ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the
(SECTION 1 CASES 1-20) alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
PRIMACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT
REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN (Bill of Rights after EDSA Revolution)
GR NO. 104768 JULY 21, 2003
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Sandiganbayan
resolution dismissing petitioners amended complaint and ordering the
return of the confiscated items of Elizabeth Dimaano
Facts:
1. President Cory Aquino issued EO No. 1 after the EDSA revolution
EO 1 created the Presidential Commission on Good Governance
(PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his cronies. The
PCGG then created the AFP Anti-graft Boad to investigate corrupt AFP
Personnel.
2. The AFP Board investigated the unexplained wealth of Josephus Ramas
Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army during the
time of former President Ferdinand Marcos.
3. Pursuant to said investigation, the constabulary raiding team served a
search and seizure warrant on Dimaanos premises.
The search warrant was for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition but the team confiscated firearms and ammunition, along
with items not included in the warrant such as monies of P2.8M and
$50,000, jewelry and land titles.
4. The AFP Board then recommended that Ramas be prosecuted before the
Sandiganbayan
The case was for violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, otherwise known as the
Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. Accordingly, the
Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed a
complaint against Ramas and Dimaano before the Sandiganbayan.
5. Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for lack of merit
The grounds for the dismissal were: (1) the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate the private respondents and (2) the search and seizure
conducted was illegal.
6. Petitioner appealed before the SC arguing that the search was conducted
during a revolutionary government bound by no constitutional limitation.
During the interregnum, the exclusionary right from illegal seizure
granted to the respondents by the Bill of Rights was inoperative.
Issue: W/N the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house were illegally
seized and therefore inadmissible as evidence.
Held: No.
1. Although the Bill of Rights was inoperative during the interregnum, as the
de jure government, the Philippine revolutionary government was still
bound by treaty obligations under the ICCPR (International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his property. Although it
is not intend as a legally binding document, the court has interpreted the
Declaration as a part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State.
2. While conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum, the
sequestration orders remained valid as they were expressly recognized
upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution.
3. During the interregnum, the directives and orders issued by government
officers were valid so long as they did not exceed the authority granted by
the revolutionary government and did not violate the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since they did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued
by a judge upon proper application, specifically stated the items to be
searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items in
the warrant. However, the constabulary seized items not in the warrant.
4. The warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The raiding team
thus had no legal basis for the seizure of the items. Such actions amounted
to warrantless search and seizure, exceeding its authority. The seizure was
therefore void and the items must be returned to Dimaano.
Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORG V. PHILIPPINES
BLOOMING MILLS CO. INC (Hierarchy of Rights)
JUNE 25, 1973
FACTS: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon,
Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are
officers and members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift
(from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts
(from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they
informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the
PBMEO after learning about the planned mass demonstration. During the
meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the
company but was in factual exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the
normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs
if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that
while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike
and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the
officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEOs
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial
Relations for being filed two days late.
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the Collective
Bargaining Agreement?
RULING: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent
Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-
can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the
scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
Injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even
if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well
as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
Also the strike was not in violation of the CBA of the company because it was not
against the company. The company must be the protectors of their employees
but rather in the case at bar, it seemed like they were looking for a chance to
reduce such personnel. They are guilty of unfair labor practice. The dismissal of
the Court of Industrial Relations of the motion for reconsideration because of the
prescription of 5 days upon the notice and 10 days to arguments that support
such motion was the reason. Considering the nature of the offense the Supreme
Court allowed such negligence to prosper hence the reversal of the decision and
the reinstatement of the petitioners with the proper pay from the moment they
were dismissed minus the one day of strike as well as the earnings which they
might have earned during their separation from other sources.
DISSENTING by Barredo, J
Barredo argues that such negligence of the submission of the motion for
reconsideration is right to be dismissed. He says that the petitioner with the help
of his counsel had the proper number of days to submit such motion. Barredo
argues with proof of previous jurisprudence. Added to this argument is that the
constitutional right is not what is being tackled in the case at bar, according to
Barredo. The errors is said to be in the interpretation, construction or application
of a constitutional precept and not a denial of due process. All of these must first
comply with the rules of procedure and overpowering a final and executory
jlyrreverre| 1
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations devoids them of power and renders
them useless hence the dissenting opinion of Barredo.
SEPARATE by Teehankee, J
Teehankee restates the reasons of the decision of the majority of the court in the
primacy of human rights over property rights are to be considered and are
considered imprescriptible.
TUPAS V. CA (Late Petition) DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL
FEBURARY 6, 1991
Facts:
1. October 12, 1989: court denied petition for certiorari for failure to show CA
(respondent court) committed reversible error in its resolution dated May 31,
1989.
2. November 23, 1989: petitioner filed motion for reconsideration to which SC
required a Comment followed by a Reply and a Rejoinder
3. After examining the issues and arguments, SC affirmed the decision of CA.
a. petitioners received copy of the Pasay RTC decision on April
3, 1989
b. motion for reconsideration was filed on April 17, 1989
c. such motion for reconsideration was denied by RTC on May 3,
1989 but only received by the petitioners counsel on May 9,
1989
d. petition for review with CA was done only on May 23, 1989
which was clearly outside the 15-day reglementary period
ISSUE:W/N the petitioners were denied of procedural due process after they fail
to comply with the 15-day prescription for appealing
HELD/RATIO: NO. Records showed that the petitioners counsel did not file
petition for review within the remaining period which he should have known was
only one day.
The tardiness of the petitioners to file an extension for review has
forfeited their right to appeal. Therefore, they cannot claim that they
have been denied of due process.
Observance of both procedural and substantive rights is equally
guaranteed by due process and must be followed whatever the
source of such rights.
Petition for certiorari cannot be a remedy if the reason behind the
lost of the right to appeal is due to the petitioners inexcusable
negligence.
Lacsamana V. CA: If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and
denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only the remaining
period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be
necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of
time to file such petition for review
Petitioners argument that they should not be prejudiced by the
mistake of their counsel was not acceptable especially that their
counsel is equipped with impressive credentials.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality. It is so
ordered.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO VS. VICENTE PALANCA (JURISDICTION
OVER A PERSON)
MARCH 26, 1918
JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the
subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions
of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem
yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always
assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may
be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS: Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels
of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio
returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again
to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since
defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The
Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants
last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of
the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered.
The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was
confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this
sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of
the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the
order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent
thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the
judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant and the subject matter of the action; (2) Whether or not due process of
law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction: The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though
related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it
may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property
which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with
reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant
How Jurisdiction is Acquired: Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by
the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted
over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over
the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property,
though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken
into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual
seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the
beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to
abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land
under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to
adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to
be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not
strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially
such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with
reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone
is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings
are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or
other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The
judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom
publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and
is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where
the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The
requisites are;
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and decide the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDING; ARBITRATION
ANG TIBAY V. CIR (due process in administrative proceedings)
February 27, 1940
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused
the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios
act is not valid. According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to
systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles
is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because the owner,
Teodoro, is discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring
the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the
employer.
The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion for new trial
was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said
motion.
jlyrreverre| 2

ISSUE: What is the function of CIR as a special court? Is the Court of Industrial
Relations the proper venue for the trial?
HELD: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR.
The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It
is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates
the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to
the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all
such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth.
SHU V. DEE (NBI without judicial or quasi-judicial power)
April 23, 2014
PONENTE: Brion
TOPIC: Right to due process, right to be heard
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint before the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) charging the respondents of falsification of two deeds of
real estate mortgage submitted to Metrobank. Both deeds of real
estate mortgage were allegedly signed by the petitioner, one in his own name
while the other was on behalf of 3A Apparel Corporation. According to the
petitioner, the respondents were employees of Metrobank. After investigation, the
NBI filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor of Makati charging the respondents
of the crime of forgery and falsification of public documents.
The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their
right to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never
required them and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the
petitioner for comparison.
The respondents argued in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their
right to due process during the NBI investigation because the agency never
required them and Metrobank to submit the standard sample signatures of the
petitioner for comparison. The findings contained in the questioned documents
report only covered the sample signatures unilaterally submitted by the petitioner
as compared with the signatures appearing on the two deeds of real
estate mortgage. An examination of the signatures of the petitioner which appear
in several documents in Metrobanks possession revealed that his signatures in
the questioned deeds are genuine.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were denied of their right to due
process during the NBI investigation.
HELD: NO. The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-
judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even
determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings
are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own
initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also
renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in
order to prosecute the persons responsible.
Since the NBIs findings were merely recommendatory, the Court found that no
denial of the respondents due process right could have taken place; the NBIs
findings were still subject to the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justices
actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due process when the
NBI issued the questioned documents report. There was no categorical finding in
the questioned documents report that the respondents falsified the documents.
This report, too, was procured during the conduct of the NBIs investigation at the
petitioners request for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of
falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent the respondents
from securing a separate documents examination by handwriting experts based
on their own evidence. On its own, the NBIs questioned documents report does
not directly point to the respondents involvement in the crime charged.
GMA NETWORK, INC V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
September 2, 2014
PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the
Fundamental Law. Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at
the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy. The aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary
as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people.
Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed the
airtime limitations for political campaign from per station basis, as used during
the 2007 and 2010 elections, to a total aggregate basis for the 2013. Various
broadcast networks such as ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, RMN and KBP
questioned the interpretation of the COMELEC on the ground that the provisions
are oppressive and violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression and of the press.
Collectively, they question the constitutionality of Section 9 (a), which provides for
an aggregate total airtime instead of the previous per station airtime for
political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates' television and radio guestings and appearances.
Petitioners claim that Section 9(a) limits the computation of aggregate total
airtime and imposes unreasonable burden on broadcast media of monitoring a
candidates or political partys aggregate airtime. On the other hand, COMELEC
alleges that the broadcast networks do not have locus standi, as the limitations
are imposed on candidates, not on media outlets.
Comelec maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in
accordance with the Fair Election Act as this would truly give life to the
constitutional objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this
as a more effective way of "levelling the playing field" between
candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without much.
ISSUES:
1. Does Section 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limit violate the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press?
2. Does resolution No. 9165 impose unreasonable burden on the broadcast
industry?
RULING:
1. Yes, Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of
the aggregate-based airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the
Fundamental Law. Freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at
the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy.
GMA came up with its analysis of the practical effects of such a regulation: Given
the reduction of a candidates airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA
estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize for his
political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88
days, or will only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he
chooses to place his political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal
allocation, he will only have 27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This
barely translates to 1 advertisement spot on a 30-second spot basis in television.
The Court agrees. The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which
jlyrreverre| 3
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government.
2. No, Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the
broadcast industry
The Court cannot agree with the contentions of GMA. The apprehensions of
COMELEC appear more to be the result of a misappreciation of the real import of
the regulation rather than a real and present threat to its broadcast activities. The
Court is more in agreement with COMELEC when it explained that the legal duty
of monitoring lies with the COMELEC. Broadcast stations are merely required to
submit certain documents to aid the COMELEC in ensuring that candidates are
not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. There is absolutely no duty on the
broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time. GMA
grossly exaggerates when it claims that the non-existent duty would require them
to hire and train an astounding additional 39,055 personnel working on eight-hour
shifts all over the country
GOVT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VS HON.
OLALIA (Extradition)
April 19, 2007
Quick Digest: This is a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify two Orders of
RTC Manila Judge Felixberto Olalia Jr (respondent)
1) Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz
(private respondent) to post bail
2) Order dated April 10 2002 denying the motion to vacate said
Order (1) filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKAR) represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner
The petition alleges both Orders were issued by Olalia with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in
the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. Petition was dismissed.
Facts
x Muoz was charged before the HK court with 3 counts of offense of
accepting an advantage as agent (bribery). He also faces 7 counts
of conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued against him.
x DOJ then received from the Hong Kong a request for the provisional
arrest of Muoz. The National Bureau of Investigation then filed in
with the RTC an application of provisional arrest of Muoz. RTC
issued an order of arrest. NBI agents then arrested and detained him
x In the same case that the HKAR filed a petition for extradition of
Muoz, he files a petition for bail. Judge Ricardo Bernardo Jr. denied
the petition for bail holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
in extradition cases and that Muoz is a high flight risk. Thereafter,
Judge Bernardo inhibited himself from the case and Judge Olalia
(respondent judge) presided.
x Muoz filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. It was granted by Judge Olalia (Order dated
December 2001).
x HKAR filed urgent motion to vacate such decision. It was denied by
respondent judge Olalia (Order dated April 2002). Hence, the instant
petition.
x Petitioner alleges that Judge Olalia acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction granting the said
Orders as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a
potential extraditee
Issue
Whether or not a prospective extraditee may be granted bail (Topic on Extradition
Proceedings under Procedural Due Process)
Held/Ratio
A prospective extraditee can be granted bail.
In USA vs Purganan, the Court held that the exercise of right to bail is limited to
criminal proceedings and not to extradition. However in light of the various
international treaties and also the modern trend in public international law
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
libertya reexamination of the Courts ruling in Purganan was made
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the
fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed, is recognized
as customarily binding upon the members of the international
community.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified also upholds the rights of every
person to life, liberty and due process.
The Philippines as member of the family of nations has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedingsto make available such remedies
which include the right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases (Mejoff v Director of Prisons
considered the Universal Declaration on Human Rights), it should also be
allowed in extradition cases. Both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence and guilt of the person detained is not an issue.
Although there is no law providing bail to the extraditee, there is also no
prohibition from exercising his constitutional right to post bail.
The right of the extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the
light of the Philippine treaties concerning the promotion and
protection of human rights.
According to Justice Puno is Purganan case, only clear and
convincing evidence will be considered. Private respondent did not
yet show evidence to show that he was not a flight risk.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
clear and convincing evidence. If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.
RCBC V. BANCO DE ORO (Arbitration)
G.R. No. 196171 and G.R. No. 199238, December 12, 2010
Quick DigestRCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision
dated December 2010 one of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and prior
rulings in vacating the second partial award on the basis of Chairman Barkers
alleged partiality
Facts:
1. RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with
Equitable-PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), George L. Go and the individual
shareholders of Bankard, Inc. (Bankard) (2000)
2. There was dispute between the parties when RCBC informed EPCIB
and the other selling shareholders of an overpayment of the subject
shares, claiming there was an overstatement of valuation of accounts
amounting to P478 million and that the sellers violated their warranty
under the SPA (2003)
3. As no settlement was reached, RCBC commenced arbitration
proceedings with the ICC-ICA in accordance with Section 10 of the
SPA (2004)
i. Section 10. Arbitration: Should there be any dispute arising
between the parties relating to this Agreement which cannot be
resolved by agreement of the parties within 15 days after written
notice by a party to another, such matter shall then be finally
settled by arbitration under the Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three
arbitrators appointed in accordance with such rules. The
decision of the arbitrators shall be final and binding upon the
parties hereto and the expenses of arbitration shall be paid as
the arbitrators shall determine.
ii. In its Request for Arbitration, Claimant RCBC charged Bankard
with deviating from and contravening generally accepted
accounting principles and practices and resulted in the
overpayment of P556 million. For this violation of sellers
representations and warranties under the SPA, RCBC sought
its rescission, as well as payment of actual damages
4. In their answer, EPCIB, Go and the other selling individual
shareholders denied RCBCs allegations contending that RCBCs
claim is one for overpayment or price reduction under the SPA which
is already time-barred. A counterclaim for litigation expenses and
costs of arbitration as well as moral and exemplary damages, was
likewise raised by the Respondents (2004)
a. Subsequently, the Arbitration Tribunal was constituted where Sir
Ian Barker was appointed by the ICC-ICA as Chairman.
5. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that they are required to pay
US$350,000 as advance on costs pursuant to the ICC Rules of
Arbitration (ICC Rules) (2004)
a. RCBC paid its share while Respondents share of the advance on
costs was thus fixed at US$175,000
b. Respondent filed an Application for Separate Advances on Costs
stating that it is improper for them to share equally on the advance
cost of Claimants (RCBC) claim since the total amount of RCBCs
claim is substantially higher more than 40 times the total
amount of their counterclaims
c. Respondents refused to pay their share in the advance cost fixed
by the ICC-ICA
d. The ICC-ICA informed the parties that if Respondents still failed to
pay its share in the advance cost, it would apply the ICC Rules
and request the Arbitration Tribunal to suspend its work and set a
new time limit, and if such requested deposit remains unpaid at
the expiry thereof, the counterclaims would be considered
withdrawn
6. The ICC-ICA notified the parties of its decision to increase the
advances on costs from US$350,000 to US$450,000 subject to later
readjustments (2005)
a. The ICC-ICA again invited the Respondents to pay the
US$100,000 increment. Respondents, however, refused to pay
the increment, insisting that RCBC should bear the cost of
jlyrreverre| 4
 prosecuting its own claim and that compelling the Respondents
to fund such prosecution is inequitable. Respondents reiterated
that it was willing to pay the advance on costs for their
counterclaim
b. In view of Respondents continuing refusal to pay its equal
share in the advance on costs and increment, RCBC wrote the
ICC-ICA stating that the latter should compel the Respondents
to pay as otherwise RCBC will be prejudiced and the inaction of
the ICC-ICA and the Arbitration Tribunal will detract from the
effectiveness of arbitration as a means of settling disputes
c. Chairman Ian Barker, in a letter stated in part (2006):
Q The Tribunal has no power under the ICC Rules to
order the Respondents to pay the advance on costs
sought by the ICC or to give the Claimant any relief
against the Respondents refusal to pay.
d. RCBC paid the additional US$100,000 under the second
assessment to avert suspension of the Arbitration Tribunals
proceedings
e. Meanwhile, EPCIBs corporate name was officially changed
to Banco De Oro (BDO)-EPCIB after its merger with BDO
was duly approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. As such, BDO assumed all the obligations and
liabilities of EPCIB under the SPA.
7. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered a Partial Award and makes the
following declarations (First Partial Award) (September 2007)
a. The Claimants claim is not time-barred under the provisions of
this SPA
b. The Claimant has established the following breaches by the
Respondents of the SPA
i. The assets, revenue and net worth of Bankard were
overstated
c. Subject to proof of loss the Claimant is entitled to damages for
the foregoing breaches
8. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm the First
Partial Award, while Respondents filed a motion to vacate the same
(October 2007)
a. The Makati City RTC issued an order confirming the First
Partial Award and denying Respondents separate motions to
vacate. Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied
9. ICC-ICA by letter increased again the advance on costs.
Respondents declined to pay its adjudged total share and the ICC-
ICA then invited RCBC to substitute for Respondents in paying the
balance. RCBC complied with the request (October 2007)
10. RCBC filed an Application for Reimbursement of Advance on Costs
Paid, praying for the issuance of a partial award directing the
Respondents to reimburse its payment representing Respondents
share in the Advance on Costs (2008)
a. Respondents filed their opposition arguing that in issuing the
award for advance cost, the Arbitration Tribunal will be deciding
an issue beyond the terms of the Terms of Reference (TOR)
11. In his letter, Chairman Barker advised the parties, as follows (2008):
a. The Tribunal notes that neither party has referred to an article
by Matthew Secomb on the very subject of the case at bar. To
assist both sides (later the court will decide that the Secomb
article was evident partiality of the Tribunal for RCBC) and to
ensure that the Tribunal does not consider material on which
the parties have not been given an opportunity to address,
Chairman Barker attached a copy of the article
i. Secomb is the ICC Secretariat
12. RCBC contended that based on Mr. Secombs article, the Arbitration
Tribunal is vested with jurisdiction and authority to render an award
with respect to said reimbursement of advance cost paid by the non-
defaulting party
a. Respondents, on the other hand, maintained that RCBCs
application for reimbursement of advance cost has no
basis under the ICC Rules
13. The Arbitration Tribunal rendered the Second Partial Award as follows
(2008):
a. Respondents are forthwith to pay to the Claimant the sum
of US$290,000
14. EPCIB filed a Motion to Vacate Second Partial Award in the Makati
City RTC while RCBC filed in the same court a Motion to Confirm
Second Partial Award (2008)
15. The Makati City RTC issued the Order confirming the Second Partial
Award and denying EPCIBs motion to vacate the same (2009)
a. Said court held that since the parties agreed to submit
any dispute under the SPA to arbitration and to be bound
by the ICC Rules, they are also bound to pay in equal
shares the advance on costs
b. It noted that RCBC was forced to pay the share of EPCIB
in substitution of the latter to prevent a suspension of the
arbitration proceedings, while EPCIBs non-payment
seems more like a scheme to delay such proceedings
16. EPCIB filed in the CA a petition for review with application for TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 113525) in
accordance with the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution (Special ADR Rules) (2010)
a. EPCIB assailed the Makati City RTC in denying its motion
to vacate the Second Partial Award despite the fact that it
was issued with evident partiality
17. The Arbitration Tribunal issued the Final Award (2010)
a. BDO filed in the Makati City RTC a petition to vacate final
award
b. RCBC filed with the Makati City RTC a motion to confirm
final award
18. The CA rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 113525 (found in no.
14), the dispositive portion of which reverses (December 2010):
a. The Second Partial Award dated May 28, 2008 issued in
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration
19. RCBC set forth the grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision dated
December 2010 one of which is that the CA acted contrary to law and
prior rulings in vacating the second partial award on the basis of
Chairman Barkers alleged partiality
Issue: W/N there was evident partiality which is a legal ground to vacate the
Second Partial Award
Held: There was evident partiality and therefore constitutes as a legal ground for
vacating the Second Partial Award
1. Special ADR Rules sets forth that evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitral tribunal or any of its members is a ground for vacating an
arbitral award
a. The failure of the CA to apply the applicable standard or
test for judicial review prescribed in the Special ADR
Rules may warrant the exercise of the Supreme Courts
discretionary powers of judicial review
b. Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on arbitration in the
PhilippinesAs a general rule, the court can only vacate
or set aside the decision of an arbitral tribunal upon a
clear showing that the award suffers from any of the
infirmities or grounds for vacating an arbitral award
2. Evident partiality is not defined in our arbitration laws. As one of the
grounds for vacating an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) in the United States (US), the term "encompasses both an
arbitrators explicit bias toward one party and an arbitrators inferred
bias when an arbitrator fails to disclose relevant information to the
parties."
a. In the Court of Appeals of Oregon, evident partiality in its
common definition implies "the existence of signs and
indications that must lead to an identification or inference" of
partiality
b. In Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council
Carpenters Benefit Funds, they stated that evident partiality will
be found where a reasonable person would have to conclude
that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration
3. The Court adopts the reasonable impression of partiality standard,
which requires a showing that a reasonable person would have to
conclude that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the
arbitration.
a. Such interest or bias must be direct, definite and capable of
demonstration rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative
b. When a claim of arbitrators evident partiality is made, the court
must ascertain from such record as is available whether the
arbitrators conduct was so biased and prejudiced as to destroy
fundamental fairness
4. CA found factual support in BDOs charge of partiality
a. Chairman Barkers furnishing the parties with a copy of the
Secomb article. This article ultimately favored RCBC by
advancing its cause. Chairman Barker makes it appear that he
intended good to be done in doing so but due process dictates
the cold neutrality of impartiality
i. By furnishing the parties with a copy of this article,
Chairman Barker practically armed RCBC with
supporting legal arguments to deal with the
situation when one of the parties to international
commercial arbitration refuses to pay its share on
the advance on costs
b. Applying the foregoing standard, we agree with the CA in
finding that Chairman Barkers act of furnishing the parties with
copies of Matthew Secombs article, considering the attendant
circumstances, is indicative of partiality such that a reasonable
man would have to conclude that he was favoring RCB
ADMU V. CAPULONG (ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE: FRATERNITY)
May 27 1993
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of
serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of
Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at
the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
jlyrreverre| 5
physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean
Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours
on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent
students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge.
Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against
respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating
Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among
the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas
imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent
students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was
granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean
del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out
by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally
unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was
granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due
process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The
nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners'
notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant
petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the
Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this
case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in
academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
GO V. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN (Academic Discipline)
October 10, 2012
Facts:
1. October: Letran recieved information that fraternities were
recruiting members among Letran's high school students.
2. Letran started an investigation--4 students admitted that they
were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity.
3. These 4 neophytes identified Emerson Kim Go, a 4th year
highschool student, as one of the fraternity seniors present during
their hazing.
4. In an incident report prepared by Letran, it stated a list of fraternity
members including Kim.
5. November 23, 2001: a PTA conference was held, informing Kim's
mother, petitioner Go, that neophytes identified Kim as a frat
member.
6. Thereafter, Letran asked Kim to explain his side.
7. December 19, 2001: Kim, in a written statement, denied that he was a
frat member and that he did not attend said hazing.
8. On the same day, Letran sent a written notice to inform spouses Go
to attend a conference on January 8 to address the issue of Kim's
frat membership. spouses Go did not attend said conference.
9. january 15: Letran subsequently conveyed to Mrs Go and
Kim the decision of Letran to SUSPEND Kim from Jan 16 to
Feb18.
10. Spouses Go filed a case in RTC of Caloocan claiming that
Letran unlawfully DISMISSED Kim, not observing due process.
11. Petitioners claim that due process was not observed under the
guidelines set by Ang Tibay v. CIR. they claim that respondents
violated due process by:
a) not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge of Kim
b) not giving them any written notice of the charge
c) not providing them with opportunity to cross examine the
neophytes.
12. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses GO.
13. CA rendered judgment in favor of Letran, stating that Letran observed
due process.
Issue: Whether or not due process was observed in suspending Kim.
Held: Yes. Due process was observed in suspending Kim.
The case of Guzman v. NU should be observed in academic due process
rather than the case of Ang Tibay. Due process in disciplinary cases of
students does not entail proceedings similar to judicial or administrative
proceedings.
Minimum standards to be observed:
a) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
the accusation
b) right to answer the charges against them
c) right to be informed of the evidence
d) right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
e) The evidence must be duly considered by the school authorities
deciding
Requirement a - The spouses and Kim were informed of the nature and charge
of the accusation through the written notices given to them for attending the
conferences on Jan 8 and 15.
Requirement b and d - They also gave an opportunity to be heard by lettinh Kim
answer the charges against them as proved by the written statement of Kim
dated December 19. Thus, he was also given a chance to adduce evidence on
his behalf.
Even though at that time, they havent received the written notice yet, they
were nevertheless given notice through the PTA meeting of the charge
against Kim. What is important is the notice given, not the form of the notice.
Requirement c - In the same PTA meeting, petitioners were informed that the
case was evidenced by the statement of the neopythes, thus they were given
the right to be informed of the evidence.
Cross examination is not needed, as again, this should not be likened to
administrative due process.
Note: Letran merely SUSPENDED Kim and not dismissed, contrary to what
spouses Go allege in their claim
LAO GI v. COURT OF APPEALS (Deportation Proceedings in General)
December 29, 1989
Quick Digest Portion: This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners wherein
they seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask that a new
one be rendered setting aside the order of the CID (Comnmission on
Immigration and Deportation) dated September 28, 1982 and directing it to
proceed with the reception of the evidence in support of the charges against the
petitioners.
Facts:
September 3, 1958: Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 191: finding
Filomeno Chia, Jr., alias Sia Pieng Hui to be a Filipino citizen as it appears that
his father Filomeno Chia, Sr. is a Filipino citizen born on November 28, 1899
being the legitimate son of Inocencio Chia and Maria Layug of Guagua,
Pampanga.
October 3, 1980: Minister of Justice rendered Opinion No. 147: cancelling
Opinion No. 191: setting aside the citizenship of Filomeno Chia, Sr. on the
ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A motion for
reconsideration of said Opinion was denied by the Minister of Justice on
February 13, 1981.
March 9, 1981: a charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his
wife and children.
March 19, 1981: an amended charge was filed with the CID alleging that said
respondents refused to register as aliens having been required to do so and
continued to refuse to register as such. On August 31, 1981 another amended
charge was filed alleging that Manuel Chia committed acts of undesirability.
September 4, 1981: said respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended
charges on the ground that the CID has no authority to reopen a matter long
settled under Opinion No. 191. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the
private prosecutor. The CID special prosecutor also filed an opposition on the
ground that the citizenship may be threshed out as the occasion may demand
jlyrreverre| 6
and that due process was accorded to respondents. The respondents filed a
reply thereto. The motion to dismiss was denied by the CID and a motion for
reconsideration of said denial was also denied in a resolution dated December
10, 1981.
February 11, 1982: said respondents then filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order. After requiring a comment thereon, on April
28, 1982 this court en banc resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
Earlier, Manuel Chia was charged with falsification of public documents in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in Criminal Case No. 60172 for alleging
that he was a Filipino citizen in the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale of
certain real property. He was acquitted by the trial court in an order dated May 5,
1982 on the ground that Opinion No. 191 of the Secretary of Justice may be
equated as res judicata and that revocation thereof by Opinion No. 147 cannot
be considered just, fair and reasonable.
Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are
aliens.
Held: The petitioners question the Order of Acting Commissioner Nituda that
they register as aliens as required by the Immigration Act. While it is not disputed
that it is also within the power and authority of the Commissioner to require an
alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding
that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very
citizenship of the petitioners is in issue there should be a previous determination
by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and
required to register as aliens.
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the
authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable
aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people.
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right
of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are
applicable to deportation proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as
amended, it is provided:
c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the
specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a
hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions
complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable
a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be
deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.
Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the respondent CID is
hereby set aside.
MACEDA V. ERB (Regulations: Fixing Rates)
July 18, 1991
FACTS: Private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective
applications on oil price increases. On September 21, 1990, the ERB issued an
order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a
petition for Prohibition on September 26, 1990 seeking to nullify the provisional
increase. We dismissed the petition on December 18, 1990, reaffirming ERB's
authority to grant provisional increase even without prior hearing, pursuant to
Sec. 8 of E.O. No. 172, clarifying as follows:
What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex-parte, a
provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or
not:
(1) to make it permanent;
(2) to reduce or increase it further; or
(3) to deny the application.
Section 3, paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex-parte and which
are subject to the resolution of the main case.
Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise,
operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to
both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the
grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements
of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an
authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final
outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from
conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority-which is of course, the
better procedure however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct
one.
In the same order of September 21, 1990, authorizing provisional increase, the
ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested parties on
October 16, 1990. Petitioner Maceda failed to appear at said hearing as well as
on the second hearing on October 17, 1990. Hearing was postponed to
November 5, 1990, on written notice of petitioner Maceda. On November 5,
1990, the three oil companies filed their respective motions for leave to file or
admit amended/supplemental applications to further increase the prices of
petroleum products. The ERB admitted the respective supplemental/amended
petitions on November 6, 1990 at the same time requiring applicants to publish
the corresponding Notices of Public Hearing in two newspapers of general
circulation. Petitioner Maceda maintains that this order of proof deprived him of
his right to finish his cross-examination of Petron's witnesses and denied him his
right to cross-examine each of the witnesses of Caltex and Shell. He points out
that this relaxed procedure resulted in the denial of due process.
ISSUE: Whether ERB has the authority to grant the provisional increase in oil
price
HELD: YES.
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS
Maceda was not denied of his right to due process. The order of testimony both
with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general
course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this
discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is
not improper. Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative
bodies, such as the ERB which in matters of rate or price fixing is considered as
exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function As such administrative
agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings.
In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing
Hearings Before the ERB provides that These Rules shall govern pleadings,
practice and procedure before the Energy Regulatory Board in all matters of
inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceedings within the
jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the Board
may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such
suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT PROVISIONAL RELIEF:
The Solicitor General likewise commented:
Among the pieces of evidence considered by ERB in the grant of the contested
provisional relief were:
(1) certified copies of bins of lading issued by crude oil suppliers to the
private respondents;
(2) reports of the Bankers Association of the Philippines on the peso-
dollar exchange rate at the BAP oil pit; and
(3) OPSF status reports of the Office of Energy Affairs.
The ERB was likewise guided in the determination of international crude oil
prices by traditional authoritative sources of information on crude oil and
petroleum products, such as Platt's Oilgram and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
We concede ERB's authority to grant the provisional increase in oil price.
The rise in crude oil importation costs, which as earlier mentioned, reached an
average of $30.3318 per barrel at $25.551/US $ in September-October 1990; the
huge OPSF deficit which, as reported by the Office of Energy Affairs, has
amounted to P5.7 Billion (based on filed claims only and net of the P5 Billion
OPSF) as of September 30, 1990, and is estimated to further increase to over
P10 Billion by end December 1990; the decision of the government to
discontinue subsidizing oil prices in view of inflationary pressures; the apparent
inadequacy of the proposed additional P5.1 Billion government appropriation for
the OPSF and the sharp drop in the value of the peso in relation to the US dollar
to P28/US $, this Board is left with no other recourse but to grant applicants oil
companies further relief by increasing the prices of petroleum products sold by
them.
We shall thus respect the ERB's Order of December 5, 1990 granting a
provisional price increase on petroleum products premised on the oil companies'
OPSF claims, crude cost peso differentials, forex risk for a subsidy on sale to
NPC (p. 167, Rollo), since the oil companies are "entitled to as much relief as the
fact alleged constituting the course of action may warrant.
CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSN. OF THE PHILS. (Regulation:
Profession)
December 12 1997
Facts: The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 505. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued
revising the PPAs charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and
supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-
03-85 on March 21, 1985, which embodied the Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in
Philippine Ports. These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be
holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three
months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have
achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular
appointments by the PPA itself
jlyrreverre| 7
Issue: Is pilotage a property right? Is A.O. 04-92 violative of due process?
Ruling:
Yes, The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of
the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right
No, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a
wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be
noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting
the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or
cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the appointees performance. PPA-AO 04-
92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of
their profession in PPAs jurisdictional area. PPA-AO No. 04-92 restricts the
pilots from practicing their profession to only one year. In light of this, due
process of law in the form of a hearing must occur in order to protect the rights of
the pilots.
Quick Digest Portion This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila RTC
regarding
their ruling on the unconstitutionality of PPA Administrative Order 04-92.
Facts:
1. Philippine Ports Authority promulgated PPA Administrative Order 03-85 on March
21, 1985 and PPA Administrative Order 04-92 on July 15, 1992.
PPA AO 03-85 contains the Rules and Regulations
Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in the Philippines.
o This rule contains that aspiring pilots must have pilot licenses and
must train for a number of months in outports and in the Port of
Manila. It is only after such training that they are given permanent
and regular appointments by the PPA. They can practice pilotage
until the age of 70 or they are removed by reason of unfitness.
PPA AO 04-92 states all existing regular appointments would only be
valid until December 31, 1992 only. All the subsequent appointments
would only have a term of one year subject to yearly renewal or
cancellation by the PPA.
2. United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association
through Capt. Compas questioned PPA AO No. 04-92 before the DOTC.
The secretary of DOTC insisted that the matter review and
recall of the administrative order lies with the PPAs Board
of Directors.
3. Capt. Compas appealed the ruling of the DOTC to the Office of the President.
The Office of the President later dismissed the appeal maintaining that
it applied to all harbor pilots in general and it comes within the power of
the PPA to control and regulate pilotage.
4. Capt. Compas filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with a
prayer for TRO. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of Compas declaring that PPA AO
04-92 is null and void.
Issue: W/N the license of harbor pilots can be cancelled without due process of
law.
Held: No. Section 1 of Article III states that No person shall be deprived of their
life, liberty or property without due process of law. Their license, which allows them
to practice their profession, comes within the definition of a property. PPA-AO No.
04-92 restricts the pilots from practicing their profession to only one year. In light of
this, due process of law in the form of a hearing must occur in order to protect the
rights of the pilots.
SALAW V. NLRC (DISMISSAL IN PRVATE SECTOR)
SEPTEMBER 27, 1991
Petitioner, Espero Santos Salaw, was employed by the private respondents
Associated Bank in September 1967 as a credit investigator-appraiser. His duties
included inspecting, investigating, appraising, and identifying the company's
foreclosed assets; giving valuation to its real properties, and verifying the
genuineness and encumbrances of the titles of properties mortgaged to the
respondents.
On November 27, 1984, The Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary was able to extract from him, without the assistance of a
counsel a sworn affidavit admitting that he and a co-employee sold twenty
sewing machines and electric generators foreclosed by the bank from Worldwide
Garment and LP Garment and divided the proceeds of Php 60,000.000 among
them in equal shares.
Petitioner appeared before the Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee
of the said bank without the assistance of a counsel. And April 1, 1985, the
petitioner was terminated from his employment effective March 27, 1985, for
alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of
the trust reposed on him by the private respondents.
The petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal against
respondent Bank and submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement
before the CIS.
Issue: Whether or not in exercise of the administrative power, the respondent
bank legally dismissed the petitioner?
Held: No. The Supreme Court said that the dismissal of the petitioner was
illegal. The dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was characterized by
undue haste. The law is clear that even in the disposition of labor cases, due
process must not be subordinated to expediency or dispatch. In order for an
employees dismissal to be legal under the Labor Code, it must be for an
authorized cause and due process notice and hearing must be observed.
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication cases. However, the right to
counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be
observed. Indeed, rights to counsel and to due process of law are two of
fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987Constitution to person under
investigation, be the proceeding administrate civil, or criminal. Hence the petition
was granted,
PEOPLE V. NAZARIO (Manager, Void for vagueness)
August 31, 1988
This is an appeal to reverse the Court of First Instance of Quezon's decision
finding Eusebio Nazario guilty of the ! violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4,
series od 1955, as amended by Ordinance 15 and 12.
Facts: Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his
municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation
provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of
Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with
the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to pay was
for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was
covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Objections of petitioner: He contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond,
he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner and manager". The
Ordinance was vague as to the dates of payment
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain
Held: NO. The Court found that accused is not merely a lessee but an owner and
manager
He does not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishpond,
introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain
them
Neither are the said Ordinances vague as to dates of payment, they have been
definitely established Ordinance No. 15: In making the tax payable "after the
lapse of 3 years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries"
Ordinance No. 12: "Beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond
started operating before the year 1964.
The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning
dates is concerned, presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not
make the ordinance vague
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially
the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified
by either a saving clause or by construction.
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN (PLUNDER, VOID FOR VAGUENESS)
November 19, 2001
Overview of the Case
The case deals with a petition to declare RA 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, unconstitutional.
In the case, Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon the court that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line
which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to
the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard
in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea (criminal
intent) in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which
are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
jlyrreverre| 8
 The supreme court ruled the law as valid and constitutional: (a) The Congress
intended the words combination and series to be understood in their popular
meanings is evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill that eventually
became the law. Also, Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free speech cases, not to penal statutes. (b) The reasonable
doubt standard cannot be presumed to be dispensed by the legislature in the
law as this standard gives life to the Due Process clause in the constitution. It is
also clear that the legislature did not do away with the reasonable doubt
standard as shown in their deliberations. (c) The court said that plunder as
defined by RA 7080 is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens
rea). This is shown by the an earlier resolution of the Congress placing plunder
as one of several heinous crimes ,and is implied with the application of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances in the RPC to the prosecutions under the said
Plunder Law.
Facts
1. Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
informations for violation of RA 7080, RA 7659, RA 3019, RA 6713,
RA 6085, etc. (April 4, 2011)
2. Estrada (Petitioner) filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of
the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses to give the
accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. (April 11,2011)
a.) The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the
law under which they are charged were never raised in that
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and
comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
b.) On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution finding that "a probable cause for the offense of
PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused."
c.) On June 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
3. Petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the
law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)
offense. (June 14,2011)
a.) Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash on June
4. 21,2011
b.) Petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition 5 days later
5. (June 26,2001)
c.) On July 9, 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's
Motion to Quash.
b. The petitioner filed the instant petition to the Supreme Court and oral
arguments were made on September 18, 2001 where the issues
were summarized and delineated
Issue: W/N The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;
W/N The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
W/N Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it
is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Held:
NO. ThePlunder Law isNOT unconstitutional for beingvague.
a.) A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of
the employment of terms without defining them.
b.) There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. It is enough that the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
c.) It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit
technical or special legal meaning to those words. (Note: Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary was used to show the definition of the words
"combination and "series.)
d.) As shown from the legislative deliberations on the bill, which eventually became the Plunder
Law, the Congress intended the words "combination and "series to be understood in their
popular meanings.
e.) Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced.
f.) A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
g.) The statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions.
h.) Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as
in all other statutes.
i.) A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
j.) The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Gallego v. Sandiganbayan - Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is
highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by
prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness violate due
process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. This Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use
of the term "unwarranted" in the said law, which was understood in its primary
and general acceptation.
NO. The Plunder Law does not require less evidence for proving the crimes
of plunder. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in the application
of criminal law. It was shown in the legislative deliberations that the
legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard of quantum of
proof in the crime of plunder.
a.) This "reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in
the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause
which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged.
b.) What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would
constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth.
c.) In short, only the relevant acts (which number should sufficient enough
for them to be considered as a combination or series of acts) constituting
a certain pattern must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, it is not
necessary that every act alleged in the information is proven.
d.) As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the
elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite criminal intent
(mens rea) must be shown.
e.) Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and
understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them.
f.) Section 4 is a purely procedural measure and does not define nor
establish any substantive right in favor of the accused.
The crime of plunder is a malum in se, as deemed in the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.
a.) The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are
inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the
case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would
be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of
the acts.
b.) The application of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the
Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates
quite clearly that criminal intent (mens rea) is an element of plunder since
the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as
FEEDER INTERNATIONALL LINE V. CA (TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE)
May 31, 1991
Quick digest: The petitioner Feeder International seeks to reverse the decision
of respondent CA, affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which found
the vessel M/T ULU WAI liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines and its cargo liable under Section 2530(a), (f) and (1-1)
of the same Code ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo, on the
ground that the petitioner was deprived of property without due process and that
the decision was not made on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
Facts:
1. M/T ULU WAI a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated
by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore left Singapore carrying
1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to
Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.
2. The vessel anchored at Guiuanon, Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs
authorities. A civilian informer notified the Iloilo authorities.
jlyrreverre| 9
3. The Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team and found
that the vessel did not have the required ship and shipping documents on
board, except for a clearance from Singaporean port officials clearing the
vessel for Zamboanga.
4. The vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention
was issued after due investigation.
5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure
and Detention which the District Collector denied in an Order.
6. The District Collector issued his decision finding M/T ULU WAI guilty of
violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
(PD 1464) and her cargo of gas oil and fuel oil guilty of violating Section
2530 (a), (f) and (1-1) and forfeited in favour of the RP.
7. Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a
decision affirming in toto the decision of the District Collector.
8. Petitioner filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the
Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to
enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his decision. The Court of Tax
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Commissioner.
9. Petitioner filed a petition in the Supreme Court for review of the Court of
Tax Appeals decision. SC issued a resolution referring the disposition of
the case to the Court of Appeals.
10. x This is in view of the SC decision in Development Bank of the Phils vs CA:
final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
11. 10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
and then denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration.
12. 11. Petitioners filed an instant petition in the SC seeking the reversal of the
decision of CA.
Issues/Held: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED in toto.
1. W/N the CA erred in finding that there had been illegal importation on the
basis of circumstantial evidence
No. A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs law is not penal in nature (do
not result in the conviction of the offender) and is purely civil and administrative in
character. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence (relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion).
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins
when the carrying vessel enter the jurisdiction of the Phils with intention to unload
therein. Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof but must
be inferred from the facts. The Government has sufficiently established that an
illegal importation or at least an attempt thereof has been committed on the basis
of substantial evidence.
2. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law
because of the lack of assistance of counsel
No. The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charter
only during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime and
during the trial of the accused. Since the forfeiture proceeding is not criminal in
nature, the assistance of counsel is not deemed essential.
3. W/N the petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law
because its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized
No. The petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the
right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is
an accused in a criminal case
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS (Relative
Constitutionality)
220 SCRA 536(1993)
The concept of relative constitutionality: The constitutionality of a statute
cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions
with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to
another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light of changed conditions.
FACTS: Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and
Examination Sector of the Central Bank "that the financial condition of TSBis one
of insolvency and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
depositors and creditors," the Monetary Board issued a RESOLUTION ordering
the closure of Triumph Savings Bank, forbidding it from doing business in the
Philippines, placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as
receiver. One week later, TSB filed a complaint against Central Bank and Ramon
V. Tiaoqui challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269,
otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act," as amended, insofar as it authorizes
the Central Bank to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with
violation of any law or regulation, much less found guilty thereof. The RTC
granted a TRO against the CB resolution.
Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint before the RTC for failure to
state a cause of action, i.e., it did not allege ultimate facts showing that the action
was plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith, which are the only grounds for
the annulment of Monetary Board resolutions placing a bank under
conservatorship, and that TSB was without legal capacity to sue except through
its receiver. These were denied. The denial was elevated to the CA, which upheld
the orders of the RTC. Thus, this petition for (Rule45) certiorari.
ISSUES 1) Is absence of prior notice and hearing constitutive of acts of
arbitrariness and bad faith, as to annul the MB resolution?2) Is it only the receiver
who has a right of action to question the resolution of the CB, and not the
stockholders of the corporation?
HELD: NO. Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not
contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop
operations and placed under receivership. When par. 4 provides for the filing of a
case within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the
bank, it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the
case. Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice
and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul
it on the basis of absence thereof. A previous hearing is NOT required. It is
enough that a subsequent judicial review be provided.
This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal
considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and as a
valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders
and the general public. The mere filing of a case for receivership by the Central
Bank can trigger a bank run and drain its assets in days or even hours leading to
insolvency even if the bank be actually solvent. The procedure prescribed in Sec.
29 is truly designed to protect the interest of all concerned, i.e., the depositors,
creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the general public.
The absence of notice and hearing is not a valid ground to annul a Monetary
Board resolution placing a bank under receivership. The absence of prior notice
and hearing cannot be deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith.
2) As regards the second ground, to rule that only the receiver may bring suit in
behalf of the bank is, to echo the respondent appellate court, "asking for the
impossible, for it cannot be expected that the master, the CB, will allow the
receiver it has appointed to question that very appointment. "Consequently, only
stockholders of a bank could file an action for annulment of a Monetary Board
resolution placing the bank under receivership and prohibiting it from continuing
operations.
FACTS: Central Bank discovered that certain questionable loans extended by
Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP), totaling approximately P300 million (the
paid-in capital of PBP amounting only to P 140.544 million, were fictitious as they
were extended, without collateral, to certain interests related to PBP owners
themselves. Subsequently and during the same year, several blind items about a
family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its stockholders
appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in PBP and resulted in
continuous over- drawings on the banks demand deposit account with the Central
Bank; reaching to P 143.955 million.
Hence, on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination
Sector, the Monetary Board (MB), placed PBP under conservatorship.
PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which proposed the transfer to PBP
of 3 buildings owned by Producers Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder
and the subsequent mortgage of said properties to the CB as collateral for the
banks overdraft obligation but which was not approved due to disagreements
between the parties. Since no other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP
for almost 3 years its overdrafts with the CB continued to accumulate and swelled
to a staggering P1.023 billion.
Consequently, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it
considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. There being no response from
both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution
instructing Central Bank management to advise the bank that the conservatorship
jlyrreverre| 10
may be lifted if PBP complies with certain conditions. Without responding to the
communications of the CB, PBP filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati against the CB, the MB and CB Governor alleging that the resolutions
issued were arbitraty and made in bad faith. Respondent Judge issued a temporary
restraining order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB filed a
motion to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the MB resolutions were arbitrarily
issued. CB filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul
the orders of the trial court but CA affirmed the said orders. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of
cause of action and declaring the MB resolutions as arbitrary.
HELD: The following requisites must be present before the order of
conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1)The appropriate pleading must be
filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of
the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days
from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank
under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that
the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP
was placed under conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day period
deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the complaint and the amended
complaint were not initiated by the stockholders of record representing the majority
of the capital stock
PEREZ V. MADRONA (NOT NUISANCE PER SE)
(March 21, 2012)
FACTS: Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are
registered owners of a residential property located in Greenheights Subdivision,
Phase II, Marikina City and covered by TCT No. 169365 of the Registry of Deeds
of Marikina. In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with
a concrete fence and steel gate. In 1999, respondents received the following
letter dated May 25, 1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina
Demolition Office stating that the structure that they built encroached on the
sidewalk and that is in violation of PD 1096 of the National Building Code and RA
917 on Illegally occupied/constructed improvements within the road right-of-way.
The respondent-spouses are given 7 days to remove the said structure. As
response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a letter stating that the May 25,
1999 letter (1) contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him
and his property without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there
is no court order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases
which do not expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a
false accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk. More
than a year later or on February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the
same contents as the May 25, 1999 letter but this time giving respondents ten
days from receipt thereof to remove the structure allegedly protruding to the
sidewalk. This prompted respondents to file a complaint for injunction before the
Marikina City RTC on March 12, 2001. Respondents likewise sought the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him from doing any act
of demolition on their property and that after trial, the injunction be made
permanent. On March 16, 2001, the RTC issued a TRO against petitioner.
On July 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
respondents. The RTC decision permanently enjoined defendant Perez from
performing any act which would tend to destroy or demolish the perimeter fence
and steel gate of the respondents property. The RTC held that respondents,
being lawful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open
possession of every inch of their property and petitioners threat to demolish the
concrete fence around their property is tantamount to a violation of their rights as
property owners who are entitled to protection under the Constitution and
laws. The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that respondents fence
is a nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the communitys
welfare, nor is there basis for petitioners claim that the fence has encroached on
the sidewalk as to justify its summary demolition. CA affirmed,
ISSUE: W/N respondents structure is a nuisance per se that presents immediate
danger to the communitys welfare and can be removed without need of judicial
intervention since the clearing of the sidewalks is an infrastructure project of the
Marikina City Government and cannot be restrained by the courts as provided in
Presidential Decree No. 1818
HELD: No. If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on
the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after
respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to
court and prove respondents supposed violations in the construction of
the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be
abated summarily without judicial intervention. Our ruling in Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial intervention when
the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said case, we
ruled:
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to
a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity
(Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the
quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be
injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be
a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without
judicial intervention. [Underscoring supplied.]
In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-
municipality similarly argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that
may be abated by the Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held:
Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil
Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to
do.
Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not
injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to
secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it.
And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner
believes that respondents fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be
so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se,
but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial
intervention is unwarranted.
AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORP. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Gutierrez, J. | May 23, 1991
FACTS:
- In 1984, Glorious Sun (Glorious) was found guilty of dollar-salting and
misdeclaration of importations by the Garments and Textile Export Board
(GTEB), as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were
cancelled.
- Glorious then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that its right
to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not
supported by evidence.
- The Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings.
However, Glorious subsequently filed a motion to withdraw its petition, which
was granted. Glorious then filed another motion to dismiss, which was duly
noted by the court.
- Two years later, Glorious filed with the GTEB a petition for restitution of its export
quota and requested for a reconsideration of the previous decision by the
GTEB. In addition to alleging that it was denied due process, it also
contended that the GTEB decision to cancel its quotas was due to duress
and threats from former Minister Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious quotas
to Marcos crony-owned corporations Del Soleil Apparel Manufacturing and
American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). This petition was denied.
- Thereafter, an appeal was brought to the Office of the President. AIFC sought to
intervene claiming that the GTEB decision had long become final.
- The Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case to
GTEB for further proceedings.
ISSUES and HOLDING:
- WON the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to the instant case on
the ground that the former decision was a final judgment on the merits.
NO
- WON Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB
decision. NO
RATIO:
- A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or
merely technical points.
- The dismissal of the GTEB case cannot be considered as a judgment on the
merits. It was based solely on the notice of withdrawal of Glorious.
On the due process issue:
- Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to disclose to Glorious
vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious was
guilty of dollar-salting, it contends that the subsequent disclosure in 1987,
where relevant documents were given to Glorious and that the latter was
given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect. This contention
by AIFC, the court holds as MISLEADING.
- The SC recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the
GTEB.
- AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence used
by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution. The
glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed to
disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious.
- Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the
charge that the former was denied due process. The data given showed that
the price of Glorious was actually below the median. Apparently, the GTEB
Investigating Panel picked up four importers whose prices were lower than
Glorious in order to show that the latters prices were the highest.
- Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit and how AIFC claims that it is an
inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence to it.
To this the court replied that Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured by
Minister Ongpin, not the members of the Investigating Panel. Mr. Puno was
the Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of
jlyrreverre| 11
 his position he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every 2. The classification freeze provision unduly favors older brands over newer
reason to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a brands?
decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their
administration had already been made. At the very least, Mr. Puno's Held: In applying the rational basis test, the Court found the questioned law
"complete turn about" casts doubts on the veracity and fairness of the Constitutional.
Investigating Panel's Report to GTEB which formed the basis for the 1984 A legislative classification that is reasonable does not offend the
GTEB decision. constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the laws.
- Finally, the court held that although factual findings of administrative agencies are The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that:
generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be disregarded if they (1) it rests on substantial distinctions;
are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead to the factual (3) it applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and
findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave (4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same class.
abuse of discretion arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest. classification freeze provision uniformly applies to all newly
- Clearly, the right of Glorious to due process was violated. Glorious export quota introduced brands in the market,
allocation, which initially was a privilege, evolved into some form of property
Finding that the assailed law seems to derogate, to a limited extent,
right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process
one of its avowed objectives (i.e. promoting fair competition among
only to hurriedly confer it to another.
the players in the industry) would suggest that, by Congresss own
standards, the current excise tax system on sin products is
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION V. FINANCE SECRETARY
imperfect. But the Court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional
CAMACHO, BIR COMMISSIONER PARAYNO (2008)
merely because it can be improved or that it does not tend to
achieve all of its stated objectives.
Doctrine: Classification if rational in character is allowable. The taxing power
has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION V. FINANCE SECRETARY
taxation.
CAMACHO, BIR COMMISSIONER PARAYNO (2009)
Facts:
Doctrine: A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it is not intrinsically equal
British American Tobacco is the distributor of Lucky Strike Cigarette
and uniform in its operation.The uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for
in the Philippines purposes of taxation
The company is questioning the constitutionality of RA 8240, entitled
"An Act Amending Sections 138, 139, 140, and 142 of the NIRC, as Facts:
Amended and For Other Purposes," which took effect on January 1, British American Tobacco filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the
1997 Courts decision in 2008
The law provided a legislative freeze on brands of cigarettes Petitioner interposes that the assailed provisions:
introduced between the period January 2, 1997 to December 31, (1) violate the equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses of the
2003, such that said cigarettes shall remain in the classification Constitution,
under which the BIR has determined them to belong as of December (2) contravene Section 19,[1] Article XII of the Constitution on unfair competition,
31, 2003, until revised by Congress. and
In effect: older brands or existing brands will have, in the long term, (3) infringe the constitutional provisions on regressive and inequitable taxation.
lower price and tax rate as inflation and price appreciation were not Petitioner further argues that assuming the assailed provisions are
factored in. constitutional, it is entitled to a downward reclassification of Lucky
o Their tax rate shall remain until Congress changes it Strike from the premium-priced to the high-priced tax bracket.
o Hence, a legislative freeze in the class of cigarettes Lucky Strike reiterates in its MR that the classification freeze
Net Retail 2005 Tax 2007 Tax 2009 Tax 2011 Tax Supreme Court
Price Classification
provision violates the equal protection and uniformity of taxation
(excluding clauses because older brands are taxed based on their 1996 net
excise tax retail prices while new brands are taxed based on their present day
and VAT net retail prices.
Less than P5 P2/pack P2.23/pack P2.47/pack P2.72/pack Low-priced
per pack HELD: Petition is denied
Bet P5-P6.50 P6.35/pack P6.74/pack P7.14/pack P7.56/pack Medium-priced Without merit and a rehash of petitioners previous arguments before
Bet P6.50- P10.35/pac P10.88/pac P11.43/pack P12/pack High-priced this Court
P10 k k
The rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the
Above P10 P25/pack P26.06/pac P27.16/pac P28.30/pac Premium-priced
k k k constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal protection
New brands shall be classified according to current net retail price challenge
The classification is considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on
New brands are the ones registered after January 1, 1997
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies,
In 2001, Lucky Strike was introduced in the market all things being equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies
Lucky Strike was classified as premium-priced hence was imposed equally to all those belonging to the same class.
the Above P10 tax rate The classification freeze provision was inserted in the law for
Lucky Strike protested the P22.77M tax assessment pegged at reasons of practicality and expediency.
P25/pack o since a new brand was not yet in existence at the time
Lucky Strike interposes that the legislative freeze is discriminatory of the passage of RA 8240, then Congress needed a
against new brands and poses barrier to entry in the cigarette uniform mechanism to fix the tax bracket of a new
industry brand.
o Legislative freeze means: existing or "old" brands shall o The current net retail price, similar to what was used to
be taxed based on their net retail price as of October 1, classify the brands under Annex D as of October 1,
1996. 1996, was thus the logical and practical choice
o Hence, the classification based on pricing is lower for The classification freeze provision was in the main the result of
older brands compared to new entrants Congresss earnest efforts to improve the efficiency and effectivity of
Lucky Strike found it unfair that Philip Morris and Marlboro are the tax administration over sin products while trying to balance the
classified only as High-priced while it is classified as Premium same with other State interests
Priced.

WON:
1. The pertinent portions of RA 8240, as amended by RA 9334, discriminates
against new cigarette brands and favors old cigarette brands?

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