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BETWEEN
Respondent
and
John Tsekouras
Appellant
On appeal from the conviction entered on March 5, 2015 by Justice John deP.
Wright of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting without a jury, with reasons
reported at 2015 ONSC 1470.
Watt J.A.:
[1] Project Dolphin was in its final few days. But some unfinished business
enterprise.
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[3] For some time, police had suspected John Tsekouras was the person in
charge of this organization. But their suspicions fell short of what was required to
[4] When John Tsekouras took some documents out of one vehicle and put
[5] John Tsekouras had his Blackberry in his hand. An officer approached
Tsekouras. Gun drawn, but pointed downward. Tsekouras took the battery out of
his Blackberry and threw the device when ordered to the ground by the officer.
[6] The reasons for the arrest are not entirely clear. Perhaps, it was for
crime. What is clear is that John Tsekouras did not remain under arrest for long.
A senior officer arrived and directed that Tsekouras be released immediately and
[7] Among the things taken from John Tsekouras incidental to his arrest were
two Blackberry devices. Neither the one he had thrown down, nor the other one
seized from his vehicle, were returned. Police told John Tsekouras that they
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found during their search, they told Tsekouras, the charge on which he had been
[8] A few months later, police did search the contents of the Blackberry
Tsekouras had thrown to the ground. What they found became a critical part of
the case against Tsekouras at his trial on several preliminary and substantive
drug offences. And the authority relied upon to harvest the contents of the
Blackberry became a central focus of the trial and the appeal to this court from
[9] These reasons explain why I would dismiss John Tsekouras' appeal
adduced at trial.
collected by investigators.
Project Dolphin
[11] Project Dolphin was a joint forces investigation into drug trafficking in
Thunder Bay and elsewhere in Canada. The police services involved included
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the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Ontario Provincial Police
[12] The targets of Project Dolphin included John Tsekouras, Frank Muzzi and
Salvatore Larizza. The drugs involved were marijuana and cocaine. In the course
of the investigation, police also seized oxycodone. The RCMP was conducting a
[13] The principal transactions with which the investigators were concerned
were the planned purchase of two kilograms of cocaine by Tsekouras and Keith
Ritchie from a person known as "Penguin" and 18 pounds of marijuana and one
Larizza's agreement.
[14] The case for the Crown at trial included evidence of:
Takedown Day
[15] The investigative plan for takedown day for Project Dolphin included the
related paraphernalia and the arrests of some of the participants in the drug
trafficking enterprise.
[16] The investigative plan for takedown day for John Tsekouras consisted of
several properties with which Tsekouras was associated. The simple fact was
suspected he was the head of the drug trafficking organization they were
investigating.
[17] When surveillance officers saw John Tsekouras remove a box of papers
from one parked vehicle and put it into another occupied by some of his family
[18] A police officer approached Tsekouras on foot, his gun drawn but pointed
downward and at his side. Tsekouras had a Blackberry in his hand. As the officer
approached, he told Tsekouras to get down on the ground. Tsekouras took the
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battery out of his Blackberry and threw it on the ground. As the officer took
[19] The officer arrested Tsekouras. Incidental to the arrest, officers seized the
Blackberry on the ground; a second Blackberry from Tsekouras' vehicle; and two
amounts of cash.
[20] A few moments later, one of the senior investigating officers arrived at the
seized incident to his arrest. They also kept the second Blackberry seized on the
[22] A police officer told Tsekouras that they (the police) would be keeping both
examination, the officer told Tsekouras they (the police) would "revisit" the
device was locked and password protected. The officer lacked the capacity to
[24] The Blackberry that was seized from Tsekouras vehicle was not password
protected. A review of the contents by TBPS revealed nothing relevant for the
[25] The password protected Blackberry seized from Tsekouras was one of
several electronic devices officers of TBPS had seized on takedown day. They
conducted. Since TBPS lacked the capacity to gain access to and analyze the
data on the locked devices, these devices were sent to the RCMP laboratory to
device sent to their lab for examination and analysis. Among other things, the
form required the submitting police agency to state the legal authority for the
[27] The authority relied upon to permit the examination and analysis of
exclude the evidence, it was agreed that this decision did not authorize the
search.
[28] Over the next several months, the RCMP laboratory proceeded to decrypt
[29] Salvatore Larizza was in a tight spot. Project Dolphin investigators had
searched his garage. There, they found 18 pounds of marijuana and 1 kilogram
of cocaine. He was charged with several drug offences, but released from
custody. The conditions on which Larizza had been released included house
[30] Larizza along with his counsel approached Project Dolphin investigators.
Larizza had decided to cooperate with the investigators. About six months after
the drugs found in his (Larizza's) garage. The delivery occurred the night before
takedown day.
[32] The Crown consented to the variation Larizza requested in his release
[33] A month after Larizza's KGB statement, about seven months after
takedown day, TBPS received the data the RCMP had harvested from
to obtain (ITOs) for the search warrants for Project Dolphin, discovered that no
warrant had accompanied Tsekouras' Blackberry when it had been sent to the
RCMP lab.
[34] Analysis of the data sent to TBPS was suspended until a search warrant
the Blackberry and a second harvest of its data. But this could not be done
[35] TBPS continued their analysis of the original data from the Blackberry. Two
[36] About one month after the initial seizure of Tsekouras' Blackberry, an
489.1 of the Criminal Code. In accordance with what was then the practice in
Thunder Bay, the officer put the report in the Court Services mail slot to be sent
to the offices of the justice of the peace for signature. About 90 days later, and
the same manner by leaving them in the Court Services mail slot for delivery to a
[37] The officer who completed the applications for further detention under s.
490(2) was unaware of the notice requirement in the section. No notice was
given to John Tsekouras on any of the three occasions on which the extensions
were sought. The officer was also unaware that a search warrant had been
[38] About 18 months later, investigators found out that 49 Reports to a Justice
required for Project Dolphin searches never reached a justice of the peace.
[39] About ten months after takedown day, police arrested John Tsekouras on
[40] Almost 18 months after takedown day, Frank Muzzi pleaded to four counts
of the counts was in connection with the drugs he had left in Larizza's garage the
[41] The basis upon which Muzzi entered his guilty pleas included:
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was correct.
mother and sister were withdrawn. The Crown agreed Frank Muzzi would not be
[43] At John Tsekouras' trial, the Crown proposed to tender evidence of the
of Muzzi's guilty plea and the statement of facts on which the guilty plea and
conviction were based. Each attracted objection from trial counsel (who is also
[44] The trial judge made several rulings as each pre-trial application
concluded.
[45] He rejected the trial Crown's contention that Tsekouras had no reasonable
[46] The trial judge found the warrantless search of Tsekouras' Blackberry
infringed s. 8 of the Charter, but admitted the evidence obtained in the search
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under s. 24(2). He also admitted Larizza's KGB statement and Muzzi's guilty plea
and its factual underpinnings under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.
[47] John Tsekouras did not testify or call any defence evidence in response to
[48] John Tsekouras ("the appellant") advances five grounds of appeal. Four
relate to evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge. The fifth challenges the
[49] The appellant says that the trial judge erred in admitting as evidence:
iii. the statement of fact filed and relied upon in the guilty plea
iv. the hearsay statements of Larizza and Muzzi under the co-
[50] The appellant also argues that the convictions entered on four counts of
[51] For all practical purposes, this ground of appeal reduces to a claim that the
failing to exclude the contents recovered from the Blackberry under s. 24(2).
detained and its contents harvested have already been canvassed. No useful
features of the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis before turning to the attacks
[53] The trial judge's analysis under s. 24(2) was premised on three discrete,
[54] In his admissibility analysis under s. 24(2), the trial judge considered the
three lines of inquiry mandated by R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
353. He characterized the first line of inquiry the seriousness of the breach as
[55] In his assessment of the seriousness of the Charter infringement, the trial
judge found that investigators did not ignore the necessity for warrants in this
major crime investigation. They made a mistake, however, in connection with the
obtained a warrant. Similarly, the failure to obtain orders under ss. 489.1 and 490
was not the fault of Project Dolphin investigators, rather it was "ultimately the
fault of another branch of the justice system". The failure to obtain the orders
[56] The trial judge acknowledged that the impact of the breach on the Charter-
privacy interest associated with such devices. That said, the trial judge concluded
that the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the appellant
i. the uncertain state of the law about the need for a warrant to
ii. the fact that the appellant was advised when released
indicated not only that it would have been granted had it been
iv. the fact that the officer who sent the Blackberry to the RCMP to
recklessness.
[57] The trial judge concluded that the third line of inquiry under Grant favoured
admission of the evidence which consisted of the actual messages sent and
received on the appellant's Blackberry. This was real evidence of a high degree
[58] In the final analysis, the trial judge was satisfied that the Grant lines of
Blackberry.
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[59] The appellant takes no issue with the findings of constitutional infringement
made by the trial judge. A warrantless search of the Blackberry and seizure of its
data and the unlawful detention of the Blackberry, which amounted to a further
breach of s. 8. But, the appellant says, the trial judge erred in his section 24(2)
[60] The appellant says that the trial judge erred in his overall approach to s.
24(2). The first line of inquiry cannot be fairly described as a "tiebreaker", the role
assigned to it by the trial judge, between the second and third lines of inquiry.
The first two lines of inquiry favour exclusion; the third, admission of the
evidence. But all are of equal importance and are to be balanced together. What
is more, the trial judge failed to properly characterize the seriousness of the
Charter-infringing state conduct when assessing the impact of the breach on the
[61] The appellant also alleges the trial judge made several specific errors in
"crucial" for the Crown's case. The Crown had available to it viva voce evidence
from two co-conspirators, one awaiting trial in separate proceedings (Ritchie) and
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submission. In addition, the trial judge was wrong in minimizing the seriousness
of the Charter breach on the basis that the law on cellphone searches was in a
state of flux at the time the Blackberry was searched. Investigators knew that a
search warrant was required. A warrant accompanied every device except the
reflected bad faith in the face of obvious knowledge of the need for a warrant.
The trial judge committed a further error in finding comfort from the fact that there
were grounds to get a warrant. The existence of grounds while relevant to the
seriousness of the state conduct does not affect the significance of the invasion
490 concerning retention of seized items, the appellant says that the trial judge
and
mandated by Grant would yield a result contrary to the ruling admitting the
[64] The violations were serious. The arrest was arbitrary, thus could not
subsequent search, intentionally done without a warrant. The search could not
comply with the requirements set out by the Supreme Court of Canada for
searches of cell phones incident to arrest in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3
S.C.R. 621.
[65] The appellant says the unconstitutional conduct of the authorities had a
detention was the result of serious systemic failures on the part of TBPS
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investigators, failures that were not mitigated by the belated attempt to regularize
[66] Exclusion of this evidence, the appellant continues, requires that acquittals
be substituted for the convictions entered at trial. Without the evidence provided
new trial would permit the Crown to reverse a tactical decision it made at the first
trial and to attempt to establish guilt on an evidentiary basis available but not
pursued at first instance. The prevailing jurisprudence does not permit the Crown
to do so.
[67] The respondent does not take issue with the findings of constitutional
infringement made by the trial judge, but resists any suggestion of legal error or
palpable or overriding errors of fact in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, or in his
[68] At the outset, the respondent reminds us that we must begin from a stance
of deference to the findings of fact made by the trial judge, absent palpable and
appellant's complaints with caution because, in the main, they are grounded on a
set of facts that the appellant wishes the trial judge had found, rather than those
[69] The respondent says that the trial judge did not treat any single factor or
line of inquiry under Grant as a first among equals or as dispositive of the issue
lines of inquiry or Grant factors. The trial judge's reference to the absence of an
existing jurisprudence and does not constitute error. His misplace of the
[70] According to the respondent, the trial judge's characterization of the law
trial, neither this court nor the Supreme Court of Canada had issued any
Charter rights.
[71] The respondent submits that the existence of grounds to obtain a search
considered a factor that mitigated the seriousness of the police conduct in this
case.
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[72] As for the breaches of ss. 489.1 and 490, the respondent takes issue with
the appellant's submission that the trial judge imposed an obligation on the
appellant to apply for the return of his Blackberry. Fairly read, the reasons of the
trial judge do not support the appellant's claim. Rather, his reference to the
appellant not seeking the return of his Blackberry was just one factor in the
totality of the circumstances that the trial judge considered. The trial judge
properly characterized the nature of the breach and its impact on the admissibility
determination.
[73] The respondent contends that the trial judge properly described the
evidence from the Blackberry as "crucial" to the case for the Crown. It was not
[74] In the end, the respondent says, the trial judge got it right. This evidence
into a criminal trial for the use of the trier of fact or be denied entry. The section
not only recognizes that the admission of constitutionally tainted evidence and its
use to demonstrate guilt may bring the administration of justice into disrepute, but
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also that exclusion of the evidence can equally bring the administration of justice
into disrepute: R. v. McGuffie, 2016 ONCA 365, 336 C.C.C. (3d) 486, at para. 60.
24(2) by considering all the circumstances and pursuing three lines of inquiry.
We examine:
accused; and
[77] In this case, the parties occupy common ground about the fact of
that should follow from the pursuit of those lines of inquiry in this case.
[78] The three lines of inquiry to be followed under Grant entail not only findings
of fact, but also the weighing of various interests frequently at odds with one
another: McGuffie, at para. 64. The trial judge's role in the s. 24(2) application
made at trial was to balance the assessments under each of the three Grant lines
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the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Grant, at
para. 71.
[79] The trial judge found two infringements of s. 8 of the Charter, one of which
yielded evidence that the Crown tendered for admission at trial. The
infringements were:
[80] Before turning to the principles that govern the Grant lines of inquiry and
the standard of review that we are to apply when invited to scrutinize a trial
detained items.
[81] I discuss first, the authority to search a Blackberry or similar device seized
incident to arrest.
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[82] The appellant's initial arrest and the seizure of his Blackberry incident to
arrest took place in 2011.The subsequent extraction of its data took place in
2011 and 2012. The trial judge's s. 24(2) ruling was released on October 20,
2014, nearly two months before the Supreme Court of Canada released its
decision in Fearon about the availability of the power to search incident to arrest
as an authority to permit the search of cellphones and similar devices taken from
a suspect.
[84] First, the Fearon court pointed out that in 2014 Canadian courts had not
incident to arrest permitted the search of cellphones and similar devices found on
the suspect. At least four approaches had emerged: Fearon, at para. 2. If the law
searched and how the search is conducted are strictly incidental to the arrest and
the police keep detailed notes of what has been searched and why: Fearon, at
para. 4.
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[86] Third, the power to search incident to arrest is a focused power assigned
to police so that they can pursue their investigations promptly upon arrest. But
the authority is not without its limits. The search must be truly incidental to the
arrest, that is to say, exercised in the pursuit of a valid purpose related to the
[87] Fourth, a search is properly incidental to arrest when the police attempt to
achieve some valid purpose connected to the arrest, such as protecting evidence
reasonable prospect of finding evidence of the offence for which the accused is
being arrested: Fearon, at para. 22; R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at paras.
19-25. What matters is that there be a link between the location and purpose of
the search and the grounds for the arrest: Fearon, at para. 25; R. v. Nolet, 2010
[88] The Fearon court recognized that some modification of the common law
search incident to arrest power was necessary when the object to be searched
was a cellphone or similar device. After all, searches of these devices have the
potential to be a much more significant invasion of privacy than the typical search
para. 58. Something more than the requirements of a lawful arrest and a search
that is at once truly incidental to the arrest and reasonably conducted is essential
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[89] The Fearon court made it clear that nothing short of strict adherence to the
requirement that a search incident to arrest be truly incidental to the arrest would
The searches must be done promptly to effectively serve their purpose, such as
the discovery of evidence: Fearon, at para. 75. To give effect to this approach,
the court modified the general rules applicable to searches incident to arrest in
three ways.
[90] First, the scope of the search. The scope of the search of a cellphone or
similar device incident to arrest must be tailored to the purpose for which it may
lawfully be conducted. Not only the nature, but also the extent of the search
particular arrest for the particular offence. And so it is, at least as a general rule,
that only recently sent or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log may be
examined. The reason is simple: only those sorts of items will have the
be able to explain, within the limited purposes of search incident to arrest or with
reference to some other valid purpose, what they searched and why they did so:
[91] From this modification of the general rule relating to searches incident to
arrest, it necessarily follows that this search authority is not a blank cheque for
arrest are not routinely permitted simply for the purpose of discovering additional
evidence. A cellphone or similar device search incident to arrest for the purpose
search the device incident to arrest. Investigators must be able to explain why it
was not practical, in all the circumstances of the investigation, to postpone the
[93] Third, a record of the search. Officers executing the search must make
detailed notes of what they have examined on the device and how it was
searched. The applications searched, the extent and time of the search. Its
[94] From Fearon we also learn that police are not entitled to navigate through
unsettled areas of the law by following the least burdensome route. As a general
rule, faced with genuine uncertainty, police should err on the side of caution by
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settling on a course of action that is more, rather than less respectful of the
Post-Seizure Supervision
C.A.), at paras. 112-113. Where the thing seized is not being returned to the
person lawfully entitled to possess it, s. 489.1(1)(b)(ii) requires the seizing officer,
490(1).
[96] The Report to a Justice must be in a statutory form Form 5.2. This form
must describe the authority under which the seizure was made; the thing that
was seized; and where, how or where applicable by whom it is being detained.
The officer who files the report must date and sign it.
officer: R. v. Garcia-Machado, 2015 ONCA 569, 327 C.C.C. (3d) 215, at paras.
[98] Failure to file a Report to a Justice in Form 5.2 means that no post-seizure
supervision of the thing seized will take place: Garcia-Machado, at para. 16. But
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failure to file a Report to a Justice as soon as practicable after a thing has been
[99] Neither section 489.1 nor Form 5.2 has anything to say about how the
peace officer who submits it, but does not require or provide space for a justice to
sign the report to acknowledge its receipt, endorse a disposition or advise the
[100] Section 490 governs extended detention of seized items. Section 490(2)
requires notice to the person from whom a thing has been seized if the thing has
been detained more than three months from the date of seizure. Neither the
section nor any other Code provision prescribes a form for the notice, although s.
clear: while the provision provides the opportunity, no obligation is imposed upon
the person from whom the thing was seized to take any steps for its recovery.
[101] In Garcia-Machado, this court left for another day whether any breach of s.
490, even one that had no real impact on the judicial oversight contemplated by
at para. 55.
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circumstances. The test, broad and imprecise (Grant, at para. 60), requires a trial
judge to assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on societal
accused; and
[104] The first two inquiries operate in tandem. Both pull toward exclusion of
strengthens the pull for and towards exclusion: McGuffie, at para. 62.
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[105] The third line of inquiry society's interest in the adjudication of the merits
This is a pull that reaches its zenith when the evidence tendered for admission is
at once reliable and crucial to the case for the Crown: McGuffie, at para. 62. See
also, R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at paras. 33-34.
[106] These lines of inquiry under Grant involve fact-finding and the assignment
para. 86; R. v. Patterson, 2017 SCC 15, at para. 54; R. v. Ct, 2011 SCC 46,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 215, at para. 48; R. v. Manchulenko, 2013 ONCA 543, 301
unreasonable: McGuffie, at para. 64; Grant, at paras. 86, 127; R. v. Cole, 2012
[108] The first line of inquiry under Grant requires a trial judge to evaluate the
seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct. This conduct will vary in its
the other. The same may be said about the effect of admitting the evidence on
the other hand, no rewards are given for ignorance of Charter standards.
Negligence or wilful blindness is not the equivalent of good faith: Grant, at para.
75. Nor can good faith be based on an unreasonable error or ignorance about
the officers scope of authority: R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631,
at para. 59; R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 55. The more
deliberate the conduct of the police in breach of the Charter, the more likely this
[110] The second line of inquiry requires an examination of the extent to which
the Charter breach actually interfered with or undermined the interests protected
by the right infringed. Again here there is a spectrum: fleeting and technical to
profoundly intrusive. The more serious the impact, the greater the risk that
admission of the evidence will bring the administration of justice into disrepute by
signalling to the public that the high-sounding nature of the rights is belied by
their feeble evidentiary impact in proceedings against the person whose rights
[111] To determine the seriousness of the infringement under this line of inquiry,
a court must look to the interests engaged by the right infringed and examine the
extent to which the violation actually impacted on those interests: Grant, at para.
dignity is more seriousness than one that does not: Grant, at para. 78.
of an accused, discoverability retains a useful role. The more likely that the
evidence would have been obtained without the Charter-infringing state conduct,
the lesser may be the impact of that Charter-infringing conduct on the underlying
interests protected by the Charter right. The converse is also true: Grant, at para.
122. See also, Cole, at paras. 93 and 97. Of course discoverability is a double
edged sword. It may signal that the breach of the accuseds right was less
serious. But it also renders the state conduct more egregious as the evidence
2014 BCCA 43, 306 C.C.C. (3d) 222, at para. 51; Ct, 2011 SCC 46, [2011]
[113] A final point concerns the evidentiary underpinnings for circumstances said
R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389, 337 C.C.C. (3d) 402, at paras. 95-98.
[114] As I will explain, I would not give effect to this ground of appeal. In my
view, the trial judge did not err in his overall approach to the admissibility issue
under s. 24(2) or in connection with the specific flaws identified by the appellant.
[115] At the outset, it is essential to keep in mind that the admissibility inquiry in
which the trial judge engaged under s. 24(2) of the Charter includes not only
findings of fact, but also the weighing of various interests frequently at odds with
characterizations of the nature and extent of any breach are entitled to deference
absent palpable and overriding errors of fact, errors of law or principle or plainly
unreasonable conclusions.
[116] Second, while it was necessary for the trial judge to consider the three
or order in which these lines of inquiry are to be considered. Further, the trial
overarching principle is that the trial judge must take into account all the
[117] Third, I do not read the trial judge's observation about the first line of
inquiry being a "tie breaker" as reflecting error in assigning that line of inquiry a
the trial judge was simply pointing out that when one factor favours exclusion
(line of inquiry #2) and another admission (line of inquiry #3), the outcome of the
remaining line of inquiry is apt (although not in every circumstance) to dictate the
probabilities.
[118] Fourth, the trial judge did not err in considering the uncertain state of the
law as a relevant factor in his s. 24(2) analysis. Recall that in 2014 the Supreme
arrest, or whether some further authority, like a search warrant, was required. In
[119] Further, it was not error for the trial judge to conclude from the fact that a
search warrant was later obtained that had one been sought immediately after
seizure of the Blackberry, it would likely have been granted, the contents
analysis. That the evidence was discovered without a warrant was not the
[120] The trial judge also found an infringement of s. 8 of the Charter because
police had failed to file any Report to a Justice in Form 5.2 and failed to notify the
[121] In this case, unlike in Garcia-Machado, the police did complete on several
occasions a Report to a Justice. In accordance with what was then the practice,
they left the reports for delivery to a justice of the peace. Delivery never
happened, but not for dint of effort. This case is different from Garcia-Machado,
[122] The second ground of appeal challenges the decision of the trial judge to
accused who had been separately charged but died before trial.
[123] A brief description of the background, the circumstances under which the
statement came to be taken and the ruling of the trial judge for admitting it as
evidence will serve as a useful framework for the discussion that follows.
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[124] On takedown day, police executed a search warrant at Sal Larizza's home.
marijuana. Police suspected, but could not prove, that the drugs had been
stashed there by Muzzi and Ritchie. Larizza was arrested. Neither Muzzi nor
[125] Sal Larizza remained in custody for about a week after his arrest until he
was released on bail. The terms of his release required him to live at his sister's
home where he was to occupy a single room together with his young daughter.
[126] A few days after his arrest, Sal Larizza was interviewed by police. The
interview was audio and videotaped. Larizza denied knowing about how the
drugs came to be found in his garage at home. He said that his home was not a
[127] There was no formal motion to admit Larizza's post-arrest statement on the
voir dire to determine the admissibility of his later KGB statement. In the interests
of trial fairness, the trial judge admitted the earlier statement. It was relevant to
[128] About three months after his arrest, Sal Larizza asked the Crown to
deletion of the house arrest term and a change in the residence condition.
Discussions took place between Larizza, his lawyer and the lead investigator
about Larizza providing a statement explaining how the marijuana and cocaine
got into his garage where they were found on takedown day.
[130] Larizza's statement was audio and video recorded. It was given under
oath. Larizza was warned about the consequences of making a false statement.
He was told that the statement would be disclosed to those facing trial. The
[131] In his KGB statement, Sal Larizza admitted that he had provided a stash
house for Muzzi and another man. Both had a key to his (Larizza's) house and
could come and go as they pleased. Muzzi and another man showed up in
Muzzi's truck the evening before takedown day. They asked whether they could
[132] Sal Larizza denied knowledge of any cocaine being part of the delivery the
in Larizza's home.
[133] Sal Larizza died prior to trial. Somebody killed him in his own home.
[134] The case for admissibility of Larizza's KGB statement was advanced under
[136] The trial judge considered the cumulative effect of several factors in
information;
iv. the events described in the statement were within Larizza's direct
knowledge;
vi. the initiative for the statement originated with Larizza, not the
material aspects;
charges;
[137] The trial judge also considered Larizzas previous statement to the police
[138] The trial judge admitted Larizza's KGB statement. It does not appear that
he was asked to exclude it on the basis that its prejudicial effect exceeded its
probative value.1
1
While a trial judge is nevertheless obliged to balance whether the probative effect of the statement
outweighs its prejudicial value, here, it was obvious that he did.
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[139] The appellant contests the trial judge's admissibility ruling on two grounds.
He says that the trial judge did not provide adequate reasons for his decision,
thus rendering it impervious to appellate review. He also argues that what the
trial judge did say reveals that he considered irrelevant factors and failed to
[140] On the inadequacy of reasons, the appellant says that the trial judge
devoted the majority of his reasons to a rote repetition of the governing legal
principles, but offered no real insight into why he found threshold reliability
here was the inability of the appellant to cross-examine the declarant. Yet the
trial judge failed to consider whether or how the circumstances in which the
statement was made could and did function as an adequate substitute or proxy
[141] The appellant submits that in reaching his conclusion on reliability, the trial
judge failed to consider that Larizza's motive in providing the statement was to
obtain a significant bail variation and that the KGB statement was fundamentally
at odds with his post-arrest statement given five months earlier in which he
continues, the trial judge assigned a place in his analysis to factors of which no
account should have been taken. That Larizza took the initiative, consulted a
lawyer and repeated crucial information several times. And that the statement
was strikingly similar to what Muzzi admitted on his guilty plea. The trial judge
also failed to recognize the double hearsay aspect of the statement when Larizza
repeated what he claimed Muzzi said when he (Muzzi) had asked to store the
[143] The respondent supports the admissibility ruling of the trial judge. The trial
judge's reasons are adequate to permit meaningful appellate review. They reveal
[144] The respondent reminds us that in considering this alleged error, we are to
[145] The respondent says that the trial judge's ruling reflects governing
which the statement came about. In this case, the trial judge took into account
confirmed by other evidence, such as Muzzi's guilty plea. He did not consider
irrelevant factors, at least none that marred the essential features of his analysis
[146] At the outset, factual findings that underpin a finding of admissibility are
2013 SCC 41, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720, at para. 31; R. v. Chretien, 2014 ONCA 403,
[147] The central underlying concern with the admission of hearsay evidence is
the inability of the party opposite to cross-examine the declarant on the truth and
narration and sincerity:, at paras. 18-19; R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2
[148] When hearsay evidence is tendered for admission under the principled
exception to the hearsay rule and no issue arises about the necessity
requirement because of the death of the declarant, the task of the trial judge is to
determine whether the reliability requirement has been met. Reliability, the
[149] It is well established that the reliability requirement under the principled
exception to the hearsay rule refers to threshold, not ultimate reliability. After all,
the ultimate reliability of any piece of evidence received in a criminal trial is for
the trier of fact to determine in the context of all the evidence adduced at trial:
[150] Since the underlying concern when hearsay evidence is proposed for
requirement under the principled approach seeks to identify those cases in which
[151] A proponent who seeks the reception of hearsay evidence under the
two ways. One way is to show that no real concern exists about the truth of the
concern arises from the introduction of the statement in hearsay form because, in
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the circumstances, the opponent can sufficiently test its truth and accuracy:
Khelowan, at paras. 62-63. See also, R. v. Blackman, 2008 SCC 37, [2008] 2
[152] These two methods of satisfying the reliability requirement are not mutually
exclusive: Khelowan, at para. 65; Blackman, at para. 65; R. v. Devine, 2008 SCC
36, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 283, at paras. 22-23. That said, where the declarant is not
available for cross-examination, the focus of the reliability inquiry will necessarily
be on the circumstances in which the statement came about. The trial judge
should consider the cumulative effect of all the evidence relevant to the reliability
issue with his or her focus on the particular dangers presented by the evidence:
Khelowan, at para. 4.
undertake a more functional approach with their focus on the particular dangers
raised by the hearsay evidence tendered for admission. But the approach of the
trial judge to the reliability requirement and, more broadly, the issue of
admissibility, must respect the distinction in roles between the trier of law and the
trier of fact. To retain the integrity of the fact-finding process, the issue of ultimate
about the circumstances in which the statement was made, a trial judge may also
[155] A final point concerns the duty of a trial judge to give reasons when ruling
reasons.
[156] The robust body of jurisprudence about the duty of trial judges to provide
reasons for recording convictions and the scope of appellate review of those
reasons for sufficiency does not apply in the same way to evidentiary rulings.
ruling is not fatal provided that the decision is supportable on the evidence or the
basis for the decision is apparent from the circumstances. The importance of the
compels reasons: See, R. v. Woodard, 2009 MBCA 42, 245 C.C.C. (3d) 522, at
[157] As I will explain, I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
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[158] The trial judge was required to decide whether the Crown had established
that Larizza's KGB statement satisfied the reliability requirement of the principled
to determine whether the Crown had shown that there was no real concern about
the truth of the statement because of the circumstances in which it came about.
[159] To begin, I am satisfied that the reasons of the trial judge on his
reasons record the principles that the trial judge considered and, albeit briefly,
why he was satisfied that the reliability requirement had been met. Nothing more
was necessary.
[160] Second, the factual findings that go into the determination of reliability are
entitled to deference. The trial judge was well-placed to assess the hearsay
case.
[161] Among the circumstances in which the statement was made, recall that,
statement was made under oath with a warning about the consequences of
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providing false information to the police. Larizza was told that the statement
would be disclosed to those affected by it. The information Larizza provided was
investigation.
[162] To be fair, some of the factors that the trial judge noted seem unhelpful in
determining the threshold reliability of the statement. That Larizza took the
considerations do not warrant interference with the reliability finding, given the
[163] Third, the trial judge was well aware of the motive that underlay Larizza's
statement. He wanted his bail varied. But the judge also knew that whatever
Larizza said, it would make no difference to the charges outstanding against him.
He took those factors into account although they seem to have greater relevance
to the issue of the ultimate reliability than to what is required for reliability under
[164] Fourth, the trial judge had an advantage not often available in cases
The trial judge was an eye and ear witness to the statement, thus was in a
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position to evaluate, at the threshold, the sincerity of Larizza to the extent it was
[165] Finally, the double hearsay claim is misplaced. Larizza recounted what
Muzzi (and Ritchie) said and did the night before takedown day. They brought
drugs to Larizza's house. They asked about leaving them in his garage. They did
common unlawful design to traffic in controlled substances. What they did and
what Larizza saw them doing was not hearsay. Their joint request was not
hearsay. To the extent it implied trafficking, it was properly admissible under the
[166] This ground of appeal also has to do with evidence received at trial after a
[167] Frank Muzzi was arrested on takedown day on several drug offences and
cocaine and marijuana found in Larizza's garage on takedown day. Shortly after
Sal Larizza gave his KGB statement to police, Muzzi was charged with further
offences arising out of the seizure of the cocaine and marijuana in Larizza's
garage.
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the trial Crown to support the plea included a reference to a part of Larizza's KGB
statement. The excerpt was a passage in which Larizza recounted what Muzzi
had said when he brought a box over to Larizza's house and asked whether he
Muzzi left the box. The following morning police executed a search warrant at
[169] Muzzi's counsel said: "my client acknowledges his involvements in the
events in question and the facts with respect to these activities are
mother and sister were withdrawn. Although the record of his guilty plea and
sentencing proceedings contains no mention of it, the trial Crown also agreed not
to call Frank Muzzi as a witness in any future proceedings against the other
alleged co-conspirators.
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[171] The trial judge admitted the fact that Muzzi pleaded guilty and made
admissions for a non-hearsay purpose on the voir dire and the trial. The judge
concluded:
[172] The appellant says that the trial judge was wrong to admit the Muzzi plea
and acknowledged facts. Each was hearsay. Neither was necessary nor reliable.
[173] The appellant focuses principally on the trial judge's failure to consider the
federal penitentiary. He was a competent and compellable witness for the Crown.
There was no suggestion that, if called as a witness, he would resile from the
admissions he made on entering his guilty plea. His availability meant that the
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necessity requirement could not be satisfied and the evidence should have been
excluded.
[174] The appellant says that this evidence had no legitimate non-hearsay use,
thus should not have been received on this basis either. It is well-settled that the
[175] The respondent rejects any suggestion that this evidence was received or
used by the trial judge as evidence of the truth of the facts admitted. The
[176] The plea of guilty of one person accused of a crime is not evidence, much
less proof, that another, accused of the same crime, committed it: R. v. Berry
(1957), 118 C.C.C. 55 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 60. A plea of guilty is a formal admission
by its maker of each essential element of the offence to which the plea is
entered. This formal admission relieves the Crown of the burden of proving these
[177] The pleas of guilty or convictions of other alleged co-conspirators are not
admissible to prove the existence or fact of the conspiracy in the trial of another
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may be proven in a variety of ways. For example, the person who pleaded guilty
may testify to that effect. Documentary evidence of the plea may be received
records or the provisions of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. See,
R. v. Caesar, 2016 ONCA 599, 339 C.C.C. (3d) 354, at para. 33.
earlier proceeding, but they are not rendered admissible as evidence of the truth
some listed or principled exception if proving the truth of their contents is the
object of their proponent: Caesar, at para. 47. Needless to say, if the proponent's
[180] Three brief points should be made about the operation of the hearsay rule
in the circumstances.
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[181] First, a critical feature of the hearsay rule is the purpose for which the
is offered to prove the truth of its contents that the hearsay rule applies and
[182] Second, what a person says may have probative value as non-hearsay, as
for example, to establish the identity of the speaker. Used in this way, no
assumption of the truth of the statement is required and the hearsay rule is not
[183] Third, evidence of things done and said by alleged co-conspirators may be
Admissibility on this basis for this purpose depends on the inferences available
from the evidence as a whole. Evidence of things done and said admitted for this
Puddicombe, 2013 ONCA 506, 299 C.C.C. (3d) 534, at para. 112.
[184] I would not accede to the argument advanced in support of this ground of
[185] First, the basis on which the evidence was admitted and used. The
evidence of Muzzi's plea of guilty and the iteration of the facts on which it was
based was neither tendered nor used to prove the truth of what was said. It was
used on the voir dire in determining the threshold reliability of Larizza's KGB
statement and in proving Muzzi's identity as a person with whom the appellant
what Muzzi said and did, as for example in Larizza's garage the night before the
agreement to traffic in controlled substances. The manner in which the trial judge
used this evidence in determining whether the appellant's guilt had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt did not exceed the basis upon which it was tendered
Ground #4: The Admissibility of Muzzi's and Larizza's Statements under the
Co-conspirators' Exception
[188] This ground of appeal asserts error in the reception of evidence of Muzzi's
utterances on the night before takedown day and Larizza's repetition of them in
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The point raised is a narrow one and can be determined briefly in light of the
[189] In a brief endorsement, the trial judge reviewed the argument advanced at
trial and relying upon R. v. Chang (2003), 173 C.C.C. (3d) 397 (Ont. C.A.)
accepts that under the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule, acts and
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admitted against other probable members of the conspiracy to prove their actual
a co-accused.
[191] The appellant also accepts that it is his burden to demonstrate why in this
case the evidence did not meet the fundamental criteria applicable to the
principled approach to the hearsay rule. However, he says that he has met that
burden because the acts and declarations of Muzzi do not satisfy the necessity
requirement under the principled approach. The appellant points out that Muzzi
was available to testify for the Crown. He was in a federal penitentiary serving a
witness for the Crown and his attendance could be compelled by subpoena.
Nothing in the trial record indicates that he would have been uncooperative or
would have failed to give evidence in accordance with the admissions he made
evidence inadmissible.
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[192] The respondent takes the position that the evidence in issue was properly
furtherance of the common unlawful object, was admissible despite its hearsay
rule, the co-conspirators' exception satisfies the criteria of necessity and reliability
admissible under the co-conspirators' exception may not satisfy the necessity
and reliability requirements of the principled approach. But those instances will
be rare. In this case, as the trial judge properly concluded, the appellant has
competent witness for the Crown at the appellant's trial and could be compelled
to testify, calling him as a witness would leave the Crown open to an argument
that any prosecution of Ritchie after he gave evidence at the appellant's trial
[196] In connection with Muzzi, who was also a competent witness for the Crown
respondent submits that he too was unavailable. When Muzzi pleaded guilty and
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received an agreed-upon sentence, the trial Crown agreed that Muzzi would not
conspirators. This was an agreement that the trial Crown could make in the
[197] In addition, the respondent reminds us, the necessity requirement refers to
reasonable necessity. It may be met where a trial judge is satisfied that there is
appeal.
[199] First, the relationship between the listed and principled exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
[200] The traditional or listed exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as the co-
necessity and reliability have not been met. But these instances are said to be
[202] Second, the relationship between the co-conspirators' exception and the
principled approach.
[203] The co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule meets the requirements
of the principled approach to the hearsay rule: Mapara, at para. 31. The
where we cannot expect to get evidence of the same value from the same or
other sources: R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, at pp. 933-934; Chang, at para.
105. Whether the necessity criterion has been met requires a consideration of all
[207] First, it is a "rare case" in which evidence that is admissible under the co-
conspirators' exception does not also satisfy the indicia of necessity and reliability
under the principled exception. Reliability is not an issue here and, in any event,
entitled to deference.
unavailability of the declarant is not the only basis upon which necessity may be
established.
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[209] Third, for different reasons, relevant direct evidence was not available from
either Ritchie or Muzzi, thus the necessity for its introduction under the hearsay
exception.
[210] For practical purposes, Muzzi was not available to give evidence for the
witness for the Crown and could be compelled to testify. But whether as a quid
pro quo for his guilty plea or otherwise, the trial Crown agreed that Muzzi would
not be called as a witness for the Crown in any later prosecution of an alleged
here.
[211] As for the availability of Ritchie to provide relevant direct evidence, the
circumstances are different, but the result the same. As a separately indicted
accused Ritchie was competent and could be compelled to give evidence for the
Crown. But, leaving to one side his willingness to testify and to do so truthfully,
about which we know nothing, requiring him to testify at the appellant's trial would
invite an application by Ritchie at his own trial to stay proceedings for abuse of
process.
[212] In the end, there is also the question of onus. That fell upon the appellant
to establish that this was one of the "rare cases" in which the co-conspirators'
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this case, because it failed to establish necessity. In that task, the appellant
failed.
[214] The trial judge found the appellant not guilty of trafficking cocaine as a
result of his purchase of cocaine from a person described as "Penguin" and also
of conspiracy to traffic cocaine with Penguin. The trial judge considered the
evidence adduced at trial insufficient to ground a finding that Penguin was aware
that the appellant purchased the cocaine for the purpose of selling it.
[215] The trial judge then examined the relationship between the appellant and
Ritchie. He found that Ritchie's assistance in acquiring the cocaine from Penguin
reaching this conclusion, the judge considered the nature of the relationship
between the two men; the substantial amount of cocaine involved; and Ritchie's
use of the same method of transferring money that he had used in the past in
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drawing an inference that the cocaine two kilograms would be trafficked. The
[216] The trial judge was also satisfied that the appellant had constructive
iii. the appellant was provided with the tracking details for the
[217] The appellant acknowledges that the trial judge correctly concluded that,
conspiracy to traffic or trafficking cocaine with Penguin. Where the trial judge
erred, the appellant says, was in drawing the further inferences necessary to
[218] The appellant contends that the cumulative effect of the evidence
demonstrated nothing more than that Ritchie was an agent for the purchaser
the appellant whose only role was to send the money to Penguin. There was
no evidence that Ritchie knew the purpose for which the money was being sent.
It follows that the evidence could not support a finding that Ritchie and the
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appellant conspired to traffic cocaine. In addition, the simple fact that money was
sent and cocaine shipped did not establish that the appellant was in possession
[219] The respondent begins with a brief reminder about the scope of review
issue is whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially,
appellate court must not revisit findings of fact made or inferences drawn by triers
of fact. These findings and inferences are entitled to significant deference and
cannot be pushed aside simply because other inferences may have been
available or the reviewing court would not have decided the case in the same
way.
[220] The respondent says that the cumulative effect of the email
correspondence adduced at trial showed that the appellant and Ritchie worked
together to purchase and have delivered two kilograms of cocaine from Penguin.
[221] The respondent contends that the appellant had constructive possession of
the two kilograms of cocaine shipped by Penguin in return for the cash payment
sent by Ritchie. The appellant knew that Penguin sent cocaine to him, in return
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for a cash payment, and provided the appellant with the tracking details
possession.
[222] Finally, the respondent relies on the fact that the appellant did not provide
[223] Several principles of general application have a say in our decision on this
inferences from evidence adduced at trial. Yet others explain the requirements
the verdict rendered is one that a properly instructed jury or a judge could
2012 SCC 22, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 746, at para. 9. We must not of course merely
substitute our view for that of the trial judge. However, in order to apply the test,
disadvantage, re-weigh and consider the effect of the evidence adduced at trial:
Yebes, at p. 186.
[226] A verdict may also be unreasonable if the trial judge has drawn an
See, R.P., at para. 9; R. v. Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 4,
16 and 19-21.
[227] In considering the reasonableness of the verdict, this court may infer from
v. Ellis, 2013 ONCA 739, 303 C.C.C. (3d) 228, at para. 51.
drawn in the circumstances. A single item or several items of evidence may give
rise to more than one inference. It is for the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, to
determine what inferences are to be drawn from the evidence taken as a whole
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and whether the cumulative effect of those inferences satisfies or falls short of
[230] Whether a trial judge has drawn the proper inference from a fact or group
Kent, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 133, at p. 143. Appellate courts may not interfere with the
findings of fact made and the factual inferences drawn by a trial judge unless
i. clearly wrong;
Any error must be plainly identified and be shown to have affected the result. In
other words, the error must be shown to be at once palpable and overriding: R. v.
evidence may support more than one inference. The same may be said of
items of evidence, or from the evidence as a whole, does not entitle a reviewing
inference of its own. The task of the reviewing court is to determine whether the
inferences drawn by the trial judge are "reasonably supported by the evidence".
No more. No less. See, H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005]
those ways is knowingly having the thing in some place, irrespective of whether
the person owns or occupies the place, for the use or benefit of himself or
[235] The core findings of fact made by the trial judge do not reflect palpable and
overriding error. The inferences drawn by the trial judge from the cumulative
effect of this evidence fall well within the field of reasonable inferences available
transaction between Ritchie and the appellant, on the one hand, and Penguin, on
the other. The quantity of drugs shipped two kilograms was plainly for the
purpose of trafficking. The drugs were being shipped to a place for pick-up in a
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package that the appellant had the information necessary to locate. Nothing
CONCLUSION