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Case study: planned Oromo Liberation Front operation to disrupt the African
Union summit
286. In early 2011, Ethiopian intelligence and federal police disrupted a conspiracy
to bomb targets in and around Addis Ababa at the time of the sixteenth ordinary
session of the Assembly of the African Union, which was scheduled to take place on
30 and 31 January 2011. Although ostensibly an OLF operation, it was conceived,
planned, supported and directed by the external operations directorate of the
Government of Eritrea, under the leadership of General Teame. If executed as
planned, the operation would almost certainly have caused mass civilian casualties,
damaged the Ethiopian economy and disrupted the African Union summit. 222

(a) Background to the operation: recruitment, planning and training

287. Planning for the operation appears to have begun in 2008, when the National
Security Agency of Eritrea recruited and trained the first of the OLF fighters to be
involved in the operation. Fekadu Abdisu Gusu, a survivor from an OLF unit that
had been defeated and dispersed with heavy losses by the Ethiopian military, told
the Monitoring Group that in 2008 an OLF associate in Kenya had put him in
contact with an Eritrean Colonel calling himself Gemachew Ayana, also known as
Kercho. Gemachew gave Fekadu instructions to travel with three other OLF
fighters to Eritrea by way of the Sudan. 223
288. Following his arrival in Eritrea, Fekadu received several weeks of initial
training in explosives theory and practice at various sites in and around Asmara,
under Gemachews supervision. The principal instructor was an Eritrean officer
known to his students only by the nickname Wedi Eyasu. 224 Upon completion of
this training, Fekadu told the Monitoring Group, he was instructed to travel to Addis
Ababa to familiarize himself with the city. 225
289. Two months later Fekadu was recalled to Eritrea for more extended and
intensive training in a range of military skills, first near Dekemhare then at the
camp of Een, where he and other OLF trainees spent the rest of 2009. According to
Fekadu, a Tigrayan militia group known as Demhit was also training at Een
during the same period. 226
290. While Fekadu was training at Een, the Eritrean security services, through
Colonel Gemachew, approached an OLF cadre based in Djibouti named Omar Idriss
Mohamed, who would eventually become the team leader for the Addis Ababa
operation. In interviews with the Monitoring Group, Omar stated that he had joined
OLF in 2003, undergone training in Eritrea at Mulubera (near Gash Barka) and
Addis Maaskar, and held increasingly senior posts. During the month of Ramadan
__________________
222 From 7 to 10 March 2011, the Monitoring Group was granted access to evidence recovered by
the Government of Ethiopia, including arms, explosives, telephone and financial records and
telephone intercepts. During that period, the Group also spent more than 22 hours over a period
of three days separately interviewing seven detained members of OLF involved in the operation,
including team leader Omar Idriss Mohamed.
223 Interview with Fekadu Abdisu Gusu, 9 March 2011.
224 The Monitoring Group believes this individual to be Solomon Eyasu, a Ministry of Defence
official who also assists the presidential office in matters of security.
225 Interview with Fekadu Abdisu Gusu, 9 March 2011.
226 Interview with Fekadu Abdisu Gusu, 9 March 2011. This information corresponds with
information obtained during an interview with an ONLF detainee, November 2010.

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(August/September) 2009 he was contacted by OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa and told
to expect a call from an Eritrean officer who would give him a secret assignment.
Shortly afterwards he was contacted by Colonel Gemachew, who told him to bring
five new recruits to Eritrea. 227 He did so, crossing the border at Dadaatu, and
subsequently returned to Djibouti. 228 Imam Said Ahmed, who was among the five,
confirms that the group was subsequently assigned to train together with Fekadu at
Een. 229
291. In March 2010, Omar was again recalled to Eritrea, meeting with Gemachew
and Teame at an Asmara hotel. Teame told Omar that he would receive explosives
training for urban operations and should select two of the five recruits he had
brought from Djibouti for this special purpose. Omar travelled to Een to attend the
graduation ceremony of the recruits, who knew him under the pseudonym Yahya,
and selected two of them as Teame had requested: Abdulqadir Gurtu and Said
Mohamed Yusuf Drogba.
292. In late April or early May 2011, after two weeks of theoretical and practical
training in and around Asmara, the three of them were instructed to prepare for a
mission to Djibouti, with the objective of blowing up Ethiopian fuel trucks at a
depot on the outskirts of Djibouti town. They were told that the explosives would be
delivered to them.
293. For reasons that are unclear, Teame recalled Omar to Eritrea before the
planned operation could be carried out. Omar and his two associates travelled
overland to Djibouti, where they spent several weeks on reconnaissance before
being recalled to Eritrea. He and 10 other OLF fighters were sent to Een for a month
of refresher training in basic infantry skills, under the supervision of the Een camp
commander, Colonel Jamal, with Omar serving as the groups leader. Upon
completion of the training, Omar was recalled to Asmara where Teame informed
him that his new target for the operation was to be Addis Ababa.

(b) Team 1: Fekadu Abdisu Gusu

294. In March 2010, as final preparation prior to deployment, Fekadu and other
trainees were sent to Asmara for a brief course with Wedi Eyasu on the use of
mobile telephones and mechanical timers to detonate explosives. According to Sifen
Chala Bedada, a member of Fekadus team, he and other members unfamiliar with
explosives received essentially the same basic training that Fekadu had received, as
well as some instruction from Teame in operational security and
countersurveillance. 230 Gemachew then instructed Fekadu and his team to return to
Addis Ababa, where they were to await the arrival of explosives and further orders.
Following his deployment, Fekadu remained in contact with Gemachew, with phone
records indicating that at least 27 conversations took place between them. 231
__________________
227 The five recruits were: Said Ali Ahmed Doctor, Imam Said Ahmed (also known as Yemam
also known as Abu Mohamed Telah also known as Abdulwahab), Abdou Said Mufti (also
known as Ali), Abdulqadir Gurtu and Said Mohamed Yusuf Drogba.
228 FRUD commander Mohamed Jabhaa also confirmed to the Monitoring Group the use of
Dadaatu as a primary crossing point for members of OLF. Interview, Djibouti, 30 November
2010.
229 Interview with Imam Said Ahmed, 10 March 2011.
230 Interview with Sifen Chala Bedada, 10 March 2011.
231 Confidential document archived at the United Nations.

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295. Fekadu and his team were sustained in Addis Ababa thanks to periodic money
transfers from abroad. Sifen Chala Bedada told the Monitoring Group that
Gemachew arranged for him to receive payments through the Dahabshiil and Amal
money transfer companies, using various Oromo and Eritrean intermediaries in
Kenya and the Sudan. Official documents issued by Amal Express and the
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia confirm that such transactions took place (see
annex 8.4.b).

(c) Team 2: Omar Idriss Mohamed

296. In mid-2010, Omar was dispatched to Ethiopia with instructions from Teame
to reconnoitre an overland route to Addis Ababa by way of Chifra, for infiltration of
his team, and to survey a number of possible targets in the Ethiopian capital,
including the African Union headquarters, the London Caf, near Bole Airport, the
Axum Hotel, and the Filoha area between the Sheraton Hotel and the Prime
Ministers office.
297. Upon completion of his reconnaissance mission, Omar returned to Eritrea
where he rejoined the trainees at Een. Upon their graduation in December 2010,
Omar and Drogba travelled together to Assab for a final session on explosives
with Wadi Eyasu and a briefing from Teame. In an interview with the Monitoring
Group, Omar recalled Teames briefing in the following terms:
One of the targets he gave me was the African Union summit. I was told
to rent a Land Cruiser or a car of the same standard as the African Union
leaders and delegates. I was to prepare two to four cylinders, hidden in a TV
style box, and put it behind the seat of the vehicle. I was to extend the fuse to
the front panel of the car. We should study the times that the African Union
leaders took their breaks and choose a time that they were either coming or
going. Then we should set a mobile phone alarm for that time. We were to sit
in a nearby hotel or caf and if the leaders came out at a different time, we
could call the cell phone.
The intention was not to kill the leaders, but to show them that they are
not safe, that Ethiopia is not safe for them. By so doing, some people may start
to listen to what Eritrea is saying about Ethiopia. Some Arab States will be
sympathetic to this view.
Another target was Filoha, near the Palace, the Sheraton and the Prime
Ministers office.
The third target was Merkato [the largest open air market in Africa] to
kill many people. This would make the people complain that the Government
is not keeping them safe. We would place the explosives, together with gas
cylinders, on an Isuzu pick-up truck. Such a truck can be filled with up to
15 cylinders and 4 to 6 kg of C-4 explosive. We were to wrap the cylinders
with detonator cord and extend it to the front of the vehicle. The C-4 would be
packed around the inner six cylinders, and the detonator cord would be
wrapped around the other nine. The fuse would be placed in one end of the
detonator cord and initiated by mobile phone.
Teame opened his laptop and showed me a video about how Iraqi
insurgents have used explosives to powerful effect. He was trying to motivate

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me [] then he closed the laptop and told me that we would make Addis
Ababa like Baghdad. 232
298. The following day, Omar met again with Teame and Gemachew to discuss
possible follow-up operations, including bombings of Government-affiliated banks,
public transport networks and the Addis Ababa power grid.
299. According to Omar, he and Drogba received from Gemachew a bag of
approximately 20 kg of C-4 explosive, detonators and a roll of 100 metres of RDX
detonator cord (pictures of items recovered from the OLF team are attached in
annex 8.4.c).
300. They travelled on foot to Djibouti, then by car across the border into Ethiopia.
Omar described in detail to the Monitoring Group the precautions taken at each
stage of the journey to avoid detection by Ethiopian police and security forces.
Upon arrival in Addis Ababa, Omar handed over the explosives and material to an
individual named Musa, whose task was to keep the explosives safe until they
were required for operations. Omar also contacted Fekadu, whose team was already
in place awaiting instructions.
301. Fekadu briefed Omar that they had failed to find a vehicle, since most car hire
agencies would not provide a car without a driver, and that to purchase a vehicle
required them to present identification. Omar also observed that Fekadu had rented
a house in a shared compound, undermining privacy and secrecy.

(d) Team 3: Mohamed Nur Doctor

302. While the team in Addis Ababa struggled to prepare the operation, the
remaining trainees at Een completed their training and also prepared for deployment
overland into Ethiopia. One member of this team, Imam, told the Monitoring Group
that an Eritrean logistics officer at Een issued weapons and equipment to the team.
As the team sniper, he was given a Dragunov-type sniper rifle, which he carried on
the mission (see para. 307 and fig. XIV below, as well as export details and the end-
user certificate in annex 8.4.d). 233 The others received Kalashnikov-pattern assault
rifles and ammunition. 234 Mohamed Nur Doctor, one of the original recruits
enlisted by Omar from Djibouti, was designated the team leader.
303. According to both Imam and Said Abdirahman Omar, the team was first
travelled to Assab, where Teame and Gemachew provided them with final
instructions and explosives. Their orders were to travel on foot to the Chifra area,
where they should bury the explosives and await further orders from Omar. 235

(e) The operation unravels

304. In early January 2011, with the date of the operation fast approaching, Omar
requested additional funds from Gemachew:
__________________
232 Interview with Omar Idriss Mohamed, 10 March 2011.
233 Interview with Imam Said Ahmed, 10 March 2011.
234 According to Imam Said Ahmed, the members of this team were (a) Said Ali Ahmedey also
known as Mohamed Nur also known as Doctor; (b) Imam Said Ahmed also known as Abdu
Mohamed Toleha; (c) Abdu Said Mufti also known as Ali; (d) Adem Awel Said; (e) Adem
Idriss; (f) Said Abdirahman Omar also known as Said Kemse also known as Bow; and
(g) Feyera Bekele also known as Abdi.
235 Separate interviews with Imam Said Ahmed and Said Abdirahman Omar on 10 March 2011.

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The additional cash was sent to Addis via Amal hawala from Kenya in the
name of Omar Idriss. Then I gave the new $3,000 to the three other guys and I
kept the balance of what was remaining from Asmara to myself. Gemachew
had also told me he would send $500 to a woman associated with one of the
guys Enani Melesi, a friend of Tesfay [Fekadu], so she could return to
Asmara. 236
305. The Monitoring Group subsequently obtained the records of both of these
transactions, dated 8 January 2011, corroborating Omars account (see annex 8.4.b).
306. In the last week of January, with time running out before the African Union
summit, Omar felt the need to consult with Gemachew. In order to do so, he would
travel to Metemma, near the Sudanese border, where he could call Eritrea from a
Sudanese SIM card. Likewise, Gemachew would sometimes travel to Teseney in
Eritrea from where he could call with a Sudanese or Ethiopian SIM (see phone
records attached in annex 8.4.e). Phone records appear to indicate that they made
contact 39 times during Omars deployment in Ethiopia, mainly initiated by
Gemachew. Omar also spoke once with Teame and Dawud Ibsa while they were
together at Teames office. 237 The phone number indicated in phone records for
Teames office is the same one independently provided to the Monitoring Group by
another former OLF cadre, arrested in the Sudan, during an interview in May
2011. 238 The Monitoring Group is in possession of an audio recording of a
conversation between Omar and Teame (archived with the United Nations), and has
independently verified Teames voice.
307. While in Metemma, Omar learned that the team led by Doctor had been
intercepted by Ethiopian security forces near Bati and that one of them, Imam, had
been injured, captured and displayed on Ethiopian television. When arrested, Imam
was in possession of a Romanian-made PSL (Dragunov-type) sniper rifle that he
told the Monitoring Group had been issued to him at Een. In a letter to the
Monitoring Group dated 11 April 2011, the Government of Romania confirmed that
it had sold the rifle and attached sniper scope to the Ministry of Defence of Eritrea
in 2004 and provided supporting documentation, including an end-user certificate
issued by the Government of Eritrea (see annex 8.4.d).

__________________
236 Interview with Omar Idriss Mohamed, 8 March 2011.
237 Interview with Omar Idriss Mohamed, 8 March 2011, and telephone records.
238 Interview, May 2011. The same source told the Monitoring Group he had met with Yahya
(also known as Omar Idriss Mohamed) during a visit to Asmara in 2010. He travelled twice to
Asmara between 2010 and early 2011, where he also met OLF leaders including Dawud Ibsa.

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Figure XIV
Dragunov-type PSL rifle recovered from Imam, sold to Eritrea by Romania in 2004

308. Other members of the Doctor team escaped and dispersed. Omar told the
Monitoring Group that he immediately put the Addis operation on hold while he
travelled to Bati to find and rescue the remaining team members. He was able to
find only two of his team members, Ali and Abdi, who had gone into hiding in the
bush near Gerba; another two had been picked up by the police. Doctor had been
killed.
309. When Omar and the survivors returned to Addis Ababa, the African Union
summit was in progress, but without a suitable vehicle and with time running out, he
abandoned the African Union as a target and decided to simply attack two other
venues using taxis. After the summit had ended, on the morning of 2 February 2011,
together with Abdi and Fekadu, he reconnoitred the Axum Hotel and Filoha. 239
Then Omar called Musa and arranged a meeting in the afternoon to pick up the
explosives and detonators. They handed over the equipment in Piazza, and Omar
transferred the material to Fekadus house.
310. The next morning, police arrested Fekadu and his associates at the house.
When Omar tried contacting Fekadu and found his phone switched off, he became
nervous and relocated the other team members to a new hotel.
311. The following day Omar boarded a public minibus where other passengers
were talking about a police arrest of people with explosives. He avoided Fekadus
residence and told the rest of his team to move to Kombolcha to avoid capture. Then
he visited Fekadus residence, and found it empty. After a few more days in Addis,
changing hotels each night and divesting himself of false documents and SIM cards,
he moved to Nazret. On the way, he was arrested.

(f) Analysis
312. Only one detainee interviewed by the Monitoring Group, team leader Omar
Idriss Mohamed, appears to have been in regular contact with the OLF leadership in
Asmara. All other team members were isolated from OLF structures from the
moment of recruitment and received all training and orders directly from Eritrean
officers. According to Omar, only Dawud Ibsa, Chairman of OLF, was aware of the
__________________
239 Separate interviews with Omar Idriss Mohamed and Fekadu Abdisu Gusu, both on 9 March
2010.

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existence of this special operation and its objectives, and he does not appear to have
exercised any command or control over its actions. 240 The Monitoring Group
therefore concludes that this operation was effectively an Eritrean intelligence
activity, falsely flagged as an OLF initiative.

F. Somalia

313. Eritrean support to Somali armed groups dates from the 1998-2000 border
conflict, when Asmara sought to open a second front against Ethiopia in Somalia
by provision of assistance to the militia faction headed by Hussein Mohamed Farah
Aydiid, and through him to Ethiopian armed opposition groups including ONLF
and OLF. Eritrean engagement in the Somali conflict was significantly enhanced in
mid-2006, following the rise to power in southern Somalia of the Union of Islamic
Courts (UIC), and continued through the Asmara-based Alliance for the
Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) and Al-Shabaab, following Ethiopian military
intervention in Somalia in late December 2006.
314. Eritrea has consistently denied providing military support to Somali armed
groups, professing a principled position of non-interference in the internal affairs
of Somalia. 241 Lack of access to much of southern Somalia poses genuine
challenges to the collection of hard evidence and eyewitness testimony.
Nevertheless, new information obtained by the Monitoring Group during the course
of the mandate not only confirms many previous allegations of Eritrean military
involvement, but also offers firm grounds to believe that Eritrea still retains active
linkages to Somali armed groups, principally through the External Operations
Directorate described above. For a detailed case study on the activities of Eritrean
intelligence links with Somali armed opposition groups, see annex 8.5.

1. Financial support to members of Al-Shabaab

315. Eritrean support to armed opposition groups has routinely involved cash
payments to members of these groups, some of which have been documented in
previous Monitoring Group reports. 242 The Government of Eritrea has in the past
officially denied that it has ever transferred cash to armed opposition group leaders
or supporters. 243
316. During the course of current mandate, the Monitoring Group has obtained
documentary evidence of Eritrean payments to a number of individuals with links to
Al-Shabaab. The documents obtained were received directly from the embassy of
Eritrea in Nairobi, including payment vouchers marked State of Eritrea, cash
receipts marked with Tigrinya and Arabic lettering and the emblem of the State of
Eritrea, and tabulated records of payments (see annex 8.5.a.). 244 Sources familiar
with Eritrean embassy operations have authenticated this documentation and have
__________________
240 Interviews with Omar Idriss Mohamed, 8 and 9 March 2010.
241 Letter to the Monitoring Group from the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations,
22 August 2006.
242 See S/2010/91, paras. 62-65.
243 Letter to the Monitoring Group from the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations,
2 December 2008.
244 A sample of this documentation has been photographed and annexed, while the originals have
been archived at the United Nations Secretariat.

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