Rule 68 Cases
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167420 June 5, 2009
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
RUPERTO JOSE H. MATEO, represented by WARLITA MATEO, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Allied Banking Corporation (petitioner) seeking
to reverse the Decision1 dated October 21, 2004, as well as the Order 2 dated February 10, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City, docketed as SCA No. 35-0145 for legal redemption
with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.
On February 19, 1996, Ruperto Jose Mateo (respondent) obtained a loan from petitioner in the amount
of P950,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, respondent executed in favor of petitioner a deed of
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in respondents name under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 236351 of the Register of Deeds of Isabela. He likewise executed a promissory note in the
amount of P950,000.00. Subsequently, respondent incurred default in the payment of his loan prompting
petitioner to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the subject property. The
property was sold at public auction for P1,531,474.53 with petitioner as the sole and highest bidder. The
Certificate of Sale was issued to petitioner, and was registered with the Register of Deeds on July 21,
1999.
Respondent, through her attorney-in-fact, Warlita N. Mateo (Warlita), sent, on several dates, faxed letters
to petitioner signifying his desire to redeem the foreclosed property for P1.1 million pesos.
On July 21, 2000, or on the last day of the period for redemption, respondent, represented by Warlita, filed
a case for legal redemption with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the
RTC of Isabela.
On January 19, 2001, petitioner effected the consolidation of its ownership over the subject property and
TCT No. 311043 was issued in its name on March 2, 2001.
During the pre-trial conference on September 18, 2002, respondent offered to redeem the property for the
foreclosed amount of P1,531,474.53, but petitioner refused. Instead of continuing with the trial, the parties
agreed to submit the case for summary judgment.
On October 21, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
against the defendant, ALLOWING the plaintiff to redeem from the defendant the property now covered by
TCT No. T-311043 in the name of the defendant, upon payment of the amount of P1,531,474.53, plus one
(1) percent as interest for one (1) month only, and ORDERING the defendant to accept the tender of
redemption of the plaintiff and to deliver the proper certificate of redemption to the latter and finally,
ordering the defendant to indemnify the plaintiff P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and cost of the suit. 3
In so ruling, the RTC found that: (1) respondent had the right to redeem the foreclosed property from
petitioner, as the one year period to redeem had not yet expired when respondent filed the instant case; (2)
even prior to the filing of the case, respondent had sent petitioner several faxed letters to show his sincere
desire to avail himself of the right to redeem the property from petitioner; (3) respondent already offered to
pay the foreclosed price of P1,531,474.53 as in fact he had consigned P1.1 million in the Land Bank. The
trial court also found that respondent began to exercise the right to redeem on August 10, 1999 when he,
through Warlita, sent a letter to petitioner on his intention to redeem; thus, applying Section 28, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, respondent should pay as redemption price the foreclosed amount of P1,531,474.53,
plus one percent interest for the month that lapsed until August 10, 1999.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in an Order 4 dated February 10,
2005.lavvphi1
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC ruled that respondents offer of P1,531,474.53 made
during the pre-trial conference already covered petitioners bid price at the foreclosure auction sale, which
already incorporated the interest, penalties, attorneys fees and other expenses of sale; that such purchase
price should be the basis of the redemption price, plus interest at one percent, in order to afford
respondent a greater chance to redeem the foreclosed property.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court, alleging that:
THE LOWER COURT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THAT:
I. It is considered sufficient tender and consignation the amount which was less than the price
for which the property was bought and in the manner not in conformity with the law and settled
jurisprudence.
II. It applied the provisions of Sec. 28, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Act No. 3135 in the
computation of the redemption price even when the said basis has been superseded by Sec.
78 of the General Banking Act (now Section 47 of RA 8791). 5
Petitioner contends that: (1) the RTC erred in considering the various offers made by respondent to
redeem the subject property for the amount of P1.1 million as sufficient tender of payment for purposes of
redemption; (2) the tender to be legally sufficient must be for the amount of the purchase price, plus the
agreed interest rate on the principal obligation; (3) the RTC erred in considering the deposit of P1.1 million
with Land Bank as sufficient consignation, since the amount should have been deposited in court and not
anywhere else; (4) the offer to redeem in the amount of P1,531,474.53 was made only during the pre-trial
conference, which was already way past the redemption period; and (5) the redemption price should be
based on Section 47 of the General Banking Act.
1
In his Comment, respondent claims that the petition should be denied outright, because it raises questions
of fact and not purely of law; that the issue as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the amount tendered by
respondent is a question of fact, as the Court should consider the factual evidence in relation to the
computation of the purchase price paid by petitioner during the foreclosure sale and the price offered by
respondent; that he offered to pay petitioners purchase amount of P1,531,474.53 during the pre-trial
conference; that he can still exercise the right of redemption over the subject property; and that a previous
tender of payment and consignation is only proper but is not essential when the redemptioner exercises his
right to redeem the foreclosed property through the filing of a judicial action within the period of
redemption.
In its Reply, petitioner argues that the case was decided on stipulation of facts by the parties; thus, any
appeal from a judgment based on stipulation of facts can only be on questions of law; that, whether under
Section 28, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court or Section 47 of the General Banking Act, the minimum
redemption amount is P1,531,474.53, which was the amount paid by petitioner during the foreclosure sale.
Preliminarily, the Court would first address the procedural matter raised by respondent: that the petition
should be denied outright because it raises questions of fact and not purely of law. Respondent claims that
the issue as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the amount tendered by respondent is a question of fact,
which could not be raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
We are not persuaded.
Notably, it was already stipulated upon by the parties that respondent offered P1.1 million as redemption
price before the filing of this action; thus, the issue is not the amount of redemption price, but the
sufficiency of the amount offered by respondent that would warrant the redemption of the foreclosed
property. This is a question of law as it calls for the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter, which is within the purview of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
The Court will now address the main issues presented, to wit:
(1) Whether or not respondent still has the right to redeem the subject property; and
(2) Whether or not Section 78 of the General Banking Act 6 should be applied to the
computation of the redemption price.
Section 6 of Act No. 3135,7 as amended by Act No. 4118, provides for a valid redemption, to wit:
SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred
to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any
person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property
is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and
such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four
hundred and sixty-six, inclusive,8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as these are not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act.
Considering that petitioner is a banking institution, the determination of the redemption price for the
foreclosed property should be governed by Section 78 of the General Banking Act. Union Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,9 is instructive:
x x x Petitioners contention that Section 78 of the General Banking Act governs the determination of the
redemption price of the subject property is meritorious. In Ponce de Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, this Court had occasion to rule that Section 78 of the General Banking Act had the effect of
amending Section 6 of Act No. 3135 insofar as the redemption price is concerned when the mortgagee is a
bank, as in this case, or a banking or credit institution. The apparent conflict between the provisions of Act
No. 3135 and the General Banking Act was, therefore, resolved in favor of the latter, being a special and
subsequent legislation. This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals where we
held that the amount at which the foreclosed property is redeemable is the amount due under the
mortgage deed, or the outstanding obligation of the mortgagor plus interest and expenses in accordance
with Section 78 of the General Banking Act. It was, therefore, manifest error on the part of the Court of
Appeals to apply in the case at bar the provisions of Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in fixing the
redemption price of the subject foreclosed property.
And Section 78 provides:
Sec. 78. In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate
which is security for any loan granted before the passage of this Act or under the provisions of this Act, the
mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the
full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank, banking or credit institution, within the purview of this
Act shall have the right, within one year after the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure of the
respective mortgage, to redeem the property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of
execution, or the amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon at the
rate specified in the mortgage, and all the costs, and judicial and other expenses incurred by the bank or
institution concerned by reason of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of said property
less the income received from the property.
In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Veloso, 10 the Court had occasion to state the requirements for the
redemption of the foreclosed property. The Court held:
The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests his
desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of
payment. This constitutes the exercise of the right to repurchase.
In several cases decided by the Court where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly
exercised, there was an unequivocal tender of payment for the full amount of the repurchase price.
Otherwise, the offer to redeem is ineffectual. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies a
reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the redemption
period fixed by law can easily be circumvented.11
In this case, it was stipulated upon by the parties that the real estate mortgage over respondents property
was foreclosed in the amount of P1,531,474.53, and that respondent offered the amount of P1.1 million as
redemption price before the filing of the complaint. It has been held that the tender of payment must be for
the full amount of the purchase price, i.e., the amount fixed by the court in the order of execution or the
amount due under the mortgage deed, as the case may be, with interest thereon at the rate specified in the
mortgage; and all the costs, and judicial and other expenses incurred by the bank or institution concerned
by reason of the execution and sale and as a result of the custody of said property less the income
received from the property. Thus, the amount of P1.1 million offered by respondent was ineffective, since
not only did the amount not include the interest but it was even below the purchase price. Such offer did
not effect a valid redemption, and petitioner was justified in refusing to accept such offer.
2
The RTC found that the instant case for legal redemption must prosper, as the one-year period to redeem
had not yet expired when respondents filed the case. Notably, respondents filed the instant case on July
21, 2000 which was within one year from the registration of the Certificate of Sale on July 21, 1999. The
question now is whether such judicial redemption is proper under the circumstances.
In Hi Yield Realty, Inc v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court held:
What is the redemptioners option therefore when the redemption period is about to expire and the
redemption cannot take place on account of disagreement over the redemption price?
According to jurisprudence, the redemptioner faced with such a problem may preserve his right of
redemption through judicial action which in every case must be filed within the one-year period of
redemption. The filing of the court action to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem, would have the effect of preserving his redemptive rights and "freezing" the expiration of the one-
year period. This is a fair interpretation provided the action is filed on time and in good faith, the
redemption price is finally determined and paid within a reasonable time, and the rights of the parties are
respected.
Stated otherwise, the foregoing interpretation, as applied to the case at bar, has three critical dimensions:
(1) timely redemption or redemption by expiration date (or, as what happened in this case, the
redemptioner was forced to resort to judicial action to "freeze" the expiration of the redemption period); (2)
good faith as always, meaning, the filing of the private respondents action on August 13, 1993 must have
been for the sole purpose of determining the redemption price and not to stretch the redemptive period
indefinitely; and (3) once the redemption price is determined within a reasonable time, the redemptioner
must make prompt payment in full.
Conversely, if private respondent had to resort to judicial action to stall the expiration of the redemptive
period on August 13, 1993 because he and the petitioner could not agree on the redemption price which
still had to be determined, private respondent could not thereby be expected to tender payment
simultaneously with the filing of the action on said date. 13
As above-stated, for the action to be considered filed in good faith, the filing of the action must have been
for the sole purpose of determining the redemption price and not to stretch the redemptive period
indefinitely. In this case, it was sufficiently shown that respondents offer of P1.1 million was even below the
amount paid by petitioner in the foreclosure sale. Notably, in petitioners Answer to respondents complaint,
it had alleged that, as of June 16, 2000, the redemption price of the foreclosed property consisting of the
amount due under the mortgage deed, the interest specified in the mortgage and all the costs and
expenses incurred by petitioner from the sale and custody of the property already amounted
to P2,058,825.73.14 Yet, during the pre-trial conference, respondent merely offered to pay the amount of
the auction price alone which was P1,531,474.53, without any payment of interest. In fact, respondent
never even consigned such amount in court to show good faith.
It is not difficult to understand why the redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else
validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem
is being made in good faith.15 Thus, the Court finds that respondents action for legal redemption was not
filed in good faith. It was not filed for the purpose of determining the correct redemption price, but to stretch
the redemption period indefinitely.16
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2004, as well as the
Order dated February 10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Santiago City, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The action for legal redemption filed by respondent is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
3
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200567 June 22, 2015

METOROPLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC. and SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR. and LEONIZA * F. REYSONO, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before Us is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 28, 2011 Decision 1 and February 13, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered in CA-G.R. CV No.
91424. Said ruling dismissed petitioner Metropolitan Banking and Trust Companys (MBTCs) claim for deficiency payment upon foreclosing respondents mortgaged properties and ordered the bank, instead, to return to
respondent mortgagors the excess amount of PhP 722,602.22.

The Facts

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

From February to October 1997, respondent CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc. (CPR Promotions) obtained loans from petitioner MBTC. These loans were covered by fifteen (15) promissory note (PNs) all signed by
respondents, spouses Leoniza F. Reynoso and Cornelio P. Reynoso, Jr. (spouses Reynoso), as Treasurer and President of CPR Promotions, respectively. The issued PNs are as follows:

PN No. Date Amount

1. 277894 (BDS-143/97) February 7, 1997 P 6,500,000.00

2. 281728 (BD-216/97) July 21, 1997 P 959,034.20

3. 281735 (BD-222/97) July 31, 1997 P 508,580.83

4. 281736 (BD-225/97) August 12, 1997 P 291,732.50

5. 281737 (BD-226/97) August 12 , 1997 P 157,173.12

6. 281745 (BD-229/97) August 22, 1997 P 449,812.25

7. 281747 (BDS-94854.696.00.999) September 3, 1997 P 105,000.00

8. 281749 (BD-236/97) September 11, 1997 P 525,233.93

4
 9. 281750 (BD-238/97) September 12, 1997 P 1,313,099.36

10. 473410 (BD-239/97) September 19, 1997 P 251,725.00

11. 473414 (BD-240/97) September 19, 1997 P 288,975.66

12. 473412 (BD-244/97) September 26, 1997 P 62,982.53

13. 473411 (BD-245/97) September 26, 1997 P 156,038.85

14. 473413 (BD-251/97) October 3, 1997 P 767,512.30

15. 473431 (BD-252/97) October 6, 1997 P 557,497.45

TOTAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 12,891,397.78

To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage on separate dates. The first mortgage, securing the amount of PhP 6,500,000, was executed on February 2, 1996 over real estate
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 624835;3 the other was executed on July 18, 1996 over properties covered by TCT Nos. 565381, 4 263421,5 and 2746826 to secure the amount of PhP 2,500,000. All of the
mortgaged properties are registered under the spouses Reynosos names, except for TCT No. 565381, which is registered under CPR Promotions. 7

Thereafter, on December 8, 1997, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety agreement 8 binding themselves solidarily with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR Promotions may have obtained from
petitioner MBTC, including those covered by the said PNs, but not to exceed PhP 13,000,000.

Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted, prompting MBTC to file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages, pursuant to Act No. 3135, 9 as amended. MBTCs request for foreclosure, 10 dated
March 6, 1998, pertinently reads:

We have the honor to request your good Office to conduct/undertake extra-judicial foreclosure sale proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, and other applicable laws on the properties covered by two Real Estate
Mortgages executed by CPR PROMOTIONS & MARKETING INC., represented by its President Mr. Cornelio P. Reynoso and Treasurer Leoniza F. Reynoso and SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR., AND LEONIZA F.
REYNOSO in favour of the mortgagee, METROPLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, to secure fifteen (15) loans with a total principal amount of TWELVE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN PESOS AND SEVENTY EIGHT CENTAVOS (P12,891,397.78), for breach of the terms of said mortgage. 11

As Annex "R", a copy of the Statement of Account, showing that the total amount due on the loans of the borrowers/mortgagers which remains unpaid and outstanding as a February 10, 1998 was ELEVEN MILLION TWO
HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS AND NINETY NIN CENTAVOR (P11,216,783.99)

Subsequently, on May 5, 1998, the mortgaged covered by TCT Nos. 624835 and 565381 were sold at a public auction sale. MBTC participated therein and submitted the highest bid in the amount of PhP 10,374,000. The day
after, on May 6, 1998, petitioner again participated and won in the public auction sake of the remaining mortgaged properties, having submitted the highest bid amounting to PhP 3,240,000. As a result petitioner was issued the
corresponding Certificates of Sale on July 15 and 16, 1998, covering the properties subjected to the first and second public auctions, respectively.

Notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the total amount of PhP 13, 614,000, petitioner MBTC alleged that there remained a deficiency balance of PhP 2,628,520.73, plus interest and charges as
stipulated and agreed upon in the PNs and deeds of real estate mortgages. Despite petitioners repeated demands, however, respondents failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner filed an action for collection of
sum of money against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-230, entitled Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc. and Spouses Cornelio Reynoso, Jr. and Leoniza F. Reynoso.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision13 dated October 11, 2007, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 in Makati City (RTC) ruled in favor of petitioner that there, indeed, was a balance of Php 2,628,520.73, plus interest and charges, as of September
18, 1998, and that respondents are liable for the said amount, as part of their contractual obligation. 14 The court disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [respondents], jointly and severally, to pay [petitioner] Metrobank, as follows:

5
 a] the amount of PhP 2,628,520.73 plus stipulated interest and penalty charges stipulated in the Promissory Notes marked as Exhibits A to O until full payment thereof; and

b] the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.

Respondents timely moved for reconsideration of the RTCs Decision, which was denied through the trial courts February 7, 2008 Order. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The appellate court, through the assailed Decision, reversed the court a quo and ruled in favor of respondents. The fallo of the said Decision reads:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the plaintiff-appallee Metrobank is ordered to refund or return to the defendants-appellants Cornelio and Leoniza Reynoso the amount of
PhP722,602.22 representing the remainder of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, with legal interest of six percent per annum from the date of filing the answer with counterclaim on March 26, 1999, until paid.

SO ORDERED.15

Supporting the reversal is the CAs finding that there was a sudden change in the terminology used, from "total amount due" to "principal amount." 16 According to the CA, from February to May 1998, the amount sought to be
collected ballooned from PhP 11,216,783.99 to PhP 12,891,397.78. From this apparently unexplained increase, the CA deduced that the increased amount must mean the principal and interest and other charges. Furthermore,
the appellate court found that petitioner failed to prove that there was a deficiency, since the records failed to corroborate the claimed amount. As noted by the CA, "[Petitioner] did not even introduce the continuing surety
agreement on which the trial court gratuitously based its decision."

On October 24, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Decision, which the appellate court denied in its assailed February 13, 2012 Resolution.

The Issues

Hence this recourse, on the following issues:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it failed to consider the continuing surety agreement presented in evidence and in ruling that petitioner MBTC failed to prove that the spouses Reynoso are solidarily
liable with respondent CPR Promotions.

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it grossly misappreciated the promissory notes, real estate mortgages, petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, certificates of sale and statement of account
marked in evidence and ruled that petitioner MBTC failed to prove that a deficiency balance resulted after conducting the extrajudicial foreclosure sales of the mortgaged properties.

The Arguments

Anent the first issue, MBTC faults the appellate court for finding that it did not introduce the continuing surety agreement on which the RTC based its ruling that respondent spouses are solidarily liable with respondent CPR
Promotions.17

As regards the second issue, petitioner asserts that the CAs grant of a refund valued at PhP 722,602.22 plus legal interest of six percent (6%) in favor of respondents is erroneous for two reasons: first, respondents never set
up a counterclaim for refund of any amount 18 and second, the total outstanding obligation as of February 10, 1998, to which the full amount of the bid prices was applied, is PhP 11,216,783.99 and not Ph P12,891,397.78, which
was used by the CA in its computation.19

6
Lastly, petitioner claims that respondents should be made to answer for certain specific expenses connected with the foreclosure, i.e., filing fees, publication expense, Sheriffs Commission on Sale, stipulated attorneys fee,
registration fee for the Certificate of Sale, insurance premium and other miscellaneous expenses, in the amounts of PhP 1,373,238.04 and PhP 419,166.67 for the first and second foreclosure sales, respectively. 20

In their Comment,21 respondents maintained the propriety of the CAs grant of a refund, arguing that in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, they laid-down in detail the excess of the prices of the foreclosed properties
over their obligation.22 Respondents then went on and argued that "from the beginning of the instant case in the trial court, [they] have already raised in issue the fact of [petitioners] taking-over of [their] lands with values over
and above the latters financial liabilities." 23 Thus, they postulate that the CA did right when it touched on the issue and ruled thereon. 24

Furthermore, respondents insist that there is actually no difference between the PhP 12,891,397.78 and the PhP 11,261,783.99 amounts except for the accumulated interest, penalties, and other charges. 25 Too, according to
them, this is the reason why what respondent CPR owed petitioner at that time increased substantially from that on February 10, 1998, when the amount was just PhP 11,216,783.99. 26

The Court's Ruling

We partially grant the petition. While We fully agree with the CA that MBTC was not able to prove the amount claimed, We however, find that neither were respondents able to timely setup their claim for refund.

Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim

Rule 6 of the Rules of Court denies a compulsory counterclaim as follows:

Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the
amount and the nature thereof. Except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the
counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. 27

In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, We have, in several cases, utilized the following tests: 28

(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?

(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?

(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants counterclaim?

(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the
parties and the court? This test is the "compelling test of compulsoriness." 29

Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis--vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the
mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these
two actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if these two
claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same
transaction, and the same evidence. The only difference here would be in the findings of the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts
due.

7
Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, We rule that respondents failed to timely raise the same.

It is elementary that a defending partys compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his Answer, 30 and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim.31 As it appears from the records, what
respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. 32 Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set
up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellants Brief filed before the CA. 33 Unfortunately, respondents belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer.
Consequently, respondents claim for the excess, if any, is already barred. With this, we now resolve the substantive issues of this case.

The CA erred in ruling that the total amount due was PhP 12,891,397.78

Basic is the rule that a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should only cover questions of law. 34 Moreover, findings of fact of the CA are generally final and conclusive and this Court will not
review them on appeal.35 This rule, however, admits of several exceptions 36 such as when the findings of fact are conflicting, manifestly mistaken, unsupported by evidence or the result of a misapprehension of acts, or when
the findings are contrary to that of the trial court, as in this case.

To recall, the CA, in its assailed Decision, made the following findings as regards the amount due on the loan against which the proceeds from the auction sales are to be applied:

In the application for extrajudicial foreclosure sale dated March 6, 1998, the total amount due as of February 10, 1998 was stated to be P11,216,783.99. The plaintiff categorically declared that P11,216,783.99 was the total
amount due on February 10, 1998. By the time the auction sales were conducted, in May 1998, as reflected in the certificate of Sale, the principal amount was said to be P12,891,397.78. What is the meaning of the change
from total amount due to principal amount? If from February to May 1998, a matter of three months, the amount sought to be collected ballooned to P12,891,397.78, the increase could have resulted from no other source that
the interest and other charges under the promissory notes after the defendants incurred in default. Thus, the amount of P12,891,397.78 as of May 1998, must mean the principal and interest and other charges. The statement
in the certificates of sale that it is the principal amount is a subtle change in language, a legerdemain to suggest that thte amount does not include the interest and other charges. 37

In short, the CA concluded that the amount of PhP 12,891,397.78 is actually comprised of the PhP 11,216,783.99 due as of February 10, 1998, plus additional interest and other charges that became due from February 10,
1998 until the date of foreclosure on May 5, 1998.

The appellate court is mistaken.

By simply adding the figures stated in the PNs as the principal sum, it can readily be seen that the amount of PhP 12,891,397.78 actually pertains to the aggregate value of the fifteen (15) PNs, viz:

PN No. Amount

1. 277894 (BDS-143/97) 38
P 6,500,000.00
39
2. 281728 (BD-216/97) P 959,034.20

3. 281735 (BD-222/97)40 P 508,580.83

4. 281736 (BD-225/97)41 P 291,732.50

5. 281737 (BD-226/97)42 P 157,173.12

43
6. 281745 (BD-229/97) P 449,812.25

7. 281747 (BDS-94854.696.00.999) 44
P 105,000.00
45
8. 281746 (BD-236/97) P 525,233.93

9. 281750 (BD-238/97) 46
P 1,31,099.36
47
10. 473410 (BD-239/97) P 251,725.00

8
 11. 473414 (BD-240/97)48 P 288,975.66
49
12. 473412 (BD-244/97) P 62,982.53

13. 473411 (BD-245/97) 50

P 156,038.85
51
14. 473413 (BD-251/97) P 767,512.30

15. 473431 (BD-252/97) 52

P 557,497.45

TOTAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 12,897,397.78

This belies the findings of the CA that PhP 12, 891,397.78 is the resulting value of PhP 11,216,783.99 plus interest and other charges. Consequently, the CAs conclusion that there is an excess of PhP 722,602.22, after
deducting the amount of PhP 12,891,397.78 from the total bid price of PhP 13,614,000, is erroneous.

Nevertheless, while the CAs factual finding as to the amount due is flawed, petitioner, as discussed below, is still not entitled to the alleged deficiency balance of PhP 2,628,520.73.

MBTC failed to prove that there is a deficiency balance of PhP 2,628,520.73

To support its deficiency claim, petitioner presented a Statement of Account, 53 which referes to the amounts due as of May 5, 1998, the date of the first foreclosure sale, to wit:

Statement of Account as of May 05, 1998

PN No. Principal Amt Outs. PDI Penalty

1 BD#216/97 489,219.20 54,808.77 49,166.53

2 BD#222/97 167,289.35 18,613.61 16,310.71

3 BD#225/97 291,732.50 32,683.72 27,422.86

4 BD#226/97 44,694.50 5,007.24 4,201.28

5 BD#229/97 435,229.25 48,760.10 44,393.38

6 BD#238/97 365,238.55 40,918.83 33,236.71

7 BD#233/97 105,000.00 11,763.50 9,082.50

8 BD#244/97 62,982.53 7,056.13 5,290.53

9 BD#236/97 497,649.70 56,135.10 38,070.20

10 BD#240/97 145,950.00 16,463.20 11,165.18

11 BD#245/97 156,038.85 17,481.55 11,897.43

12 BD#239/97 210,421.50 22,605.52 15,360.77

13 BD#251/97 572,470.15 64,574.86 38,232.57

9
 14 BD#252/97 557,497.45 47,896.46 31,110.63

16 BDS#143/97 6,500,000.00 573,681.89 336,818.28

17 BDS#218/97 1,800,000.00 93,536.05 74,401.15

18 Fire Insurance 49,238.69 0.00 1,698.73

TOTAL 12,450,652.22 1,111,986.53 747,859.44

GRAND TOTAL 14,310,498.19

Applying the proceeds from the auction sales to the foregoing amount, according to petitioner, would result in a deficiency balance of PhP 2,443,143.43. Afterwards, the amount allegedly earned interest for four (4) months in
the amount of PhP 185,337.30, 54 bringing petitioners claim for deficiency judgment to a total of PhP 2,628,520.73. 55

We are not convinced.

We have already ruled in several cases56 that in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, where the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. 57 In
ascertaining the deficit amount, Sec. 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is elucidating, to wit:

Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale. The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there
shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there
be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it.

Verily, there can only be a deficit when the proceeds of the sale is not sufficient to cover (1) the costs of foreclosure proceedings; and (2) the amount due to the creditor, inclusive of interests and penalties, if any, at the time of
foreclosure.

a. Petitioner failed to prove the amount due at the time of foreclosure

Having alleged the existence of a deficiency balance, it behooved petitioner to prove, at the very least, the amount due at the date of foreclosure against which the proceeds from the auction sale would be applied. Otherwise,
there can be no basis for awarding the claimed deficiency balance. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed to substantiate the amount due as of May 5, 1998 as appearing in its Statement of Account.

To recall, MBTC admitted that the amount due as of February 10, 1998 is PhP 11,216,783.99, inclusive of interests and charges. As alleged in the petition:

57. Firstly, it should be noted that respondents total unpaid obligations inclusive of interest and penalties as of 10 February 1998 amounted to Php 11,216,783.99. 1wphi1 This amount was the subject of petitioner Metrobanks
Petitioners for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage and NOT Php 12,891,397.78 which is the total principal amount of respondents loan obligations at the time when they obtained said loans as shown in the Promissory Notes
and the Certificates of Sale. After the execution of the Promissory Notes, payments were made, although insufficient, which resulted in the balance of PhP 11,216,783.99 as of February 1998 inclusive of interest and
penalties.58

If the total amount due as of February 10, 1998 is PhpP 11,216,783.99 is already inclusive of interests and penalties, the principal amount, exclusive of interests and charges, would naturally be lower than the PhP
11,216,783.99 threshold. How petitioner made the determination in its Statement of Account that the principal amount due on the date of the auction sale is PhP 12,450,652.22 is then questionable, nay impossible, unless
respondents contracted another loan anew.

Moreover, the amounts petitioner itself supplied would result in the following computation:

10
 PhP 11,216,783.99 Total outstanding obligation as of February 10, 1998

1,373,238.04 Add: Alleged May 5, 1998 public auction sale expenses

(no consistent data) Add: Additional interests and charges earned between February 10, 1998 to May 5, 1998

(no consistent data) Subtotal: Amount due as of May 5, 1998

10,374,000.00 Less: May 5 Bid Price to be applied to the amount due

419,166.67 Add: Alleged May 6, 1998 public auction sale expenses

(no consisted data) Add: Interests and charges earned from May 5 to 6, 1998

3,240,000.00 Less: May 6 Bid Price to be applied to the amount due

PhP 2,443,143.43 Total: Deficiency reflected in the Statement of Account from May 5 to September 18, 1998

As can be gleaned, petitioner failed to sufficiently explain during the proceedings how it came up with the alleged "deficiency" in the amount of PhP 2,443,143.43, as per the Statement of Account. Reversing the
formula, petitioners claim would only be mathematically possible if the missing interest and penalties for the three-month period-from February 10, 1998 to May 6, 1998-amounted to PhP 3,047,954,73, 59 which is
inconsistent with MBTCs declaration in its Statement of Account as of May 5, 1998. 60 Needless to say, this amount is not only unconscionable, it also finds no support from any of the statement of accounts and loan stipulations
agreed upon by the parties.

Given MBTCs conflicting, if not irreconcilable, allegations as to the amount due as of the date of foreclosure-as noted in the statement of accounts, the petition for foreclosure, and the promissory notes-the computation offered
by MBTC cannot be accepted at face value. Consequently, there can then be no basis for determining the value of the additional interests and penalty charges that became due, and, more importantly, whether or not there was
indeed a deficiency balance at the time the mortgaged properties were foreclosed.

In addition, it is noticeable that petitioners presentation of the computation is circuitous and needlessly lengthened.1wphi1 As a matter of fact, nowhere in the petition, in its complaint, 61 reply.62 pre-trial brief,63 among others,
did it make a simple computation of respondents obligation as well as the amounts to be applied to it, or even a summary thereof, when it could have easily done so.

b. Petitioner failed to prove the amount of expenses incurred in foreclosing the mortgaged properties

another obstacle against petitioners claim for deficiency balance is the burden of proving the amount of expenses incurred during the foreclosure sales. To recall, petitioner alleged that it incurred expenses totaling PhP
1,373,238.04 and PhP 419,166.67 for the first and second public auction sales, respectively. However, in claiming that there is a deficiency, petitioner only submitted the following pieces of evidence, to wit:

1. The fifteen (15) promissory notes (Exhibits A to O);

2. Continuing Surety Agreement (Exhibit P);

3. Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibits Q & R);

4. Petition for Sale under Act. No. 3135, as amended (Exhibit S);

5. Notices of Sheriffs Sale (Exhibits T & U);

6. Affidavit of Publication (Exhibits V & W);

11
 7. Certificates of Posting and a Xerox copy thereof (exhibits X & Y);

8. Certificates of Sale (Exhibits Z & AA);

9. Demand Letters (Exhibits BB & CC); and

10. Statement of Account (Exhibit DD).

Curiously, petitioner never offered as evidence receipts proving payment of filing fees, publication expenses, Sheriffs Commission on Sale, attorneys fee, registration fee for the Certificate of Sale, insurance premium and other
miscellaneous expenses, all of which MBTC claims that it incurred. Instead, petitioner urges the Court to take judicial notice of the following expenses: 64

May 5, 1998 auction sale expenses

Filing Fee PhP 52,084.00
Publication Expenses 24,267.75
Sheriffs Commission on Sale 207,560.00
Registration fee and other Miscellaneous Expenses 32,644.50
Attorneys Fees (10% of total amount claimed) 1,005,744.37
Fire Insurance 50,937.42
Sub-total PhP 1,373,238.04
May 6, 1998 auction sale expenses
Publication Expenses 24,267.75
Sheriffs Commission on Sale 64,880.00
Registration fee and other Miscellaneous Expenses 16,593.00
Attorneys Fees (10% of total amount claimed) 313,425.92
Sub-total 419,166.67

Petitioners argument is untenable.

First, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the attorneys fees being claimed by petitioner because although 10% was the rate agreed upon by the parties, We have, in a line of cases, held that the percentage to be charged
can still be fixed by the Court. For instance, in Mambulao Lumber Company v. Philippine National Bank, 65 the Court held:

In determining the compensation of an attorney, the following circumstances should be considered: the amount and character of the services rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service; the professional standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the fee
is contingent or absolute, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent that when it is not. From the stipulation in the mortgage contract earlier quoted, it appears
that the agreed fee is 10% of the total mortgage is to be effected. The agreement is perhaps fair enough in case the foreclosure proceedings is prosecuted judicially but, surely, it is unreasonable when, as in this case, the
mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially, and all that the attorney did was to file a petition for foreclosure with the sheriff concerned.

Similarly, in Bank of the Philippine Islands, Inc. v. Spouses Norman and Angelina Yu, 66 the Court reduced the claim for attorneys fees from 10% to 1% based on the following reasons: (1) attorneys fee is not essential to the
cost of borrowing, but a mere incident of collection; (2) 1% is just and adequate because the mortgagee bank had already charged foreclosure expenses; (3) attorneys fee of 10% of the total amount due is onerous considering
the rote effort that goes into extrajudicial foreclosures.

Second, the Court cannot also take judicial notice of the expenses incurred by petitioner in causing the publication of the notice of foreclosure and the cost of insurance. This is so because there are no standard rates cited or
mentioned by petitioner that would allow Us to take judicial notice of such expenses. It is not unthinkable that the cost of publication would vay from publisher to publisher, and would depend on several factors, including the
size of the publication space. Insurance companies also have their own computations on the insurance premiums to be paid by the insurer, which the courts cannot be expected to be knowledgeable of. To be sure, in arguing
the Court to take judicial notice of the alleged expenses, MBTC merely cited Sec. 3 of Act 3135 requiring publication and the mortgage agreement provision on the insurance requirement, without more. 67 Said provisions never
expressly provided for the actual cost of publication and insurance, nor any formulae for determining the same. Thus, the claims for publication and insurance expenses ought to be disallowed.

12
Third, the claims for registration fees and miscellaneous expenses were also never substantiated by receipts.

Conclusion

In demanding payment of a deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, proving that there is indeed one and what its exact amount is, is naturally a precondition thereto. The same goes with a claim for
reimbursement of foreclosure expenses, as here. In this regard, it is elementary that the burden to prove a claim rests on the party asserting such. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.68 For having failed to adequately substantiate its claims, We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court that respondents are liable for the claimed deficiency, inclusive of foreclosure expenses. Neither can
We sustain the CAs finding that respondents are entitled to the recovery of the alleged excess payment.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91424 and its February 13, 2012
Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of refund in favor of respondents in the amount of P722,602.22 with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is hereby DELETED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Rule 69

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 151334 February 13, 2013

13
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA, namely:
LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely:
FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA,
AND HEIRS OF QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M.
FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M. FIGURACION, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
1
Decision2 dated December 11, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290, which
reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated June 26, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 49. The RTC decision (1) dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerillas (Emilia)
complaint for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages, and (2)
annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion
(Carolina).
The Facts
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May 1958. Petitioner
Carolina is the surviving spouse. The other petitioners Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion
(Hilaria), Felipa Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez and
respondent Emilia were Carolina and Leandros children. 4
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which were acquired
by Leandro during his lifetime. These properties were: (1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of 7,547 square
meters originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P; 5 and (2) Lot No. 705 measuring
2,900 square meters and covered by TCT No. 4220-P. Both lands were registered in the name of "Leandro
Figuracion married to Carolina Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above real
properties in favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not delineated
with particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an
area of 3,164 square meters originally owned by Eulalio Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued in his name on August 21, 1917. Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina)
with his first wife Marcela Estioko (Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio had
another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina). 6
On November 28, 1961, Agripina7 executed a Deed of Quitclaim8 over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in
favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication9adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her
deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina.10 On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale11 over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the
cancellation of OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names. 12
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon
her return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707. 13
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish
the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot
Nos. 2299 and 705. The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no
amicable settlement was reached by the parties. 14 On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia instituted the
herein Complaint15 for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of Lot No.
707, quieting of title and damages.
In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the respondents
cause of action had long prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing the
suit; (2) TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and
conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and (3) an action for partition is no longer tenable
because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia and
the same amount to a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership. 16
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into: (1) whether or not Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are
the exclusive properties of Leandro; and (2) whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern
half of Lot No. 707.17
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 26, 1997
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for partition, reconveyance, quieting of title and
damages is hereby ordered dismissed whereas the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the
transfer certificate of title involving Lot 707 are hereby declared null and void.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.18
The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their ownership is yet to
be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in estate
settlement proceedings. Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-
half () share to Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina was void.
While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, it
refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lots eastern half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a
settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken. 19
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11, 2001, ruled that the
RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707. The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot
No. 707 under judicial administration since Carolina had long sold her pro indiviso share to Felipa and
Hilaria. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 as her own, the sale
affected only her share and not that belonging to her co-owner, Agripina. The proper action in such case is
not the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the
third person, but for a division or partition of the entire lot. Such partition should result in segregating the
portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
14
The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 is indeed premature
considering that there is a pending legal controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the
income from Lot No. 2299 and of the expenses for the last illness and burial of Leandro and Carolina, for
which the lots appear to have been intended.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision appealed
from in Civil Case No. U-5826 is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Lot No. 707 covered by TCT No. 42244 to be owned by appellant Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
[herein respondent], pro indiviso share, appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro
indiviso share, and appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], pro indiviso share, who are hereby
directed to partition the same and if they could not agree on a partition, they may petition the trial court for
the appointment of a commissioner to prepare a project of partition, in accordance with the procedure as
provided in Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.20
Respondent Emilia appealed the CAs decision to the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 154322. In a Decision
promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the appeal, concurring with the CAs ruling that a
partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 would be inappropriate considering that: (1) the ownership of Lot No.
705 is still in dispute; and (2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the estate
of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole error committed by the
CA:
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL DICTA LAID DOWN BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.21
In view of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 154322, the ensuing discussion shall concern only Lot No. 707.
The Arguments of the Parties
The petitioners argue that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership because
the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in fact a deed of donation that contained no
acceptance and thus, void. The petitioners attached a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim and stressed on the
following portions, viz:
I, AGRIPINA ESTIOKO ADVIENTO, of le[ga]l age, Filipino citizen, single and a resident [of] San Vicenter
(sic), Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO ([P]1.00), Philippine
Currency and the services rendered by my niece EMILIA FIGURACION, 20 years old, single, Filipino
citizen and a resident of San Vicente, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, do hereby by these presentsw (sic)
RENOUNCE, RELEASE and forever QUITCLAIM in favor of EMILIA FIGURACION, her heirs, and assigns
the ONE[-]HALF (1/2) eastern portion of the following parcel of land more particularly described and
bounded as follows to wit[.]22
They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim is riddled with defects that evoke questions of law,
because: (a) it has not been registered with the Register of Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as
1961; (b) a certification dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) of the RTC of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, shows that it does not have a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c) the Office of the
National Archives which is the depository of old and new notarized documents has no record of the Deed
of Quitclaim as evidenced by a certification dated May 19, 2003; 23 and (d) Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar, who
supposedly notarized the Deed of Quitclaim was not commissioned to notarize in 1961 per the certification
dated June 9, 2003 from the OCC of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. 24
Respondent Emilia, on the other hand, contends that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an
onerous donation that requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not by the
formalities for a simple donation.25
The Courts Ruling
Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time in a petition filed under
Rule 45
Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the petitioners before the RTC and the
CA.
In the Pre-Trial Order26 of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties agreed to limit the issue with regard to
Lot No. 707 as follows: whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of Lot No.
707. The petitioners supporting theory for this issue was that "the Deed of Quitclaim dated November 28,
1961 was rendered ineffective by the issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name of Felipa and Hilaria." 27 On
appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory by questioning the execution and
enforceability of the Deed of Quitclaim. They claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in
the manner required by law.28
The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot
change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new
trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been
raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the answer may not
be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is
decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. 29 The Court had likewise, in numerous
times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to
the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory,
which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 30
15
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory,31 this exception does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.
Contrary to the petitioners assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the supposed defects and actual
nature of the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the
evidence already adduced by the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners
themselves have acknowledged when they attached in the petition several certifications 32 in support of
their new argument. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition since
the Court is not a trier of facts.33
Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by the petitioners involving the
nature and execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For their failure to advance these questions during trial, the
petitioners are now barred by estoppel 34 from imploring an examination of the same.
The respondent can compel the
partition of Lot No. 707
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not
lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are
required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the
property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first
definitely resolved.35
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of
Quitclaim executed by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of
Eulalio. It is well to recall that the petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the Deed of
Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of
Felipa and Hilariathis contention is, of course, flawed.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under coownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant
may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title.36 Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. 37 In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707
was precisely what respondent Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly found by the
RTC and affirmed by the CA.
The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an undisputed fact. As such heirs,
they became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930. Since Faustina was
predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the lot upon Eulalios death. Faustinas share,
however, passed on to her daughter Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949. The Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share of Agripina because it is not legally
possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an entire property he was not the sole owner of. A co-owner
cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners nemo dat qui non habet.38
Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina. As co-owners, each of them had
full ownership of her part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right
to alienate the lot but only in so far as the extent of her portion was affected. 39
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria and Felipa without the
consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolinas pro indiviso share, and the
vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what corresponds to Carolinas share. A co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.40
Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa was a valid conveyance
but only insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolinas successors-in-
interest to the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any superior right in the property than what
Carolina is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition.
In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same
rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-
owner.41 Hilaria and Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which has already
been effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of
Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripinas share in Lot No. 707, respondent Emilia
took the formers place in the co-ownership and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any
time.42
The respondents right to demand
for partition is not barred by
acquisitive prescription or laches
The petitioners posit that the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Hilaria and Felipa over Lot No.
707 on December 11, 1962 was an express repudiation of the co-ownership with respondent Emilia.
Considering the period of time that has already lapsed since then, acquisitive prescription has already set
in and the respondent is now barred by laches from seeking a partition of the subject lot.
The contention is specious.
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership. 43 The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating
co-ownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such
an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.44
The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions. The act of Hilaria and Felipa in effecting the
registration of the entire Lot No. 707 in their names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively
repudiate the co-ownership. The respondent built her house on the eastern portion of the lot in 1981
without any opposition from the petitioners. Hilaria also paid realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the
respondent, for the years 1983-1987.45 These events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa failed to
assert exclusive title in themselves adversely to Emilia. Their acts clearly manifest that they recognized the
subsistence of their co-ownership with respondent Emilia despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962.
Their acts constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn negates the presence of a
clear notice of repudiation to the respondent. To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly
appear that one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his
co-owners were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership
before the alleged prescriptive period began to run.46
16
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion of Emilia, an implied
trust was created by force of law and the two of them were considered a trustee of the respondents
undivided share.47 As trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration. In Ringor v. Ringor,48 the Court had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:
A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by another cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens Certificate of Title in Joses name did not
vest ownership of the land upon him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and
records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. The Torrens
system was not intended to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of another. Where one does not have a rightful claim to the property, the Torrens
system of registration can confirm or record nothing. Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands
in Joses name nor in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they seek. For
Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he held in trust for his co-heirs.1wphi1 The
beneficiaries are entitled to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The
intended trust must be sustained.49 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of occupation and possession
exercised by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only
evidence of possession extant in the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared the
lot in their names for taxation purposes.50 Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of
ownership, or in this case, possession, do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other
co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot take place when acts of ownership exercised are
vague or uncertain.51
Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based,
must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of doubt;
and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive
and opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie. 52 The
petitioners failed to muster adequate evidence of possession essential for the reckoning of the 10-year
period for acquisitive prescription.
The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on December 11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244
was issued but in 1994 when Hilaria attempted to demolish Emilias house thus explicitly excluding her
from the co-ownership. It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa made known their denial of the co-
ownership. On the same year, the respondent instituted the present complaint for partition; hence, the
period required by law for acquisitive period to set in was not met.
Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the period when the co-
ownership was expressly repudiated and when the herein complaint was filed. Laches is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it.53 More so, laches is a creation of equity and its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud
and injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from
recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.54
Partition of Lot No. 707
Under the Old Civil Code55 which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and Marcelas marriage, Lot No.
707 was their conjugal property.56 When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to
Eulalio, the surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership. 57 Marcelas rights to the other half,
in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child, Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio. 58 Under Article 834
of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled only to the usufruct of the lot while the naked ownership
belonged to Agripina. When he remarried, Eulalios one half portion of the lot representing his share in the
conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other half were brought into his second marriage
with Faustina.59
When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her share in the
conjugal partnership.60 The remaining were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and Eulalios
children, Carolina and Agripina.61 However, Faustina is only entitled to the usufruct of the third available
for betterment.62
The usufructuary of Eulalio over the portion inherited by Agripina earlier was merged with her naked
ownership.63 Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which represents her share in the
conjugal partnership and her inheritance from Eulalio were in turn inherited by Carolina 64 including
Faustinas usufructuary rights which were merged with Carolinas naked ownership. 65
Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining 3/8 pertains to Carolina.
Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only 3/8 portion of the subject
lot. Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the eastern portion of Lot No. 707 in favor of Emilia
instead of Agripinas entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8 portion shall be inherited by Agripinas
nearest collateral relative,66who, records show, is her sister Carolina.
In sum, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is entitled to have Lot No. 707
partitioned. The CA judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the above-discussed
apportionment of the lot among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58290
dated December 11, 2001, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: (1) 3/8 portion of Lot No. 707
shall pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and Felipa Figuracion-Manuel; (2) portion of Lot. No.
707 shall pertain to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; and (3) 1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate
of Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the
actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the
foregoing manner. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the property and the
proper share appertaining to each co-owner, including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court. When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it
assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or
sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the
property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell
the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter
distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of each co-owner. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
17
Rule 70

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189239 November 24, 2010

SPOUSES LETICIA & JOSE ERVIN ABAD, SPS. ROSARIO AND ERWIN COLLANTES, SPS. RICARDO
AND FELITA ANN, SPS. ELSIE AND ROGER LAS PIAS, LINDA LAYDA, RESTITUTO MARIANO,
SPS. ARNOLD AND MIRIAM MERCINES, SPS. LUCITA AND WENCESLAO A. RAPACON, SPS.
ROMEO AND EMILYN HULLEZA, LUZ MIPANTAO, SPS. HELEN AND ANTHONY TEVES, MARLENE
TUAZON, SPS. ZALDO AND MIA SALES, SPS. JOSEFINA AND JOEL YBERA, SPS. LINDA AND
JESSIE CABATUAN, SPS. WILMA AND MARIO ANDRADA, SPS. RAYMUNDO AND ARSENIA LELIS,
FREDY AND SUSANA PILONEO, Petitioners,
vs.
FIL-HOMES REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAGDIWANG REALTY
CORPORATION, Respondents.

18
 DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (respondents), co-
owners of two lots situated in Sucat, Paraaque City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
21712 and 21713, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on May 7, 2003 against above-named petitioners
before the Paraaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
Respondents alleged that petitioners, through tolerance, had occupied the subject lots since 1980 but
ignored their repeated demands to vacate them.
Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than 30 years; and that respondents predecessor-in-
interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. In any event, they contend that the
question of ownership must first be settled before the issue of possession may be resolved.
During the pendency of the case or on June 30, 2004, the City of Paraaque filed expropriation
proceedings covering the lots before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque with the intention of
establishing a socialized housing project therein for distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A
writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of Turn-over given to the City.
Branch 77 of the MeTC, by Decision of March 3, 2008, rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case
against petitioners, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Leticia
and Ervin Abad et. als. ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them
to VACATE and SURRENDER possession of the premises (Lots covered by TCT NOS. (71065) 21712
and (71066) 21713 otherwise known as Purok I Silverio Compound, Barangay San Isidro, Paraaque City
to plaintiff and to PAY the said plaintiff as follows:
1. The reasonable compensation in the amount of P20,000.00 a month commencing November
20, 2002 and every month thereafter until the defendants shall have finally vacated the
premises and surrender peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, and finally
3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.1 (emphasis in the original)
The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots, they still maintain
ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of a Writ of
Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision of September 4, 2008, 2 reversed the MeTC
decision and dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:
x x x The court a quo ruled that the case filed by plaintiffs (respondents herein) is unlawful detainer as
shown by the allegations of the Complaint. The ruling of the court a quo is not accurate. It is not the
allegations of the Complaint that finally determine whether a case is unlawful detainer, rather it is
the evidence in the case.
Unlawful detainer requires the significant element of "tolerance". Tolerance of the occupation of the
property must be present right from the start of the defendants possession. The phrase "from the start of
defendants possession" is significant. When there is no "tolerance" right from the start of the
possession sought to be recovered, the case of unlawful detainer will not prosper.3 (emphasis in the
original; underscoring supplied)
The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the continuation
of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been rendered in the
expropriation proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to
"disregard the . . . final judgment and writ of possession" due to non-payment of just compensation:
The Writ of Possession shows that possession over the properties subject of this case had already been
given to the City of Paraaque since January 19, 2006 after they were expropriated. It is serious error for
the court a quo to rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-
Homes Realty and Development Corporation could still be given possession of the properties
which were already expropriated in favor of the City of Paraaque.
There is also another serious lapse in the ruling of the court a quo that the case for expropriation in the
Regional Trial Court would not bar, suspend or abate the ejectment proceedings. The court a quo had
failed to consider the fact that the case for expropriation was already decided by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 196 way back in the year 2006 or 2 years before the court a quo rendered its judgment in the
unlawful detainer case in the year 2008. In fact, there was already a Writ of Possession way back in the
year 1996 (sic) issued in the expropriation case by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 196. The court a quo
has no valid reason to disregard the said final judgment and the writ of possession already issued
by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the City of Paraaque and against Magdiwang Realty
Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation and make another judgment
concerning possession of the subject properties contrary to the final judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 196.4 (emphasis in the original)
Before the Court of Appeals where respondents filed a petition for review, they maintained that
respondents "act of allowing several years to pass without requiring [them] to vacate nor filing an
ejectment case against them amounts to acquiescence or tolerance of their possession." 5
By Decision of May 27, 2009,6 the appellate court, noting that petitioners did not present evidence to rebut
respondents allegation of possession by tolerance, and considering petitioners admission that they
commenced occupation of the property without the permission of the previous owner Pilipinas
Development Corporation as indicium of tolerance by respondents predecessor-in-interest, ruled in favor
of respondents. Held the appellate court:
Where the defendants entry upon the land was with plaintiffs tolerance from the date and fact of entry,
unlawful detainer proceedings may be instituted within one year from the demand on him to vacate upon
demand. The status of such defendant is analogous to that of a tenant or lessee, the term of whose lease,
19
has expired but whose occupancy is continued by the tolerance of the lessor. The same rule applies where
the defendant purchased the house of the former lessee, who was already in arrears in the payment of
rentals, and thereafter occupied the premises without a new lease contract with the landowner. 7
Respecting the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings, the appellate court,
citing Republic v. Gingoyon,8 held the same does not signify the completion of the expropriation
proceedings. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
a quo is REVOKED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March 3, 2008 is
hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION [by] deleting the award for attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated August 26, 2009, hence, the filing
of the present petition for review.
The petition fails.
In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in
furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social justice. 9
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution
held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 53810 enlightens, however:
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands
belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying
said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation
proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of
suspension shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current
rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been
instituted. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the
suspension. They nevertheless posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings,
respondents can no longer assert a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the
initiation of expropriation proceedings designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled
to continue staying there.
Petitioners position does not lie.
The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the Local Government
Code (LGC):
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit
of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration
of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of the property.
Lintag v. National Power Corporation11 clearly outlines the stages of expropriation, viz:
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with
an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon
the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners x x x .lavvphi1
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The
process is not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of
possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of
ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation.12 (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not
transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation.
There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the Citys
possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.
Respecting petitioners claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance
authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so. 13 Petitioners cannot thus claim any
right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance.
Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are
automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with
before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.
20
In another vein, petitioners posit that respondents failed to prove that their possession is by mere
tolerance. This too fails. Apropos is the ruling in Calubayan v. Pascual: 14

In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate the premises nor filing an action
to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendants possession and use of the premises. It has been
held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of the
defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession
is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondents bought the lots from Pilipinas Development Corporation in 1983. They stepped into the
shoes of the seller with respect to its relationship with petitioners. Even if early on respondents made no
demand or filed no action against petitioners to eject them from the lots, they thereby merely maintained
the status quo allowed petitioners possession by tolerance.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014

AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL
ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons claiming authority under them, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

21
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which reversed the Decision 2 dated August 22, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the Decision 3 dated October
8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang, Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil Case No.
862.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed
on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias,
against the above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents
are the occupants of a parcel of land with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters,
situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the
name of petitioner and issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.
The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 18
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and thus the case was
returned to the court.5
After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of defendants Victoria Anacay,
Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay and Myrlinda Yalo, and all
persons acting under them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with damages, Unlawful Detainer is, hereby,
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an action for
unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents occupation of the
subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand letter sent by petitioners
counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioners own
"Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for forcible entry which should have been filed
within one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical
possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year
from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the proper remedy considering that she
merely tolerated respondents stay in the premises after demand to vacate was made upon them, and they
had in fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced to take legal action when respondents
reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse of the period agreed upon.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that respondents
entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded
to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents reneged on their
promise to vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the
respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one
year.
With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that respondents occupation
ofthe property without petitioners consent can be converted to a contract, such agreement not being
prohibited by law nor contrary to morals or good customs. Having satisfied the requisites for an unlawful
detainer action, the RTC found that petitioners complaint was filed within the prescribed one-year period
counted from the time the final demand to vacate was received by the respondents on July 24, 2008.
The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo
dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the
defendants and all claiming under their rights to: (1) vacate the subject property and surrender possession
and control over the same to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos each as
rentals or compensation for the use thereof starting from July 2008 until the same is paid in full, with
interests thereon at twelve (12%) percent per annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages;
and (4) pay the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.7
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the above decision
became final and executory.8
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the hearing heldon
January 4, 2012,respondents were given a period of ten days within which to file their comment. At the
next scheduled hearing on February 6, 2012,respondents counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry
of Appearancewith Manifestation informing the court that on the same day they had filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA, copies ofwhich were served to petitioner thru her counsel
and to the RTC. Nonetheless, in its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated that said manifestation
was "tantamount to [a] comment to the pending motion" and thus gave petitioners counsel a period of ten
(10) days within which to fileher Reply and thereafter the incident will be submitted for resolution. 9
On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated August 22, 2011 rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Branch 17
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an
action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer,
reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the
property.
22
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of the subject
property,she availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still file an accion
publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory. She
argues that the suspension of the strictadherence to procedural rules cannot be justified by unsupported
allegationsof the respondents as to supposed non-receipt of documents concerning this case.
On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the proceedings before the RTC and were
not furnished a copy of the said courts adverse decision. They also stress that resort to certiorari was
proper and the suspension of procedural rules was justified by compelling circumstances such as the
imminentdestruction of the only property possessed by respondents who are indigent, respondents lack of
awareness of unfavorable judgment rendered on appeal by the RTC, substantive merits of the case insofar
as the jurisdictional requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack of showing that resortto certiorari
petition was frivolous and dilatory, and there being no prejudice caused to the other party.
After a thorough review of the records and the parties submissions, we find neither reversible error nor
grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. 11 In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section
112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence.13 Such remedy is either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry,
the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. 14
The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioners complaint make out a case for forcible
entry but not for unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by toleranceof the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination ofthe
latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.16
In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:
3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with an area of
SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-
01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax declaration is hereto attached
as Annex "B";
4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She had it planted to Bananas
and other fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have
entered the subject property and occupied the same;
5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The defendants requested for time
toleave and she acceded to said request. The defendants committed to vacate the subject property by the
end of May, 2008;
6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject premises
prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND
to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their illegal use and occupancy of the
subject property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as Annex "C";
7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st for possible
conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still refused to vacate the subject property. Thus, the said
Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a copy thereto attached as Annex
"D";
x x x x17
The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe
possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal
upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioners insistence that she actually
tolerated respondents continued occupation after her discovery of their entry into the subject premises is
incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondentsoccupation in May 2007. Such possession
could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it
based on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. 18
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise,
if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be
made.
23
If right at the incipiencydefendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter
may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within
one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered,
to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge tothe right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior
court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed,
then the remedy ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief
in the inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a
number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter
how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of
the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but
in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
It is the nature of defendants entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible
entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is
forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is
unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must
show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publicianaor an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an
unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through
intestate succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their
deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners case for unlawful detainer will prosper,
the court ruled:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-32110
from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and
after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on December, 1994, but
that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the
moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full
agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her
death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely
tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then
built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx
Clearly, defendants entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners,
consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs.
Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer
not of forcible entry x x x.
xxxx
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would
substantiate petitioners claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This failure
of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The
bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have enterep
the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that
respondents entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's consent,
which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs
prayed for by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory judgment of the
RTC deserves scant consideration.
It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. 20 Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction
is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
final and any writ of execution based on it is void. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 20, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
24
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015

RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS

MANALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

25
In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) shall decide the appeal of the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in unlawful detainer or forcible entry cases on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
required by the RTC. There is no trial de nova of the case.
The Case
The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68419, 1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, Branch 49, in Guagua,
Pampanga, and reinstated the judgment rendered on August 31, 2000 by the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga
dismissing their complaint for unlawful detainer and the respondents counterclaim. They also hereby assail
the resolution promulgated on January 24, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration. 2
Antecedents
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao
Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No 4236 with an area of 914 square meters of the
Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was
covered by approved survey plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents Lot No. 4235
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-216701. In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation
and verification survey of Lot 4236 and the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the respondents had
encroached on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted
by the Lands Management Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
confirmed the result on the encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached
portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this
action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua (Civil Case No. 3309), and the
casewas assigned to Branch 2 of that court. 3
On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed Civil Case No. 3309 for lack of jurisdiction based
onits finding that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute that should be properly resolved in an
accion reivindicatoria.4 It stated that the complaint did not aver any contract, whether express or implied,
between the petitioners and the respondents that qualified the case as one for unlawful detainer; and that
there was also no showing that the respondents were in possession of the disputed area by the mere
tolerance of the petitioners due to the latter having become aware of the encroachment only after the
relocation survey held in 1997.
On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for further
proceedings,5holding that because there was an apparent withholding of possession of the property and
the action was brought within one year from such withholding of possession the proper action was
ejectment which was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the case was not a boundary dispute that
could be resolved in an accion reinvidicatoria, considering that it involved a sizeable area of property and
not a mere transferring of boundary.6
Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1,7 ultimately dismissed the complaint and counterclaim for lack ofmerit
through the decision rendered on August 31, 2000,8 ruling that the petitioners failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence showing that the respondents had encroached on their property and had been
occupying and possessing property outside the metes and bounds described in Bienvenido Bacanis OCT
No. N-216701; that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the respondents right of possession;
and that the respondents counterclaim for damages should also be dismissed, there being no showing
that the complaint had been filed in gross and evident bad faith. 9
Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.
At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of
encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel Limpin, then Acting Chief of
the Survey Section of the CENR- DENR.
On September 19, 2001,10 the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set aside the MTCs
decision of August 31, 2000, observing that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners property
based on the court-ordered relocation survey, the reports by Engr. Limpin, and his testimony; 11 that the
respondents could not rely on their OCT No. N-216701, considering that although their title covered only
481 squaremeters, the relocation survey revealed that they had occupied also 560 square meters of the
petitioners Lot No. 4236;12 that the petitioners did not substantiate their claims for reasonable
compensation, attorneys fees and litigation expenses; and that, nevertheless, after it had been established
that the respondents had encroached upon and used a portion of the petitioners property, the latter were
entitled to P1,000.00/month as reasonable compensation from the filing of the complaint up to time that the
respondents actually vacated the encroached property, plus P20,000.00 attorneys fees.13
The respondents moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for its lack of merit. 14
The respondents appealed.
On October 18, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 15 viz:
WHEREFORE, the appealed RTC decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decisions of
the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branches 1 and 2, are REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The CA concluded that the RTC,by ordering the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction" upon motion of the petitioners and over the objection of the respondents, and making a
determination of whether there was an encroachment based on such survey and testimony of the surveyor,
had acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it amounted to the reopening
of the trial, which was not allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It observed that the
relocation and verification survey was inconclusive inasmuch as the surveyor had himself admitted that he
could not determine which of the three survey plans he had used was correct without a full-blown trial.
The CA held that considering that the petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer did not set forth when and
how the respondents had entered the land in question and constructed their houses thereon, jurisdiction
did not vest in the MTC totry and decide the case; that the complaint, if at all, made out a case for either
accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana, either of which fell within the original jurisdiction of the RTC;
and that the RTCs reliance on Benitez v. Court of Appeals 16 and Calubayan v. Ferrer17 was misplaced,
because the controlling ruling was that in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 18 in which the complaint was
markedly similar to that filed in the case.
26
The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion for its lack of merit in the resolution
of January 24, 2003.19
Issues
Hence, this appeal.
The petitioners contend that the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in
anejectment case because it was not absolutely confined to the records of the trial in resolving the appeal;
that the respondents were estopped from assailing the relocation and verification survey ordered by the
RTC because they had actively participated in the survey and had even cross-examined Engr. Limpin, the
surveyor tasked to conduct the survey; 20 that Engr. Limpins testimony must be given credence, honoring
the well-entrenched principle of regularity in the performance of official functions; 21 that the RTC did not
conduct a trial de novoby ordering the relocation and verification surveyand hearing the testimony of the
surveyor; that the desirability of the relocation and verification survey had always been part of the
proceedings even before the case was appealed to the RTC; 22 that, in any case, the peculiar events that
transpired justified the RTCs order to conduct a relocation and verification survey; 23 that the case, because
it involved encroachment into anothers property, qualified as an ejectment case that was within the
jurisdiction of the MTC; and that the respondents were barred by laches for never questioning the RTCs
February 11, 1999 ruling on the issue of jurisdiction. 24
In contrast, the respondents assail the relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC as immaterial,
because (a) it could not vest a right of possession or ownership; (b) the petitioners were mere claimants,
not the owners of the property; (c) the petitioner had never been in possession of the area in question; and
(d) cadastral surveys were not reliable. Hence, they maintain that whether or not the relocation and
verification survey was considered would not alter the outcome of the case. 25
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a rehearing or
trial de novo.26 In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides:
Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership.
x x x.
xxxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide
the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification survey
"in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was
tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately
decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyors testimony instead of the record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin. Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309 was an ejectment
case within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the complaint.
Accordingly, the pertinent allegations of the petitioners complaint follow:
2. Plaintiffs are co-owners ofland known as Lot no. 4236 of the Guagua cadastre. Plaintiffs
inherited the said parcel of residential land from Tomasa B. Garcia-Manalang who is the
absolute owner of the said property and the same is declared for taxation purposes in her
name under Tax Declaration No. 07014906, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A";
3. Lot No. 4236 is covered by an approved plan, Plan Ap-03-004154 (a copy made Annex B")
and it consists of 914 square meters;
4. Adjacent to plaintiffs [p]roperty is Lot No. 4235 of the Guagua Cadastre and covered by
approved plan As-03-00533 (copy made Annex "C") which is being claimed by defendants and
is the subject matter of Cadastral Case No. N-229 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Branch 53 where a decision (copy made Annex "D") was rendered by said court on August 28,
1996 confirming the title over said lot in favor of defendant Bienvenido Bacani. The said
decision is now final and executory
5. On February 23, 1997, plaintiffs caused the relocation and verification survey of cadastral
Not No. 4236 of the Guagua Cadastre belonging to plaintiff and the adjoining lots, particularly
Lot No. 4235 being claimed by defendants;
6. The relocation and verification survey conducted by Engr. Rufo R. Rivera, a duly licensed
Geodetic Engineer per plan (copy made Annex "F") revealed that defendants had encroached
an area of 405 square meters of the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs. In fact, the whole or
part of the houses of the said defendants have been erected in said encroached portion;
7. Sometime in June of 1997, plaintiffs through plaintiff Concepcion Gonzales lodged a
complaint before the Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga against defendants
regarding the encroached portion. A preliminary relocation survey was conducted by the Lands
Management Sector of the DENR and it was found that indeed, defendants encroached into
the parcel of land belonging to plaintiffs. This finding was confirmed by the approved plan Ap-
03-004154;
8. Since defendants refused to vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful possession
thereof to plaintiff, the Barangay Captain of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga issued a
certification to file action (copy made Annex "G) dated March 4, 1997 to enable the plaintiff to
file the appropriate action in court;
9. On March 10, 1997, plaintiffs senta formal demand letter (copy made Annex H") to
defendants to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the said
encroached portion;
10. Despite receipt of said demand letter per registry return cards attached to the letter,
defendants failed and refused to vacate the encroached portion and surrender the peaceful
possession thereof to plaintiffs;
27
 11. Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable compensation in the amount of P 3,000.00 from
defendants for the illegal use and occupation of their property by defendants;

12. By reason of the unjust refusal of defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable
compensation to plaintiffs, the latter were constrained to engage the services of counsel
for P30,00.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance and incur litigation expenses in the amount
of P10,000.00.27

Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a non-
summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must
be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not
about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of
the plaintiffs property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer,
the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his
right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendants possession was
lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of
possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the
issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession de facto.

Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was
correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by the
complaint determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the action. 28 To be
clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. 29 To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect
the ejectment from the land of the respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful
detainer.30 However, the allegations of the petitioners' complaint did not show that they had permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the respondents; or how the respondents' entry
had been effected, or how and when the dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the
petitioners alleged was the respondents' "illegal use and occupation" of the property. As such, the action
was not unlawful detainer.

Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondents had encroached on the petitioners' property was also warranted. In contrast, the only Republic of the Philippines
basis for the RTC's decision was the result of the relocation and verification survey as attested to by the SUPREME COURT
surveyor, but that basis should be disallowed for the reasons earlier mentioned. Under the circumstances, Baguio City
the reinstatement of the ruling of the MTC by the CA was in accord with the evidence.

SECOND DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 198356 April 20, 2015
SO ORDERED.
ESPERANZA SUP APO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, namely: ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD,
RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR., SHEILA LORENCE, all surnamed SUPAPO, and SHERYL FORTUNE
SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ROBERTO and SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE PERSONS
CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, Respondents.

28
 DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioners Esperanza Supapo and Romeo
Supapo2(Spouses Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision 3 and August 25, 2011 resolution4 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint 5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus
(Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the
respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel
the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5
(subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-28441 6 registered and
titled under the Spouses Supapos names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine
hundred eighty pesos (P39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration)
issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. 7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they
made sure to visit at least twice a year.8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on
the subject lot. The houses were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the
Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one. 9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by
bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang
Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably. 10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case 11 against the respondents for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE
JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. 14 While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted
Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which
resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.15
On April 30, 1999, the CAs dismissal of the criminal case became final. 16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents civil
liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion
and issued the writ of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied
the same. The RTC also denied the respondents motion for reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTCs orders denying the
quashal of the writ and the respondents motion for reconsideration. 17 The CA granted the petition and held
that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents criminal and civil liabilities were
extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 and July 24,
2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-45610 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from further executing or
implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now
have unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to
compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners. 19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the
CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana. 20
After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary
hearing22 and argued that: (1) there is another action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint
for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapos cause of action is
barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC Ruling23
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It ruled that the
arguments advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the
course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the respondents motion for reconsideration.
From the MeTCs ruling, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. 24
The RTC Ruling25
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii)
accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made.
Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
29
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. (1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the
assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is
located in Metro Manila; and that
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction.

(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the
SO ORDERED.26 Torrens system.

In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized that the courts jurisdiction over an The Respondents Case33
action involving title to or possession of land is determined by its assessed value; that the RTC does not
have an exclusive jurisdiction on all complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of the
subject lot falls within MeTCs jurisdiction. The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred
by prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.

The RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issues

It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the subject lot, the Spouses
Supapos cause of action had already prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the ten (10)-year The issues for resolution are:
prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to
vacate was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by which the ejectment suit should have been
filed is counted from the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to file action was I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
issued on November 25, 1992,while the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or
more than ten (10) years thereafter.
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and

Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA. 29
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

The CA Ruling30
Our Ruling

The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged
The petition is meritorious.
before the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.

We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not prescribed; and
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
(3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2009 and Order dated October 19,
Accion Publiciana and the Jurisdiction of the MeTC
2009 are AFFIRMED.

Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
SO ORDERED.
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 34
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they
came to us through the present petition.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot
but they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
The Petition
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
In seeking reversal of the CAs ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that: ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. 35

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of

30
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapos claim of ownership over the subject property, we will only
do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession. Having thus determined
that the dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction
to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is plenary.38
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to
hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
now determined by its assessed value.40 The assessed value of real property is its fair market value
multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. 41
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained:
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of the value of the
property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as
affirmed by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial
courts regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction
must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro
Manila; and P50,000.00, if within. 43 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or
the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the
nature of the action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims
asserted therein.44
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in
Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration 45 issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax
declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC
of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana. The cause of action
has not prescribed
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for being filed out of time.
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
xxxx
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7,
2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The
respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property,
the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.
31
Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a TCT over the subject property,
and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their
right to recover possession because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more than ten
(10) years after the certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action
is imprescriptible since the subject property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapos position is legally correct.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses
Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. 46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the
existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapos TCT.47
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have allegedly been in actual,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since
1992. The respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having
possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed in
their possession.48
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents contentions have no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless
when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 49 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496
[now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950 ]. 51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The
most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the title
of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the
possession thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence
of ownership. 53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible. 54
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
of other persons occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized
or merely tolerated, if at all.56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported sale or transfer of the property, we
still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of
sale, a duly-registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado 57 in which we gave greater probative weight to the plaintiffs TCT vis-
-vis the contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however,
the respondents did not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapos TCT. With more reason
therefore that we uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapos title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapos TCT, this Court merely
recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity
of land registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee
the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be
unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will force land
transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even
violent.58
With respect to the respondents defense59 of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in nature
and cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. 60 In other words, the party alleging laches
must adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on
this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's
petition.61On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intentof the Spouses Supapo
to exercise their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to
the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the
accion publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapos right to recover possession of the
subject lot is not barred by prescription.
The action is not barred by prior judgment
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res judicata. They contend that the
decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the accion publiciana.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to challenge the
RTCs issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their
conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined the
execution of the respondents conviction because their criminal liability had been extinguished by the
repeal of the law under which they were tried and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from the
crime had also been erased.
The respondents reliance on the principle of res judicatais misplaced.
32
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c). 62
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the merits and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the
same claim, demand or cause of action.63
The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same.66
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the Anti-
Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "conclusiveness of
judgment" does not apply.

Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment"
(1) The former judgment or order must be final; still does not apply because there is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the
respondents (accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the information, while the only issue in
accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than the respondents to possess and
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
occupy the subject property.1wphi1

(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
parties; and

Final Note
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and
cause of action.
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between
the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the
Res judicata is not present in this case.
issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the
determination of the issue of ownership.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter,
parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and consequently REVERSE and SET
civil action for the recovery of the subject property.
ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 111674.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was
prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was
SO ORDERED.
filed by and in the name of the Spouses Supapo.

Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under
the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject
property.

And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to
protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The
Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property
and recover its possession.

Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still no
basis.
SECOND DIVISION
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of action
provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties. 65 January 25, 2016

33
G.R. No. 195477
SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners to challenge the July 28, 2010
decision1 and January 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 92770. The CA
affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) decision ordering the petitioners to vacate the property.
THE ANTECEDENTS
Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Barangay San Mariano, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, and covered by TCT No. T-53000. The San
Mariano Academy structures are built on the property.
The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale on April 25, 1990. Because
the former owners, Spouses Herminio and Editha Erorita (Spouses Erorita), failed to redeem it, the title
was consolidated in the buyers name.
The Spouses Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue to operate the school on the property. The
Spouses Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the San Mariano Academys administrators.
The Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), but had failed to pay rentals since 1990. The Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos
allowed them to continue to run the school without rental out of goodwill and friendship.
On December 16, 2002, the Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property. Although the
Spouses Erorita wanted to comply, they could not immediately close the school without clearance from the
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports to whom they are accountable.
On March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the defendants Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita. 2
In their joint answer, the defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed because they cannot be
forced to vacate and to pay the rentals under their factual circumstances.
After the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial. However, the defendants-Eroritas failed to
appear despite notice. Thus, the RTC declared them in default and ordered the Spouses Dumlao to
present evidence ex parte.
On June 4, 2007, the RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlaos favor. It ordered the defendants (1) to
immediately vacate the property and turn it over to the Spouses Dumlao, and (2) to pay accumulated
rentals, damages, and attorneys fees. The RTC also prohibited the defendants from accepting enrolees to
the San Mariano Academy.
The defendants Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint patently shows a case for unlawful
detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
THE CA RULING
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
The CA ruled that the applicable law on jurisdiction when the complaint was filed, was Republic Act No.
76913 (RA 7691). This law provides that in civil actions involving a real propertys title or possession,
jurisdiction depends on the propertys assessed value and location if the assessed value exceeds fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in Metro Manila, and twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside of Metro
Manila, the RTC has jurisdiction. If the assessed value does not exceed these amounts, then, the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction.
Because the tax declaration showed that the assessed value of the property and its improvements
exceeded P20,000.00, the CA concluded that the RTC had jurisdiction.
Citing Barbosa v. Hernandez, 4 the CA held that this case involves an action for possession of real property
and not unlawful detainer.
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.
THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
In their petition, the Spouses Erorita essentially argue that: (a) the RTC had no jurisdiction because the
allegations in the complaint show a case for unlawful detainer; and (b) Hernan and Susan were improperly
impleaded as parties to this case.
In their comment, the respondents argue that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction because this case involves
issues other than physical possession; (b) even assuming the RTC initially had no jurisdiction, the
petitioners active participation during the proceedings bar them from attacking jurisdiction; (c) Hernan and
Susan are real parties in interest as the lease contracts primary beneficiaries; and (d) this last issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
ISSUES
Based on the parties positions, the issues for our resolution are:
I. Whether the RTC had jurisdiction; and
34
 II. Whether Hernan and Susan were improperly impleaded.
OUR RULING
The petition is partly meritorious.
We hold that: (1) the MTC had jurisdiction; and (2) the second issue was not raised before the lower
courts; thus, it cannot be considered in the present case.
Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the complaint.
On the first issue, the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction over
the case.5 Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaints caption. 6 Nor is jurisdiction changed by the
defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues, then,
claim lack of jurisdiction.7
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully
possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiffs tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant
that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived
plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property.8 A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real
property will not be considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts
is omitted.9
A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the petitioners to
continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter dated February 12, 2004,
the Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to
vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from
the last demand to vacate (February 12, 2004).
Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations contain the
jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within
the MTCs exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the propertys assessed value. 10
The CA incorrectly applied our ruling in Barbosa. In that case, the complaint did not state that (i)
possession was unlawfully withheld and (ii) the complaint was filed within a year from the last demand.
Because these special jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case were lacking, we held that the case
should be accion publiciana over which the RTC has jurisdiction
In the present case, however, the complaint clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case.
Thus, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case.
Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, 11 the RTCs decision is void.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time.
With the jurisdictional issue resolved, we now examine whether the petitioners timely raised this issue.
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, or even for the first
time on appeal.12 An exception to this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches. 13
Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is
analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.14 In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after
almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively
participated in several stages of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision
adverse to the movant.
In Figueroa v. People,15 we ruled that the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel
by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court, no considerable length of
time had elapsed for laches to apply.16 Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it." 17
The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application of the estoppel
by laches doctrine.1wphi1 As in Figueroa, the present petitioners assailed the RTCs jurisdiction in their
appeal before the CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches.
Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do not constitute the active
participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in Tijam.
Thus, the general rule should apply.1wphi1 The petitioners timely questioned the RTC's jurisdiction.
Issue not raised before the lower court
On the second issue, it is settled that issues that have not been raised before the lower courts cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.18 Basic consideration of due process dictates this rule. 19
We note that the second issue raised by the petitioners were not raised before the lower courts. The
petitioners only raised this issue in their petition before this Court. Thus, we need not discuss this issue at
our level.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The July 28, 2010 decision and January 4, 2011 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 92770 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
we DECLARE the June 4, 2007 decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-492 void for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
35
Rule 71

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 February 4, 2015

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ]

36
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation 1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy),
Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution, 2 referring
the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes),
Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Facts
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct.
Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-
2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class
discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis),then Presiding
Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the
marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of
her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In
one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis
(Francis),son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict." 4 She was absent from class at
that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the
inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes
and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis" 5 (Lachica v. Tormis), her
mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail
bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending
before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he
recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother.
She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, "People of
the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,"docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R, 6 then pending before Branch 8,
MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated
thatJudge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of
the investigations, he recommended sanctionsagainst Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her
daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge
Tormis involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by
the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams
in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other
judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams
werealso discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remediallaw and legal ethics
were taught; that he talked about past and resolvedcases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge
Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis
because these cases were known to the legal community and some were even published in the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge
tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, butshe resented his advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his
discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also
brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted
saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and thatdrug dependents had
no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested thatFrancis should be removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the
influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the
persons to be appointed as court employees. JudgeTormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to
apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a
cash bail bond of 6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio onMarch 13, 2011. He claimed
though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-
62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends,
official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As
Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he
instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk
of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred thatthe discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge
Tormiscould not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance
of his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the
filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law
studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her
classmates brought about by Judge Paredes frequent discussions in class of her mothers administrative
cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge
Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court
and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases
were confidential in nature.
37
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother,
Francis, as a "drug addict."
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss
the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was
also written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of
Justice of Cebu City.
In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the
conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the
evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive natureof the charges, a full-blown
investigation should be conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative
complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.11
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the
appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy
received the respective memoranda of the parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes act of discussing Judge Tormis cases in class
where she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadezabordering
on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of
magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively
liable as the act was not made in the performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge
should be the embodiment of whatwas just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but
also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when he discussed the marriage scam
involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the
administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes
was not the Executive Judge ofthe MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguiocase; that he
could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail
bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of
the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from committing
the acts complained of. In his Reply-Memorandum, 13Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in
his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public
knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every
citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and
expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case; that ifhe indeed made
derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should havefiled a criminal action for oral defamation; and
that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the
protection of the Judiciary.14
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His
statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure,
were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of
Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of
propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they
shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary." 16
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes position that he could not be held administratively liable for
his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of
his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he
conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also inhis other
professional endeavors and everyday activities.
Justice Diy found merit in Jills allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when the latter
discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being
investigated. She cited, as basis for JudgeParedes liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguiocase, Justice Diy
absolved him ofany liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence.
She accepted Judge Paredes explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of
a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not
less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the
penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.18
The Courts Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
38
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. 19
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge
Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
"misconduct." They are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge
Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might
affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. 21 The rationale
for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 22 where it was stated that it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact
and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; thatfacts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.23 Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in
2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the
case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on
the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage
scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudicerule.
Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the
marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste.
The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not
give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity
given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let
people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the
wound,"25 as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge
Tormisas a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify
propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges
shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and
respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. Heshould choose his words and exercise more caution
and control inexpressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by
uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate,
patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language. 26
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to
use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated
conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal
circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being
discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes
who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedomof expression, Judge Paredes should
uphold the good image of the Judiciary ofwhich he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and
uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect inhis language. Beinga
judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge
Paredes fell short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for
his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be
reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him asa judge not only in the performance of his judicial
duties, but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code
mandates:
39
 CANON 2 judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no
INTEGRITY judge assigned for duty during Sundays.

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity
demeanor of judges. reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient
evidence.28

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the
judiciary.1wphi1 Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases supplied)
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less
than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be is admonition.
tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge mustbe free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his salaand as a private individual. There WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional
is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave therefor.
with propriety at all times. A judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify SO ORDERED.
judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. 27

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case,Justice Diy correctly found that it
cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court findsmerit in the position of Judge Paredes that the
approval, as well as the receipt, ofthe cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jills allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave
misconduct when he personally received cash bailbond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes
justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5
of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00
oclock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should
the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in
writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said
procedure, he cannot beheld administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the
Guioguio case.
Republic of the Philippines
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of SUPREME COURT
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the Manila
court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest. SECOND DIVISION

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to G.R. No. 158874 November 10, 2004
exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their
functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising
powers incidental to his functions as anExecutive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita MAYOR SOBAIDA T. BALINDONG of the Municipality of Tagoloan, Province of Lanao del
Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguios payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In Norte, petitioner,
addition, the judge assignedto the court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive vs.
judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only

40
VICE GOVERNOR TIMOTEO D. DACALOS, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS CESAR R. CANOY,
SITTIE AMIRAH IRMA U. ALI, SIRAD D. TAHA, DAVID Q. DITUCALAN, SIMPLICIO FERNANDEZ, Jr.,
RUFA L. BILIRAN, MAGSAYSAY P. ARUMPAC, AGUAM M. MALO, MASTURA B. USMAN, MANUEL D.
RODA, AMER K. BAZER, GOVERNOR IMELDA Q. DIMAPORO all of the Province of Lanao Del Norte
and MUNICIPAL TREASURER MIA M. DIMAALAM, Al Hadj, of the Municipality of Tagoloan, Province
of Lanao del Norte, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, 1 with an application for the issuance by this Court
of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and a prayer for temporary restraining order. 2 The petition
assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68003 promulgated on 30 June 2003,
which held that the mode of appeal taken by the petitioner is erroneous. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.
The relevant facts are as follows:
Mayor Sobaida Balindong was elected Municipal Mayor of Tagoloan, Lanao Del Norte, in the simultaneous
local and national elections in May 2001, and assumed her duties after taking her oath of office on 30 June
2001.4
On 10 August 2001, petitioner received a Notice that an administrative case for Dishonesty, Oppression,
Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Authority, was filed against her by Municipal
Treasurer Mia M. Dimaalam before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lanao Del Norte, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 01-2001.5
On 08 November 2001, a Decision6 was issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lanao Del Norte
suspending petitioner for a period of six (6) months, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this BODY finds the Respondent guilty by substantial,
preponderance and convincing evidence GUILTY of MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE and/or GRAVE
ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, and hereby imposes upon her the PENALTY of SUSPENSION for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS as provided for in Sec. 66-b of RA 7160 effective immediately upon
receipt of this Decision in accordance with Sec. 68 of RA 7160 which provides, that:
An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall
be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal. . . .
On 06 December 2001, petitioner filed a petition under Rule 65 7 for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
with application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction and prayer
for issuance of temporary restraining order or status quo order before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 68003.8
The Special First Division of the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order on 18 December
2001.9Thereafter, on 13 March 2002, a Resolution10 was issued by the same body granting petitioners
application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction upon posting of an injunction bond in the amount
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000). Petitioner complied, and on 26 March 2002, the injunction
bond was approved.11
On 01 April 2002, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction 12 enjoining
respondents Gov. Imelda Dimaporo, Vice Gov. Timoteo Dacalos, the members of the Provincial Board of
Lanao Del Norte, and all other persons acting for and in their behalf, from executing or implementing the
Order of suspension against petitioner and/or in furtherance thereof, pending termination of the litigation
unless sooner lifted by the same Court.
On 30 June 2003, the Court of Appeals13 promulgated the assailed decision, part of which is quoted
hereunder:
But unfortunately, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive (Obando vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 673). More so when the
law, that is the Local Government Code, explicitly provides the proper remedy is appeal and
the forum to go is the Office of the President.
The rationale of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition is quite simple. Petitioner should have
appealed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lanao Del Norte to the Office of the President
pursuant to the Local Government Code.
Sections 61(b) and 67(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 are germane on the matter, to wit:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring
local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
...
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the
President; . . . .
...
41
 Sec. 67. Administrative Appeals. Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:

...

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decision of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.

It is apparent from the foregoing provisions of law that the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President
was available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, resort to filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65, 14 was inapt.

The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15

The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the
requirements for availment of the latter remedy is precisely that there should be no appeal. 16

The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ, never demandable as
a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion." 17 Under the circumstances of
this case, petitioner failed to clearly show that an appeal to the Office of the President was not the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy, which would justify judicial intervention.

Well settled is the rule that certiorari will lie only when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 18 As a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari,
Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court additionally requires that "no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" must be available. 19

It is, thus, clear that the availability of the right of appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action for
certiorari.20

Lastly, we are not convinced that the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply
in this case since the petitioner failed to clearly show that flexibility in its application is warranted.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, the ancillary reliefs prayed
for are denied, and the petition is, as it is hereby, DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

42