Railways and the Great Game

Afghanistans leaders have often been concerned about the intentions of foreigners wanting to build
railways into their country and not without reason.

Throughout the nineteenth century the British political and military authorities were worried that Russia
might advance through Afghanistan towards India, threatening British rule in the subcontinent. Even if a
full-scale Russian invasion and occupation of India was unlikely, any move towards India would tie-up
British resources dealing with both the Russians themselves and also any Indian uprising which they
might inspire. Britain saw defence of Indias North West Frontier, now part of Pakistan, as essential to the
Great Game of politics played across Central Asia by the two rivals.

In 1857 William Andrew, Chairman of the Scinde, Punjab & Delhi Railway, suggested that railways to the
Bolan and Khyber passes would have a strategic role in responding to any Russian threat. 1 No action
was taken until 1876, when Britain decided to keep at least one route into Afghanistan open all year round
to permit the rapid deployment of troops from Karachi to counter any threat to India. Orders were given
that a railway should be built to Quetta, near the Afghan border, and this developed into a scheme to
reach Kandahar.

The Second Afghan War (1878-80) broke out between Britain and Afghanistan before work on the
railway could begin. The war gave a new urgency to the need for easier access to the frontier, and on 18
September 1879 the Viceroys council decided to make do with a line through the Bolan pass usable only
in fair weather. Work began just three days later, and after four months the first 215 km of the line was
complete, opening from Ruk to Sibi in January 1880. On 27 March 1880 the Morning Post commented
after three and twenty years of apathy the necessity has been realised and now these railways are being
constructed. The railway was built to the 1 676 mm Indian broad gauge.

Beyond Sibi the terrain was more difficult. Reconnaissance parties had reached Kandahar by December
1879, but Afghanistan was enemy country, making it difficult to find an optimal route for the line. It was
realised it would not be possible to for the railway to reach Quetta before the conclusion of the war, and
so the railway was given a lower priority. When a new cabinet under Gladstone was formed in April 1880
the planned Kandahar extension was put to one side.

In March 1880 Britain and Persia agreed the Herat Convention. Persia would take control of the Afghan
city of Herat subject to certain conditions, including permitting British soldiers
to be stationed there. Article seven of the draft agreement stated that
If a railway or telegraph be constructed to Kandahar the Shah [of Persia] at the request of
the Queen [Victoria] would facilitate its extension to Herat in all ways in his power and would
contribute thereto from the surplus of the Herat revenues according to his ability.

At first the Persian foreign minister requested the removal of this article. He eventually agreed to its
inclusion, but objected to the conditions regarding the assessment of the revenue of the city.2

In 1880 Russia began to build the Trans-Caspian railway.3 In Britain there was concern that Russia might
seize Herat, and extend their new railway to the city.

In response to this threat Britain restarted work on the railway to Afghanistan. To avoid alerting Russia to
this work it was described as the Harrai road improvement project, and camels were used for
construction traffic instead of the more usual temporary railway lines. This deception was abandoned
when Russia occupied the city of Mary in 1883, and the line was developed as the Sind Peshin State
Railway. Over 320 km long, the line reached Quetta in March 1887, through barren mountains inhabited
by armed tribesmen.

On 30 September 1891 the Chaman Extension Railway was opened, linking Bostan, north of Quetta, to
the Afghan frontier. The buffer stop lay 5 km beyond Chaman fort, and just 200 m short of the Durand line,
the Afghanistan-India border which was drawn around the railway when the frontier was fixed by Sir
Mortimer Durand in 1893.

A supply depot was set up at Chaman containing the rails, sleepers and bridge parts required to extend
the line the remaining 108 km to Kandahar in the event of a military emergency. Meanwhile, across
Afghanistan, the Russians stockpiled materials at Kushka 4 to allow the rapid construction of a line to
Herat.

Amir Abdul Rehman, ruler of Afghanistan between 1880 and 1901, banned railways and the telegraph
from entering Afghanistan, in case they were used in any British or Russian invasion. Rehman
commented there will be a railway in Afghanistan when the Afghans are able to make it themselves and
said as long as Afghanistan has not arms enough to fight against any great attacking power, it would be
folly to allow railways to be laid throughout the country. Rehman forbade his subjects from travelling on
the British line to Chaman,5 the construction of which he described as just like pushing a knife into my
vitals.6 The Afghan army produced a manual on how to destroy railway tracks in the event of an invasion
threat.7

In 1891 Captain AC Yates wrote a booklet setting out arguments in favour of building a railway to Seistan,
rather than Kandahar, to allow the defence of Herat against Russia. 8The press and the public are at this
moment advocating the extension of our railways to Kandahar; but that this could be done without
precipitating a rupture of our relations with the Amir is doubtful.

Around 1910 there was discussion9 regarding extending the Chaman line to Kandahar, and beyond to
Herat and the Russian railhead at Kushka. In the event, the line was never extended across the border. It
did however carry traffic from Afghanistan, with a daily ice-packed train bringing fresh fruit grown in
Afghanistan to the cities of India until the 1940s.

A through railway link from Europe to India had long been contemplated, but the schemes raised
concerns for the security of the subcontinent. In 1910 a Russian syndicate proposed a Trans-Persia
railway, running from Tehran to Yezd, Kerman, Seistan and Nushki. This raised the risk of Russian troops
being able to occupy Kandahar and Quetta, outnumbering available Indian army forces.

In 1911 a British study looked at the implications of Russian railway construction in the light of the
successful movement of troop on the Trans-Siberian line during Russias war with Japan (1904-
1905).10 The Trans-Persia line faced political problems in that it would cause alarm and suspicion in
Afghanistan, as its rails lead direct to the Afghan Frontier, which may give rise to tribal excitements that
may prove beyond the Amirs power to control. The measures taken to restore confidence may involve us
in complications with other European Powers.

The studys author commented No connection between this line and either Afghanistan or Northern
Baluchistan should be permitted,

Russian railways now stretched from Orenburg to Tashkent and Samarkand. The further extension can
only be accomplished in peace, or with the consent of the Amir, which is hardly likely to be given; or
during a war with Afghanistan. The bridging of the Oxus [Amu-Darya] is estimated to take four months to
complete. It was estimated that after reaching the Amu-Darya it would take the Russians 16 months to
extend the railhead to Doshi. The report also considered that an extension of the Trans-Caspian railway
from Kushka into Afghan territory would only be possible with consent or in war time. Rails were stacked
at Kushka, and it was estimated that the line could be laid to the Helmud in 18 months.

The extension of Russian or Persian railways through Afghanistan should be more strongly resisted than
ever said the report. The author speculated that the German-backed Baghdad railway could be extended
to the Afghan frontier, but handwritten annotations on the Public Record Offices copy of the booklet
suggest officials thought this somewhat unlikely.

The author concluded that The present attitude of the Amir concerning them [i.e. railways] may change
rapidly, as it has recently with regard to roads in Afghanistan. Thus the construction of these two lines
[Trans-Caspian from Kushka, an extension from Samarkand] is probably only a matter of time.