's was the voice of
moderation. He welcomed the prospect of an early peace but
condemned those who insisted on continuing the war. Palmerston in
an even briefer speech welcomed the spirit of Disraeli's remarks and
quite agreed that it would be wrong to continue the war if they were
now able to accomplish the objects for which it was fought.S
The only sour note came from Roebuck who announced that he
had no confidence in 'the noble Lord' (Palmerston) and did not think
the people of the country had either. Denouncing Russia's long
record of aggression, he contended that they had gone to war 'to
prevent Russia from acquiring such a preponderance in Europe as
would enable her to override both France and England'. This he
argued had not been achieved, for although they had 'an army of
lions', it had been 'led by jackasses'. Instead they were 'suing for
peace', because 'our great Ally- our "big brother" as he was called-
chooses to lead the way'. 6
In the Lords Derby made a speech that was three times as long
as Disraeli's in the Commons and much less accommodating. While
he did not intend to give comfort to the enemy by voting .against the
Queen's Speech, as it was called, he thought it a pretty sad affair.
Indeed, he tore the whole Speech apart, paragraph by paragraph,
with emphasis on the omissions. He noted the lack of any mention
of Turkey or Sardinia and the failure to say anything about the
deterioration of relations with Persia and more seriously with the
United States over the Foreign Enlistment issue. He was especially
vehement on the lack of any reference to Kars, to the valour of its
defenders and of any explanation for its loss. While he welcomed
the prospects of peace, providing the objects of the war were fully
secured, he asked why Austria was approaching Russia on behalf of
the Allies instead of the opposite. It would have been difficult to have
made a more scathing attack on the Address and yet he concluded his
long speech by reiterating his intention of not offering it the 'slightest
opposition'. 7 The irony of the situation was that many of the views
expressed were those of the Prime Minister who was forced by
circumstances to accept situations that were uncongenial to him. As
we have seen, Palmerston and Clarendon had constantly attempted,
unsuccessfully, to secure assistance for the Turkish garrison of Kars
and they were both unhappy about the way in which they were
forced to go along with the Austro-French peace initiative.
Lord Clarendon replied more briefly in a conciliatory speech,
which Hansard reported as being 'very imperfectly heard'. He
explained that nothing was said about differences with the United
States since discussions were still in progress and publication of the
correspondence, on which any debate would have to be based, would
be premature, but he proceeded to give a stout defence of the British
position. As for Kars, he fully agreed with Derby's elogium of its
defenders, promised the early publication of all the relevant papers
on which the House could make judgement and hotly denied that
there was any difference between England and France on the
grounds that England had a selfish interest in this front. Derby's
raising of this question had been impolitic for how could Britain
separate her obvious interest and concern at the continued expansion
of the Russian Empire into this part of Asia from the more immediate
concern for the protection of Turkey from Russian aggression? Actu-
ally there was no doubt that the British Government was more
concerned about the Asian front than the French, despite Claren-
don's disclaimers, but that did not warrant Derby's severe strictures
made, it would seem, merely to embarrass the Government. Clar-
endon also vigorously defended the role of Austria and concluded
with warm praise for 'the judgement, firmness and moderation, the
honourable and straightforward conduct' of the French Emperor,
who 'desired peace', but who 'would make no peace that was incon-
sistent with the honour and dignity of France' .8
The Government had got off lightly as Palmerston recognised
when in his jaunty way he wrote to Clarendon: 'Roebuck and Derby
might be put into a bag together, and the survivor let out to be trod
upon .... But a few war to the knife speeches, (appropriate as
somebody said for the member from Sheffield) will do no harm. '9
There was a relative lull in diplomatic activity between the signing
of the Protocols in Vienna on 1 February and the opening of the
Congress in Paris on the 25th. The Austrian, British and French
ambassadors conferred with the Porte in Constantinople in this
period in an effort to get their position settled with the Turkish
Government on Points One and Four. The Fourth Point was finally
disposed of when the Turkish Grand Council approved with a few
amendments some twenty-one proposals made by the ambassadors,
which on paper comprised a sweeping programme of legal and
administrative reforms providing equality of treatment for non-
Musselman subjects of the Sultan. These were promulgated by him
on 18 February as the Hatti-Humayun of Abdul Medjid. There was
also much discussion of the future organisation of the Principalities
envisaged in the First Point, but no decisions were reached.1
Cowley, who was to support Clarendon as the second British
delegate, was anxious that the British and French Governments
should hold preliminary discussions prior to the opening of the
Congress to ensure a clear understanding between them. Walewski,
however, stalled to the last moment in preparing a memorandum for
that purpose, since in Cowley's view his object was to enter the
Conference with as few engagements towards England as possible,
and no memorandum had arrived before he left Paris on 9 February
for a short visit to England where he was able to confer with Clar-
endon. During the first week in February Cowley had two audiences
with Louis Napoleon, who was as friendly as ever, and ascertained
the Emperor's views on most of the matters that were likely to come
up at the Peace Conference, or Congress as the French preferred to
call it, some of which he told Clarendon were 'odd enough', but on
the whole he thought the Emperor would be amenable to reason,
'except on Bessarabia'. Alluding to an inquiry from Cavour as to
what he thought might be done in the conferences for Italy, the
Emperor indicated that he was disposed to make an effort on two
points raised by Cavour, namely the matter of the sequestrations (in

Lombardy of property owned by refugees in Piedmont) and the
introduction of municipal government in the Legations.1 1
Palmerston had strongly supported Sardinia's right to full partici-
pation in the Congress and although Clarendon had originally had
reservations he pressed it strongly and successfully against Buol, who
argued that Sardinia was not a great power. Clarendon maintained
that Cavour could be trusted to limit himself to issues which he
considered concerned his country. Britain, on the other hand,
strongly opposed Buol's proposal that the participation of Prussia
should be left an open question, and in the end it was agreed that
Prussia should not be invited to attend until the revision of the
Convention of 1841 came under discussion. 12
Walewski was, of course, the chief French Plenipotentiary as well
as President of the Congress, with Bourqueney as his second.
Austria, Sardinia and Turkey were represented by Buol, Cavour and
Ali Pasha, a former Grand Vizier, and their resident ministers in
Paris. Count Orlov was the chief Russian Plenipotentiary and Baron
Brunnow, former Russian ambassador in London, his able second.
Orlov, a veteran Russian statesman and a most imposing personage,
had long experience in peace negotiations, generally as a victor, at
Paris in 1814, at Adrianople in 1829 and at Unkiar Skelessi in 1834.
He received an extraordinarily warm reception in Paris and was
lionised wherever he went, always conducting himself in public with
cheerful good humour, expressing his admiration for the conquerors
of Sebastopol and, within eight days of his arrival, making himself a
warm friend of General Canrobert. His instructions were to insinuate
himself into the good grace of the French Emperor, to gain his
confidence and appeal to his impartiality and magnanimity. This he
did with marked success, for while Napoleon III remained on inti-
mate and friendly terms with Clarendon, more and more as the
Congress progressed he tended to play a mediating role between the
two main adversaries, his ally and his new friend. 13
Brunnow arrived in Paris in early February and on the 7th sent
Nesselrode a report on the situation, indicating that the British would
oppose Russian retention of Kars, demand the non-fortification of
the Aland Islands, endeavour to support the claims of the tribes in
Circassia and oppose any modification of the Bessarabian transfer in
exchange for Kars. He anticipated correctly that France would
support the British on Kars and the Aland Islands, but only weakly
on Bessarabia and not at all on Circassia.t 4
STAYING PROCEEDINGS.
Jlr. 81i. " TELL RUSSIA, IP HE DOESN'T SETTLE AT ON<"E. I SHALL GO ON WITH THo ACTION."
On Cowley's advice Clarendon arrived in Paris on 16 February, nine

days before the Congress opened, to hold preliminary discussions
with Buol and Walewski, but to his chagrin Brunnow had arrived
before him. The following day he had a long and friendly after-
dinner conversation with the Emperor who professed his delight with
a 'charming' letter from Queen Victoria and his great determination
to maintain the Alliance. He admitted his error in originally agreeing
to Austria's free hand in sending her Ultimatum, 'but when the
subject was calmly discussed by men of business in England', he told
Clarendon, 'he was made to see his mistake'. Clarendon warned the
Emperor against the efforts that would be made by flattery to divide
the Allies and alluded to the bad impression created by peace at any
price talk in Paris. Louis Napoleon strongly condemned such talk,
which he attributed to 'the notorious levity and love of change of
the French nation', and agreed to the importance of prior agreement
before the Conference opened. On being pressed by Clarendon he
said he would have no hesitation or difficulty in renewing the war if
Russia failed to live up to her engagements. Clarendon again warned
Napoleon against flattery and advised him how to parry this request.
'Every time I see him', the Foreign Secretary wrote to Palmerston,
'I am better satisfied with his frank and straightforward conduct',
but events were to prove him over-sanguine.1 5
Although Louis Napoleon attached great importance to the
English Alliance and rejoiced in his friendship with Queen Victoria,
he was much more prepared to be friendly with the Russians than
was Clarendon and the Russians knew this.
On the 18th Clarendon had what he called a satisfactory conver-
sation with Brunnow, who was 'full of professions of esteem and
respect' for Palmerston (!)and who made no disguise of the fact that
Russia 'had been beaten and must take the consequences'. Clar-
endon told Palmerston that when Brunnow asked what England
wanted under Point 5, he replied that England was determined not
to make peace unless she secured the objects of the war. He told
Brunnow that the English people:
did not regard the prospects of Peace with much favour; they had
made vast preparations and were cheerfully submitting to great
sacrifices in order to prosecute the war with vigour . . . and it was
not unnatural therefore that the people of England should desire
one more campaign, nevertheless [illegible] their sound sense and
sober judgement would be satisfied with a peace upon conditions
to which Russia had agreed ....
Clarendon formed the impression that Brunnow thought the terms
were moderate and that peace would be made.16
The next day he was more pessimistic, telling Palmerston he feared
Brunnow was stiffening because of the shameful peace atmosphere
on the Bourse and in the salons of Paris. He said that he was anxious
to have the prime minister's comments for he felt that he was walking
upon ground that was mined and that he had 'nobody to depend
upon except the Emperor and Marshal Vaillant'. Clarendon did not
need to ask Palmerston for comments (perhaps he was humouring

the old man) for they poured in thick and fast. The Prime Minister's
constant admonition was to give nothing away, with a rehearsal of
all the familiar arguments. He firmly rejected the Russian plea that
they should not be humiliated. 'Russia has brought that humiliation
upon herself', he wrote, claiming that the Allies were justified in
making demands 'for attaining the objects of the war and for the
future security of Europe. '17
Clarendon later admitted that he had been 'rather provoked' by
Palmerston's early telegrams and despatches telling him how to deal
with the Russians, but asserted he had 'taken no notice of them' in
his public despatches; 'as luckily I am old enough to walk alone', he
told Granville, 'you may suppose they did not embarrass me much'. 18
The British, French and Austrian Plenipotentiaries held an
informal meeting on 21 February to settle on proposals to be made
at the first official conference regarding 'preliminaries', an armistice
and the order of business, as well as such contentious questions as
the seating of Sardinia and the exclusion of Prussia. 'The conference
was perhaps not exactly what Walewski had intended it to be',
Clarendon reported, 'and I have no doubt he wanted to make a
softer bed for Russia to fall upon but it all passed off most good
humouredly' .19
Count Orlov arrived on 22 February and at their first meeting
the Emperor appears to have resisted his blandishments, but in
conversation with Clarendon afterwards Napoleon III was inclined
to give up the Bessarabian frontier, 'if any really useful object could
be procured in exchange for it'. Clarendon gave him no encourage-
ment.zo On the 25th Orlov called on Clarendon. 'We met as old
friends and his manner was cordial', Clarendon reported. (They had
known each other in St Petersburg many years before.) But Orlov
wasted no time in pointing out that the new Bessarabian frontier
was meaningless and proposed by Austria to humiliate Russia. He
argued they had won Kars at great cost and felt they should get
something for it. Indeed he claimed it was worth more than the
whole of Bessarabia! Clarendon made it clear that Kars was not
negotiable since Britain had gone to war to defend the integrity of
Turkey. The argument was to be continued through the early sessions
of the Congress. Clarendon mentioned the great preparations that
were being taken for the 1856 Baltic campaign; Orlov said he was
aware of this, but that Russia too was making her preparations and
that Cronstadt, which might have been taken last summer, was now
many times as strong. Likewise, he observed, the Allies might have

taken Sebastopol had they pressed on after the Alma. He was critical
of the conduct of Russian policy on the eve of the war, especially of
Menschikov's mission, but protested that Nicholas had not wanted
war.
Throughout the conversation which lasted upward of an hour
[Clarendon observed] the tone of Count Orloff was moderate and
becoming - he expressed no fear and made no boast - he said his
object was to put an end to the war and he should regret sincerely
if his mission were to fail as he was prepared to make such
concessions as were not inconsistent with the dignity of Russia,
but the impression left upon my mind was that Count Orloff will
be unbending with respect to various points on which it will be
the duty of Lord Cowley and myself to insist and that the successful
issue of the negotiations will mainly depend upon the amount of
support we shall receive from our colleagues.21
On some points that turned out to be less than they would have
wished.
II THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PEACE TREATY,

25 FEBRUARY-30 MARCH
The meetings or 'conferences' of the Congress of Paris, which began

on 25 February, normally lasted about four hours, starting at one
o'clock. 22 The Plenipotentiaries agreed to accept the Protocol signed
in Vienna on 1 February in lieu of the usual Preliminaries and to an
armistice that was to last only to 31 March, thus setting a deadline
to the proceedings. The armistice provided for the suspension of
hostilities between the armies during this period. It did not affect the
blockade, but the Allies assured the Russians that naval commanders
would be instructed to refrain from hostile acts against the territories
of the belligerents. 23 'Walewski performed his part well and will make
a better President than I expected', Clarendon told Palmerston, an
opinion he changed before the end of the Congress. Buol he found
'rather taquin', but courteous and helpful. 'Brunnow', he wrote,
'evidently means to be very troublesome and to gain the order for
something or other in diamonds for his zeal and patriotism. ' 24
On the next day the British Plenipotentiaries met with the Russians
and Walewski to discuss points of difference that might arise. The
Russians agreed to leave the Aland Islands unfortified, but continued

to demand a rectification of the Bessarabian frontier in return, for
which they proposed to exchange Kars. There were long arguments,
but the British and the French refused to listen to all talk of an
exchange. 'We were like deaf adders', Clarendon told Palmerston.
In an official despatch he continued: 'Then said Count Orloff, it is
clear that no understanding is possible. He expressed his regret as
Russia was desirous of peace .... We also expressed our regret that
there appeared to be no prospect of coming to an agreement.' Orlov
subsequently asked that the 'final meeting' be postponed a day, and
requested an audience with the Emperor, which was not granted
immediately. Clarendon was uncertain whether the Emperor would
remain firm on the question of the frontier and foresaw that they
would be asked whether if they got all the other things they wanted
they would 'persist in the rupture', which, he told Palmerston in a
private letter, seemed to be imminent. He recognised that the situ-
ation was critical, but was also uncertain whether the Russians were
bluffing or really believed they could make no more concessions
without humiliation. He knew that the French Emperor did not
approve of the proposed frontier, which he looked upon as 'a line
drawn at random' by Austria, that Turkey did not consider it of vital
consequence, that Sardinia was not much interested and that Austria
would not go to war for it.
We may therefore [he warned] and within the next 48 hours find
ourselves standing alone and having to decide the grave question
of Peace or War. I do not think that we should be deserted by
the Emperor but in acting with us if we determined on war he
would make himself unpopular in France and the entire responsi-
bility would be thrown upon England.
My opinion therefore is that rather than expose the Alliance to
this severe trial and Europe to a renewal of the War we should if
absolutely necessary agree to give up the Bessarabian frontier, but
leaving both banks of the Danube in the hands of the Turks upon
Russia accepting all the conditions which we think indispensable
for a safe and honorable peace.
Consequently Clarendon asked for the Government's views and
guidance by telegraph.2s
The answer came without delay, insisting that Russia stick by the
terms of the Ultimatum. 'If Russia determines to carry on the war
rather than give up Kars, things must take their course, and the
responsibility will rest on Russia', the telegram concluded. 26 In a

letter written the same day Palmerston reminded Clarendon 'Faint
heart never won fair lady', and went on to argue foolishly that since
Russia knew she was not strong enough to defeat all the Allies
together the attack on Kars was 'a wanton sacrifice of life and
effusion of blood because she knew she could not be allowed to keep
it'! All this was a little too much for Clarendon who replied with
some asperity that he was 'not faint-hearted' and that since he had
arrived 'the language has been firmer and the alliance has been
strengthened'. He told Palmerston bluntly that he simply failed to
take account of the totally different state of affairs in France where
everyone except the Emperor and Walewski (who was tied to him)
was 'prepared to make any peace'. In other words they could not
count on France and England holding together as Palmerston
assumed. 27
Walewski on this occasion remained firm, asked Orlov to take
back his letter regarding a final meeting which he saw as a threat
and embarrassed Buol by asking him if the Allies would have
Austria's active co-operation if negotiations were broken off on the
Kars-Bessarabia issue. The Russians backed down and came to the
next meeting on the 28th, which Clarendon described as a 'desultory'
affair. There was a general discussion of the four articles of the
Austrian Ultimatum during which the Russians agreed to the British
requirement that the Congress must approve of the number of police
boats to be specified in the Russo-Turkish convention, and Ali Pasha
took exception to the phrasing of Article 4 as being derogatory to
the Sultan's independence. A committee was also appointed to make
proposals for the organisation of the Principalities. 2s
The next day the Emperor told Clarendon that he had invited
Orlov to dinner and had had a reasonable conversation. Orlov had
told him he had been instructed if he ran into difficulties to appeal
to the French Emperor, but Louis Napoleon said he had replied that
he was unable 'to give any decision without the assent of the Allies'.
Nevertheless, it was clear to Clarendon that the Emperor was
resigned to giving up the Bessarabian claim 'to secure other objects
of greater importance', despite Clarendon's urging that if they
remained firm they could avoid any concession. 29
Before the third meeting on 1 March Walewski showed the British
representatives a paper in the Emperor's hand requiring the demili-
tarisation of the Aland Islands, the Bessarabian cession and the
return of Kars, but making no mention of Nikolaev and the countries
east of the Black Sea. Clarendon and Cowley objected to the omis-
sions and told Walewski they expected his support which he prom-
ised. At the meeting the conditions under Article 5 were considered.
It was agreed to settle the demand regarding the Aland Islands by
a separate convention between Russia, Britain and France, since they
were of no concern to Austria, Sardinia and Turkey. The Russians
expressed the hope that their compliance on this condition would
be taken into account when other matters were considered. The
conference then considered the territories east of the Black Sea. As
a result of British pressure before the meeting Walewski spoke of
the necessity of placing an effectual barrier between Russia and
Turkey, but in fact the Russians had already been informed that the
British would not be supported by France in this area. Thus when
Clarendon went further, proposing that the territory east of the
Kuban river should be declared independent (that is, the entire area
from the Kuban to the Turkish frontier), Orlov protested strongly
against any suggestion of such a vast cession of territory not
mentioned in the Ultimatum nor subsequently. He also refused to
make any promises about abolishing any fortifications on the Circas-
sian coast, since they might be needed as protection against brigands.
Brunnow pointed out that these territories had been ceded by Turkey
to Russia under the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. This was admitted
by Ali who told Cowley, when the latter took him aside, that the
real difficulty lay in border infractions. Cowley then suggested setting
up a mixed commission to revise the frontier to which Orlov agreed.
When Walewski asked for the restitution of Kars, Orlov repeated
his claim for compensation. Clarendon rejected this on the ground
that the war had been fought to defend the integrity of Turkey;
'restitution of territory held by the enemy', Clarendon argued, 'is
invariably made at the conclusion of peace.' (The adjective 'defeated'
should be understood before the word 'enemy' to make this state-
ment meaningful.) 'We restore I said', Clarendon reported, 'Eupa-
toria, Kinburn, Kamiesch, Sebastopol, Balaclava and Kertch, but at
the same time we give her what is far more valuable than all these
places -we give her peace .... ' He went on to spell out the advan-
tages for Russian commerce in the Black Sea and the Baltic that
would accrue from the end of the blockade; the cession of a strip of
land in Bessarabia; already agreed to, was a small price to pay.
Orlov then withdrew his demand regarding Bessarabia and agreed to
return Kars if other matters were dealt with satisfactorily. Clarendon
refused to proceed under 'menace', saying they 'would continue the
war for 10 or 20 years rather than leave an inch of Turkish territory

in Russian hands'. Orlov explained that he merely meant that if
negotiations were broken off Kars would remain in Russia's
possession. Clarendon observed that the British Plenipotentiaries, in
responding to Orlov's arguments, got no support from their
colleagues, who said that Russia could not be expected to make such
an extensive cession of territory and that the right of fortifications
could not be denied. In a private letter Clarendon said he feared
that Austria would give way with French support on the Bessarabian
frontier, and asked for the Cabinet's direction. 3
Clarendon's letter and despatch must have crossed a despatch and
a letter from Palmerston both dated 2 March and written, according
to Granville, 'after a row in the Cabinet'. After congratulating Clar-
endon on the firmness with which he and the French Emperor had
withstood 'unwarrantable' Russian pretensions Palmerston went on
to urge the desirability of Russia recognising the independence of
the whole area between the Turkish frontier and the River Kuban
(which runs into the Sea of Azov) and an agreement not to rebuild
the forts on the shore of the Black Sea. Even Palmerston realised
this was asking a lot and suggested that at least Russia might agree
to recognise the independence of the Circassian tribes in the western
part of this area over which, he claimed, the Russians had not exerted
control. In both the despatch and the letter the Prime Minister gave
Clarendon a free hand to exchange some Bessarabian territory for
'advantages in the Turkish Empire', but emphasised the importance
of cutting the Russians off from the Pruth.3 1
On the evening of 2 March Clarendon had a long and trying
conversation with the French Emperor. He maintained that if the
Russians successfully resisted their demands east of the Black Sea
and got a revised Bessarabian frontier which the Emperor was
inclined to grant them then the peace would be a 'triumph for the
Russians' since they would be getting better terms than they would
have expected. 'The Emperor rather warmly expressed his entire
dissent from this opinion', Clarendon reported, for with Kars, the
Aland Islands and free navigation of the Danube, he claimed, France
and England would have 'an honourable peace'; 'but the fact is', the
Emperor continued, 'you are much more exigent than you were a
week ago. When you came to Paris you told me that your Govern-
ment assented to the conditions which I sent over to London for
their approval. . . .' He said that Clarendon was now asking for
more than had been proposed in the memorandum and more than
had been communicated to Russia by Seebach. ' ... I really don't

know where you will stop', he complained. Clarendon commented
that he had never seen Louis Napoleon so excited but that his
irritation subsided. It seems the Emperor was now persuaded that
the Allies were in the wrong and consequently lacked firmness with
Orlov who exploited his vacillation. In a more friendly tone he
admitted that Clarendon's demands respecting the region east of the
Black Sea might be desirable, but he was sure they were unobtain-
able. He protested that any attempt to hold out for these objectives
would only stimulate the peace cry in France, while Clarendon
stressed the opposite point about public opinion in England. The
Emperor, however, did agree to two moderate proposals of Claren-
don's, that there should be French and British representation on the
proposed Russo-Turkish boundary commission and that there should
be unrestricted commerce with the countries to the east of the Black
Sea. 32
Clarendon may have put on a bold front in his conversation with
the Emperor, but in his despatch he spelt out the realities of the
situation:
if we continue to demand that which Russia is now certain to
refuse [he wrote] we shall stand alone in the Conference, and the
Emperor's manner last night left me in no doubt that there were
in his mind mingled feelings of surprize, regret and vexation at
what he thinks is our exigency but he will soon consider to be our
obstinacy ....
He pointed out that it would be 'most imprudent' to carry on the
war without France and that consequently he did not see that they
could insist on their own conditions. Rather, in his view, it was 'in
the interests of England' to maintain 'unshaken the alliance with
France'. In a private letter to Palmerston he took a more truculent
line. Apologising for being forced to talk about concessions, he
declared he had 'never on any occasion nor on any point yielded
anything'. He was being unnecessarily defensive, but he should have
added the word 'yet'. He went on to say that the tone he had adopted
at the conferences resulted in his being blamed exclusively for the
delay in making peace.
I understand that by nature I am not considered to be a wild beast
[he wrote], but that I am the slave of the English newspapers and
the representative of your anti-Russian feelings and that as peace
would be fatal to your Government I am here for the purpose of

rendering it impossible. I need not tell you how rubbish of this
kind foments and grows sour in a place like Paris and that I every
day here become more alive to the difficulty of satisfying public
opinion in England and maintaining the alliance with France.33
In response Palmerston said he was sorry to hear of the Emperor's

attitude, but that it would have been worse if Clarendon had not
been there. Optimistically he hoped that Louis Napoleon might think
twice when he realised what the consequence would be of a split
between the Allies. Palmerston followed this with a tough despatch
saying that the British people were reconciled to peace on the terms
that had been laid down, but that 'they would be justly dissatisfied
with any treaty in which those terms were not fully and fairly
included'. He agreed that 'some concession might be made on the
Bessarabian border to gain something elsewhere', but he maintained
that 'to give Russia gratuitously something she had already agreed
to' would not be justified. If, nevertheless, France persisted on such
a course then the British Government would have to decide whether
reluctantly to yield to the example of France or to continue the war
on her own. In either case they would have to tell Parliament that
they had been so forced to act because of the decision of France
which would be a source of deep disappointment in view of British
confidence in the determination of the French Emperor. In an
accompanying letter, he explained that what he said in this despatch
was only to support Clarendon if he thought it useful. 'Your manage-
ment of the difficult matters you have had to deal with has been so
skilful as to show you are in need of no suggestions', he added
magnanimously. 34
Good progress was made at the fourth conference on 4 March.
The Russians agreed, subject to the Czar's approval, that there
should be an English and a French officer on the boundary
commission. The text of the Black Sea neutrality paragraph was
agreed to and when Clarendon raised the question of Nikolaev,
where the British feared warships might be built and floated down
the Bug, Orlov said the Russians could not accept any stipulation in
the Treaty, but announced that the Russian Emperor had declared
that the facilities in that place would only be used for constructing
and repairing patrol vessels. Clarendon accepted this assurance,
which he thought more valuable than an article in the treaty that
would not have covered other river sites. Other points were agreed
to amicably, provision for consuls, reference to the 1841 Convention

and the setting up of a committee to draft the Russo-Turkish conven-
tion to be submitted to a later conference; 'upon every point ...
the tone and the language of the Russian Plenipotentiaries were most
conciliatory', Clarendon reported.3 5
Again on the defensive, in his accompanying letter he wrote:
We cannot disguise from ourselves that we are making a premature
peace and that another campaign would have given us different
results but as we were compelled to accept the Austrian Ultimatum
on pain of separating from France there is no use in lamenting it
now and we must try and make the best of our position.
Laying modesty aside, he added, he agreed with Palmerston that it
was a good thing he had gone to Paris, for had he not come and
spoken from his experience and knowledge he believed they would
have been 'awfully thrown over'. This seemed a little hard on the
trusted Cowley. 36
Palmerston, who for all his bluster was a realist, replied:
I agree with you that the Peace we are likely to get will not be
unsatisfactory though it may fall short of what we should wish,
and though it will leave Russia a most formidable Power able in
a few years when she shall by wiser internal policy have developed
her immense natural resources to place in danger the great inter-
ests of Europe. But the future must take care of itself. We are
now dealing with the present, and you will obtain the credit of
having obtained very good terms.37
At the fifth conference held on 6 March Clarendon asked whether
the Czar's declaration regarding Nikolaev applied to Kherson (on
the Dnieper) and to the Sea of Azov. Orlov gave him assurances on
the former and pointed out that there was no shipbuilding on the
Sea of Azov because it was too shallow for large vessels. Discussing
Article 2 France and Britain opposed the Austrian contention that
it should apply only to the lower Danube thus excluding Bavaria
from a seat on the Commission.3s
That evening Clarendon had another conversation with the French
Emperor renewing all his arguments for resisting the Russians on the
Bessarabian frontier. Although promising not to make a concession,
Louis Napoleon argued the justice of the Russian request in view of
what they had agreed to under Point 5, a claim to which Clarendon
dissented. The Emperor alluded to the deplorable extent of sickness
in the French army, implying they 'might find it difficult to undertake

active operations' in the spring. He also urged the case for combining
the Principalities, but Clarendon pointed out the difficulties arising
from the opposition of Austria and Turkey and the fact that they
were fighting to defend the integrity of Turkey. In a private response
Palmerston agreed it was best to keep the Emperor to the terms of
the Ultimatum, but suggested a compromise line if that was not
possible, proposing that in turn the Russians might agree to leave
the forts on the eastern shore of the Black Sea demolished.39
According to Greville, who attended a soiree at the Tuileries on
6 March, Clarendon was only the first of four Plenipotentiaries whom
the Emperor took off ior a private conversation in the course of the
evening. He was followed by Buol, then Orlov and finally Walewski,
'and probably more was done', Greville shrewdly concluded, 'than
at the Conference in the morning'. Indeed it appears that Orlov
revealed his backup position to Napoleon, which the latter agreed
to support. This happened to coincide fairly closely with a compro-
mise later proposed by Buol, but Clarendon was evidently unaware
of the arrangement. 40
The sixth conference held on 8 March was confined to discussion
of the first point, but came to no conclusions. Walewski proposed
the union of Moldavia and Wallachia with support from Russia, but
was opposed by Austria and Turkey. The British offered no opinion,
but objected to Buol's contention that the proposal was incompatible
with Article 1 of the Ultimatum. Hiding the secret French under-
standing with the Russians, Walewski also proposed a compromise
Bessarabian frontier, conceding some of the Bess arabian territory
which the Russians wanted to retain, while keeping them from the
Danube and the navigable part ofthe Pruth. The Russians, however,
professed not to be satisfied since they wanted a corridor giving them
access to the Danube for the export of Bessarabian grain. In his
private letter Clarendon told Palmerston he did not 'really think' the
proposed concession was of importance since they still secured the
freedom of the Danube. 'I cannot conscientiously feel', he wrote,
'that for the difference of frontier (sorry as I am to give up anything)
now proposed we should have been justified in continuing the war
or in breaking with France, but even this line does not satisfy the
Russians'. Palmerston told Clarendon he was 'quite right' to give
way to the Emperor on the Bessarabian frontier. He said he thought
the separation of the Principalities was best, but if the Emperor
pressed for their union and Turkey consented he did not see any
objection. 41
On the evening of 9 March Clarendon again discussed the Bessara-
bian frontier with the Emperor, who he still thought was too
considerate of Russian sensibilities. He agreed, however, to a change
in the proposed line to avoid bisecting a Bulgarian colony providing
it was made to reach the Pruth well above its junction with the
Danube. Excusing his moderation the Emperor dwelt on his financial
difficulties and blamed his generals for failing to make it possible for
them to conclude 'a glorious peace and crush Russia'! Again,
however, on the same night the Emperor saw Orlov and continued
to promise his support (according to Charles-Roux, in return for
Russian support on unification of the Principalities). In fact, as
Baumgart suggests, on this point France basically sided with the
Russians against Britain and Austria. 42
At the conference the next day the Russians agreed to refer to
St Petersburg the new proposal for a line that kept them 20 miles
east of the Danube and the Pruth up to a point 120 miles north of
the junction of the two rivers but 'passing round' Bolgrad, the centre
of the Bulgarian colony. Russian requests for guarantees for Russian
subjects left west of the frontier and for the dismantling of Turkish
fortifications were refused. It was agreed to appoint a committee,
Buol, Bourqueney and Ali, to draft articles for the reorganisation
of the Principalities. Walewski proposed that if general principles
were agreed to, the details could be worked out later without holding
up the conclusion of the peace treaty. At this point it was agreed on
Walewski's proposal to invite Prussia to attend a meeting to amend
the 1841 Convention. The Russians concluded what had been a
fruitful session by responding to an earlier request of Clarendon's
giving assurances regarding the care of Allied war graves in the
Crimea. In his private letter Clarendon wrote: 'We have made great
progress today and peace may almost be looked upon as a fait
accompli. ' 43
The news was well received by Palmerston who seems to have
drawn in his horns. He congratulated Clarendon on the progress that
they had made and expressed the view that the peace would be well
received by the country, although he regretted their failure to get
any concessions on the eastern shores of the Black Sea. 'But if
the French will not back us up in asking these things', he added
philosophically, 'it is of course hopeless for us to expect to obtain
them by ourselves.' He went on to talk about the details of evacuating

the Crimea which he thought might take six months. 44
Clarendon's confidence that the end was now in sight is to be seen
in a letter that he thoughtfully wrote on 10 March in fulfillment of
a promise to Aberdeen, which he said he had put off until he could
see a 'successful issue'.
We shall not perhaps get all we desire [he wrote], and I shall, of
course, get plenty of abuse, but I hope that it will be a peace that
we need not be ashamed of, and if we can shake hands heartily
with the Russians, so much the better.
It is lucky that we have Orloff to deal with, for he has behaved
in a straightforward and gentlemanlike manner. - Brunnow has
been like a low attorney and we should have finished nothing with
him: - his intentions were, I dare say, good, but he has a slavish
fear of saying a word or doing a thing that might displease St.
Petersburg. Orloff treats him like his footman.
He spoke highly of the French Emperor, although he 'might have

been a little firmer'; Walewski, he said, had been 'very feeble' as
President of the Congress, as he insisted upon calling it; Buol, on
the whole, leant more towards England than France; the Russians
he pronounced to be 'very bitter against Austria'. In thanking him
Aberdeen declared that it was 'an indescribable relief' to know that
that for which he felt some responsibility was coming to an end. 45
At the eighth meeting on 12 March three contentious issues were
discussed, the question how to ascertain the wishes of the Moldavians
and Wallachians, Austria's attempt to limit the Danube regulation
to the lower Danube, and the one point in their Black Sea Conven-
tion on which Ali and Orlov had been unable to agree. The British
Plenipotentiaries objected to Russia's claim for guard ships in all
Russian ports for police, customs and quarantine purposes. It was
subsequently agreed that Russia and Turkey might each maintain 6
light vessels (50 metres long) for police purposes and 6 transports
(65 metres), but objection was raised to Orlov's proposal to arm the
transports. Indeed it was argued that it was unnecessary to make
any mention of unarmed ships.46
This was a subject on which Palmerston had strong feelings. On
11 March, as we have seen, he congratulated Clarendon on the good
progress being made, but later in the day, mulling over the Black
Sea issue, he wrote again in a much sharper tone:
We must hold stiff language to the Emperor and to the Russians

about these Naval Questions, and we must make them both under-
stand that England will not make peace with Russia if those points
are not settled to our entire satisfaction. We gave way to the
Emperor's wishes though we thought them not well founded about
Bessarabia, but on these naval questions nous n'entendons pas
raillerie, and upon them we take our stand. We are in possession
of the Black Sea and the Baltic and we shall not give up our
possession until the conditions which have been accepted by Russia
are carried out fully and in perfect good faith to the letter and
spirit of the engagement.
If the Emperor is unable for want of men and money to carry
on the war well and good let him make peace. He is deceived
both as to men and as to money.
After contrasting the condition of the British and French Armies,
the reverse of the previous winter, he continued:
But if France wants to make peace we have an army of 100,000
men in perfect order, and we have such a fleet as we never had
before and even if we deem it inexpedient to employ that army in
the East and were to bring it home we could at a small expense
continue our naval war against Russia and make her suffer
severely, and perhaps such a war would best suit the taste of the
people of England. We must therefore be unflinching about the
Black Sea arrangements and let Orloff understand that we wont
stand no nonsense [sic) on these points ... and that we break off
if he does not abide by his master's engagements. 47
The next day Palmerston returned to the Circassian issue, saying
that Lansdowne and other members of the Cabinet were pressing
him regarding the non-establishment of fortifications on the eastern
shores of the Black Sea. If this was not obtainable for lack of French
support they wanted something for the record. Lansdowne also
wanted assurances that the Cabinet would see the treaty before it
was signed, while the peace-loving Lewis did not want ratification
before 1 April in order that he might have another twelve months
of war taxes! On the 13th Palmerston was back to the Black Sea
clauses, having just received a telegraphed warning from Clarendon
that they would probably grant the Russians 6 light vessels and 6
transports. 'Really Orloff is too bad and ought to be ashamed of
himself', Palmerston expostulated, 'he is like a housebreaker who
tries every door and window in succession.' He was not worried by

the threat posed by six Russian men of war, but by the importance
of making the Russians honour their commitments. 'I could not
defend a Treaty which gave the Russians either an inch or an ell on
these matters and so you may tell Orloff with my best compliments',
he added. On the same day he sent a telegraphic despatch warning
that the six transports could easily be converted to men of war and
asking why the Russians could not use merchant vessels. 'This is
another trick to evade the Emperor of Russia's engagements. First
they ask for frigates, then for corvettes, then for hulks, and now for
transports. We ought to be firm and to resist', he insisted. 4B
On 14 March Orlov gave up the claim for transports per se, but
asked for an additional six light vessels for coast service (two for
duty at the mouth of the Danube) on the grounds that the original
six would be required as transports! The British representatives
rejected this request and the haggling went on for another three days
with Orlov threatening at one point to break off the negotiations.
In the end they came to a compromise of four additional vessels
not to exceed 200 tons which Clarendon thought better than larger
unarmed transports of several thousand tons that might be converted
to ships of war. Moreover he pointed out it was impossible to prevent
Russia using commercial vessels. Ali was quite satisfied and he hoped
the Cabinet would approve. Palmerston acquiesced but grumbled
about the bad faith of the Russians and speculated that next time
France might make a better thing of it by siding with them. However,
he added, he was content to think of the present and let the future
look after itself.
Clarendon professed to be greatly relieved at this news and
pleaded that his role was very difficult because there were no French
Plenipotentiaries - 'only 3 Russians'. Yet according to Professor
Curtiss, citing a letter from Orlov to Nesselrode on 21 March, Clar-
endon sent Orlov 'an apologetic note' pleading that he was acting
on instructions from the Cabinet. He is alleged to have explained
that they did not want to insist on disagreeable conditions, but that
they had severe masters. 'We have Parliament, the Press, public
opinion, finally, which we have to take account of, and worst of all',
Clarendon is quoted as saying, 'the spirit of the party, which will
make the defense of the treaty ... a truly severe task. ' 49
In the meantime other matters were falling into place. At the ninth
meeting on 14 March Orlov announced the Russian Government's
acceptance of the Bessarabian boundary settlement, a draft article
regarding the future organisation of the Principalities was approved;

the conference was also informed of Prussia's decision to send her
Foreign Minister, Manteufel, to represent her at the Congress (with
her ambassador in Paris). On the 18th Austria agreed to represen-
tation from Bavaria and Wiirttemberg on the Danube Commission,
Turkey and Russia presented a draft Black Sea convention, which
was accepted, and a committee appointed to draft the text of the
Treaty presented the preamble and several clauses for consideration.
The British delegates objected to a proposition for a formal extension
of the armistice, but agreed to a proposal that army commanders
should be told not to resume fighting until so instructed. 50
At a second meeting on 18 March the Prussian Plenipotentiaries
were admitted, according to Clarendon on the understanding that
they would not be allowed to discuss any matters except the amend-
ment of the 1841 Treaty. A revision of that Treaty was agreed to
and Baron Manteuffel appointed to a drafting committee. A few days
later Manteuffel called on Clarendon to complain that he and his
colleagues were being excluded from discussions of other matters
not yet settled. Clarendon told him that Prussia's policy throughout
the war made it impossible to admit her to the peace negotiations,
but it had been thought right to invite her to sign a general treaty
of a European character when the negotiations were completed as
well as to take part in the revision of the Treaty of 1841. Clarendon
told Palmerston that Manteuffel was most conciliatory and contented
himself by appealing to the good feeling of the British Plenipotent-
iaries to improve Prussia's position in any way consistent with their
sense of duty. In particular he was concerned that the preamble of
the Treaty should be worded in a way not humiliating to Prussia.
Clarendon was prepared to consider a rewording, but not to the
extent that Walewski proposed. Indeed he was so indignant when
Walewski produced a draft suggesting that Prussia had attended
and participated throughout the conference that he demanded an
audience with the Emperor to protest a wording so at variance
with the truth. The Emperor pointed out that they wanted to avoid
humiliating Prussia, but he agreed to a modification of the wording.
Next day this was worked out, with a statement setting forth the
time and object of Prussian attendance, to which the Prussian
delegates finally agreed. The audiei).ce had borne fruit, Clarendon
told Palmerston, and next day Walewski was an altered man and
'his swagger had quite subdued' .5 1
On 18 March Clarendon sent Palmerston proof sheets of the
Treaty, saying he did not think that Russia was at present contem-
plating renewed aggression against Turkey. He reported Orlov as
admitting they had been beaten and were signing a treaty 'such as
never was signed by Russia before'. He claimed he was simply trying
to soften the hard conditions being pressed on his master. Clarendon
denied the severity of the terms and promised there would be no
harshness or discourtesy in the 'redaction'. A few days later Clar-
endon reported that everything was in a state of discreditable
confusion owing to the manner in which W alewski had failed to keep
his engagements, not from bad faith, but because he had 'no prin-
ciple, no convictions and no feeling of personal and national dignity'.
The trouble, Clarendon declared, was that Walewski was 'very weak'
and wanted 'to please everybody'; ' ... we found the Russians in
one room, the Prussians in another and we were shown into a third
and Walewski was running from one to another', he continued,
'till I said we could not any longer take part in such a Vaudeville
travestie'. 52
In the course of a long conversation with the Emperor on 18
March Clarendon broached the Italian question and on the following
day they were joined by Walewski and Cavour, but the discussion
was on the whole inconclusive and according to Clarendon, Cavour
was not pleased. The Emperor, however, instructed Walewski to see
Buol about the withdrawal of Austrian and French troops from the
Papal Legations, and to sweeten the proposal he added the with-
drawal of Allied troops from Greece. Palmerston was delighted that
Clarendon had raised the matter and wasted no time in sending him
a despatch approving his course. 'The military occupation of an
independent state by foreign troops is a condition of things which is
so repugnant to all right principle that it can only be justified by
some strong and urgent and temporary necessity', he declared and
now that peace was 'about to be restored', he argued, 'all these
occupations might by general consent be made to cease'. Clarendon
was more sceptical for he did not see how troops could be removed
from Italy and Greece 'before some better order of things is
established'. 53
In another audience with the Emperor a few days later Clarendon
communicated the substance of this despatch from Palmerston on
the subject and expressed the hope that the Emperor would not
leave the important matter of Italy solely in the hands of Walewski,
'but that he would himself communicate to Count Buol his determi-
nation to withdraw the French troops from Rome and to require
that the Austrian troops should quit the Legations'. The Emperor
seemed to assent, but made no promises, agreeing that 'a strong
declaration of opinion on the subject of Italy should be expressed
and recorded by the Congress before its final separation'. 54
The Emperor's tone in these conversations remained friendly, 'but
the impression left on my mind was not satisfactory', Clarendon
reported to Palmerston. 'The Emperor wants peace to be signed and
he has ceased to care much for the conditions upon which peace is
to be made .... ' The Austrian Alliance no longer interested him.
The Emperor spoke with detestation of Austrian policy [Clarendon
continued] and in slighting tones of the Emperor of Austria - but
on the other hand there is an evident tendency on the part of the
Emperor towards Russia - a dislike to offend and a great desire
to be agreeable to the Emperor of Russia - the comparisons
constantly made between England and France to the disparage-
ment of the former by the organs and agents of Russia through
Europe and by those who have daily access to the Emperor have
not, I think, been without effect upon His Majesty, altho' at the
same time I have no reason to believe that his feelings towards
England have undergone any change or that His Majesty has
ceased to consider that his own interests are closely bound up with
the Anglo-French Alliance.ss
At this stage the Cabinet began to take an active interest in the
drafting of the final text of the Treaty, and indicated their desire to
see a complete draft before the Treaty was signed, especially of the
articles regarding the Principalities. On 22 March Palmerston wrote
that the Cabinet had been going over Clarendon's reports, which
seemed to them to be 'generally speaking ... very good', but he
promised they would have a few verbal alterations to suggest, some
of which might be important; 'we are all unanimous', he wrote, 'that
a Treaty of such great importance, and upon the conclusion of which
questions of peace and war in Europe may hereafter depend ought
not to be signed in a hurry nor until we are quite satisfied with the
wording of every article'. The result was a long despatch of fifteen
pages on 24 March returning nineteen articles with suggested alter-
ations in wording and queries on various matters. In a letter on the
same day Palmerston suggested a colony in European Turkey for
the Polish volunteers, saying 'We cannot turn these men wholly
adrift without doing something for them and they would probably
be useful settlers for the Sultan'. He warned that the Morning Adver-
tiser was beginning to carp against the Peace, but he thought reason-
able men would be satisfied, although there would be 'nothing to
spare in it' .56
Palmerston continued to send daily comments on various details,
even after withdrawing to Broadlands for a few days and on the 27th
indicated that he thought the Cabinet would accept the changes in
Clarendon's latest communications; he again urged proper treatment
for the Poles, gave Clarendon a free hand in the prolongation of the
armistice, but professed a preference for Monday to Sunday for the
signing of the treaty (perhaps on the advice of his wife's evangelical
son-in-law, Lord Shaftesbury). 'Your Aland Island Treaty will do
quite well', he added laconically. Clarendon, however, showed little
sympathy with the Poles; 'as the war did not become general and
there [was] to be no recasting of the map of Europe', he told Palmer-
ston, it was useless to put forward demands on their partY
The substance of the fourth point, it will be remembered, had
been settled at the Constantinople Conference when the Sultan met
the demands of the Allied ambassadors with the proclamation of the
hatti-sherif recognising the rights and immunities of non-Moslem
subjects of the Porte. It was proposed to take formal note of this by
an article in the Treaty, but Ali insisted on the use of a weaker
phrase indicating that the contracting powers 'recognized the value'
of the firman. The Russians, who regarded this clause as a vindication
of their original demands on Turkey in 1853, unsuccessfully tried to
get an additional sentence emphasising their point of view. In fact,
of course, the Russians no longer enjoyed the special privileges
claimed in former treaties.ss
The last week of March was taken up with discussing and
approving of the final wording of the various clauses of the Treaty
and on 26 March the representatives of Britain, France and Russia
met and agreed to the terms of a Convention 'stipulating that no
fortification should be erected on the Aland Islands, nor any naval
or military establishments placed on those Islands by Russia'. Clar-
endon transmitted copies of the various clauses as they were
approved and on the 28th was able to tell Palmerston that the greater
part of modifications he had suggested in a despatch of the 24th had
been 'wholly or partially accepted'. At the seventeenth meeting on
28 March the remaining clauses were discussed and approved. The
British Plenipotentiaries asked that the treaty should not be signed
on Sunday, but yielded to the universal wish both inside and outside
the Congress to avoid any unnecessary delay. To have persisted,
Clarendon claimed, would have caused much irritation. On the 29th

the draft Treaty and the three Conventions were all read and on the
30th approved.59
The same day Clarendon received an unwelcome letter from the
Prime Minister saying they were still averse to a Sunday signing.
The Cabinet will meet tomorrow Saturday at three [Palmerston
wrote], they will then have to consider the whole of the articles,
and I must take the Queen's pleasure for so important an act as
the signature of such a treaty, even supposing that the Cabinet
shall be content to take it as it may then stand. You might make
the French understand that we cannot be hurried and hustled in
engagements of such vast importance as this Treaty; we have a
Parliament and a Nation to whom we are responsible, and with
whom we must be able to defend and justify acts which bind both
Nation and Parliament, and therefore be the consequences what
they may, we must have sufficient time given us to consider, and
look before we leap; and we cannot take the jump unless we are
satisfied we can clear the fence- I dare say Monday would do. 60
Clarendon replied expressing his embarrassment and annoyance at
receiving this directive; 'I could not go back from my engagement',
he wrote, 'everything is ready for the illuminations tomorrow not in
Paris alone but throughout France .... ' To his great relief he
received a telegram the same day telling him he might sign on the
30th. In a letter Palmerston explained that the Cabinet had now
gone over all the articles and were 'well satisfied with them', although
they would have preferred the articles regarding the Asian frontier
and the Russian amnesty undertaking to have been more explicit.
As for the tonnage of the Black Sea ships, he wrote:
As Ali is pleased with it, we have no right to be dissatisfied - you
may therefore sign tomorrow with safe conscience if the rest are
bent upon doing so. We shall not fire our guns until Monday
morning - guns are not fired in the middle of the day and of course
we shall not get your despatch till Monday morning nor your
telegram till tomorrow midday. Taking the Treaty as a whole it
will make a good shew. 61
'We never should have heard the end of it (in this world or the
next I believe) if we had succeeded in postponing the signature and
disappointing all France and all the Corps Diplomatique', Clarendon
replied. He said that everybody was grateful to the British Plenipo-
tentiaries for taking the risk they did of unpopularity at home by

going ahead with the signing. 'I hope you will have the Government
offices illuminated', he added, 'as I am sure it will be for our interest
not to be thought sulky at the peace or behind other nations in
rejoicing at the war being terminated.' The Treaty was signed at
2 pm on Sunday 30 March 1856, two years and two days after the
Allied declaration of war, and a 101 gun salute was fired from Les
Invalides. The Congress then proceeded in a body at Clarendon's
proposal to the Tuileries to announce the event to the Emperor as
a 'public manifestation of deference' to the Sovereign of the host
country, in acknowledgement of 'his gracious kindness and hospi-
tality'. The Emperor congratulated them on their achievement, refer-
ring in particular to Clarendon's recent speech in the House of Lords,
which breathed the spirit of conciliation that 'had contributed to the
conclusion of a peace which was honorable to all parties' and which
he hoped would be 'solid and lasting'. 62
III THE TREATY OF PARIS AND ITS RECEPTION IN

BRITAIN
Now that the haggling was over Palmerston was magnaminous. 'I
wish you joy with all my heart', he wrote to Clarendon that same
day, 'on the conclusion of the great work on which you have been
engaged. It will I am sure give general satisfaction in this country
and I trust it will for many years to come secure the peace of Europe
against a resurgence of the dangers which have been the cause of
the war.' 'I have not read anything in a long while', Clarendon
responded, 'that has given me as much pleasure as your opinion of
the Treaty and your expectation of the results to which it may lead.'
Once the matter was settled both Palmerston and Clarendon quickly
abandoned the high ground they once occupied. Writing to the
Queen immediately after signing the peace treaty Clarendon asserted
that, while another campaign must have brought glory to Her
Majesty's arms, the price would have been too high, quite apart
from 'the cost and the horrors of war', for the continuation of the
war, he thought, might have led to a coalition of Europe against
England, joined by the United States, the consequences of which, he
added with some understatement, 'might have been most serious'.63
The Treaty, based on the Five Points of the Austrian Ultimatum,
consisted of a Preamble and thirty-four articles, with three annexes. 64
SWINDLING THE CLARENDON.

(By a Distinguished Russian.)
Jfr. B~tll(UwJ/onl of lA' Bnfid Lion). "WHAT! QUITE THE GENTLEMAN! WHY, HE HAS LEFT NOT HING BUT A
PORTMANTEL FULL OF BRICKS AND STONES. AND GONE Off WITHOUT PAY IN G THE BILL! ..
Nine articles dealt with such matters as the end of hostilities, ratific-
ation, the return of occupied territories and prisoners of war, the
evacuation of troops, amnesty for nationals who served the enemy
and the resumption of normal commerce. Two new and significant
articles (VII and VIII) provided for the admission of Turkey 'to
participate in the advantages of the public law and system (concert)
of Europe, and for the mediation of any differences that might arise
between the Porte and the other Contracting Powers'. Had these
important clauses been in existence before 1853, The Times pointed

out on 29 April, the war might have been avoided.
Nine articles (XX to XXIX) dealt with the First Point of the
Ultimatum. The amount of Bessarabia to be surrendered by the
Russians and joined to Moldavia was reduced to approximately one-
third of the original demand, but the intention of keeping Russia
from the lower Pruth and lower Danube was maintained. Russia lost
her exclusive rights in the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia,
which remained under the suzerainty of Turkey, but retained their
privileges and immunities, now guaranteed by all the contracting
powers, and were promised an independent national administration,
and liberty of worship, legislation and commerce. The signatories
were to form a special commission to meet a commissioner of the
Porte in Bucharest 'to investigate the present state of the Principal-
ities and to propose bases for their future organization'. Divans were
to be convoked immediately in each Principality to express the wishes
of the people in this respect. Taking these wishes into consideration
the Commission was to make proposals without delay to the
contracting powers in Paris and the final agreement with the Porte
was to be recorded in a Convention. A national armed force was to
be maintained and measures for defence against aggression were to
be taken in agreement with the Porte. In the event of internal
insurrection, the Porte was to consult with the Contracting Powers
as to what measures should be taken, but no armed intervention was
to take place without previous agreement. The Principality of Serbia
retained its independence and national administration and its rights
and immunities were guaranteed by the contracting powers, but
Turkey retained her right of garrison.
The Second Point was treated in five articles (XV to XIX)
providing for the free navigation of the Danube under supervision
of a permanent Commission composed of one representative each
from Austria, Bavaria, Turkey and Wiirttemberg and three,
approved by the Porte, from the three Principalities. A temporary
European Commission made up of representatives of the contracting
parties was made responsible for dredging the mouth of the Danube
out into the Black Sea and authorised to charge fees to cover the
expense. It was to turn its duties over to the permanent Commission
within two years.
The Third Point of the Ultimatum was covered by five articles (X
to XIV) which provided for the neutralisation of the Black Sea as
already indicated, the amendment of the Convention of 1841, the
abandonment of naval military arsenals on the shores of that sea and

the opening of it to the commerce of all nations, with provision for
consuls in its ports.
The Fourth Point had been settled as we have seen by the
preceding ambassadorial conference in Constantinople with the issu-
ance of the Sultan's hatti-sherif of 18 February, promising equality
of treatment for his non-Musselman subjects. The significance of this
communication was recognised in Article IX (except that reference
was made to 'Christian' rather than 'non-Musselman' subjects), but
it was made clear that the Powers had no right to interfere. The
demilitarisation of the Aland Islands, as we have seen, was dealt
with in a separate convention signed by Britain, France and Russia.
The Peace Treaty was better received at home than Clarendon
originally expected, although greeted with lamentations by some
papers and in an edition in black borders by the Sun. The Times,
which had taken an aggressive line throughout the war, was well
content. It reported that when the Peace salute was fired at 10 pm
on the night of 30 March, crowds turned out into the streets 'and
the joy which the intelligence inspired was manifest and general'.
Although the official text of the Treaty was not released until
28 April when ratifications had been exchanged, on 31 March its leader
expressed the belief that they had 'not concluded a hollow truce, but
a final and honourable reconciliation'. Dallas, the new American
Minister in London, reported that it was very generally regarded as
' ... a botchery and a sham', but this may be presumed to have been
a biased opinion in view of the strained relations between Britain
and the United States at that time. The Sardinian minister,
d'Azeglio, gave a more neutral opinion in a letter to Cavour in which
he wrote: 'En general la conclusion de la paix ne souleve guere
plus d'enthousiasme que les premieres lueurs qui en apparurent le 16
Janvier.' Granville writing to Canning a week after the treaty was
signed had no hesitation in saying it had 'been wonderfully well
received', but when the herald read the Royal Proclamation at
Temple Bar on 29 April he reported that it had been hissed, which
Palmerston's biographer, Herbert Bell, takes as evidence along with
Dallas' report that the British people felt they had been let down.
The Times' long and light-hearted account of the traditional
procession from StJames Palace to the Mansion House to proclaim
the peace, with stops for reading the Proclamation at Charing Cross
and Temple Bar, makes no mention of the hissing, that could scarcely
have been prompted by the contents of the Proclamation, which, we
are told, was inaudible. If there was hissing at Temple Bar it was
more likely caused by the fact that the procession arrived an hour
and a half late, by the inaudibility of the herald or by the closing of
the City Gates in traditional fashion in the faces of the crowd from
the West End. In a leader The Times described the whole ceremony
as 'meagre, motley, slovenly and too late', but nevertheless
pronounced it as a 'successful' appeal to the good nature of the
populace. 'We do all our forms in a slovenly way', it pontificated,
'and the slovenliness of the ceremony made it the more authentic.
By this time people have well nigh forgotten sores that were rankling
even two short months ago .... They have reason to be satisfied
with the terms which our diplomatists have battled for and won. '65
The previous day in a leader, examining the terms of the Treaty,
now published for the first time, they were satisfied that it could not
be said, as was so often the case in the past, that what had been
gained in the war was lost in the negotiation. It continued:
The Treaty is at least commensurate with our military successes.
What more we might have extorted from Russia . . . had we more
signally vanquished her in the field, it is vain to conjecture. As it
is we have inspired one another with mutual respect, and that
respect is reflected in the Treaty before us. To use a hackneyed
phrase 'the objects of the war' have been 'achieved'; and we are
really at a loss to discover what has been omitted that we had a
right to require. 66
Clarendon could not have asked for more from the great Thunderer
whose malign influence in the past had often been a cause of grave
concern for him.
8 Finale
I THE RESUMPTION OF THE CONGRESS, THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY AND THE
RESOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN ENLISTMENT
CRISIS
Five more meetings of the Congress were held after the signing of
the peace treaty, for Louis Napoleon had always wanted it to be
more than just a peace conference. The atmosphere was, however,
more relaxed and much of the time was taken up with festivities.
The Emperor gave a grand banquet of 140 'couverts' on the evening
of 12 April, which Clarendon described 'as the finest thing of the
kind I ever assisted at', but he was less pleased with his conversation
with the Emperor whom he sat next to. He found Louis Napoleon
too afraid of hurting the Pope, too anxious for a European Congress
and inclined to think that in a year or two the French people would
tire of the arts of peace and want something more striking for their
amusement. This affair was followed on the 14th by an even more
lavish dinner and fete at the Hotel de Ville which lasted for seven
hours. 'There is no sovereign in Europe who could give such a fete
as the Prefet de Ia Seine for he had the best singers and all the best
dancers of Paris in a locale far more magnificent and commodious
than the Tuileries', Clarendon wrote to Palmerston. 'Certainly the
Plenipotentiaries will carry away with them notions of the boundless
wealth and luxury of France. ' 1
Details regarding the implementation of the Peace Treaty were
cleared up during the first week of April. The armistice was extended
to the sea, the blockade was lifted and restrictions to trade between
the former belligerents were removed, all with great celerity for this
was the first international peace settlement since the invention of the
telegraph. Arrangements were also discussed for the early evacuation
of troops and the meeting of the Bessarabian boundary commission,
and instructions were prepared for the Commissioners to be sent to
the Principalities.z
The Congress then turned its attention to broader issues the more
important of which Clarendon had already discusssed with the
Emperor. 'The signature of peace has put that august body in high
good humour and I would say it would agree to anything that would
207
not be called revolutionary', he wrote to Palmerston on 6 April. 'I

need not tell you that the British and Sardinian PPs are the only
liberal members of it.' That evening in a 'frank and cordial' conver-
sation with Louis Napoleon about a variety of issues, Clarendon
asked him to instruct Walewski to take a firm line on Italy, but he
was not too confident of the Emperor's assurances on this point.
When he went on to propose free trade in food and raw materials
the Emperor playfully exclaimed, 'Peste! vous etes joliment radical',
but professed to know little about political economy. At Clarendon's
request he also agreed to speak to Orlov on the subject of Poland
if Clarendon would tell him what to sayP
In a long and extraordinary meeting of the Congress on 8 April
Walewski presented a string of problems for their consideration on
the grounds that it would be a lost opportunity if the representatives
of the principal powers of Europe so assembled did not take advan-
tage of this circumstance to consider them and 'make certain declar-
ations . . . with the view of ensuring the future tranquility of the
world'. 4 Among other things he expressed the hope that the King of
Naples might be assisted in putting his house in order. Clarendon
and Cavour spoke more positively on this point, but the representa-
tives of Austria and Russia maintained that they had no authoritiy
to speak on the affairs of Italy. Walewski also declared that France,
and he hoped Buol would agree with him, was prepared to undertake
the withdrawal. of troops from the Papal Legations as soon as their
internal stability was restored and his language was sufficiently vague
to obtain Buol's ready assent. He also made a proposal, to which
there was no objection, that the 'three protecting courts' (Britain,
France and Russia) should 'devise means' for dealing with the
'deplorable situation' in Greece. In response to Walewski's complaint
about the hostility .of the Belgian press to the Second Empire, Buol
and Manteuffel advocated a policy of press restraint, but Clarendon,
while deploring the violence of some Belgian newspapers, indicated
that 'the Representatives of a country in which a free and indepen-
dent press is, so to say, one of the fundamental institutions' could
not 'associate themselves to [sic] measures of coercion against the
press of another state'.
The most important and substantive proposal that Walewski made,
obviously in conjunction with Clarendon who had obtained the prior
approval of the Cabinet, was that the Congress should 'lay down the
basis of a uniform maritime law in time of war as regards neutrals',
just as the Congress of Westphalia had sanctioned liberty of
Finale 209
conscience and the Congress of Vienna had proclaimed 'the abolition

of the Slave Trade and the freedom of navigation of rivers'. He
therefore proposed the adoption of four principles which were
subsequently adopted and became known as 'The Declaration of
Paris'. They were:
1. The abolition of privateering;

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods except contraband of
war;
3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to
capture even under enemy's flag;
4. Blockades are not binding except in so far as they are
effective. s
Clarendon indicated that England, having renounced at the begin-

ning of the war the principles of blockade she had always held in
the past, was now 'disposed to renounce them definitively, providing
that privateering [was] equally abolished for ever'. The passage of
this declaration was the main achievement of the Congress after the
completion of the Peace Treaty, although Clarendon also secured
assent to a resolution giving assent to his proposal that the principle
of mediation prescribed in Article VII of the Treaty should be gener-
ally adopted as a 'barrier against conflicts' that frequently arise as a
result of misunderstandings between states. 6
The Congress closed without any reference to the subject of
Poland, supposedly dear to the heart of Louis Napoleon and his half-
Polish Foreign Minister. The Emperor had spoken to Orlov on the
Polish question as he had undertaken to do, but, to quote Clarendon,
'with no satisfactory result'. Orlov had subsequently told Clarendon
'that the Emperor Alexander was determined to adopt a different
policy towards Poland', but that the announcement could not be
made then as that would be misrepresented in Russia and the Czar
would be thought to have yielded to foreign pressure. Orlov said to
him in a friendly manner: 'Do not in the interest of the Poles bring
the subject forward in the Congress for I can tell you nothing there
nor admit your right to interrogate me and my answer will therefore
be disheartening to the Poles and the Emperor may think it a matter
of dignity to postpone what he intends to do.' Clarendon would not
agree, but privately concluded, he told Palmerston, that it would
only do harm to bring the matter forward, even though 'old Czarto-
ryski', the Polish patriot leader who had been in frequent contact
with the British Government throughout the war, urged him to go

ahead 'singlehanded'. 7
Meanwhile the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Britain and France
had been secretly negotiating the Triple Treaty of Guarantee to
Turkey provided for in the Memorandum of 14 November. When
Buol raised the matter towards the end of March the Emperor tried
to argue that it was no longer necessary in view of the guarantees
contained in the Peace Treaty. Clarendon wrote Palmerston: 'the
Emperor ... would have thrown Buol and the Vienna Memorandum
over altogether if I would have backed him but I said the Treaty was
part of our Bond'. (The roles were reversed from the time when
Britain refused to give full assent to the Memorandum of
14 November that France had initialled.) The Treaty was signed on
15 April after the French Government had eliminated a secret article
which they thought, when discovered, would be particularly
distasteful to the Russians. The new Treaty which was signed without
the knowledge of the Russians made any infraction of the Peace
Treaty a casus belli and provided for joint consultation in such an
event. By using the term casus belli and mentioning the use of
military sanctions, the Treaty made much more specific the general
obligation accepted under Article VII of the Peace Treaty. Since the
Treaty was not a secret one the British Government insisted on
placing it before Parliament after it was ratified on 2 May, despite
the embarrassment of the French Government, which wanted a
longer delay. When Walewski finally explained to Orlov why France
was bound to sign the Treaty despite her reluctance, the Russians
were naturally chagrined. Louis Napoleon blamed Walewski for the
delay in informing them and went out of his way to bid Orlov an
effusive farewell before he finally left Paris. This was undoubtedly a
set-back to the new Franco-Russian rapprochement, but the French
Government sought to restore its credibility in Russian eyes by
showing itself much more friendly to Russia than to its allies over
the disputes that accompanied the peace Treaty's implementation.
As it was the ill-fated Triple Treaty of 18 April 1856 never became
effective and within three years two of its signatories were at war
with each other. s
Clarendon was back in London before the Triple Treaty was
ratified. He was well satisfied with his final audience with the
Emperor on most counts and not really dissatisfied even on the
matter of Italy. His only fear was the old one, that this well disposed
but weak ruler would be deflected from the right path by his despised
Finale 211
entourage. Clarendon also had an interesting conversation before

leaving Paris with Orlov, who said that the new Czar was well
aware of the folly of his father in sacrificing Russia to vast military
expenditures and that he preferred a peaceful development of
Russia's resources. Orlov claimed that the neutralisation of the Black
Sea was a good thing for Russia for it relieved her of the necessity
of maintaining two fleets. Orlov seemed impressed by the French
Emperor, 'but thinks as we do', Clarendon told Palmerston, 'about
the knaves and fools by whom he is surrounded'. He thought Red
Republicanism was still alive in France and feared what might happen
if the Emperor was to die. For this reason, he said, Russia would
not rely exclusively on a French alliance, 'an idea which in a guarded
manner and general terms I did not discourage,' Clarendon
observed. 9
Before attempting any general conclusion we may look briefly at two

major problems arising from the war and the peace treaty that were
not easily settled, namely the implementation of the Treaty itself
and the resolution of the quarrel with the United States over the
foreign enlistment issue.
On learning that the Russians were still in Kars after their own
evacuation of the Crimea was completed on 12 July, the British
Government sent two ships of the Royal Navy back into the Black
Sea as a demonstration. Calling at Sebastopol, the Admiral in
command alluded to the continued occupation of Kars in conver-
sation with the Governor and then proceeded to Trebizond which
was reached on 3 August. Three days later the Russians finally
departed from Kars, but to the great indignation of the British
Government they destroyed the citadel. They also, without authoris-
ation, but in connivance with the French Government, had earlier
destroyed the fortresses of Ishmael and Renni on the Danube. The
Turks, on the other hand, with British support, occupied the small
Serpents' Isle off the mouths of the Danube, which passed under
Turkish control, although the Russians claimed that it was part of
Bessarabia where the frontier was still to be delimited. On the main-
land the Russians attempted to push the frontier to Lake Yalpukh,
making a line the British Government considered strategically unac-
ceptable and which was twenty miles south of the town of Bolgrad,
supposed centre of the Bulgarian colony as shown on the map used
at the Conference; here too they were supported by Walewski,
anxious to repair the damage done to the new Franco-Russian

relationship by the Triple Treaty of Guarantee. For some time the
situation remained deadlocked with Austria coming to the support
of Britain, but Walewski, refusing to recognise France's responsi-
bility under the Triple Treaty, preferred to attempt, without success,
the role of 'honest broker' between Britain and Russia. Turkey was
only interested in asserting its claim to direct control of the mouths
of the Danube and Serpents' Island, not in the Bolgrad frontier
which affected Moldavia. Britain and Austria held the trump cards
as Britain threatened to keep her Navy in the Black Sea and Austria
her Army in the Principalities until the matter was settled to their
satisfaction. It was proposed to hold an ambassadorial conference in
Paris in January 1857 to settle the matter, but first Napoleon III,
acting behind the backs of his Foreign Minister and his Russian
friends, encouraged Cavour to vote against France and Russia to
ensure that his old ally Britain would not be defeated! He then
persuaded both the Russian and the British Governments to accept
a new frontier line that abandoned the Russian claim to 'New
Bolgrad' and recompensed them with additional territory of no stra-
tegic significance but with Bulgarian colonists. When the conference
eventually met this solution was accepted amicably by all parties. 10
The crisis in Anglo-American relations was more serious and its
solution more painful for the Government. Clarendon postponed
answering Marcy's Note of 28 December demanding the minister's
recall until he received Crampton's comments and he himself had
returned from the Paris Peace Conference. He was not prepared to
accept Crampton's offer of resignation and in a formal reply to Marcy
handed to Dallas, the new American Minister in London, he refused
the American request, while renewing his expression of regrets if,
contrary to directions, 'there had been any infringement of the laws
of the United States'. The situation was complicated by the further
deterioration of affairs in Central America where an American-
recruited free-booting expedition had set up a new regime in Nica-
ragua under a Sefior Rivas with William Walker the Californian
leader of the expedition as Commander-in-Chief. When the Rivas-
Walker administration issued a proclamation declaring that all the
Mosquito Coast belonged to Nicaragua, the British Government
decided to send more ships to the area to defend Greytown, but
abandoned the idea of a blockade for fear of an adverse reaction in
public opinion.n
On 11 June Dallas presented Clarendon with a despatch from
Finale 213
Marcy, which, although conciliatory in tone, announced the determi-

nation of the American Government to send Crampton his passports
and to revoke the exequaturs of three British consuls accused of
participating in the recruiting drive. Despite previous declarations of
Palmerston to the contrary, the British Cabinet took the sensible but
surprising decision to do nothing, that is to say not to dismiss Dallas.
The explanation for this sudden evaporation of the crisis presumably
lay partly in the realisation that a large segment of British public
opinion was unprepared to support the Government taking a hard
line in such a matter and partly in the fact that in another despatch
Marcy indicated that the American Government was now willing to
discuss Central American affairs.1 2
When, after a briefing from Clarendon, Russell asked a question
in the House about Marcy's despatches, Palmerston was able to make
a positive and conciliatory response. With respect to the despatch of
the naval force he said they 'thought it right to be strong', but
because they were strong they could 'act with calmness, with moder-
ation, and with due deliberation upon a matter of such great import-
ance', especially as there were 'so many causes of union and so many
mutual interests as between Great Britain and the United States'.
This did not sound like the Palmerston of the Don Pacifico Crisis of
1850, but the United States was not Greece. Disraeli commented
briefly and moderately, but in the Lords Derby was more caustic
about the Government's ill-judged attempt to recruit in the United
States. By the autumn Clarendon and Dallas had worked out a
satisfactory settlement of the Central American differences, but
unfortunately the British Government refused to accept some
amendments demanded by the American Senate and the final settle-
ment had to wait for another three years.1 3
Nevertheless, the crisis over the attempt at American enlistment
had passed. Given the existing state of Anglo-American relations it
was unwise to have allowed the setting up of a network of agents
who were almost bound to fall foul of the law, but having done it
the Government had to make the best of a bad job. It is more
difficult to excuse the element of self-righteousness and indeed self-
deception evident in the private correspondence of Clarendon,
Palmerston and Crampton.
II PARLIAMENTARY AND HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT

OF THE PEACE TREATY
On 5 May lengthy Resolutions were introduced in both Houses

proposing 'an humble Address' to the Queen expressing the
members' 'joy and satisfaction' at the conclusion of an honourable
peace.14 The debate in the Commons lasted only two nights and the
motion was passed without a division, perhaps because the Oppo-
sition had exhausted itself in the longer debate on Kars in the
preceding week with disappointing results in the division lobbies. It
is significant that the mover, Evelyn Denison, and his seconder, H.
Herbert (a Peelite Liberal), both admitted that the peace had not
been 'received with any great exultation or enthusiasm', but this was
attributed, not to dissatisfaction with the terms, but to the popular
conviction that the army and navy were now strong enough to
achieve great successes. Lord John Manners, the only ranking
Conservative spokesman, said he would not oppose the address, but
that he objected to the claim that the objects of the war were fully
accomplished, since the Asiatic frontier of Turkey was still in danger,
the Circassian tribes had been abandoned and no steps had been
taken to prevent the Russians rebuilding their forts on that coast of
the Black Sea. Lord Claud Hamilton likewise waxed indignant about
the Circassians and introduced an amendment which was later with-
drawn. Others contented themselves with criticising the strictures on
the Belgian press, the Maritime declaration and the state of Italy,
all matters discussed after the Treaty had been signed. There were
more speakers from the Government side of the House. Layard
surprisingly professed himself as generally satisfied that the great
objects of the war were accomplished and paid tribute to the achieve-
ments of Clarendon and especially of Cowley. Lord John Russell
thought that the conditions were honourable and that the objects of
the war had been accomplished. His only reservations were about
Nikolaev and the forts on the Circassian coast, but he supported what
Clarendon had said about Italy. Milner Gibson welcomed peace,
but thought the debate was pointless. He objected to the Turkish
guarantee and ridiculed the abjuring of interference in Turkey while
approving of it in Greece and Italy. He abjured all interference and
called upon the Prime Minister to turn to domestic reforms.
Cardwell, Sidney Herbert and Gladstone all spoke in support of
the motion, the first named confining himself to a defence of the
Finale 215
Maritime Declaration against R. J. Phillimore (another Peelite

Liberal), who had attacked it.
Gladstone considered it an occasion of joy and thankfulness,
although agreeing with Herbert that better provision might have
been made for the Christians in Turkey, but he denied the allegation
that the Treaty bound the signatories to maintain Mahometan law
and institutions. While the Treaty did not give them the right to
interfere if the hatti-sherif was not enforced it did not take away any
existing rights of protest on behalf of the Christians. More positively
Gladstone asserted that the signature of the treaty contained a great
moral lesson in that it repudiated Russia's attempted aggrandise-
ment. He declared that very few wars had been 'begun and continued
with such perfect purity of motives' and repudiated the suggestion
that the security of India had been a 'powerful motive' for beginning
the war. Although doubtful of the prudence of extending the peace
conference to consider other issues, he could not object to the Mari-
time Declaration, despite the views of his friend Phillimore, and he
applauded Clarendon's proposal for international arbitration, while
venturing certain cautions. Such arrangements, he said, were much
more desirable than large military expenditures.
Palmerston wound up the debate with a powerful speech. He
asserted that the war had been fought to rescue Turkey from external
assault, not to defend any dominant party or race within the country,
and that the objects of the war had been fully accomplished. It had
been an unselfish war on England's part and the Treaty had given
them no prizes and no conquests. He compared the situation that
now existed, with Russia excluded from the Principalities, from the
Danube and the lower Pruth, and the Black Sea neutralised with
what it had been on the eve of the war. He denied that there
was any betrayal of the Circassians with whom they had had no
communication. They had attempted to approach Schamyl far to the
east, but he was unwilling to co-operate with them. The Russians
had withdrawn from their forts along the Circassian coast, some of
which were then occupied by Circassian tribes. The amnesty would
apply to the tribes which Russia had previously controlled, but not
to those in the north on the Kuban who had always been indepen-
dent. 'To have required Russia to have ceded Georgia, Mingrelia,
Imeritia, however desirable it may seem to obtain such cession,
would have been a demand sure to meet with a positive refusal,' he
pointed out, and would not have been considered justified by Euro-
pean opinion. The threat to Turkey's Asian frontier came not from
Circassia but from the Caspian to the east where the Russians had
good lines of communication. Turkey had ceded the territories
between Batoum and Anapa in 1829, although she had not had
control over all of them. Orner had now occupied one of these
provinces, but Palmerston admitted that as a Moslem he was the
right man in the wrong place. 15 (The Circassian tribes to the west
were Moslem.) As for the hatti-sherif he claimed it was impossible
to overrate its importance, although admitting that it would not be
uniformly administered. The Allies could not make the demands
that the Russians had made, but he claimed the Sultan was willing
to give the Allies 'that sort of moral right' which he thought would
give sufficient security. He went on to say it was not unnatural for
people to be disappointed that it had been impossible to make use
of the formidable military and naval power they had built up, but
he added 'when a war ceases to be just I hold it to be a crime', a
sentiment with which Gladstone could easily agree. Perhaps the most
remarkable part of Palmerston's speech was its conclusion. Prompted
by Clarendon, 16 he rejected the widespread opinion (which surely
he so recently held) that Russia would continue her 'long cherished
projects of aggression'. He professed the belief that the new Czar
was a man of peace, 'not inspired by ambition of conquest', other
than 'conquests over indolence, undeveloped natural resources, and
all those difficulties which prevent the progressive improvement of
a nation'. He was optimistic in whatever direction he looked and
trusted that the late war had settled the divisions in every part of
Europe, although he was sure that in time of necessity the nation
would always be ready to do its duty.
I trust that period may be long deferred [he concluded], and that
the youngest man who sits in this House may not live to see the
time when it will be necessary for responsible Ministers of the
Crown to call upon the people of this country to support their
Sovereign in the prosecution of any war.
Aberdeen could not have asked for more, providing he could bring
himself to believe these peaceful professions of his old rival. Indeed,
the speech contrasted sharply with the views Palmerston had
expressed privately, prior to the conclusion of the treaty, but, except
for some of his colleagues, the House had not heard the more
ebullient expressions of them. As we have seen, Palmerston often
exaggerated to make his point or to let off steam, but he was basically
a realist, temperamentally an optimist and, in point of fact, a Prime
Finale 217
Minister with a case to make, which he was bound to do as best he

could.
The debate on the Peace Treaty in the House of Lords, although
shorter, was more partisan, perhaps because the Conservative peers
had not enjoyed an opportunity for attacking the Government on
the fall of Kars. 17 The Resolutions were moved by the Peelite Lord
Ellesmere, more renowned as a scholar than as a politician, in a
flowery speech that was highly praised, but that lacked substance,
and seconded by the veteran Lord Glenelg, who spoke more plainly
but more to the point. Lord Malmesbury criticised the Treaty in a
strongly political speech for paying too high a price for the return of
Kars by the restoration of so many places in Russia, for the betrayal
of the Circassians, for the compromise on the Bessarabian frontier
and for the failure to veto armed transports on the Black Sea and
the restitution of Black Sea forts. For these reasons, while welcoming
the return of peace, he moved an amendment to the resolutions
(subsequently rejected), deleting the reference to 'joy and satisfac-
tion'. Clarendon easily refuted many of Malmesbury's charges, some-
times using arguments that had been made against him in the Peace
Congress when he sought tougher terms. He claimed that the Circas-
sian tribes had no wish for Turkish rule and had given no help to
the Allies, that it was not unreasonable to allow the Russians to
restore their forts on the Circassian coast and that the Bessarabian
frontier agreed upon was a more rational one than that which was
first proposed. He applauded the role of Louis Napoleon and the
straightforwardness and good faith of Orlov, and concluded by
contrasting Russia's weakened position vis-a-vis Europe and Turkey
with what it had been prior to the war. Derby in a hard-hitting
speech, which was much more effective than Malmesbury's, said that
he accepted the peace 'without enthusiasm, but without opposition',
at the same time objecting to the claims that were made for it. He
denounced the large surrender of territory in Bessarabia and the
change in Clarendon's attitude regarding Nikolaev and the Circassian
forts from what was reported in the Protocols, and criticised the
vague arrangements for the Principalities; however he did not intend
to divide the House. 'I believe the country looks upon it as a peace
that might have been worse, but which might have been far better',
he said, '- a peace with which they are willing to put up, but not a
peace which they think compensates for the sacrifices, the sufferings,
the labour, and the expenses of the war.'
Aberdeen thought the peace was 'wise and honourable' and
rejoiced that Palmerston's 'warlike reputation' had made it possible

to accept terms which, if they had been made under his own auspices
'might perhaps have produced discontent and excited serious
reprehension'. It was not as triumphant a peace as the one he had
signed in Paris some forty years before, but he was sure it would
'meet with the approbation of the Country'. He thought it was
honourable to all parties, but questioned the value of the hatti-sherif
in view of the Turkish record of broken promises and asked what
protection Russia had from the Turkish fleet. Lord Cowley, making
his first speech in the House, answered Aberdeen's queries, saying
that at the Conference it was laid down as a general rule that if
either party violated the Treaty, the Allies would go to the aid of
the wronged party and that in any event Turkey was prohibited
from an act of aggression without first giving the other Powers an
opportunity of meeting the difficulty. As to the hatti-sherif, it was
not the intention of the Congress to limit the power of diplomatic
interference regarding its execution, but rather of protecting the
Porte from harassment in her internal affairs. He wisely observed
that just as in the war so in the peace negotiations Britain had to
take the views of other powers into consideration and not act entirely
on her own. 'Nevertheless, I believe the Treaty is a good and honour-
able one', he concluded, 'worthy of acceptance and approval of your
Lordships, and the approbation of the country at large.' Lord Grey
thought that the hatti-sherif was not worth the paper upon which it
was written, but attacked Derby's criticism of the Maritime Declar-
ation and congratulated Clarendon 'for having powerfully contrib-
uted to the termination of the calamities of war'. Argyll admitted
the hatti-sherif did not solve the problem, but thought it diminished
the danger. There was no objection to genuine diplomatic inter-
vention, but rather to the sort of intervention attempted by Russia.
After presenting their addresses to the Queen on 8 May 18 both
Houses then reassembled and proceeded to pass votes of thanks to
the armed services. In the Lords these were proposed by Lord
Panmure, who praised the operations of the Navy, which had carried
435,803 troops and 339,918 horses in the Baltic, the Mediterranean
and the Black Sea without the loss of a single ship, and of the Army,
which had lost 19,584 all ranks, killed in action or died of wounds
or of disease. He put the strength of the army at the end of the war
at 70,000 with only 3.7 per cent sick. He boasted that all this was
accomplished without resorting to impressment for the Navy or
balloting for the Militia, which mustered 63,603 men at the end of
Finale 219
the war, 6,000 of whom were serving in the Mediterranean garrisons.

He also, of course, paid tribute to the Allied armies with whom they
fought. The resolution was seconded by Lord Derby and passed
unanimously .19
Similar resolutions were moved in the Commons by Palmerston
and seconded by Disraeli, who also paid tribute, not only to their
allies, but also to the enemy, 90,000 of whom according to Palmer-
stan were buried in the Crimea. Palmerston noted that at the begin-
ning of the war the Army had numbered 120,000 in all parts of the
world and that by the end there were 110,000 in the Mediterranean
area, including the Turkish contingent and the 'foreign corps'. The
Navy in the same time had been increased from 212 to 590 ships.zo
The Crimean War was over except for the bills to be paid, the
wounded pensioners to be cared for and the long drawn out task of
implementing the Treaty. A public holiday was proclaimed to
celebrate the peace with special fireworks displays in London, Edin-
burgh and Dublin. The London display divided between Hyde Park,
Green Park, Victoria Park and Primrose Hill lasted for two hours,
culminating, according to the Annual Register, with the firing of
10,000 rockets 'into space'. In the City, Cabinet Ministers were
entertained at the Mansion House and responded with the inevitable
speeches. 'Palmerston performed his task excellently and was greatly
applauded', Lord Broughton recorded, 'but the hero of the fete was
Clarendon, who was so much cheered that it was some time before
he could proceed with his speech. He spoke very well indeed. '2 1
Now that we have completed our account of the negotiations of
the Peace Treaty and of its acceptance in Britain some general
questions remain to be considered. Was the settlement a reasonable
one from the British point of view or did it represent a failure on
the part of the British negotiators as charged by their critics then
and now, notably Lord Derby and Professor Schroeder? How can
we explain the change of attitude of Palmerston and Clarendon
between the beginning of the year and the end of March? Did
they, especially Clarendon, overrate the friendship of the French
Emperor? Did they exaggerate in their own minds the bellicosity of
British public opinion? Were the military prospects for 1856 as good
as they made them out to be? Was Palmerston or Clarendon the
main architect of British policy or was it a genuine partnership?
There can be no categorical answers to these questions. Opinion
varied widely at the time and even today the answers can only be a
matter of opinion, although based on wider knowledge than was

possible then.
As we have seen throughout the discussions, Britain took the
strongest stand against any modification of the terms laid down in
the preliminaries of peace. She demanded not only the full four
points specified in the original Austrian Ultimatum, but a broad
interpretation of the third point to include Nikolaev and the Sea of
Azov, her own two special conditions under the fifth point, and the
return of Kars without compensation. Given the free declaration of
the Czar regarding Nikolaev and Kherson and the fact that the Sea
of Azov was too shallow to float large ships of war and also given
the legal weakness of the British claim, the compromise on this point
was a sensible one. The one important concession to Russia in the
original four points was the considerable reduction in the amount of
Bessarabian territory the Russians were required to surrender. The
original boundary change, however, had been proposed by Austria
for her own ends and the final boundary agreed upon obtained the
essential provision required by Britain and France, namely that
Russia should be denied access to the Danube and the lower Pruth.
The fact that Britain held out so long against any compromise may
suggest a loss of face on her part, but the final satisfactory compro-
mise might not have been achieved without the initial tough stance.
Britain's main setback was undoubtedly to be found in her failure
to set up an independent buffer zone between the Russian and
Turkish Empires east of the Black Sea or to deny the Russians the
right of refortifying the Circassian coast when the first demand failed.
This point, however, had been a tentative one, phrased vaguely,
because the British Government recognised the weakness of the
claim in view of the lack of any sovereign authority in the region
with which to deal. It might have been unwise to raise the matter,
but there is evidence that had France given Britain support Russia
would have been prepared to make some concession. 22 If she retained
control of the Circassian coast, however, it was easily demonstrated
that some forts were necessary for garrison purposes. It is difficult
to see that the failure to secure this doubtful demand represented a
major setback for Britain. She did succeed in getting the appointment
of a boundary commission, which seemed to be all the Turks wanted,
and the appointment of a British and a French member on it. On
the other special condition, the neutralisation of the Aland Islands,
and on the return of Kars, on both of which she had the full support
of France, Britain was completely successful.
Finale 221
Of the four original points the settlement of the first one,

respecting the future organisation of the Principalities, was open to
criticism in the failure to work out the details before the Treaty was
signed, but the principles were established, Russia's protectorate
over the area was ended, and the differences that remained were
with Austria and Turkey, rather than with Russia. On the second
point, respecting the freedom of navigation on the Danube, Russia
had made no difficulties and Austria had been forced to accept a
commission controlling the entire river and thus including German
representatives she had wished to exclude. On the third point, Russia
had accepted the principle of neutralisation, that some contemporary
critics such as Aberdeen considered too stringent, and after fierce
argument had only been allowed four small armed transports in
addition to the six original patrol vessels, a very minor and not
unreasonable concession. Had Clarendon not taken such a firm line
on this issue, the other signatories were probably prepared to make
considerably larger concessions to Russia. Britain had also been
successful in getting her original demands regarding consuls and
naval military arsenals. On the fourth point, Russia's special claims
to protect the Christian subjects of the Porte were ended, but the
value of the Sultan's firman that had been extracted from him
remained to be seen. It is difficult to see that the rayhas were any
worse off than before and the most recent historian of the peace
treaty suggests that viewed in the long run of modern Turkish history
it can be seen as a significant step.z3
Therefore we may conclude that the peace settlement was a
reasonable one from the British point of view and not th~ diplomatic
failure that some historians have suggested. It was not a Carthaginian
peace, but it was all the better for that and it should be remembered
that Russia had not been as completely defeated as France had in
1814 and 1815 and as was Germany in 1918 and 1945.
It may be asked whether the British Plenipotentiaries had been
unnecessarily difficult in the negotiations and protracted them
unnecessarily. They might have taken a less severe stance with no
great loss, but we should recognise their genuine suspicion of Russia's
good faith based on their experience in the negotiations on the eve
of the war and in the ill-fated Vienna Conference of 1855 and also
their lack of confidence in their Allies. As already suggested the
tough stance may have ensured somewhat stiffer terms than would
have been otherwise exacted.
These suspicions, probably not as well founded as they thought,
also explain the attitude of Palmerston and Clarendon on the eve of

the peace conference, which they still believed was premature. But
to their surprise, Austria stood by the full terms of her Ultimatum
and Russia accepted them with no concessions. In the course of the
negotiations Austria and Russia showed good faith. Orlov always
acknowledged their original commitment, but argued strongly for
some mitigation and with some success. It was France who let Britain
down, more perhaps than Clarendon realised. Indeed it must be
admitted that Clarendon was taken in too easily by Louis Napoleon's
friendliness and apparent good-will and unaware of his double
dealing. It was not that his concessions to the Russians were
unreasonable, but that he deceived his Allies in making commitments
behind their backs. This, of course, is not surprising in an arriviste
who had always had to live by his wits and whose famous uncle had
never shown scruples in matters of state.
All things considered the change in the attitude of Palmerston and
Clarendon in the first three months of 1856 is understandable. The
peace conference in their view proved to be a genuine one, quite
unlike the abortive negotiations in Vienna the previous year. The
final settlement was a reasonable one even though Britain had to
abandon one of her objectives and make some modifications on
others. It was soon clear that she could not rely on France to hold
out for everything and, while earlier it may have been all very well
to talk about going on alone, by now that policy was clearly unreal-
istic. But just as Britain had fought a rear-guard action from mid-
October to the beginning of February, so she continued fighting at
the Congress until the last week in March. In the end, as we have
seen, she got all that it was possible to get, given the supine attitude
of France. Without the dogged fight that Clarendon and Cowley put
up, the concessions might have been considerably greater. By the
end of March, Palmerston and Clarendon, being rational men,
realised that they had done as well as they could and that the results
were really satisfactory. In December they believed that, if they
agreed to a compromise peace, they would be turned out of office
by the combination of the war party in their tail with the Opposition
that had brought down the Aberdeen Ministry. Clarendon was
inclined to exaggerate the power of public opinion, but there is no
doubt that the House of Commons elected in 1852 was an unpredict-
able one as Palmerston found out in the following year when he was
forced to dissolve it.
Palmerston and others undoubtedly exaggerated Britain's military
Finale 223
strength in 1856. The new recruits in the British Army had not shown
up well in the fight for the Redan, although admittedly the operation
was ill-conceived. The qualities of the new Commander-in-Chief
were uncertain and yet no other General officer had been thought
fit for the appointment. The only British General who had really
distinguished himself, Fenwick Williams, was a prisoner-of-war in
Russia. According to Colonel Wetheral, as we have seen, the
Crimean Army was 'immoveable' because of the failure of the Land
Transport Corps and yet there was talk of sending it into the wilds
of Georgia in the spring. Britain might have been able to carry on
the war alone by means of a naval blockade, but there is no evidence
that she had or was likely to have the military capacity to make it a
reasonable project. Prince Albert made this clear in his memor-
andum for the Cabinet of 28 January. In talking of such a possibility
earlier, British spokesmen were guilty either of bluffing or of self-
deceit, probably a combination of the two. By March they were
more realistic and also less afraid of public opposition to the peace
they were concluding.
The relationship between Palmerston and Clarendon is a matter
of some dispute. Temperley would seem to exaggerate the role of
Palmerston and underestimate that of Clarendon, although some of
his strictures on the Foreign Secretary are not without foundation. 24
(Clarendon still awaits a good modern biographer.) Herbert Bell is
more judicious, but as a biographer he naturally lays more emphasis
on Palmerston's role, and he did not have access to Clarendon's
letters in the Palmerston papers, nor did he make use of Clarendon's
despatches. Palmerston was clearly the more forceful and the more
aggressive of the two, but he always showed respect for the Foreign
Secretary's opinions and the two men treated each other as equals,
although Clarendon realised that as Prime Minister Palmerston had
the last word. Palmerston often put pressure on Clarendon, but he
always remained flexible and ready to adjust as the situation
required. The fact is that the two men worked well together and
were in general agreement on the broad outlines of policy. Clarendon
was no rubber stamp and British diplomacy in the Crimean war
would have been less effective without his steady hand at the helm.
He was a cautious man and if he thought a clear departure from
previous policy was necessary, he would normally ask for directions,
but in other circumstances, especially towards the end of the peace
negotiations, he made his own decisions which were accepted by
Palmerston and his colleagues. Clarendon's great forte was his
industry, his expertise in writing despatches (in his private correspon-

dence he let off steam and was prone to exaggeration), his broad
grasp of European affairs and his diplomatic finesse in face to face
negotiations. His weakness lay in his over-sensitivity to public
opinion, and in his insularity and over-suspiciousness of foreigners,
but his failing in this area was not as great as Palmerston's. Perhaps
the greatest testimony in Clarendon's favour was the high opinion
both of his colleagues and of other contemporaries.
III CONCLUSION
The formation of the Palmerston administration in 1855 resulted

from the fall of its predecessor, the Aberdeen Coalition, but except
for the desertion of Lord John Russell that collapse was not caused
by serious divisions in Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet. The main objective
of this book has been to see how Lord Palmerston's ministry dealt
with the military and diplomatic problems that remained unresolved
at the time of Aberdeen's resignation. That we have done, but before
making some final assessment of Palmerston and his ministry, we
may first briefly consider the relationship of that Liberal ministry
with the departed Peelite colleagues - with whom they had entered
the great enterprise and whose departure most of them regretted -
and also with the rank and file of the former Peelite party.
The withdrawal of the senior Peelite ministers and some of their
colleagues from Palmerston's Government in early 1855 obviously
set back the full integration of the Peelites and the Liberal parw.
There was, however, no return to the Conservative Opposition. The
Liberal party of the late 1850s was a fairly loose collection of old
Whigs, moderate Liberals, various sorts of Radicals and some Irish
tenant righters, and the Peelites remained with them on the Govern-
ment benches. The last mentioned were no longer a political party
and had no organisation so that any reference to them as a body is
apt to be misleading. Graham, Gladstone and Herbert continued to
sit together below the gangway and frequently met together with
Lord Aberdeen, and Cardwell acted closely with them. Argyll and
Canning (recently departed for India) and the five Peelites who
held junior ministerial or household appointments should now be
regarded as Liberals. Indeed most, if not all, the members whom
we have called Peelite received the Liberal whip, although in 1856
Dod lists all but two of them as Liberal Conservatives or Conserva-
Finale 225
tives and ten of them were still shown to be members of the Carlton
Club. 25
Lord Granville in writing to the Duke of Newcastle several months
after the formation of Palmerston's ministry emphasised his own
affinity with the Peelites and his strong desire for a Peelite Liberal
'amalgamation'. 26 He admitted that Whig prejudices were the main
obstacle and had nothing but praise for the conduct of the Peelite
ministers towards their Whig colleagues during the Coalition, but he
felt that he had to express his regret that the Peelites were also guilty
of indiscretions, such as insisting on so many places in the Coalition
administration and in remaining as members of the Carlton Club. It
should be noted, however, that, with the exception of Russell, the
Whig prejudice to which Granville referred was mainly or altogether
outside the Cabinet. Had it not been for the misfortune of the
Crimean War the Coalition might have survived and the fusion of
the parties that both Granville and Newcastle desired have been
achieved. As it was, Newcastle stood apart from his Peelite
colleagues and four years were to pass before they all came together
again.
On foreign policy issues the four ex-ministers in the Commons
often took an independent line in debate and occasionally in the
division lobbies, especially Gladstone, but they were no more inde-
pendent than many Radical members of the Liberal party. It is more
difficult to generalise about the back-bench Peelites, most of whom
were now probably regarded as Liberals. Examination of the division
lists 27 is of limited value, partly because there were not very many
significant divisions during the period under consideration and partly
because a vote with the Opposition did not necessarily signify any
movement towards the Derbyites, nor a vote with the Government
full acceptance of the Palmerston administration. Moreover, many
of the divisions against the Government were inspired by Radicals,
who on some motions got Conservative support and who were often
more hostile to the Government than any of the Peelites (with the
exception of Gladstone) for there was no class barrier in the case of
the latter. An examination of eight major divisions up to 1 May
1856 indicates that 35 members once identified as Peelites generally
continued to give the Government support, as no more than two
gave as many as four adverse votes and nineteen gave none. Glad-
stone, who was the strongest Peelite critic of the Government did
support it in ten out of eighteen divisions during the period from
1 March 1855 to 1 May 1856. Indeed, his hostility to Palmerston was
clearly revealed in an unsigned article he contributed to the Quarterly

reviewing the session of 1856, entitled 'The Declining Efficiency of
Parliament' .28 He criticised Palmerston's leadership harshly, but he
was also critical of the state and direction of the Conservative party
and blamed 'those gentlemen who pass by the appellation of Peelites'
for helping to prolong the existing state of party weakness and organ-
isation to which he attributed the decline in Parliament's efficiency.
Gladstone was the only one of the former Peelite ministers who
showed any interest in Conservative reunion, but he would not go
back alone. In his article he admitted that there were no longer any
great issues dividing the two parties, but he had a strong sense of
the importance of party to the efficient working of Parliamentary
institutions and consequently was more uncomfortable than any of
his colleagues in remaining in a middle position, yet it took him
another three years and a crisis in Italy to persuade himself that he
might again accept office under Palmerston.
As we have seen there was no great change in the direction of

military operations resulting from the change of Government, but
the war was quite possibly more prolonged than it would have been
on account of Palmerston's distinctive leadership. Palmerston was
undoubtedly a better wartime leader than Aberdeen, in that his heart
was much more in the business of winning. The peace-time Prime
Minister is often not suited to such a role, as we have twice seen in
this century. Palmerston's administration on the other hand was
weaker than his predecessor's after the resignation of the Peelite
ministers, for none of the new members had their particular parlia-
mentary and administrative talents. Nor, as we have seen, was
Panmure any improvement over the combination of Newcastle 'and
Herbert; indeed, some of the Whig ministers seemed to think the
opposite. The record of the Army in the Crimea in 1855 was undis-
tinguished, although the administrative failings of the early winter
had largely been eliminated, thanks mainly to steps already taken
before the change of administration. Had Aberdeen remained in
office his Government might have accepted the Austrian peace
proposals of the spring of 1855, but it is doubtful whether the
Russians would have done so before the fall of Sebastopol. Had he
survived to the fall of Sebastopol he undoubtedly would have been
readier to work for peace with Buol and Napoleon III, but this could
easily have produced a political crisis in Britain. Indeed, the war
Finale 227
party in the country would have been less disposed to accept peace
from Aberdeen than they were in fact from Palmerston. The Palmer-
ston Government probably wrested a little more from Russia in the
peace settlement than Aberdeen's might have done, but it is doubtful
that this would have made any great difference in the long run.
Whether Aberdeen would have succeeded in persuading Clarendon
to be more cautious on the enlistment issue is hard to say.
Although Palmerston was what today we would call a 'hawk' in
both foreign and military affairs, much more than Aberdeen, he was
not a militarist. Commenting on a letter of Prince Albert who took
a continental view of military matters, he made some interesting
remarks to Clarendon about 'the feeling of this country about the
military condition'.
He [the Prince] should recollect [Palmerston wrote] that in coun-
tries where there is no Parliament or a Parliament recently estab-
lished the military principle predominates and men are prouder of
being officers than of being gentlemen. Whereas in countries like
this where Parliamentary Government has taken deep root the
civil principle predominates and men are more proud of being
gentlemen than being officers.
In continental countries, he pointed out, the army was the first line
of defence, 'while in this country whose island position makes the
army but the second line of defence we do not regard the army in
the same degree as a permanent institution of prime necessity on a
large scale' .29
Palmerston lacked Aberdeen's moral qualities as a prime minister
and for this reason in some ways commanded less respect, but in
others he had an advantage. Not only was his heart more in the war,
but he sat in the House of Commons and he belonged to the much
larger Liberal component of the coalition, even if he was still, after
twenty-five years, regarded as a newcomer by some Whigs. For these
reasons he was probably a more acceptable leader to the majority
of the Liberal party, but not necessarily to all of them; Russell still
had some following and of course the Manchester School or Radical
peace party had no use for Palmerston.
Lord Aberdeen had been a great favourite with Queen Victoria
whereas Lord Palmerston when Foreign Secretary in the Russell
administration had much antagonised her. Nevertheless as Prime
Minister, after initial awkwardness, he got along better with the
Queen than might have been expected. He sent her pithy, sometimes
pungent, accounts of debates in the House of Commons, often with

personal allusions as on 7 June 1855 when he wrote:
Lord Robert Cecil attacked the Government in the manner of a
violent partisan, but unpractised debater. [The first part of this
stricture, but not the second, remained true for the next forty
years.] Mr. Bright then made a speech in his own peculiar style,
full of bitter personalities, vehement invective and vituperation,
heavy jokes and commonplace pathos.3
Since he was in the House of Commons, of course, Palmerston had
the advantage over Aberdeen, but his style was also livelier.
It is noticeable that Queen Victoria's point of view with regard to
the prosecution of the war was now more advanced than Aberdeen's.
She took a keen interest in military affairs and a firm line in defending
British interests in the negotiations leading up to the peace confer-
ence. Sometimes, probably on the Prince's advice, she urged caution
in the wording of despatches, but occasionally she took an advanced
position as in her firm letter to the French Emperor and bellicose
one to Clarendon on 15 January 1856 (above p. 167), when she
was perhaps writing on her own. In military matters and in peace
negotiations it is probable that her letters generally reflected her
husband's more pacific opinions, for despite his keen interest in
military affairs Albert was no chauvinist. In any event it is clear that
the Queen and the Prince took an active part in the discussion of
military and diplomatic policy and that their views were generally
treated with respect.
Although he made a poor start, Palmerston proved himself a better
leader in the House of Commons than was anticipated. He was
indefatigable in his attendance and on the whole led with common
sense and good humour. After his long years in the Foreign Office
it was a new experience for him to have no departmental duties,
but his letters to the Queen, his letter books and his numerous
interventions in the House, which were generally short and crisp,
showed that he assumed his new role surprisingly well for a man
turned seventy. He was perhaps less successful as a Cabinet chairman
and rather casual in the matter of ministerial appointments, although
ready to discuss them with his colleagues. For the most part, the
new members of his administration were undistinguished, but the
area of choice was limited. In foreign policy Palmerston and Clar-
endon generally had their own way, although occasionally the rest
of the Cabinet appear to. have restrained them. There was a substan-
Finale 229
tial peace party in the Cabinet composed of a duke, an earl and

two or three baronets. (Argyll, Granville, Grey, Lewis and perhaps
Wood), who probably would have been just as glad to remain under
Aberdeen, but they were not very effective in this area.
His first fifteen months in office as Prime Minister had established
Palmerston's leadership in Parliament and his popularity in the
country, but in a sense the years that followed the making of peace
were anti-climactic. Palmerston was an elderly man, naturally
conservative, and not inclined to take any strong lead in domestic
legislation - 'perhaps a little law reform' as he told an aspiring young
Liberal member who had innocently questioned him on the matter.
This suited many members of the Opposition and a large segment
of the voting public at the time, but not all members of his own
party. The result was that he was twice defeated in crucial votes that
resulted in a dissolution in 1857 and a change of government in 1858
and when in 1859 he returned to office as Prime Minister for the
remaining six years of his life it was as head of a ministry including
the four leading Peelites who remained in active public life. The fall
of the Aberdeen Coalition had delayed but not prevented the
eventual fusion of the Peelites and the Liberal party which ultimately
resulted in the birth of Gladstonian Liberalism. But, as Kipling once
said, 'that is another story'.
Notes and References
ABBREVIATIONS
Ab. Cor. Aberdeen Correspondence

Add. MS(S) Additional Manuscript( s)
Akten Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs
AHR American Historical Review
BL British Library
CHR Canadian Historical Review
cmd. command
dep. deposit
ed. editor or edited
EHR English Historical Review
EP Eastern Papers
FO Foreign Office
Hansard Hansard's Parliamentary Debates; third series
JMH Journal of Modern History
LQV Letters of Queen Victoria
memo. memorandum
pp Parliamentary Papers
PRO Public Records Office
RA Royal Archives
tel. telegram.
wo War Office
1 THE PALMERSTON COALITION, FEBRUARY 1855
1 See J. B. Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition 1852-1855.

2 C. R. Dod, Parliamentary Companion 1856 and earlier vols; F. H.
MacCalmont, Parliamentary poll book (1879); J. H. Whyte, The 1nde-
pendent 1rish Party, 1850-1859; Aberdeen Coalition, 456-9, Appendices
A and B corrected. The Radicals have been identified on the basis of
several important votes against the party leadership.
3 Letters of Queen Victoria, first series, III (subsequently LQV, III),
102-4, memo. by Queen Victoria.
4 Ibid.; BL, Add MS 44745, 79-84 (John Brooke and Mary Sorensen
(eds), W. E. Gladstone, III, Autobiographical Memoranda 1845-1866,
230
156-8), Gladstone memo., 31.1.55; Herbert Papers, copy of letter to
Derby, 31.1.55.
5 LQV, III, 106-7, memo. by Prince Albert, 1.2.55; Hansard's Parliamen-
tary Debates, 3rd series (hereinafter Hansard), 136, 1238-60; L. Stra-
chey and R. Fulford (eds), The Greville Memoirs, VII, 108-9.
6 BL, B.P. 12(12), (Aberdeen) Correspondence &c 1855-60 (hereinafter
Ab. Cor. 1855-60), 12; LQV, III, 108-9, memo. by Prince Albert,
2.2.55.
7 BL Add. MS 44747, 87-94 (Autobiographical Memoranda 1845-66,
159-61), Gladstone memo. 2.2.55, partly reproduced in John Morley,
Gladstone, I, 528-9, with important omissions; BL Add. MS 44791,
111-13, part of an autobiographical memo.; LQV, III, 109-10, memo.
by the Queen, 2.2.55.
8 LQV, III, 111-13, memo. 2.2.55, drafted by the Prince and signed by
the Queen, and 114-16, Victoria to Russell, 2.2.55; and 119-21, memo.
by Prince Albert, 3.2.55; Brian Connell, Regina v. Palmerston, 157-8,
Queen's Journal, 2.2.55.
9 LQV, III, 114-18, memo. by Prince Albert and the Queen, 3.2.55; BL
Add. MS 44745, 97-106, Gladstone memo., 3.2.55; PRO 30/22/12A,
149-56, Argyll, Lansdowne and Cranworth, 3.2.55; Connell, Regina v.
Palmerston, 158-61.
10 Hickleton Papers, A4/57, Clarendon, 3 and 4.2.55; Maxwell, Clar-
endon, II, 59-60; LQV, III, 121-2; PRO 30/22/12A, 157-8, Palmerston,
2.3.55; G. P. Gooch, Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, II,
182-3.
11 LQV, III, 122-5, the Queen and Palmerston, 4 and 5.2.55; memo. by
the Queen, 6.2.55. Palmerston had not yet heard from Graham who
was ill.
12 MS Clar dep c31, 15-16, 5.2.55.
13 See BL Add. MSS 44237, 251-6, 44745, 43-60 and 108-17, 44163,
168-9, and 44262, 175-84; Lord Stanmore (Sir Arthur Gordon), Sidney
Herbert, I, 251-62 and The Earl of Aberdeen, 289-90, John Martineau,
Duke of Newcastle, 254-6. John Morley, Gladstone, I, makes use of
many of the Gladstone memoranda covering the crisis and most are
published in John Brooke and Mary Sorensen, W. E. Gladstone, III,
Autobiographical Memoranda, 1845-56.
14 Ab. Cor. 1855-60, 31-2 and 40, letters from Palmerston, Granville and
Clarendon, 7, 8 and 12.2.55 with Aberdeen's replies. For the office
of Secretary at War and its abolition, see John Sweetman, War and
Administration (Edinburgh: 1984) 70-6. This book appeared after my
own was completed.
15 Broadlands MS GC/CL/585-6, 4 and 5.2.55; Lansdowne Papers,
Palmerston, 7.2.55; MS Clar dep c31, 18, 5.3.55; Autobiographical
Memoranda, 1845-1866,277, Appendix 6, Palmerston Diary. Frederick
Peel, the former Prime Minister's son, was appointed Under Secretary
for War and thus became a not very effective spokesman for the War
Office in the Commons.
16 Broadlands MS GC/PA/99, n.d.
232 Notes and References
17 Sir George Douglas and Sir George D. Ramsay (eds), The Panmure
Papers, I, 51.
18 Ibid., 8-9 and 45 (for the quotation).
19 Broadlands MS GC/GR/1830, 7.2.55.
20 Ashley, Palmerston, II, 307.
21 Hansard, 136, 1296-1308.
22 Ibid., 1329-32.
23 Ibid., 1332-57; Malmesbury, Memoirs, II, 7.
24 Hansard, 136, 1365-8.
25 See my Aberdeen Coalition, 440-3.
26 Broadlands MS GC/CL/487-8, 8 and 9.2.55; Hickleton Papers A57,
Clarendon, 9.2.55; MS Clar dep c31, 5.2.55.
27 MS Clar dep c31, 21-2, 10.2.55 (Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 63, in part).
28 MS Clar dep c29, 268-9, 9.2.55. Seep. 36.
29 MS Clar dep c30, 20, 9.2.55. I can no longer find the letter about the
feeling at Brooks's in the Russell Papers where I originally read it before
they were bound. There are numerous other letters of congratulations in
PRO 30/22/12A and /12B.
30 Hansard, 136, 1421-31; Greville Memoirs, VII, 114; Argyll, Autobi-
ography, I, 536.
31 Broadlands MS CAB/A81, Palmerston memo. of results of Cabinet
deliberations Saturday 10.2.55; G. Douglas and G. D. Ramsay (eds),
Panmure Papers, I, 56-7; Hansard, 136, 1402-13 and 1421-31; Connell,
Regina v. Palmerston, 166; BL Add. MS 44791, 115.
32 Hansard, 136, 1431-8.
33 Panmure Papers, I, 58-9 and 70.
34 Greville Memoirs, VII, 117; Hansard, 136, 1431-66; LQV, III, 134-5.
35 BL Add. MS 44745, 77-8, memo. 18.2.55 (Autobiographical Memor-
anda 1845-1866, 178-9).
36 Hansard, 136, 1514-30.
37 Ibid., 1534-41, 1580 and 1592; Ab. Cor. 1855--60, 44-5, 19.2.55.
38 Greville Memoirs, VII, 115.
39 BL Add. MS 44745, 121-32, memos 20 and 21.2.55 (Autobiographical
Memoranda, 180-4); LQV, III, 136-8, memo. of Prince Albert,
21.2.55.
40 BL Add. MS 44745, 132-40 (Autobiographical Memoranda, 184-7);
Stanmore, Herbert, I, 264, LQV, III, 138-9, Palmerston, 21.2.55;
Broadlands MS GC/CA/377, 22.2.55; RA A24/5, Palmerston, 22.2.55
and /6, 23.2.55; Parker, Graham, II, 267; Hansard, 136, end pages,
List of the Ministry, 22.2.55.
41 MS Clar dep c30, 27-8, 22.2.55; Ab. Cor. 1855--60, 49-50, 22.2.55;
Greville Memoirs, VII, 117-18. See also Stanmore, Herbert, I, 267-8
and Parker, Graham, II, 272-3 for letters of Wood and Clarendon and
MS Clar dep c30, 86, 22.2.55 for Graham's reply to Clarendon.
42 BL Add. MS 44112, 13 and 14, 22 and 23.2.55; Hansard, 136, 1743-55,
1762-72 and 1820-46.
43 Hansard, 136, 1846-51.
44 Ibid., 1851-9.
45 Ibid., 1755-62.
46 Ibid., 1774-1820.
47 Ibid., 1864-8. The nominees were J. Roebuck, H. Drummond, Sir John
Pakington, Colonel J. Lindsay, A. H. Layard, E. Ellice, Lord Seymour,
Sir George Lewis and General Peel. Two others, E. Ball and T. W.
Bramston were added on nomination from the floor. In all, there were
six Conservatives, two of them independent who had given support to
the Coalition Government, and five Liberals, two of them critical of
the Government. Ball, a Conservative, was later replaced by Captain
Gladstone, a Liberal Conservative. (Ibid., 137, 1686-1700.)
48 BL Add. MS 44791, 115 (in an autobiographical memo. written in the
1890s entitled 'Second Stage of Parliamentary Life 1853-65');
49 Bell, Palmerston, II, 115.
50 PRO 30/22/12B, 103-7 and 115-16; Gooch, Later Correspondence, II,
192-3; Walpole, Russell, II, 250-1; BL Add. MS 44745, 147-8, memo.
28.2.55.
51 Walpole, Russell, 251-2.
52 MS Clar dep c30, 218-19, 22.2.55, Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 71; PRO
30/22/12B, 163-6, Clarendon 26.2.66. See also Autobiographical
Memoranda 1845-1866, 189, 192-3 and 194-5.
53 RA A24/ 17, 18, 20, 26, 30, 35, 36, 38 and 42, 8, 10, 15, 18, 26, 28
and 31.3.55; Broadlands MS GC/EL2, 10.3.55 and GR/1832, 28.3.55;
Hodder, Shaftesbury, II, 490-4, 503-4 and 506-11. See also Geoffrey
Finlayson, The Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, 373-5.
54 Broadlands MS GC/W0/28 29.2.55; PRO 30/22/12B, 163-6, 26.2.55.
55 Greville Memoirs, VII, 119.
56 MS Clar dep c30, 231-2, 28.2.55.
57 For all these appointments see RA A24/5-42, 22.2 to 31.3.55; Broad-
lands MS GC/RU/485 and 486, 28.2 and 26.3.55; PRO 30/22/12B,
125-8, 134-5, 167-8 and 177-8, 23-26.2.55; PRO 30/22/12C, 128-31
and 159-60, 10 and 13.3.55; PRO 30/22/12D, 65-6, 28.3.55 and 111-12
and 129-30, 3 and 4.4.55; Hickleton Papers, A4/63, 28, 8.3.55; Greville
Memoirs, VII, 121-2; Connell, Regina v. Palmerston, 171.
58 BL Add. MS 44745, 158 and 159, Gladstone memo. 28 and n.d.2.55
(Autobiographical Memoranda 1845-1866, 192).
59 PRO 30/22/12C, 128-31, 10.3.55; Greville Memoirs, VII, 120 and 124.
2. THE VIENNA CONFERENCE OF 1855 AND ITS

PARLIAMENTARY REPERCUSSIONS
1 G. B. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 33-67, 'The Eclipse of

Lord John Russell'; Paul Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the
Crimean War.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1854-55, LV, cmd. 1924, Eastern Papers, XIII,
3; cf. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 101-8.
3 Henderson, 'The Two Interpretations of the Four Points, December
1834', in Crimean War Diplomacy, 107-10.
4 MS Clar dep c30, 208-11, Russell, 17 and 18 Feb. 1855; PRO 30/22/
12B, 41-2, 17.2.55, PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1964, EP, XVI, 265-9.
5 Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 39-41.
6 Broadlands MS GC/CL/590, 18.2.55; see also PRO 30/22/12C, 204-11,
20.3.55.
7 See pp. 97-8.
8 Broadlands MS, GC/RU/483, 1-3, 22.2.55; Gooch, Later Correspon-
dence, II, 193-4, who omits the passage dealing with Poland. See also
Schroeder, Crimean War, 150-2 and passim. About this time Louis
Napoleon was also attempting to negotiate a military convention with
the Austrian Emperor (PRO 30/22/12C, 169-70, Cowley, 15.3.55 and
229-36, copy of a letter from the French to the Austrian Emperor).
Clarendon was uncertain whether to consider this 'a reality or a dodge'.
For further details see Schroeder, 260.
9 MS Clar dep c30, 264-71, 15, 16 and 18.3.55; PP 1854-5, cmd. 1924,
EP XIII, 4-21; cf. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 41-5; FO 7/
461, nos. 21 (tel) and 26, 27 and 28/3/55; PRO 30/22/12D, 61-6,
28.3.55; MS Clar dep c31, 69-70, 23.3.55.
10 PRO 30/22/12C, 41-8; Broadlands MS GC/CL/597 and 598, 11 and
13.3.55; MS Clar dep c30, 268-70, 18.3.55 and dep c31, 49-52 and
69-70, 11 and 23.3.55.
11 Winfried Baumgart (ed.), Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, ser. I,
vol. II (hereafter Akten, II), 809-10, no. 396, 15.3.55 and 823-3, no.
412, 28.3.55. See also p. 253 n.55. Buol was chagrined at the British
Government's failure to appreciate what a great assistance Austria's
occupation of the Principalities was to the Allies in their Crimean
campaign (see ibid., 852-4, no. 424, 10.4.55).
12 MS Clar dep c30, 266-80, 18 and 20.3.55; PRO 30/22/12B, 207-30,
n. d., 'Memorandum on modes of carrying into effect the 3rd Point',
and various drafts in English and French, 221-87; 12C further memor-
anda, dated 8 and 9.3.55; cf. Schroeder, Crimean War, 257-9. For the
Russian point of view see J. S. Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 388-9.
For Raglan's view on the war situation as expressed to Russell see
pp. 93-4.
13 FO 7/463, no. 38, 26.3.55; MS Clar dep c30, 266-7, 274-80 and 291-4,
18, 20 and 26.3.55; MS Clar dep c31, 79-82, 25.3.55; Broadlands MS
GC/CL/610, 30.3.55.
14 Broadlands MS GC/CL/607, 24.3.55; cf. Henderson, Crimean War
Diplomacy, 45.
15 PRO 30/22/12C, 284-92, partly reproduced in Gooch, Later Correspon-
dence, II, 199-200; PRO 30/22/12D, 1-2, Lansdowne 27.3.55 (Gooch,
Later Correspondence, II, 199); Lansdowne Papers, Russell, 1.4.66.
16 PR0/30/22/12D, 28.3.55.
17 FO 7/463, no. 38 and 39, 26.3.55 and no. 47, 30.3.55, Protocols nos.
Vand VI, 23 and 26.3.55 (PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1924, EP XIII, 39-43).
Russell's despatch is much more informative than the Protocol. There
were apparently six Russian warships still afloat at Sebastopol and
two nearing completion in the shipyards at Nikolaev (Curtiss, Russia's
Crimean War, 396).
18 Broadlands MS GC/CL/596, 9.3.55; Walpole, Russell, II, 356-7; MS

Clar dep c30, 316-17, 10.4.55; Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 83. Stratford
gave further trouble in the autumn by his attitude to the French
ambassador and his humiliating treatment of the Sultan. See PRO 30/
22/12F, 151-2 and 160-5, 21 and 26.9.55; MS Clar dep c31, 434-7,
3.9.55; Broadlands MS GC/CL/695 and 700, 21 and 28.9.55.
19 MS Clar dep c30, 295-303, 28.3.55. Two days later Russell made the
extraordinary proposal that Prussia might be forced to abandon her
neutrality, which was considered pro-Russian, and show her friendliness
to the Allies by placing certain forts in the hands of Austria and the port
of Danzig in those of Britain (FO 7/463, no. 46). This was presumably in
response to an approach by Prussia to Britain and France asking to
participate in the Conference (Akten, II, 816-17, no. 401, Buol to
Hubner and Colloredo, 23.3.55).
20 PP 1854-55, LV, cmd. 1959, EP, XV, 3-4, no. 2, 3.4.55; Henderson,
Crimean War Diplomacy, 47-9.
21 Ashley, Palmerston, II, 310-12; PRO 30/22/120, 129-30, 4.4.55; MS
Clar dep c30, 306-7, 1.4.55. Gooch, (Later Correspondence, II, 203)
publishes another letter of the same date and even more bitter, but
which was probably not sent since it is not in the Clarendon Papers.
Clarendon replied apologetically, refusing to go into a 'polemique' or
to respond in the same tone. He claimed his intention was to share
Russell's responsibility (PRO 30/22/120, 133-8, 10.4.55).
22 MS Clar dep c30, 311-12 and 316-17, 9 and 10.4.55. Cf. FO 7/464, no.
64, 10.4.55.
23 PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1959, EP, XV, 1-3, no. 1, 3.4.55.
24 Ibid., 5-6, no. 3, 10.4.55 (FO 7/464, no. 66); ibid., 6-11, 12-18.4.55
(cf. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 50-4). A few words and
sentences uncomplimentary to Austria were omitted from the published
despatches (cf. FO 7/464, nos. 70, 77 and 83).
25 Theodore Martin, The Prince Consort, III, 236-59. See p. 98.
26 PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1924, EP, XIII, 25-7, Protocol 10, 17.4.55.
Henderson (Crimean War Diplomacy, 52) argues that from this point
forward Russell and Drouyn departed from their instructions, but given
their ministerial status and the fact that they were making no commit-
ments without reference to their Governments this course seems
understandable.
27 Ibid., cmd. 1959, EP, XV, 11-12, no. 9, 18.4.55. See also Akten, II,
865-7, No. 432, Buol to Hubner and Colloredo, 16.4.55, on the perfect
accord between himself and the British and French Plenipotentiaries at
a private meeting before the Conference of 17 April; and 868-70, nos.
434 and 435 for Buol's defence of his plan.
28 Ibid. and 12, no. 10, 18.4.55. See also FO 7/464, no. 88, 19.4.55 and
no. 90, 19.4.55; MS Clar dep c30, 320-1, 18.4.55 and dep c31, 136,
22.4.55.
29 PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1924, EP XIII, 28-38, Protocols 12 and 13, 19
and 21.4.55; FO 7/464, no. 94, 21.4.55. There were also clauses in
Drouyn's proposal allowing an equal number of Allied ships (half
British, half French) and permitting the Sultan to open the Straits when
in danger of aggression.
30 FO 7/464, no. 92, 21.4.55.
31 MS Clar dep c31, 143-4, 23.4.55, Clarendon to Palmerston with Palmer-
ston's marginal reply. Cf. PRO 30/22/120, 203, Clarendon to Russell,
22.4.55.
32 FO 7/464, no. 95, 22.4.55. Cf. Buol to Hiibner and Colloredo, 23.4.55
(Akten, II, 877-9, no. 440), expressing satisfaction at the attitude of
Russell and Drouyn.
33 MS Clar dep c30, 330-55, two letters dated 23.4.55 and two enclosures,
one Drouyn's draft of proposed terms to be offered Russia, the other
a draft of a proposed treaty of guarantee (both in French). Cf. FO 7/
464, no. 100, 23.4.55. The independence and integrity of Turkey was
to be guaranteed, the Straits were to remain closed but, in the event
of Russia increasing her Black Sea fleet, Britain and France were each
to be permitted to bring into the Black Sea half as many ships as the
Russians, and should the Sultan be threatened he reserved the right to
open the Straits to his allies. By a secret clause Austria was to undertake
to recognise an increase of the Russian fleet to the size of its pre-war
strength as an occasion for invoking the treaty. These provisions went
further than Buol's earlier proposals. Cf. Schroeder, Crimean War,
270-84.
34 Broadlands MS GC/RU/488, 23.4.55.
35 Ibid., GC/CL/620, 26.4.55; MS Clar dep c31, 152, 26.4.55, printed in
Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 81; LQV, III, 152-3; Henderson, Crimean War
Diplomacy, 54.
36 Broadlands MS, GC/CL/627, Clarendon, 30.4.55. Russell was probably
influenced by a pessimistic letter he had received from Raglan while in
Vienna. See pp. 93-4.
37 FO 519/171, 376-9, 30.4.55. Clarendon carried on an almost daily
private correspondence with Cowley, with whom he was most intimate.
38 Ibid., 382-5, 2.5.55. Drouyn's modification involved changing the limi-
tation on the Russian fleet from 'the status quo afloat' to 'any excessive
development of Russia's fleet' (Schroeder, Crimean War, 275).
39 Ab. Cor. 1855-60, 64, Clarendon, 2.5.55; MS Clar dep c30, 40, 3.5.55;
Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy, 59. Clarendon often showed
Aberdeen Russell's despatches. Muriel Chamberlain, Lord Aberdeen
(London: 1983), 518, questions the propriety of this proceeding.
40 MS Clar dep c30, 364-8, 4.5.55 and c31, 168-71.
41 Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, 106-8.
42 FO 519/171, 396-403, 4.5.55.
43 Ibid., 422-8, 5.5.55.
44 MS Clar dep c33, 227-69, Cowley, 1, 2 and 3.5.55.
45 Ibid., 260-9 and 280-93, 3 and 7.5.55; FO 27/1067, nos. 514 and 515
(confidential), both 7.5.55; FO 519/171, 439, 9.5.55. Cf. Henderson,
Crimean War Diplomacy, 59-63, Schroeder, Crimean War, 276-8, and
F. A. Simpson, Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France, 305-7.
For Hubner's views see Akten, II, 845-7 and 910-13, nos. 443-4 and
452-3, 30.4 and 9.5.55.
46 FO 519/171, 434-7, 7.5.55. Lacking a private code to communicate
with Walewski, the Emperor had asked Cowley to send the invitation
to Walewski in English cypher through the Foreign Office! (MS Clar
dep c33, 276 and 280-93,5 and 7.5.55; F. A. Wellesley and A. Sencourt,
Conversations with Napoleon Ill, 82, quoting the Emperor to Cowley,
5.5.55.)
47 MS Clar dep c30, 369-74 and 377-8, 6 and 7.5.55.
48 PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1959, EP XV, 14, no. 13.
49 Ibid., 14-18, nos. 15 and 17; MS Clar dep c31, 195-200 and 214-18,
15, 20 and 23.5.55; Broadlands MS GC/CL/632, 634-6, 19 and
22-4.5.55; PRO 30/22/12E, 7-10, 19 and 23.5.55; Connell, Regina v.
Palmerston, 175-6.
50 PRO 30/22/12E, 13-14, 23.5.55; Argyll MS, 1855, 22.5.55, copy made
by lOth Duke of Argyll.
51 FO 519/171, 506-10, 23.5.55, 526-9, 26.5.55 and 530-5, 28.5.55; FO
519/4, 460-2, no. 603, 23.5.55. Cowley's despatches and letters
expressed his contempt for the French Government and their constant
chopping and changing. Walewski was now on a pro-peace, pro-
Austrian tack, but the Emperor assured Cowley that he would on no
account accept the current Austrian proposals. He suggested, however,
that they might play Buol's game and appear to go along with him, but
Cowley assured him that no British Government could defend such a
course before Parliament. 'H.M. Government must decide this question
with regard to their own honor and interests alone', the ambassador
told Clarendon. He even suggested 'that they must take the honor and
interests of France into their own safe keeping for there are no men to
do it here'! (FO 519/4, no. 584, 453-5, 20.5.55.)
52 PRO 30/22/12E, 27-30, Clarendon, 30.5.55. Cf. Palmerston, 27 May
in Maxwell, Clarendon, I, 82.
53 FO 519/4, 470-3, no. 621, 27.5.55; PP 1854-5, LV, cmd. 1939, EP
XIV, Protocol 14, 4.6.55 and XV, no. 16, 29.5.55. The key article of
the Austrian proposals was no. 2, which stipulated that the Russian and
Turkish plenipotentiaries should propose 'by common agreement the
equal amount of the effective naval forces which the two sea-bordering
powers [would] keep in the Black Sea and which [was not to] exceed
the actual number of the Russian ships afloat in the sea'. The other
articles covered the guarantee of Turkish territorial integrity, the closing
of the Straits except for two frigates each allowed England and France,
and the right of the Sultan to call in the fleets of his allies, if, 'which
God forbid' (the text ran), he should be threatened.
54 Cf. Schroeder, Crimean War, 278-84, who concludes his account of the
Vienna Conference with an interesting rationalisation of Austrian
policy. According to Professor Curtiss, Austria was now able to demob-
ilise some 62,000 reserves, but persuaded Russia not to invade the
Principalities nor to repudiate her concessions on Points One and Two
(Russia's Crimean War, 401).
55 Hansard, 137, 1628-9, 1790-1 and 1951-3; 138, 105-13 and 559. In the
House of Lords on 3 May Derby condemned the Allied proposals as
being too conciliatory (ibid., 138, 18-24).
56 Stanmore, Herbert, I, 427-32 and 439 (Add. MS 44210, 175-8 and

183-92); MS Clar dep c30, 41-2, Aberdeen, 21.5.55 and dep c31,
210-12, Palmerston, 21.5.55; RA A24, 60, Palmerston, 21.5.55; Glad-
stone Diaries, V, 53, 21 and 22.5.55; Hansard, 138, 836-58.
57 Hansard, 138, 1093-1183.
58 Ibid., 819-7.
59 Graham Papers, Herbert and Gladstone, 24.5.55; Herbert Papers,
Graham, 24.5.55; RA A24/62, Palmerston, 24.5.55.
60 RA A24/62, Palmerston, 24.5.55; Broadlands MS, GC/GR/1835, Gran-
ville, 24.5.55 and GC/CU637, 24.5.55.
61 Hansard, 138, 973.
62 Ibid., 973-1009; Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, I, 1404-7.
63 Hansard, 138, 1010-17.
64 Ibid., 1017-23.
65 Ibid., 973-1091 and 1193-1307. Lord Stanley's speech in support of
Disraeli's motion was a curious one in its condemnation of the war
that seemed to place him with Heathcote and the peace party and to
foreshadow his role as Foreign Secretary in the Eastern crisis of the
1870s (ibid., 1241-51).
66 Hansard, 138, 1213-24 and 1251-70.
67 Ibid., 1270-85 and 1296-1300. Some elected as Peelites in 1852 had,
of course, now merged with the Liberals, but they cannot be separated
when the independent Peelites voted with the Government.
68 Derby Papers, Letterbooks, 183/1, 199-205, 30.5.55. Eight of Derby's
21 deserters were independent Conservatives in my classification. Derby
may have included several Peelites in his total.
69 Hansard, 138, 1300-7.
70 Hansard, 138, 1300-1, 1318-96, 1409-86, 1554-1633, 1651-1758.
71 Lord C. Hamilton, G. H. Vansittart, Sir H. P. Willoughby and Glad-
stone's friend, Sir S. Northcote.
72 'Radicals' and 'Liberals' are not separated since the former were divided
among the peace party, the war party and Government supporters.
73 Hansard, 138, 1451-69.
74 Ibid., 1469-86.
75 Ibid., 1757-8; RA A24/68, 8.6.55. Indeed, in the final stages the debate
seemed to have become one between different sections of the Govern-
ment side of the House for on one occasion, as Palmerston told the
Queen in one of his brief but colourful accounts of the debates, Disraeli
and one other Conservative were the only members on the Opposition
benches (RA A24/66, 5.6.55).
According to Wood, at the last moment, contrary to the advice
of the Chief Whip, he had persuaded Palmerston to oppose Lowe's
amendment. This, he claimed, defeated Disraeli's intention of voting
against Lowe with members of the peace party on the Government side
of the House (Grey Papers, Wood, 11.6.55).
3. PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IN THE SUMMER OF 1855
1 Walpole, Russell, II, 271-2; Hansard, 139, 423-9 and 551-9.

2 Hansard, 139, 559-73.
3 Ibid.
4 BL Add. MS 43759, 10-11, 7.7.55. The entries for the next four days
record the condemnation of Russell's conduct at Brooks's and in the
press (ibid., 12-14).
5 Hansard, 139, 573-82.
6 Ibid., 582-90.
7 Ibid., 590-4.
8 Ibid., 596-60.
9 Grey Papers, 9.7.55; BL Add. MS 43384, 8-9, 12.7.55.
10 BL Add. MS 43384, 8-9, 12.7.55; Graham Papers, Aberdeen, 11.7.55.
11 MS Clar dep c31, 316-18, 10 and 11.7.55.
12 Derby Papers 145/3, 10.7.55; (see also ibid., 11.7.55); PP 1854-5, LV,
217-63, EP Pt XV, cmd. 1959; Hansard, 139, 805-15.
13 MS Clar dep c30, 417-18, 11.7.55; Greville Memoirs, VII, 145; Broad-
lands MS, GC/RU/490, 14-15, 13.7.55; Walpole, Russell, II, 273-4;
PRO 30/22/12E, 124-6, 12.7.55. Herbert Paul mistakenly asserts that
the group was led by Bouverie, although the latter subsequently denied
in the House that he was one of those who threatened resignation (Paul,
History, I, 411; Hansard, 139, 913-14).
14 MS Clar dep c31, 320, 13.7.55; RA A24/108, 13.7.55; Broadlands MS,
GC/CL/666, 13.7.55 and ibid., RU/481, 15.7.55; Hughenden Papers,
B/XX/5/136, 16.7.55 (reel 54).
15 Hansard, 139, 889-900.
16 BL Add. MS 43759, 17-18, Broughton Diary, 16.7.55; Hickleton
Papers, A4/55/3, 17.7.55.
17 Hansard, 139, 901-13.
18 Ibid., 914-18.
19 Ibid., 918-31.
20 Ibid., 939-44. Cf. pp. 40 and 49.
21 Greville Memoirs, VII, 146-7.
22 Hickleton Papers A4/63/38, 19.7.55, a much corrected draft of six or
seven pages. I can find no original in the Broadlands MSS.
23 Ibid., /39, 20.7.55.
24 MS Clar dep c30, 421-7, 22 and 23.7.55. See also Gooch, Later Corre-
spondence, II, 213.
25 Hickleton Papers A4/63/39, 20.7.55. Professor Winter substantiates the
charge of government collusion with The Times in his Robert Lowe
(54-5). Lowe, who is alleged to have organised the revolt of the under-
secretaries, was sworn in as Vice President of the Board of Trade on
14 August. On that day he had two leaders in The Times, the one
suggesting the new Prime Minister had still to prove himself (presumably
written before he was sworn in), and the other a summary of the
Session, in which Lowe judiciously praised Palmerston, whose colleague
he now became.
26 PRO 30/22/12F, 19-20, 27.7.55.

27 Greville Memoirs, VII, 131; PP 1854-5, Parts 1, 2 and 3, five Reports
from the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol.
28 Stanmore, Herbert, I, 445.
29 This is not entirely fair. See my Aberdeen Coalition, 447-520.
30 BL Add. MS 56567, 137, Broughton Diary, 19.6.55.
31 Journals of the House of Commons, 1854-5, v.110, 386. Palmerston
told the Queen that Roebuck had intimated that he had no wish to
install Derby, but rather wished to force a dissolution and 'to weaken
both Whigs and Tories, and to strengthen the administrative reformers'.
The Prime Minister commented that this was 'an expectation in which
Mr. Roebuck might possibly be disappointed'. (RA A24/80, 22.6.55.)
32 Newcastle Papers, Newcastle to Aberdeen, 24.6.55, Aberdeen, 25.6.55;
BL Add. MS 44089, 132-7, Aberdeen 21, 25 and 27.6.55; Graham
Papers, 5.7.55; BL Add. MS 44163, 194-8, 7.7.55; Stanmore, Herbert,
I, 451.
33 Malmesbury, Memoirs, II, 30. Hughenden Papers (reel 55) B/XX/5/
618 and 618s, Stanley, 4.7.55.
34 Hansard, 139, 954-66.
35 There was an element of truth in all Roebuck's charges, especially the
second and third, but there was much to be said in the Government's
defence as I have indicated in my Aberdeen Coalition.
36 Hansard, 139, 966-74.
37 Ibid., 997-1001.
38 Ibid., 1001--4.
39 Ibid., 1004-12.
40 Ibid., 1012-18.
41 Ibid., 1054-65 and 1085-1101.
42 Ibid., 1101-26. For Admiral Lyons' low opinion of Sir George de Lacy
Evans, see Greville Memoirs, VII, 220.
43 Hansard, 139, 1132-50.
44 Ibid., 1164-75.
45 Ibid., 1175-83.
46 For the division see Hansard, 139, 1186-9.
47 RA A24/116, 19.7.55.
48 Gladstone spoke 65 times, Cardwell 23, Graham and Herbert 19 each
(Hansard, vols 136 to 139).
49 For a detailed account of the financial provisions of this year see Olive
Anderson, A Liberal State at War, 197-228.
50 Ibid., 103-24. See also the same author's article on the Administrative
Reform Association in Victorian Studies, VIII (1965), 231--42.
51 Hansard, 138, 2070-9 and 2114.
52 Ibid., 2098-2114 and 2222-5. The division, which was taken on 18 June,
found Bulwer-Lytton, Disraeli, Graham, Palmerston and Russell in the
same lobby, but Gladstone absented himself. The amended motion was
passed on the following day (ibid., 2332).
53 Hansard, 139, 1226-33, 1268-70, 1438--44, 1464-82 and 1513; BL, Add.
MS 43759, Broughton Diary, 26.7.55; Ab. Cor. 1855--6, 91-2, Glad-
stone, 9.8.55; See further Olive Anderson, A Liberal State at War,
222-6.
54 Martineau, Newcastle, 266-80; Newcastle Papers, Clarendon, 11.8.55
and partial draft of letter to Mrs S. Herbert, 1.5.55. See also pp. 114--5.
4. THE CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN OF 1855 TO THE DEATH

OF RAGLAN
1 See my Aberdeen Coalition, 552 and passim.: also [S.J.G. Calthorpe]

Letters from Headquarters, II, 236-7.
2 B. L, Add. MS 48759 (Palmerston Letterbook), 13 and 14 (to Panmure
and the Lieutenant General of Ordnance, 5.5.55) and passim; see also
Bell, Palmerston, II, 122-4.
3 G. Douglas and G. D. Ramsay (eds), The Panmure Papers, I, 8-36;
Greville Memoirs, VII, 153. See also pp. 117-22.
4 Broadlands MS CAB/A/80, 1-2, Palmerston memo. of results of
Cabinet deliberations, 10.2.55; Panmure Papers, I, 52-4; Hansard, 136,
1402-13 and 1421-31. For the problems of the Ordnance and the
changes in its administration, see Sweetman, War and Administration,
70-6.
5 PP 1854-5, XXXIII, cmd. 1920, Report upon the State of the Hospitals
of the British Army in the Crimea and Scutari.
6 PP 1856, XX, cmd. 2007, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Supplies of the British Army in the Crimea (the two Reports are bound
in one volume with separate pagination for the evidence and appendix).
PP 1856, XXI, cmd. 2112, Report of the Board of General Officers . .. ;
Commissary General Filder, The Commissariat in the Crimea . .. ; [C.
E. Trevelyan] Statement ... of the Arrangements made by the Treasury
in reference to the supply of forage for the Crimea; Col. [A. M.] Tulloch,
The Crimean Commission and the Chelsea Board. For a recent
discussion of the Commissariat and the problems of the Crimean War,
see Sweetman, War and Administration, 44-59.
7 PP 1857, IX, 241-591, cmd. 2196, Report . . . of the Sanitary
Commission despatched to the Seat of War in the East, 1855-56; Cecil
Woodham Smith, Florence Nightingale, 204.
8 WO 33/1, 95-8, no. 1, 12.2.55 (printed); draft in W0/6/70, 209-17.
For Newcastle's despatch see my Aberdeen Coalition, 526-7. For the
relationship of the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards with the
Cabinet and the Secretary of State for War on the one hand and the
Commander-in-Chief in the field on the other, see Sweetman, War and
Administration, 88-96.
9 Panmure Papers, I, 58-60, 12.2.55 and 69-70.
10 Ibid., pp. 92-5.
11 WO 33/1, 167-80, Raglan to Newcastle, No 164, 30.1.55, 'Printed solely
for the use of the Cabinet, February 24, 1855'.
12 Ibid., 259-262 (1-4), No. 185, 2.3.55 (received 16.2), printed for the
Cabinet 27.3.55.
13 Panmure Papers, I, 103-6, 16.3.55.

14 W06/70, 333-5, no. 49, 19.3.55.
15 Panmure Papers, I, 136 and 164-6; W06/74, 231, 23.4.55. For a stout
defence of Raglan, Airey and Estcourt and sharp condemnation of their
traducers see Letters from Headquarters or the Realities of the War in
the Crimea, II 'by an Officer of the Staff' (Somerset Calthorpe), 3rd
edn, 1858. Colonel Calthorpe went to the Crimea as a young lieutenant
and was an ADC of Raglan's.
16 Panmure Papers, I, 150-3 and 170-1. He left it to McNeill, of whom
he had a high opinion, to report on the Commissariat.
17 Ibid., I, 180, 191-2 and 201; Broadlands MS, GC/PA/101, 1.5.55.
Edward Watkin (1819-1901), not 'Watkins', later became an MP, a
baronet, and a major railway director in England and Canada.
18 BL Add. MS 48759 (Palmerston Letter Book), 14-15, to Panmure,
8.5.55; Derby MS 183/1 (Letter Book), to Duke of Beaufort, 10.5.55;
BL Add. MS 56567 (Broughton Diary), 120-2, 14.5.55; Malmesbury,
Memoirs, II.23, 12.5.55.
19 Panmure Papers, I, 221-2, 292-4 and 309. Cf. Christopher Hibbert,
The Destruction of Lord Raglan, 273-4 and 300-1. Palmerston also
unsuccessfully demanded the replacement of Dr Andrew Smith
(1798-1872), Director General of the Army Medical Service, who was
eventually awarded a KCB in 1859.
20 Aberdeen Coalition, 487-91.
21 Cf. Hibbert, Raglan, 274, who writes: 'Extremely intelligent and hard
working, highly impatient and often brusque to the point of insolence,
Airey refused to suffer fools gladly and had accordingly, in an army
with more than a fair share of them, made many enemies.' For Raglan's
early career see Hibbert, chapter 1. In his well-researched book Hibbert
makes a stout defence of Raglan.
22 For a vivid description of the dramatic change in conditions in the
camp see Nicolas Bentley (ed.), Russell's Despatches from the Crimea
1854-1856, ch. 15 entitled 'Springtime', and for the employment of
mercenaries see C. C. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea: the German,
Swiss and Italian Legions in British Service, 1854-1856 and p. 127.
Statistics differ according to the time and the authority. Cf. B. D.
Gooch, The New Bonapartist Generals in the Crimean War, 190-1 and
206 and A. J. Barker, The Vainglorious War, 240-56. Britain undertook
to advance 1,000,000 for the Sardinian troops, half paid in 1855 and
the balance in 1856 (Le Relazioni Diplomatiche fra Ia Gran Bretagna e
il Regno di Sardigna, series III, 1848-60, 213, no. 142, 28.1.56).
23 Panmure Papers, I, 87, Palmerston, 28.2.55 and Raglan, 24.3.55 and
Stewart, 24.3.55; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 374; Broadlands MS,
GC/CL/591, 28.2.55. 'I do not pretend to be a military genius', the
Emperor told Cowley, 'but if I go I shall at least relieve the Generals
from the responsibility which is weighing them down and of which I am
not afraid' (Wellesley and Sencourt (eds), Conversations with Napoleon
Ill, 73).
24 Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 72-4.
25 Panmure Papers, I, 127, 129.
26 PRO 30/22/12C, 252-9, 26.3.55.
27 PRO 30/22/12D, 113-20, 123-4, 3.4.55. Parts of this long letter are
reproduced in Gooch (Later Correspondence, II, 203-4), but Gooch
deletes some parts uncomplimentary to the French.
28 FO 519/171, 396-403, 4.5.55.
29 Panmure Papers, I, 118-9, 23.3.55; WO 6/74, 16-19, 26.3.55 (printed
in WO 33/1, 255--6).
30 Graham Papers, to Wood (copy), 3.6.55.
31 Panmure Papers, I, 135 and 141.
32 Ibid., I, 150-3 and 160-4, 16 and 21.4.55; (Simpson wrote again on 27
April to say that the cannonade had continued some eighteen days and
nights with little obvious effect, ibid., 170-1) PRO 30/22/12D, 267-70,
Lady Westmorland, 12.5.55.
33 Hibbert, Raglan, 317-18.
34 FO 519/171, 370-3, 28.4.55.
35 LQV, III, 155--60.
36 Panmure Papers, I, 156-9 and 164--6, Panmure, 20 and 23.4.55.
37 Calthorpe, Letters from Headquarters, II, 297-300; Gooch, The New
Bonapartist Generals, 196--8; MS Clar dep c33, 294-302, 8.5.55.
38 WO 6/74, Panmure to Raglan, 4.5.55 (printed for Cabinet, 5.5.55);
Panmure Papers, Panmure, 4.5.55; A. C. Dewar (ed.), Russian War
1855- Black Sea Official Correspondence (Navy Records Society, 1945),
143-4 and 147.
39 Calthorpe, Letters from Headquarters, II, 307-9.
40 Ibid., 309-12; Dewar, Russian War, 1855, 79-102, 156-7 and passim;
A. W. Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, IX, 39-83; MS Clar dep
c31, 236, 28.5.55.
41 See Broadlands MS, GC/CL/647 and 655, Clarendon 3 and 22.6.55;
FO 519/171, 664-71, Clarendon, 20.6.55; Martin, Prince Consort, III,
292. Sir Adolphous Slade (1804-1877), an English admiral who
commanded the Turkish fleet 1839-1866, in his book, Turkey and the
Crimean War (1867), 392-5, gives a more critical account of these
operations and claims that they had little effect on the supplying of
Sebastopol, but he seems a rather hostile witness.
42 B. D. Gooch, The New Bonapartist Generals, 213-14; E. B. Hamley,
War in the Crimea, 242-3.
43 PRO 30/22/12E, 27-30, Clarendon to Russell, 30.5.55, relaying infor-
mation from Cowley. See also Gooch, The New Bonapartist Generals,
207-17.
44 E. B. Hamley, The War in the Crimea, 246-54; Panmure Papers, I,
233.
45 MS Clar dep c31, 243, Palmerston 30.5.55; FO 519/171, 568-73,2.6.55
and 582-5, 4.6.55.
46 Panmure Papers, I, 243, 18.6.55.
47 MS Clar dep c31, 249-50, 31.5.55; FO 519/171/622-5, Clarendon
11.6.55; wo 6/74, 33-4.
48 Hamley, War in the Crimea, 255--62; N. W. B. Pemberton, Battles of
the Crimean War, 195-207; Albert Seaton, Crimean War: a Russian
Chronicle, 189-91; Panmure Papers, I, 244--6, 19.6.55; Gooch, The
New Bonapartist Generals, 225-7. Hamley places the Russian losses at

5.400, Seaton at 3,950.
49 FO 519/171, 712-15, 25.6.55; MS Clar dep c31, 286-9, 22.6.55,
repeated to Cowley inFO 519/171, 672-5.
50 Hibbert, Raglan, 338-40; Panmure Papers, I, 258-9, Admiral Stewart,
30.6.55.
51 FO 519/171, 728-32, 25.6.55.
52 Hansard, 139, 271-6; Broadlands MS GC/PA/107, Panmure, 29 and
Palmerston, 30.6.55, and 108, Panmure, 30.6.55; Panmure rapers, I,
307, to Simpson, 20.7.55; Lansdowne Papers, Clarendon, 29.6.55 and
Palmerston, 30.6.55; RA/A24 83-94, correspondence with Palmerston,
28 to 30.6.55.
5. THE CONCLUSION OF THE CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN

AND THE WAR ON OTHER FRONTS
1 Panmure Papers, I, 256-7 and 259, both 30.6.55.

2 Broadlands MSS GC/PA/109 and GC/CL/660, both 30.6.55.
3 Broadlands MS GC/PNllO, 2.7.55, enclosing a despatch (W0/6/74,
2.7.55); Panmure Papers, I, 271-2 and 317, 2 and 28.7.55.
4 Panmure Papers, I, 273-6.
5 Ibid., 282-4, 286-7, 289, 294 and 304-8.
6 Ibid., 289-91.
7 Ibid., 297.
8 Ibid., 316-17.
9 Ibid., 320-1. Panmure also urged Simpson to stand up to Pelissier when
they held a Council of War and to make full use of Admiral Lyons who
had great knowledge of 'the French language, character and feeling,'
and a 'talent for diplomacy', gifts poor Simpson lacked (ibid., 357).
10 Ibid., 334-6 and 348-9.
11 Ibid., 275, 278, 307, 310, 336, 353, 355, 405 and 429; BL Add. MS
48579 (Palmerston Letterbook), 43-7, 16.8.55.
12 W06/74, 44-8.
13 Ibid., 52-4.
14 Panmure Papers, I, 320-23, 31.7.55; Gooch, The New Bonapartist
Generals, 206. Military statistics are notoriously elusive and generals
often seem to find totals smaller than do their governments. Although
losses from illness and casualties were lower than they had been, they
continued day by day.
15 See Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea; for the Polish legion, Schro-
eder, Crimean War, 342-3.
16 Panmure Papers, I, 314, 318 and 340.
17 MS Clar dep c31, 345-9, 20.7.55. Cf. ibid., 404-5, 13.8.55, when he
was still harping on the desirability of attacking from Eupatoria.
18 Broadlands MS GC/CL/677, 8.8.55 and 685, 22.8.55.
19 Seaton, Crimean War, 191-2 and 196.
20 Panmure Papers, I, 295 and 313.
21 Ibid., 299.
22 Ibid., 310 (21.7.55) and 339 (7.8.55); W06/74, 49-51, Panmure,
13.8.55. When he asked Simpson why he did not destroy the buildings
in the town, Panmure had callously added, 'Raglan spared them on
some principle of mercy that I don't comprehend.' (Panmure Papers,
I, 311, 23.7.55.)
23 See Hamley, War in the Crimea, 75-9; Seaton, Crimean War, 112-17.
24 Hamley (War in the Crimea, 129), citing Todleben, puts the total
Russian force 'in and around Sebastopol' at 110,000 and 115,000, against
an Allied total of 65,000 in November 1854; A. W. Kinglake, The
Invasion of the Crimea, III (NY, 1875), 43-4, puts the Russians at
120,000 'on the Sebastopol theatre of war' (including battalions of
seamen) and the Allies at 65,000 (including seamen and marines) plus
some 11,000 Turkish troops. In May 1855 the Allied force totalled
224,000, according to Gooch (The New Bonapartist Generals, 206).
Seaton (Crimean War, 189) places the Russian strength at 84,000 in
June 1855 including 9,000 in eastern Crimea. Three additional Russian
divisions were sent to the Crimea in the summer of 1855 (Seaton,
Crimean War, 195; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 440).
25 See Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 401 and 439.
26 See Seaton, Crimean War, 186-7. Admiral Slade ranks the achieve-
ments of Satler, the Russian Commissary General, with those of
Todleben (Turkey and the Crimean War, 391).
27 MS Clar dep c42, 73-86, 30.8.55. For Newcastle's sojourn in the Black
Sea theatre of war, see further F. Darrell Munsell, The Unfortunate
Duke: Henry Pelham, Fifth Duke of Newcastle. 18II-1864 (Columbia,
Missouri: 1985) 219-25, which appeared after the present book was
completed.
28 MS Clar dep c42, 61-110, 15 and 28.7, 30.8, 11, 15 and 22.9, 3 and
15.11.55 and several more from Clumber in December, 114-28.
29 MS Clar dep c29, 202-4 and 218-21, Panmure, 13.9 and 4.10, and c31,
375--6, 502-3 and 554--6, Palmerston, 2.8, 20.9 and 6.10.55, and c30,
497-8, Granville, 16.9.55; Broadlands MS GC/CU705, 4.10.55.
30 Hamley, War in the Crimea, 262-3 and 276.
31 Ibid., 267 and 271-2; Seaton, Crimean War, 196-7; Curtiss, Russia's
Crimean War, 448-9. Hamley puts the Russian losses in Sebastopol and
vicinity from March to August at 81,000.
The extremely elaborate system of trenches and tunnels constructed
on both sides (sometimes the one under the other) is well illustrated in
the very detailed maps and plans included in the official history of the
Royal Engineers in the Crimea: Captain H. C. Elphinstone and Major
General Sir Harry D. Jones, Journal of the Operations conducted by
the Corps of Royal Engineers, Parts I and II (1859), 2 vols., with a
separate box of plans. For a graphic description of the construction of
the siege works see Bentley, Russell's Despatches, 178.
32 Leo Tolstoi, Sebastopol, introduction by Philip Rahv (Ann Arbor paper-
backs). There is also a brief preliminary story entitled 'Sebastopol in
December, 1854'.
33 Seaton, Crimean War, 195-206; Hamley, War in the Crimea, 271;
Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 441-4. The British Government received

prior warning of the attack, but probably too late to warn the Army
(Panmure Papers, I, 351; BL Add. MS 48579, 43-6, Palmerston to
Panmure, 16.8.55).
34 Seaton, Crimean War, 209.
35 Pemberton, Battles of the Crimean War, 213-15.
36 Seaton, Crimean War, 211-18; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 450-8;
Hamley, War in the Crimea, 275-85. The Russian evacuation entailed
the abandonment of a very large quantity of weapons, ammunition,
naval stores, commissary supplies and machinery. The amount of iron
was regarded as especially useful since it was thought to be better than
that of the Allies. (PRO 30/22/12F, 146-9, Palmerston, 20.9.55; RA
G40/53, printed copy of a Simpson despatch (23.10.55) presenting the
report of a commission appointed to value and divide the stores.)
37 MS Clar dep c42, 87-98, 11 and 15.9.55. Leaving the Crimea later in
September Newcastle made a six week tour in Circassia and northern
Georgia, sending Clarendon an interesting and informative account of
the situation in that area that should have been valuable to the Govern-
ment (MS Clar dep c42, 103-8, 31.11.55).
38 Lansdowne MS, Clarendon, 27.9.55; Bickleton MS A4, Palmerston,
26.9.55.
39 Gooch, The New Bonapartist Generals, 252-3; Panmure Papers, I, 395,
435 and 464; Broadlands MS GC/P A/121/2, telegram, Simpson to
Panmure, 9.10.55.
40 Panmure Papers, I, 377 and 388, Panmure, 10 and 15.9.55; Broadlands
MS, GC/PA/120, Panmure, 26.9.55, enclosing an extract from his
despatch to Simpson of 15.9.55; Lansdowne MS, Clarendon, 27.9.55.
41 Panmure Papers, I, 389-90, 396-7 and 403-4; Broadlands MS, GC/
PA/120/2, copy enclosed with a letter to Palmerston, 26.9.55.
42 Panmure Papers, I, 406-7.
43 Ibid., 407-9, 29.9.55 and 444-7, 14 and 15.10.55.
44 MS Clar dep c42, 98, Newcastle, 15.9.55; ibid., c31, 554-6, Palmerston,
6.10.55; RA G39/55, 19.10.55; Panmure Papers, I, 411-14, 421-5,
Panmure to Queen Victoria, 30.9.55, 3 and 4.10.55, and 427-8, Queen
Victoria, 5.10.55; Argyll, Autobiography, I, 584-7.
45 Panmure Papers;, I, 451-60; Martin, Prince Consort, III, 382; RA G39/
80, 16.10.55. Argyll, Autobiography (vol. I, 584-7).
46 The Times, 1.10.55; RA G/39/55 and /65, 10 and 12.10.55; Connell,
Regina v. Palmerston, 186-7.
47 PRO 30/22/12F, 143, 18.9.55; Broadlands MS, GC/CL/712; 17.10.55.
48 Panmure Papers, I, 405-6 and 438-9.
49 Broadlands MS GC/CL/718, 27.10.55.
50 See Hamley, War in the Crimea, 290-1; Panmure Papers, I, 428-9, 469
and 474-5; FO 27/1078, tel. despatches 1445 and 1450, 4 and 5.11.55.
51 RA G39/96-7 and 107, tels. from Clarendon and Wood, 20.10.55 and
a copy of a Simpson despatch, 9.10.55; Dewar, Russian War, 1855, the
Black Sea, Navy Records Society, vol. 84 [London]1944. 338-60.
52 See RA G39/100, Pelissier despatch to Vaillant, 17.10.55 (copy) and
138, Cowley to Clarendon, 28.10.55 (copy); FO 519/172, 425-30, Clar-
endon to Cowley, 2.11.55.
53 RA G39/83, Cowley, 17.10.55 (precis) and 99, 22.10.55 (copy).
54 Ibid., 118, 22.10.55 (copy).
55 FO 2711078, Cowley telegram, 26.10.55.
56 FO 519/172, 359-71, 381-90, 395-401 and 405-10, Clarendon, 20, 22,
24, 29 and 31.10.55.
57 RA G40/14, 4.11.55 (copy); MS Clar dep c34, 667-78, Cowley, 28.10.55
and c35, 7-8, 26-30, Cowley, 2 and 7.11.55; FO 5191172, 435-41,
Clarendon, 7.11.55.
58 MS Clar dep c35, 91-9, Duke of Cambridge, 16.11.55; see also Broad-
lands MS GC/CL/733 and 734, 17.11.55. Codrington strongly opposed
further proposals for withdrawal by Pelissier in December (RA G41/
86, 15.12.55).
59 Hamley, War in the Crimea, 289-97; Gooch, The New Bonapartist
Generals, 253-6, 260-1; The Times, 3.1.56.
60 Martin, Prince Consort, III, 417 (mistakenly has a total of 80,000).
61 RA G42/5, Queen Victoria (copy), 20.12.55, /8, Clarendon, 20.12.55;
see also /75, Clarendon, 6.1.56 and /76, extract from Wetheral's letter.
62 MS Clar dep c42, 124-35, Newcastle, 19.12.55; Lansdowne Papers,
Palmerston, 15.12.55. For the Turkish expedition to the Circassian coast
see pp. 132-3 and for Clarendon's concern for the inhabitants of the
area, p. 129; Panmure Papers, II, 47, to Codrington, 4.1.56; MS Clar
dep c48, 8, Argyll, 4.1.56. The British representatives were the Duke
of Cambridge and Sir Richard Airey, both of whom had returned from
the Crimea under a cloud, General Sir Harry Jones, R. E. and the two
admirals commanding in the Black Sea and the Baltic, Lyons and
Dundas.
63 Panmure Papers, II, 60-2, Duke of Cambridge, 12.1.56,113-15, to the
Queen, 20.2.56 and 131-5, 'Proposed Secret and Confidential Memor-
andum' [n.d.2.56]; MS Clar dep C48, another Panmure memorandum,
296-300, 1.2.56; dep c49, Clarendon to Palmerston, 114-15, 7.2.56, re
'war committee' meeting with Lyons and Airey that made the decision.
Wellesley and Sencourt, Conversations with Napoleon Ill, 106-8, Napo-
leon to Cowley, 4.2.56.
64 Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, I, 141. Granville
told Canning that he had visited 'Mars' on his sick-bed, laid up with
gout, reading a book of Scottish divinity and dismissing Macaulay's
History (which everybody was reading) as 'pot-house gossip!'
65 Panmure Papers, II, 9-10,78,79, 92, 93, 103-4, 128-9, 130 and 145-6.
In view of the impending peace Codrington was inclined to spare the
public buildings of the city that were left standing, a proposal with which
Panmure vigorously disagreed, chiding his general for being 'somewhat
chivalrous' (ibid., 104-5).
66 Robert Saunders Dundas (1802-61), son of the second Viscount
Melville, is not to be confused with Admiral Sir James Melville Dundas,
RN, commander in the Black Sea in 1854.
67 See D. Bonner-Smith (ed.) Russian War, 1855, Baltic: Official Corre-
spondence; Annual Register, 1855, 223-30; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean
War, 283-9; Carl C. Revells, An Eye on Sevastopol: British Naval

Policy and Operations during the Russian War, 1853-1856, Queen's
University doctoral thesis 1984.
68 Hickleton MS A4/63/55 and 57, 15.11.55 and 14.1.56.
69 For these operations, see John J. Stephan, 'The Crimean War in the
Far East' Modern Asian Studies, III (1969) 257-77; Curtiss, Russia's
Crimean War, 419-20; Revells thesis (n. 67 above).
70 See Schroeder, Crimean War, 330, various references in the Clarendon-
Palmerston and Clarendon-Cowley Correspondence and Argyll, Autobi-
ography, I, 553-5 and 591-2.
71 What follows is a brief summary of a longer account which is being
published in the Society for Historical Research Journal. It is based
mainly on: P.P. 1856, LXI, cmd 2032, Papers relating to the Military
Affairs in Asiatic Turkey and the Defence and Capitulation of Kars;
Colonel (H.) Atwell Lake, Narrative of the Defence of Kars, Historical
and Military (1857); Humphrey Sandwith, A Narrative of the Siege of
Kars (1856); Thomas Buzzard, With the Turkish Army in the Crimea
and Asia Minor- A Personal Narrative (1915); Laurence Oliphant, The
Transcaucasian Campaign of the Turkish Army in Asia Minor under
Orner Pasha (1856); S. Lane-Poole, Life of Stratford Canning, Viscount
Stratford de Redcliffe (1887), v. II; Rear Admiral Sir Adolphus Slade,
Turkey and the Crimean War (1867); Panmure Papers, I.
72 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, v. XIV (1980),
624-30; Slade, Turkey and the Crimean War, 414-18.
73 Hansard, 141, 1594-1688, 1718-85 and 1803-1905; Annual Register,
1856, 14-26.
74 SeeR. A. Humphreys, The Diplomacy of British Honduras 1638-1901
and my 'Lessons in Twisting the Lion's Tail', in Michael Cross and
Robert Bothwell (eds), Policy by Other Means: Essays in Honour of
C. P. Stacey, 77-94 (from which the quotations are taken). In what
follows I wish to acknowledge some useful leads given me by a former
graduate student, D. R. Thompson, who wrote a research paper for
me on the Enlistment Crisis many years ago.
75 I have written a fuller account of the Enlistment crisis in a separate
article. A rather biased and incomplete account of the crisis and of the
Central American question is to be found in the section on William
Learned Marcy by H. B. Learned in S. F. Bemis (ed.), American
Secretaries of State (Knopf, 1928), VI. This interpretation has been
modified by J. B. Brebner, 'Joseph Howe and the Crimean War Enlist-
ment Controversy', CHR, XI (1930), 300-327, and by R. W. van
Alstyne, 'John F. Crampton, Conspirator or Dupe?', AHR, XLI (1936),
492-502. See also Claude M. Feuss, Caleb Cushing, II, 165-77, and C.
C. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea, 87-94.
76 See Brebner, CHR, IV, 304-11; van Alstyne, AHR, LXI, 493-6.
77 van Alstyne, AHR, XLI, 497-500 (for the quotation); PP 1856, LX,
cmd. 2080, Papers Relative to Recruiting in the United States, 10-12;
Brebner, CHR, IV, 312-20.
78 See PP 1856, LX, cmd. 2080, 17-183; van Alstyne, AHR, XLI, 499-502.
6. THE DRIFT TO PEACE
1 The Times, 10.10.55; BL Add MS 43384, 18-21 and 28-9, Bright, 8,

16 and 21.10.55; Ab. Cor. 1855-60, 107, Aberdeen, 27.10.55.
2 Hughenden Papers, B/XX/5/138, Derby, 25.10.55 (neither Monypenny
and Buckle, Disraeli, I, 1421-2, nor Robert Stewart, Foundation of the
Conservative Party, 314, include the passage quoted in the extracts they
publish from this letter); Derby Papers, 183/1, 308-16, to Joliffe, 2 and
20.11.55 and 145/3, Disraeli, 7 and 21.11.55. (Disraeli's letter of the
7th is published in Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, I, 1422.) Palmer-
ston did urge Wood to look into a proposal for a 'submarine machine',
but Wood replied that the Navy had no funds for it (see Hickleton
Papers, A4/63/ 51, 54, 58 and 59, Palmerston, 5 and 17.12.55 and 10
and 19.3.56; Broadlands MS/GC/W0/31, 37, 68 and 69).
3 RA A24/145, 149, 150 and 152, Palmerston, 10 and 13.11.55 and Queen
Victoria, 14 and 19.11.55; Broadlands MS GC/CU735/4, 18.11.55;
Greville Memoirs, VII, 168-9. For the development of a small war
committee of the Cabinet in the later stages of the war, see Olive
Anderson, 'Cabinet Government and the Crimean War', EHR, LXXIX
(1964) 550-1. It consisted of Palmerston, Panmure, Wood and Gran-
ville, who as Lord President of the Council was responsible for economic
warfare.
4 Broadlands MS GC/CU731, 15.11.55; MS Clar dep c31, 652-4,
15.11.55.
5 Broadlands MS GC/CU783, 17.1.56.
6 MS Clar dep c49, 15-16, 9.1.56 and 112-23, 4.2.56. It should be remem-
bered that France and England were at war for most of the first thirty
years of Palmerston's life and off and on for the preceding four
generations.
7 Broadlands MS GC/CU693 and 694, 16.9.55.
8 MS Clar dep c31, 567-70, 9.10.55.
9 See W. Baumgart, The Peace of Paris 1856 (translated by Ann P. Saab);
Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, ch. 20 and 21; Vicomte (Eugene) de
Guichen, La Guerre de Crimee (1854-1856) et /'attitude des puissances
europeennes (1936); G. E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of the Crimean
System 1855-71 (1963), which reprints several of his articles on the
subject. Schroeder, Crimean War, ch. XIII and XIV; E. V. Tarle,
'La diplomatie pendant la guerre de Crimee a la Congres de Paris
(1853-1856)', in V. P. Potemkin (ed.) His to ire de Ia diplomatie, I
(trans., 1946); Harold Temperley 'The Treaty of Paris of 1856 and its
Execution', Parts I and II, Journal of Modern History, IV, Sept. and
Dec., 1932, and 'Austria, England and the Ultimatum to Russia 16 Dec
1855' in Wirtschaft und Kultur: Festschrift 70 Geburtstag zum Alfons
Doppel (1938), as well as various older authorities, notably, F. Charles-
Roux, Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napoleon III (1913).
10 See Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 480-84; Charles-Roux, Alexandre
II, Gortchakoff et Napoleon III, 44-56; Edouard Gourdon, Histoire du
Congres de Paris (1857); de Guichen, La Guerre de Crimee, ch. xxiv
to xxviii. P. de la Gorce, Histoire du second Empire, I, 455, quotes

Prince A. Gortchakov as saying 'Les evenements ont condamne Russie
a etre muette, non pas a etre sourde.' Tarle (Histoire de Ia diplomatie,
I, 453) confuses the chronology of events in presuming that Austria
approached France on hearing of the Morny-Gortchakov contact.
Early in November Walewski admitted that Seebach had made an
indirect overture, but Cowley said he had confined himself to a 'general
caution', wanting to encourage the French Foreign Minister to be open
with him (MS Clar dep c35, 31-9, 7.11.55).
11 RA G39/82 and 83, precis of Cowley letters of 13 and 17.10.55.
12 FO 519/172, 353-8, 17.10.55 and 359-68, 20.10.55; MS Clar dep c31,
602-13, 25, 26 and 28.10.55 (cf. MS Clar dep c31, 577-9, Palmerston,
16.10.55 from which Clarendon quotes without attribution in his letter
of 17 October).
13 RA G39/127, 137 and 138, 24, 27 and 28.10.55 (copies).
14 FO 519/172,425-30, 3.11.55; Hickleton Papers, A4/57, 7.11.55; Broad-
lands MS GC/CL/727, 12.11.55; LQV, III, 191-2, 13.11.55.
15 MS Clar dep c27, 310-14, Elliott, 14.11.55; dep ci34 (letterbook),
190-3, 13.11.55; FO 7/459, 14.11.55; Broadlands MS GC/CL/731,
15.11.55.
16 MS Clar dep c35, 50-64, 11.11.55; FO 519/172, 499, 16.11.55; see also
L. M. Case, French Opinion on War and Diplomacy in the Second
Empire (1954), 38-43, Gourdon, Congres de Paris, 215-19.
17 MS Clar dep c35, 100-12, 17 and 18.11.55 and 119-46, 18.11.55.
18 RA G40/81 and 82, texts of the Ultimatum and the Memorandum in
French as originally worded; FO 7/460, texts as finally worded, enclosed
with despatch no. 35, 19.12.55. I have summarised the Points as
amended.
The text of the Memorandum of 14 November 1855 and the original
and final texts of the Austrian Ultimatum are printed in Baumgart (ed.),
Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, III, 105-7 and 162-3.
19 FO 7/460, Memorandum of 14.11.55, initialled by Buol and Bour-
queney. It was not amended. Persigny passed on background infor-
mation which Clarendon later summarised in a despatch to Cowley (FO
27/1059, no. 1356, 24.11.55). If Russia rejected the Ultimatum, Austria
would consult with Britain and France concerning joint action with the
Allies as soon as the rupture was effected. It was thought that Austria
could tie up more Russian troops without declaring war, since Russia
would then be uncertain where an attack might be made. On the other
hand, Russia would be unwilling to declare war on Austria for fear of
bringing in the whole of Germany.
20 MS Clar dep c35, 100-12, 17.11.55; RA G40/80, Cowley, 18.11.55
(copy).
21 FO 519/172, 505-10, 19.11.55; Broadlands MS GC/CL/735, 18.11.55.
For the perceptive reports to Buol from Colloredo in London and
Hubner in Paris, see Akten, III, 90, 99-101, 122-4, 127, 152-5, 213-17,
243, 249, 253-5 and passim.
22 LQV, III, 192, 19.11.55; Lansdowne MSS, 19.11.55.
23 MS Clar dep c134, 264-5, 20.11.55.
24 FO 519/172,517-20, 20.11.55; CfPalmerston (MS Clar dep c31, 666-7,
20.11.55) who wrote: 'I do not see why we should assume that Austria
is imposing her ultimatum on us as well as on Russia and I conclude
we are at liberty to move amendments before the passing of the Proto-
cols'. As for Georgia and Circassia, Clarendon had earlier indicated to
Wood that he thought their liberation important for the security of
Britain's Indian possessions (Hickleton MS, A4/57, 5.6.55).
25 Greville Memoirs VII, 169-70; PRO 30/22/12G, 19-20, 26.11.55
(Greville to the Duke of Bedford).
26 FO 27/1079, no. 1522, 22.11.55; MS Clar dep c27, 322-7, Elliot,
21.11.55, re Walewski's early response (MS Clar dep c35, 21.11.55).
27 FO 519/172, 523-4, 532 and 545-53, 21, 22, 23 and 26.11.55.
28 FO 27/1059, no. 1536, 24.11.55.
29 Ashley, Palmerston, II, 322-3, 21.11.55.
30 Broadlands MS GC/CL/738, 21.11.55; MS Clar dep c35, 213-27 and
242-53, 25 and 26.11.55. By coincidence Clarendon had warned Cowley
only a few days before against the very step that Palmerston was now
proposing, claiming that to 'threaten to continue the war singlehanded'
would be to invite 'a declaration of war from the United States'. (FO
519/172, 501-3, 17.11.55.)
31 Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 103-5; MS Clar dep cl34, 318-21, 26.11.55.
32 RA G40/105, 22.11.55 (copy).
33 Broadlands MS GC/CL/739, 22.11.55; MS Clar dep c31, 672-80, 22
and 23.11.55.
34 Martin, Prince Consort, III, 393-6 (translation); RA G40/101, 22.11.55.
35 Ibid., 397-402 (translation); see RA G41/3 and 4 for Prince Albert's
draft and a copy of the Queen's reply, 26.11.55. Clarendon asked
Cowley to let Walewski know that the Queen had written the letter
herself after a conversation with Palmerston and himself and that
Palmerston had merely expressed his agreement with some of the points
she proposed to make (FO 519/172, 563-7, 28.11.55).
36 MS Clar dep c31, 688-703,26,27,28 and 29.11.55; FO 519/172,569-76,
29.11.55.
37 MS Clar dep c134, 322-9, 27.11.55; FO 7/459, nos. 227 (tel.) and 228,
Elliot, 28 and 29.11.55; FO 27/1079, no. 1536, Cowley, 26.11.55; FO
519/172, 569-76, Clarendon, 29.11.55. The case of Colonel Tiirr, who
was alleged to be a deserter from the Austrian army, dragged on until
late January when he was finally released, since Buol was anxious not
to antagonise the British Government. The other differences included
the mistaken arrest and alleged mistreatment by Austrian police of an
English clergyman, a case involving a British consul Colquhon, the
Lombardian sequestrian issue and an Austro-Sardinian dispute
regarding a Tuscan diplomatic appointment. Professor Schroeder, who
has little sympathy with British Crimean War diplomacy, emphasises
these Anglo-Austrian differences in his Austria, Great Britain and the
Crimean War, 316-20.
38 MS Clar dep c35, 265-78 and 284-302, 28 and 30.11.55.
39 RA G41/28, Palmerston to Clarendon (copy), 1.12.55.
40 FO 27/1059, no. 1371, 29.11.55; RA G41/22, 29.11.55.
41 MS Clar dep c134, 351-4, 30.11.55.

42 FO 27/1080, no. 1567, 2.12.55; MS Clar dep c35, 311-32, 2.12.55; RA
G41135, Cowley (copy), 4.12.55.
43 FO 27/1080, 1574, Cowley, 5.12.55; FO 27/1060, 1389, 1390 and 1405,
Clarendon, 4, 5 and 6.12.55; MS Clar dep c134, 383, 396 and 410, to
Cowley 5, 6 and 7.12.55 and 374-82 and 392-5, to Seymour, 4 and
6.12.55; FO 7/450, no. 7, 6.12.55; RA G41/43 and 44, 7.12.55.
44 FO 27/1080, no. 1585, 9.12.55; MS Clar dep c35, 384-91, Cowley,
9.12.55.
45 FO 27/1080, nos. 1591 (tel), 1597 and 1604, 10 and 13.12.55; FO 7/
460, tel, 7.12.55 and no. 11, 10.12.55; MS Clar dep c35, 394-405 and
431-6, Cowley, 10 and 11.12.55; FO 27/1060, no. 1441, Clarendon,
13.12.55; FO 27/1080, no. 1619.
46 MS Clar dep c134 (between 441 and 442) to Persigny, 11.12.55 and dep
c35, 447-52 and 460-7, Cowley 13 and 16.12.55; FO 27/1080, no. 1612,
13.12.55.
47 MS Clar dep c134, 442-5, to Cowley, 12.12.55; RA G41/62, Queen's
draft, 12.12.55; MS Clar dep c31, 732-3, 13.12.55.
48 LQV, III, 198, MS Clar dep c35, 406-29, Cowley 'Private and confide-
ntial', 10.12.55. Clarendon eventually gave the gist of this letter to the
Queen which led to an entry of eight foolscap pages in her journal (RA
G42/42, 28.12.55). See also di Nolfi, Europa e ltalia, 474-6 for Cowley's
correspondence with Hudson, 6-28.1.56.
49 FO 7/460, tel. 7.12.55 and no. 6, 9.12.55; MS Clar dep c27, 341-2,
6.12.55.
50 FO 7/460, nos. 17, 18 and 19, 12.12.55; MS Clar dep c27, 351-4,
12.12.55.
51 Broadlands MS GC/CL, 759 and 764, 12 and 16.12.55; FO 7/460, nos.
22 and 23, 13.12.55 and tels 13, 15, 16 and 29.12.55; FO 7/450, nos.
21-24, 12, 13 and 14.12.55; RA G41n6-83, 13 and 14.12.55. Russian
rights in the Principalities were more closely curtailed in the First Point,
while in the Third provision was made for the protection of commercial
and maritime rights in the Black Sea, which entailed the accreditation
of consuls. No reference was made to the demands the Allies intended
to make under the Fifth Point.
52 FO 7/460, tel16.12.55; FO 7/450, no. 33, 17.12.55; MS Clar dep c134,
436-9, to Seymour, 11.12.55; Greville Memoirs, VII, 171, 4.12.55; RA
G42/1, 19.12.55. Gourdon, Congres de Paris, 252-3, notes that no
French newspaper carried the news (perhaps because of censorship).
Clarendon also revealed to Queen Victoria that a Russian loan was
actually being raised in England 'in the ordinary way of commerce
which cannot be interfered with' and that 200,000 in gold had left
London the day before. The next day he told Cowley that the Stock
Exchange had announced that no loan of a hostile power was to be
quoted and expressed the view that the Bourse should do the same.
Cowley wrote: 'I have tried the Emperor, Walewski and Fould, in order
to get a declaration against the Russian loan, similar to that issued at
the Stock Exchange, made at the Bourse- but they will not bite-
Probably Momy has a large share in the loan', but a week later he
indicated that the step had been taken. (MS Clar dep c134, 506-9,
20.12.55; RA G42/1 and /21, 19 and 20.12.55.)
53 MS Clar dep c134, 474-9, 18.12.55; FO 7/460, no. 20, 24 and 25, 12
and 17.12.55; MS Clar dep c27, 350 and 364-8, 10 and 12.55.
54 FO 7/480, no. 19, 9.1.56; MS Clar dep c46, 17-24, Seymour's covering
letter, 7-9.1.56.
55 MS Clar dep c31, 784-7, 30.12.55; dep c49, 13-14 and 18,7 and 9.1.56.
In the third letter Palmerston pointed out that a preliminary treaty
was not really necessary, especially when operations were ipso facto
suspended by winter. Colloredo confirmed Palmerston's account in a
despatch to Buol (Akten, III, 213-40) and later reported a similar
conversation with Clarendon who refused to accept the claim that the
additional points were a matter of negotiation (ibid., 213-17). Buol was
taken aback by this news and told Hubner that the language of the
English ministry was 'neither loyal nor logical'. (ibid., 222-4, nos. 107,
to Colloredo, and 108, to Hubner, 9.1.56).
56 MS Clar dep c135, 1-12 (to Seymour), 1.1.56. Cf. Schroeder, Crimean
War, 334 ff, whose indictment of Clarendon is, I think, over-severe.
57 MS Clar c46, 17-22, 7.1.56 and 22-5, 9.1.56; FO 7/474, no. 16, 8.1.56;
MS Clar dep c135, 51-5, 8.1.56; FO 7/480, no. 19, 9.1.56.
58 RA G42/92 and 98, Cowley (copies), 8 and 9.1.56. The words quoted
are Cowley's. Cf. Palmerston's cynical views quoted above
(pp. 138-40). The Emperor was, however, easily swayed in his opinions
for a week later the Austrian Minister claimed that he was much
impressed by the argument that the English demands were contrary to
the Memorandum of 14 November. Hubner admitted, nevertheless,
that Louis Napoleon was very loath to embroil himself with England.
(Akten, III, no. 35, to Buol, 17.1.56).
59 FO 519/173, 37-40, 11.1.56.
60 FO 7/480, tel 11.1.56 and nos. 29 and 31, 12.1.56; MS Clar dep c51,
102-22, 13.1.56.
61 LQV, III, 205-7; MS Clar dep c51, 102-22, 13.1.56.
62 LQV, III, 207-9, 15.1.56.
63 Broadlands MS GC/CL/782, 15.1.56.
64 FO 7/480, no. 30, Seymour, 12.1.56; RA G42/142, Cowley (copy),
15.1.56 and G43/8, Clarendon to Cowley (copy), 16.1.56.
65 FO 7/474, nos. 22 and 23. 14 and 15.1.56; MS Clar dep c135, 78-83,
to Seymour, 15.1.56.
66 FO 7/480, Seymour tel, 15.1.56, and nos. 39, 44 and 48, 16.1.56. For
Clarendon's reply see FO 7/474, no. 34, copy of tel, 18.1.56.
A week later, prompted by Palmerston, Clarendon sent Seymour a
rebuke in an official despatch. (SeeMS Clar dep c49, 64, Palmerston,
25.1.56; FO 7/474, no. 52, 25.1.56; MS Clar dep c135, 169-73, 29.1.56.)
Seymour subsequently offered his resignation, which Clarendon brushed
aside. 'The fault is mine', Seymour wrote. 'I never before conversed by
telegraph, and in trying to be terse I became coarse. I must look more
closely to my Telegrams, thank you for the bran new word'. (MS Clar
dep c46, 26-31, 13.2.56.)
67 RA G43/4, Cowley (copy), 15.1.56; FO 27/1108, no. 66, 12.1.56.
Discussing the bad relations between Cowley and Walewski at this time
Greville commented: 'The fact is that Cowley is a gentleman and a man
of honour and veracity, but he is sensitive, touchy and ill tempered;
the other is an adventurer, a needy speculator, without honor,
conscience, or truth, and utterly unfit both as to his character and his
capacity for such an office as he holds.' (Greville Memoirs, VII, 191.)
68 FO 7/480, no. 49, 16.1.56; de Ia Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I,
454; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 500; Broadlands MS, GC/CL/773,
26.12.55. F. A. Simpson (Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France,
1848-56, 346-7) suggests that the Allied failure to take Sebastopol in
1854 was as fatal to Russia as Russia's withdrawal in 1812 had been to
Napoleon. See Schroeder, Crimean War, 331-2, for the attitude of the
German states.
69 Charles-Roux, Alexandre 11, Gortchakoff, et Napoleon Ill, 78.
70 MS Clar dep c49, 30, 17.1.56; LQV, III, 209-11.
71 MS Clar dep c49, 46-9, 23.1.56. The private letters Palmerston and
Clarendon wrote expressing their real beliefs seem to refute Professor
Schroeder's charges of duplicity, although they were both undoubtedly
capable of self-deception.
72 RA G43/32, Clarendon to Queen Victoria, 19.1.56.
73 Ibid., /70, 25.1.56.
74 RA G43/57 and 59, Clarendon, 24.1.56, enclosing a letter from Palmer-
ston, 23.1.56; FO 27/1108, no. 99, Clarendon to Cowley, 18.1.56 (also
FO 519/173, 57-62, 18.1.56 and 75-8, 23.1.56); MS Clar dep c135,
127-9, to Seymour, 22.1.56; FO 7/474, no. 47, Clarendon to Seymour,
24.1.56; FO 7/480, tel 21.1.56, and nos. 53 and 63, 22 and 23.1.56.
75 FO 519/5, 400/5, no. 96, 19.1.56; MS Clar dep c51, 176-85, Cowley
to Seymour (copy), 20.1.56; FO 519/173, 63-70, Clarendon, 21.1.56,
opposing the Bessarabian-Kars proposal; MS Clar dep c49, 34-9,
21.1.56. Clarendon telegraphed Seymour to ignore Cowley's suggestion
(FO 7/474, no. 36, 22.1.56).
76 Add. MS 48579, 101-2, 24.1.56; FO 7/480, nos. 60 and 63, Seymour,
23.1.56; MS Clar dep c135, 169-73, 29.1.56 and FO 7/474, no. 54,
25.1.56, in which Clarendon drew a distinction between the Memor-
andum and the Ultimatum, pointing out that the conditions in the
Ultimatum were 'a minimum and not a maximum'.
77 RA G43/24, 18.1.56. Cf. FO 519/173, 57-62, 18.1.56.
78 FO 519/5,400-5, no. 96, 19.1.56; FO 519/173,55-62, 18.1.56; RA G43/
20 and 39, Clarendon, 18 and 21.1.56; FO 27/1108, no. 125, 23.1.56,
Clarendon summarising Walewski's despatch. See also Akten, III,
266-70, no. 145, re a conversation between Hubner and Louis Napo-
leon, 17.1.56.
79 MS Clar dep c51, 222-37, 25.1.56; FO 519/5, 424-8, no. 140, 25.1.56.
On 16 January Colloredo informed Buol that Persigny had told him
that both the British and French Governments understood that Austria
had informed Russia unofficially about the additional conditions, a point
Buol acknowledged to Colloredo on the 18th, but on the 14th Buol had
instructed V. Esterhazy in St Petersburg to make it understood that the
5th point implied no obligation and accorded the same latitude to all
belligerent powers (Akten, III, 243, 249, 263, nos. 126, 131 and 141).
80 FO 7/480, no. 65, 24.1.56; FO 519/173, 85-8, 25.1.56; RA G43173 and
80, 26.1.56; FO 519/5, no. 160, 29.1.56; FO 27/1109, no. 145, 26.1.56.
The Austrian Government had anticipated that the acceptance of the
Memorandum of 14 November by all the belligerents would be the basis
of the preliminaries of peace (Akten, III, 263, no. 141).
81 FO 519/5, 433-4 and 445, nos. 151 and 166, 27 and 29.1.56; FO 7/474,
no. 62, 30.1.56, authorising Seymour to sign the protocol; FO 7/481,
no. 91, 1.2.56, announcing the signature; FO 519/173, 85-8, 25.1.56,
in which Clarendon refers to the signing of an 'insignificant protocol'
in Vienna.
82 FO 519/5, 423, no. 137, 25.1.56, Cowley re Russian proposal; Maxwell,
Clarendon, II, 114; Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, 144; Greville Memoirs,
VII, 201; Broadlands MS GC/CL, 784 and 785, 19.1.56, Clarendon
opposing Seymour as a negotiator and reporting the Queen's acceptance
of his offer to go.
83 Greville Memoirs, VII, 180, 193, 195-6. Indeed, on 3 February (197)
Greville observed: 'The "Times" has become completely changed, it is
full of moderation. . . .'
Edouard Gourdon, a contemporary French chronicler, expressing a
rather official French point of view, remarks that the attitude of the
English Government inspired lively disquiet among the friends of peace,
that several newspapers wanted a third campaign and that the Cabinet
was thought to be disposed to follow this impulse, but that the sequel
showed that the press did not represent the whole nation. (Histoire du
Congres de Paris, 248-50.)
7. THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE, 1856
1 Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, 143.

2 The Times, 19.1.56.
3 Ab. Cor. 55--60, 148-51, 156-9, from Gladstone, 4.1.56, to Gladstone,
16.1.56, to Herbert, 21.1.56, from Graham, 23.1.56.
4 Hansard, CXL, 1-5, 31.1.56. The speech was silent on domestic affairs
except for the promise of a few minor commercial and legal reforms.
5 Ibid., 67-77. Palmerston had shown a draft of the speech to Clarendon
who had congratulated him but had questioned his assertion that Seba-
stopol had 'been yielded up' when the north side was 'still intact' (Broad-
lands MS GC/CU790, 27.1.56).
6 Hansard, CXL, 77-82.
7 Ibid., 17-39.
8 Ibid., 39-48.
9 MS Clar dep c49, 105 [1.2.56).
10 Schroeder, Crimean War, 351-3; Baumgart, Peace of Paris, 158-64.
See also PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2069, Correspondence Regarding Christian
Privileges in Turkey, 1-83.
11 MS Clar dep c51, 312-65, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9.2.56.

12 Broadlands MS, GC/CL, 794, 3.2.56; FO 519/173, 91-6, 28.1.56; FO
27/1168, 24-33, no. 5, Clarendon to Palmerston, 22.2.56 (these are all
drafts); Cavour e l'lnghilterra:Carteggio con V. E. D'Azeglio, I, 166-8
and 199.
13 Charles-Raux, Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napoleon Ill, 84-8; for the
arrival of the Russians see Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 502-4 and
L. M. Case, French Opinion on War and Diplomacy in the Second
Empire (Philadelphia, 1954), 45-9.
14 Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 502-5.
15 LQV, III, 219-24; Broadlands MS, GC/CU796 and 800, 18 and
22.2.56; FO 27/1168, 1-7, no. 1, 17.2.56.
16 FO 27/1168, 12-21, no. 3, 19.2.56; Broadlands MS GC/CU797,
19.2.56.
17 Broadlands MS GC/CL/798, 20.2.56; MS Clar dep c49, 121-35, 14, 19
and 25.2.56; FO 27/1167. 1-10 and 21-4, nos. 1, 2 and 6, 20, 22 and
26.2.56. The quotation in the text is from 26.2.56.
18 Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 118-19.
19 Broadlands MS GC/CU799, 21.2.56; FO 27/1168, 24-33, no. 5,
22.2.56.
20 FO 27/1168, 51-2, no. 11, 25.2.56, and 58-73, no. 15, 25.2.56. Clar-
endon probably failed to realise how successful Orlov was throughout
the Congress in his private meetings with Louis Napoleon. The Russian
historian E. V. Tarle (Potemkin (ed.), Histoire de Ia diplomatie, I,
456-7) may exaggerate the extent of the Franco-Russian understanding
behind the scenes, which enabled Orlov to know on which points he
could hold out and which ones he should surrender, but it will be
seen that the British Plenipotentiaries were powerless when the French
withdrew their support. Louis Napoleon wanted the best of both worlds
and as a result was to be found acting behind the backs of one or
another of his two friends. It was the Russians, however, who felt
betrayed when he secretly negotiated the Treaty of 15 April 1856 (see
p. 210).
21 Ibid., 53-61, no. 12, 25.2.56.
22 Greville, who was Cowley's guest at the Embassy for several weeks
during the Congress, gives a description of its proceedings, (Memoirs,
VII, 209).
23 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, Protocols of Conferences held at Paris relative
to the General Treaty of Peace. 1856. 3-5, no. 1 (trans.) 25.2.56. The
annexed 'Project of Preliminaries', signed in Vienna, 1.2.56, 7-9,
detailed the Five Points or Guarantees to which Russia agreed as a basis
of a peace treaty. The First Point respecting the Danubian Principalities
specified that 'In exchange for the fortified position and territories
occupied by the Allied armies, Russia consents to a rectification of her
frontier with Turkey in Europe.' This was set out in general terms and
the line was to be 'definitely settled in the Treaty'. Cf. Akten, III,
409-13, no. 234 re Buol's role in obtaining the naval compromise.
24 Broadlands MS, GC/CU804, 25.2.56; see also FO 27/1168, 62-7, nos
13 and 14, 25.2.56, terms of the armistice and Vienna Protocol, and
74-7, no. 16, 26.2.56 re first conference. Clarendon explained in his

letter that he would write a private letter after each meeting, followed
in due course by a despatch. Reports of each meeting (in French) from
Buol and Hubner to their Emperor, supplemented by private letters
from Buol (in German) are to be found in Akten, III.
25 Broadlands MS GC/CU805, 26.2.56; FO 27/1168, 80-94, nos. 18 and
19, 27.2.56. Actually it is clear from Professor Curtiss's account that
Orlov was bluffing and that his instructions permitted him to give way
(Russia's Crimean War, 508). Baumgart asserts that earlier Napoleon
had encouraged Buol to be flexible on the Bessarabian boundary and
that Buol had informed St Petersburg that it was negotiable. Baumgart
criticises Austria for having originally demanded more of Bessarabia
than was necessary to ensure freedom of shipping on the Danube, but
this provided something to compromise on in the negotiations without
serious loss. (Baumgart, Peace of Paris, 108).
26 FO 27/1167, 36-7, 28.2.56. Palmerston told Clarendon that this tele-
gram expressing the Cabinet's views was based almost word for word
on a memorandum of the Queen's (MS Clar dep c49, 142-5, 29.2.56).
27 MS Clar dep c49, 140-1, 28.2.56; Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 116-7.
28 FO 27/1168, 100-8, nos. 22 and 23, 28 and 29.2.56; PP 1856, LXI,
cmd. 2073, 11-14, Protocol no. 2, 28.2.56. Cf. Schroeder, Crimean
War, 35 who claims Britain would have welcomed a rupture. Baumgart
attributes Orlov's withdrawal to a conversation he had with Louis Napo-
leon (Peace of Paris, 112).
29 FO 2711168, 109-14, no. 24, 29.2.56.
30 FO 27/1168, 121-33, no. 28, 2.3.56, Clarendon's official account of the
conference; cf. the official Protocol, no. 3, 1.3.56 (PP 1856, LXI, cmd.
2073, 15-16), which records decisions and points raised, but does not
reveal the sharp arguments that occurred; Broadlands MS GC/CU812,
1.3.56. Professor Curtiss makes it clear that Walewski had already
warned the Russians about the British demands for Circassia and had
made it clear that France would not support them (Russia's Crimean
War, 509).
31 FO 2711167, 40-5, no. 11, 2.3.56; MS Clar dep c49, 148-9, 2.3.56;
Fitzmaurice, Granville, I, 170.
32 FO 27/1168, 134-44, no. 29, 3.3.56. According to Charles-Roux (Alex-
andre 11, Gortchakoff et Napoleon 111, 90-1), who gives no references,
Orlov had appealed to the Emperor at a reception that same evening,
apparently before the latter's meeting with Clarendon, to persuade the
English to give up their demands.
33 Broadlands GC/CU814, 3.3.56.
34 MS Clar dep c49, 150-4, 4 and 5.3.56; FO 27/1167, 55-8, no. 14, 5.3.56.
35 FO 27/1168, 156--62, no. 35, 5.3.56; PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 18-19,
no. 4, 4.3.56. Palmerston accepted the news about Nikolaev as 'perhaps
all that we could reasonably expect' (MS Clar dep c49, 153-4, 5.3.56).
36 Broadlands MS GC/CU816, 5.3.56. See also LQV, III, 229-30.
37 MS Clar dep c49, 155-9, 7.3.56.
38 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 22-3, ProtocolS, 6.3.56; FO 27/1168, 171-5,
no. 39, 7.3.56. Cf. Charles-Roux, Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napo-

Leon III, 92.
39 FO 27/1168, 176-85, no. 40, 7.3.56; MS Clar dep c49, 160-3, 8.3.56.
Palmerston suggested that the Russian tactics of bluster and bullying
might be followed by a retreat to official instructions, failing to notice
the similarity to British tactics in demanding more than they really
expected to get.
40 Greville Memoirs, VII, 213-14; Baumgart, Peace of Paris, 109, Curtiss,
Russia's Crimean War, 512-13; Schroeder, Crimean War, 360.
41 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 26-9, Protocol no. 6; FO 27/1168, 194-201,
no. 45, 9.3.56; Broadlands MS GC/CL/819, 8.3.56; MS Clar dep c49,
164-5, 9.3.56.
42 FO 27/1168, 202--6, no. 46, Clarendon 10.3.56; Charles-Roux, Alex-
andre II, Gortchakoff et Napoleon III, 94; Baumgart, Peace of Paris,
109-110.
43 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 31-2, Protocol 7, 10.3.56; FO 2711168,
217-24, no. 52, 11.3.56; Broadlands MS GC/CL/821, 10.3.56. For a
fuller treatment of the complicated question of the Danubian Principal-
ities, which Cavour and Louis Napoleon, with the moral support of
Palmerston, would have liked to turn to the advantage of Piedmont,
see Baumgart, Peace of Paris, 116-25, and also Cavour e l'lnghilterra,
I, 259-77, 310 and passim.
44 MS Clar dep c49, 166-70, 11.3.56.
45 Ab Cor 1855--60, 159--60, 10 and 11.3.56.
46 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 35-7; FO 2711169, 1-7, no. 56, 13.3.56.
The Committee on the Principalities made a report setting out three
principles: (1) that peace should not be concluded leaving final instruc-
tions in suspense; (2) that the rights of the inhabitants should be
consulted (but it failed to indicate how this was to be done); (3) that
the rights of the suzerain and guaranteeing powers should be respected.
Austria objected to the proposal that Bavaria should be represented on
the Danube Executive Committee and Britain objected to the Austrian
Lloyd Steamship Company retaining its existing monopoly.
47 MS Clar dep 349, 174-7, 11.3.56.
48 MS Clar dep c49, 178-9 and 180-1, 12 and 13.3.56; FO 27/1168,
229-30, no. 55, 12.3.56; FO 27/1167, 82-3, tel copy, 13.3.56. In another
despatch, however, Palmerston thanked Count Orlov for the 'handsome
manner' in which he agreed to arrangements for British war graves in
the Crimea (ibid., 76-7, no. 19, 12.3.56).
49 FO 27/1169, 11-12, 16-24, nos. 58, 60 and 61, 14, 15 and 18.3.56; FO
27/1167, 88-90, no. 23, 17.3.56; Broadlands MS, GC/CL/827-9 and
831, 15, 16, 17 and 19.3.56; MS Clar dep c49, 182-99, 15, 16, 17, 18
and 19.3.56; Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 514. The quotation does
not sound quite like Clarendon, but this may be the translation, or
Orlov may have been paraphrasing. See also Tempc:rley, JMH, IV,
407-8.
50 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 38-87, nos. 9, 10 and 11, 14 and 18.3.56;
Broadlands MS GC/CL/830, 18.3.56; FO 2711169, 13-14 and 30-3,
nos. 59 and 64, 15 and 19.3.56.
51 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 48 and 50-2, nos. 12 and 13, 22 and 24.3.56;
FO 27/1169, 30-3, 53-6, 62-70, 72-3, nos. 64, 69, 72 and 73, 19, 23,
24 and 25.3.56; Broadlands MS GC/CU838, 24.3.56. Indeed, according
to Clarendon, after this incident Buol warned Louis Napoleon about
antagonising his English allies! For a fuller discussion of the question
of Prussian participation see Baumgart, Peace of Paris, 153-8, who
criticises Clarendon for not contesting the way in which Walewski
drafted the invitation and who says that the Prussians did participate
fully;" subsequent sessions without protest from Clarendon.
52 Broadlands MS GC/CU830 and 835, 18 and 22.3.56.
53 FO 27/1169, 34-47, nos. 65 and 66, 19 and 20.3.56; Broadlands MS
GC/CU831, 19.3.56; FO 27/1167, 104-12, no. 27, 21.3.56; for the
original Allied occupation of Greece, see my 'Lessons in Twisting the
Lion's Tail', in Cross and Bothwell, Policy by Other Means, 87-91.
Palmerston's despatch and other communications to and from Clar-
endon regarding Italy are printed in an appendix of Ennio di Nolfi,
Europa e 1talia 1855-1856 (Rome, 1967). See also Cavour e l'Inghilterra,
I, 338-9 and 345-7.
54 FO 27/1169, 68-9, no. 72, 24.3.56.
55 Ibid., 69-70.
56 FO 27/1167, no. 29, 117-32, 24.3.56; MS Clar dep c49, 199-212, 19,
21, 22, 23 and 24.3.56.
57 MS Clar dep c49, 213-18, 25, 26 and 27.3.56; Broadlands MS GC/CU
840, 26.3.56.
58 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 50-2 and 56-61, Protocols 13 and 14, 24 and
25.3.56; Temperley, JMH, IV, 410-11.
59 FO 27/1169,72-117, nos. 73 to 92,25-30.3.56 (quotations, 90 and 102).
PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 50-84, nos. 13 to 19, 24-30.3.56. In
discussing the steps to be taken for the restoration of commerce the
Turks claimed to be freed from all former treaties with Russia. The
Russians were unwilling to admit that all former treaties were abro-
gated, but Britain and France insisted, and agreement was eventually
reached on a less objectionable wording suggested by Clarendon. (FO
27/1169, 143-5, no. 102, 8.4.56.)
60 MS Clar dep c49, 219-22, 28.3.56.
61 Broadlands MS GC/CU844, 29.3.56; FO 27/1167, 156, tel29.3.56; MS
Clar dep c49, 223-4, 29.3.56. Despite Panmure's order for a Monday
morning salute which was opened too late, the guns were fired at 10
pm on Sunday under an order that had been issued by the Duke of
Newcastle that this should be done as soon as news of peace arrived
(MS Clar dep c49, 229-30, 31.3.56).
62 Broadlands MS GC/CU845-6, 30.3.56; FO 27/1169, 119-21, no. 93,
30.3.56.
63 MS Clar dep c49, 225-6, 30.3.56; Broadlands MS GC/CU847, 31.3.56;
LQV, III, 233-4. The Queen offered steps up in the peerage to both
Clarendon and Cowley, but they both declined it, the latter because of
his 'extreme poverty' and Clarendon because he thought courtesy titles
would interfere with his sons earning their livelihood. (FO 27/1169,
125-6, no. 95, 31.3.56; Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 121-3.)
64 The text is printed in PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2072, and in Annual Register
1856, 310-20.
65 The Times, 31.3 and 29 and 30.4.56; Cavour e l'Inghilterra, 404; Bell,
Palmerston, II, 149; MS Clar dep c49, 229-30 and 233-5, 31.3 and
2.4.56.
66 The Times, 29.4.56.
8. FINALE
1 Broadlands MS GC/CU862, 863 and 865, 12, 13 and 15.4.56.

2 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 85 and 88-90, Protocols 20 and 21, 2 and
4.4.56; FO 27/1169, 136-41, no 100, 5.4.56; Broadlands MS GC/CU
853 and 854, 4 and 5.4.56.
4 What follows is based mainly on the very long Protocol no 22, 8.4.56
(PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 97-105), supplemented by Clarendon's
letters to Palmerston of 8, 9 and 11.4.56 (Broadlands MS GC/CU858,
859 and 861). See also Cavour e l'Inglhilterra, I, 436-41 and 444.
5 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 100 (Protocol 22); Broadlands MS GC/CU
856, 6.4.56, a copy of Clarendon's letter with an early draft of the four
principles enclosed with a note of Palmerston's dated 7 April circulating
it to the Cabinet and their individual replies, mostly favourable. Olive
Anderson, ('Some Further Light on the Inner History of the Declaration
of Paris', The Law Quarterly Review, 76, 1960) makes it clear that
Walewski first broached the matter to Clarendon. Cf. Baumgart, Peace
of Paris, 165--6, who presumes that Walewski was the sole author. For
the Declaration of Paris see also H. W. Malkin, 'The Inner History of
the Declaration of Paris', British Year Book of International Law, VIII
(1927); C. I. Hamilton, 'Anglo-French Seapower and the Declaration
of Paris', The International History Review, IV (1982).
6 PP 1856, LXI, cmd. 2073, 100-105 (Protocol22) and 107-12 (Protocols
23 and 24, 14 and 16.4.56). For the text of the Declaration as approved
see ibid., cmd. 2074.
7 Broadlands MS GC/CU859, 9.4.56.
8 Ibid., 847, 862 and 865, 31.3 and 12 and 15.4.56; MS Clar dep c49,
231-5 and 256-9, 1, 2, 11 and 12.4.56; W. E. Mosse, 'The Triple Treaty
of 15 April1856', EHR, LXVII (1952), 203-29 gives the fullest account
of the Treaty; see also Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 524-5, and
Charles-Roux, Alexandre II, Gortchakoff et Napoleon III, 105-8, who
stresses the extent of the Franco-Russian rapprochement despite the
set-back of the Triple Treaty.
10 For fuller consideration of the implementation of the Peace Treaty and
of the Triple Treaty of Guarantee see Temperley, 'The Treaty of Paris
of 1856 and its Execution', Part II, JMH, IV (1932), 523-43, and Mosse,
'The Triple Treaty of 15 April1856', EHR, LXVII (1952), 216-29. On
hearing of the Russian destruction of the fortifications of Kars and
Ishmael (in Bessarabia) at the end of May, Palmerston, in a burst of

indignation proposed to 'blow up Kinburn, Kertch and Eupatoria'
before handing them back to the Russians (MS Clar dep c49, 331 and
354, 31.5 and 4.6.56).
11 See Broadlands MS GC/CL/792, 833, 874 and 879-83, 30.1.56, 21.3,
15 and 17.5 and 4, 5, 8 and 10.6.56; PP 1856, LX, cmd. 2080, Papers
Relative to Recruiting in the United States, 167, 173-8 and 260-6, nos.
60, 72 and 84, 8.2, 3.3 and 30.4.56.
12 PP 1856, LX, cmd. 2108, Further Papers Relative to Recruiting in the
United States, 1-9. Up to 11 June Palmerston was privately denouncing
the tactics of the Americans, who, he told Clarendon, sought to make
out that he was 'positively hostile to the United States' in order to push
him into doing something foolish in order to disprove the assumption.
'This is just the same principle', he added, 'on which a man reproaches
a woman for being cold, when he sees her passions are on the point of
breaking loose.' (MS Clar dep c49, 375-7, 11.6.55.) Presumably he
spoke from experience.
13 Hansard, 142, 1472-4, 1499-1513 and 1660; PRO 30/22/13B, 126-7,
15.6.56; PP 1856, LX, cmd. 2108, 55-7, no 9, 26.6.56; R. W. van
Alstyne, 'British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850-60',
JMH, XI (1939), 178.
14 The debate is reported in Hansard, 141, 1947-2024, 2037-2114 and 142,
17-136 and more briefly in The Annual Register, 1856, 42-54.
15 Some of Palmerston's information sounded as if it was based on a long
letter Newcastle had written to Clarendon following his visit to Circassia
the previous autumn (MS Clar dep c42, 103-8 and 124-35, 3.11 and
19.12.55).
16 On 5 May Clarendon sent Palmerston a note indicating he intended to
say something that evening 'in favor of the manner in which the Russian
PPs conducted themselves at the Congress and of the good faith of
the Emperor of Russia; ... we want a little soft sawder for the re-
establishment of relations,' he went on. 'If you would say the same it
would be far more important than my doing it because you are
considered hostile to Russia.' (Broadlands MS GC/CL/869, 5.5.56.)
17 Hansard, 141, 1947-2029; Annual Register 1856, 32-42.
18 Annual Register 1856, 54.
19 Hansard, 142, 182-205.
20 Ibid., 216-37. Palmerston's figure of 110,000 presumably includes Medi-
terranean garrisons and reinforcements as well as the army in the
Crimea. He put total Russian losses at 500,000 men.
21 Annual Register 1856, 'Chronicle', 115-16; Hansard, 141, 1468, 1540
and 1707; BL Add. MS 43759, 103-5, 7 and 8.5.56.
22 See Temperley, JMH, IV, 396, but Curtiss, Russia's Crimean War, 522
claims the negotiation would have collapsed; see also Greville Memoirs,
VII, 217 for Cowley's views.
23 Baumgart, Peace of Paris, 163.
24 See Temperley, JMH, IV, 397-400.
25 C. R. Dod, The Parliamentary Companion for 1856. Oddly Sir J.
Hanmer, one of the few listed as a Liberal is also shown as a member
of the Carlton. Graham is listed as 'now inclining again towards the

Liberal party'. It may be assumed that in most cases Dod's entries are
only revised on the instruction of the individual concerned, and are apt
to be out of date.
For Gladstone's views on the party situation and his flirtation with
the Conservatives in the spring of 1856 (which are outside the scope of
this book) see Gladstone, Autobiographical Memoranda 1845-1866,
195-207.
26 Martineau, Newcastle, 256-7.
27 Divisions 1854-5 and Divisions 1856.
28 Quarterly Review, XCIX (Sept. 1856), 558. For an unflattering but
thoroughly researched view of Gladstone in these years see the first
volume of R. T. Shannon's Gladstone (1982).
29 MS Clar dep c31, 500-1, 20.9.55.
30 RA A24/167, 7.6.55. On another occasion Palmerston sent the Queen
a letter he had received from Lady Clanricarde evidently making charges
against her husband, to which the Queen replied: 'It has been with her
an invariable rule never to take upon herself the office of sitting in
judgement upon accusations or reports against private character'.
Palmerston no doubt highly approved of this opinion and may have let
it influence him when he made the questionable appointment of Lord
Clanricarde to the Cabinet three years later. RA A24/47, Queen
Victoria to Palmerston, 25.4.55.
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5. THESIS
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Index
Aberdeen, 4th earl, collapse of his government, 1, 3, 76, 79, 224;
resignation, 3; presses Peelites to join Palmerston, 8-9; praised by
Granville, 11-12; favours Russell as envoy to Vienna, 14; laments
resignation of Peelites, 20; informed of Vienna proposals and approves,
42 and n.39; on Russell's 'extraordinary declaration', 60; and the
Sebastopol Committee Report, 67-9, 72; urges Newcastle to attend
debate, 67, 88-9; on peace coalition, 136; critical of proposed peace
terms, 177; welcomes Clarendon's news of peace, 194; on treaty of peace,
216-18; Palmerston compared with, 224-8; and also: 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 22,
24,27, 31, 51,59,60, 76, 79,83,90, 127,162,221,222,224,229
Abdul Medjid, Sultan, issues Hatti Humayun on treatment of non-
Musselman subjects, 179, 200, 216, 218
administrative reform, 75-6
Adrianople, Treaty of, 131
Airey, Gen. Sir Richard, criticised by Panmure, 15; replacement
recommended, 83-4, 87; Raglan's confidence in, 85; ministers continue
to lack confidence in, 87-8; defended by Calthorpe, 242 n.15; and
Hibbert, 242 n.21; and also, 90, 247 n.62
Aland Islands, 148-9, 160, 171-2, 180, 185-7, 200, 220
Albert, Prince, attempts to persuade Gladstone, 19; attends London war
council, 98; visits Paris, 112; recommends creation of two corps, 121;
critical of Simpson, 122; army statistics, 127; quoted by King of Sardinia,
159; on danger of breaking with France, 170, 173; drafts Queen's letter,
251 n.35; continental military views, 227; his influence on Victoria, 228;
and also 3, 5, 27, 100, 138
Alexander II, Czar, 30, 140, 169, 209, 211, 216
Ali Pasha, attends Vienna Conference, 35; and Paris Peace Congress, 180,
186, 187, 193, 194
Allied forces, statistics, 90-1 and n.22, 102 and n.48, 110 and n.14, 114
and n.24, 115 and n.31, 116, 127; campaign plans, 98, 129; withdrawal of
troops proposed, 123-6
Alma, battle of, 117, 184
Aloushta, 98-9
Amery, L. S., 18
Amur river, 131
Anapa, 100
Argyll, 8th duke of, refuses to join Russell, 5; joins Palmerston ministry,
8; opposed to Roebuck committee, 16; does not resign, 19; despondent,
47; opposes Grey motion, 49; identified with peace party, 60, 175;
favours Colin Campbell, 120; and also, 23, 129
aristocracy, attacked by Layard, 17-18, 75-6; and The Times, 127-8
Armenia, 131-3
armistice, 164, 183, 197, 200, 207
Index 271
army, British, early reverses, 2; staff problems, 15, 83-8; reform measures,
80-2; problems of command, reinforcements and planning, 83-96;
operations April-June 1855, 96-104; further problems of command,
105-9; reinforcements, ill-trained, 110--11; pay increase for Crimean
soldiers, 104, 109; criticism of Army Work Corps, 109, 115; problem of
reinforcements, 110-11; formation of a sixth division, 111; continuation
of siege to fall of Sebastopol, 111-17; failure to follow up victory, 117-19;
Simpson's resignation, 119-20; appointment of Codrington, 120-1;
divided into two corps, 121; The Times criticism of, 122, 127; capture
of Kinburn, 123; proposed troop withdrawal, 123-6; in good shape in
second winter, 126-7; plan for another campaign, 227-9; evacuation of
troops, 207, 211; vote of thanks, 218-19; British military strength
exaggerated, 222-3; British view of different from Continental, 227; see
also Codrington, Crimea, Panmure, Raglan, Simpson, etc.; for foreign
armies see Austria, France, Russia, Sardinia, Turkey, etc.
artillery, discipline and patronage put under C-in-C, 81; powerful batteries
constructed, 84; failure to erect batteries to fire on North Side, 118;
troop sent to Eupatoria, 123
Asia Minor, 129, 131-3
Austria, initial peace proposals, 13, 29-30; Vienna Conference, 30-48;
proposals rejected, 46-8; possibility of further proposals, 49; Russell's
support of her proposals revealed, 57-8; uncomplimentary wording
towards deleted from despatches, 235 n.24; the Austrian ultimatum,
138-61; Russian acceptance of ultimatum and British reservations,
162-75; impressed by fall of Kinburn, 143; terms of ultimatum, 145-6
and n.19; Russian revisions refused, 166-7; Russian acceptance, 169;
impasse with Britain, 167-72; defended by Clarendon, 178-9; and the
Triple Treaty of Guarantee, 210; see also, Buol, Paris Peace Congress,
Vienna Conference, etc.
Azeglio, V. E. d', Sardinian minister, 205
Azov, Sea of, 96, 98, 100-1, 148-50, 191, 220
Baidar Valley, 123

Baines, Edward, 137
Baines, M. T., 26, 137
Baktchi Sara, 99
Balaclava, 79, 82, 113, 114, 119, 187
Balaclava railway, 84, 90, 114
Balkans, 36
Ball, E., 233 n.47
Baltic Sea, 130, 169, 170, 183
Baring, Sir Francis, 25-6
Batoum, 131, 216
Bavaria, 141,159,191,197,204
Bedford, 7th duke of, 64-5, 149
Belbeck river, 113
Berlin, 31, 160
Bessarabia, Russia to surrender part of, 145; proposed return of Kars
instead, 166; Cowley proposes Kars-Bessarabian exchange, 166-7; Britain
272 Index
Bessarabia-continued
opposed to exchange, 180-3; danger of rupture over, 184-8; Palmerston
on possibility of some concession, 190-1; compromise proposed, 192-3;
and accepted, 196; extent of transfer defined, 204; boundary commission
to meet, 207; boundary disputes, 211-12
Beust, Count, 141
Black Sea, curtailment of Russian preponderance on, 13, 29-30, 33, 45,
56; number of Russian ships in, 34-7; French neutralisation proposal,
36-40 and nn.33 and 38; proposed admission of British and French
warships, 38 and 236 n.33; Austrian proposal for, 48 and n.53; Russian
refusal of Allied proposals, 48, 53; Newcastle's visit to, 76, 114-15, 117;
neutralisation of, 141, 145, 148, 153, 156, 190; Convention, 194--6, 201,
204-5; disposition of East coast of, 148, 172, 186-7, 189, 193, 195;
return of British warships to, 211; and also, 81, 129, 131, 160, 170,
215, 217, 218, 220, 252 n.51; see also Circassia.
blockade, 130, 184, 187, 207, 209
Board of General Officers, 82
Bolgrad, 193, 211
Bomarsund, 148
Bosphorus straits, 82, 127
Boulogne, 91
Bourqueney, baron, French ambassador in Vienna, 32--6, 141, 144, 147,
153, 160, 180
Bourse, the French stock exchange, 156, 161, 169, 182, 252 n.52
Bouverie, E. P., 27, 61 and n.13
Bright, John, 'angel of death' speech, 21; on Sebastopol Committee
Report, 72-3; alleged peace coalition, 136, 138; and also 48, 50, 55,
56, 60, 72, 228
Britain, agrees to discuss peace proposals, 13, 29-30; greater naval
resources, 81; treaty with Sweden, 169; impossible to continue war alone,
170; danger of split with France, 185; degree of success in peace
negotiations, 220-1; see also army, Clarendon, Crimea, Paris Peace
Congress, Palmerston, Vienna Conference
Brooks's Club, 14, 17, 20, 24, 25, 26, 60
Broughton, 1st baron, diary comments, 58, 62, 89 and passim
Brown, Gen. Sir George, 100, 103, 121
Brunnow, baron, 180-2, 184, 187, 194
Buchanan, James, 135
Bug river, 190
Bulgaria, 81
Bulgarian colony in Bessarabia, 193
Bulwer-Lytton, Sir Edward (later 1st earl), 60, 63-4, 75--6 and n.52
Buol, Count, host of Vienna Conference, 32-42 and n.11, n.27 and n.33;
provides text of Austrian proposals, 46; Cabinet agrees to reject his
proposals, 49; his circular about Russell, 57; Russell's promise of support
to, 61; peace proposals to Bourqueney, 141-2; Austrian ultimatum and
memorandum of 14 November, 145--6; British modifications, 154, 156-7,
160; anxious for secrecy, 161; fails to inform Russia of British conditions,
163-4, 168; queries British assent to memorandum, 164; misinformed
Index 273
by Seymour, 164-5; refuses Russian revisions, 167; regrets British

reservations, 168; refuses to inform Russians of special conditions, 171-2;
at Paris Peace Congress, 180, 184, 192, 193-4, 256-7 n.25 and n.26; and
Triple Treaty of Guarantee, 210; and also 150, 153, 155, 162, 164, 234
n.ll, 237 n.51
Burghersh, Lord, 97
Burgoyne, Gen. Sir John, 81, 98
Cabinet, coalition reorganised by Palmerston, 7-12; approves appointment

of Crimean commissions, 15; discusses Roebuck committee motion,
16-17, 19; resignation of three Pee lite ministers, 20; new appointments,
24--6; its weaknesses, 27-8; critical of Russell's proposals, 40-1; divided
on modified Vienna proposals, 42-3; abandons the proposals, 44; peace
party weak, 47, 175; opposed to further negotiations, 45, 57; agrees to
reject Buol proposals, 49; Russell's failure to resign from, 57--61; junior
ministers force his resignation, 60-1; Russell attests to its unanimity
against Vienna proposals and explains his position in it to Commons,
61-2; concurs in Clarendon's despatch to Austria, 62; charged with
lack of meetings, 69, 72; to discuss proposal from Napoleon III, 91;
crisis over threatened resignation of Panmure, 104; appointment of
Codrington, 144; new appointments, 137; discusses Austrian ultimatum,
147-8; Queen's warning to, 158; confidentiality, 161; Clarendon's request
for instructions, 185; Granville reports a row in, 188; to see text of
treaty, 195, 199; final meeting on treaty text, 200; first draft of
Declaration of Paris, 260 n.5; accepts dismissal of Crampton, 213;
entertained at Mansion House, 219
Calthorpe, Somerset, Lt. (later Col.), 99, 242 n.15
Cambridge, 2nd duke of, 107, 120, 247 n.62
Campbell, Lt. Gen. Sir Colin, 120, 121
Canada, 234
Canning, viscount, 16, 19, 23, 24, 137, 176
Canrobert, Gen., 83-4, 91, 93, 95, 96, 98-100, 180
Cardwell, Edward, in Palmers ton ministry, 9; resigns office, 20; refuses
Exchequer, 20, 24; speaks 23 times, 240 n.48 and also 48, 55, 74, 76,
214-15
Carlisle, 7th earl, 25--6
Carlton Club, 225
Caspian Sea, 216
casualties, from winter, 79; 22-3 May, 100; 6-7 June, 101; 17-18 June,
102 and n.48; continue through summer, 112; Russian, 115; final
battles, 116
Cavour, Camillo, count, 158-9, 180, 205, 208, 258 n.43
Cecil, Lord Robert, 70, 228
Central America, 134
Chatham, 1st earl of, 90, 109
Chersonese peninsula, 124
Chief of Staff, office created, 81
cholera, kills Raglan and Estcourt, 103; continues in camp, 112
Chotyn, 145
274 Index
Churchill, Winston, 90, 109

Circassia, Circassians, 100, 172, 215-17; see also Black Sea
civil service reform, 75-6
Clanricarde, Lord and Lady, 262 n.30
Clarendon, 4th earl of, objections to Derby, 4; refuses to join Russell, 6;
accepts Foreign Office from Palmerston, 8; objected to by Derby, 12;
suspects Austria, 13 and passim; proposes Russell as peace envoy, 13-14;
attacked by Layard, 17; regrets departure of Peelites, 20; and Cabinet
reconstruction, 24-6; refuses to take Peel, 27; differences with Russell,
32, 34, 37, 39-43; moods oscillate, 32; Colloredo finds him hostile, 33;
antagonises Russell, 36 and n.21; instruction on neutralisation, 36-7;
sensitive to public opinion, 41, 43, 47, 162-3, 174-5; informs Cowley
of divisions on Vienna proposals, 42-3; sends Aberdeen copy of
proposals, 42; misleads Russell, 46; anxious to avoid rupture with
Austria or with France, 47; on proposed Franco-Austrian convention,
234 n.8; frequent correspondence with Cowley, 236 n.37; attempts to
tone down published despatches, 60; and Russell resignation, 60-1; calls
on Austria to honour Treaty of 2 December, 62; critical of Peelites,
76; meets Napoleon III at Boulogne, 91-3; attitude on war and peace
puzzling, 94-5; critical of French operations, 97; attends London war
council, 98; critical of Napoleon III's interference in Crimea, 101-2; low
opinion of Simpson, 106, 119, 121-2; his increasing pessimism, 111-12;
on royal visit to Paris, 112; on failure to follow up Sebastopol victory,
117-18; on proposed troop withdrawal from Crimea, 125; depressed by
army's lack of transport, 128; and Anglo-American enlistment crisis,
134-5, 212-13; unconvinced by Delane, 137; confidence in Napoleon
III, 138; regrets his pressing Polish question, 140; his reservations re
Austrian proposals, 142-4, 147-8, 149-50, 152, 154, 155; and
Palmerston's letter, 151 and n.30; conditional acceptance of Austrian
ultimatum, 156-7; continued difficulties with Walewski, 156, 158; mixed
feelings re ultimatum, 162-3; reservations re Memorandum of 14
November, 164-6; requests Buol to inform Russia of British conditions,
157, 165; doubts army capable of carrying on alone, 167; exasperation,
170; insists on Fifth Point, 171-2; to attend Peace Congress, 174 and
n.82; wants to impose stiff terms on Russia, 175; rebuts Derby's criticism
of Queen's Speech, 178; pre-conference conversation with Napoleon
III, 181-2; conversation with Brunnow, 182; provoked by Palmerston,
183, 186; who rejects his advice on Bessarabian frontier, 185-6; further
conversations with Napoleon III, 186, 188-9, 191-2, 197, 198-9, 207,
208, 210; argues for Bessarabia, Kars and Circassia, 186-8; to
Palmerston on their isolated position, 189-90; accepts Orlov's assurances
on rivers emptying into Black Sea, 190-1; pessimistic letter, 191; given
assurances on Allied war graves, 193; reports progress to Aberdeen,
194; complimentary to Orlov and Napoleon III, 194; alleged to have
apologised to Orlov, 196 and n.49; conversation with Manteuffell, 197
and n.51; cross with Walewski, 198; and the Italian question, 198; thinks
Emperor over-anxious for peace, 199; little sympathy for Poles, 200;
most of Cabinet modifications accepted, 200; decision to sign on
Sunday, 201; his satisfaction, 202; offered promotion in peerage, 259
Index 275
n.63; discusses Italy, Russia, Poland and free trade, 207-9; supports
Declaration of Paris and principle of mediation, 208-9; on Belgian press,
208; and Triple Treaty of Guarantee, 210; final conversation with Orlov,
211; defends peace treaty, 217; honoured at Mansion House, 219; change
in attitude understandable, 222; exaggerates power of public opinion,
222; relationship with Palmerston, 223-4; Sebastopol never fully yielded,
255 n.5; declines promotion in peerage, 259 n.63; see also 31, 49, 58,
121, 124, 131, 168, 256 n.39, 247 n.62, 255 n.5, 259 n.63
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 134
Cobden, Richard, 20, 50, 55, 58, 60, 76, 136, 138
Coburg, Prince of, 141
Cockburn, Sir Alexander (Attorney General), 60, 72, 73
Codrington, Gen. Sir William, considered for command, 107; named
successor to Simpson, 108; appointment of delayed, 120-1; considers
army unfit to move, 128; and also 112, 129, 223, 247 n.58
Colloredo, Count, 33, 37, 164, 168, 254 n.79
Colonial Office, 8, 24, 65, 137
Colquhon, consul, 251 n.37
Commissariat commission appointed, 81; its report, 82
Conservatives, number of, 2, 54 and n.68; upset by postponement of debate
on Vienna papers, 49; divisions among, 50, 55; differences on Sebastopol
Report, 68, 74; no return of Peelites to, 8, 224; Gladstone critical of,
226
Constantinople, conference on Points One and Four, 179, 200, 205; and
also 218
Consuls, admission of to Black Sea ports, 38, 156, 191, 221
Contemporary, The, 115
Council of War, in London, 98; in Paris, 126, 129
Counterpoise proposals, 33-4, 35, 37
Cowley, 1st earl, informed of Cabinet divisions, 42, 43, 55; persuades
Emperor to abandon Austrian proposals, 44-5; critical of Russell and
Drouyn, 44; considers French amoral, 47, 237 n.51; on French threat of
Crimean withdrawal, 123-6; influence with Emperor, 138; discusses
Buol proposals with Bourqueney and Emperor, 141; his dislike of Buol
proposals, 142, 146; warns of consequences of troop withdrawal, 143;
out of favour, 144; shown Austrian ultimatum and Buoi-Buorqueney
Memorandum, 144-6; dislike of Austrian proposals and differences
with Walewski, 149, 154-8, 168 and n.67; suggests Kars-Bessarabian
exchange, 166-7, 171; second British Plenipotentiary at Paris Peace
Congress, 179, 184; proposes a mixed commission, 187; offered
promotion in peerage, 259 n.63; defends Treaty in Lords, 218; and
also 98, 171, 181, 187, 191, 222
Crampton, J. F. T., British minister in Washington, 134-5, 212-13
Cranworth, 1st baron, 6, 16
Crimea, Crimean war, Napoleon III's plan of campaign, 38; weakness of
Allied generals, 42, 43; his desire to take command in, 31, 91-3;
Sebastopol Committee Report on, 66-75; Palmerston, Panmure and the
Crimean commissions, 79-82; problems of command, reinforcements
and planning, 83-96; telegraph to, 90; Allied armies in Crimea, 90-1;
276 Index
Crimea-continued
lack of a plan, 91; Raglan warns Russell and criticises invasion decision,
93-4; Clarendon apprehensive, 94-5; new plan of campaign, 98-100;
continuation of siege to fall of Sebastopol, 111-17; conclusion of
operations and second winter, 117-30; and also 40, 51
Cronstadt, 130, 137, 183
Crossley, F., 55
Curtiss, Professor J. S., 196 and n.49
Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 209
Dallas, George, 205, 212

Danube river, free navigation of, 13, 32, 145, 191, 192, 194 and n.46, 196,
197, 211-12, 215, 221, 257 n.25
Danzig, 235 n.19
Davies, J. L., 55
Declaration of Paris, 208-9 and n.5, 215, 218
Delane, J. T., editor of The Times, 65-6, 121, 137
Denison, Evelyn, 214
Derby, 14th earl of, number of followers, 2; attempts to form a
government, 3-4, 136; explains his failure, 12; opposes Grey motion,
49; calls party meeting, 50; analysis of vote, 54; advises withdrawal of
Bulwer-Lytton motion, 61; and Sebastopol Committee Report, 68;
supports Ellenborough motion, 88; critical of Disraeli's peace views,
136-7; critical of 1856 Queen's Speech, 177-8; critical of peace treaty,
217; and also 83, 213, 219, 237 n.55
Disraeli, Benjamin, attacks Palmerston, 15, 21; denounces Herbert and
Gladstone, 49; proposes resolutions, 50; threatens resignation of
leadership, 51; debate on his resolutions, 51-6 and nn.72 and 75; attacks
Russell, 59; supports Bulwer-Lytton motion, 60; and the Sebastopol
Committee Report, 33, 70, 74; inclines to peace, 136-7; reports Austrian
proposals to Derby, 137; and also 48, 61, 64, 240 n.52
Dnieper river, 123, 191
Drouyn de Lhuys, French Foreign minister, visits London, 36; envoy in
Vienna, 37-41; proposals criticised by Clarendon, 41; and considered by
Cabinet, 41-3; and challenged by Cowley, 44-5; resignation of, 45-6;
and also, 48, 62, 235 nn.26 and 29, 236 nn.23 and 38
Drummond, (H.), 39
Dundas, Adm. Sir James M., 131 and n.66
Dundas, Adm. Sir Richard, 130-1 and 247 n.62
Elcho, Lord, 55
Elgin, 8th earl, 25
Ellenborough, 1st earl, 3, 54, 83, 88-9
Ellesmere, 1st earl, 217
Ellice, Edward, 136
Elliot, Henry, 141, 144, 153
Engineers, Royal, discipline and patronage put under C-in-C, 81; Crimean
history of, 245 n.31
England, see Britain
Index 277
Erzeroum, 131-2
Estcourt, Gen. James, Adjutant General in Crimea, replacement
recommended, 83; Raglan's confidence in, 84-5; ministers' continued
lack of confidence in, 87-8; dies of cholera, 103; defended by Calthorpe,
242 n.15
Esterhazy, Count Valentin, 159, 160, 254-5 n.79
Eugenie, Empress, 97
Eupatoria, 91, 98, 99, 102, 103, 111, 113-14, 118, 119, 123, 124, 129, 187,
244 n.17, 260-1 n.10
Evans, Gen. Sir George de Lacy, 69, 73, 74
Eyre, Lt. Gen. Sir William, 121
Fergusson, Lt. Gen. Sir James, 107

Filder, Commissary-General James, 82, 87-90
Flagstaff bastion, 91, 96
Finland, 129, 130
Foreign Enlistment Act, 111, 134
foreign legionaires (mercenaries), 91, 110-11, 127
Four Points, bases of Austrian peace proposal, 13, 30, 31, 34, 59, 141; see
also Austrian ultimatum, 138-61
France, French government, agrees to discuss peace proposals, 13, 29-30;
sends foreign minister to Vienna, 36; importance of maintaining alliance
with, 47; greater military resources of, 81, 91, 98-9; reports of distress
and anti-war feeling in, 124; public opinion against war, 143; her
authority in Europe, 155; treaty with Sweden, 169; welcomes peace
conference, 169, 170; unable to continue war, 173; to inform Russia
of special conditions through Seebach, 173; danger of split with Britain,
185-6, 189-90, 192; sides with Russia, 193; Franco-Russian
rapprochement set back by Triple Treaty, 210; see also Crimea, French
army, Napoleon III, Paris Peace Congress, Vienna Conference,
Walewski, etc.
Francis Joseph, Austrian Emperor, 40, 141; see also Austria
Fredericksham, 130
free trade, 208
French army, February attack repulsed, 84; arriviste generals, 90; larger
than British, 81, 91; takes up positions on British right flank, 91;
Napoleon III proposes to lead, 91-3; Raglan's opinion of, 93; intentions
uncertain, 94; generals blame British, 94; superior 'equipage' of, 97;
waiting for reinfurcements, 97; role in new war plan, 98-9; participates
in Kertch expedition, 98-100; captures Tchorgoun and Mamelon, 101;
repulsed at Malakoff, 102; its size, 110; progress towards Malakoff, 112,
115; battle of Tchernaya, 116; final assault on Sebastopol, 116-17;
reconnaisances in Baidar valley and from Eupatoria, 123; joint
expedition to Kinburn, 123; crippled by disease, 126, 191-2; and also
72, 118; see also Canrobert, Pelissier
Georgia, 119, 131, 142, 148 and n.24, 152, 172, 215, 223
Germany, recruiting in, 110
278 Index
Gibson, Milner, notice of motion, 48; its withdrawal, 49; questions

Russell's retention of office, 57-8; and also 55, 71
Gladstone, W. E., refuses office, 3-8; joins Palmerston, 8; recommends
Cardwell, 9-10; opposes Roebuck committee, 16-19; resignation speech,
20-21; his replacement, 25; on weakness of Palmerston ministry, 27;
attitude to Gibson motion, 48-9; opposes Disraeli's motion of 24 May,
50-6; on Vienna Conference, 64; on Sebastopol Committee Report,
67-9; 74-5; further criticism of the Government, 75-7, and nn.48 and
52; alleged peace coalition, 136, 140; on peace treaty, 215; attitude to
Liberal party, 224-6; his 'Declining Efficiency of Parliament' in
Quarterly Review, 226 and n.28; Gladstonian Liberalism, 229; and also
12, 61, 176, 240 nn.48 and 52
Glenelg, baron, 217
Gortchakov, Prince Alexander, Russian ambassador at Vienna, 32-9, 46,
48, 141 and n.10, 171
Gortchakov, Prince M.D., Russian C-in-C at Sebastopol, 114, 116
Gourdon, Edouard, 255 n.83
Graham, Sir James, in Aberdeen coalition, 1; refuses Russell, 5-6;
reluctantly joins Palmerston, 8; opposed to Roebuck Committee, 16,
19; attacked by Layard, 17; resignation speech, 20; and Gibson motion,
48; attends Liberal party meeting, 50; supports Baring, 54; opposes
Lowe, 55; and Sebastopol Committee Report, 74; speaks 19 times, 240
n.48; and also 76, 176, 224, 240 n.52
Granville, 2nd earl, joins Palmerston, 8; on Whig hostility to Peelites, 10;
proposes dissolution, 16; supports Vienna proposals, 43; opposes Grey
motion, 49; considered pro-peace, 60; says peace well received, 205;
opinion of Peelites, 225; and also 12, 23, 26, 176
Greece, 198, 208
Greville, Charles, on Derby and Newcastle, 4; on temper of the House,
14, 16, 18-19; on Palmerston as PM, 28; on Russell's statement, 64; on
Sebastopol Committee Report, 66; on attitude of press, 175; Cowley's
guest in Paris, 192; comparing Cowley and Walewski, 254 n.67; and
also 24, 26, 149, 161
Grey, 3rd earl, 9, 25, 49, 63, 218
Grey, Sir George, refuses Russell, 6; joins Palmerston, 8; temporarily
responsible for Colonial Office, 24; considered pro-peace, 60, 175; and
also 11, 16
Greytown, 134, 212
Hall, Sir Benjamin, 65

Hall, Dr John, 68, 90
Hardinge, 1st viscount, 66, 98, 107
Harrowby, 2nd earl, 25
Heathcote, Sir William, 50, 52-3, 55
Henderson, Gavin, 29, 34
Herbert, H., 214
Herbert, Sidney, in Aberdeen coalition, 1; refuses Derby, 3-4; refuses
Russell, 5; joins Palmerston, 8; better qualified than Panmure, 10; opposes
Roebuck Committee, 16-19; resignation speech, 20; secures withdrawal
Index 279
of Gibson motion, 48-9; attends Liberal party meeting, 50; supports

Baring, 54; opposes Lowe, 55; on Sebastopol Committee Report, 68-9,
73; speaks 19 times, 240 n.48; offered Colonial Office, 137; and also 12,
15, 64, 76, 176, 214-15, 226
Home Office, 8
Hospital Commission Report, 81-2
hospital ship(s), 81
hospitals, 81-2
House of Commons, see Parliament
Howe, Joseph, 134
Hubner, baron, 44, 144, 180, 253 n.58
Hungary, 57
Imeritia, see Circassia
India, 129, 137, 215, 251 n.24
India Office, 9
Indian army officers, 17, 88
Inkerman Heights or Ridge, 91, 97, 102; battle of, 107, 120
Irish Independents (Brigade), 2, 54
Ishmael fortress, 211
Italy, Italian question, 110, 179, 198-9, 208; see also Sardinia
Joliffe, W. G. H., 54, 136

Jones, Gen. H. D. (KCB 1856), chief Engineering Officer, 81, 84, 105,
118, 247 n.62
Kaffa, 118
Kamchatka peninsula, 131
Kamiesch, 124
Kars, 119, 131-3, 140, 166, 171-2, 178, 183, 185-8, 211, 214, 217, 220
Kertch, 98-101, 124, 187, 260-1 n.10
Kertchine peninsula, 100
Kherson, 123, 191, 220
Kinburn, 123, 124, 140, 143, 187,260-1 n.lO
Kornilov, Adm., 114
Kuban river, 187-8, 215
Kutais, 132-3
La Mamora, Gen., Sardinian commander, 114
Labouchere, Henry, 26, 137
Land Transport Corps, 73, 81, 84, 96, 114-15
Lansdowne, 3rd marquis, consulted by Queen, 4-5; refuses Russell, 6;
account of ministerial crisis, 12; favours Russell as peace envoy, 13;
letter to Russell, 34; visits Paris, 125; and also 16, 23, 147, 195
Layard, A. H., attack on government and aristocracy, 17-18; member of
Roebuck Committee, 233 n.47; notice of motion, 48; withdrawn in
favour of Disraeli, 50-1; supports Lowe, 53; administrative reform,
75-6; and also 51, 52
Leeds Mercury, 137
Le Marchant, Sir Denis, 27-8, 58, 59
280 Index
Le Marchant, Sir John Gaspard, 134

Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, replaces Gladstone, 25; considered pro-
peace, 60, 175; critical of colleagues, 148; and also 28, 65, 233 n.47
Lewis, Sir Thomas Frankland, 25
Liberals, Liberal party, number of, 2, 54; anti-Peelite feeling among, 9,
11; some support Russell, 10; three different forces, 23, 26; some plan
amendment to Disraeli motion, 50; some want Russell's resignation,
60-1; relationship with Peelites, 224-6; Palmerston as leader of, 226;
final fusion of Peelites with, 229; see also Whigs
Limitation plan, 33-9, 57; see also chs 6 and 7
Lindsay, Col. J. 233 n.47
Louis Philippe, King, 97, 138
Lovisa, 130
Lowe, Robert, 21, 26, 53, 54-6, 66 and n.25, 75
Lyons, Adm. Sir Edmund, C-in-C Black Sea, 111, 119, 174, 244 n.9, 247
n.62
Lyttelton, 4th baron, 49
Mackenzie Heights, 98, 99, 102, 113
McMurdo, Col., see Land Transport Corps
McNeil, Sir John, Crimean Commissioner, 81-2
Malakoff, 91, 95, 101-2, 111-12
Malins, R., 11
Malmesbury, 3rd earl, 22, 49, 217
Malta, 127
Mamelon, 91, 94, 96, 101
manpower, see reinforcements
Manteuffell, Otto von, 197, 208
Marcy, Wm. M., US Secretary of State, 134-5, 213
Markham, Maj. Gen. Sir Frederick, 88, 106, 107, 121
Marx, Karl, 133 and n.72
Mediterranean Sea, 56, 219
Menshikov, Prince Alexander S., 197-9
mercenaries, foreign, see foreign legionaires
Miles, W., 22
Mingralia, 183, 215; see also Circassia
Minto, 2nd earl, 66
Moldavia, see Principalities
Molesworth, Sir William, 10, 55, 65, 137
Montgomery of Alamein, 1st viscount, 90, 99
Morning Advertiser, 199-200
Morning Chronicle, 15
Morning Post, 14
Morny, due de, 141 and n.lO
Mosquito Coast, 134, 213
Muntz, G. F., 11
Nakhimov, Adm, 112, 114
Napoleon III, Emperor, proposes to go to Crimea, 31, 91-3 and n.23;
conversation with Russell, 31; change of mind re Vienna proposals,
Index 281
43-6; real views on war questioned, 57; proposes plan of campaign, 91;
instructions to French army, 97; state visit to England, 37-8, 97-8;
proposals to war council, 97-8; orders Canrobert to call up reserve for
new offensive, 98-9; urges attack from Aloushta, 99; opposes attack
on Anapa, 100; critical of Kertch expedition and of attack on Mamelon,
101; his instructions criticised by Panmure, 102; low about Crimean
prospects, 112; ready for peace negotiations, 123; threatens withdrawal
in Crimea, 124-6; British confidence in, 138, 174; raises Polish question,
50, 140; influenced by anti-war sentiment, 140, 143; wants to re-draw
map of Europe, 143; and Austrian ultimatum, 145-52, 154-7; upset by
report of Palmerston's remarks, 159; reveals Drouyn's anti-English bias,
166; no objection to special conditions, 165; urges Victoria to accept
Russian reservations, 166-7; partiality for Cowley, 168; faithful to British
alliance, 168; Seebach to inform Russia of special conditions, 173;
praised by Clarendon, 179; friendly discussion with Cowley, 179; plays
mediating role between Clarendon and Orlov, 180; conversations with
Clarendon, 181; also friendly to Russians, 182 and n.20; doubtful of
Bessarabian frontier, 185; conversations with Orlov and Clarendon,
186; favours Russia on Bessarabia, 191:--2; sees envoys separately, 192;
discusses Italian question with Clarendon, 198-9; over-anxious for
peace, 199; Congress greets him at Tuileries, 202; entertains Congress
with banquet, 207; further conversations with Clarendon, 207-8, 210;
discusses Polish question with Orlov, 209; and Triple Treaty of
Guarantee, 210; Bessarabian border settlement, 211-12; praised by
Clarendon, 217; seeks military convention with Austria, 234 n.8;
communicates with Walewski by English cypher, 237 n.46; and also 1,
141, 143, 222, 226, 237 n.51
Navy, Royal, conveyance of French troops, 81; expedition to Kertch and
Sea of Azov, 98-100; Kinburn expedition, 123; The Times on defects,
127-8; in the Baltic, White Sea and Pacific, 130-1; receives votes of
thanks, 218-19; increase in size, 219
Nesselrode, Count, 140
Neutralisation plan, 35-7, 48, 154
Newcastle, 5th duke of, in Aberdeen coalition, 1; presses Peelite colleagues
to join Palmerston, 8; praised by Panmure, 12; and Sebastopol
Committee Report, 67-9, 73--4; visits Crimea, 67, 114-17 and n.37;
despatch to Raglan, 83--4; qualifies report on Codrington, 120; proposes
expedition to Circassia, 128-9; stands apart from other Peelites, 225;
and also 9, 15, 22, 86, 88, 90, 226, 259, n.61
Newdegate, Charles, 18
Nicaragua, 212
Nicholas I, Czar, 30
Niel, Gen., 91, 113
Nightingale, Florence, 81, 82
Nikolaev, 123, 186, 190 and n.35, 217, 220, 234 n.17
Nova Scotia, 134
Odessa, 123
Orner Pasha, 91, 98, 132-3, 216
282 Index
Ordnance Corps, 73, 80-1

Orlov, Count, chief Russian Plenipotentiary at Peace Congress, 180;
conversations with Napoleon III and Clarendon, 183-4 and n.20;
threatens to end negotiations, 185 and n.20; his skilful conduct of
negotiations, 187-98; private talks with Napoleon III, 186, 192, 193;
complimented by Clarendon, 194; discusses Polish question with
Napoleon III and Clarendon, 209; informed of Triple Treaty, 212; and
also 217, 222, 257 n.28, 258 n.48
Oxford, bishop of, 49
Pacific Ocean, 131

Pakenham, Col., 89
Pakington, Sir John, 71, 233 n.47
Palmer, Roundell, 52
Palmerston, 3rd viscount, differences with Aberdeen, 1; and the ministerial
crisis, 3-8; forms his first ministry, 7-12; appoints Russell peace envoy,
13-14, 24; first address to House as PM, 14; reports to Queen, 15-16,
238 n. 75; abolishes office of Secretary at War, 15; fails to stop appointment
of Roebuck Committee, 15-19; weak response to Layard, 18; regrets
departure of Peelites, 21, 24; fills their vacancies, 24-7; consults
colleagues on appointments, 25; Le Marchant and Greville on his
leadership, 27-8; estimate of his success, 28; freed by Peelite departure,
31; critical of Russell, 32; views on Vienna Conference, 32-3; afraid to
recall Stratford, 35; humours Russell, 36; dissatisfied with his despatch,
39; to put Austrian ultimatum to Cabinet, 40; opposes Russell proposals,
41; opposed to counterpoise, 42; persuades Russell to stay, 46; anxious
to avoid rupture with Austria, 47; writes to Napoleon III, 47;
acknowledges breakdown of Vienna Conference, 48; claims Russian
counter-proposals unacceptable, 48; on publication of Conference
Protocols; 48-9; says Russell speaks well but Tories disgruntled, 49;
responds to Disraeli, 50; reports on party meeting to Queen, 50; supports
Baring amendment, 52-3; on Lowe's amendment, 54-6 and n.75;
denounces Cobden, 58; tables despatches, 60; and Bulwer-Lytton's
motion:, 60-4; accepts Russell's resignation, 61; Cabinet appointments,
65-6; and debate on Sebastopol Report, 67-8, 72-4; his interest in army,
79; military reforms and appointments of commissariat and sanitary
commissions, 80-1; continued concern re Filder and Crimean staff, 88-9;
his limitations, 90; opposes Emperor's proposal, 91; attends war council,
98; opposes proclamation, 100; urges attack on Simpheropol, 103;
reprimands Panmure on pay increase, 104; discusses alternatives to
Simpson, 105-7; advantage of combined action, 111; on Newcastle's
letters, 115; exasperation with Simpson, 117-18; hesitation re
Codrington appointment, 120-1; wants another campaign, 127-9, 140-1,
152, 162; critical of Dundas, 131; new Cabinet appointments, 137; opposed
to dissolution, 138; opinion of Napoleon III and French alliance, 138-40;
on avoiding pressure for peace, 140--3; letter to Persigny, 150-1 and n.30;
critical of Austrian proposals, 152-3 and n.35; criticises Queen, 158;
quoted by Sardinian King in Paris, 159; reservations re Memorandum of
14 November, 164 and n.55; insists on special conditions, 170-2; finds
Index 283
a solution, 172-3; praised by The Times, 176; admonitions to

Clarendon, 183; insists on Bessarabian frontier and Kars, 185-6; to
Clarendon re Circassia and Bessarabia, 188; on consequences of a split
with France, 190; is a realist, 191 and n.35; agrees to Bessarabian
compromise, 192-3 and n.39; congratulates Clarendon, 193-4; opposes
Russian Black Sea demands, 194-6; on occupation of Greece, 198;
alterations to treaty text, 199-200; refuses to be rushed, 200; accepts
Black Sea clauses and Sunday signing, 201; becomes more moderate,
202; on dismissal of Crampton, 213 and n.12; defends p.eace treaty in
Commons, 215-16 and nn.15 and 16; tribute to armed services, 219 and
n.20; change in attitude understandable, 222; relationship with Clarendon,
223-4; his leadership assessed, 226-9; on militarism, 227; relations with
Queen and Cabinet, 227-8; Lowe in The Times on his leadership, 239
n.25; and also 23, 43, 51, 67, 102, 109, 121, 129, 229, 240 nn.31 and 52
Panmure, 2nd baron, appointed War Secretary, past career, 9-10; speaks
well of Newcastle, 12; first letter to Raglan, 15-16; opposed to Roebuck
Committee, 16; biography, 80; military reforms, 80-1; appointment of
McNeil and Sutherland commissions, 81-2; to Raglan on staff
deficiencies, etc., 83-4; questions Palmerston's suggestions, 88; fails to
crush Ellenborough, 89; pessimistic about Crimea and critical of
French, 95-6; attends war council, 98; favours northern attack but gives
Raglan free hand, 101-2; orders an attack, 102; announces pay increase,
104; reprimanded by Palmers ton but gets his way, 104; appointment of
Simpson, 105-6; his advice to, 106-10 and n.9; his second thoughts,
107-9; reinforcements, 110-11; Clarendon's low opinion of him, 111-12;
urges Simpson to follow up victory, 118-19; and Simpson's resignation,
119-20; Codrington eventually appointed as commander, 120-1; puts
merit before seniority in corps appointments, 121; problems of land
transport, 128; keen to the end, 129-30; faces possibility of peace, 130;
moves vote of thanks to armed services, 218-19; and also 73, 90, 91,
113 and n.22, 115, 162, 226, 259 n.61
Paris, Exhibition of, 126, 144; Congress banquet at Hotel de Ville, 207
Paris Peace Congress, locale proposed by Russia, 174; preparations,
176-84; negotiations, 184-202; terms of peace treaty, 202-5;
celebrations, 205-7; other issues, 207-9
Paris, Treaty of, negotiation and signature of, 184-202; terms of, 202-5;
reception in Britain, 205-6; implementatiot)., 211-12; debated in
Parliament, 214-17; assessment of, 219-21
Parliament, addresses presented to Queen, 218; votes of thanks to armed
services, 218-19; Gladstone's article on 'declining efficiency of', 226 and
n.28
House of Commons, Roebuck motion, 2; party standings, 2-3; change of
ministry, 11; Palmerston's first address as PM, 14; refuses to abandon
Roebuck Committee, 15; Layard's attack on ministry and aristocracy,
17-18; Vienna Protocols to be tabled, 48; critical motions from
Milner Gibson and Layard, 48; Gibson motion withdrawn, 49; Disraeli
proposes resolutions, 50-1; debate and division on Baring
amendment, 51-6; division, 54; attacks on Russell, 57-60; debate on
Bulwer-Lytton's motion of censure, and resignation of Russell, 60-4;
284 Index
House of Commons-continued
debate on Sebastopol Committee Report, 67-75; debates on Turkish
loan and administrative reform, 75--6; Palmerston unable to defend
Crimean situation in, 88; debate on Kars campaign, 133; debate on
Queen's Speech, 1856, 177 and n.4; to be informed in event of split
with France, 190; Triple Treaty of Guarantee tabled, 210; question re
dismissal of Crampton, 213; debate on peace treaty, 214-16;
Palmerston's leadership in, 228
House of Lords, change of ministry 11-12; Grey's motion of Vienna
Papers defeated, 48-9 and n.55; Ellenborough Resolutions defeated,
88-9; Derby criticises Queen's Speech, 177-9; debate on peace treaty,
217-18
Paskevich, Field Marshal, 114
Paton, Gen. G., 99
Paxton, Sir Joseph, 88
peace negotiations, Vienna Conference, 13-14, 29-48; parliamentary
debates on, 48-56; cause of Russell resignation, 61; attitude of Raglan
and Clarendon, 93-5; Napoleon III ready for, 123, 141; Austrian
proposals, 138--61; British reservations, 162-75; preliminaries of peace,
179-84; peace conference in Paris, 184-202; Parliamentary debate on,
214-18; historical assessment of, 219-24; see also Paris Peace Congress
and Paris, Treaty of
Peel, Frederick, 27, 231 n.15
Peel, Gen.J., 21, 70, 71-2, 233 n.47
Peel, Sir Robert (3rd bt.), 26-7
Peelites, number of, 2; Liberal hostility to, 9-11; divided on resignation,
19-20; resignations unwise, 22-4; support for Palmerston? 24; on
Baring amendment, 50, 54--6; vote on Sebastopol Report, 74; Clarendon
critical of, 76; their difficult position, 76-7; relationship with Liberals,
224--6; analysis of voting, 225; final fusion with Liberals, 229; and also
31, 47, 70, 176
Pelissier, Gen., succeeds Canrobert, 100; Emperor upset by his
independence, 101-3; makes crucial decisions, 110; fails to
communicate with Simpson, 112; bulldog tenacity of, 114; criticised by
Newcastle, 114; his plan, 115; fall of Sebastopol, 116-17; defends
failure to follow up, 118; only agrees to limited operations, 122-3;
negative views, 123-5; and also 119, 244 n.9
People's Paper, 133
Persia, 178
Persigny, comte, 45, 47, 125, 147, 149, 150-1, 158, 173, 250 n.19, 254 n.79
Petropaulovsk, 131
Pfordten, von der, 141
Phillimore, J. G., 52
Phillimore, R. J., 52, 215
Phinn, T., 66
Piedmont, see Sardinia
Poland, Polish question, 31, 57, 140, 149, 200, 209
Principalities, Danubian: protectorate proposed, 13; Russian withdrawal
from, 29; discussed at Vienna Conference, 32; Austrian proposals, 142,
Index 285
145, 154; drafting committee, 186, 193, 197, 258 n.46; union of, 192,
194 and n.46; treaty provisions for, 199, 204, 212; and also 1, 171, 215,
217, 221, 252 n.51, 256 n.23
Prussia, Russell visit to Berlin, 31; abandonment of neutrality proposed,
235 n.19; puts pressure on Russia, 169; full participation at peace congress
opposed, 180; invited to later sessions, 193, 197-8; and also 14, 124, 159
Pruth river, 188, 192, 193, 215
public opinion, British, 41-2, 43, 47, 95, 163, 174-5, 176, 189, 190, 196,
199-200, 205-6, 213, 219-20, 222, 223, 224; French, 124, 140, 147,
155, 169, 170, 190
quarries (south of the Redan), 101

Quarterly Review, 226
Queen's Speech, 31 January 1856, 177-8
Radicals, 2-3, and n.2, 227; see also Liberal party

Raglan, Field Marshal, 1st baron, from Panmure restaff, 15; annuities to
widow and heirs, 57; Newcastle despatch restaff, 83; Panmure despatch
re failure to keep ministers informed, 83-4; inquiry re evacuation plans,
84; replies to Newcastle, 84-5; to Panmure, 85-6; his good qualities
and weaknesses, 85, 89-90 and n.21; further correspondence with
Panmure, 86-7; Simpson's opinion, 87; unable to take lead, 91;
revealing letter to Russell, 93-4; role in new war plan, 98; refuses to
tum British trenches over to Turks, 99; favours attack from Eupatoria,
99; congratulated by Panmure, 101; operational instructions, 102;
blamed for Redan failure and advised to change target, 103; contracts
cholera and dies, 103; problem of replacement, 105-6; and also 68, 72,
81, 95, 106, 107, 110, 242 n.15
Redan, the, 95,96, 101,102-3,113,115-18,120,140,223
reinforcements, 81, 90, 105-6, 110-11
Renni fortress, 211
Rhine river, a possible war front, 47
Richmond, 5th duke of, 103-4
Rivas, Sefior, 212
Roebuck, John, motion for inquiry, 2, 11, 15, 17-19; committee named,
22 and n.47; criticises ministers, 55; attacks Russell, 59; Sebastopol
Committee Report, 66-75 and nn.31 and 35; denounces Palmerston and
peace proposals, 177
Rokeby, Maj. Gen., 6th baron, 111
Rothschilds informed of Austrian ultimatum, 161
Russell, Lord John, resignation, January 1855, 1; unable to form
government, 6-10; refuses to join Palmerston, 8; appointed envoy to
Vienna Conference, 13-14; accepts Colonial Office, 24; participation in
Vienna Conference, 30-41; visits Berlin, 31; conversations with Louis
Napoleon, 31; indignation with colleagues, 36; asks Cabinet to await his
return, 30; his proposals opposed by Palmerston and Clarendon, 41;
returns to London, 41; presses his proposals, 41-3; criticised by Cowley,
44; persuaded not to resign, 46, 48; reports on Vienna Conference to
Commons, 48; says no basis for agreement, 49; differs with Gladstone,
286 Index
Russell, Lord John-continued

52-3; opposes Lowe, 55-6; exposed by Buol, 98; parliamentary
explanation, 57-8; forced to resign, 59-6; subsequent parliamentary
debate, 61-5; critical of new appointments, 65-6; debate on Sebastopol
Report, 68-9, 72-3; warning from Raglan, 93-4 and 236 n.36; question
re Marcy despatches, 213; proposes Prussia abandon her neutrality,
235 n.19; did he exceed his instructions? 235 n.26; and also 15, 19, 27,
28, 47, 51, 52, 65, 67, 224, 227, 235 nn.19 and 21, 240 n.52.
Russell, W. H. 2, 126-7
Russia, agrees to discuss peace terms, 13, 29-30; curtailment of her
predominance in Black Sea, 13, 30, 56; refusal of Allied proposals, 39,
48, 53; blockaded in Baltic, 130-1; not ready for peace, 141, anticipated
response to Austrian ultimatum, 145-7 and n.lO, 149-50, 162-3; and
neutralisation of Black Sea, 35, 48, 145 and passim; to be informed of
British special conditions, 157, 164-5, 170-3; proposes to treat directly,
157-8; British distrust of, 161; conditional acceptance refused, 166-7;
reasons for final acceptance, 169; proposes waiving peace preliminaries,
173; raises loan in England, 252-3 n.52; denounced by Roebuck, 177;
envoys meet British, 182-4; convention on Aland Islands, 185-7;
convention with Turkey, 145, 154, 186, 191, 194-6; boundary
commission, 187-9; treaty unprecedented, 198; rapprochement with
France set back by Triple Treaty, 210; young Czar seeks internal
development, 211; not completely defeated, 221; and also 124-5,
128-9, 148, 160, 162, 171-2, 175, 176, 220-3, 252 n.51; see also Crimea,
Orlov, Paris Peace Congress, Vienna Conference
Russian army, extends forward positions, 91; strength over-estimated, 94;
reinforcements, 95; withdrawal from Circassian coast, 100; holds Malakoff
and Redan, 101-3; praised by Stewart, 112-3; now outnumbered, 114
and n.24; heavy losses, 114-16; battle of Tchernaya, 116; fall of
Sebastopol, 116-17 and n.36; driven out of Kinburn, 123; tied down on
Baltic coast, 130-1; Kars campaign, 131-3
St Germans, 3rd earl, 25

St Petersburg, 129, 130, 131, 160, 173
Salzyk, Lake, 145
Sardinia, King's visit to London and Paris, 158-9; not mentioned in
Queen's Speech, 178; participation in Peace Congress, 180, 183, 187, 208
Sardinian contingent, 91 and n.22, 98, 116, 124, 127
Satier, Russian Commissary General, 245 n.26
Schamyl, 215
Schroeder, Professor Paul, 29, 162, 219
Scutari hospital, 81, 82, 90
Seaton, Gen.Lord, 107
Sebastopol, siege of, 90-118, and also 2, 29, 32, 33, 56, 76, 138, 140, 141,
184, 187, 234 n.17
Sebastopol Committee, named, 22 and n.47; Report, 66-75
Seebach, Baron, 141, 144, 157-8, 169, 173
Serbia, 204
Serpents' Isle, 211
Index 287
Seymour, Sir George, British minister in Vienna, 153-4, 156, 159-61,

164-5, 167-8 and n.66, 171-2, 255 n.82
Seymour, Lord, 12th duke of Somerset, 21, 25, 67, 71, 233 n.47
Shaftesbury, 7th earl, 25, 200
Shee, Serjeant, 55
Simpheropol, 98-9, 103, 123
Simpson, Gen. James, appointed Chief of Staff, 83-4; satisfied with staff
situation, 87; gloomy report, 96-7 and n.32; appointed Raglan's
successor, 105; Panmure's advice to, 105-6; his despondency and
Panmure's second thoughts, 106-10 and n.9; the summer campaign,
111-17; criticised by Newcastle, 114; defends failure to follow up victory,
118-19; receives honours, 119; resignation, 119-20; continued criticism
of, 121-2; sends troops to Eupatoria, 123
Slade, Adm. Sir Adolphus, 133, 243 n.41, 245 n.26
Smith, Dr Andrew, 90, 242 n.19
Smith, Vernon, 26, 28
Stanley, 2nd baron of Alderley, 26
Stanley, Lord (later 15th earl of Derby), 68, 137, 238 n.65
Stevenson, Robert, 88
Stewart, Adm. Houston, 93, 97, 105, 108, 111, 112
Stock Exchange, bans Russian loan quotations in England, 252-3 n.52
Stratford de Redcliffe, 1st viscount, 35, 132-3
submarine ships, 137 and n.2
Sun newspaper, 205
Sutherland, Dr John, sanitary commissioner, 82
Sveaborg, 130
Sweden, 131, 169
Switzerland, 110
Taganrog, 100-1
Tartar insurgents, 100
Tchernaya river, 102, 116, 117, 118, 123, 126
Tchorgoun, 101
Times, The, W. H. Russell's despatches to, 2; opposing Government, 14;
Lowe a leader writer of, 21, 27, 66; alleged connection between Delane
and Cabinet, 65; publishes letters re Crimean conditions, 87; arrives in
Sebastopol before Balaclava, 113; Queen's indignation with, 121;
reports good conditions in British winter camp, 126-7; critical of military
system, 127-8; reports a 'peace coalition', 136; British opposition to peace
known abroad, 163; mixed feelings re peace, 176-7; on signing of peace
treaty, 205-6; and also 26, 73, 169
Todleben, Maj. Gen., 101, 112, 114
Tolstoi, Leo, 115
Tories, see Conservatives
Trakatir bridge, 101, 113
Transport Board, 81
Treaties (of)
Adrianople, 1829, 131, 180, 187; December 2 1854, 30, 36, 37, 40; Paris,
1814, 180; Paris, 1856, see Paris, Treaty of; Straits, 1841, 30, 197; Triple
288 Index
Treaties-continued
Treaty of Guarantee, 1856, 146, 210, 212; Unkiar Skelessi, 1834, 180
Trebizond, 132, 211
Tulloch, Col. A.M., Commissariat Commissioner, 82, 87, 89
Turkey, treaties with Russia, 13; represented at Vienna Conference, 35;
proposed guarantee of, 38, 40 and n.33, 57, 142, 146; and Austrian
ultimatum, 145, 149, 154; separate treaty with Russia, 186, 191, 194-5;
protection of Christians, 145, 160, 179, 200, 205, 217-18; objection to
Article Four, 186; right to garrison Principalities, 204; former treaties
with Russia, 259 n.59; claims Serpents' Isle, 212; and also 30, 36, 37, 48,
58-9, 62, 128, 156, 172, 183; see also peace negotiations, treaties
Turkish army, numbers in Crimea, 91; divided between Eupatoria and
Sebastopol, 91; role in new war plan, 98; and Kertch expedition, 100;
occupation of Tchorgoun, 101; proposed attack on Simpheropol, 103;
Eupatoria garrison, 124; defence of Kars, 131-3
Turkish contingent under Gen. Vivian, 110, 132
Turkish loan, 35, 75--6, 133
Tiirr, Col., 154, and n.37
Ukraine, 129
United States, and Central America, 134, 213; and Foreign Enlistment
Crisis, 134-5, 178, 212-13
Upland, the, 113
Vaillant, Marshal, supports Cowley, 45; attends London war council, 98;
proposals for troop withdrawal, 125; and also 182
Vane, Sir Harry, 55
Varna, 81
Vernon, G. E. H., 21, 55
Victoria, Queen, summons Derby, 3-4; seeks advice of Lansdowne, 4-5;
calls Russell, 5-6; commissions Palmerston, 7-8; Palmerston reports to,
15, 16, 56 and n.75; impressed by Louis Napoleon, 37-8, 97-8, 138;
from Palmerston re Vienna proposals, 41; writes to Emperor, 47;
accepts Russell resignation, 61; from Palmerston re Sebastopol Report,
74, 240 n.31; vexed by Emperor's pessimism, 102; requests formation
of 6th division, 111; royal visit to Paris, 112; and successor to Simpson,
120-1; indignation with The Times, 121; critical of Simpson, 122;
cabinet appointments, 137; favours consideration of peace negotiations,
143-7; critical of Palmerston's letter, 151; correspondence with Napoleon
III re Austrian ultimatum, 152-3; regrets wording of Clarendon's
despatch, 157; absence at Osborne, 158; revisit of King of Sardinia,
158-9 and n.48; refuses Emperor's request, 167; 'charming letter' to
Emperor, 181; offers promotion in peerage to Clarendon and Cowley,
259 n.63; addresses presented to, 214-18; relations with Palmerston,
227-8 and n.30; her views on prosecution of the war and influence of
Albert, 228; and also 161 and n.52, 170, 172, 202, 228
victory celebrations, 219
Vienna Conference, 1855, 13-14, 29-48, 48-9, 55--6, 60
Vienna Protocol of 1 February 1856, 177, 184
Index 289
Villiers, Charles, 12
Vivian, Maj. Gen. Robert, 110, 132
Walewski, Count, asked to ascertain Emperor's opinion, 43; replaces

Drouyn, 45 and n.56; proposes re-opening Vienna Conference, 47; agrees
to ending Conference, 47-8; pro-Austrian, 237-51; attends London war
council, 98; mistrusted, 138; and the Austrian ultimatum, 144-60;
indignant at British reservations, 165-6; hostility to Cowley, 168; makes
difficulties re special conditions, 173; seeks to avoid commitments to
Britain, 179; President of Congress, 180; meeting with Austrian and
British envoys, 183; presides well at first conference, 184; stands firm
on Bessarabia and Kars, 184-6; and Aland Islands, but not Circassia,
186-8 and n.30; subdued, 197; creates confusion, 198; withdrawal of
troops from Greece and Rome, 198, 208; complains of Belgian press,
proposes uniform maritime law, 208-9; and Triple Treaty of
Guarantee, 210, 212; and also 159, 162, 192, 193, 194
Walker, William, 212
Wallachia, see Principalities
Walpole, Spencer, 55, 56
Walter, John, 3, 121
War Office, 5, 8
Watkin, Edward, 88 and n.17
Wellington, 1st duke of, 56, 89
Westmorland, 11th earl, 13, 97, 141
Wetheral, Col., 128, 223
Whigs, 1-2, 4, 9-10, 25, 66 and n.25; see also Liberals
White Sea, 130
Whiteside, J., 133
Wilkinson, W. A., 52
Williams, Col. (later Gen.), and defence of Kars, 131-3, 223
Windsor Castle, 4
Wood, Sir Charles, refuses Russell, 6; joins Palmerston, 24; applauds
Russell's appointment to Vienna, 14; favours accceptance of Roebuck
Committee, 16; on Russell's admissions, 59; considered pro-peace, 60;
on Cabinet appointments, 65; on Sebastopol Report, 71-2; no funds for
a 'submarine machine', 249 n.2; and also 24, 25, 26, 238 n.75
Wiirtemburg, 197
Yalpulch, Lake, 211

Yenikale, 100
Yenitchi, 100

J. B. Conacher (Auth.) - Britain and The Crimea, 1855-56 - Problems of War and Peace-Palgrave Macmillan UK (1987)

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BRITAIN AND THE CRIMEA, 1855-56

By the same author

First published in the United States of America in 1987

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

2 Map 1: The Black Sea 78

3 Map 2: The Upland 92

4 WHAT IS THE PRICE OF PEACE? 139

5 STAYING PROCEEDINGS 181

6 SWINDLING THE CLARENDON (By a Distinguished

preliminaries of peace and the weary weeks of the peace conference

Finally, I must acknowledge the great debt I owe to my wife who

Garden Island, Ontario J. B. Conacher

The sudden collapse of Lord Aberdeen's Government at the end of

Derbyite Conservatives 266

Lord Derby claimed to have 270-280 reliable supporters, but of the

up to 30 January 1855. Of the 39 Peelites, one, John Walters, voted

Lord Derby at all', according to the Queen. Neither Herbet nor

towards Aberdeen for the past two years. Lord Cranworth

II PALMERSTON THE CABINET-MAKER: PEELITE

NOW FOR IT!

affirmative he received her commission and late in the afternoon of

the Whig members of the previous government were clearly anxious

regard Canning as a Peelite, apparently since Canning acted separ-

men' with whom he had the good fortune to be associated. He

III DEMISE OF THE PALMERSTON COALITION

With the ministerial problem apparently settled by the adhesion of

neutralising the threat posed by the presence of an independent Lord

We cannot leave the negotiations in Westmorland's hands and it

the whole subject, he is quite incapable of making a peace that

the Peelite Morning Chronicle, neither of which had 'any circulation

inconclusively and the final decision was postponed to a later

gave it as his opinion that 'This country is coming to the opinion

Palmerston has no authority there, and the House is in complete

in my life I am really and seriously alarmed at the aspect of

The Cabinet discussed the matter of the committee again on the

Cabinet resigned including Cardwell, who heroically refused a seat

prolonged and accentuated the crisis unnecessarily, but their decision

One of Palmerston's biographers has suggested that the departure

The replacement of Gladstone was more difficult. 'This is not so

Admiralty protesting that he would not want to be 'the means of

name' made it desirable in Palmerston's view 'that he should be

It is a Cabinet without a head. Lord Palmerston is an eminent

Palmerston's ministry got away to a slow start and was weakened,

intimate with Whig ministers, expressed his views of the situation in

I LORD JOHN RUSSELL AND THE VIENNA

The situation was transformed by the appointment, as the senior

understanding' that might, indeed, 'be modified by future circum-

Colloredo, the Austrian Minister in London, sensed Clarendon's

Clarendon rather contemptuously supposed that Russell had not

received a despatch from Paris instructing him to propose a new plan

the new policy of neutralisation he acknowledged it curtly by saying,

from 16 to 21 April. He made a good impression, especially on

(1) a general engagement to guarantee the territorial integrity of

After discussing these proposals with Drouyn, Russell wrote to Clar-

system of limitation I believe to be far better than that of counter-

ambassador that they had refused the Austrian terms, but he

had 'the merit of binding Austria to the Western Powers' and he

When Russell and Drouyn left Vienna there seemed to be a possible

the chances of success in war diminish and if we reject (as we must

Clarendon even sent a copy of the proposal to Aberdeen whom he

Russia which would raise instead of making to cease her preponder-

to maintain harmony between the allies, France agreed to support

III PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES ON WAR AND PEACE