SYLLABUS FOR NEGLIGENCE

What is the test to determine negligence?

The test of negligence is as follows: Did the defendant in doing the

alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? (Picart vs.
Smith)

What/Who are the exceptions in using the ordinary diligence of

a good father as a standard in determining negligence?

The first exemption is in determining whether or not children are

negligent in particular accidents. In the case of Jarco Marketing vs. CA, the
Court ruled that a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed
to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of
age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.

However, this ruling has been abandoned since it restricts the judges
to an inflexible rule that changes only whenever there is an amendment to
the law changing the age of exemption from criminal liability.

Hence, the ruling in Taylor vs. Manila Electric Rail Road subsists as the
test in determining whether or not a child can be considered as negligent in
particular situations for failure to observe the diligence of a good father. If he
is imbued sufficient level of maturity and knowledge, then he is obliged to
observe the diligence of a good father.

Second, professional experts who holds himself out as being

competent to do things requiring professional skill, will be held liable for
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in
the particular work which he attempts to do (Culion vs. Philippine).

Third, an intoxicated man does not assume automatic negligence when

faced in accidents. xx Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It
is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to
prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is
drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to
him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one xxx
(Wright vs. Manila Electric)

Lastly, an insane or demented person though criminally exempted

from liability is not freed from civil liability or damages for injuries he caused
(US vs. Baggay).
 What is the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? When is it
applicable as a mode of evidence?

xxx Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself is rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises
upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does
not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which
caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of
alleged wrongdoer xxx (Layugan vs. IAC)

The doctrine is only applicable in the absence of any proof to tie the
negligent act of the defendant with the injury sustained by the petitioner.

The requisites are:

xxx 1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured xxx (DM
Consunji vs. CA)

What are the exceptions in applying the doctrine?

xxx (1) where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents

evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of
the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to
the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally,
once 2) the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely
eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably
be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case xxx
(Layugan vs. IAC)
 Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809
March 15, 1918

The test of negligence is as follows: Did the defendant in doing the

alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
The Court also introduced the criteria in determining negligence,
to wit:
xxx Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
By applying the test of negligence it can be said that the act of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury while that of the plaintiff is
the remote cause.
xxx It is enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was in t
his case the immediate and determining cause of the accident
and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a more remote
factor in the case xxx
 Taylor vs. Manila Rail Road
GR No. L-4977
March 22, 1910

The question brought before the Court is on what standard of conduct

shall be used in determining whether or not a child has been negligent or
not? Whether the diligence of a good father is equally applicable to children?
The Court held that in determining whether a child is negligent or not,
his level of maturity and knowledge should be taken into consideration. If he
is imbued sufficient level of maturity and knowledge, then he is obliged to
observe the diligence of a good father.
As the Court pronounced:
xxx In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-
grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to
which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of
the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own
deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held
to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful
and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries
would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the
accident which inflicted the injury xxx
 Jarco Marketing vs. CA
GR No. 129792
December 21, 1999

The Court in determining whether the child is negligent applied the

conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old
in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
In his book,former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
xxx In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment,
and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The
same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under
fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted
with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-
delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and
that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen
years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law xxx
 Del Rosario vs. Manila
GR no. L-35283
November 5, 1932

The presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the

breakage of this wire has not been overcome. They are deemed liable for the
death of the child.
xxx It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can
properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and the natural curiosity which a child
would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere
fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the
age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But even
supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be
properly imputed to the deceased, a proposition upon which the
members of the court do not all agree, yet such negligence
would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not
having been the determining cause of the accident xxx
 Ylarde vs. Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722
July 29, 1988

Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent

Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to
the death of his pupil Ylarde?

xxx The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving

his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal
connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it
was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the
strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with
whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous
instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them
jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since
the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was
also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole
beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of
the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the
child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation
created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all
the pupils concerned to real danger xxx
 Culion vs. Philippine
GR No. 32611
November 3, 1930

In this connection it must be remembered that when a person

holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular
work which he attempts to do.

xxx The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the
engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he
was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason,
possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the
flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that
particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently
warned from those circumstances to cause him to take greater
and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words
Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by
one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats.
There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy
antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have
resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an
unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the
injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame.

We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is

chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the
changes which Quest undertook to accomplish xxx
 US vs. Pineda
GR No. L- 12858
January 22, 1918

A pharmacist is one of the professions obliged to observe a higher

degree of diligence more than the diligence of a good father.

xxx The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is
one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to
use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care
of a special high degree," "the highest degree of care known to
practical men." Even under the first conservative expression,
"ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the
highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and
vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent
with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that
human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger
flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless
medicine xxx

Moreover, he can be made responsible for fraudulent act.

xxx The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree

of certainty that the druggist made a material representation;
that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was
false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth
and as positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in
reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury xxx
 BPI vs. CA
G.R. No. 112392
February 29, 2000

BPI in allowing the withdrawal of private respondent's deposit, failed to

exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. In total disregard of
its own rules, petitioner's personnel negligently handled private respondent's
account to petitioner's detriment.
xxx While it is true that private respondent's having signed a blank
withdrawal slip set in motion the events that resulted in the withdrawal
and encashment of the counterfeit check, the negligence of
petitioner's personnel was the proximate cause of the loss that
petitioner sustained. Proximate cause, which is determined by
a mixed consideration of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent, is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred." The proximate cause of the withdrawal and eventual
loss of the amount of $2,500.00 on petitioner's part was its
personnel's negligence in allowing such withdrawal in
disregard of its own rules and the clearing requirement in the
banking system. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk of
incurring a loss on account of a forged or counterfeit foreign check and
hence, it should suffer the resulting damage xxx
 Wright vs. Manila Electric
G.R. No. L-7760
October 1, 1914

Whether intoxication warrants a prima facie presumption of

negligence:
xxx Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is
but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence
tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is
immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary
care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater
degree of care is required than by a sober one. If one's conduct
is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is
immaterial whether he is drunk or sober
The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been
injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say
that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under
the conditions described xxx
 US vs. Baggay
G.R. No. 6659
September 1, 1911

Insane or demented person though not criminally liable is still civilly

liable, particularly liability for damages.
xxx True it is that civil liability accompanies criminal liability,
because every person liable criminally for a crime or
misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for
indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil
liability because of acts ordinarily punishable, although
the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from
criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane
person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of
the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still
reasonably and justly liable with his property for the
consequences of his acts, even though they be performed
unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to
suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more
than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition.
Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his
illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property
for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the
benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but
this protection does not exclude liability for damage
caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer
the consequences of his acts xxx
 Marinduque vs. Workmens
G.R. No. L-8110
June 30, 1956

Does the violation of an order of an administrative agency constitute

negligence?
xxx Many courts hold that violation of a statute or ordinance
constitutes negligence per se. Others consider the
circumstances.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that
violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board
is not negligence per se xxx
Rather, a violation of an order of an administrative agency can
be considered only as rebuttable presumption of negligence. As
oppose to a violation of ordinance or statute enunciation negligence per se.
xxx not notorious negligence, which we have interpreted
to mean the same thing as gross negligence
implying conscious indifference to consequences
pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and
probably result in injury utter disregard of
consequences. Getting or accepting a free ride on the
companys haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence, because
as the referee found, no danger or risk was apparent xxx
 Layugan vs. IAC
G.R. No. 73998
November 14, 1988

In the absence of proof of negligence, the petitioner assails the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against the driver of the truck.
xxx Any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses
serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the
highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a
threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver
as well as the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver,
to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road
would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself is rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which
arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one
which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened
provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have
occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been
under management and control of alleged wrongdoer xxx
However, the Court held that the doctrine does not apply in this case
since it satisfies the two exceptions of applying the doctrine, to wit:
xxx Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of
inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
overcome, 1) where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is
the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct
evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the
facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly
 appear. Finally, once 2) the actual cause of injury is established
beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the
defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can
reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this
case xxx

Ramos vs CA
G.R. No. 124354
April 11, 2002

The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen

absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
an endotracheal tube. As was noted in the Decision, the instruments used in
the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all
under the exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez and Dr.
Hosaka.

Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:

xxx [with the] reasoning that the injury to the patient therein
was one which does not ordinarily take place in the absence of
negligence in the administration of an anesthetic, and in the
use and employment of an endotracheal tube. The court went on
to say that "[o]rdinarily a person being put under anesthesia is not
rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such
anesthesia in the absence of negligence. Upon these facts and under
these circumstances, a layman would be able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily
have followed if due care had been exercised." Considering the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the testimony of Cruz
was properly given credence in the case at bar xxx
 Batiquin vs. CA
G.R. No. 118231
July 5, 1996

The requisites for the Doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur are as follows:
xxx which arises upon proof that 1) instrumentality causing
injury was in defendant's exclusive control 2) and that the
accident was one which ordinary does not happen in
absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence
whereby negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from [the] mere fact that [the] accident happened provided [the]
character of [the] accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence it would not
have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have
been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged
wrongdoer . . . . Under [this] doctrine . . . the happening of an
injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces
substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had
been used xxx
Lastly, 3) the defendant must not be able to provide any
explanation to exculpate his liability.
It must be emphasized that the doctrine can be invoked when and
only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.
 DM Consunji vs. CA
G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001

xxx Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where

evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured xxx

By proving the doctrine, the presumption of negligence against the

defendant arises.

xxx the defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when

the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res
ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all
the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other
evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the
inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the
defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established
xxx