MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND NEW TRIAL (RULE 37)
1. ATTY. JESUS F. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF
Fernandez APPEALS AND CONCEPCION OLIVARES, RESPONDENTS.
v. CA Concepcion Olivares filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioner Jesus Fernandez. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC)
dismissed the Complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. Olivares
appealed to the RTC which reversed the MeTC,
On 28 June 1994, Fernandez received a copy of the decision. On 12 July
1994 or 14 days after receipt of the decision, he filed an MR. On
November 29, 1994, Fernandez received an order denying his MR. On
December 1, 1994, Fernandez filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review which was granted. Said resolution was
received by Fernandez on 12 December 1994.
In the meantime, on December 9, 1994, Fernandez filed a Motion for New
Trial before the RTC citing newly discovered evidence of receipts proving
his rental payments. In view of his MNT, Fernandez, thru counsel, filed on 29
December 1994 in the CA a Motion to Withdraw his Petition For Review
which the court duly noted in its resolution.
RTC: Denied the Motion for New Trial. It explained that when Fernandez
went to the CA and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review, and the CA accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension
sought, jurisdiction of the CA over the parties and the subject matter had
already attached. RTC granted the Motion for Execution of Olivares and
denied the MR of Fernandez.
Fernandez filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of WPI and TRO before the CA.
CA: Denied the Petition and affirmed the stance of the RTC. It ruled:
When petitioner herein elected to file before this Court a motion for
extension of time to file petition for review, he in effect opted to appeal the
adverse decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to the Court of
Appeals. This is so because appeal to this Court is perfected by petition for
review, where judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction. This Court's assumption of appellate
jurisdiction resulted initially in the issuance of the resolution granting
petitioner an extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition
for review. Since this Court acquired appellate jurisdiction, the only proper
thing for the court below to do was to deny the motion for new trial.
Fernandez filed MR. CA denied.
[Did not say which petition was filed before SC, but I think its a Rule 45]
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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
WHETHER OR NOT THE MERE FILING BY PETITIONER OF A MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW (WHICH INTENTION [sic]
WAS LATER WITHDRAWN), AUTOMATICALLY DIVESTED THE RTC OF ITS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AS TO ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
SC: At first glance and mindful of the rule that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as
the motion for extension of time to file petition for review filed by Fernandez in this case, is
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court it may seem at once apparent that the
CA had in fact acquired jurisdiction over his person. It has been repeatedly held that an appearance in
whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. He may appear by presenting a motion, for
example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he
thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
As we are dealing here with the jurisdiction of an appellate court, additional rules are required for
jurisdiction to attach therein, to wit: (1) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the CA
within the time for doing so; (2) he must have filed his petition for review likewise within the time for
doing so; (3) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and (4) the other parties must have
perfected their appeals in due time.
The Rule requires that in an appeal by way of Petition For Review, the appeal is deemed perfected as
to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful
fees.
ITC: It may be argued, and rightly so, that CA has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case
because Fernandez merely filed a motion for extension of time to file petition but not the petition itself.
Withal, sans the petition, it cannot be said that the CA has acquired jurisdiction over the case as to say
that the trial court is without authority to act on a motion for new trial. When Fernandez filed the
motion for extension of time to file petition for review, jurisdiction of the CA had not yet attached,
such that his failure to file the petition itself would normally have the effect of rendering the decision
of the lower court final and executory.
What is the legal effect of the filing by Fernandez of MNT before the trial court?
Assuming that Fernandez filed his MNT on time, we hold that the trial court still had jurisdiction to
rule on the matter as the jurisdiction it originally acquired had not yet been lost.
The appellate jurisdiction of the trial court is to be juxtaposed with its residual jurisdiction as set forth
in Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph of the Rules of Court. Before the CA gives due course to a
Petition for Review, the RTC retains jurisdiction for specified instances enumerated therein, to wit:
(1) To issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve
any matter litigated by the appeal, such as, the appointment of a receiver, and the issuance of writs of
preliminary attachment or preliminary injunction.
(2) To approve compromises. (3) To permit appeals of indigent litigants.
(4) To order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39.
(5) To allow withdrawal of the appeal.
The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed
 to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached
upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but
prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. Considering that no appeal was
perfected in this case and the records of the case have not yet been transmitted to the Court of Appeals,
the case has not as yet attained the residual jurisdiction stage so as to say that the trial court already
lost the jurisdiction it first acquired and that it is left with only its residual powers.

[IMPORTANT!] HOWEVER, From the records of the case, the ultimate issue to be tackled concerns
the proper computation of the period to file a motion for new trial.

Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court providing for the period to file a motion for new trial
in relation to Rule 41, Section 3 is in point.

Rule 37. Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. Within
the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of said party.
Rule 41. Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

ITC: Fernandez received a copy of the RTC Decision on 28 June 1994. 14 days after the receipt of
the decision or specifically on 12 July 1994, he filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was
denied by the RTC and the Order of denial was received by Fernandez on 29 November 1994.
Applying Rule 37, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, he had only one (1) day left to file a
motion for new trial since a motion for new trial should be filed within the period to appeal, that
is, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment. The motion for new trial suspends the
running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal must be
perfected. Hence if denied, a movant, like Fernandez in this case has only the balance of the
reglementary period within which to appeal. Applying Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court, he had 15 days from receipt of the RTC decision to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. He filed a motion for reconsideration fourteen (14) days after receipt of the decision.
The motion was denied (Nov. 29, 1994) and he had only the remaining one (1) day to file MNT which
day fell on December 1, 1994 (since 30 November 1994 was a holiday, Fernandez had up to 01
December 1994 to file the MNT). Extant from the records, instead of MNT, he filed before the CA on
December 1, 1994 the motion for extension of time to file petition for review. Thereafter, and
pending the resolution of his motion before the CA, Fernandez went back to the RTC and filed on
December 9, 1994 a motion for new trial.

ITC: Applying the foregoing, Fernandez's MNT was filed out of time. The 15-day period for filing
MNT cannot be extended. As early as the case of Habaluyas v. Japzon, motions for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts,
lower than the Supreme Court. The rule in Habaluyas applies even if the motion is filed before
the expiration of the period sought to be extended because the fifteen (15) days period for filing a
motion for new trial or reconsideration with said court is non-extendible. Thus, motions for

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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador

2. Republic REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS., REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF
v. Peralta DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, (DENR REGION XI) AND
MARION V. ABUNDO, SR., CONSERVATION OFFICER (DENR
REGION XI), PETITIONERS, VS. MARILYN A. PERALTA, ROSIE A.
LAVALAN, GRACE A. REYES, ALBERTO B. ALONDAY, MERCY B.
ALONDAY, RICHELIEU B. ALONDAY, AZUCENA B. ALONDAY AND
JANETA A. BALURAN, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO
CITY, RESPONDENTS.
[Same case as found in Rule 15; I also made the digest hehe. Same issue so
Im copy-pasting everything, except the antecedent facts. Focus on the May
1997 MR.] Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership of real property with the RTC of Davao City against the
petitioners.
Petitioners filed their Answer. They interposed the special and affirmative
defenses that: (a) the complaint did not state a cause of action against them;
(b) the building constructed by the defendants was within the perimeter of the
Mt. Apo National Park, a forest reserve under Proclamation No. 59, as
amended, of the President of the Philippines, and not on the plaintiffs'
property; (c) the installation of a generator unit did not push through; (d)
Project 1-B, under which the subject property was declassified as alienable
and disposable property per Land Classification Map No. 1412, should not
prevail over Proclamation No. 59, as amended; (e) the suit was against the
State which cannot be sued without its consent; (f) the plaintiffs failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies before filing their complaint. They prayed
that the the complaint be dismissed.
After the pre-trial conference, the RTC issued an Order dated 29 August
1995 constituting a panel of commissioners composed of Engineer Roderick
R. Calapardo, as Team Leader, and Gregorio Cenabre and Engineer Rogelio
Zantua, as members, to conduct a relocation survey and determine if the
respondents' property is part of the Mt. Apo National Park. They reported that
the land in case is 92,216 square meters within the certified Alienable and
Disposable (A & D) Lands while the remaining portion of 145,682 square
meters is within the Mt. Apo National Park Reservation."
RTC rendered a judgment in favor of respondents. The RTC ordered the
petitioners to vacate the property, restore possession thereof to the
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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection
with cases pending before the Supreme Court, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. No such motion may be filed before any lower courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, is ordered to execute the decision dated 02 May 1994 in Civil Case
No. 93-67034.
Issue: w/n the petitioners properly filed a motion for reconsideration on 30 May 1997 No.
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for a
new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of
which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is that prescribed in
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of
hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the parties concerned at least three days
before the date of hearing. Section 5 of the same rule requires that the notice of hearing shall be
directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. The
requirements are vital elements of procedural due process. Since the Rules of Court do not fix any
period within which the said party may file his reply or opposition, the trial court would have no way
of determining whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him
on his objection. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its motion.
The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and
non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma; a worthless piece of paper
which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. In
cases of motions for a new trial or for the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the period for
appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion.
ITC: The petitioners, through the OSG, received on May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence,
they had until June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for reconsideration or for a new trial or to
perfect their appeal from said adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed the motion for
reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is no proof that the respondents were actually
served with a copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The OSG
did not bother to file an amended motion for reconsideration containing the requirements of Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court grants not only petitioners' plea that it suspend
its own rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs the reopening of the trial of the case for the
parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Court excepts this case from the said rule in the
interest of justice, to avert a grave miscarriage of justice to the State through the negligence of the
OSG.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
53440 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 13, dated February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in Civil Case No. 23,168-94 are SET
ASIDE. The said Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to reopen the trial to enable the parties to
adduce their respective evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General is hereby directed to represent
respondents and remove all the improvements thereon made by them. The the petitioners during the trial. No costs.
RTC declared that the report of the panel did not take into account
Property 1-B for LC Map 1412; hence, the said report had no probative
weight. The torrens title prevails over the relocation survey done by the
commissioners.

[Important part] On 30 May 1997, or five days before the expiration of

the period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC issued ex parte an order expunging the said motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it was a mere scrap of paper for
failure of the petitioners to incorporate any notice of hearing as required
by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners only received the Order on 18 July 1997, so they filed their notice
of appeal. The respondents, for their part, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
of the petitioners on the ground that their May 30, 1997 Motion for
Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper; hence, the motion did not toll the
running of the reglementary period for appeal.

The then presiding judge of RTC retired and was replaced by a new judge
who issued an Order giving due course to the petitioners appeal declaring
that they still have five days from July 18, 1997 when they received a copy of
the order expunging their notice of appeal or until July 23, 1997 within which
to perfect their appeal from the June 11, 1997 Order. Since the petitioners
filed their notice of appeal on July 22, 1997, they had perfected their appeal
within the reglementary period.

However, (daming sinabi) the RTC issued an ex parte order dismissing the
petitioners' appeal on its finding that in light of jurisprudence brought to its
attention, they failed to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period.
The respondents filed for motion for execution which was granted. To this,
the petitioners filed a MR.

The RTC issued an order denying the petitioners' motion for

reconsideration and at the same time denying the respondents' motion for
execution on the ground that public policy prohibited the issuance of a writ of
execution against the government. The RTC recalled the writ of execution it
earlier issued.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA for the nullification of
the RTC Orders. The CA denied due course and dismissed the petition. The
appellate court held that petitioners' May 30, 1997 Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC decision did not comply with Section 5, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court, as amended; hence, a mere scrap of paper which did not
toll the running of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the RTC
decision had already become final and executory.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners argument:

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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
 appellate court committed reversible error in finding and declaring that they
failed to perfect their appeal from the decision of the trial court within the
reglementary period. The CA likewise allegedly erred when it held that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it dismissed the petitioners' appeal. By dismissing their
petition, the CA thereby sustained the validity of the respondents' title despite
strong evidence that the said property is part of the public forest and,
therefore, inalienable. The petitioners further argue that even if their notice of
appeal was belatedly filed, the rule on perfection of appeals should be
suspended and that their appeal should be given due course on grounds of
equity and substantial justice.
3. People v. People of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. David S. Odilao, Jr., Respondent.
Odilao
David S. Odilao, Jr. together with Enrique Samonte and Mario Yares, was
charged with Estafa in an Information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor
Feliciano with RTC-Cebu City.
The Executive Judge then issued a warrant of arrest against Odilao Jr. Upon
motion of Odilao Jr, Executive Judge issued an order directing the Office of
the City Prosecutor to conduct reinvestigation of the case with a caveat that
the reinvestigation will be terminated within ten days from receipt of the
order and thereafter, submit appropriate recommendation to it. In the
meantime the Executive Judge countermanded the service of the warrant of
arrest.
Based on his reinvestigation report which found no probable cause, Asst. City
Prosec Capacio filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss. Bugash [private
complainant] filed an urgent motion to disregard the reinvestigation report.
Bugash then filed with the DOJ a petition for review seeking the reversal of
the Reinvestigation Report.
RTC issued Two Orders, separately:
1. Order deferring the arraignment until the petition for review would
have been finally resolved by DOJ; and
2. Order holding in abeyance the resolution of the MTD until the DOJ
shall have resolved the petition for review.
More than a year later, Bugash filed with RTC a Motion to Suspend
Resolution of the MTD. Thereafter, RTC issued an Order: (1) denying
prosecs MTD; and (2) declaring the motion to disregard the reinvestigation
to be moot and academic. RTC ruled that [t]he Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which was approved on December 1, 2000 vests now authority to
the trial court to rule on the presence or absence of probable cause. If the
Court finds probable cause it will issue forthwith a warrant of arrest
otherwise it will dismiss the case.
An MR was filed by Obilao Jr but was denied by the RTC. Likewise, RTC
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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
[crim pro issue]
ISSUE # 1: whether or not the trial court was correct in denying the prosecutions motion to dismiss
the estafa case and ordering the implementation of the warrant of arrest against Odilao Jr YES!
Pursuant to Section 6 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the judge of the trial
court is mandated to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to
determine whether probable cause exists and pursuant to its own findings, either dismiss the case
immediately if no probable cause exists, or to issue the warrant of arrest in the absence of probable
cause.
Crespo v. Mogul:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case,
at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal
may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.
The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
ITC: When RTC issued the Order deferring the arraignment until the petition for review would have
been finally resolved by DOJ and the Order holding in abeyance the resolution of the MTD until the
DOJ shall have resolved the petition for review, respectively, RTC Judge was merely performing his
mandated duty to personally determine the existence of probable cause and thus arrive at a resolution
of the motion to dismiss. Having found probable cause, the trial court acted well within its authority in
denying said motion to dismiss and, since in the present case, a warrant of arrest had already been
issued and only the service thereof had been countermanded, the trial court judge was also correct in
ordering the implementation of the previously issued warrant of arrest.
Verily, the proceedings in the criminal case pending in the trial court had been held in abeyance long
enough. Under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the suspension of
arraignment of an accused in cases where a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending at either the Department of Justice or the Office of the President shall not exceed sixty days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Indeed, with more than three years
 directed the implementation of the existing warrant of arrest against him.
Obilao Jr went up to the CA by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against People of the PH, Presiding Judge and Bugash.
CA Decision: granted the petition and directed the RTC to defer the
proceedings until the petition for review before the DOJ has been resolved.
[1st Decision]
Hence, People of the Philippines filed this petition for review on
certiorari before the SC seeking the reversal of the CAs decision.
SC issued a Resolution requiring Odilao Jr to file his Comment on the
petition. In compliance therewith, Odilao Jr filed his Comment/Opposition to
Petitioners Application for TRO and/or WPI, which SC duly noted.
However, unknown to the SC, while the petition for review on certiorari
was pending with SC, Bugash filed an MR before the CA seeking the
reversal if its Decision.
CA Resolution: granted Bugashs MR and thereby reversed its own Decision
[1st decision].
CA ruled that the RTC Orders denying Prosecs MTD together with the
implementation of the warrant of arrest against herein respondent is valid,
pursuant to Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides that the suspension of arraignment shall not be more than
sixty days from the filing of the petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor. [2nd Decision]
It should be emphasized that the 2nd Decision of CA was issued despite
the pendency of the petition for review on certiorari before SC. SC was
only only apprised of such development when Odilao Jr furnished SC
with a copy of his Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed with
CA, where he sought reconsideration of its 2nd Decision. The records do
not show whether CA had resolved said motion. Odilao likewise filed with
SC an Urgent Manifestation that the DOJ, acting on Bugashs petition for
review, has issued a Resolution denying the said petition and in effect
sustaining the filing of the MTD by the Asst. City Prosec.
SC received Peoples Consolidated Reply and Comment praying that the 2nd
Decision of CA be affirmed and that a TRO and/or PI be issued to restrain
Odilao Jr and any person acting in his behalf from implementing the 1st
Decision of CA.
4. Neypes v. DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
CA VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL
MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, RTC, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
having elapsed, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal case
below as the sixty-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ, provided
for in Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now applicable to the case at
bar, had long lapsed.
[relevant issue]
ISSUE #2: w/not CA erred in hearing Bugashs MR despite Bugashs previous filing of a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC YES!!!
Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (effective August 22, 2002,
provides:
SEC. 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court. - No motion for
reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has previously filed in
the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a motion for extension of
time to file such petition. If such petition or motion is subsequently filed, the motion for
reconsideration pending in this Court shall be deemed abandoned. (Emphasis Ours)
ITC:
Although it is clear that the Court of Appeals earlier erred in granting the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed before it by herein respondent, the Court of Appeals remedied such error by reversing
its 1st Decision in its 2nd Decision, and sustained the RTCs Orders denying the prosecutions motion
to dismiss. However, SC reminded CA of Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals.
In any event, pursuant to Section 15, Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, CA
ought not to have acted on the said motion for reconsideration of private complainant Bugash. It
should have considered said motion which, in the first place, was without the conformity of the OSG,
the representative of petitioner People of the Philippines, as having been abandoned by the filing of
herein petition for review on certiorari before the SC by the OSG, pursuant to the aforequoted section
of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.
NEVERTHELESS, in the interest of speedy and orderly administration of justice, we deem it
expedient to uphold in the present petition, the Orders of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss of the
assistant city prosecutor and directing the implementation of the warrant of arrest against respondent,
for being in accordance with our rulings in Crespo vs. Mogul, Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. and
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Rolando How.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 27, 2002
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Its Resolution dated June 12, 2003 correcting its own error is
AFFIRMED with ADMONITION that the Court of Appeals should act with more circumspection and
comply with its 2002 Internal Rules.
The Orders dated May 21, 2002 and June 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch
6) are AFFIRMED and the said Regional Trial Court is directed to proceed, with immediate dispatch,
with the arraignment of herein respondent and trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. CBU-55283.
W/N petitioners timely filed their appeal Yes. This case established the fresh period rule for
appeals under Rules 40-43 and 45. So the 15-day period is counted from the receipt of the denial of the
MR, which is considered as a final order in itself (or the decision itself in case no MR was filed).
BP 129, as amended, provides:
Respondents.
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et al. filed an action for annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC, Branch 43, of Roxas against the
Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the
Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
The parties filed several motions: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to
declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest
Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent
heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
RTC resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to
declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in
default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against
the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of
summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical
admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the
motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on
prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be
determined only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well
resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint
itself without waiting for the trial proper.
[Important]
In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and,
on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on
July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice
of appeal (not mentioned in the case pero jic sir asks, siguro Rule 41 to kasi
RTC to CA) and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
RTC: denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
MR denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under
Rule 65. Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to
run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order
of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal. So parang inaargue nila
na there should be a fresh period from the denial of the MR for them to
appeal.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions
of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus
cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from.
xxx
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is adjudication on the merits, which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
ITC: Petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should
be construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint.
Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998,
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998.
SC sustained petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?
On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of
appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on
the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of
appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were
entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
In previous cases, the SC ruled that there is no fresh period. In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. SC ruled there that they only had
the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. SC consistently applied this
rule in similar cases, premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.
CA: dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should
have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
MR denied hence this present petition for review under Rule 45.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
However, to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. This fresh period rule shall
also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts;
Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of
the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. The use
of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within
the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
Other doctrines:
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute (BP 129) and
procedural rules (Rules of Court).
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing
with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal,
an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment
or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided,
the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice
of the denial of said motion. (emphasis supplied)

5. Tan v. ANNIE TAN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
CA BLOOMBERRY EXPORT MANUFACTURING, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
Petitioner Annie Tan, doing business under the name and style "AJ & T
Trading," leased a portion of the ground floor of her building, more
specifically described as Stall No. 623, Carvajal Street, Binondo, Manila, in
favor of Bloomberry Export Manufacturing, Inc.
For several alleged violations of the lease contract, petitioners filed against
private respondent a complaint for ejectment. As its rental payment was
refused by petitioner, private respondent instituted a case for
consignation. These two cases were consolidated.
MTC of Manila: dismissed the complaint (failed to substantiate her case).
The case for consignation has become moot and academic for failure to
appeal a decision of another MTC branch allowing respondent to consign
rental payments to the court of Manila.
RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.
(!!!) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
The Motion for Reconsideration did not contain any notice of hearing as
required under Section 5, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Private respondent filed an ex-parte Motion for Entry of Judgment upon
the ground that said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper
which should not merit the attention of the RTC. Private respondent contends
that since the Motion for Reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper aside from
being pro forma, said Motion for Reconsideration did not toll the period of
appeal; hence, the Decision of the RTC had become final and executory.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Set for Hearing the Motion for
Reconsideration, which was vehemently opposed by private respondent.
(!!!) RTC issued an Order granting the motion to set for hearing
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. (Respondent MRed this Order
but denied)
CA: reversed the RTC. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
setting for hearing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, notwithstanding
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129,
however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period
of appeal and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict
observance of this reglementary period of appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Issue: WoN the omission of a notice of hearing of a motion for reconsideration filed with the trial
court is a fatal defect which did not stop the running of the period to appeal, thus rendering the assailed
decision final and executory." YES
Applicable Provision: Sec. 4 and 5 of Rule 15
SC went jurisprudence heavy on the mandatory requirement of notice of hearing and how failure to
comply does not toll the running of the period to appeal. (5 cases, same lang ang doctrine nilang lahat
kaya di ko na nilagay. Haha)
Before a trial court, a motion for reconsideration that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing
does not toll the running of the period of appeal. It is a mere scrap of paper which the trial court and
the opposite party may ignore.
Petitioners excuses: (1) her former counsels messenger, due to an honest mistake, inadvertently
omitted the fourth page of the motion containing the crucial Notice of Hearing; and (2) because of the
pressure of work, her former counsel was unable to follow up such motion until the day said counsel
requested the setting of a hearing.
We are not in the least convinced. First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the
messenger. The burden of preparing a complete pleading falls on counsels shoulders, not on the
messengers. The counsel is ultimately responsible for the acts or omissions of his agents. Hence, the
messengers conduct can neither justify the counsels mistake nor warrant a departure from the
mandate of the aforesaid procedural rules.
Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left behind due to
honest mistake. In fact, there was no such page. Petitioners claim is belied by the following pertinent
portions of the subject Motion for Reconsideration.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the
Honorable Court cause a further REVIEW and RECONSIDERATION of its
decision on the above-captioned consolidated cases.
Quezon City for Manila, August 12, 1996. (Sgd.)ANGELINA
ARANDIA-VILLANUEVA Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant 39-L T.
Morato Avenue, Quezon City
IBP No. 407450 6-26-96 PTR No. 227013 1-5-96 Manila
Copy furnished:
Atty. Arnel Zaragoza Dolendo Counsel for Defendant Rm 408, 413 First
United Bldg. Escolta, Manila"
(basically, sabi ng Court, sinungaling sila. Haha Hindi naman talaga nawala yung fourth page ng MR
the fact that said Motion contained no notice of hearing. Petitioners failure to
comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, reduced her motion to a mere scrap of paper which did not
merit the attention of the court.
CA cited three cases where the Court allowed an MR that had not been set for
hearing and held that these cases were inapplicable in the case at hand.
o Galvez v. CA- involved a motion to withdraw the information -- not a
motion for reconsideration. The Court held that there was no imperative need
of notice and hearing because, first, the withdrawal of an information rests on
the discretion of the trial court; and, second, the accused was not placed in
jeopardy. On the other hand, the subject of the present controversy is a
motion for reconsideration directed against the Decision of the RTC; thus, the
motion affects the period to perfect an appeal.
o Tamargo v. CA- the application of the aforesaid mandatory provisions was
suspended. The Court did so in order to give substantial justice to the
petitioner and in view of the nature of the issues raised which were found to
be highly meritorious.
O Que v. IAC- the trial court set the Motion for Reconsideration (MR) for
hearing, which was actually attended by the counsel for the adverse party.
This was not so in the case at bar; petitioners MR was set for hearing,
because she belatedly moved for it upon the filing of private respondents
Motion for Entry of Judgment.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
which supposedly contained the Notice of Hearing kasi yung last entry ay yung Copy Furnished part
na; which alam naman nating lahat sa LegForms, lels, ay ibig sabihin yun na yung last page. English
translation coming up. . .)
The normal practice is to note, at the end of the pleading, that a copy was furnished to the adverse
party. Thus, petitioners motion ended exactly at the bottom of the third page as evidenced by the
"copy-furnished" notation. It is safe to conclude that there was no accidental or excusable neglect in
not including a fourth page in this case. In other words, petitioners counsel simply failed to include a
notice of hearing.
Finally, the fact that petitioners former counsel calendared the motion for hearing for August 23, 1996
belies the excuse that an alleged fourth page had been left behind. In the first place, if a notice of
hearing had been included in the Motion for Reconsideration, there would have been no need for
petitioner to file the Motion to set the time and date of hearing. What is clear is that said counsel filed
the latter Motion, only after private respondent had submitted its Motion for Entry of Judgment -- with
copy furnished petitioners counsel-- on the ground that petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was a
mere scrap of paper that did not stop the period for appeal.
Petitioner pleads for liberal construction of the rule on notice of hearing, citing Tamargo, Galvez
and Que. The nonadmission of her Motion for Reconsideration would result in a miscarriage of justice,
as the main case (ejectment), which was tried under summary procedure, had been unnecessarily
prolonged; and, second, the tenant lessee would be occupying the premises without
paying rentals.
Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in the following cases:
(1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,[
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein;
(2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
(3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound
and judicious discretion of the court; and
(4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
ITC: Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the case at bar falls under any of these exceptions.
(try and try until you succeed. . .) Petitioner claims deprivation of property without due process.
Petitioner can obtain proper payment of rentals through a motion for execution in the case below. The
MTC may have dismissed her ejectment case, but it did not exculpate private respondent from its
liabilities. Petitioner is, therefore, not being deprived of her property without due process.
Having failed to observe very elementary rules of procedure, which are mandatory, petitioner caused
her own predicament. To exculpate her from the compulsory coverage of such rules is to undermine
the stability of the judicial process
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
 PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (RULE 38)
1. Alaban v. CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE P. COLLADO, JUDITH
CA PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO, ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL
PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, JR.,
SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO MARIN,
JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., AND MATHILDE MARIN, PETITIONERS, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, RESPONDENTS
Respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition for the probate of the
Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado alleging that
he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On May 30, 2001,
RTC allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directed the issuance of
letters testamentary to respondent.
More than 4 months later, or on 4 October 2001, petitioners filed a motion for
the reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to
the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the
decedent.
RTC: On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners' motion
for being unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that
petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the
deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal
of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the deficiency. Moreover, the
RTC's Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners'
filing of the motion to reopen.
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction
with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC's Decision dated 30 May 2001
and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed, among others, that they learnt of
the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their
motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the
will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be
annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
W/N CA committed GADALEJ when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to
show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own- NO
SC: The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of
MR on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the
decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should
be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when
a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party
may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order
or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies
available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it
has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear
therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment.
ITC: Petitioners are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the
probate proceedings. Under the RoC, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the
will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies
of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact,
the part of the RTC.
CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners
failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their
own. Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners' claim that the
proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any
showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief from judgment in the RTC. CA denied petitioners MR.
Petition went to SC via petition for review asserting that CA committed
GADALEJ when it dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to show that
they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief from judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own, and held
that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the proceedings before
the RTC.
Respondent countered that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies
provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they filed MNT; that they
could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment since they learned
of the RTC's judgment only three and a half months after its promulgation;
that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the RTC's Decision,
since there was no showing that they were denied their day in court.
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have
availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They
aver that respondent's offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of
the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of
the RTC's judgment.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners
praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion
was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they
could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to
reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or
almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to
avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them,
petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would
benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail
for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the
final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is
resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process.
A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that
he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and
he would be adversely affected thereby. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of
fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured.
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondent's
deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the
decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and
thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent's offer of a false
compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing
the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced. According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. The will shows that respondent was instituted
as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither
compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified. The non-inclusion of petitioners'
names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do
not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not
prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate
court.

2. Samartino REGALADO P. SAMARTINO, PETITIONER, VS. LEONOR B. RAON,
v. Raon AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A. MAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 16, CAVITE CITY, HON. ROLANDO D. DIAZ,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17, CAVITE CITY, SHERIFF
DANILO G. LAPUZ, CAVITE CITY AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS.
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving
sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-
Crisostomo. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in
a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T- 131898 in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena
Bernardo.
Respondents instituted against petitioner Samartino a complaint for ejectment in
the MTC of Noveleta. They alleged that their predecessor leased her share in the
property to petitioner for a period of five years, and as the lease expired and not
extended, petitioner refused to vacate it despite demands.
Summons was served to petitioners brother. During the service, petitioner was
not at home but was confined a rehabilitation center in Tagaytay City where
he was being treated for drug dependency. A liaison officer of the rehab center
appeared before the MTC with a certification that petitioner will be unable to
comply with the directive to answer the complaint with the period, because it will
take six months for him to complete the program before he could be released.
The MTC, however, granted respondents motion to declare petitioner in
default and ordered them to present evidence ex parte. The MTC then
rendered judgment in respondents favor.
Petitioners counsel filed with the RTC a motion to set aside judgment. It was
treated as an appeal. On 18 July 1996, the RTC affirmed MTCs decision. The
decision became final so MTC issued a writ of execution, and ordered petitioner
to vacate the premises within one month. The property was then sold at a public
auction.
On 25 November 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for relief from
judgment. Petitioner submitted an affidavit of merit (ito yung sinasabi ni sir!),
alleging that the land was actually sold to him by Filomena as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute of Sale he also presented.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition. MR was also denied. 2nd MR was
also denied. On the same day, a writ of demolition was issued.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed the
petition. MR was also denied. Hence this petition for review.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
Issue: w/n petition for relief from judgment should be granted Yes based on these grounds:
MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners person; petition was filed within the period
provided in the rules; and petitioner has meritorious grounds.
Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for default
judgments are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the
case is intended for delay.
A verified petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or final order has been entered or such proceeding has been taken. It must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense.
ITC:
1) It is not clear from the records of the case at bar when petitioner learned of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court affirming the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. What appears is that
the said decision became final only on August 15, 1996, and must have been entered sometime
thereafter. Hence, the petition for relief filed on November 25, 1996 was well within the six-
month period prescribed by the Rules.
2) The records show that petitioner raised a meritorious defense in his affidavit of merit. He
alleged therein that the property from which he was being ejected had been sold to him by its
registered owner. Ownership is a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While possession is
the main issue in ejectment, it is also one of the essential attributes of ownership. It follows that
an owner of real property is entitled to possession of the same.
MTC had no jurisdiction over petitioner there being no valid service of summons, hence all
judgments and orders against him are void. Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by
personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will
substituted service be availed of.
ITC: The sheriffs return failed to show why personal service could not be made. It failed to
state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible. It was not
shown that efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence
the resort to substituted service. As stated above, these requirements are indispensable because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. Furthermore, nowhere in the
return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioners brother, on whom
substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing
at petitioners residence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43202 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite, which is directed to continue
proceedings in Civil Case No. 744 by affording petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a chance to file
his answer and present evidence in his defense, and thereafter to hear and decide the case. The

3. Purcon v. Full Title: Julio B. Purcon, Jr., Petitioner, vs. MRM Philippines, Inc. and Miguel
MRM Phil., L. Rivera/Maritime Resources Management, Respondents.
et al.
Purcon Jr filed a Complaint for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness
allowance and permanent disability benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC.
In his verified position paper, he alleged that MRM Phils. hired him as a
seaman on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. His contract was for
3 months. His work involved a day-to-day activity that required exertion
of strenuous effort. His contract was extended for another three (3)
months. Later, he felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After
being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was diagnosed
with hernia. Hence, he was repatriated due to his ailment. Upon his
return in the PH, he was examined by the company physician who
prescribed certain medications and later declared him fit for resume
work. However, when he reported to MRM Phils, they said that there
was no vacany. Also, he consulted with an internist-cardiologist of
Philippine Heart Center, who diagnosed him with EPIDIDYMITIS,
LEFT; UPPER RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH
INPEDIMENT GRADE XIV.
MRM Phils counters that Purcon Jrs ailement, hernia, is not work-
related hence, he is not entitled to disability benefit and related claims.
In fact he was declared fit for work. Moreover, Purcon Jr. signed a
Quitclaim and Release w/c was notarized.
LA Decision: dismissed Purcon Jrs Complaint for utter lack of merit. He was fit
to resume work as a seafarer as his hernia was already cured or non-existent. In
fact, he was ready to resume work. Unfortunately, he was not accommodated due
to lack of vacancy. The fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean
that he was suffering from disability.
Purcon Jr filed a Memo of Appeal with the NLRC-3rd Division.
NLRC Resolution: dismissed the appeal and affirmed LA.
MR was filed by Purcon Jr but was denied. Hence, on January 27, 2006, NLRCs
Resolution became final and executor and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
On March 2, 2006, Purcon Jr filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
CA but CA dismissed the case due to formal infirmities. Purcon Jrs MR was
denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution became final and executory.
Purcon Jr then went to the SC via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
assailing the CA Resolutions.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
Writ of Execution dated September 17, 1996, the Writ of Demolition dated January 14, 1997,
and the certificate of sale over Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-283572, as well as all acts and
deeds incidental to the judgment in Civil Case No. 744, are declared NULL AND VOID.
ISSUE: w/not Purcon Jr can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review NO!
A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court.
1. Although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file
a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule
56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court [please see
Codal to save space]. A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list
of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
o Dela Cruz v. Andres: A petition for relief from judgment is not an available
remedy in the CA and SC. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner's good
and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most
importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered the
decision. [Section 1, Rule 38 of the RoC]
2. While Rule 38 [please see Section 1, Rule 38] uses the phrase "any court," it refers
only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
o As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued
the order to hear the petition for relief. The procedural change in Rule 38 is
in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal and
Regional Trial Courts and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial
Courts as courts of record.
3. The procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate
provisions of the Rules of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by
additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars.
o As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the
CA allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
o The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55 of RoC, with the exception of
Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies
available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or
resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial
(Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
o If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in
the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the
Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for
relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the
 SC Resolution: denied the petition effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or
Reasons for the denial: (1) the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount
of fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time docket and negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel. In exceptional cases, when the mistake
other fees and deposit for costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second
Section 5(c) of Rule 56; (3) insufficient or defective verification under Section 4, opportunity to vindicate his right.
Rule 7; and (4) petitioner was not able to show the SC that CA committed any
reversible error in the challenged resolutions and that he was not able to convince ITC: A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court.
SC why the actions of LA, NLRC and CA should be dismissed. Nevertheless, even if we delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be dismissed.
The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable negligence. Petitioner's
Purcon Jr filed this petition for relief from judgment before the SC interposing the lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or
ff. grounds: excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel's gross
The Honorable Labor Arbiter committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown.
based his decision on the fit to work certification issued by the
company-designated physician and on the Quitclaim and Release ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.
executed by the complainant;
The Honorable Labor Arbiter further committed a GROSS MISTAKE
when he adopted the irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the respondents
and by adopting it in his decision;
The Honorable NLRC Third Division also committed a GROSS
MISTAKE when it affirms the ERRONEOUS decision of the
Honorable Labor Arbiter;
The factual findings of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, and the Honorable
NLRC Third Division, are not based on substantial evidence and that
their decisions are contrary to the applicable law and jurisprudence; and

The collaborating counsel of the petitioner committed a GROSS

MISTAKE in filing defective pleadings to the prejudice of the herein
petitioner.

EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT (RULE 39)

1. Capa v. CA DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge,
Branch 43, RTC, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondents.
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC,
Branch 43, of Roxas against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank
of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.
W/N petitioners timely filed their appeal Yes. This case established the fresh
period rule for appeals under Rules 40-43 and 45. So the 15-day period is counted
from the receipt of the denial of the MR, which is considered as a final order in
itself (or the decision itself in case no MR was filed).
BP 129, as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed

Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue

4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
The parties filed several motions: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent
heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the
motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
respectively.
RTC resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for
their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo
because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical
admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there
were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to
dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription
from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.
[Important] In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly
received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal (not mentioned in the case pero jic sir asks, siguro Rule 41 to kasi RTC to CA) and
paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
RTC: denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
MR denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65.
Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the
15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the
day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal. So parang inaargue nila na there should
be a fresh period from the denial of the MR for them to appeal.
CA: dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint.
MR denied hence this present petition for review under Rule 45.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where
a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is adjudication on the merits, which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
ITC: Petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998
order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial
of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July
27, 1998.
SC sustained petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on
time?
On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not
file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration.
According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day
appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of
appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue
that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of
the final order or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15
days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration).
In previous cases, the SC ruled that there is no fresh period. In Quelnan and
Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
trial court. SC ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day
appeal period to file the notice of appeal. SC consistently applied this rule in
 similar cases, premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional.

However, to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. This fresh period rule shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of
the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. The use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1,
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from
receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse
of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as
already discussed.

Other doctrines:
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss
of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute (BP 129) and
procedural rules (Rules of Court).

Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue

4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador

2. Navaros v. CHARITO NAVAROSA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Comelec HONORABLE DEAN R. TELAN, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 9, KALIBO, AKLAN AND ROGER M. ESTO, RESPONDENTS.
Petitioner Navarosa and Respondent Esto were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the
May 2001 elections. the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao proclaimed
petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winning margin of three (3) votes over
respondent Esto.
Esto filed an election protest in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The RTC rendered judgment in
favor of respondent Esto. The trial court found that respondent Esto obtained 4,595 votes over
petitioner Navarosa's 4,553 votes. Thus, the trial court declared respondent Esto the elected
mayor of Libacao by a margin of 42 votes and annulled the earlier proclamation of petitioner
Navarosa.
Petitioner Navarosa appealed the trial court's ruling to the COMELEC. Respondent Esto, on
the other hand, filed with the trial court a motion for execution of the judgment pending
petitioner Navarosa's appeal. Petitioner Navarosa opposed respondent Esto's motion. In the
alternative, petitioner Navarosa offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution
pending appeal, should the trial court grant respondent Esto's motion.
The trial court granted respondent Esto's motion subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond.
However, in the same order, the trial court also granted petitioner Navarosa's prayer to stay
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of
order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for
new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the
period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that
in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.
(emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30
days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations
of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre
behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal and enhance the
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of
this reglementary period of appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records
of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
[NOT RELEVANT] Issue on filing fees.
Estoppel has set in precluding petitioner Navarosa from questioning the
incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee, and in effect assailing the
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over the election protest. At this stage, the
remedy for respondent Esto's incomplete payment is for him to pay the P200
deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee. It is highly unjust to the electorate of
Libacao, Aklan, after the trial court has completed revision of the contested
ballots, to dismiss the election protest and forever foreclose the determination of
the true winner of the election for a mere P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing
fee.
[RELEVANT] WoN there exists good reasons for the execution pending
appeal to be granted.-YES
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(2) there must be "good reasons" for the execution pending appeal; and
(3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the "good reasons."
Petitioner Navarosa concedes respondent Esto's compliance with the first and third
requisites. What she contests is the trial court's finding that there are "good
reasons" to order discretionary execution of its decision.
[Ramas v. COMELEC] summarized the circumstances qualifying as "good
reasons" justifying execution pending appeal:
the execution pending appeal, upon filing a P600,000 supersedeas bond.
Unlike Sec. 2, Rule 39 where the grant of execution pending appeal is
conditioned upon the presence of the "good and valid reason" for its grant,
Sec. 3, Rule 39 does not provide for any condition precedent before the
discretionary execution of Rule 2 may be stayed. All that it requires is that a
sufficient supersedeas bond must be approved by the court conditioned upon
the performance of the judgment allowed to be executed in case it shall be
finally sustained in whole or in part. Under this section, therefore, the filing of
a supersedeas bond sufficient in amount is enough to stay the execution
granted under Sec. 2.
(Both MRed. Both denied)
Respondent Esto filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the Order.
Petitioner Navarosa raised for the first time the issue of the trial court's failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the election protest because of respondent Esto's failure to pay the
COMELEC filing fee.
COMELEC Second Division: affirmed the trial court's Order granting execution pending
appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. By granting the immediate execution, the RTC
recognized that the "good reasons" cited in the questioned Order constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse
party if the decision is reversed. By declaring that petitioner Esto is the duly elected Mayor of
Libacao, Aklan, the trial court gave substance and meaning to the people's mandate as
expressed in the ballot, especially since it has established petitioner Esto's right to the office.
The trial court cannot indirectly reverse its substantial finding of "good reasons" by a rule of
procedure which does not strictly apply in election protest cases when it allowed the filing of
a supersedeas bond under Section 3, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To allow
the application of the said procedural relief would defeat the right of the winning candidate in
an election protest to hold the public office by virtue of the people's mandate expressed
through the ballot and to perform the functions of the said public office.
(NAvarosa MRed. Denied)
R64 to SC
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
(1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate;
(2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
(3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.
ITC: The trial court in the present case, relying on cases reviewed in Ramas,
invoked two "good reasons" to justify its order allowing execution pending appeal.
First, the order will "give substance and meaning to the people's mandate."
Second, "more than 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term" of the office in
question had already lapsed. The COMELEC found these "good reasons"
sufficient.
WoN Section 3 Rule 39 is applicable to Election Protest Cases. NO
Unlike the Election Code of 1971,[27] which expressly provided for execution
pending appeal of trial courts' rulings in election protests, the present election laws
are silent on such remedy. Nevertheless, Section 2, Rule 39 ("Section 2") of the
Rules of Court (now 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) applies in suppletory
character to election cases, thus allowing execution pending appeal in the
discretion of the court.
In election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by
courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials,
which are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment
pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissible
pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SEC 4. In what cases not applicable.- These Rules shall not
apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
As to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials, which fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of Article
IX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies.
[Gabol v. Riodique] gave an additional justification for allowing execution
pending appeal of decisions of trial courts. Something had to be done to strike the
death blow at the "pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest"
technique often, if not invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who
would render nugatory the people's verdict against them and persist in continuing
in an office they very well know they have no legitimate right to hold.
Thus, a primordial public interest to obviate a hollow victory for the duly
elected candidate as determined by the trial court lies behind the present rule
giving suppletory application to Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary
 policy consideration can prevent the suppletory application of Section 2.

Petitioner: insists that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay
execution pending appeal. Petitioner Navarosa neither claims nor offers a more
compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she merely contends that
Section 3 of Rule 39 ("Section 3") applies also in a suppletory character because
its "Siamese twin" provision, Section 2, is already being so applied.

Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the public interest underlying
Section 2's application. We cannot countenance such argument.

Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests
of the prevailing party in election protest cases.

A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed

from in case of its affirmation. Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions
where the interest of the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and
consequently, of protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the
penultimate sentence of Section 3 states: "The bond thus given may be proceeded
against on motion with notice to the surety." Consequently, it finds no application
in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders, which are not
capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its
functions.

By allowing the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of a judgment in

an election protest declaring the protestant, as in the case of petitioner herein, as
the winning candidate who is entitled to the right to hold and perform the functions
of the contested public office, would render the judgment in an election protest
illusory.

Such bond, in the event the appealed case is affirmed and the execution pending
appeal is proven to be meritorious, cannot adequately answer for the deprivation of
a duly elected candidate of his post, and his constituents of their leader of
choice, such deprivation being unquantifiable.

ITC: the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed can only answer for that
portion of the trial court's ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual
damages, attorney's fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot secure execution of that
portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition. The Resolution dated 28

November 2002 of the COMELEC Second Division, and the Resolution dated 15
April 2003 of the COMELEC En Banc, are AFFIRMED. The status quo order
dated 10 June 2003 is LIFTED and the COMELEC is directed to cause the
implementation of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 9, in Election Case No. 129, without prejudice to any judgment the
COMELEC may render in EAC Case No. A-9-2002. Moreover, respondent Roger
M. Esto shall pay immediately the P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee.

Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue

4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
3. International INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC. (MANILA), PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF
School v. CA APPEALS, SPOUSES ALEX AND OPHELIA TORRALBA, RESPONDENTS.
RTC-QC rendered a decision in Civil Case involving a Complaint for Damages due to the
death of plaintiffs' (Sps. Torralba) only son, Ericson, while in the custody of ISM and its
officers. It found ISM liable to pay plaintiffs damages (moral-4M; exemplary-1M; actual-2M;
and attys fees-300k).
ISM appealed to the CA. During its pendency, Sps. Torralba filed a motion for execution
pending appeal before the lower court on the grounds that the appeal is merely dilatory and
that the filing of a bond is another good reason for the execution of a judgment pending
appeal. ISM filed its opposition.
RTC granted execution pending appeal upon the posting of a bond of Php5M by Sps.
Torralba. Pursuant to the writ of execution, ISM's bank deposits with Citibank in the amount
of P5,500,000.00 were placed on 'hold/pledge'.
In the meantime, ISM filed MR or for approval of supersedeas of Php5.6M.
RTC issued an order directing Citibank to release to the Deputy Sheriff in cash or check the
amount of Php5.5M subject of the Notice of Garnishment. The following day, Sps. Torralba
filed an urgent ex parte motion to encash and receive the proceeds of the amount garnished in
execution.
However, ISM filed an urgent motion to stop delivery of garnished funds to Sps. Torralba.
RTC issued an Order suspending the execution process there being no opposition filed in
relation thereto and pending resolution of ISM's MR (or for approval of supersedeas bond).
Sps. Torralba opposed ISM's MR.
RTC: Denied ISM's MR and authorized and directed Deputy Sheriff to encash the Citibank
Manager's Check (Php5.5M) payable to the said court and to turn over the net proceeds to the
plaintiffs or their representative. In view of the said Order, ISM filed a motion to withdraw
the supersedeas bond.
ISM filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. ISM sought the nullification of the
assailed orders for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with GAD.
CA: DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit in that the grounds relied upon by the RTC in
granting execution pending appeal, and which were raised by the plaintiffs-spouses in their
motion - that the appeal taken by the defendant school is merely dilatory and the filing of a
bond - constitute good reasons. CA agreed with the lower court that ISM's appeal appears to
be dilatory in view of its "virtual admission of fault when it adopted the project "Code Red"
consisting of safety and emergency measures, only after the death of plaintiffs-spouses
Torralba's only son"; and that the delay has already affected the plaintiffs-spouses Torralba
financially. CA also denied ISMs MR.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
W/N special civil action for certiorari filed before the CA to assail an order for
execution pending appeal was proper - YES
SC: Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the
same is not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had
appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in respondent
court as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature
execution.
That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution
pending appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against
him. The filing of such bond does not entitle him to the suspension of
execution as a matter of right. It cannot, therefore, be categorically considered as
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a losing party so
circumstanced to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of other remedial
options at hand.
Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the
requirement for a supersedeas bond presupposes that the case presents a
presumptively valid occasion for discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no
good reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing party could
unjustly compel the losing party to post a supersedeas bond through the simple
expedient of filing a motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ
of execution pending appeal although the situation is violative of Section 2, Rule
39. This could not have been the intendment of the rule, hence we give our
imprimatur to the propriety of petitioner's action for certiorari in respondent
court."
Verily, a petition for certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending
appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons.
[IMPORTANT!] W/N CAs ruling upholding the writ of execution pending
appeal is valid- NO
SC: It must be stressed that Sps. Torralbas motion/application for an execution
pending appeal was premised on the ff: that the appeal was being taken for
purpose of delay and that they are filing a bond, which grounds were adopted by
the RTC in granting the motion.
In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, CA observed that the lower
court had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the presence of the circumstances laid
down by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, allowing execution as an
exception, or pending appeal, even before final judgment, to wit:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party;
(b) There must be good reasons for issuing the execution; and
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special order.
CA also accepted as `good reasons' that ISM's appeal appears to be dilatory in
view of its virtual admission of fault when it adopted the project "Code Red" only
 after the death of Sps. Torralba's son, and the delay of the case which already
affected the Torralbas financially.

Ong vs. Court of Appeals

"Where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution
pending appeal cannot be justified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that
an appeal is frivolous and consequently to disapprove it since the disallowance of
an appeal by said court constitutes a deprivation of the right to appeal...

ITC: The "admission of fault or negligence" adverted to in the RTCs order and
subsequently adopted by CA in its decision, was based on the ff exchange between
the spouses' counsel and ISM's swimming coach, to wit:
"ATTY. GUERRERO: Issue of Vol. 48, No. 2 of October 1993.
Mr. Reloj, you said that you have read this. There is here an article which says on
the front page "Introducing Code Red." And in this article it says and I quote "It
was introduced last year by the administration to prevent further incidents like the
tragic death of Freshman Ericson Torralba in August 1991 who collapsed while
taking the swimming competency test.
Due to school's lack of emergency procedures and equipments, valuable time was
lost in coordinating medical efforts in bringing him to the Makati Medical Center.
WITNESS: Yes, I read that portion.
Q. That's all I want from you.
Now likewise Mr. Witness on page 8 or Exhibit AA, by the way your Honor, may
I request the portion which I read be marked as AA-1. Likewise on page 8, there is
again mentioned here I quote "ISM has also acquired new equipment to deal with
emergencies such as oxygen tank, respirator, new buoyancy and life saving
equipment to the pool and a licensed ambulance to transport the victim to the
Makati Medical Center.
With the apparent success of Code Red, no one at ISM need worry any longer
about life or death emergency. Did you read these portions?
WITNESS: I read those articles."

For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of execution pending
appeal, we cannot see how the lower courts came upon the conclusion of virtual
admission of fault or negligence by ISM based on the above-quoted exchange
where ISM's swimming coach admitted that he read the school paper article
introducing "Code Red". As correctly pointed out by ISM, the article was not an
official statement of the school, but merely an opinion of its author. Moreover, we
cannot see how the statement that he read the article on "Code Red" can be
construed as an admission of liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion
of the lower courts that the appeal is dilatory based solely on the foregoing
exchange rests on shaky ground.

[IMPORTANT!] W/N the filing of a bond can be considered a good reason to

justify immediate execution under Section 2, Rule 39. NO

SC: In Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that:

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4. Manacop v. JOSE F. MANACOP, HARISH C. RAMNANI, CHANDRU P. PESSUMAL AND
Equitable Bank MAUREEN M. RAMNANI, PETITIONERS, VS. EQUITABLE PCIBANK, LAVINE
LOUNGEWEAR MANUFACTURING INC., PHILIPPINE FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE CORPORATION AND FIRST LEPANTO-TAISHO INSURANCE
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
[So many unnecessary facts in the case. I only included the facts related to the discussion of
Rule 39.] Respondent Lavine insured its buildings and supplies against fire with PhilFire,
Rizal Surety, TICO, First Lepanto, Equitable Insurance and Reliance Insurance. Except for
the insurance policy issued by First Lepanto, all policies provide that: Loss, if any, under
this policy is payable to Equitable Banking Corporation-Greenhills Branch, as their interest
may appear subject to the terms, conditions, clauses and warranties under this policy.
Meanwhile, Lavine is indebted to Equitable Bank. The loan is secured by REM. Lavine also
made Equitable a benefiiary of the policies, hence its interest in this case.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
"xxx to consider the mere posting of a bond a `good reason' would precisely
make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule
rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed immediately, as a
matter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to
post a bond to answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation,
to repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law."
DOCTRINE: The mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good
reason for ordering execution pending appeal, as "a combination of circumstances
is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution, the
requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the
protection of the defendant's creditor." Since we have already ruled that the
reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify execution pending appeal,
neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more, justify the same.
The Court also held that awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be
the subject of execution pending appeal, to wit:
The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on
the outcome of the main case. Unlike the actual damages for which the petitioners
may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of
which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary
damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending
resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court.
The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal
relation to the petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of errors on
appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages
may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated
to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution issued by
the lower court pursuant to its order of June 19, 1996 is hereby ANNULLED.
[not so important]: w/n CA should have dismissed the petitions of Equitable
Bank and Lavine [remember they filed a petition for certiorari, instead of filing
a Notice of Appeal on the RTCs judgment] = YES, the CA should have dismissed
the petitions.
Simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed
since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.
It is elementary that for certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
the requirement that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied. The case of Chemphil v.
CA is similar to the present case wherein a co-party filed a Notice of Appeal and
Fire razed Lavines buildings and their contents so claims were made against the policies. the other, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Prior to the release of the proceeds, the insurance companies required Lavine to sign a Sworn
Statement in Proof of Loss and Subrogation Agreement whereby the former would be ITC: When Equitable Bank and Lavine filed their respective petitions before the
absolved from their liabilities upon payment of the proceeds to Equitable Bank. Only Harish Court of Appeals on April 24, 2002, the trial court had already rendered on April
(one of the petitioners) signed the document while the rest of Lavines directors refused to 2, 2002 a judgment on the merits. Both had notice of said final judgment as they
sign. even filed notices of appeal with the trial court. This only goes to show that
Instead of paying the policies to Lavine, certain insurance companies released the proceeds Equitable Bank and Lavine unwittingly recognized ordinary appeal as the proper
directly to Equitable Bank thus Chandru (an officer of Lavine) filed, in behalf of Lavine, a remedy in seeking reversal of the assailed decision.
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for a Issue #2: w/n CA erred in declaring null and void the Special Order = NO, the
Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC of Pasig against PhilFire, Rizal Surety, CA did not err.
TICO, First Lepanto and Equitable Bank.
The general rule is that only judgments which have become final and executory
Harish, et al., the other officers of Lavine moved to intervene claiming they were Lavine's may be executed. However, discretionary execution of appealed judgments may
incumbent directors and that Harish was Lavine's authorized representative. They disclaimed be allowed under Section 2 (a) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Chandru's designation as president of Lavine as well as his authority to file the action. They Procedure upon concurrence of the following requisites:
also denied having refused to sign the Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss and Subrogation (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
Agreement. The RTC granted the motion for intervention. (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of
exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage
Parties Pleading Allegation that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later.
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general
Rizal Surety Answer with Willing to pay but only to the rule, the existence of good reasons is essential.
Compulsory rightful claimant
Counterclaim ITC:
1. On petitioners argument that execution is justified because insurers admitted
First Lepanto and Philfire Answer Some proceeds paid to Equitable their liabilities: NOT a good reason. On the contrary, admission of their liabilities
(filed Answers separately Bank; withheld payment of the and willingness to deliver the proceeds to the proper party militate against
but averred the same thing); balance on account of this case execution pending appeal since there is little or no danger that the judgment will
TICO did not respond become illusory.
hence declared in default 2. On petitioners argument that the appeals are merely dilatory: NOT a good
reason. It is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a decision he rendered
Equitable Bank Answer with Sufficiently established its claim as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within competence of the
Compulsory as beneficiary of the policies, trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the
hence entitled to collect the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as basis for finding good reasons
proceeds to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory intent of an
appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending
Intervenors Amended Answer-in- The proceeds paid to Equitable appeal.
Intervention with Bank already exceeded the amount 3. On petitioners argument that Lavines financial distress is sufficient reasons:
cross-claim against owed by Lavine hence the bank NOT a good reason. Petitioners cited Borja v. CA, where execution pending
insurance companies and the insurers should be ordered appeal was granted when the prevailing party was already of advanced age and in
to deliver the remaining proceeds danger of extinction. Borja is inapplicable because its factual milieu is different.
to Lavine Lavines entity cannot be likened to a natural person. Its precarious financial
condition is not by itself a compelling circumstance warranting immediate
Second Amended Lavines liabilities to Equitable execution and does not outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing
Answer-in- Bank were extinguished since it only final and executory judgments.
Intervention received proceeds exceeding
Lavines obligations, thus the WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. CA-G.R. SP Nos. 70292

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 and 70298 are DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
REM must be released May 29, 2003 is AFFIRMED insofar as it declared null and void the Special Order
dated May 17, 2002 and the Writ of Execution dated May 20, 2002 of the
Daming hanash. Equitable Bank refuted the Second Amended Answer-in-Intervention and Regional Trial Court-Pasig City, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 68287.
said that the loans were not only secured by the policies and REM but several other surety
agreements.
RTC held: 1) dismissed the Complaint by Chandru; 2) ordered Equitable Bank to refund
Lavine through intervenors the amount representing the overpayment; and 3) ordered the
insurers to fully pay the proceeds.
This is it. The intervenors filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on the following
grounds (remember them because the SC will rule on each ground): 1) TICO was on the brink
of insolvency; 2) Lavine was in imminent danger of extinction; and 3) any appeal from the
trial courts judgment would be merely dilatory.

Some insurers filed Notice of Appeal. On the other hand, Equitable Bank and Lavine,
without waiting for the RTC to rule on the Motion for Execution, filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the CA. They initially filed a Notice of
Appeal but subsequently withdrew it.
RTC granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal through a Special Order, which
meant several properties of the insurers and Equitable Bank were seized. First Lepanto,
Philfire filed a petition under Rule 65 because of this. In view of the grant of the motion,
Equitable Bank amended its original petition. The CA then consolidated the petitions.
CA declared null and void the Special Order of the RTC, and remanded the case for the
conduct of pre-trial conference on the Second Amended Answer-in-Intervention. The CA also
lifted the levy and notice of garnishment on the properties of the insurers.
The intervenors filed a petition for review in the SC.

5. Curata v. Copied this digest from the previous year. Huhu. Sorry. This case is just too long. Quick Held+ Ratio:
PPA The SC held that the appeal was correctly granted despite the non-payment of the
[Note from the copied digest: This is a super long case with 7 consolidated petitions. For our appeal fee. This case is an exception to the rule that the appeal fee is absolutely
purposes, I am sticking to the GR No. as specified in our syllabus, since that is where the mandatory, for it involves billions of pesos in public funds.
pertinent topic can be found anyway. The other GR Nos. are completely omitted from this As to the issue of execution pending appeal, it was held that no execution pending
digest.] appeal can ever be had against the government. PPAs monies, facilities and assets
are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by
Full Title: SPOUSES CURATA, et al. vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent. virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal. PPA is a government instrumentality.
(G.R. Nos. 154211-12 June 22, 2009) Therefore, an undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of
government funds, and such may not be garnished absent an allocation by its
Quick Facts: Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its
The Batangas Port Zone was placed under the administrative jursidiction of the Philippine properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution
Ports Authority. Pursuant thereto, the PPA filed a complaint to expropriate 185 lots in pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot grant
Batangas. The RTC split the affected owners according to their counsel, and pertinent to our discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established
case is the Dimayacyac group (representing Curata, et al.). The RTC had 3 commissioners jurisprudence that government properties are exempt from execution.
come up with the fair market value of the lots, and they came up with a Php 4,800 per square
meter figure. The judge then ordered that the owners be compensated at the amount of Php Full HELD:
5,500 per square. PPA ultimately filed an appeal with the CA, and the latter court nullified the In G.R. Nos. 154211-12, the Court affirms the July 30, 2001 Decision of the CA
RTCs orders. The Dimayacyac group assails the orders the CA Order, arguing, primarily, and its July 11, 2002 Resolution in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 60314
that the CA should not have entertained the appeal and that the RTC orders should be and 63576, which granted both petitions of PPA. (Court affirmed the annulment of
executed pending appeal. the Motion and Writ of Execution, the Garnishment, the Denial of Appeal)

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FACTS:
385 and EO 431 delineated the BPZ (Batangas Port Zone, I think) and placed it under the
administrative jurisdiction of the PPA. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted a Complaint for
Expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC of Batangas City.
These lots, covering around 1.3M square meters, were meant to be developed into
Phase II of the BPZ.
For convenience, the RTC divided the defendant-lot owners into three groups, named
according to counsel Dimayacyac group (representing Curata, et al.), Ortega and Cruz
group, and the Agustin Group.
The RTC eventually declared that the expropriation was for public purpose. No appeal was
taken from that Order. That was settled.
It also appointed 3 commissioners to determine just compensation.
Basically, the commissioners determined the amount to be Php 4,800 per square meter.
When the PPA filed the complaint, it alleged that the FMV of the lots were around
Php 336 per square meter.
The RTC rendered the First Compensation Order pertaining particularly to the Dimayacyac
group. (There will be a Second Compensation Order pertaining to the others, saying pretty
much the same thing.)
In this Order, the RTC further amended the findings of the Commissioners and
determined the FMV of the lots at Php 5,500.
The Dimayacyac group filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution under Rule 67 in
relation to Sec. 2, Rule 39. The RTC, over PPAs opposition, issued an Order granting the
Motion.
It issued a Writ of Execution and subsequently, a notice of garnishment to LBP
Batangas City Branch.
PPA appealed this. The RTC denied the appeal for non-payment of appeal fee.
PPA registered with the CA a Supplemental Petition to annul the RTC issuances.
CA granted the appeal. It annulled and avoided all the Orders of the RTC (the order of
payment, the execution, the garnishment, the denial of appeal).
Dimayacyac Group
ISSUES:
1. W/N CA committed GADLEJ in allowing PPAs appeal, considering the RTC
order/partial judgment had already become final and executory
2. W/N CA was correct in ruling that an execution pending appeal would render moot
the very issue raied by PPA in its appealthat of Just Compensation.
a. The real issue is actually W/N execution pending appeal is applicable
to expropriation proceedings. - NOPE
3. What was the proper amount for just compensation?
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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
Full Ratio:
On the propriety of the granting of the appeal
We reiterate our consistent ruling that the payment of the appellate
docket fees is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal and held that the
above-quoted Sec. 13 of Rule 41, as amended in 2000, gives the
additional ground for the dismissal of an appeal on the nonpayment of
the required appellate docket fees, which gave force to the ground
provided under the above-quoted Secs. 4 and 9 of Rule 41.
As with most rules of procedure, however, exceptions are invariably
recognized and the relaxation of procedural rules on appeals has been
effected to obviate jeopardizing substantial justice. This case warrants an
application of the exception, as the public interest and the higher
interests of justice and fair play dictate that PPAs appeal should be
allowed.
The trial judge should have permitted the appeal to prosper in view of
the billions of pesos of taxpayers money, subject matter of the appeal.
Fully aware of the wide disparity between the fair market values of the
lots ranging from PhP 2.10 to 3.50 per square meter based on the tax
declarations and the amount of PhP 5,500 per square meter pegged as
just compensation, the judge cannot be said to have wielded his power to
reject PPAs appeal with the highest degree of circumspection.
In view of the importance of Phase II of the BPZ Project, the huge
financial implications of the prescribed compensation and the
considerable interests of the government in enhancing our port facilities,
the trial court should have allowed the record on appeal and the payment
of the appeal fees to afford the higher court a second look at the merits
of the case.
As to the execution pending appeal in expropriation cases
The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending
appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings.
As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the
Court held:
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally
take the form of an order merely requiring the payment of the
award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a
personal judgment against the Government could not be
realized upon execution.
In Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the
eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee explained the rationale behind
the doctrine that government funds and properties cannot be seized
under a writ of execution, thus:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be
sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimants action "only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under
 writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. xxx
PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties. Ergo,
they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of a final judgment or
pending appeal. PPA is a government instrumentality charged with
carrying out governmental functions through the management,
supervision, control and regulation of major ports of the country. It is an
attached agency of the Department of Transportation and
Communication pursuant to PD 505.
This Courts disquisition in Manila International Airport Authority v.
Court of Appeals is squarely applicable to PPA, as it is similarly situated
as MIAA. First, PPA is likewise not a GOCC for not having shares of
stocks or members. Second, the docks, piers and buildings it administers
are likewise owned by the Republic and, thus, outside the commerce of
man. Third, PPA is a mere trustee of these properties.
Therefore, an undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of
government funds, and such may not be garnished absent an allocation
by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished
and its properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a
writ of execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court
likewise cannot grant discretionary execution pending appeal, as it
would run afoul of the established jurisprudence that government
properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be done directly
cannot be done indirectly.
Nevertheless, this issue of discretionary execution has been rendered
moot by our dispositions in this judgment, more particularly on just
compensation.
On Just Compensation
In view of our ruling that the August 15, 2000 Order is the final order
that can be appealed to the CA, thus removing the technical hurdle, the
correctness of the ruling of the trial court that the just compensation is
PhP 5,500 per square meter will have to be examined anew on the
merits.

After a circumspect reevaluation and analysis of the records and

evidence at hand and taking into careful account the information
gathered from the oral arguments, the Court arrives at the conclusion
that the just compensation or the full and fair equivalent of the property
sought to be expropriated at the time of taking is PhP 425 per square
meter. We recall our previous affirmation of the CAs determination that
the lots should be valued at Php 5,500.

6. Garcia v. JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE Whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the
PAL AIRLINES, INC., Respondent. Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC
decision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter, now that respondent has
An administrative charge was filed by PAL against its employees-herein petitioners after they exited from rehabilitation proceedings.

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were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel
and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Centers Toolroom Section. PAL dismissed
petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal and damages.
LA: Ruled in favor of the employees, thus ordering PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply
with the reinstatement aspect of the decision.
Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiters decision, the SEC placed PAL, which was
suffering from severe financial losses, under a receiver.
NLRC: Reversed the LA and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit.
The Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement aspect of its
decision. He also issued a Notice of Garnishment (Notice). Respondent thereupon moved to
quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the garnished amount.
Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC. However, NLRC affirmed
the validity of the Writ and the Notice issued by the Labor Arbiter but suspended and referred
the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action.
Respondent elevated the matter to the appellate court which issued the herein challenged
Decision and Resolution nullifying the NLRC Resolutions on two grounds, essentially
espousing that: (1) a subsequent finding of a valid dismissal removes the basis for
implementing the reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiters decision (the first ground), and (2)
the impossibility to comply with the reinstatement order due to corporate rehabilitation
provides a reasonable justification for the failure to exercise the options under Article 223 of
the Labor Code (the second ground).
CA: PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition but suspended the instant proceedings until
further notice from this Court. It ruled that The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, as well as the Court
of Appeals should have abstained from resolving petitioners case for illegal dismissal and
should instead have directed them to lodge their claim before PALs receiver.
Subsequently, respondent informed the Court that the SEC granted its request to exit from
rehabilitation proceedings. In view of the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings, the
Court now proceeds to resolve the issue.
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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
Amplification of the First Ground
It has been advanced that there is no point in releasing the wages to petitioners
since their dismissal was found to be valid, and to do so would constitute unjust
enrichment. SC ruled that the social justice principles of labor law outweigh or
render inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The
constitutional and statutory precepts portray the otherwise unjust situation as a
condition affording full protection to labor. The SC reaffirms the prevailing
principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages
of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate
them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative,
employer must pay the employees salaries. Furthermore, this does not require the
application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the
execution of a reinstatement since the very object and intent of Article 223 of
the Labor Code is the immediate execution of a reinstatement order.
The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:
x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by
the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during
the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the
employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is
entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.
Amplification of the Second Ground
The Court sustains the appellate courts finding that the peculiar predicament of a
corporate rehabilitation rendered it impossible for respondent to exercise its option
(i.e., actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement) under the circumstances.
After the labor arbiters decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the
employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that
the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on
the part of the employer.
The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of
reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the
delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is
due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay
the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision.
The new NLRC Rules of Procedure now require the employer to submit a report of
compliance within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision,
disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The employee need

7. Arcenas v. LEONARDO ARCENAS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
CA CARMELITA ARCENAS VILLANUEVA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ARMIE E. ELMA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 153,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, AND JOSE DELA RIVA,
RESPONDENTS.
1st Case: An action for annulment of the foreclosure sale of a barge. The Trial counrt
rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint and sentencing plaintiff Emilio Espino to
return the barge "Sta. Lucia Triumph I" to the possession of defendant Jose dela Riva, and to
pay the said defendant P46,000.00 a month as unrealized profit. "Both plaintiffs Espino and
Leonardo Arcenas are also sentenced to pay jointly defendant Dela Riva moral damages in
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not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter
shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ. With the new rules in place, there is
hardly any difficulty in determining the employers intransigence in
immediately complying with the order.
ITC: It is apparent that there was inaction on the part of respondent to reinstate
them, but whether such omission was justified depends on the onset of the
exigency of corporate rehabilitation. It is settled that upon appointment by the SEC
of a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims before any court, tribunal or
board against the corporation shall ipso jure be suspended. As stated early on,
during the pendency of petitioners complaint before the Labor Arbiter, the SEC
placed respondent under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver. After the Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision, the SEC replaced the Interim Rehabilitation
Receiver with a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver.
Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the implementation of
the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. This injunction or
suspension of claims by legislative fiat partakes of the nature of a restraining
order that constitutes a legal justification for respondents non-compliance with the
reinstatement order. Respondents failure to exercise the alternative options of
actual reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified. Such being the
case, respondents obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal, as the normal
effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach.
While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger
to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does
not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a
judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive.
In sum, the obligation to pay the employees salaries upon the employers failure to
exercise the alternative options under Article 223 of the Labor Code is not a hard
and fast rule, considering the inherent constraints of corporate rehabilitation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY DENIED. Insofar as the Court of
Appeals Decision of December 5, 2003 and Resolution of April 16, 2004 annulling
the NLRC Resolutions affirming the validity of the Writ of Execution and the
Notice of Garnishment are concerned, the Court finds no reversible error.
[NOT RELEVANT] Issue on summons. INVALID SERVICE, so RTC did not
acquire jd over defendant.
If the defendant is temporarily out of the country, summons may, by leave of
court, be effected outside of the Philippines by substituted service or by
publication. However, if the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, summons may be effected, by leave of court, by personal service or by
publication; or other sufficient manner as determined by the court, provided that
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff residing in the Philippines; or
when the action relates to, or the subject of which involves property within the
Philippines.
ITC: Petitioner is no longer residing and found in the Philippines. He left for the
the amount of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00. Both plaintiffs are further
ordered to pay jointly defendants Dela Riva and Antonio Sy, Sr., attorneys fees of
P15,000.00 each, and the costs of the suit.
CA affirmed w/ modification reducing the moral and exemplary damages.
Such decision became final and executory.
Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution with the trial court,
which motion was granted. However, despite the writ of execution, private respondent failed
to enforce the judgment.
2nd case: Five years from the time of the entry of judgment, private respondent filed a
complaint for revival of judgment and sum of money with damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig.
[Facts on summons. Not very important] The complaint alleged that petitioner could be
served with summon at BF homes. Paranaque. The Sheriffs return indicated failure to serve
on that address, having been told that the defendant is already out of the country. private
respondent filed a motion to order the sheriff to effect service of summons by substituted
service upon petitioner. The motion was granted by the trial court. The deputy sheriff served a
copy of the Alias summons together with the complaint upon petitioner through his mother,
Mrs. Carmen Arcenas, who refused to receive and acknowledge the same.
Petitioner failed to file his answer and, upon motion by private respondent, was declared in
default. Thereafter, private respondent was allowed to adduce his evidence ex-parte.
Trial court rendered a decision reviving the decision in Civil Case No. 35349 and for the
corresponding writ of execution to be issued; ordering defendant Leonardo Arcenas to pay
plaintiff P171,022.00 in his capacity as one of the principals under the surety bond,
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and 15% of the amount recoverable as and by
way of attorneys fees.
A writ of execution was issued and petitioners properties were levied.
Petitioner through his attorney-in-fact Carmelita A. Villanueva, filed with the respondent
Court of Appeals a petition to annul the judgment of the RTC.
Petitioners contention: the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person because
there has been no valid service of summons. He posits that the service of summons is
improper and invalid since he was already living in the United States when the summons was
served and that it was served at the wrong address. Petitioner also contended that the decision
of the trial court is void because it substantially amended the original decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 35349 absolving him of any liability with regard to the return of the barge.
Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Presumption of Regularity of
the service of summons.
[to the SC]
Petitioners contention: The original decision of the Regional Trial Court as modified by the
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United States in June of 1993 as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. Hence,
summons may be served on him either personally or by publication. However,
since the complaint filed against him is one in personam (a personal action) and
does not involve the personal status of the private respondent, nor any property in
the Philippines in which petitioner has or claim or an interest, or which the private
respondent has attached, summons should be served on him personally. The
deputy sheriff can not serve the summons by substituted service.
Having failed to serve the summons on the person of the petitioner, the Regional
Trial Court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over him. Consequently, the
proceedings held is null and void.
[RELEVANT] AND EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE RTC ACQUIRED JD
OVER THE DEFENDANT, JUDGMENT RENDERED IS STILL A NULLITY
BECAUSE. . .
W/N the RTC erred in modifying the judgment originally rendered when it
gave due course to the revival of the case. YES
Doctrine: When a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making
of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of
course, where the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.
ITC: In Civil Case No. 35349 (first case), the judgment of the trial court ordered
only petitioners co-defendant Emilio Espino to return the barge MV Sta. Lucia I
to private respondent Jose de la Riva and to pay P 48,000.00 a month as unrealized
profit from February 3, 1980 or until June 18, 1980. The said judgment absolved
petitioner from any liability insofar as the barge is concerned but found him jointly
liable to private respondent and Antonio Sy, Sr., for moral and exemplary
damages.
On the other hand, the revived judgment (2nd case) now subject of this case,
substantially modified the original judgment by directing petitioner to pay private
respondent the sum of P171,022.00 representing double the value of the barge;
P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and 15% of the amount recoverable
by way of attorneys fees.
These new monetary awards can not be allowed since they were not adjudged in
the original judgment which had long become final and executory.
The purpose of the action for revival of a judgment is not to modify the
original judgment subject of the action but is merely to give a creditor a new
right of enforcement from the date of revival. The rule seeks to protect judgment
 Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court is already final and executory, hence, it
could no longer be amended or altered.
8. RCBC v. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. FEDERICO A.
Serra SERRA, RESPONDENT.
In 1975, Federico Serra and petitioner RCBC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land in Masbate to RCBC for 25 years. Serra further
granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement (property) within 10 years from
the signing of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
In 1984, RCBC informed Serra of its decision to exercise its option to buy the property.
However, Serra replied that he was no longer interested in selling the property. Thus, RCBC
filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against Serra (Specific
Performance case) in RTC Makati. RTC Makati initially dismissed the complaint.
However, in an Order dated 5 January 1989 it subsequently reversed itself and ordered
Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of RCBC.
Serra appealed to CA. On 18 May 1989, Serra donated the property to his mother, Leonida
Ablao (Ablao). On 20 April 1992, Ablao sold the property to Hermanito Liok (Liok). Thus,
RCBC filed a Complaint for Nullification of Deed of Donation and Deed of Sale with
Reconveyance and Damages against Liok, Ablao and Serra (Annulment case) before the RTC
Masbate.
Meanwhile, the CA, and later the SC, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati in the Specific
Performance case. In a Decision dated 4 January 1994, this Court declared that the Contract
of Lease with Option to Buy was valid, effective, and enforceable. On 15 April 1994, the
decision in the Specific Performance case became final and executory upon entry of
judgment.
In 2001, RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and
the subsequent sale to Liok null and void, which Decision was affirmed by CA. CA held that
the donation to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade Serras obligation to
RCBC. Since Ablao had no right to transfer the property and Liok was not a buyer in good
faith, the subsequent sale to Liok was likewise null and void.
Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182478, while
Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182664, before this
Court. In separate Resolutions dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final
and executory on 27 August 2008 and 3 March 2009, respectively, this Court found neither
reversible error nor GAD on the CAs part.
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific
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creditors from wily and unscrupulous debtors who, in order to evade attachment or
execution, cunningly conceal their assets and wait until the statute of limitation
sets in.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 3, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 43407 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
W/N THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RCBC IS
BARRED FROM HAVING ITS JANUARY 5, 1989 DECISION EXECUTED
THROUGH MOTION, CONSIDERING THAT UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THIS CASE, RCBC WAS
UNLAWFULLY PREVENTED BY THE RESPONDENT FROM
ENFORCING THE SAID DECISION-
SC: The petition has merit.
The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be
executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action
after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court,
however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after
the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the
delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred
for his benefit or advantage
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we held that where the delays were occasioned
by the judgment debtors own initiatives and for her advantage as well as
beyond the judgment creditors control, the five-year period allowed for
enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively
interrupted or suspended.
ITC: RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on
April 15, 1994 which orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in
favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred
the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serras
action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the
execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the
pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to
enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since
the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and
RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs motion is
deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision
through a motion.
This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for
enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Far from
sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his
obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict compliance with the rules
of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
 Performance case. RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of
the decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by Serra. Thus, the
period to execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the Annulment case.
Serra argued that the motion for execution was already barred by prescription and laches,
and that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in the original title the Contract of
Lease with Option to Buy.
RTC Makati: DENIED RCBCs motion for execution. The RTC Makati opined that
[RCBC] should have asked for the execution of the deed of sale and have the same
registered with the Registry of Deeds, so that even if [Serra] sold or transferred the subject
property to any person the principle of caveat emptor would set in. RTC likewise denied
RCBCs MR.
Petition for Review on Certiorari before SC.
9. Infante v. ADELAIDA INFANTE, PETITIONER, VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., RESPONDENT.
Aran Builders
Aran Builders filed an action for revival of judgment against Infante on 6 June 2001 before
the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The judgment sought to be revived was one rendered by the
RTC of Makati City in action for specific performance and damages.
The Makati RTC judgment ordered Infante to execute the deed of sale in favor of Arante,
among others.
Infante filed a motion to dismiss the action for revival on the grounds that Muntinlupa RTC
has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that the venue was improperly laid.
RTC denied the motion. The RTC clarified that at the time the Decision (sought to be
revived) was rendered there was no RTC in Muntinlupa yet. The case at bar is a revival of a
judgment which declared the plaintiff as the owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa
City.
Petitioners MR was denied, so she came to the CA via certiorari. She alleges GADALEJ.
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and damages before the Makati
RTC is a personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is also
personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the action for revival of judgment is
either Makati City or Paraaque City where private respondent and petitioner respectively
reside, at the election of private respondent.
CA ruled in favor of respondent. The CA held that since the judgment sought to be revived
was rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
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enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July 2012.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 3 December 2012 is
made permanent. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City is DIRECTED to issue
the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 10054 for the enforcement of the decision
therein. Costs against petitioner.
Issue: w/n CA erred in finding the complaint for revival of judgment is an
action in rem which was correctly filed with the RTC of the place where the
disputed real property is located = NO, CA did not err.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the
lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment and before it is barred by the statute
of limitations, a final and executory judgment or order may be enforced by action.
The Rule does not specify in which court the action for revival of judgment
should be filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo, an action upon a judgment must be brought either in the
same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or
defendant resides, or in any other place designed by the statutes which treat of
the venue of actions in general. So, read together with Rule 4 of the ROC (venue
for civil actions). [Note: in the same case, the issue on whether an action for
revival of judgment is quasi in rem was not yet proper and justiciable. It was an
obiter dictum, hence not a source of legal basis for petitioner.]
The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a
real action or a personal action.
ITC: The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and executory
judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of
land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent, among
others. The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's right
to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore,
undeniable that private respondent has an established interest over the lot in
question; and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to
revive the previous judgment.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should
indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is
located. A branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over
a particular territory defined by the Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City
was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. According to BP 129,

10. Josef v. Albino Josef, Petitioner, vs. Otelio Santos, Respondent.
Santos
Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant in a Civil Case, which is a case for collection of
sum of money filed by Otelio Santos, who claimed that Josef failed to pay the shoe materials
which he bought on credit from Santos on various dates in 1994.
RTC-Marikina found Josef liable to Santos. Josef appealed this to the CA but CA affirmed
the RTCs decision in toto. So, Josef went to the SC via Petition for review on certiorari but
was dismissed by the SC. The judgment became final and executory on May 21, 2002.
Santos then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was opposed by Josef.
Josefs Opposition to the Writ of Execution: He claimed that he was insolvent;
that he had no property to answer for the judgment credit; that the house and
lot in which he was residing at the time was his family home thus exempt from
execution; that the household furniture and appliances found therein are
likewise exempt from execution; and that these furniture and appliances
belonged to his children.
RTC granted the motion and issued an Order commanding that a writ of execution be
issued commanding the Sheriff to execute the decision dated Dec 18, 1996 [decision of
the RTC in the collection case]. A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and
enforced on August 21, 2003. [TAKE NOTE: in RTCs Order, it ignored the arguments
of Josef]
On August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subject of the writ of execution were
auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City and covered by a
TCT was sold on October 28, 2003 by way of public auction to fully satisfy the judgment
credit. Santos emerged as the winning bidder and a Certificate of Sale dated November
6, 2003 was issued in his favor.
Josef filed an original petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the sheriff's levy and
sale of the abovementioned personal and real properties. Josef claimed that the personal
properties did not belong to him but to his children; and that the real property located at
Marikina City was his family home thus exempt from execution.
CA Ruling: dismissed the petition for failure of Josef to file an MR of the RTCs Order
granting the motion for execution and ordering the issuance of a writ therefor, as well as for
his failure to indicate in his petition the timeliness of its filing as required under the Rules of
Court.
Josef filed an MR but was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
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RTC in Muntinlupa is created. Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court in
Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue
orders and processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 12, 2002 and
Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
W/N the levy and sale of the personal belongings of Josef's children as well as
the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the
judgment award in favor of Santos is legal No. The levy and sale is illegal.
Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.
An Order [granting Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution] that is
void cannot confer any right. A writ of execution based on it is likewise void.
Although the general rule is that A claim for exemption from execution of the
family home should be set up and proved before the sale of the property at public
auction, and failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption since the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor which must be claimed by the judgment debtor himself at the
time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter. However, the
circumstances of this case are different thus, an exemption from the general
rule. [see #2 under ITC]
Family Home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized
by creditors except in certain special cases.
Procedure to be observed after the trial court is apprised that the property
subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioners family home:
1. Determine if petitioner's obligation to respondent falls under either of the
exceptions under Article 155 of the Family Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner's claim that the property
was his family home; conduct an ocular inspection of the premises; an
examination of the title; an interview of members of the community
where the alleged family home is located, in order to determine if
petitioner actually resided within the premises of the claimed family
home; order a submission of photographs of the premises, depositions,
and/or affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination
of the petitioner, his children and other witnesses. At the same time, the
respondent is given the opportunity to cross-examine and present
evidence to the contrary;
3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioner's family
home, the court should determine:
under Rule 45 before the SC.
Josefs Arguments:
RTC sheriff erroneously attached, levied and sold on execution the real property
located at Marikina City because the same is his family home;
The execution sale was irregular because it was conducted without complying with
the notice and posting of requirements;
The personal and real properties were sold for inadequate prices as to shock the
conscience. The real property was allegedly worth P8 million but was sold for only
P848,448.64.
CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the petition based purely on
technical grounds, i.e., his failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's order granting execution, and his failure to indicate in his petition for
certiorari the timeliness of filing the same with the Court of Appeals.
Santos Counter-Arguments:
Josefs alleged family home has not been shown to have been judicially or
extrajudicially constituted, obviously referring to the provisions on family home of
the Civil Code - not those of the Family Code which should apply in this case;
Josef has not shown to the court's satisfaction that the personal properties executed
upon and sold belonged to his children. Respondent argues that he is entitled to
satisfaction of judgment considering the length of time it took for the parties to
litigate and the various remedies Josef availed of which have delayed the case.
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a) If the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or
after, the effectivity of the Family Code;
b) If petitioner's spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other
beneficiaries of the family home;
c) If the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of
determining which of them, if any, is his family home; and
d) Its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the
provisions of Articles 157and 160 of the Family Code.
ITC: Josef, in his Opposition to Santos Motion for Issuance of the Writ of
Execution, claimed, among others, that the house and lot in which he was residing
at the time was his family home thus exempt from execution; that the household
furniture and appliances found therein are likewise exempt from execution; and
that these furniture and appliances belonged to his children. Thus, as early as
during proceedings prior to the issuance of the writ of execution, Josef brought to
the fore the issue of exemption from execution of his home, which he claimed to
be a family home in contemplation of the civil law. However, instead of
inquiring into the nature of Josef's allegations in his opposition, RTC ignored
the same and granted Santos motion for execution. RTCs Order did not
resolve nor take into account petitioner's allegations in his Opposition, which
are material and relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ
of execution. This is serious error on the part of the trial court. It should have
made an earnest determination of the truth to petitioner's claim that the house and
lot in which he and his children resided was their duly constituted family home.
Since it did not, its Order granting Santos Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution is thus null and void. Trial court had enough time to conduct the
crucial inquiry that would have spared Josef the trouble of having to seek relief all
the way to the Supreme Court. The RTCs inaction on Josefs plea resulted in
serious injustice to Josef, not to mention that its failure to conduct an inquiry based
on the latters claim bordered on gross ignorance of the law.
Being void, the RTCs Order granting Santos Motion for Issuance of the
Writ of Execution could not have conferred any right to Santos. Any writ of
execution based thereon is likewise VOID. Josef claimed exemption from
execution of his family home soon after Santos filed the motion for issuance of a
writ of execution, thus giving notice to the trial court and Santos that a property
exempt from execution may be in danger of being subjected to levy and sale.
Thereupon, the trial court is called to observe the procedure as herein laid out [see
above]; on the other hand, Santos should observe the procedure prescribed in
Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to obtain an order for the sale on execution
of the Josef's family home, if so, and apply the proceeds - less the maximum
amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Code which should remain with
the petitioner for the rebuilding of his family home - to his judgment credit.
Instead, both the trial court and Santos completely ignored Josef's argument that
the properties subject of the writ are exempt from execution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 and May 7, 2004 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-

11. D- D ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs.
Armoured ARNULFO ORPIA, LODUVICO ABUCEJO (others omitted), respondents.
Security v.
Orpia Respondents, who were employed as security guards by D Armoured Security and
Investigation Agency, Inc. and assigned to Fortune Tobacco, Inc., filed with the Labor Arbiter
a complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims against petitioner and Fortune
Tobacco.
LA: ruled in favor of the employees and required D Armoured to pay P1,077,124.29.
Only Fortune Tobacco appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the complaint against it. This
Decision became final and executory. Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter
became the sole liability of petitioner.
The records were then remanded to the Arbiter for execution. The LA then issued a writ of
execution. The sheriff served a writ of garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an existing services agreement. Thus,
petitioners receivables with Foremost were garnished.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and Garnishment
which was denied. The NLRC also dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to post a bond
within the reglementary period.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
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G.R. SP No. 80315 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 16, 2003 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 in Civil Case No. 95-110-
MK, as well as the writ or writs of execution thus issued in said case, are hereby
DECLARED VOID, and all acts proceeding therefrom and any title obtained by
virtue thereof are likewise DECLARED VOID.
The trial court is hereby DIRECTED (1) to conduct a solemn inquiry into the
nature of the real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-105280,
with a view toward determining whether the same is petitioner Albino Josef's
family home, and if so, apply the pertinent provisions of the Family Code and Rule
39 of the Rules of Court; and (2) to conduct an inquiry into the ownership of all
other properties that were levied upon and sold, with the aim of determining as
well whether these properties are exempt from execution under existing law.
Respondent Otelio Santos is hereby DIRECTED to hold the abovementioned real
and personal properties, or the proceeds thereof, in trust to await the outcome of
the trial court's inquiry.
Finally, the trial court is DIRECTED to resolve, with utmost dispatch, Civil Case
No. 95-110-MK within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners monthly
receivables from the Foremost Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from
execution. NO. The exemptions from execution only pertains to natural persons.
An order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not
appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. On this ground
alone, the instant petition is dismissible. But on the merits, the petition is still
unmeritorious.
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties
are exempt from execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from
execution:
xxxxxxxxx
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his
personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are
necessary for the support of his family.
The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the
Civil Code, the substantive law which proscribes the execution of employees
wages, thus:
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or
attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and
medical attendance.
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of
the New Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works
 are manual.

In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons
and not to juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries,
wages and earning from the personal services rendered by the judgment obligor.
The rule further requires that such earnings be intended for the support of the
judgment debtors family.

Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the
exemption. If at all, the exemption refers to petitioners individual employees and
not to petitioner as a corporation. Parenthetically, in a parallel case where a
security agency claimed that the guns it gives to its guards are tools and
implements exempt from execution, the Supreme Court had the occasion to rule
that the exemption pertains only to natural and not to juridical persons.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt
from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be
enforced against the business entity [Pentagon Security and Investigation Agency
vs. Jimenez, 192 SCRA 492 (1990)].

*********
Jic sir asks, heres another provision:
Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
Rule IV
EXECUTION
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. Only the properties of the
losing party shall be the subject of execution, except:
(a) The losing partys family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code or
Family Code or as may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof, the
homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection therewith,
subject to the limits fixed by law;
(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that
purpose by the losing party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding the
amount fixed by law;
(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for three (3) months;
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges, physicians, pharmacists,
dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not
exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his personal services within the
month preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family;
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner
growing out of any life insurance;
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his trade or employment of a
value not exceeding three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December

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12. Caja v. FLORENTINO A. CAJA, PETITIONER, VS. ATILANO G. NANQUIL, SHERIFF IV,
Nanquil REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 72, OLONGAPO CITY, RESPONDENT.
This is a complaint for Grave Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Rules on Execution
under the Rules of Court against Atilano G. Nanquil, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Olongapo City.
Antecedent facts of the case:
- Complainant Florentino A. Caja was a defendant in Civil Case for Sum of Money
before Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City.
- Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas rendered a decision ordering the defendants to pay the
plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P956,285.00 with interest at the rate of
18% per annum
- A Writ of Execution, addressed to Sheriff Nanquil, was issued. He levied the
following properties:
-Notice of Garnishment to the Manager of PAG-IBIG (Take-Out Office)
informing the latter not to deliver, transfer or dispose defendants money,
credits, shares, interests and deposits therein except upon orders from the court.
-Notice of Levy: a parcel of land including its improvements, declared in the
name of Subic Realty Corporation.
-Personal properties: One payloader, One Dump Truck
-77 pieces of G.I. Sheets
- a Notice of Third Party Claim was filed by BAP Credit Guaranty Corporation
(BCGC) informing its sheriff, that the payloader and dump truck he levied were
previously mortgaged to BCGC. He requested that the levy thereon be immediately
lifted and/or discharged in accordance with Section 17, Rule 39
- defendants Subic Realty Corporation, Florentino Caja and Erickson Y. Caja filed a
Motion to Lift Levy on Execution praying that the levy on their real property lifted on
the ground that the levy made on their personal properties is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment.
- Judge Ubiadas denied the motion.
[back to the admin case]
Complainant alleged that respondent sheriff committed the following irregularities
amounting to Gross Misconduct:
Respondent sheriff levied defendants real property ahead of their personal properties;
Respondent sheriff made an excessive levy;
Respondent sheriff levied defendants personal properties without serving a Notice of
Levy or issuing a receipt therefor;
Respondent sheriff delivered the levied personal properties to the judgment creditor
without conducting an auction sale; and
Respondent sold the levied personal properties in an auction sale almost four years after
being levied.
Respondents defense: admitted that he first levied real property under TCT No. T-46478 but
since the same was heavily mortgaged for P5,000,000.00, the judgment creditor, Triangle Ace
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
18, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61799 is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO. Costs against petitioner.
WoN Sheriff Nanquil is guilty of Gross Misconduct. YES
As per first alleged violation of levying real properties before personal
properties.
It is clear in Section 8(a) of Rule 39 that satisfaction of the judgment must be
carried out first through the personal property of the judgment debtor, and then
through his real property. This directive is evident from the Writ of Execution and
Alias Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court.
Going over the record of the case, it appears that after the decision of the lower
court became final and a writ of execution was issued, the first thing respondent
sheriff did was to serve a Notice of Garnishment to the Manager of PAG-IBIG
(Take-Out Office) advising the latter not to deliver, transfer or dispose of money
credits, shares, interests, and deposits in his control and possession belonging to
Subic Realty Corporation, Florentino Caja and Erickson Y. Caja. Subsequently, an
alias writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto, he levied the real property
of complainant and then the latters personal properties on July 1, 1997.
Clearly, what respondent sheriff levied first was personal property via
garnishment. Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching
credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the
litigation.
ITC, however: Respondent sheriff still violated the rule that satisfaction of the
judgment must be carried out first through the personal property of the judgment
debtor, and then through his real property. After levying the real property of
complainant, respondent sheriff then levied complainants personal properties,
which is a direct violation of Section 8, Rule 39 and of the writ and alias writ of
execution issued by the court.
First, there was negligence on his part when he immediately levied the real
property of complainant without checking if the latter has other personal properties
that could satisfy the judgment. He could have easily asked the Land
Transportation Office if complainant had vehicles registered in his name. If he had
done so, respondent sheriff could have known that complainant had vehicles which
he could levy first before levying any real property. He should have exhausted all
means before going after the real property. This, he did not do. It was only after
levying complainants real property and after discovering that said property was
encumbered did he look for other personal property.
Respondents contention: the levy on complainants real property was not
continued because it was previously mortgaged.
[Court] Untenable. It was the sale of the levied real property in an execution sale
Corporation, desisted from proceeding with the levy. It was because of this that he levied the
personal properties consisting of the payloader, dump truck and G.I. sheets. He added that
although the aforesaid section provides that the officer shall first levy on the personal
properties, if any, then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to
answer the judgment, this section has been nullified by the succeeding paragraph which says
(w)hen there is more property of the judgment obligor that is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
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which did not push through.
Levy is different from an execution sale. Levy has been defined as the act or acts
by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of a judgment
debtors property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ of
execution. On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other
ministerial officer under the authority of a writ of execution which he has levied
on property of the debtor. In the case before us, there was a levy on real property
but the levied property was not sold in an execution sale because said property, if
sold, will not satisfy the judgment debt because of an existing encumbrance
thereon.
As per Second alleged violation of excessive levy:
The amount of the real property levied upon is definitely more than ten million
pesos since the property was mortgaged for ten million. This amount alone is more
or less ten times greater than the judgment debt. As it is, there is already a clear
case of overlevy. Although the levied realty was not auctioned at an execution
sale, its value should still be taken into account in computing the total amount
levied by respondent sheriff.
Respondent sheriffs act of levying complainants real property despite its being
mortgaged is tantamount to negligence. As an officer of the court, he knew fully
well that the property cannot be used to satisfy the judgment debt since the
mortgagee is the preferred creditor in relation to said property.
The rule is well-settled that a sheriff is guilty of misconduct where he failed to
limit the goods to be levied to the amount called for in the writ. A deputy sheriff
who made a levy far and in excess of the value of the judgment commits a
misconduct in office. In the case before us, respondent sheriff clearly made an
excessive levy when he levied complainants real property which was valued at
more than ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00).
As per third alleged violation of levying without issuing Notice of Levy or
Receipt:
Respondent sheriffs answer that he cannot remember if he did leave a copy of the
Notice of Levy with the judgment debtor only shows that he was not performing
his duty as sheriff. As sheriff, it was his duty to give the notice of levy or receipt to
the person to whom the personal properties were taken. If no one would like to
receive the same, it was his duty to leave copies of the notice at the place where he
levied the personal property. Thereafter, he should have reported the proceedings
by filing a report or return to the court. In the case at bar, even assuming that no
one was willing to accept the notice of levy, the record is bereft of any evidence
showing that respondent sheriff reported his failure to leave a copy of the notice of
levy.
As per fourth alleged violation of delivering the levied properties to the judgment
creditor without conducting an auction sale:
Respondents defense: Respondent sheriff argues that he never delivered said
personal properties to the judgment creditor but merely kept the same in a secured
place owned by the latter. He brought them there because the Sheriffs Office and
 the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City had no warehouse or place to keep
levied personal properties.

[Court]: A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody.
The levied property must be in the substantial presence and possession of the
levying officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant. They should
not have been delivered to any of the parties or their representative. The courts
lack of storage facility to house the attached properties is no
justification.Respondent sheriff could have deposited the same in a bonded
warehouse or could have sought prior authorization from the court that issued the
writ of execution.
ITC: Respondent sheriff brought the personal properties he levied directly to the
vacant lot of Triangle Ace Corporation, in violation of the rule requiring him to
safely keep them in his capacity, after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.
Furthermore, Erickson Caja said he once saw the levied dumptruck being used in
hauling desilted materials from the Kalaklan River in Olongapo City.
From these, it is apparent that respondent sheriff was again imprudent in his duty
in safekeeping the properties he levied. In delivering the levied personal properties
to the judgment creditor, he allowed others to use them before they can be sold in
a public auction.

As per last alleged violation of conducting auction sale almost four years after
levy:
Respondent sheriff cannot be held liable for any delay of the scheduling of the
execution sale for he merely waited for the judge to rule on matters relative to the
properties he had levied.

[on his penalty]

Considering that the respondent had spent the best years of his life in the
Government Service he has been in the service for more than thirty-five (35)
years, and is about to retire and considering further that the offense he
committed appears to be his first, the Court is inclined to grant him certain
leniency without, nonetheless, being unmindful of the fact that he had breached the
provisions of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atilano G. Nanquil, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 72, Olongapo City, is found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct in the
discharge of his duties and is hereby FINED the amount of Seventy-Nine
Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Four (P79,644.00) Pesos, same to be deducted from
his retirement benefits.

13. Zamora v. ATTY. STANLEY G. ZAMORA, Complainant v. RAMON P. VILLANUEVA, Sheriff W/N respondent observed Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to
Villanueva IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, Respondent. the expenses of the execution sale

For resolution is a letter-complaint filed by Atty. Stanley Zamora, charging respondent It is undisputed that respondent demanded and received P10k from complainant.
Ramon Villanueva, Deputy Sheriff, RTC- QC, with Gross Misconduct. He, however, reasoned that the amount was to defray the expenses he incurred in
implementing the writ of execution and annotating the notice of levy on
Antecedents: defendants property in Nasugbu, Batangas. Nevertheless, his justifications for

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Atty. Zamora is the counsel for plaintiff in Civil Case entitled Sps. Mario and Carmelita
Cruel v. Sps. Ernesto Pe Lim and Lulu Yu Pe Lim whereby the RTC granted plaintiffs motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently, he informed respondent sheriff that the
defendant has real property in Nasugbu, Batangas and requested him to prepare the required
Notice of Levy. Respondent in turn demanded from complainant P10k allegedly to defray the
expenses for the execution proceedings. Complainant initially paid P5k; the balance to be
paid upon the transfer of the property in the name of his client.
After the notice had been annotated on the title, respondent refused to proceed with the
execution sale unless and until he was paid the balance of P5k.
Complainant then gave him P5k after respondent assured him that he would proceed with the
execution sale. However, before the date of execution sale, respondent demanded an
additional 5% of the bid price before proceeding with the sale. Complainant, however,
refused to heed his demand. Hence, respondent refused to proceed with the sale on the
scheduled date; and further refused to accept the bid of complainants client.
Despite warning that his continued refusal to proceed with the sale would render him
administratively and criminally liable, respondent still did not perform his duty. Hence, this
complaint.
In his Comment, respondent admitted receiving P10k but contended that it was used in
serving the writ of execution. He asserted that he, along with another court personnel and two
police officers, tried to attach the personal properties of defendant, however, the Deputy
Sheriff of another QC RTC branch was already implementing another writ of execution
against the same defendant. In his attempt to attach defendants properties, he incurred
transportation, representation and other expenses, and further expenses in registering the
notice of levy.
As regards the questioned auction sale, respondent contended that he was ready to proceed
with the public auction, with complainants client as the only bidder. He then requested
complainant to pay the corresponding Office Commission to the Clerk of Court pursuant to
the Rules of Court. However, complainant refused to pay, claiming that the title should first
be consolidated.
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4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
demanding and receiving the amount from complainant are futile attempts to
exculpate himself from liability under the law.
Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to secure the courts prior
approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the writ.
Specifically, the Rules provide:
SEC. 9. Sheriffs and other persons serving processes. x x x (l) For money
collected by him by order, execution, attachment, or any other process, judicial or
extrajudicial, the following sums, to wit; 1. On the first four thousand (P4,000.00)
pesos, four (4%) per centum. 2. On all sums in excess of four thousand
(P4,000.00) pesos, two (2%) per centum.
In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the party requesting the process of any
court, preliminary, incidental, or final, shall pay the sheriffs expenses in serving or
executing the process, or safeguarding the property levied upon, attached or
seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards fees,
warehousing and similar charges, in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to
the approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested
party shall deposit such amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff, who
shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process, subject
to liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the process. Any
unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report
shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriffs
expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment debtor. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the following:
(1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which
he must seek the court's approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an
official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment debtor.
The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses
to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party
has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and exofficio Sheriff. The
expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation
within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent
amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.
ITC: There was no evidence that respondent submitted to the court, for its
approval, the estimated expenses for the execution of the writ before he demanded
P10k. Neither was it shown that he rendered an accounting and liquidated the said
amount to the court. Any act deviating from these procedures laid down by the
Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
As regards respondents refusal to proceed with the execution sale, allegedly due
to the parties refusal to pay the sales commission, nowhere in the Rules can it be
inferred that payment of any such commission is a prerequisite to an
execution sale. Respondents refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless
and illegal.

14. Landrito v. SPS. MAXIMO LANDRITO, JR. AND PACITA EDGALANI, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
CA HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; SPS. BENJAMIN SAN DIEGO AND
CARMENCITA SAN DIEGO; THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF AND CLERK OF COURT OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENTS.
[All about redemption period.] Spouses Landrito obtained a loan from Carmencita San Diego.
To secure the payment, petitioners executed a deed of REM. Petitioners defaulted in paying
their loan and refused to pay despite repeated demands. So Carmencita filed with the Clerk
and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC-Makati a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure. After
complying with all the procedural requirements, the public sale was conducted, wherein
Carmencita came out as the highest bidder.
She caused the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale on 29 October 1993. Because
petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period from date of
inscription of sheriffs certificate of sale, Carmencita caused the consolidation of title over the
property in her name.
On 9 November 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale with damages. Petitioners alleged that
(1) said foreclosure and auction sale were null and void for failure to comply with the
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
[IMPORTANT!] W/N respondent prematurely adjourned the execution sale
contrary to Sec. 22, Rule 39, Rules of Court.
SC: Sec. 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly shows that a sheriff has no
blanket authority to adjourn the sale. It is only upon written consent of the
judgment obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, that
the sheriff may adjourn the sale to a date and time agreed upon. The sheriff
may adjourn it from day to day when there is no such agreement but only if it
becomes necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day
fixed in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned. Consequently,
respondents act of unilaterally adjourning the execution sale is irregular and
contrary to the Rules.
By the nature of their functions, sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety
and decorum, to be above suspicion. Sheriffs are court officers and, like everyone
else in the judiciary, are called upon to discharge their sworn duties with great care
and diligence. They cannot afford to err in serving court writs and processes and in
implementing court orders lest they undermine the integrity of their office and the
efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, Sheriff Ramon P. Villanueva is found GUILTY of grave
misconduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
governmentowned or controlled corporations and financial institutions.
Respondent is furthered ordered to return the amount of P10,000 to complainant
Atty. Stanley G. Zamora
W/N CA erred in affirming RTCs decision = NO.
Republic Act No. 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special
Powers Inserted In Or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages), as amended by
Republic Act No. 4118, provides in Section 6 thereof, thus:
"Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and
after the date of the sale; xxx" (Emphasis supplied)
The one-year redemption period should be counted not from the date of
foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the
Register of Deeds. And under Article 13 of the New Civil Code, a year is
understood to have three hundred sixty-five (365) days each.
ITC: It is not disputed that the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on 29
October 1993. Thus, excluding the first day and counting from 30 October 1993
(under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the New Civil Code), and bearing in mind that
1994 was a leap year, petitioners had only until 29 October 1994, the 365th day
after registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale on 29 October 1993, within
 requirements of notice and publication, as mandated by Act 3135, as amended;
(2) the mortgaged property was illegally foreclosed in the light of the settled rule that an
action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage
document, in this case, P1,000,000.00, which amount was allegedly bloated by respondent
Carmencita San Diego to P1,950,000.00; and
(3) the San Diegos' application for consolidation of title was premature because the husband,
Benjamin San Diego, allegedly granted them an extension of the period of redemption up to
11 November 1994.
Respondents filed MTD alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Petitioners had no right since they failed to exercise their right of redemption within the
redemption period.
RTC granted the MTD. The RTC found that petitioners action was already barred by
laches. Petitioners went on appeal to CA, which affirmed the RTCs decision in toto.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
15. Marmosy MARMOSY TRADING, INC. AND VICTOR MORALES, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT
Tradiing v. CA OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR
ARBITER ELIAS H. SALINAS AND JOSELITO HUBILLA, RESPONDENTS.
Marmosy Trading, Inc. is a domestic corporation. It acts as a distributor of various chemicals
from foreign suppliers. Victor Morales is the President and General Manager of Marmosy
Trading, Inc. Joselito Hubilla was hired as a Technical Salesman by Marmosy. Marmosy
Trading, Inc. terminated Huhillas services. Owing to his termination, Huhilla filed a case for
illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and diminution of benefits against Marmosy Trading, Inc
before the LA.
LA rendered a Decision against Marmosy Trading Inc and declared the termination of the
services of Huhilla to be illegal and without just and valid cause. Marmosy Trading Inc are
hereby ordered to reinstate Huhilla to his former position, or in case the same is no longer
available, to other equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and
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which to redeem the foreclosed property in accordance with law. And since 29
October 1994 fell on a Saturday, petitioners had until the following working day,
31 October 1994, within which to exercise their right of redemption. From the
foregoing, it is clear that even the complaint filed by the petitioners with the trial
court on 09 November 1994 was instituted beyond the 1-year redemption period.
On petitioners argument that they were granted an extension to redeem the
property: in Lazo v. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. this Court has made it
clear that it is only where, by voluntary agreement of the parties, consisting of
extensions of the redemption period, followed by commitment by the debtor to
pay the redemption price at a fixed date, will the concept of legal redemption
be converted into one of conventional redemption.
ITC: There is no showing whatsoever that petitioners agreed to pay the
redemption price on or before 11 November 1994, as allegedly set by Mrs. San
Diego's husband. On the contrary, their act of filing their complaint on 09
November 1994 to declare the nullity of the foreclosure sale is indicative of their
refusal to pay the redemption price on the alleged deadline set by the husband.
Other doctrines on redemption period: It must be remembered that the period of
redemption is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent provided by
law to restrict the right of the person exercising redemption. Correspondingly, if a
person exercising the right of redemption has offered to redeem the property
within the period fixed, he is considered to have complied with the condition
precedent prescribed by law and may thereafter bring an action to enforce
redemption. If, on the other hand, the period is allowed to lapse before the right of
redemption is exercised, then the action to enforce redemption will not prosper,
even if the action is brought within the ordinary prescriptive period. Moreover, the
period within which to redeem the property sold at a sheriff's sale is not
suspended by the institution of an action to annul the foreclosure sale.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
ISSUE: whether or not the decision dated 14 July 2005 [CA denying the 65 filed
by Marmosy] and the resolution dated 16 November 2005 [denial of Marmosys
MR] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 85989, which allowed the notice
of levy to be annotated on the title of the real property registered under a TCT in
the name of petitioner Victor Morales, are in accordance with law and existing
jurisprudence YES!
When a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable
and unalternable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted
to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. The only
recognized exception are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-
called nune pro tunc entries which cause no injury to any party, and, of course,
where the judgment is void. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole
privileges + full backwages and other benefits he should have received had his services not
been terminated.
Marmosy Trading Inc filed an Appeal with the NLRC but NLRC denied it for lack of merit.
This NLRC Resolution became final and executory on June 26, 2000. Huhilla then filed a
Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Marmosy Trading Inc, for their part, further filed a petition to the CA but CA issued a
Resolution dismissing outright Marmosys petition on the ground of procedural infirmities,
such as failure to file MR of the NLRC resolution and failure to append to the petition
relevant and pertinent pleadings. This CA Resolution likewise became final and executory
and an Entry of Judgment was issued by the appellate court on 25 November 2000.
Marmosy elevated the decision to the CA and to the SC via a petition for review but SA
denied the petition for the Marmosys late filing and failure to show reversible error on the
part of CA. Entry of Judgment was issued on April 13, 2001.
Huhilla resorted to a Motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. LA issued a writ of
execution addressed to the NLRC Sheriff. Marmosy filed an MR with Motion to Recall the
Writ of Execution. They assailed the computation made by the LA and averred that the
company had stopped its operations as of June, 1997; that there is no position to which
Huhilla can be reinstated or appointed; and that Huhilla had already been paid his separation
pay. In actuality, Huhilla still owes them the amount of P22,383 when they ceased operations
at the end of 1997 and Huhilla had already received his separation pay.
Marmosy's MR was denied by the LA in its Order but the monetary award in favor of Huhilla
was corrected to read as P274,823.70, and the Sheriff was directed to proceed with the
execution.
Undeterred, Marmosy Trading Inc again filed before the NLRC a "Memorandum of Appeal
with Prayer for Injunction" assailing the Order of the Labor Arbiter denying Marmosys MR.
Huhilla countered by filing an opposition on the ground of failure to file a supersedeas bond
on Marmosys part and that no new issues were raised therein. NLRC dismissed this petition
for failure to file a supersedeas bond and affirmed LAs order in toto.
Marmosy Trading Inc filed an MR but was denied for lack of merit. The NLRC likewise
emphasized that no further MR shall be entertained.
Acting on Huhillas ex-parte motion for the re-computation of his monetary award and for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution dated 19 November 2002. LA issued an alias Writ of
Execution addressed to the NLRC Sheriff, directing to Sheriff to proceed to the premises of
Marmosy to collect from the latter the sum of P251,927 K.
Pursuant to the writ of execution issued by LA, the Sheriff garnished Marmosys account
with Equitable-PCI Bank in the amount of P22,896.58, which was later released to the NLRC
cashier and, thereafter, turned over to Huhilla as partial satisfaction of the judgment in his
favor. Marmosy Trading Inc objected to the garnishment by filing an MR and to recall the
order of release and alias writ of execution alleging that the account with Equitable-PCI Bank
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action or suit such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as
still pending so that all proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit.
Judgments of courts should attain finality at some point lest there be no end in
litigation. The reason for this is that a litigation must end and terminate sometime
and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived
of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to
bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies.
ITC: Petitioners already exhausted all the remedies available to them since the
time the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision in the illegal dismissal case. In fact,
said decision of the Labor Arbiter was elevated all the way up to the SC by the
petitioners via petition for review, which was denied by SC. Execution in favor of
the Huhilla ought to have taken place as a matter of right. From the finality of
Resolution of SC in the petition for review of Marmosy, this case was remanded to
the LA for execution. Regrettably, due to the series of pleadings, motions and
appeals to the NLRC, including petitions to the Court of Appeals, filed by the
petitioners, they have so far successfully delayed the execution of the final and
executory decision in this case. Until the present, the decision in 1999 has not yet
been executed.
LAs decision in the illegal dismissal case has long become final and executor and
it can no longer be reversed or modified. Furthermore, petitioners did not succeed
in overturning the decisions of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals and even SC
denied its petition for review.
Everything considered, what should be enforced thru an order or writ of execution
in this case is the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision as affirmed by
the NLRC, the Court of Appeals and this Court. Since the writ of execution issued
by the Labor Arbiter does not vary but is in fact completely consistent with the
final decision in this case, the order of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter is
beyond challenge.
It is no longer legally feasible to modify the final ruling in this case through the
expediency of a petition questioning the order of execution. This late in the day,
petitioner Victor Morales is barred, by the fact of a final judgment, from
advancing the argument that his real property cannot be made liable for the
monetary award in favor of respondent. For a reason greater than protection from
personal liability, petitioner Victor Morales, as president of his corporation, cannot
rely on our previous ruling that "to hold a director personally liable for debts of a
corporation and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, the bad faith or
wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and convincingly. The final
judgment in this case may no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly
or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 85989 dated 14
 belongs to both petitioner Marmosy Trading, Inc. and petitioner Victor Morales; that only July 2005, and the Resolution of the same court dated 16 November 2005 are
petitioner Marmosy Trading, Inc. was the employer of respondent whereas petitioner Victor AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Morales, who was president of the Marmosy Trading, Inc. when the complaint was filed, is
only a nominal party. But again, this MR was denied by LA.

Marmosy again appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolution
mentioned that,
As borne by the records, individual respondent Victor H. Morales is the
President and General Manager of [respondent] Marmosy Trading Inc. As
correctly ruled being the President at the same time General Manager of the
Corporation, [Respondent] Morales is therefore to be held responsible for the
corporation's obligations to the workers including complainant especially when
as alleged the company had already closed its business operations. The
termination of the existence of a corporation requires the assumption of the
company's liabilities and there is no responsible officer but the President who
must assume full responsibility of the consequences of the closure.

MR was again filed but was denied in a Resolution, which Resolution became final and
executory on Oct 8, 2004.

Marmosy Trading Inc again elevated the case to the CA via petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 but this petition was denied in a Decision. Marmosy filed an MR but was also denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the SC raising the lone issue
of whether or not the decision dated 14 July 2005 [CA denying the 65 filed by Marmosy] and
the resolution dated 16 November 2005 [denial of Marmosys MR] of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 85989, which allowed the notice of levy to be annotated on the title of the
real property registered under a TCT in the name of petitioner Victor Morales, are in
accordance with law and existing jurisprudence.

16. Benitez v. GLORIA O. BENITEZ, complainant, vs. MEDEL P. ACOSTA, Sheriff IV, respondent.
Acosta
This is an administrative complaint against Medel P. Acosta, Sheriff IV, assigned to Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interests of the service.
Complainant Gloria Osila Benitez filed this case in representation of her mother, Amparo
Osila, the defendant in Civil Case No. GMA-97-02, entitled "Leon Basas vs. Amparo Osila",
filed with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona and General Mariano Alvarez. It
would appear that judgment was rendered against Amparo Osila for a sum of money.
Complainant alleges that in implementing the writ of execution and conducting the execution
sale to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. GMA-97-02, respondent committed the
following: (a) ignored the bid of Gloria Osila Benitez and Edna Samson; (b) sold the jeepney
to the highest bidder, Mario Timbol, who was absent and only sent his bid through Joe
Castillo, who was also absent during the bidding; (c) sold the jeepney for an unconscionably
low price of P15,000.00; (d) used Mario Timbol and Joe Castillo merely as fronts because
respondent was interested in the jeepney; (e) failed to deliver the jeepney even as of April 2,
1998; (f) did not make a return of the writ of execution until March 30, 1998; and (g) did not
comply with the notice requirements in Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
W/N Acosta is administratively liable YES.
Respondent is guilty of misfeasance and nonfeasance for his failure (a) to make a
return on the writ; (b) to make the periodical reports required by the Rules of
Court; (c) to comply with Rule 39, 9 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding the disposition of proceeds of auction sales; (d) to conduct a public
auction sale as contemplated by law which resulted in the simulation of the auction
sale; and (e) for turning over the proceeds of the sale to parties not authorized by
law to receive them.
SC agrees with the findings of the OCA for the following reasons:
1. The writ of execution directed the respondent:
to likewise return this writ into (sic) the Court at any time, not less than ten days
nor more than sixty days after its receipt with your proceedings endorsed
thereon.
As per the pertinent portion of the order issuing the writ of execution, respondent
should have made a return on the writ within 60 days from his receipt of the order,
or by February 9, 1998. To date, respondent has not submitted or made a return on

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Procedure as there were no notices of posting attached to the certificate of sale.
Respondent filed a counter-affidavit in which he alleged that: (a) during the auction sale there
was only one bidder, Mario Timbol, who was represented by one Joe Castillo; (b) Timbol
submitted a written bid for P15,000.00; (c) there was symbolic delivery of the jeepney to
Mario Timbol's representative; (d) he did not say that the jeepney would go for P100,000.00;
(e) though complainant submitted a bid, she was not able to come up with the money to
outbid Mario Timbol; (f) Mario Timbol was not his (respondent's) dummy; (g) Atty. Delfin
Gruspe, counsel for complainant, was present throughout the proceedings as per his affidavit;
(h) Atty. Gruspe would have protested if he (respondent) had sold the jeepney for a low price;
and (i) Joe Castillo was present at the public auction sale as shown by his signature on the
Minutes of the Public Auction Sale.
Amparo Osila also filed a Motion to Declare Null and Void the Public Auction Sale.
MCTC: issued an order declaring null and void the public auction sale and found Acosta
administratively liable.
The Office of the Court Administrator to which this matter had been referred for
investigation and recommendation found Acosta guilty of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the Service and be DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his reinstatement or re-
employment.
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the writ and has violated a mandate of the court. It is well settled that the sheriff's
duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. As such, any
failure to comply with such constitutes nonfeasance in the performance of his
duties.
2. [See Rule 39, sec 14] Under this provision, respondent is required (1) to make
a return and submit it to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full
of the judgment; and (2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to make a
report to the court within 30 days after his receipt of the writ and state why full
satisfaction could not be made. The Sheriff shall continue making a report every
30 days on proceedings being taken thereon until the judgment is full satisfied.
The over-all purpose of the requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of
decisions.
ITC: the records show that respondent received the writ of execution on
December 11, 1997. Following Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, respondent was supposed to make a return to the court 30 days after
December 11, 1997, or by January 10, 1998, and every 30 days thereafter until the
judgment has been satisfied. However, as of July 17, 2000, he failed to make any
report to the court as it was his ministerial duty to do so. He was thus guilty of
nonfeasance.
3. [See Rule 39, Sec. 9 (a)]
The records show that when Mario Timbol paid the bid price to respondent, the
latter did not turn over the amount to Atty. Delfin Gruspe, as counsel of Leon
Basas, Sr., or the Clerk of Court, but rather to Cesar Gruspe, the brother of
plaintiff's counsel. The Minutes of the Public Auction Sale reveal that during the
said sale, the judgment obligee, Leon Basas, Sr., was absent and so was Cesar
Gruspe. As such, under Rule 39, 9, respondent was under the obligation to turn
over the P15,000.00 to Atty. Delfin Gruspe, the authorized representative of Leon
Basas Sr. Instead, as evidenced by the Minutes of the Public Auction, respondent
paid the amount to Cesar Gruspe, who was not even present at the bidding, nor
authorized by Leon Basas, Sr. to receive the amount from respondent.
4. As complainant points out, there are discrepancies in the Minutes of Public
Auction Sale prepared by respondent. These discrepancies are the following:
The first discrepancy concerns the absence of any mention of complainant's
bid. No entries were made on the blank spaces opposite the words "other
bidders" despite the fact that complainant did submit a bid.
Next is the manner in which the words "Fifteen Thousand" is written in
complainant's copy and in respondent's copy of the Minutes of the Public
Auction Sale attached to the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated July
23, 1998. In the copy submitted by respondent, there are no erasures in the
particular entry, whereas in complainant's copy, there is an erasure that
separates the words from each other. This discrepancy suggests that
respondent executed two different documents and submitted one to the
court and one to complainant. This disparity places in doubt the veracity of
each copy, as well as respondent's motives in making two different copies

17. St. Aviation ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., PETITIONER, VS. GRAND
Services v. GIA INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., RESPONDENT.
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., petitioner, is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It
is engaged in the manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand
International Airways, Inc., respondent, is a domestic corporation engaged in airline
operations.
Petitioner and respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification
of Airbus" (First Agreement). Under this stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake
maintenance and modification works on respondent's aircraft. The parties agreed on the mode
and manner of payment by respondent of the contract price, including interest in case of
default. They also agreed that the "construction, validity and performance thereof" shall be
governed by the laws of Singapore. They further agreed to submit any suit arising from their
agreement to the non- exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
The parties verbally agreed that petitioner will repair and undertake maintenance works on
respondent's other aircraft; and that the works shall be based on a General Terms of
Agreement (GTA). The GTA terms are similar to those of their First Agreement.
Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter promptly delivered the aircrafts to
respondent. Petitioner billed respondent in the total amount of US$303,731.67 or
S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent failed to pay.
Petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an action for the sum of
S$452,560.18, including interest and costs, against respondent.
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concerning the same matter, the one he submitted to the court, and the other
he furnished complainant.
The manner in which Mario Timbol signed the copies of the Minutes of
Public Auction is another anomaly. Respondent claims that Mario Timbol
authorized Joe Castillo to bid on his behalf. This allegation is confirmed by
Mario Timbol's affidavit. Yet, both copies of the Minutes of the Public
Auction are signed by Mario Timbol as agent, and not as the principal. This
discrepancy is proof that respondent misrepresented some aspect of the
facts to the court.
Because of the irregularities above pointed out, the public auction sale conducted
by respondent appear to have been simulated. Indeed, the MCTC declared the said
sale null and void. In effect, respondent failed to conduct a public auction sale.
Furthermore, SC have held that failure to make a return makes respondent guilty
of malicious nonfeasance warranting dismissal.
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the recommendation of the Office of the
Court Administrator, respondent Sheriff Medel P. Acosta is hereby DISMISSED
from service for misfeasance, nonfeasance, and dereliction of duty, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
(1) whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent by the service of summons upon its office in the
Philippines YES
(2) whether the judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by the Singapore High
Court is enforceable in the Philippines. YES
Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
however, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. Certainly,
the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and
procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as
well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines.
The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our
legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the

Upon petitioner's motion, the court issued a Writ of Summons to be served extraterritorially
or outside Singapore upon respondent. The court sought the assistance of the sheriff of Pasay
City to effect service of the summons upon respondent. However, despite receipt of
summons, respondent failed to answer the claim.
On motion of petitioner, the Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default
against respondent.
Petitioner filed with the RTC, Pasay City, a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds: (1) the Singapore High
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its right to due process.
RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss, holding that "neither one of the two grounds (of
Grand) is among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure."
Respondents contention (before the CA): The extraterritorial service of summons on its
office in the Philippines is defective and that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction
over its person. Thus, its judgment sought to be enforced is void.
CA (R65): granted the petition. Set aside the order of the RTC. (without prejudice)
The complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor any property in which the
defendant has a claim or interest, or which the private respondent has attached but purely an
action for collection of debt. It is a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an
action in rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, the service of summons should be
personal or substituted, not extraterritorial, in order to confer jurisdiction on the court.
To SC (R45)
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judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among
others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the
party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum, which in this case is the law of Singapore.
ITC: petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
outside Singapore. In an Order, the Singapore High Court granted "leave to serve a
copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service
authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any originating process
issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner
Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines." This service
of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules
of Court 1996[6] of Singapore, which provides. . .
Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is to
be served on a defendant in any country with respect to which
there does not subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for
service in that country of process of the High Court, the originating
process may be served
xxx
xxx
c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country
for service of any originating process issued by that country.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by
the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer either personally by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. In this case, the Writ of
Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon respondent at its
office located at Mercure Hotel (formerly Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay City.
The Sheriff's Return shows that it was received on May 2, 1998 by the Secretary of
the General Manager of respondent company. But respondent completely ignored
the summons, hence, it was declared in default.
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance
with our Rules, jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its
person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court against respondent
is valid.

18. Makati v. CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI, AS REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JEJOMAR
Odena C. BINAY, PETITIONER, VS. EMERITA B. ODEA, RESPONDENT.
This case involves respondent Emerita B. Odea (respondent) who was a teacher previously
employed by petitioner. She was illegally dismissed and is now seeking full payment of her
backwages and other benefits.
Some of the incidents of this case have been previously resolved by the SC in Elenita S.
Binay, in her capacity as Mayor of the City of Makati, Mario Rodriguez and Priscilla
Ferrolino v. Emerita Odea, in a Decision dated 08 June 2007 (the 2007 Decision). The SC
ruled therein that respondent had been illegally dismissed and was thus ordered to be
reinstated and paid her backwages, computed from date of dismissal up to date of
reinstatement, but in no case to exceed five (5) years.
2007 Decision
Respondent had been employed by petitioner as a teacher since 1980. In 2000, Mayor Binay
issued a Memorandum dropping respondent from the roll of employees in view of the latters
absences without official leave (AWOL) starting on 10 November 1999. Respondents MR
was denied. Aggrieved, she appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC ruled that the dropping of respondent from the roll of employees was not supported
by evidence. Thus, by virtue of respondents illegal dismissal, CSC directed petitioner to: (1)
reinstate her; and (2) to pay her back salaries from the time of her separation up to her actual
reinstatement. CSC denied petitioners MR.
Petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition appealing the findings of the CSC to the CA. The CA
denied the Petition and affirmed that respondent was illegally dismissed and also affirmed the
CSC Resolutions which ordered the reinstatement of respondent and payment of back
salaries, but subject to the modification that an illegally terminated civil service employee,
like respondent, is entitled to back salaries limited to a maximum period of five (5) years,
and not to full salaries from her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition with the SC arguing that the CA committed serious error
in ruling that the respondent had been illegally dismissed. In its 2007 Decision, SC dismissed
the Petition and affirmed the ruling of the CA in its entirety; more specifically, that
respondent had indeed been illegally dismissed and was thus entitled to payment of
backwages to be computed from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, but
not exceeding five (5) years.
The 2007 Decision became final. After promulgation of the 2007 Decision, CSC, upon
motion of respondent, directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate
respondent to her former position and cause the payment of all her salaries and other benefits
from the date of her removal from service up to her reinstatement. However, the directive to
reinstate respondent was never complied with. Respondent instead opted to avail herself of
early retirement effective 13 February 2008. Petitioner thereafter paid her the amount of
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WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51134 are SET ASIDE.
Whether petitioner undertook an improper remedy when it filed a Rule 43
Petition with the CA to question the Resolutions issued by the CSC-
SC: Petitioner undertook the correct remedy in assailing the CSC Resolutions by
filing a Rule 43 Petition with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner insists that its filing of a Rule 43 Petition to assail the CSC Resolutions
was proper, as these supposedly involved a new subject matter and were thus
issued pursuant to CSCs exercise of its quasi-judicial function. They were not
merely incidental to the execution of this Courts 2007 Decision.
Filing a Rule 43 Petition with the CA is the proper remedy to assail the CSC
Resolutions, but not for the reasons advanced by petitioner.
First, CAs jurisdiction over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to
judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. Second, although the
general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA failed to
consider that there are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case.
A writ of execution is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the
mandate of the writ, which is normally the enforcement of a judgment. By
analogy, the CSC Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in
connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision.
It is obvious from both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC
Resolutions that they carried instructions to enforce this Courts 2007 Decision,
albeit erroneously made.
The CA was correct in treating the CSC Resolutions as orders of execution that
were issued in connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision.
The CA, however erred in dismissing petitioners Rule 43 Petition for being
improper.
To recall, the CA ruled that an order of execution is not appealable under Section
1(f), Rule 41of the Rules of Court. It reasoned that the correct remedy should have
been a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Indeed, the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable;
otherwise, a case would never end. The CA, however, failed to consider that there
are exceptions to this rule. This Court in Banaga v. Majaducon, citing Limpin v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, enumerated the exceptional circumstances where a
party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for appeal, to wit:
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the
P558,944.19, representing her supposed back salaries and other benefits. In acknowledging
receipt, she signed in favor of petitioner a Release, Quitclaim, and Waiver.
Later on, respondent alleges that after realizing that she had been shortchanged by petitioner,
she complained to the CSC, asserting that the amount paid her did not correspond to
the entire amount she was legally entitled to. She claimed in her Letter-Complaint that the
payment made to her, the amount of which corresponded to 5 years of service, was
insufficient to cover her almost 8 years of suffering.
CSC took cognizance of respondents Letter-Complaint and directed petitioner to file her
comment. Petitioner denied respondents allegations for being false and baseless. She argued
that the 2007 Decision has become final and executory, and that, under the same, payment of
respondents back salaries shall be limited to five years only; and that respondent voluntarily
executed the Quitclaim.
CSC: Ruled in favor of respondent, and directed petitioner to pay her backwages and other
benefits from the period of her illegal dismissal until her early retirement, or for a period of
seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty- eight (28) days. The CSC Resolution stated that
the 5-year limit was inequitable, to wit:
Although it would appear that the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case affirmed the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, it is worth noting, however, that there is nothing in the High
Courts decision, either in the body or the dispositive portion, that categorically states that
Odena is entitled to back salaries and other benefits only for a period not exceeding five (5)
years. As such, it is apposite to conclude that Odena is entitled to the payment of her entire
back salaries and other benefits from the date of her illegal dismissal up to the date of her
retirement, as will be explained later. xxx
To limit the entitlement of Odena to only five (5) years of back salaries and other
benefits will indubitably cause serious injustice to her inasmuch as the prevailing
jurisprudence at the time of promulgation of the Binay case, supra, is that an illegally
dismissed employee who is ordered reinstated by competent authority is entitled to the
payment of his/her illegal dismissal up to his/her reinstatement. Thus, even if the Supreme
Court indeed intended to limit to only five (5) years the back salaries and other benefits
of Odea, and that said decision had already become final and executory, the same had
to yield to the higher interest of justice.
Petitioner filed MR which the CSC denied. CSC emphasized that, [T]he apparent affirmation
by the Supreme Court of the Decision dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals must not
be employed as an instrument to thwart and ultimately defeat the lawful claim of Odea for
the payment in full of her back salaries and other benefits after her illegal dismissal from the
service. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata being invoked by the City Government of Makati
must give way to the higher interest of justice.
Petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA and argued that: (1) the CSC Resolutions
were violative of the doctrine of res judicata; and (2) the CSC erred in including respondents
retirement as a ground for her entitlement to full back salaries and other benefits, more than
what was granted by this Court in its 2007 Decision.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These
instances, rare though they may be, do call for correction by a superior court,
as where
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust;
xx xx
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment
debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without
authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that
there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a
higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or
certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus.
To rule that a special civil action for certiorari constitutes the sole and exclusive
remedy to assail a writ or order of execution would unduly restrict the remedy
available to a party prejudiced by an improper or illegal execution.
ITC: The appeal of the CSC Resolutions under Rule 43 is proper on two points:
(1) they varied the 2007 Decision and (2) the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied.
First, the CSC Resolutions have varied the 2007 Decision, considering that
instead of directing the payment of backwages for a period not exceeding five (5)
years, the CSC ordered petitioner to pay an amount equivalent to almost eight (8)
years.
Second, the judgment debt arising from the 2007 Decision has been satisfied as
respondent has already received payment from petitioner the amount of
P558,944.19, representing her back salaries not exceeding five (5) years, as
computed by petitioner.
All these circumstances require a factual review of the manner of the execution of
the 2007 Decision, which should have prompted the CA to take cognizance of the
appeal. Clearly, these circumstances fall under the above-quoted enumeration of
the exceptions to the general rule that an order of execution is not subject to
appeal. Thus, the CA committed grave error when it denied petitioners
appeal for being the wrong remedy.
W/N respondent is entitled to the amount awarded to her by the CSC-
SC: We reverse CSCs ruling granting respondent additional amounts pertaining
to her back wages for the entire period that she was not reinstated.
To recall, the 2007 Decision, in relation to the CA Decision dated 14 May 2004,
directed petitioner to do two things: (1) to reinstate respondent to her former
position; and (2) to pay her back wages to be computed from the time of her illegal

CA: Dismissed the Rule 43 Petition. It regarded the CSC Resolutions, issued in relation to
respondents Letter-Complaint, as orders of execution of the final and executory 2007
Decision of this Court. Thus, petitioners recourse to a Rule 43 Petition was unavailing,
because orders of execution cannot be the subject of appeal, the proper remedy being a
Rule 65 petition. CA cited Section 1(f), Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
x xx
(f) an order of execution;
x xx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied)
According to CA, the assailed Resolutions of the CSC arose merely as an incident of the
execution when the CSC modified the judgment award on account of private
respondents complaint wherein she sought to be paid more than what has been
awarded to her by the Supreme Court. Such being the case, petitioners recourse to a
Petition for Review is unavailing. The filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 was the proper remedy questioning an order of execution on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. CA denied petitioners MR.
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
dismissal until her reinstatement to her former position, but not to exceed five (5)
years.
The reinstatement portion was rendered moot by respondents early retirement
effective on 13 February 2008.
To comply with the second directive, the amount representing her back wages for
a period not exceeding five (5) years, as computed by petitioner, was paid to
respondent.
The CSC grievously erred in taking cognizance of respondents Letter-
Complaint which was actually a prohibited appeal of the 2007 Decision that
by then had long become final and executory.
It is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked
by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest
court of the land.
Based on the Letter-Complaint, the respondent was assailing the award of
backwages for a period not exceeding five (5) years as decreed by this Court in the
2007 Decision. In the said Letter- Complaint, respondent expresses her dismay at
the seemingly insufficient award of back wages, which were limited to five (5)
years vis--vis the period of almost eight (8) years that she was out of work.
The CSC should have realized that it did not have any authority to entertain any
attempt to seek the reversal of the 2007 Decision. Indeed, while being well-aware
that the 2007 Decision had long become final and executory, and that any such
appeal by respondent would be futile and useless, it still erringly took cognizance
of the appeal and worse, modified the 2007 Decision, instead of dismissing the
Letter-Complaint outright.
As the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it, our
decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case, from
which there is no appeal.
ITC: The 2007 Decision bars a further repeated consideration of the very same
issues that have already been settled with finality; more particularly, the illegal
dismissal of respondent, as well as the amount of back wages that she was entitled
to receive by reason thereof.
To once again reopen that issue through a different avenue would defeat the
existence of our courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Having attained
finality, the decision is beyond review or modification even by this Court.
Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory
and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the latters case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment, which is the life of the law. Thus, the CSC gravely erred in taking
 cognizance of respondents appeal of this Courts 2007 Decision in the guise of a
Letter-Complaint. Any proceedings and resolutions arising therefrom should be
rendered nugatory.

We likewise rule that the CSC Resolutions are void and ineffectual for varying
the tenor of our 2007 Decision. These Resolutions directed petitioner to pay
respondents back salaries for the entire period that she had not been reinstated;
more specifically, from the time of her illegal dismissal on 15 May 2000 until her
early retirement on 13 February 2008, contrary to our 2007 Decision limiting the
said award only to five (5) years.

It is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it

thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by this
Court. The only recognized exception is the correction of clerical errors; or
the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party or when the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration that
substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.

ITC: When the CSC directed petitioner to pay respondent her backwages for a
period of almost eight (8) years, it erroneously modified the 2007 Decision of this
Court. The CSCs directive cannot be considered as mere correction of a clerical
error either, since it substantially altered the amount of benefits respondent was
entitled to as decreed by this Court.

The discussion in the 2007 Decision did not mention any qualification pertaining
to the five-year limit set by the CA on the amount of back wages to be received by
respondent. Rather, our 2007 Decision unequivocally affirmed the CA Decision
dated 14 May 2004 without modification. Since there is no qualification stated
in either the body or the dispositive portion, the ordinary and literal meaning
of the word affirm should prevail, that is, that the CA Decision had been
affirmed in its entirety; including the five-year limit imposed by the appellate
court.

We have often ruled that when the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear
and unequivocal, it must be executed strictly according to its tenor. A
definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or
reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter it. The 2007 Decision had been clear and unambiguous to
both parties; otherwise, the parties would have filed a motion for its clarification,
but neither party did in this case. Thus, the CSCs act of increasing the amount of
benefits awarded to respondent was improper. It did not have any authority to
modify, let alone increase the said award which has already been adjudged with
finality.

Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue

4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
 Further, the rule is fundamental that after a judgment has been fully satisfied,
the case is deemed terminated once and for all. It cannot be modified or
altered.

ITC: The CSC gravely erred in modifying a judgment which had in fact already
been satisfied even before respondent filed her Letter-Complaint. It is undisputed
that the respondent received from the petitioner the amount of P558,944.19 as
backwages. Thus, upon satisfaction of the judgment, any subsequent
modification thereof ordered by the CSC was rendered useless and futile.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review filed by City of Makati is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 23 October 2009 and 17 March 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108983 are REVERSED. The Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim signed by respondent, however, is without force and effect,
and should not foreclose her entitlement to retirement benefits. The City of Makati
is hereby likewise directed to immediately pay the same.

Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue

4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador