VALLES v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari assailing Resolutions of the COMELEC dismissing the
petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner Valles, against private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.

Lopez was born on 1934 in Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. At the age of fifteen, she left Australia
and came to settle in the Philippines. She was married to a Filipino citizen, at the
Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in
the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well.

In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was
contested alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However,
finding no suficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship,
the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition

In the 1995 local elections, respondent ran for re-election. Her opponent, Rabat,
filed a petition for disqualification, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said
petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its
decision in her 1992 case.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she
ran for re-election as governor in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was
questioned by the herein petitioner. COMELEC dismissed the petition stating that
petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this
Commission in the first two cases.

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail. Hence this

petition.

Petitioner alleges that

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate
of Registration; SCEDaT
b) she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR);
and
c) She was issued Australian Passport

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent renounced her filipino citizenship as evidenced

by applying for alien certificate of registration and holding a foreign passport.
Held:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; RENUNCIATION MUST BE EXPRESS;

APPLYING FOR AN ALIEN CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND HOLDING A
FOREIGN PASSPORT, NOT A CASE OF;

No. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioner's contention that the application of private respondent for an
alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This
issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case
of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC. In the case of Aznar,
the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a
Filipino, and that an application for an alien certicate of registration was not
tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs.
Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and
was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a
certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of
an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her
claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.

RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP EFFECTIVELY REMOVES ANY

DISQUALIFICATION AS A DUAL CITIZEN;

I
It was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship.

The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,

effectively removing any disqualfication as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as
an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992.
And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private
respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of
the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.

ONG CHIA v REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner was born in Amoy, China. He stayed in the Philippines since

1932 wherein he found an employment, started his own business and married a
Filipina with whom he had four children. At the age of 66, he filed a verified petition
to be admitted as Filipino citizen in accordance with the Revised Naturalization Law.

The prosecution having been convinced by the evidence presented by the petitioner,
did not present any evidence to refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner

Hence, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed. The State's appellant's brief with corresponding annexes alleged that the
petitioner:
(1) failed to state all the name by which he is or had been known as
evidenced by an attached copy of the 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
the petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization;
(2) failed to state all his former places of residence as evidenced by his
Immigration Certificate of Residence;
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner as he
lived with his wife without the benefit
of marriage from 1953 to 1977 as evidenced by his marriage contract;
(4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation as reflected by the 1973 to
1977 income tax returns; and
(5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
denied petitioner's application for naturalization. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of
which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision.

Held:
POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION LAW; RIGIDLY ENFORCED AND STRICTLY
CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT; APPLICANT MUST SET FORTH IN
THE PETITION HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE; NOT COMPLIED
IN CASE AT BAR.

No. The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rule may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such case is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by
the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude
the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the
basis of the same documents.

Moreover, it is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. As noted by the
State, C.A. No. 473, 7, clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall
set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision
and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's
argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v DE LA ROSA

FACTS:

On 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized

by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On 1961, William, then twelve
years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of
Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the
Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the
secretary of foreign affairs and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued
an identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by
the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result
of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal
of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order
affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of

Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian.
Issue:

Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino Citizen

Held:

PROOF OF FILIATION; STATEMENTS OR DECLARATIONS REGARDING FAMILY

REPUTATION OR TRADITION IN MATTERS OF PEDIGREE; ADMITTED IN CASE AT
BAR.

As records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation

Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the
testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony
subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the
testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine
consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and
relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as
statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of
pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore, this salutary rule of evidence finds
support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 267. In
the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession
of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws."

EFFECT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR.

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian

follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the
latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago
Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine
citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12,
1960. Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens
contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: "Section
1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: "(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . ." This forecloses any
further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.

CO v. HRET

Facts:
Petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On 1987, the congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was
held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative

Petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Private respondent alleged that his father (Jong Ong Chuan) filed with the Court of
First Instance of Samar of application for naturalization on 1954 which after trial,
was declared a Filipino citizen. Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. At the time Jose
Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent is a Filipino citizen of not.

Held:

SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IV OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; ELECTION OF

CITIZENSHIP; APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE BORN OF FILIPINO MOTHER AND ALIEN

FATHER BUT NOT TO ONE WHOSE FATHER HAS BEEN NATURALIZED WHEN MINOR
WAS ONLY NINE (9) YEARS OF AGE.

There is no dispute that respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time
of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section
2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The
reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987
the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement
in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

CASE OF IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE APPLIES IN CASE AT BAR.

On the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare, the Court held that the exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
"Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship." The private respondent did more
than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In
Re Mallare rule. The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos
when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office
where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.

AN ATTACK THERETO MAY ONLY BE DONE THROUGH A DIRECT ACTION.

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot
go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after
his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. The petitioners
question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be
done. In our jurisprudence, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity (See Queto vs. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]).

FRIVALDO v COMELEC (June 23, 1989.) (Salvador Estuye)

Facts:
Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 1988, and
assumed office in due time.

The league of municipalities represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was
also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
for the annulment of Frivaldo's election and proclamation on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on 1983.

Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he
said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad."

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead to set the case for hearing on
the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied

Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization
as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." His oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act
of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional
elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United
States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

Issue:

whether or not. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election
on1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held:

No. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free
and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo,
and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary
nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon theircherished status as
Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the
petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce
and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning
in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the
impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their
Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine

citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless
claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically
forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.

Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose
his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that
by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law
envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in
this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. Obviously,
this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is

hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
FRIVALDO v COMELEC (June 28, 1996.) (Raul R. Lee)

Facts:

Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
1995 elections. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying
that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position
by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate
of Candidacy be cancelled.

Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon

until after the 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was
voted for during the elections

the canvass of the election returns shows the following votes obtained by the
candidates:
Frivaldo 73,440
Lee 53,304

Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon. Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,
1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of the
June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on
June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725. As such, there
was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor

Comelec promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as
duly elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of
votes, and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,
1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold
the office of governor of Sorsogon";

Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec

Issue:

Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a

continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of
Sorsogon
Held:

No. It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo
was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654
was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such
elections is final and can no longer be changed.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot

govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any
of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or

administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."

CONCLUSION OF THE COURT

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government

Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time
he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any
time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted
and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature
of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred,
his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application
therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U.
S. nationality.

Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino

citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should
have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition
of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the
citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to
run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our
previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of
our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give
life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way
of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections (citations omitted)."

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and
refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed
the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort
to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the
majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be
filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a
winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.

In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause.
The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his
citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections.
Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local
position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings
over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the
law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with
Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of
the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he
returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The
people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an
oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of
candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be
overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his
nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in
spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now
at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as
nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of
lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease
and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted,
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling
but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation
of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over
and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most
certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.

LABO, JR. v. COMELEC (August 1, 1989.)

Facts:

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis
Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that
Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an
Australian after he married an Australian.
Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian;
that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed
became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was
lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being
bigamous.
Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of
citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

Issue:

Whether or not Labo, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines on the day of 1988 elections.

Held:

POLITICAL LAW; NATURALIZATION; ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP BY

NATURALIZATION.

The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national

in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There
is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that
marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was
married to an Australian citizen. Asa condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance.

CITIZENSHIP; MODES OF LOSING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Among these are:
(1)naturalization in a foreign country;
(2)express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3)subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country,
all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law."

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE TO A FOREIGNER NOT AN AUTOMATIC

RESTORATION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia
was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That
is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the
fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that
he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean
that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

MEANS OF REACQUIRING PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be

reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does
not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.

LACK OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE DAY OF LOCAL ELECTIONS;

GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION AS A CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR.

Thus, the petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on
January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified
voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore
ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local
Government Code.

LABO, JR. v. COMELEC (July 3, 1992)

Facts:

For the second time, this Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship
of Ramon Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen, launched
his
candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in 1992 elections by filing his
certificate of candidacy

Ortega, on the other hand, also filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same office

Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before

(Comelec) seeking to cancel Labo's certificate of candidacy on the
ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein
that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.

After Labo failed to respond to summons, the disqualification case was

set for reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the
decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections (1986 case)
declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.

respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio, to suspend the

proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City
Mayor of Baguio.

Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer for the issuance of
TRO to set aside resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment
declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to
proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested
elections.

At any rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant
case any
evidence, if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship
either before this Court or the Comelec.

Petitioner Labo claims however, that Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election

Code
"operates as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding"
and that it
allows his proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution
disqualifying him was not yet final at the time the election was held.

Issue:
Whether or not by filing of application for repatriation Labo reacquired Filipino
citizenship thus allowing him to run for the election.
Held:
The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and
untenable.
Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the
Comelec can
legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of
the winning
number of votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case,
Labo failed to present any evidence before the Comelec to support his
claim of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To

reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien.
His election does not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which
is an
indispensable requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local
Government
Code).

To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the

Solicitor
General, the Special Committee on Naturalization had not yet acted
upon said
application for repatriation. Indeed, such fact is even admitted by
petitioner. In
the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities,
a mere
application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.