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Suggested Answer:
II
TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW
Give the two (2) requisites for the judicial review of administrative
decision/actions, that is, when is an administrative action ripe for
judicial review?
Suggested Answer:
Suggested Answer:
The issuance of the new rules and regulations violated due process.
Under Section 9, Chapter II, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987, as far as practicable, before adopting proposed rules, an
administrative agency should publish or circulate notices of the
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views; and in the fixing of rates, no rule shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the first
hearing on them. In accordance with this provision, in Commissioner
of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 (1996), it was
held that when an administrative rule substantially increases the
burden of those directly affected, they should be accorded the chance
to be heard before its issuance.
Alternative Answer:
II
Suggested Answer:
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
1.) A law violates substantive due process when it is unreasonable
or unduly oppressive. For example, Presidential Decree No. 1717,
which cancelled all the mortgages and liens of a debtor, was
considered unconstitutional for being oppressive. Likewise, as stated
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849, a law which is vague so that men of
common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application violates substantive due process. As held in Taada v.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, due process requires that the law be published.
2.) In State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505, it was held that the
dismissal of a case without the benefit of a hearing and without any
notice to the prosecution violated due process. Likewise, as held in
People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452, the lack of impartiality of
the judge who will decide a case violates procedural due process.
B.
The Police Commission is not bound by the findings of the City
Fiscal. In Mangubat v. de Castro, 163 SCRA 608, it was held that the
Police Commission is not prohibited from making its own findings on
the basis of its own evaluation of the records. Likewise, the
protestation of lack of due process is not well-grounded, since the
hearings before the Municipal Board and the City Fiscal offered
Gatdula the chance to be heard. There is no denial of due process if
the decision was rendered on the basis of evidence contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
C.
a) Torre was constructively dismissed, as held in Equitable Banking
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 273 SCRA 352.
Allowing an employee to report for work without being assigned any
work constitutes constructive dismissal.
b) Torre is correct in saying that he was not given the chance to be
heard. The meetings in the nature of consultations and conferences
cannot be considered as valid substitutes for the proper observance
of notice and hearing.
I
TOPIC: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The Department of National Defense entered into contract with
Raintree Corporation for the supply of ponchos to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), stipulating that, in the event of breach,
action may be filed in the proper court in Manila.
Suppose the AFP fails to pay for delivered ponchos where must
Raintree Corporation file its claim? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Raintree Corporation must file its claim with the Commission on
Audit. Under Section 2(1) IX-D of the Constitution, the Commission on
Audit has the authority to settle all accounts pertaining to
expenditure of public funds. Raintree Corporation cannot file a case
in court. The Republic of the Philippines did not waive its immunity
from suit when it entered into the contract with Raintree Corporation
for the supply of ponchos for the use of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The contract involves the defense of the Philippines and
therefore relates to a sovereign function.
In-United States vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487,492, the Supreme Court held:
"The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the project are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order: they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commerce or
business purposes"
The provision for venue in the contract does not constitute a waiver
of the State immunity from suit, because the express waiver of this
immunity can only be made by a statute.
In Republic vs. Purisima. 78 SCRA 470 474, the Supreme Court ruled:
"Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract
between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant
Rice and Com Administration which, according to him, anticipated the
case of a breach of contract between the parties and the suits that
may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must come
from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out
by Justice Bengzon in Mobil."
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, Raintree Corporation should first file a claim with the
Commission on Audit. If the claim is denied, it should file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
II
Topic: Administrative rulings subject to final determination of the
courts
Andres Ang was born of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother in
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on January 20, 1973. In 1988, his father was
naturalized as a Filipino citizen On May 11, 1998. Andres Ang was
elected Representative of the First District of Sorsogon. Juan Bonto
who received the second highest number of votes, filed a petition for
Quo Warranto against Ang. The petition was filed with the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Bonto contends that Ang is
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and therefore is
disqual1fied to be a member of the House.
The HRET ruled in favor of Ang. Bonto filed a petition for certiorari
in the Supreme Court. The following issues are raised:
1. Whether the case is justiciable considering that Article VI.
Section 17 of the Constitution declares the HRET to be the sole Judge-
of all contests relating to the election returns and
disqualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
2. Whether Ang is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
How should this case be decided?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The case is justiciable. As stated in Lazatin vs.House Electoral
Tribunal. 168 SCRA 391, 404, since judicial power includes the duty
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Supreme Court
has the power to review the decisions of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal in case of grave abuse of discretion on its part.
2. Andres Ang should be considered a natural born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born of a Filipino mother on January 20, 1973.
This was after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on January
17, 1973. Under Section (I), Article III of the 1973 Constitution,
those whose fathers or-mothers are citizens of the Philippines are
citizens of the Philippines. Andres Ang remained a citizen of the
Philippines after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Section
1. Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution:"
III
TOPIC: SELF INCRIMINATION
Suppose Congress passed a law to implement the Constitutional
principle that a public office is a public trust, by providing as
follows:
"No employee of the Civil Service shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence,
documents or other evidence in any administrative investigation
concerning the office in which he is employed on the ground that his
testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him
or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture: but his testimony or any
evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in criminal
prosecution based on the transaction, matter or thing concerning
which is compelled, after invoking his privilege against self-
incrimination to testify or produce evidence. Provided, however, that
such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution
and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying nor shall he be
exempt from demotion or removal from office. Any employee who refuses
to testify or produce any documents under this Act shall be dismissed
from the service."
Suppose further, that Ong, a member of the Professional Regulatory
Board, is required to answer questions in an investigation regarding
a LEAKAGE in a medical examination.
1. Can Ong refuse to answer questions on the ground that he would
incriminate himself?
2. Suppose he refuses to answer, and for that reason, is dismissed
from the service; can he pausibly argue that the Civil Commission has
inferred his guilt from his refusal to answer in violation of the
Constitution?
3. Suppose on the other hand, he answers the question and on the
basis of his answers, he is found guilty and is dismissed. Can he
pausibly assert that his dismissa1 is based on coerced confession?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. No. Ong cannot refuse to answer the question on the ground that he
would incriminate himself, since the Jaw grants him immunity and
prohibits the use against him in a criminal prosecution of the
testimony or evidence produced by him. As stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S.591, 597, what the
constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination seeks to
prevent is the conviction of the witness on the basis of testimony
elicited from him. The rule is satisfied when he is granted immunity.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. No Ong cannot argue that the Civil Service Commission inferred
his guilt from his refusal to answer. Be was not dismissed because of
his involvement in the leakage in the medical examination but for his
refusal to answer. This is a violation of the law. He could be
compelled to answer the question on pain of being dismissed in case
of his refusal, because he was granted immunity.
In Lefkowitz vs. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,84, the United States Supreme
Court said:
"Furthermore, the accommodation between the interest of the State and
the Fifth Amendment requires that the State have means at its
disposal to secure testimony if immunity is supplied and testimony is
still refused. This is recognized by the power of courts to compel
testimony, after a grant of immunity, by use of civil contempt and
coerced imprisonment. Shilitani vs. United States, 384 US 364, 16 L
Ed 2d 622, 86 5 Ct 1531 (1966). Also, given adequate immunity the
State may plainly insist that employees either answer questions under
oath about the performance of their job or suffer the loss of
employment."
3. Yes, Ong can argue that his dismissal was based on coerced
confession. In Garrity vs. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, the United
States Supreme Court held:
"We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth
Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent
criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal
from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen
or other members of the body politic."
IV
TOPIC: LIMITATIONS OF POWER
The police had suspicions that. Juan Samson, member of the subversive
New-Proletarian Army, was using the mail for propaganda purposes in
gaining new adherents to its cause. The Chief of Police of
Bantolan., Lanao del Sur ordered the Postmaster of the town to
intercept and open all mail addressed to and coming from Juan Samson
in the interest of the national security. Was the order of the Chief
of Police valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the order of the Chief of Police is not valid, because there is
no law which authorizes him to order the Postmaster to open the
letters addressed to and coming from Juan Samson. An official in the
Executive Department cannot interfere with the privacy of
correspondence and communication in the absence of a law authorizing
him to do so or a lawful order of the court.
Section 3(1), Article III of the Constitution provides:
"The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
IV
TOPIC: JURISDICITON
Suppose a Commissioner of the COMELEC is charged before the
Sandiganbayan for allegedly tolerating violation of the election laws
against proliferation of prohibited billboards and election
propaganda with the end in view of removing him from office. Will the
action prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action will not prosper. Under Section 8 Article Xl of the
Constitution. the Commissioners of the Commission on Elections are
removable by impeachment. As held in the case of In re Gonzales, 160
SCRA 771,774-775, a public officer who is removable by impeachment
cannot be charged before the Sandiganbayan with an offense which
carries with it the penalty of removal from office unless he is first
impeached. Otherwise, he will be removed from office by a method
other than impeachment.