Criminal Law Review- Midterm Consolidated Cases
kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an
PEOPLE v PETRUS YAU AND SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA; G.R. No.
208170; August 20, 2014
I. The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the
RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are as follows:
(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty;
(b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and
(c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release
of the victim.
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the
testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at
bench. First, Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped
Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious
while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus
took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau
in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and
hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will.
And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransom in the amount
of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
II. Criminal liability of each accused-appellant; As a Principal; As an
Accomplice
there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of the crime of
accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be
emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana
participated in the decision to commit the criminal act.
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with
Article 18 of the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an
accomplice, namely;
(1) that there be a community of design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way; and
(3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband,
Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police
authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food
to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the
victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus illegal act, but also supplied
him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and
giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person
responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. As keenly observed
by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential
and indispensable for the perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support to her
husband. Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. De
Vera, where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the
offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a
principal.
III. Penalty
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole
against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view
of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that
the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be
proper.
The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all
those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation.
Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice. (People v.
Montesclaros)
FACTS:
1. Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For
Ransom of private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who was
put into sleep while riding a taxi (White Toyota taxi cab with plate
number PVD-115) bound to San Juan, Manila. Subsequently, Chau
(Alastair girlfriend) received an email from the purported
kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00;
ISSUES
2. During twenty-two (22) days of captivity, he was allowed to
communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still
alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by
Petrus or the other accused Susan Yau;
3. The police were able to chance upon the said vehicle. they
followed it, then flagged it down and approached the driver. The
driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told that the
vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant
did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted the
officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was
Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his drivers
license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce
any. Since he could not produce any drivers license and car
registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station
for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private
complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man
is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he
was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant
Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional
rights. rescue operations of the victim proceeded thereafter;
4. When the police proceeded inside the house they found a man
sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later
identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam;
5. RTC finds them guilty beyond reasonable doubt and rejected the
twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and
Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence
6. The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana, Hence this
assignment of errors.
The focus of this case is the degree of responsibility of each
accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Case no. 2
People of the Philippines v. Gonzales
183 SSCRA 309, March 19, 1990

Doctrine: The commission of a felony under Art. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code requires that an act a punishable act or omission must be committed,
and that it must be committed with deceit and/or fault.
FACTS:
The appellant is appealing to the court regarding his participation
in the killing of a certain Loly Penacerrada. He claims that he did not
participate in the killing based on the claim that he was not present in the
said act.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 p.m. of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja,
barangay captain of Brgy. Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened by
two of the accused. Paja learns that Fausta killed their landlord,
Lloyd Penacerrada, and would like to surrender to authorities.
Knife used in killing was seen, and blood was found smeared on
Faustas dress.
-Paja immediately ordered a nephew to take spouses to the police
at the Municipal Hall in Poblacon, Ajay, where the couple
informed the police on duty of the incident.
-Several patrolmen, along with Paja and Augusto proceeded to the
residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly
occurred, and found the body of the deceased, clad in underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom.
-Group stayed for an hour in which the scene was inspected, and a
rough sketch of the area was made.
-The next day, a patrolman, accompanied by a photographer, went
back to the scene for further investigations. Fausta was brought
back to the police station.
-The autopsy of the deceased was performed at 11:20 a.m. Report
shows the following:
-Sixteen wounds: five fatal as they penetrated the
internal organs
-Multiple puncture, stab, incision, and lacerated
wounds
-The day after the autopsy, Augusto appeared before the sub-
station and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Sazon for
detention and protective custody for having been involved in the
killing of the deceased. Augusto requests to be taken to where
Fausta was already detained.
Based on the investigations conducted, an information for murder
dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against
the spouses. However, they pleaded not guilty. Before the trial, however, a
certain Jose Huntoria presented himself to the wife of the deceased.
Huntoria claims to be a witness of the killing, and on October 6, 1981,
volunteers as a witness for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case
was called, in which several more were filed as accused, including the
appellant. All the accused except for Lenida pleaded not guilty
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the
physician who conducted the autopsy on the body, Paja, the patrolmen and
constabulary members who joined in the investigation, the widow, and
Huntoria.
Dr. Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy at around 11:20
a.m. on Feb. 1981 after the deceased was taken to the municipal hall. He
found 4 puncture wounds, 7 stab wounds, 4 incisions, and1 laceration; five
of these were fatal wounds. Rojas admitted one of two possibilities:-
-Only one weapon might have caused all the wounds-
-Multiple instruments were used due to the number and
different characteristics
The substance of the prosecutions case rested on Huntorias
alleged eyewitness account of theincident, which was as follows:
-Testified on July 27, 1982; at 5 pm on Feb. 21, 1981, he
left his work at Brgy. Central, and walked home, taking a
short-cut.
 -While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses
home at around 8:00 pm, he heard cries for help.
Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the
shouts were from.
-15-20 m away from the scene, he hid himself behind a
clump of banana trees, and saw all the accused ganging
upon the deceased near a threshing platform. He said he
clearly recognized all the accused as the place was awash
in moonlight.
-After stabbing and hacking the victim, the accused lifted
his body and carried it to the house. Huntoria then left
home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to
his wife and mother before going to sleep.
-Eight months after the incident, bothered by his
conscience and the fact that his father was a tenant of the
deceased, he thought of helping the widow. Out of his
own volition, he travelled to the widows house, and
related to her what he saw
Except Fausta who admitted killing the deceased as he was trying
to rape her, the rest denied participation in the crime. The appellant claimed
that he was asleep in his house which was one kilometer away from the
scene of the crime, and he knew of the crime only when his grandchildren
went to his house that night
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed
the prosecutions version.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellant contended that the
trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of the lone
witness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi. The Court found no
merit in the errors, and rejected defense of alibi. Worsening this is that the
appellate court found the sentence erroneous, and upgraded the penalty to
that of murder reclusion temporal/death. The case is now brought upon
certification by the Court of Appeals, hence the appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the client, under the evidence presented, has committed the
felony of murder.
HELD:
NO. Courts analysis of the evidence:
-Investigation conducted left much to be desired. Centeno gave
the date of commission as March 21, 1981. The sketch made was troubling,
as it did not effectively indicate the extent of the blood stains in the scenes
of crime. This would have added a lot of weight to any one of the versions
of the incident
-Sazon, who claimed that Gonzales surrendered to him, failed to
state clearly the reason for the surrender. It may even be possible that
Augusto surrendered just so he could be safe from the victims kin. Sazon
also admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of
other persons in the killing.
-Rojas statement showed two possibilities for the killing. Faustas
admission that she was the only killer is plausible. Furthermore, there were
only five fatal wounds, which will be discussed later.
-Huntorias testimony, of which the prosecutions argument solely
rests, needs to be examined further. Huntorias claims in his testimony did
not exactly match with those from his cross-examination. He first claimed
that he recognized the people involved. However, in the cross-examination,
he only saw flashes. This implies that he may not have recognized anyone
at all.
On the criminal liability of the appellant:
-There is nothing in the findings or the evidence that establishes
the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal for direct participation
under Art. 17, para. 1 of the Revised PenalCode.
-Furthermore, there is nothing in the findings or evidence that
inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same article. Based
on the definition of felonies in Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prosecutions evidence could not establish intent nor fault. Recall that the
elements of felonies include:
-An act or omission
-Act or omission must be punishable
-Act is performed or omission incurred by deceit or fault
-The lone witness could not properly establish any acts or
omissions done by the appellant. He stated that he does not know who
hacked or stabbed the victim, thus implying that he does not know what the
appellant did. With this, the essential elements of felonies may not even be
present.
-Furthermore, the fact that there were five stab wounds and six
accused would imply tha one of them may not have caused a grave wound
(especially given the statement of the physician). This may have been the
appellant, and given that there is no evidence that the appellant caused any
of the wounds, coupled with the prosecutions failure to prove the presence
of conspiracy (that is, how many people actually took part in the killing), it
weakens the arguments against the appellant. On the lone witness:-
Huntorias credibility as a witness is tarnished by two points:
1. He came out eight months after the killing. He claims that he
feared for his life, but there was no proof that he was being
threatened, nor was the length of time reasonable given the
circumstances.
2. He is not exactly a disinterested/neutral witness. He admitted
to being a tenant of the deceased, and stated that one of the
reasons why he testified was because the victim was his
landlord.-
-Under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the source of his
livelihood from his landlord. As such, they would do everything to get the
landlords to their favor. Posing as a witness would have been a convenient
way to do this, especially as he ceased to be employed as early as May
1981.
Finally, based on Philippine customs and traditions, it is unlikely
for the appellant to be in the scene of the crime, as under our family culture,
aging parents are usually sheltered and insulated from possible harm. It is
improbable for the accused to bring their aging father when they were
clearly in better shape than he was, and it was unlikely for the appellant to
offer his services as they were more or less enough to handle what could
have been a perceived enemy.
Although alibi is a weak defense, in cases like this where the
participation of the appellant is not clear, it may be considered. In light of
the evidence on record, it may be sufficient for an acquittal.
Decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. Appellant acquitted
CASE No. 4
U.S. vs. DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 504 September 16, 1902
DOCTRINE:
There can be no conviction under the Penal Code where by reason of a
mistake of fact the intention to commit the crime does not exist. However,
the diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to
govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is to
perform. In a matter so important to the good order of society as that in
question, where the consequences of a mistake are necessarily so serious,
nothing less than the highest degree of diligence will satisfy the standard
prescribed by the law.
FACTS:
Julian Gonzales and Accused Tomasa Delos Reyes were married in 1897.
After some time, the two separated, with Gonzales living elsewhere while
Delos Reyes stayed at their home where Gonzales mother also lived. On
July 12,1900, Delos Reyes remarried to Ramon Martinez. Thus, Gonzales
filed for a case of bigamy against his wife.
As her defense, she testified that she honestly believed that her husband was
dead when she married Martinez. That sometime after they separated, the
mother of Gonzales informed her that her son was dead and she believed
this to be true.
As witness, Gonzales testified that after he left their house, he would still
visit his relatives who were left living in their house almost every day until
a few days before the trial of this case.
ISSUE:
Was acquittal of the accused for the crime of bigamy proper? YES
RULING:
Acquittal for bigamy was proper, however, accused should be convicted
under Art. 568 (Old Penal Code: reckless imprudence)
U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)
Doctrine/Topic: Art. 3; Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent
(Dolo) - Mistake of fact
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been
justified in killing the intrude. Par. 1, Art XI of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) provides that in order for the act to be justified, the requisites must
be present.
Requisites (Honest Mistake of Fact):
1) Unlawful agression on the part of the victim
2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression
3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself
If the victim was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah
Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression, there would have been
a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home and
the knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such
aggression.
The act done by Ah Chong was merely an act done due to Honest Mistake
of Fact. The Court acquits Ah Chong.
FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at Officers quarters.
On the night, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly
awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in
bed and called out twice, Who is there? He heard no answer and was
convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing
that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out: If
you enter the room, I will kill you. He was struck just above the knee by
the edge of the chair and he thought that the blow had been inflicted by the
person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar.
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out,
was his roommate. The roommate eventually died.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong may be held criminally responsible for
murder in the case at bar.
People v Estrada
Doctrines and Decision:
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable
for a felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our
penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will.
Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito
doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily,i.e., with
freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every
person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal
presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the
normal condition of a person. This presumption, however, may be
overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the
actor from criminal liability.
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of
the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he
shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the
same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when
the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall
order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be
released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his
outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of
the accused to a mental institution.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be so insane as to
be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. He must be deprived of
reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended, if
at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such
case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary,
his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he
appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition of such nature as
to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the
proceedings and order the mental examination of the accused, and if
confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement and
examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties
at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, the process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither
comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea
thereto.
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by
the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to
stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an
unsound mental condition that effectively renders [the accused] unable to
fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. It
is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to fully
understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea
was made intelligently. The plea of not guilty was not made by accused-
appellant but by the trial court because of his refusal to plead.
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a
mental examination. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is
not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon
emotional and psychological appreciation.Thus, an intelligent determination
of an accuseds capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper
and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can
make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or
psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency
be determined by the trial court. By this time, the accuseds abilities may be
measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him.
Facts:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, the accused, Roberto Estrada, being then armed with a butchers
knife, with intent to kill one Rogelio Mararac with treachery and committed
in a holy place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by
stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon,
thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest,
Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as per Autopsy Report and
Certificate of Death. At the arraignment, accused-appellants counsel, filed
an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was alleged that accused-
appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was
suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he
was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in
Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the
issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. The motion was
opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded
several questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were
understood and answered by him intelligently, the court denied the motion
that same day.
Issue:
Whether or not insanity of a person can exempt him from criminal liability
and postpone the trial for a case against him.
Whether the judge through intelligent questions can validly determine the
mental capacity of a person in determining whether to continue with the
trial and with his liability in a criminal case.
JESUSA CRUZ VS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN
IN MANDALUYONG
G.R. NO 125672 Septmeber 27, 1996
RA 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993, partly
modified the penalties prescribed by R.A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), that is, inter alia, where the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is
less than 750 grams, the penalty is reduced to a range of prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua and that where the marijuana is less than
250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision correccional.
Moreover, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable
is further reduced to any period within arresto mayor, as minimum term, to
the medium period of prision correccional as the maximum term, there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances
The petitioner should now be deemed to have served the maximum
period imposable for the crime for which she was convicted, i.e., selling 5.5
grams of dried marijuana leaves. Although her penalty of life imprisonment
had already become final, the beneficial effects of the amendment provided
under R.A. 7659 should be extended to petitioner.
FACTS:
Petitoner Jesusa Cruz, presently confined at the Correctional
Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City serving the penalty of life
imprisonment imposed upon her as a consequence of her conviction which
became final and executory last March 1, 1993 for violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A 6425, filed, through her counsel, the present petition for
habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges that, as of the date of filing of her herein
petition, she has already served five and a half years of her life
sentence. She argues that the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the
trial court is excessive considering that the marijuana allegedly taken from
her was only 5.5 grams or less than 750 grams.
ISSUE: After having served five and a half years of her life sentence, may
petitioner -- who was convicted of selling 5.5 grams of prohibited drugs,
namely, dried marijuana leaves -- be now entitled to the beneficent penalty
provisions of R.A. 7659 and be now released from imprisonment?
Case #7
People of the Philippines v. Daniel Quijada
G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996
Article 14 Aggravating Circumstances
Ruling:
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for
illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a
person. Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or
modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in such
a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide
or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to
aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not
anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision
are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of
homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code, is
obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in
illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in
killing a person. The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty
prescribed in the first paragraph of Section 1 -- reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua -- to death, seemingly because of the
accused's manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of the law in using an
unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to absolve
the accused from any criminal liability for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or
murder with death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and
not as an offense. That could not have been the intention of the lawmaker
because the term "penalty" in the subject provision is obviously meant to be
the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for
homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or
murder. Under an information charging homicide or
murder, the fact that the death weapon was an
unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the
penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder
to death. The essential point is that the unlicensed
character or condition of the instrument used in
destroying human life or committing some other
crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a
legislative intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the offense
of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm
so illegally possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. To
charge the lawmaker with that intent is to impute an absurdity that would
defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on homicide and murder and
impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is
used in the commission of homicide or murder.
Facts:
On or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis,
province of Bohol, Philippines, the accused, with intent to kill and without
any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, the
accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was
unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the
opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the accused
having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident of
murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm,
hitting the latter on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to
his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased. That the
accused carried and had in his possession, custody and control a firearm
(hand gun) with ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or
license to possess the said firearm from competent authorities which firearm
was carried by the said accused outside of his residence and was used by
him in committing the crime of Murder with Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the
victim.
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada now appeals from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses
separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from
seventeen years, four months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years
and one day, as maximum, for the second crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC is correct in convicting the accused of two separate
crimes.
People v. Pinto Jr.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE - In the performance of a Public
Duty
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE - Evident Premeditation,
Unlawful Aggression, Night time, Taking Advantage of Public Position
MOTIVE - Needed to prove Circumstantial Evidence
ABERATTIO ICTUS - Mistake in the Identity
 CONSPIRACY - Acting in concert
=================================
Pt. I
=================================
Search warrant was issued for inspecting the house and premises of
Francisco Bello on the ground that the police had probable cause that Bello
illegally possessed a garand rifle, a thompson submachinegun and two
automatic pistols
1 of 3 teams were walking on the Mariawa road toward the premises, when
one PC Romero heard rumbling of a jeep, heard gunshots and saw flashes
of light from the direction of Buenaflor, his team member running towards
the same.
On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were Fr. Felix
Cappellan, Mrs. Zenaida Stilianopolous Tiongson, her six children and the
driver returning from mass, fearing that there might be "people with bad
intentions" or hold-uppers, Fr. Capellan told the driver to go faster. Shots
were fired at the jeep.
After the shooting incident, the police pursued the mission searching the
premises.
=================================
Pt. II
=================================
Although Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were not around, the
police searched the area and found a Japanese Springfield rifle, ammunition
of a garand rifle, ammunition of a carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber
pistol and 380 bullets for an automatic pistol.
Thereafter, the Chief of Police declared the search terminated and the entire
searching party left for headquarters
Team 3 was instrued by a "superior officer" "to remain and maintain peace
and order in (the) vicinity including Mariawa". While he and Buenaflor
were patrolling the area, at around midnight, they "chanced upon a house"
wherein Bello and his group were staying. They captured four of Bello's
bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn shirt of one of the
captives he saw a man with a bolo in his hand running towards him. As the
man was menacingly near him, Pinto shot the man later identified as
Rosalio Andes when he was at a distance of around three meters
Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee when she
heard a successive burst of gunfire. Bello, who was the balcony facing the
copra kiln ("agonan") with his back towards the pili tree, gradually fell to
the floor with his hands above his head. Then there was another burst of
gunfire. From the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to the door from where she saw
a man holding a long firearm, whom she later identified as Pinto, near the
pili tree which was around eight meters from where Bello was, and another
man, also holding a gun, crouching near the stairs
Inocencia was about to rush to Bello. Just then a man, whom Inocencia
identified as Buenaflor, came up the house, pointed a gun at Inocencia and
her husband and told them to lay flat on the floor.
When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia that Rosalio
was dead. Inocencia went near the pili tree where Rosalio's body was, knelt
down and asked the man with a long firearm why he killed Rosalio. The
man answered that Rosalio fought back. However, Inocencia did not notice
any weapon near Rosalio's body
=================================
Pt. III
=================================
Buenaflor and Pinto were charged: without any justifiable cause or motive,
with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, by means of a Cal. 45 Thompson
Sub-Machine Gun and a US Carbin Inland, Cal. 30 owned respectively by
said accused,
(1) shoot one Rosalio Andes,23y/o. inflicting upon him gunshot wounds
causing upon said Rosalio Andes serious and mortal wounds which led to
his instantaneous death.
(2) one for the murder of Richard Tiongson, 9y/o. sustained a gunshot
wound at the back, Richard was operated at the hospital but he died
suffering a hemorrage.
(3) another for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson.
(4) Bello died because of "shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due to
multiple gunshot wounds.
=================================
ISSUES
=================================
(1) Is the defense of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11(5) of the RPC
tenable?
(2) Is there evident premeditation, treachery, night time, public position
present as Aggravating Circumstances?
(3) Is the defense of unlawful aggression tenable?
(4) Is the defense of mistake in the identity of those who were shot in the
jeep tenable?
=================================
RULING
=================================
(1) Originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a search warrant
on Bello. In the process, however, appellants abused their authority
resulting in unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. Armed
with only a search warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went
beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two other persons
of their lives.
The defense has to prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the
offender acted in the performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful
exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the
justification becomes an incomplete one thereby converting it into a
mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code
The police had obtained a search warrant for illegal possession of firearms
against Bello even on Christmas day which was supposed to be a holiday,
no such effort was made in securing warrant of arrest for Bello's alleged
frustrated killing of Botin
(2) On Killing Bello and Andres:
Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this
case but we find that the appellants indeed took advantage of their public
position in perpetrating the crime.
(3) As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes against Pinto, we
find that if we are to believe Pinto, we have to stamp full credibility on his
statement alone. Even Buenaflor admitted that he did not see Rosalio Andes
attack Pinto.
(4) On the jeep coming towards them was owned by the Anduizas, the
appellants acted obviously in the belief that Bello was its passenger and
posthaste they fired upon it even without any inquiry as to the identity of its
passengers
Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has been established.
Such motive provided a circumstantial evidence leading to the inference
that indeed he fired his gun
All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other inference than
that Pinto and Buenaflor fired their guns in defiance of their superior
officer's order only "to find the whereabouts" of Bello
The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants
intended to injure cannot save them from conviction. Aberratio ictus or
mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the
accused zeroes in on his intended victim. The main reason behind this
conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for
the life of the victim(s) without checking carefully the latter's identity as
to place himself on the same legal plane as one who kills another willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously. Neither may the fact that the accused made a
mistake in killing one man instead of another be considered a mitigating
circumstance
It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor
actually caused the death of Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in
the presence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they acted in conspiracy
with each other.
The lower court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellants
shall solidarily be liable for each of the three murders they committed and,
for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson
People vs. Oanis
Art. 11, no. 5 of RPC
Art. 69 of RPC
Murder
Rule 109, Sec. 2, par. 2
Facts:
In the afternoon of Dec. 24, 1938, The Constabulary Provincial inspector
received a telegram stating " escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with
bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive". The Inspector then
called his men, Included is Alberto Galanta, and instructed to arrest
Balagtas, and if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instructions were given to Chief of Polic Oanis, by the
Inspector.
The inspector divided the party into 2 groups to locate Balagtas. Galanta
and Oanis were group together and proceeded to Irene's house. Upon
reaching the house, Oanis approached brigida Mallare and asked Irenes
location.
Defendants then went to the room of Irene and upon seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their revolvers. It turned out that the person
shot and killed was not the notorious Balagtas, but an innocent Serapio
Tecson, who was Irene's paramour.
On trial, the testimonies of the defendants were contrary to each other but
such was corroborated by Irene's testimony that the defendants fired at
Tecson while he was lying in bed.
The RTC charged the defendants of Homicide through reckless impudence
and senteced each an indeterminate penatly and a fine to pay the heirs of
Tecson.
Defendants contended that they incur no criminal liability because they
believed that the man was Balagtas and they acted in innocent mistake of
fact in the honest performance of their official duties.
Issue: WON they should be held responsible for the death caused to
Tecson?
Held: Yes, they are responsible for tge death of Tecson.
The SC are of the opinion that the crime committed is murder though
specially mitigated. The contention of the defendants that they are not liable
because of their defense of "mistake of fact" is not applicable.
In the case of Ah Chong, it was shown that there was an innocent mistake of
fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused,
having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed
by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts
as they then appeared to him.
In the instant case, appellants found no circumstances whatsorever which
would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made.
The SC also held that the crime committed by appellants is not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. Stating
that "a deloberate intent to di an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence.
There is, however, an incomplete justifying circumstance, falling under Art.
11 no. 5 of the RPC. Only one requisite was present as the "offenders acted
in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right". Such being
the case, and applying Art 69 od the RPC, the penalty lower by one or two
degress than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.
Intod vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and
Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go
with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that
Mandaya should accompany them. Otherwise, he would also be killed.
February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's
house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the
room.
RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the
witness
ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible
crime under Art. 4 (2)
HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay
the costs
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the
night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime
inherently impossible.
The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in
the offender his formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed,
would not amount to a crime
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of
the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a
crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended
crime this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime; legally
impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime
Case # 12
ESCAMILLA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 188551 February 27, 2013
HOMICIDE
DOCTRINE: The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at
whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of
injuries. The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the
means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim.l1
Petitioners intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries.
Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest, petitioner continued to shoot at
him three more times, albeit unsuccessfully. While running, the victim saw
his nephew in front of the house and asked for help. The victim was
immediately brought to the hospital. The doctor said that the victim would
have died if the latter were not brought immediately to the hospital. All
these facts belie the absence of petitioners intent to kill the victim.
FACTS:
1. Around 2am of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer of Estrada
and Arellano Streets, Manila. Mendol was about to ride his tricycle at this
intersection while facing Arellano Street.
2. Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30 meters away from
Mendol, shot the later four times, hitting him once in the upper right portion
of his chest.
3. The victim was brought to the Ospital ng Makati for treatment and
survived because of timely medical attention.
4. Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Fled an Information charging
petitioner with frustrated homicide.
5. During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mendol, Joseph
Velasco (Velasco) and Iluminado Garcelazo(Garcelazo), who all positively
identified the petitioner as the shooter of Mendol.
RTC: found petitioner guilty of frustrated homicide.
CA: affirmed the conviction
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in affirming the conviction of
frustrated homicide?
13. People vs Campuhan [G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000]
Ruling: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to
an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Costs de oficio.
People v. De la Pea: labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated
Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her
vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped
Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand,
thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his
victim
the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is
belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by
putting her legs close together and that she did not feel any intense pain but
just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!
no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the
accused and the victim.
FACTS:
April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old
Crysthel Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo
chocolate drinks for her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper
of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then busy filling small
plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the
second floor.
Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and
saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel
whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while
his short pants were down to his knees and his hands holding his penis with
his right hand
Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him
several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed
Corazon aside who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and
shouted for help thus prompting Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle
who were living within their compound, to chase the Campuhan who was
apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel s hymen was
intact
Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his
back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down
on the floor.
RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of
death
Thus, subject to automatic review
ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIOLETO
VILLACORTE, alias BONGING, et al., defendants. CRISANTO
INOFERIO Y ALINDAO alias SANTE, and MARCIANO YUSAY alias
MANCING (appeal withdrawn res. of 7/10/67), defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-21860 February 28, 1974
RULING: Although inherently weak and easily fabricated, the evidence
presented by an accused in support of that defense must be scrutinized with
the same care that evidence supporting other defenses deserves. When an
accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once have a
mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on
record, it may be sufficient to acquit him, as in the case of appellant
Inoferio. He should be acquitted upon the ground that although his defense,
in the nature of an alibi, is inherently a weak defense, it should be
considered sufficient as in this case, to tilt the scale of justice in favor of the
accused because the evidence for the prosecution is itself weak and
unconvincing and, therefore, by and large, insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
FACTS: After closing his shop for the day, Chinese merchant Benito Ching
left his store in the public market of Caloocan. He brought with him a paper
bag where all the proceeds of his sale for the day are placed. While walking
with his 2 companions, Libantino and Galvez, 4 men accosted them. Two of
the men held Ching and Galvez while Labantino continued to walk in front
of them, initially unaware of the commotion. A .45 caliber pistol as pointed
at Ching while he was held, while another man snatched the paper bag from
him. When Ching tried to call Labantinos name for help, the gun was shot
resulting to a gun wound on Ching. Labantino fled, while Galvez finally
freed himself from the men holding him. The men eventually fled too. After
falling from the gun shot, Ching was able to walk to home. His common-
law wife brought him to the hospital. He died a day after.
Galvez and Labantino both identified Villacorte as one of the men who
accosted them. Upon interrogation, Villacorte admitted to the crime and
identified his companions as "Roque", "Sante" and "Fred".
Consequently, an information for robbery with homicide was filed against
Villacorte, Roque Guerrero (Roque), Alfredo Handig (Fred) and an alias
Sante whose identity was not yet ascertained. The information was
eventually amended to implicate Crisanto Inoferio. The trial court acquitted
Handig and found Villacorte and Inoferio guilty. Guerrero was discharged
and used as a state witness.
Only Inoferio pursued this appeal. Inoferio testified that he first met
Villacorte and Handig while in Police custody for the investigation. He
claims that he knew Guerrero as they played cara y cruz together.
ISSUE: Whether or not Inoferios weak alibi could warrant a conviction.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADEO PERALTA, ET
AL.
Doctrine: A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically
provides a penalty therefore as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
Proof of conspiracy. Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a
preconceived plan or agreement; however, to establish conspiracy, "it is not
essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it
being sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective." Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an
offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.
Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our
jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who
acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This
rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their
common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the
consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable.
Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit
more than one offense. Since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all,
then, perforce, each of the conspirators is liable for all of the crimes
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if the
conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in
effecting their common design and purpose, each of them is guilty of three
murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties
upon conspirators. An accused who was charged with three distinct crimes
of murder in a single information was sentenced to two death penalties for
two murders, and another accused to thirteen (13) separate death penalties
for the 13 killings he perpetrated. Therefore there appears to be no legal
reason why conspirators may not be sentenced to multiple death penalties
corresponding to the nature and number of crimes they commit in
furtherance of a conspiracy
Ruling. The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the
accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common
brigade, up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it
is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual killing
of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty and
collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. It is not
indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and
should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy is the
common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details
of the execution of the crime. All those who in one way or another help and
cooperate in the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-
principals. Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the slaughter of
Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz each is guilty of three separate and
distinct crimes of murder.
Facts: On February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary were
preparing to attend Sunday mass, that a fight between two rival members of
the "Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO" gangs occurred in the plaza where the
prisoners were assembled, causing a big commotion. The fight was,
however, quelled, and those involved were led away for investigation, while
the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.
Moments later, another riot erupted in Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-
A, mostly "OXO" members and sympathizers, destroyed the lock of their
door and then rampaged from one brigade to another. The invading OXO
clubbed and stabbed to death Jose Carriego, an inmate of 4-B. Afterwards,
they forcibly opened the door of 4-C and killed two more inmates, namely,
Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz. The three victims sustained injuries
which swiftly resulted in their death before they could be brought to the
hospital.
Issue: Whether or not the commission of the murders was attended
with conspiracy?
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN DE
VERA yGARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM,
KENNETH FLORENDO and ELMER CASTRO, accused, EDWIN DE
VERA yGARCIA, appellant.
Doctrines:
Conspiracy - It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy
beyond reasonable doubt. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy
criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or
conjectures.

Requisites of Conspiracy:
To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites:
1 that two or more persons came to an agreement;
2 that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and
3 that the execution of the felony [was] decided upon.
Accomplice, Defined; Elements.
The Court has held that an accomplice is one who knows the criminal
design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith
by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just
the same.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present:
1 the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose; and
2 the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Conspirator and Accomplice, Distinguished. all by himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera and Garcia to have
1 Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not
individual. The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. In the
case of an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of
a principal.
2 Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they
know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however,
know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided
upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it
after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do
they agree to cooperate in its execution.
3 Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed;
accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the
plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
4 Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely
their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration
of the offense.
Accomplices; Penalties;
The penalty of an accomplice is one degree lower than that of a principal.
Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Abuse of Superior
Strength; Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength
Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. The trial court found that the
killing was attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength. Hence, there is only one generic aggravating
circumstance, not two.
Facts:
The accused with evident premeditation, treachery and use of superior
strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, hitting him between his eyes
and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds. The trial court ruled that
there was conspiracy and sentenced all of the accused to suffer reclusion
perpetua mainly on the testimony of an eyewitness. Specifically, it based its
conclusions on the following facts: appellant was seen with the other
accused inside the victims car; the victim was clearly struck with a blunt
object while inside the car, and it was unlikely for Florendo to have done it
been unaware of Florendos dark design on Roderick.
Such witness, Cacao, testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car,
where an altercation later occurred. Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of
the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and shoot the victim in the
head moments later. But, Cacaos testimony contains nothing that could
inculpate appellant De Vera aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no
other act was imputed to him.
Issues:
1 WON the trial court erred in deciding that there is conspiracy?
2 WON the trial court erred in aside from treachery, there are other
two aggravating circumstances (evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength).
Ruling:
1 YES. The prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt. Here, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
 Cacaos testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant.
Aside from the fact that he was inside the car, no other act was
imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to conspiracy.
Criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere
surmises or conjectures
2 YES. Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. Hence, there is
only one generic aggravating circumstance, not two
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REGIE LABAIGA,
Appellant.
G.R. No. 202867, July 15, 2013
ARTICLE PRINCIPLE OF LAW
Article 6 Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.
In Serrano v. People, we distinguished a frustrated felony from an
attempted felony in this manner:
1 In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony as a
consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender
merely commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2 In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment
of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the
reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offenders own spontaneous
desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound
would have been fatal were it not for timely medical intervention. If the
evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would
have caused the victims death without timely medical attention, the
accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated
murder.
A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was not afforded any
opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack. The existence of
treachery is not solely determined by the type of weapon used. If it
appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure the execution
of the crime, and to render the victim defenseless, then treachery may
be properly appreciated against the accused.
FACTS
According to the Prosecution, Regie Labiaga shot Gregorio Conde outside
the latters house. Conde cried for help which prompted his daughters Judy
and Glenelyn to rush towards him. Regie Labiaga shot Judy and told the
other accused Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag that she is already
dead., and they left the vicinity. Judy and Gregorio were rushed to the
hospital wherein Gregorio was treated and fully recovered Judy was
declared dead on arrival due to cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound.
According to the defense, Regie Labiaga admitted that he was present
during the shooting incident and claimed that he acted in self-defense when
Gregorio challenged him to a fight while armed with a shotgun. He alleged
that when he tried to wrest the gun from Gregorio, the shotgun fired without
him knowing whether somebody was hit. Demapanag alleged that she was
14 km away from the crime scene which was corroborated by her brother.
The accused were charged with Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearm. The information stated that the accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed firearm, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed
firearm, x x x thereby performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused; that
is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Gregorio
Conde which prevented his death.
The RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence while
Regie Labiaga was convicted of murder and frustrated murder. CA-Cebu
affirmed the conviction.
ISSUES:
Whether Regie Labiaga is guilty of frustrated or attempted murder.
HELD:
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio
Conde was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura, who examined
Gregorio after the shooting incident.
Since Gregorios gunshot wound was not mortal, the SC held that appellant
should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. Under
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for
attempted murder shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for
consummated murder under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Case No. 18
People vs. Narvaez
121 SCRA 389
G.R. Nos. L-33466-67
April 20, 1983
Intro:
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance
under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be
appreciated, the following requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).
In this case, there was an aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on
his property rights when the victims angrily ordered the continuance of the
fencing. There was also no provocation at all since the appellant was asleep
before the commission of the crime. However, the second element is not
present as the killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Facts:
On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia as the two were
constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house
and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of
construction and found fence being made. He tried to stop the group from
destroying his house and asked if they could talk things over but Fleischer
responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher and Rubia with his shotgun. Defendant
claims he killed in defense of his person and property but the CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of killing of the accused is in defense of his person
and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability.
 Flores vs People G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013
Article #/Doctrine: To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must
satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements of self-defense. Under
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of
his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that
the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There
can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim
had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense."30 "Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or
at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of
threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful
intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action. It is
present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones
life."31"Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression
warranting self-defense."32
In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the nature and
number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the claim
of self-defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered four (4)
gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body, specifically: on the
medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on
the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen;
on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and
on the right flank towards the umbilicus.
According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the victim,
the latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of
the liver.36 If there was any truth to Flores claim that he merely acted in
self-defense, his first shot on Jesus shoulder, which already caused the
latter to fall on the ground, would have been sufficient to repel the attack
allegedly initiated by the latter.
But Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot
wounds sustained by the victim, the Court finds it difficult to believe that
Flores acted to defend himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in
this regard that the location and presence of several wounds on the body of
the victim provide physical evidence that eloquently refutes allegations of
self-defense."37
Facts: On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque,
Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors, Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin
Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus.
They started drinking at 8:30 oclock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined
his visitors only at around 11:00 oclock after he and his wife arrived from
Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to settle a problem regarding a
vehicular accident involving one of their children. The drinking at the
terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle.4
Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was
heading towards the terrace. After glancing at the two, who began talking to
each other near the terrace, Duran focused his attention back to the table.
Suddenly, he heard several gunshots prompting him to duck under the table.
Right after the shooting, he looked around and saw the bloodied body of
Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores was no longer in sight.5
Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought
to a hospital. Thereafter, Duran, Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went
home. Jesus was brought to the hospital by his wife and children. Duran did
not, at any time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with
him.6
Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the
shooting incident took place, anxiously waiting for the arrival of his parents
from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents were then attending to his problem
regarding a vehicular accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short
conversation with his father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace. 7
Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the
company of some members of the CAFGU. He was on his way back to the
house when he saw Flores and his father talking to each other from a
distance of about six (6) meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him
on the right shoulder. Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was already
lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he felt hurt to have lost his
father.8

Issue: WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION,
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDIT TO PETITIONERS
CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.
[G.R. No. 109614-15. March 29, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADRONICO
GREGORIO and RICARDO GREGORIO,defendants-
appellants.
ARTICLE
ARTICLE 11. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES The following do
not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of is person or rights, provided the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
According to the court the guiding jurisprudential principle has
always been that when an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of
self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him to prove the elements of
that claim; otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable.
And that he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution. Having admitted the killing, appellant has to
justify his taking of a life by the exacting standards of the law. For self-
defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent
or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
If the appellants stabbed Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo to defend
themselves it certainly defies the reason why they had to inflict 16 stab
wounds and 6 respectively. The location, number and gravity of the wounds
inflicted on the victims belie the appellants contention that they acted in
self-defense. The nature and extent of the wounds inflicted on a victim
negate an accused claim of self-defense.
FACTS
Around 8:00 PM of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his
fifteen year old son Romeo Catorse arrived at the house of appellant
Adronico Gregorio at Sitio Bug-as, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Murcia, Negros
Occidental, to attend the wake of the latters grandson.
Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit
with him any weapon in their possession for safekeeping so as to avoid
trouble. Complying therewith, Carlos Catorse handed over his samurai,
John Villarosa and Remolito Calalas, their respective knives, to Adronico .
Around 1:00 oclock in the morning of May 8, 1986, while the game of
pusoy was still in progress, appellant Ricardo, in a very loud voice,
reprimanded Tunggak (son of Adronico) from peeping at the cards of other
players. In response, Tunggak stood up and also in a very loud voice
ordered the game stopped).
Overhearing the incident, Adronico ordered his son downstairs and right
there and then scolded and boxed him several times. While Adronico was
severely beating Tunggak, Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico
from further hurting his son so as not to put him to shame before the
crowd. Carlos was in this act of pacifying the matter between the father and
son when suddenly appellant Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind
with a samurai (the same samurai deposited by Carlos to Adronico) and
thereafter hacked and stabbed him several times more in different parts of
his body: Right after Carlos fell to the ground, Adronico, for his part, safety. In the instant case, there was no imminent and real danger to the life
repeatedly hacked the victim with a bolo. or limb of the petitioner when he shot the deceased, since the latter had
already been disarmed. As former Chief Justice Aquino states in his book on
Romeo Catorse, son of Carlos Catorse, ran out of the house. Jovito Nicavera Criminal Law:
also tried to get out of the house but Adronico hacked him instead with a
bolo hitting his left shoulder. Marcelo Lo tried to help his uncle Jovito but
Ricardo, with the same samurai used against Carlos hacked him on his
forearm. Adronico immediately followed and using a bolo hacked Marcelo
In order to justify self-defense, it is essential that the attack upon
on the nape. Although wounded, Marcelo was able to run out of the house
defendant be simultaneous with the killing, or preceded the latter
but Adronico ran after and overtook him. Adronico then hacked him again.
without an appreciable interval of time. (Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56),
Ricardo died during the trial. Adronico on the other hand interposed self-
defense to exculpate himself from criminal liability.

ISSUE xxx xxx xxx

Whether or not the appellant can validly invoke self-defense.

The harm caused by one person to another who offended or caused

P/CPL. FAUSTO ANDAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF him injury, sometime after he suffered such offense or such injury,
THE PHILIPPINES does not constitute an act of self-defense, but an act of revenge.
(Banzuela 31 Phil. 564)
G.R. No. L-60159, 06 November 1989

In imposing on the appellant the penalty of just one (1) year of prision
correccional, the respondent Court held (which the Supreme Court
affirmed):
Introduction (Provisions involved, principles, jurisprudence):

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner failed to prove the defense he had raised. The primordial
requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression. And for unlawful
aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal
 Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code vests discretion to the court
in lowering the penalty either by one or two degrees whenever
incomplete justifying circumstance exists in a given case like the
case at bar. The laudable patience of accused in not retaliating
despite repeated insults by a subordinate, his length of service in
the government (since 1957), and most important, his obsession to
inculcate discipline in his men, to OUR mind, entitle accused to a
two-degree reduction of the penalty prescribed by law. Our attitude
is a signal to the men in uniform that while WE condemn felonious
violence WE support efforts to maintain discipline in the service.
Brief facts:
At about 0700pm on 25 September 1980, Petitioner Fausto Andal, then a
corporal in the Batangas Integrated National Police, while on patrol aboard
a tricycle driven by Police Pfc. Casiano Quinio, went to the police station at
the pier located at Sta. Clara, Batangas City to check on one of his men, Pfc.
Maximo Macaraig, who was stationed there, because the said Macaraig had
failed to report to police headquarters for briefing but Macaraig replied that
he did not have to report to police headquarters since he already had his
orders and told the petitioner: "You report, supsup, ka.
When petitioner Fausto Andal and Quinio went back to the poblacion of
Batangas City and parked their vehicle in front of the Philbanking Building
at P. Burgos Street, Batangas City, Macaraig arrived and went straight to the
petitioner as he was furious and demanded why the petitioner had
embarrassed him in front of so many people. The petitioner denied the
charge and Quinio told Macaraig that the petitioner did not utter defamatory
words against him and asked him to forget the incident. But still Macaraig
challenged the petitioner and fired his gun at the petitioner, hitting the latter
in the middle aspect, lower right knee. The petitioner was able to wrest the
gun from Macaraig when they grappled for the possession of the gun and
two (2) successive shots were fired at Macaraig by the petitioner which
caused Macaraigs death.
Brief issue:
Was there an appreciable time lapse between the first aggression, i.e. when
deceased shot accused on his knee and the time accused resorted to force by
way of firing the two shots at the deceased? The facts unfolded indicate that
there was. This is what happened after accused had grabbed the gun: (1) He
asked deceased, "Why did you fire at me?" (2) He even turned his head
towards his son and instructed him just to stay in the jeep. (3) His son,
Domingo Andal, challenged deceased to a fight "Sportsman like." (4)
Deceased moved backward 2 meters away from accused. (5) Pfc. Quinio
even thought the trouble was over as he started to get his tricycle
Case no. 25
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO SAZON, alias
"INSIK,"
G.R. No. 89684 | September 18, 1990
 REGALADO, J.
DOCTRINE / RULING:
Self-Defense; Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes
self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved
after the accused himself had admitted the killing.
It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against
the person defending himself. In the present case, the burden of evidence
having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to establish the primary
element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the
plea of self-defense must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by
the accused, and by the lone alleged eyewitness for the defense, are
unconvincing primarily on account of their inherent inconsistency and
conflict with each other.
Qualifying Circumstances; Under such considerations and there being no
other evidence to prove that the death of the victim was the result of
meditation, calculation or reflection, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. The circumstances qualifying or
aggravating the act must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner.
They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.
Thus, for the same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Superior strength may
aggravate or qualify a crime, only if it is clearly shown that there was
deliberate intent to take advantage of it. Absence of any evidence to show
that the accused purposely sought to use their superior strength to their
advantage in this case, a finding to that effect by the trial court cannot be
sustained.
Conspiracy; The fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon
the deceased is of no moment, since the existence of conspiracy was
satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of appellant and
Altejos of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting him
thereafter reveal a concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the
encounter. The circumstances that after the accused shot the victim in the
forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellants gun,
Altejos stabbed the victim to death, indicate closeness and coordination of
their action geared towards a common purpose, that is, to kill the victim.
Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is not absolutely
essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown
to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, as such
circumstance is invariably indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.
The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted
the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. The act of one in
killing the victim becomes the act of all the accused.
FACTS:
Ernesto Romualdez was accosted by appellant near the barangay hall for
allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and his companions were
engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez which
caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longno, who was then present at the
scene, approached and helped the fallen Romualdez and pushed appellant
away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his native dialect said,
Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta guid, (Watch out Inday for I will kill
you) to which Longno retorted, Just do it.
Two days later, appellant and his cousin, Cornelio Altejos, were drinking
softdrinks at the store of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by.
Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-consumed and
followed Longno who eventually reached the bench near the public faucet
where a group of guys were sitting and joined the group in their
conversation. Shortly thereafter, appellant and Altejos arrived and appellant
accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying, Maano ka? (What are you
going to do?). Longno then faced appellant and said, Brod, tiruha lang.
(Brod, just shoot.)
Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in
the left forearm. Dullete, Canoso and Ramos then scampered for safety as
appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for the gun. It was while the
two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the chest, after
which both appellant and Altejos ran away.
Appellants version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot
Longno but pleads self-defense. He claims that Altejos for help to have a .
22 caliber revolver repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a
policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant saw Longno from a
distance. Upon his approach, Longno allegedly said, Insik, I heard that you
are not afraid of me. Maybe you want to be taught a lesson.
Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and
was about to draw the same. He, therefore, parried the gun but it fired
hitting one of appellants left fingers which was later amputated. It was then
that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm. Appellant
and Longno afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to
separate appellant and Longno but he was brushed aside by the latter. In the
course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted to appellant, I stabbed Inday,
run, and so he and Altejos ran away.
ISSUE/S:
1 Did the accused act in self-defense?
2 Whether or not qualifying circumstances are present?
3 Is there a conspiracy between the accused and Altejos?
Note:
Insofar as Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over him and he can neither be convicted nor
exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him are, therefore, obiter
and with no binding effect on him.
PEOPLE v. ALCONGA
Facts:
As the deceased Barion and the defendant Alconga were playing black jack,
the former became outraged and expressed his rage at the latter for his
cheating tactics. Two (2) days later, making good the threat uttered after the
game, Barion approached the defendant and swung his pingahan, a bamboo
stick. A fight ensued afterwards, upon which Alconga gained the upper hand
by firing his revolver at Barion and eventually inflicting a mortal bolo blow,
slashing the latters cranium. The argument of self defense was raised by
Alconga.
Issues:
1 Whether or not the Alcongas plea of self defense can be sustained
2 Whether or not Barions provocation is considered a mitigating
circumstance
Ruling:
1 NO.
There were two (2) stages in the fight- the first wherein the deceased
was the aggressor and the second wherein there is no more aggression,
since Barion was already injured and fleeing. Under such
circumstances, Alcongas plea of self-defense (as a justifying
circumstance) during the second stage of the fight cannot be sustained.
There can be no defense where there is no aggression, given that the
aggression must be deemed to have ceased upon the flight of the
deceased during the first stage. A fleeing man is not dangerous to the
one from whom he flees.
2 NO.
Section 4, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code requires that there be
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the act. Sufficiency, as defined by Justice
Albert, means that it should be proportionate to the act committed and
adequate to stir one to its commission. It would seem self-evident that
Alconga could never have succeeded in showing that Barions
aggression was proportionate to his killing his already defeated
adversary. Also, it is noteworthy to mention that at Alconga, as a guard
 by profession, was the holder of more deadly weapons and has superior
fighting ability than Barion.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN GONDAYAO,
alias "BEN", ET AL.
Article 11. Justifying Circumstances- 1. Anyone who acts in defense of
his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Article 13. Mitigating Circumstance- 1. Those mentioned in the preceding
chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt
from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Article 14. Aggravating Circumstance- 16. That the act be committed
with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
No unlawful aggression when there is an agreement to fight. The challenge
to a fight must be accepted. The reason for the rule is that each of the
protagonists is at once assailant and assaulted and neither can invoke the
right to self-defense because aggression which is incident in the fight is
bound to arise from one or the other of the combatants.
Unlawful aggression must come, directly or indirectly, from the person who
was subsequently attacked by the accused.
RULING: Benjamins story is manifestly artificious and unworthy of
credence. It should be noted that, according to Benjamin, he held the
dagger, even before they fell from the "papag"; that the dagger was still in
his hand when Piol allegedly struck his face with a stone; and that he
(Benjamin), in turn, took another piece of stone, and hit Piol with it. This
would have been impossible, however, unless Benjamin first released the
dagger, which he then held; but, We cannot believe that he, or anybody for
that matter, would have done so under the circumstances.
Again, when Piol allegedly squeezed the neck of Benjamin, the latter threw
the stone away and picked up the dagger once more. He would thus have Us
believe that, in order to get the stone with which he claimed to have hit Piol
on the head, he put the dagger in a convenient place from which, at the
opportune moment, he got it back to inflict the second stab wound. The
context of Benjamin's story does not convey the idea that he had such a
control of the situation as to be able to choose the place where he would put
the dagger and the time he would retrieve it.
But, this is not all. Instead of stabbing Piol on the stomach, for, by this time,
he was again lying down on his back according to the defense with
Benjamin on top of him, he (Benjamin) thrust the dagger, with his left hand,
into the back of Piol, causing therein another stab wound almost at right
angle with his body, like the first. Just why, being in the precarious
condition he depicted himself, Benjamin chose to stab Piol in such an
awkward, inconvenient and unbelievable manner, the defense has not even
tried to explain. Regardless of the foregoing, an injury inflicted in this
fashion on Piol's back, which was allegedly pressed against the ground,
would have necessarily been much more slanting than the first, instead of
being almost perpendicular to the body. The fact of the matter and this
has been established by the testimony of the Chief of Police, whose
impartiality and veracity are not contested is that Piol was then lying
down, not on his back, but on his stomach with Benjamin on top of him.
This explains why and how he (Benjamin) managed to stab Piol on the
back. It, likewise, shows that Piol could not have struck Benjamin on the
face with a stone, much less squeezed his neck.
Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming him.
Considering, moreover, that Benjamin had provoked the incident, by
hurling uncomplimentary remarks at his political opponents, one of whom
was Piol; that such remarks led to an altercation with Piol, in consequence
of which, stones were thrown at him, hitting him on the head; that when,
owing to the impact of said stone, which could have rendered him groggy, Benjamin testified that his remark, about the failure to give a blow-out on
and the lacerated injuries thus sustained by him, Piol prepared himself to the part of the winner in the elections, was addressed to his nephew, Rudy
fight by drawing out his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting Natividad; that, when Piol resented said remark, Benjamin replied that the
from this act, by "rushing" to his encounter and grappling with him; and same was not aimed at him, and that, perhaps, he (Piol) is a "nacionalista".
that, accordingly, Benjamin cannot be given the benefit of either complete
or incomplete self-defense. Although Piol was stabbed from behind, ISSUE: Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense.
Benjamin did not act with treachery, for this was merely an incident of their
struggle, which had begun with both contenders facing each other, each G.R. No. L-28129 October 31, 1969
prepared for the fight that ensued.
ELIAS VALCORZA, petitioner,
The crime committed by Benjamin Gondayao is, therefore, that of vs.
homicide, and no modifying circumstance having attended its perpetration, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
the penalty therefor (reclusion temporal) should be imposed in its medium
period. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should, accordingly,
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day
of prison mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion RULING
temporal as maximum, with the corresponding accessory penalties.
The petitioner is acquitted.
FACTS: Appeal, taken by defendants Benjamin Gondayao and Anoy
Gondayao from a decision convicting them of the crime of murder of
Orlando Piol, qualified by treachery. ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any
criminal liability
After consuming a bottle of gin, Benjamin, repeatedly cursed the Paragraph 5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
"Nacionalistas" for not offering a drink despite their victory in the polls; the lawful exercise of a right or office.
that, as Piol who was nearby, replied by cursing the losers in the elections,
an exchange of unfriendly utterances followed; that, eventually, the group
headed by Benjamin picked up stones and threw them at Piol, who was hit
several times on the head; that, as the same began to bleed, Piol drew out a The facts and circumstances constrain us to hold that the act thus performed
dagger and approached Benjamin, who, forthwith, embraced him; that, by petitioner, which unfortunately resulted in the death of the escaping
grappling with each other, they both fell down. detainee, was committed in the performance of his official duty and was
more or less necessary to prevent the escaping prisoner from successfully
eluding the officers of the law. To hold him guilty of homicide may have the
After grappling with Benjamin Gondayao, Orlando Piol appeared to have
effect of demoralizing police officers discharging official functions identical
in addition to several lacerations on the head two (2) stab wounds on
or similar to those in the performance of which petitioner was engaged at
the back, 4 to 4-1/2 inches deep, in consequence of which he died due to a
the time he fired at the deceased Pimentel, with the result that thereafter We
massive internal hemorrhage. Immediately after the occurrence, Benjamin
would have half-hearted and dispirited efforts on their part to comply with
assumed full responsibility for said injuries, which he claimed to have
such official duty. This of course, would be to the great detriment of public
inflicted in self-defense.
interest.

FACTS:
The deceased, Roberto Pimentel was a detention prisoner who escaped.
While in search for the escaped prisoner, Sgt. Daiton saw a person
approaching slowly under the bridge and he ordered him to halt. The latter
instead of doing so, jumped down into the creek spanned by the
bridge. Roberto Pimentel emerged suddenly from the bushes and lunged at
the appellant Valcorza, hitting him with a stone and causing him to fall to
the ground. Appellant Valcorza regained his composure and immediately
chased the deceased, as the deceased did not heed his order to stop,
appellant fired four times into the air, and a fifth shot at Pimentel as the
latter was in an act of again jumping down into another part of the creek.
The members of the patrol team went down into the water to locate
Pimentel and they saw him floating, with a wound on his back. Elias
Valcorza surrendered himself and his firearm to the Chief of Police
ISSUE:
Whether or not peace officer Valcorza was justified in shooting the deceased
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AVELINO MANANSALA, JR.
and JOSE MANANSALA
G.R. No. L-23514, February 17, 1970
Article 17 of the RPC; Article 18 of the RPC states that Accomplices are
those persons who, not being included in Art.17, cooperate in the execution
of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. In this case, Jose
Manansala was found guilty as co-principal on the ground that there was
concert of action between him and his nephew. The evidence does not
justify this finding beyond reasonable doubt. There is no showing that the
killing was agreed upon between them beforehand. No motive for it has
been shown other than the provocation given by the deceased; and such
motive was true only insofar as Avelino was concerned. The circumstances
indicate that if Jose embraced Rodrigo and rendered him helpless, it was to
stop him from further hitting Avelino with his fists. However, Jose is not
entirely free from liability, for it has been established that even after the first
knife thrust had been delivered he did not try to stop Avelino, either by
word or overt act. Instead Jose continued to hold Rodrigo, even forced him
down on the bamboo bed with Avelino still pressing the attack. Withal it
cannot be said that Jose's cooperation was such that without it the offense
would not have been accomplished. But although not indispensable, it was a
contributing factor. If Jose's initial intent was free from guilt, it became
tainted after he saw the first knife thrust delivered. The thirteen wounds
must have taken an appreciable interval of time to inflict, and Jose's
cooperation facilitated their infliction. He must therefore be held liable as
an accomplice.
Facts: Avelino was eating his lunch inside one of the eateries dotting the
market site, when Rodrigo Aringo alias Diego, a baggage boy in the same
market, approached him and demanded his fee for having carried Avelino's
baggage. When Avelino said he was willing to pay for the services rendered
at noon, but not for those rendered earlier in the morning, Rodrigo
brusquely brushed Avelino's hand aside and instantly gave him a fist blow
in the face. A quarrel between them ensued and Jose Manansala, Avelino's
uncle, noticed the commotion and so he went there and had Rodrigo in a
tight embrace. While in that position, Avelino stabbed him with a balisong,
or Batangas knife thirteen times which resulted to Rodrigo's death. Avelino
and his uncle, Jose were charged with murder and Jose was considered as a
co-principal by the CFI.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Manansala was correctly considered as a co-
principal by the CFI?
Case #32.
People of the Philippines vs Jose Encomienda
 GR No L-26750; August 18, 1972
Article 11, Revised Penal Code/ Legitimate Self-Defense, elements: (1)
unlawful aggression on part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means, employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself
Illegal Aggression, what constitutes: Illegal aggression is
equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and
imminent kind.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed, what
constitutes: Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not
imply material commensurability between the means of attack and
defense. When the law requires is rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter as principal factors the
emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is
exposed and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not
depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of
such injury.
Facts: Accused was charged with the crime of murder aggravated by
recidivism. He interposed the lawful self-defense as per Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not the accused satisfied the elements of lawful self-
defense?
Held: Yes, the accused sufficiently proved the elements for lawful self-
defense. Elements are: (1) unlawful aggression on part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means, employed to prevent or repel the attack;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
It was the deceased who drew his gun towards the accused. Not
having enough time to think rationally how to deal with the situation, the
accuseds act of hacking the left arm of deceased is justified due to
immediate danger to his life as the former was about to grab gun from his
free left hand. Provocation came from the deceased (not the accused) as he
ordered the accused to vacate land and drew his gun when he did not like
the response of the former.
People vs Sotelo
55 PHIL 403
December 13, 1930
Article 13 of the RPC: Incomplete Self Defense
Facts:
The Sotelo brothers, namely, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente, were
prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur for the crime of
homicide. The said accused conspired to attack Ignacio Cambaliza and
inflicted a mortal wound upon him which he died in a few minutes
afterwards.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused Constante can invoke self defense?
Ruling:
The selfdefense invoked by the accused was incomplete, for, although the
appellant was unlawfully attacked by the deceased and compelled to
employ reasonable means to defend himself, he is responsible for provoking
the attack.
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
 GR NO. L-6025, MAY 30 1964
Labrador, J.:
Article 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection
FACTS:
About March 15, 1945, Amado Hernandez and other appellants were
accused of conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in the criminal cases of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. They were accused of being members
of PKP Community Party of the Philippines which was actively engaged in
an armed rebellion against the government of the Philippines. With the
party of HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon), they
committed the crime of rebellion causing murder, pillage, looting plunder,
etc., enumerated in 13 attacks on government forces or civilians by HUKS.
ISSUE: Does his or anyones membership in the communist party per se
render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the RPC?
HELD:
No. The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is
not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or
converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere
advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an
uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an
uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize
the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding
belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet
advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the
Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field
subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and
actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion.
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the
propagation of improvement of conditions of labor through his organization,
the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and active president,
has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the
unity and cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for
struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or
against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it
is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in
connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and
fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political
ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of
which he was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the
cause of Communism, not merely to advance his political aspirations.
Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned,
We have not found, nor has any particular act on his part been pointed to
Us, which would indicate that he had advocated action or the use of force in
securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the
leaders of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion,
but this notwithstanding, evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended
their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in planning
and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof.
Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is
concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary, who passed
said machine and clothes on to others. It does not appear that he himself
furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion
or to the forces of the rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of
the apparent desire of the chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-
participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster the rebellion or the
uprising.
G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
 MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO
PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-appellants
FACTS:
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of
war, and continued to serve as Mayor during the Japanese occupation, until
March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon
his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel
Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold,
regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a
guerrilla unit in the province of Abra.
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the
province of Abra were in progress, Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with
his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant
to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of
La Paz to file complaints against him. In no time, charges of espionage,
aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal.
The trial lasted 19 days up to April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on
all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors. And on
the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of
Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave
digger.
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio
Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda as
prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen,
Servillano Afos, Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago
Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and Pedro Turqueza
as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo Afos as
grave digger, and Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were
indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder, for allegedly
conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal.
ISSUE:
whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San
Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La
Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18, 1945, together with the package of
records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by
Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a).
RULING:
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find
no satisfactory proof that Beronilla did actually receive the radiogram
Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it.
. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution
witness, as to the hatching of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal.
Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in the
early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the agreement was
made about ten o'clock in the morning, shortly after the accused had denied
Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be
ascertained, failed to transmit the Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this
being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal must be
rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who
was, to their knowledge, duly sentenced to death.
decided that the concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration with the
enemy as motives for a liquidation does not operate to exclude the case
from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may
not be held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives"
Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants
were impelled by malice.
The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal had really
committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured,
and hidden American officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly
declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for political or personal
reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal"
Actus non facit reum nisi mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made
such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such
negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is
equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum,
nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico,
18 Phil., 507).
G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since there is no modifying circumstance
in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
The accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando, with intent to kill, by
means of treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y
MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, by then and there, shooting
him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious
and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder,
qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial
court did not appreciate in favor of the appellant the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability.
RULING:
The appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
his affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun
accidentally going off, the bullet hitting the victim without his fault or
intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and
negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty of a
felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence.33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing
a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere
accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. 34 An accident
is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of
humanly foreseeable consequences." If the consequences are plainly
foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.
The appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code qualified by treachery.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the
commission of the crime, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
People VS. Ong
Intro:
All contrary to law with the following generic aggravating circumstances:
(a) Evident premeditations;
(b) Grave abuse of confidence;
(c) Nighttime;
(d) Use of an motor vehicle ;
(e) Use of uperior strenght;
(f) Cruelty.
Kidanapping with Murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Article 267
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in
treachery. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime (nocturnidad) cannot
be absorbed in treachery because in this crimes," treachery arose from the
defenseless position of Chua when he was killed, while nighttime was
purposely sought by the accused to facilitate immunity in the commission of
the crime. The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado)
is also present, due to the deliberate selection of an isolated place (Barrio
Makatipo Novaliches, Caloocan City) for killing and burying the victim
The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of
the crimes," can be considered present because the Biscayne car of Ong was
used to trail the victim's car and to facilitate the commission of the crimes,"
and the escape of the accused.
Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, because the
accused meditated, planned, and tenaciously persisted in the
accomplishment of the crime.
Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
one analogous to passion and obfuscation" because Chua previously
threatened Ong for non-payment of debt arising from gambling, causing
Ong humiliation and shame.
"Conspiracy, connivance and unity of purpose and intention among the
accused were present throughout in the execution of this crime. The four
participated in the planning and execution of the crimes," and were at the
scene in all its stages. They cannot escape the consequences of any of their
acts even if they deviated in some detail from what they originally thought
of. Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in every
detail of the execution. Thus, treachery should be considered against all
persons participating or cooperating in the perpetration of the crime."
Brief Facts:
That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the municipality of
Paraaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above named accused, being then private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with treachery and known
premeditation and for the purpose of killing one Henry Chua and thereafter
extorting money from his family through the use of a ransom note,
kidnapped and carried away said Henry Chua, initially by means of friendly
gestures and later through the use of force, in an automobile, and later after
having taken him to an uninhabited place in Caloocan City, with the use of
force detained him (Henry Chua) and killed him in the following manner, to
 wit: The accused after gagging and tying up Henry Chua and repeatedly
threatening him with death, assured him that if he would write and sign a
ransom note for the payment by his family of the sum of $50,000.00 (US),
he would not be killed and would be released upon receipt of the ransom
note, he was again gagged and tied up by the accused, and thereafter
stabbed in the abdominal region, several times with an ice-pick, inflicting
upon him (Henry Chua) mortal wounds on his vital organs, which directly
caused his death.
Brief Issue:
The only issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the accused II.
Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the commission of the crime.
Case #41
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GEORGE
CORTES y ORTEGA, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001]
*in this case the court took little discussions on the application of the following
aggravating circumstances as alleged in the complaint.
I Evident Premeditation.
In the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must prove the following elements:
(a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime,
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that
determination, and
(c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution
sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of
the act
In the case at bar, the prosecution fails to prove this aggravating
Circumstance
Cruelty
For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that the
accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly
and painfully as he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain.
Rationale: The crime is aggravated because by deliberately increasing the
suffering of the victim the offender denotes sadism and
consequently a marked degree of malice and perversity.
In the case at bar, The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds
upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening
between the infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he
had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking
this aggravating circumstance into consideration.
Nighttime
Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when:
(1) it is specially sought by the offender;
(2) the offender takes advantage of it; or
(3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's
immunity from identification or capture.
 In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the
cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.
IV Abuse of Superior Strength
Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it cannot be
appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance. Here, treachery
qualified the offense to murder.
V Disregard of Sex
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not
be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to
offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her
womanhood.
In the case at bar, the accused mistook the victim for a man
VI Intoxication
Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating,
depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other
hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating
circumstance.
A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of
having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the
crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same
time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not
taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to
commit the crime
FACTS:
1 an Information for murder (violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code) against accused On George Cortes y Ortega, for the murder of Edlyn
S. Gamboa, a 16 year old girl
2 Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn.
3 He entered a plea of guilty In virtue of his plea of guilty, the trial court
proceeded to satisfy itself of the voluntariness of the plea by propounding
questions to the accused to find out if he understood his plea and the legal
consequence thereof.
4 The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disrespect to
sex, and intoxication were present in the commission of the crime.
5 The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and
the alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
6 the trial court after considering the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances attendant found the existence of the aggravating
circumstances and appreciated only the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty that was offset by one of the aggravating circumstances. Hence, this
review
ISSUES:
Whether the trial court erred in finding that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of
superior strength, sex and intoxication attended the commission of the crime
charged.
 Ulanday, a health officer of Aroroy, testified herself that the complaining
witness either voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into
HELD: one.

The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that the only aggravating ISSUE:
circumstance present was treachery which qualified the killing to murder (a) Whether additional rape committed in a crime of robbery be considered
and that there were two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and as an aggravating circumstance?
intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not
death, in accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6759
HELD:
On cross-examination, both Nerissa Tagala and Consuelo Arevalo,
separately testified that they saw the face of Regala, despite of no electricity
CASE No. 42 at the commission of the crime, because he used a flashlight and took off
the mask he was wearing, and thus, they remembered him wearing an
People vs Regala earring of his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police
G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000 line-up inside the police station.

The trial court held that contradiction referred to a minor detail, cannot
FACTS:
detract from the fact, that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified
On the night of September 11, 1995, at Barangay Bangon in Aroroy,
the accused-appellant. As correctly pointed out by the appellee, the victim
Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother,
was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was
Counselo Arevalo, were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his
not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant,
two other companions entered the formers house.
who was a stranger. Hence, Dr. Ulandays testimony does not support the
contention of accused-appellant that the victim voluntarily submitted to
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen and
sexual advances of Regala.
went to the room of the victims and poked at 8-inch gun on them, one after
the other, and hogtied both of them. Armando raped Nerissa in bed while
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was
her grandmother was hogtied on the floor. Later, she saw her grandmothers
already in force. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
aparador being opened where two rings, two wrist watches, and money
now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: (1) The penalty of reclusion
were taken from the aparador. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-
perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the
appellant counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
brought to the kitchen, still hogtied and was raped again by the accused.
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
He was convicted in the lower court but accused-appellant appealed his
In this case, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant
criminal case at the Regional Trial Court in Masbate. He questioned the
should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua
sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence in identifying him as one of the
imposed by the trial court is proper. The judgment convicting Armando
perpetrators of the crime charged. And based on medico-legal, Dr. Conchita
Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Rape, where the victim is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity.
PEOPLE vs BERDIDA
GR No. L-20183; June 30, 1966
DOCTRINE:
Rule of aggravating circumstances with regards to penalty the presence of
one generic aggravating circumstance, apart from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, suffices to fix the penalty for murder at the
extreme punishment of death.
Nighttime from the facts and evidence of record in this case, appellants
took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged for they had
evidently chosen to execute their victims under cover of darkness, at the
dead of night, when the neighborhood was asleep.
Exception to the rule of absorbing Nighttime in Treachery in as much as
the treachery consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied at the
time they were beaten, the circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in
treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery
rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case therefore is present
to which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does not apply.
Evident Premeditation from the time the accused abducted the victims up
to the time one of the latter lost consciousness and the other died, sufficient
time had lapsed for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences
of their act.
FACTS:
At around 10:00pm, Antonio, Federico, Virgilio and Pedrito had just left a
store and were on their way to each of their homes, when a group of men
armed with bolos stopped them and introduced themselves as policemen,
saying that the four are accused of killing someone and that they should go
with them. Antonio and Federico held their hands up while Virgilio and
Pedrito could ran away. Antonio and Federico were taken to a rail track
where their hands were tied. They were then further taken to a pier in North
Harbor where they were met by more armed men. The group of men beat
Antonio and Federico until Antonio lost consciousness at around 1:00am of
the following day. The police, together with Antonio's sister, found Antonio
and Federico the following day. Antonio was still alive thus was rushed to
the hospital while Federico was already dead.
ISSUE:
1. Was the RTC correct in imposing the death penalty?
2. Was the appreciation of the aggravating circumstances proper?
People vs Castillo
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH
CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, appellants.
[G.R. No. 132895. March 10, 2004]
Doctrine/s and/or Rulings: We affirm the trial courts judgment convicting
Castillo. However, we acquit her co-accused Padayhag.
To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,[8] the prosecution must establish
the following: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the victim of his liberty; (3)
the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of
the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed
by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a public officer.[9]
Appellant Castillos Liability
Castillo asserts that the victims parents did not pay her wages when she
worked as a maid of the victims family.[10] She claims that it was this
injustice, her educational level and her ignorance of the law, which impelled
her to take Rocky. She faults the trial court for refusing to consider this.
Castillo is mistaken. Whether or not her employer failed to pay her salary is
irrelevant. No amount of perceived injustice can serve as justification for
any person to retaliate through the commission of another crime. The trial
court was therefore correct in disregarding Castillos claim that Rockys
parents committed injustice on her.
Castillos claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her demand for
ransom. Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from
captivity.[11] Thus, even if she had a right to demand payment of her
unpaid wages, the money she actually demanded and eventually received, is
still ransom.
Castillos reliance on her low educational level is similarly unavailing. The
penalty for kidnapping for ransom is the singular and indivisible penalty of
death. This bars the application of any alternative, mitigating or aggravating
circumstance
Appellant Padayhags Liability
The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the evidence on record
shows that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
We reiterate the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire
case for review on any question including those not raised by the parties.
[25] This becomes even more imperative in cases where the penalty
imposed is death.
There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in
concert with Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused
guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and
unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused to the
commission of the crime without any space for baseless suppositions or
frenzied theories to filter through.[26] Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as
clearly as the commission of the crime itself.[27]
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of
intent; and (2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must
concur. Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not
enough. The act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither
joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy,
unless proved to have been motivated by a common design.[28]
Padayhags act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity
with Castillos plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants
testified that Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag
that Padayhags boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they
were to visit Padayhags boyfriend that the two met. When they met,
Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived her:
All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy. We
also find that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In People v. Gonzales[36] we held:
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction.
Penalty and Damages
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,[44] the penalty of death is
imposed upon proof that the kidnapping was committed to extort ransom
from the victim or any other person. We find that the prosecution has
established Castillos guilt for this crime beyond reasonable doubt. However,
Castillos pecuniary liability must be modified to conform with
jurisprudence. The award of exemplary damages must be deleted in the
absence of any aggravating circumstance. Mr. Cebrero testified that their
family suffered serious anxiety at the possibility of not seeing Rocky again.
[45] The pain and anguish they experienced justifies the award of moral
damages. However, we reduce the trial courts award of moral damages to
P100,000 in line with current jurisprudence.
Brief Facts: Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of Paranaque, Branch 260, National Capital Judicial
Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86, finding appellants Elizabeth Castillo
(Castillo) and Evangeline Padayhag (Padayhag) guilty of Qualified
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention[2] and sentencing them to death.
The Information[3] charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda Wenceslao with
the crime of kidnapping, reads:
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, conspiring
together, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, and seriously
detain HORACIO CEBRERO IV @ Rocky, a five years old child (sic),
which kidnapping or serious detention lasted for more than three (3) days
thereby depriving him of his liberty, and which was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the parents of the victim, to the damage
and prejudice of the victim himself and his parents.
Issues:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPRECIATING (SIC)
THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE
WAS CONSPIRACY TO EXTORT RANSOM IN THIS CASE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION OF EVANGELINE PADAYHAG.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE CASE AT BAR.[7]
People vs Tan, G.R. No. 132324. September 28, 1999
Doctrines:
Self defense
When the accused invoke self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to
them to prove that the killing was justified and that they incurred no
criminal liability therefor. They must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
latter is weak, it could not be disbelieved after their open admission of
responsibility for the killing.
In the present case, it is incumbent upon Appellant Norly Tan to prove self-
defense. Thus, he must prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim, that the means employed to prevent it were reasonable, and
that there was lack of sufficient provocation o his part. However, he failed
to discharge this burden.
Crime and its Punishment
The killing was attended by treachery; hence, the crime was murder. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the attack on
Magdalino Olos was treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was
therefore unable to defend himself, as testified to by the prosecution
witnesses and as indicated by the wounds inflicted on him.
Culpability of Jose Tan
The prosecution was not able to establish conspiracy in the killing of the
victim; thus, Appellant Jose Tan is guilty only as an accomplice. According
to the widow Ofelio Olos, she even heard Jose Tan telling and pleading with
his brother to stop his attack and stabbing of the victim. The most therefore
that said accused could be liable for is merely that of an accomplice, who, Issue:
not being a principal cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous
and simultaneous acts, that in this case, by his stoning the victim Modesto Whether or not self defense can be used as a justifying circumstance in this
Olos and hitting him on the neck. However, the accused Jose Tans act of case.
stoning was neither a direct participation nor indispensable to the killing of Whether Jose Tan can be considered as an accomplice in this case.
the victim. Also, as held by the Supreme Court, when doubt exists whether
an accused acted as principal or accomplice, the court should favor the
lesser or milder identity (People vs. Irenea, G.R. No. 44410, August 5,
1988). Case # 47 People v. Abarri

The penalty of Appellant Jose Tan as an accomplice is one degree lower G.R. No. 90185 March 1, 1995
than that of the principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal, in its
maximum period, to death. Considering that he is entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, because he was only sixteen years old Art. 8 Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony
when the crime was committed, the trial court should have lowered his
penalty by two degrees, i.e. prision correccional maximum to prision Art. 17 Principals
mayor medium. Likewise, he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven, the imposable Doctrine/ Ruling:
penalty on Norlito Tan is reclusion perpetua.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the
Facts: agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the agreement itself may be
inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
On the 6th day of September, 1993, in Barangay Gatbo, Municipality of
Ocampo, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, Norlito Tan and Jose Tan
as an accomplice, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one The common intent of robbing the victim and committing the acts of
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, lasciviousness can be inferred from their behaviors.
assault, stone and stab with a deadly weapon one Magdaleno Rudy Olos
alias Modesto Olos, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the
different parts of his body which caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the offended party in such amount as may be Abarri and Andales each poked a knife at Gan's neck and forcibly brought
proven in court. her to the vacant lot. The other appellants followed them and watched while
Abarri divested the victim of her valuables. After robbing the victim, Abarri
On December 14, 1995, Jose Tan was arrested in Ocampo, Camarines with the use of a "balisong" tore the upper portion of the victim's blouse and
Sur. Subsequently, Norlito Tan was arrested on April 1, 1996. They both all the other appellants participated in removing her clothes, pawing her and
pleaded not guilty. biting her nipples.

The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the
acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. We find that the acts
of appellants in striping naked and hogtying the victim and touching her
private parts constitute lewd designs.
However, in the case of Andales, the acts of lasciviousness committed by
him culminated in the raping of the victim when he was left alone with her.
Nothing in the records show that the other accused had knowledge or were
aware of the rape committed by Andales. Consequently, he alone is guilty of
robbery with rape.
Likewise, we do not regard the remarks made by Cawaling to Andales
as sufficient to make him a principal by inducement or a co-
conspirator. Before a remark can produce such an effect, the same must
be of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the
determining cause of the crime, as to make the utterance a command
from a superior to a subordinate. In the case at bench, it appears that
the decision of Andales to rape the victim had been made before
Cawaling uttered the remarks. Cawaling was then leaving the place
with Abarri, Estrada and Pajalago while Andales purposely stayed
behind with the victim. There is not even a showing that Cawaling had
any moral influence over Andales.
Facts:
On October 14, 1988, at around 7:30 P.M., while Gregoria Gan was walking
along 4th Avenue, Kalookan City on her way home, Ernesto Abarri and
Ronnie Andales stopped her and each poked a knife at her neck. Abarri then
grabbed Gan's bag and warned: "Kung gusto mong mabuhay, huwag kang
sisigaw." Gan was dragged by the two and brought inside a fenced, vacant
lot strewn with garbage and covered with tall grass. Clemente Cawaling,
Conrado Estrada and Joselito Pajalago were former employees of Gan.
Once inside the vacant lot, Abarri, with the use of a "balisong, " tore the
upper portion of Gan's blouse. The other accused then started tearing the
rest of the blouse and pulling down her pants. The torn blouse was used to
tie her mouth, hands and feet. When she was completely naked, the accused
started touching her private parts.
Abarri opened Gan's handbag and took a bunch of keys, which included the
key for her store at Carmen Planas Street in Binondo, Manila. He also got
her watch valued P2,000.00, necklace valued at P5,000.00 and wallet
containing P250.00.
After robbing Gan, appellants left except Andales. Before leaving,
Cawaling told Andales: "Nognog, (referring to Andales) bahala ka na,
sampung taon na rin na hindi nakakatikim 'yan, makatas pa 'yan."
Andales then dragged Gan to a dark spot and after loosening the tie on her
legs, raped her twice. After satisfying his lust, Andales left.
Gan waited for about 20 minutes before she started to roll over to the
middle of the lot. In the process, the tie on her mouth loosened and she was
able to shout for help. Responding to her cries, neighbors came and untied
her hands.
Meanwhile, at around 8:30 P.M. of the same day, Barangay Captain Anita
Alejo was informed by a resident that somebody was opening the store of
Gan. Repairing at the place, Alejo saw Abarri and Estrada. She noticed that
the door of the store had been partly opened. When she asked the two what
they were doing there, Abarri answered that Gan instructed them to get the
latter's pants. Alejo brought them to the barangay hall for investigation.
Upon further questioning, Abarri admitted to forcibly bringing Gan to a
vacant lot and binding her arms and legs. Alejo turned over the two to the
custody of the police detachment in Binondo.
The police brought Abarri and Andales to the crime scene. However, Gan
was no longer there when they arrived. The police proceeded to Gan's house
where the latter positively identified the two as among those persons who
robbed her.
Issue:
Are the accused guilty of robbery with rape?
Case No. 48
Enrile vs. Salazar
186 SCRA 217
G.R. No. 92163 64
June 5, 1990
Intro:
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished
separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would
be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine
not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding
12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him,
even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant.
Facts:
A warrant was issued charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
The petitioner's counsel contended that the petitioner is charged with a
crime that does not exist in the statute books, therefore, the same must be
dismissed as it is just a mere flight of rhetoric.
Issue:
Whether or not under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may
properly be complexed with a common offense, murder.
#49 Santiago v Garchitorena
ART 10 RPC - Supplementing Special Laws
CONTINUING CRIME - For delito continuado to exist there should be a
plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision
violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same
instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose or aim
a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one
crime in the mind of the perpetrator.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with performing a single criminal act that of her
approving the application for legalization of 32 aliens not qualified under
the law to enjoy such privilege under EO 324, causing undue injury to one
offended party, the Government, done on a single day, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988.
According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and
identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
The information was then amended reproducing verbatim the allegation of
the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the
original information each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors
manifested that they would file only one amended information embodying
the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated
November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):

On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded
categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists
of one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications
of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization
Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the
accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical that there will not be
32 accusations but only one . . . (
ISSUE:
Is the consolidation of cases proper for violation of EO 324? / Was there
only one offense committed?
RULING:
YES. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence,
legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
Applying the concept of delito continuado
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the
same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the application or the
legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the
pen. Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion
for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury.
Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to
consolidate the 32 Amended Informations into one information charging
only one offense under the original case number,
Case # 52
Cristobal v. Labrador
G.R. No. L-47941 December 7, 1940
ABSOLUTE PARDON
DOCTRINE: Absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
FACTS: The CFI of Rizal found respondent Santos guilty of estafa,
however, he continued to be a registered elector in the city of Malabon,
Rizal and was seated as the municipal president from 1934 to 1937. On
1938, Commonwealth Act No 357 or the Election Code was approved
which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been declared by
final judgment guilty of any crime against property. The
respondent applied to the President for an absolute pardon and granted the
petition restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights, except
that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Santos
from the list of voters in precinct no. 11 of Malabon, Rizal on the ground
that the latter is disqualified. After hearing, the court denied the petition for
exclusion and declared that the pardon extended in favor of respondent has
had the effect of excluding him from the disqualification created by the
Election Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction?
54. RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
respondent. G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968
Ruling: There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses
because some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province
and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either
province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has
jurisdiction to try the case. There are, also, crimes which although all the
elements thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a single place,
yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the violation of
the law is deemed to be continuing. The crime of evasion of service of
sentence is an example of the latter kind of crime - when the prisoner in his
attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts
and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another;
for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of
acts, set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long it may be. It may not be validly said that after the convict
shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his
sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be
arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be found. Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion,
for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be
arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from confinement.
Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the
principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime evading the service of his sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against Parulan?
FACTS: Petitioner Parulan was confined in the state penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however,
was commuted to 20 years by the President. He was then transferred to Fort
Bonifacio in Makati. In October 1964, while still serving his sentence, he
escaped. He was eventually recaptured in Manila. Consequently, he was
prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence and was found
guilty. As a recourse, he filed a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus directed against respondent Director of Prisons.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO TALUSAN y
PANGANIBAN
G.R. No. 179187 July 14, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Doctrine(s): Special complex crime. Where the law provides a single
penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a
special complex crime. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision
that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate
complaints.
Mitigating Circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in single and
indivisible penalty. The presence of mitigating circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilty has no effect or disregarded incase the penalty imposable is
single and indivisible.
Automatic Review in case the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. When the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the case is automatically
forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic review. However, such
automatic review to the Supreme Court does not bar the referring of the
case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate disposition.
Searching inquiry incase of plea of guilty in a crime having a penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. There is thus no hard and
fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry." As long as
the voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea are ascertained.
Facts: In January 14, 2004, while AAA was on her way to school, appellant
kidnapped AAA by deceiving the latter that they would would go to
Jollibee, but in fact appellant brought AAA to a house in Imus, Cavite. AAA
was thereafter under appellants control and custody for eight days during
which he abused her by inserting his finger inside her vagina on a daily
basis before breakfast, despite her resistance.
AAA having failed to return home, her stepfather BBB went to search for
the former. A neighbor then informed him that he saw appellant with AAA
while the latter was on her way to school. At dawn of the following day,
January 23, 2004, appellant, who was with AAA, was apprehended.
An information for kidnapping with rape was filed against appellant by on
the basis of the report submitted by the medico legal.
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of guilty. The lower court thereupon conducted a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea, and despite repeated
questions and just as repeated answers showing that appellant understood
his plea and its consequences, the trial court still ordered the prosecution to,
as it did, present evidence.
Issue: Whether or not a searching inquiry is required in case of plea of
guilty where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment?
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Doctrines:
1 A court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court
Martial is a court akin to any other courts. The General Court
Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as
a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of
War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary.
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 10. Offenses not
subject to the provisions of this Code.Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to
such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
2 A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not
defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code. In the present
case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and
Violation of the 97th Article of War, or Conduct Prejudicial to
Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The corresponding
penalty imposed by the General Court Martial, which is two (2)
years of confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore,
absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in
the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial's
decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically
Article 29 should be applied.
3 Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987
Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through the states duly-
constituted authorities
Facts:
Major General Carlos Garcia of the AFP was charged in a Court Martial for
failure to disclose all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets
and Liabilities and Net Worth for the years 2002 and 2003. After six (6)
years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, Garcia was found
guilty of the charged offenses and was dishonorably discharged from the
service, forfeited all pay and allowances due and confined at hard labor at
such place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years.
Issue: WON the period of preventive confinement of Garcia shall be
credited to the sentence imposed by the court martial.
Ruling: Yes. Applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive
confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of
the President. The period of confinement of six years shall be credited in his
favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was
sentenced.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondnet.
G.R. No. 176504, Spetember 03, 2008
ARTICLE
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is qualified when it is,
among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence, to wit:
ART. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding article,
if committed x x x with grave abuse of confidence x x x.
The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is
deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation
and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.
Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
Qualified Theft is two degrees higher than that specified in
Article 309.
FACTS:
Ferdinand Cruz was a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the lease of cellular phones. He went to his office,
obtained a pad of official receipts from the collection officers table. He
delivered the communication equipment and received the PhP15,000.00
payment and issued a receipt even though he not authorized to receive cash
payments and issued receipts. He then failed to deliver the cash to his
office. When he was confronted, Ferdinand admitted that he deposited the
amount to his personal bank account. He was instructed to remit the amount
which he failed to do claiming that the company has paid his
reimbursements.. The company sent a demand letter which he answered
stating that he already remitted the amount to the accounting supervisor
which the latter denied. He refused to turn over the amount despite demands
made by the officers of the company which prompted the company to file
the a case of Estafa/Falsification of Documents. According to the
Information filed before the RTC of Makati, Ferdinand Cruz as a Marketing
Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. had access to the funds of the
corporation and with grave abuse of confidence, steal and carry away the
amount of PhP15,000.00. He entered a plea of not guilty during
arraignment, and the witnesses for the prosecution testified that he received
the said amount from Hemisphere-Leo Burnett and issued a receipt but
failed to turn over the amount to Porta-Phone Rentals. The prosecution
changed the case to Qualified Theft.
Ferdinand Cruz in his defense alleged that he issued an acknowledgment
receipt to Hemisphere and remitted the amount to the accounting supervisor.
He was asked by the supervisor to sign the official receipt because he was
the one who closed the deal.
The RTC found Ferdinand guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT. He filed a Motion for New Trial on the grounds of
(1) absence of a preliminary investigation for the crime of qualified theft
and (2) newly discovered evidence the testimony of a former employee of
Hemisphere testifying on Ferdinands signing of an acknowledgment
receipt. The RTC revived and reinstated the conviction of Ferdinand. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.
2 The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was
ISSUE:
1 Whether Ferdinand was denied of due process when he was
indicted for qualified theft even as he was initially investigated for
estafa/falsification of private documents.
2 Whether Ferdinands guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt.
3 Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied.
HELD:
1 Ferdinand was not denied of due process. The settled rule is that
when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have
waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it. In the instant case,
Ferdinand did not present evidence that arraignment was forced
upon him. On the contrary, he voluntarily pleaded to the charge
and actively participated in the trial of the case
3 The RTC imposed on petitioner the indeterminate penalty of 10
It is not correct for Ferdinand to claim that preliminary
investigation on the charge of qualified theft was not accorded
him. The truth is, Ferdinand was able to answer the initial charge
of estafa/falsification of private documents through his counter-
affidavits. Based on the same complaint affidavit and the same sets
of evidence presented by the complainant, the prosecutor deemed it
proper to charge Ferdinand with qualified theft. Since the same
allegations and evidence were proffered by the complainant in the
qualified theft, there is no need for Ferdinand to be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits anew, as he had already
answered said allegations when he submitted counter-affidavits for
the original indictment of estafa/falsification of private documents.
a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking
was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon
things.12 Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is
qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of
confidence, to wit:
ART. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by
the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in the next preceding article, if committed x x x with
grave abuse of confidence x x x.
The prosecution established, beyond the shadow of doubt that
Ferdinand took and kept the fifteen thousand peso-collection from
the companys client.
Years and 1 Day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 Years, 8
Months and 1 Day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
Qualified Theft is two degrees higher than that specified in Article
309. Paragraph 1 of Article 309 provides that if the value of the
thing stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed
 P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be
medium periods. In this case, the amount stolen was P15,000.00. convicted only of grave coercion.
Two degrees higher than prision mayor minimum and medium is
reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance in the commission of the offense, the maximum No Motive to "Kidnap"
period of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of 16
years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days.
The minimum penalty imposed by the RTC is correct. However,
the maximum period imposed by RTC should be increased to 16 Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore, motive becomes
years, 5 months and 11 days. material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there
is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the
accused has committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample
direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In this case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself
admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNULFO ASTORGA

G.R. No. 110097, 22 December 1997

Kidnapping or Coercion?

Introduction (Provisions involved, principles, jurisprudence):

The prosecution failed to prove one essential element of kidnapping the
fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. Under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, the elements of kidnapping are as follows:
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If
the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be
held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the prosecution merely
proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he 1 That the offender is a private individual.
 2 That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty.
3 That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4 That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present:
1 That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
five (5) days; or
2 That it committed simulating public authority; or
3 That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or
4 That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the
terms "lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar).
Lockup is included in the broader term of "detention," which refers not only
to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to
any other deprivation of liberty which does not necessarily involve locking
up. Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted
in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict
with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably
shows the absence of "locking up." It is clear that the appellant and the
victim were constantly on the move. There is no actual confinement or
restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of
kidnapping. Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her
will towards the direction of Tagum. The evidence does not show that
appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be
said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne.
There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of
kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article
286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements:
(a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it
right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party;
and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant
forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to
Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from
going home.
Brief facts:
While there was a brown out, accused or "Boy" Astorga told Yvonne Traya,
who was only eight (8) years old at that time and who stays with her
grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan, Maco, to go with Brief issues:
him to buy candy and immediately grabbed and held Yvonnes hand as the
latter did not answer, placed his hand on her shoulder, covered her mouth,
and went and walked inside the compound of Maco Elementary School, and
later, there being no person around the gate, accused brought her out to the Whether the accuseds motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya is relevant to convict
highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum which is the opposite him for the crime of kidnapping. No, motive is not relevant.
direction towards her grandparent's house at Binuangan, hence Yvonne cried
and protested that she must go home but the accused did not heed her plea.

Whether Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her

liberty so as not to convict the accused for the crime of kidnapping but only
While the accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, for grave coercion. Yes!
somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge, they met some group of
youngsters-men and the said group was suspicious about the man who was
bringing a child, thus the said group decided to follow them. Accused
hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he
carried the victim and ran but they were chased and were overtaken.
ORTEGA V. PEOPLE (CRIMINAL)

ARTICLE 12 - EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in
chasing, asked the accused where they were bound and he answered
towards Binuangan but the group noticed something suspicious because
their destination was already towards Tagum which is an opposite direction
to Binuangan.
Section 6 of RA 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility - A child 15 years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

Jonathan, one of those who chased, knew Yvonnes family and he got from
the accused Yvonne who showed some resistance, and the group brought the
accused and Yvonne to Yvonnes home at Binuangan.
A child above 15 years but below 18 years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected
to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act

ORTEGA vs PEOPLEGR No. 151085August 20, 2008


FACTS:
The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was charged with the crime of
rape
for allegedly raping AAA, who was about 8 years old. That the rape happened in 3
occasions. The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in the crime of rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC, RA 9344 Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a comprehensive system to manage
children in conflict with the law. At the case at bar, because the petitioner was a minor
under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, he can be relieved from criminal
liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance provided by the newly
enacted law on minors in conflict with law.
HELD
: Yes
RATIO
: The petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve him from criminal
liability because the law enacted was favorable to the accused, and is therefore retroactive
in application. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act provides that a child under 15 years of
age in the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability, but is
subject to an intervention program. Exemption from criminal liability, however, does not
include exemption from civil liability. Section 64 of the newly enacted law also provides
that cases of children under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate
local social welfare and development officer. The Court therefore held that
the case against Joemar Ortega is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby
referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the
appropriate intervention program
Case No. 65
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRVIN TADULAN y EPAN
G.R. No. 117407 | April 15, 1997
PADILLA, J.
DOCTRINE / RULING:
Alibi; It has been held time and again that for alibi to prosper as a defense
the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA 266). In this case,
however, it is not so situated, for according to him he was at the plant of the
Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig,
which is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the same
municipality where the crime was committed.
Rape; Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victims testimony by
questioning her behavior after she was allegedly raped. The court ruled that
it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people. The range of emotion shown by rape
victims is yet to be captured even by the calculus. It is thus unrealistic to
expect uniform reactions from rape victims.It should be borne in mind, in
this connection, that the victim was only a naive nine (9) year old child
when the crime was committed on her. She considered the accused as a
friend, almost like a relative, as in fact she called him Tito Loloy.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: (A)s regards the acts
imputed to Estela, the delay of seven (7) days from the date of her
knowledge of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to the
authorities the rape of her daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not
yet certain of the steps she would take considering the delicate nature of the
problem they were facing (citing People v. Danguilan, 218 SCRA 98;
People v. Joaquin, Jr., 225 SCRA 179). Besides, we have ruled that a delay
in prosecuting the rape is not indicative of fabricated charges.
Pardon; It is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant has not
expressly pardoned the said accused. Besides, there are authorities holding
that pardon must be granted not only by the parents of an offended minor
but also by the minor herself in order to be effective as an express pardon
under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in the case of People vs.
Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following words: Neither
must we be understood as supporting the view that the parents alone can
extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the belief that the
pardon by the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious. It was also held in
another case, that The express pardon of a person guilty of attempted
abduction of a minor, granted by the latters parents, is not sufficient to
remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the express
pardon of the girl herself. (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360).
FACTS:
Complainant Estela Santos owns a house at No. 6 Dr. Garcia St., in
Barangay Sumilang, Pasig, she resides with her common-law husband and
their minor daughter, Maristel Cruz. Behind the said house, complainant
also owns a three-door apartment building, one unit of which was rented
and occupied by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and their
three children name Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9 and 5,
respectively. In 1992 complainants daughter, Maristel Cruz was about nine
(9) year old and was in grade school. She often played with the accuseds
children in the vicinity of their house and the apartment building.
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, armed with a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one Maristel Cruz, a minor, nine (9) years old,
without her consent and against her will.
Estela Santos immediately informed the wife of Irvin Tadulan that her
husband has raped her daughter. She further informed Adefa Tadulan that
she would not take action against the latters husband if they would vacate
the apartment unit right away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with Estela
Santos and told her that she had driven away Irvin Tadulan, but requested
that she and her children be allowed to stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992.
Estela Santos thereafter noted, however, that Irvin Tadulan was still coming
home to the apartment unit every night despite the promise of his wife that
she herself would call the police should he ever come back to the place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in disregarding the defense of pardon and
alibi of the accused?
PANAGUITON, JR. v. DOJ
Facts:
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money from petitioner
Panaguiton, Jr. On January 8, 1993, Cawili and Ramon C. Tongson
(Tongson) jointly issued in favor of Panaguiton, Jr. three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Upon presentment for payment on March 18,
1993, the checks were dishonored.
On August 24, 1995, Panaguiton, Jr. filed a complaint against Cawili and
Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 before the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office. However, on March 15, 1999, Assistant City
Prosecutor Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P.
Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years starting on the date the checks
were dishonored (March 18, 1993) Panaguiton, Jr. appealed to the DOJ but
it dismissed the case on the same grounds of prescription.
The DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts
that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of
the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art.
90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses
penalized thereunder. The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,
wherein the SC ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as
amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's
office (administrative proceedings). Therefore, the filing of a complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, this
Petition for Review.
Issues:
Whether or not the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already
prescribed per Act No. 3326

Ruling:
NO.
As correctly stated by the DOJ, Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to
offenses under special laws which do not provide for their own prescriptive
periods. However, as ruled in the cases of Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim, and Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Interport Resources Corporation, et al, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. Although Panaguiton, Jr.
went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed from the time he filed his
complaint-affidavit up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control.
Notwithstanding whether or not the proceeding is a judicial proceeding or
an administrative proceeding, Panaguiton, Jr.s filing of the complaint
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG) vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ET AL.
Prescriptive period for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No.
3019, as amended)
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section
2 of Act No. 3326, as amended (Act Establishing Prescriptive Periods for
Violations of Special Laws and Municipal Ordinances), which provides that
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. overwhelm
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known
of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made (PCGG
vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo
v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no
person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions.
Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of
discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.-Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (2001)
RULING: Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the subject complaint on the ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of
NOCOSII are charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special law.
Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, increased the
prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the
aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto, where the Court held that it was well-nigh impossible for
the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged,
the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries
of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
period for the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were
charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof
and not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the same not be known'
in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean 'lack of knowledge' but that the
crime 'is not reasonably knowable' is unacceptable, as it provides an
interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written
in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for
interpretation but only application.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph
of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is
interrupted 'when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The
complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995, or
within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the
complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
FACTS: On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all
behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever
appropriate actions to be pursued thereby and Memorandum Order No. 61
expanded the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and
review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group
(TWG) were the loan transactions between Northern Cotabato Sugar
Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) and Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the
Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest
because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals after it
had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan
transactions.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador,
petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint
against respondents on April 5, 1995. Petitioner alleges that respondents
violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the
Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S.
Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a
Resolution, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the
respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto
approved the recommendation. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo, which was
approved by Ombudsman Desierto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the offense leveled against respondents has
prescribed.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM G.R. No. 158131
vs
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
August 8, 2007
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that SENCORs criminal liability was not
extinguished. The SC argued that for novation to apply there must be an
original contract to speak of. In this case, the novation does not apply
because there was no original contract that can be replaced by a new
contract changing the object or principal condition of the original contract,
substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a third person in the
rights of the creditor.
The Court observed that although novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish criminal liability, it
may prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature
of the original basic transaction, provided the novation takes place before
the filing of the Information with the trial court. In the case People v. Nery,
We held:
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to
the filing of the criminal information in court by the state
prosecutors because up to that time the original trust
relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary
creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant
in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the
justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and
instituted action in court, the offended party may no
longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the
criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The
crime being an offense against the state, only the latter
can renounce it.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is
not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code
whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the
role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of
criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that
its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as
when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or
other similar disguise is resorted to.
FACTS
respondent Martels are directors of SENCOR, an information technology
firm. Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation
mandated by its charter, RA 1161, to provide financial benefits to private
sector employees. Petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office a
complaint against Martels and their five co-accused for SENCORs non-
payment of contributions. To pay this amount, respondent Martels offered to
assign to petitioner a parcel of land in Tagaytay City. Petitioner accepted the
offer subject to the condition that respondent Martels will settle their
obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash settlement
within a reasonable time. Thus, petitioner withdrew its complaint but
reserved its right to revive the same in the event that no settlement is arrived
at. In December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote petitioner offering,
in lieu of the Tagaytay City property, computer-related services. Petitioner
filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office another complaint against
respondent Martels for SENCORs non-remittance of contributions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the concept of novation serves to abate the criminal liability
of the respondents
Part I, Case No. 70
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs.HON.
SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman,
and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006
Intro/Doctrine/Ruling:
Sec. 7 and 11 of RA 3019; Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326;
Article 91 of the RPC cannot be applied suppletorily to Act No. 3326
because such Act is not a special law within the ambit of Article 10 of the
 RPC.
1 Yes. Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable
therein shall prescribe in 15 years. But prior to the amendment of Section 11
of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982,
the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was
only ten (10) years. Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner
from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On
the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the
period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15
years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No.
3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by
and penalized under special laws. Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive
period of the offenses herein began to run from the discovery thereof or on
May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the
preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3,
2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged
offenses subject therein have already prescribed.
2 No. Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to
warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged
against him. In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner averred that PCGG
acted without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a
preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its competence. This
Court, in its resolve to deal with the merits of the case to remove the
possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes
petitioners cases in the Sandiganbayan to take declared invalid the
preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses
ascribed to Romualdez.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner assailed the validity of the
informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 considering that the same were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In
granting petitioners plea, this Court held, thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party.
The defect cannot be cured by conducting another
preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no
information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal
proceedings.
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General
Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan
in 1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings
exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
3 No. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly,
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused
from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the
accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
 Also, while it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the
Code suppletory to special laws, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit
of special law as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC because it
does not define any acts which are punishable and provides penalties for
them. Special law is defined as penal laws that punish acts not defined and
penalized by the Penal Code of the Philippines.
Thus, Art. 91 cannot apply suppletorily to Act No. 3326.
Facts: Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No.
3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period
1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical
Assistant in the DFA. He claims that the court should dismiss the criminal
cases pending against him on the ground of prescription.
The Ombudsman and the PCGG argue that that the filing of the complaint
with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987
and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989
interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from
the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period
based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code; that considering that both
RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of
Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are
silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is
absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the
same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues: 1. Whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have
already prescribed?
2 WON the filing of the complaint with the PCGG and Sandiganbayan
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period?
3 WON Article 91 of the RPC applies suppletorily to Act No. 3326, such that
it suspended the running of the prescriptive period of 10 or 15 years in RA
3019?
Case #72.
People of the Philippines vs Vergara
GR No 177763; July 3, 2013
Doctrines:
Self-Defense, elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.
A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove
all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the
elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression
is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong,
positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It "presupposes
actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and
intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to ones life."
Treachery, how manifested: the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.
Credibility of Witnesses:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the
guiding rules some of which are that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb
the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which
showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the
opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand,
and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3)
a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness.
Facts: Accused Vergara and Inocencio were charged of murder qualified by
treachery. Victim was allegedly stabbed by the accused while the latter were
causing some disturbance in the street. Exchange of words lead to the
incident initiated by the accused and the retort of the victim was not likened
by the former.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused had basis to interpose self-defense? No,
the accused had no basis to interpose self-defense. Elements are not all
present. In fact, the unlawful aggression came from the accused and not the
victim. The victim was passing in peace when they approached him and
initiated the act of killing causing the life of the victim in peril.
2. Whether or not treachery is present? Yes, treachery is present. Here,
accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw
his arm around the victims shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim
was totally unaware of the evil that would befall him. The number and
severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was
rendered immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other
than feebly raising his arm to ward off the attack.
DAYAP VS SENDIONG
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by
reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless
imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person
attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more
grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48
speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of
the definition of felonies in Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by
law committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa). Thus, the
penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision
correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years)
and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
FACTS:
Dayap allegedly drove in a reckless manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck hitting
an automobile driven by Sendiong who was with two female passengers.
Such incident caused the death of Sendiong, less serious physical injuries
on the bodies of the two female passengers and extensive damage to the
automobile. Hence, Dayap was charged with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and
Damage to Property.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC has jurisdiction to hear a criminal case involving complex They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at
crimes such as reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
physical injuries and damage to property?

RULING:
NO. When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Issue:
Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping
No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal for Ransom under Article 267 ofthe RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?
cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It
explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through Ruling: Yes
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."
It follows that criminal cases for reckless imprudence punishable Kidnapping; Elements.The crime has the following elements: (1) the
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should
fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim or a
therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person; (2) he
RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case. Consequently,
the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
People vs Mamantak
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is
GR no. 174659
committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries
July 28, 2008
are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public
Article 267 of the RPC official.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the

Facts:
victims liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it; If the
victim is a minor, or the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the
Christopher, a two-year old minor, had disappeared from mcdonalds in purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes
Binondo when his mom and his sister were ordering from the counter. On
February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman and claimed to inconsequential.
have custody of Christopher and asked forP30,000 in exchange for the boy.
 SAFEGUARD SECURITY vs. TANGCO
GR No. 165732, December 14, 2006
Austria Martinez, J.:
DOCTRINE: An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise
to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations
arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes.
Provisions mentioned: Art. 2176, 2177 of the Civil code, Article 103 of
the RPC
FACTS:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline)
went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time
deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to
carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo,
who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag
to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline
with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her
death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a
criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No.
0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to
file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon
City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated
January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with
modification as to the penalty in a Decision.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273,
Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages against Pajarillo for negligently
shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by
its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the
complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that
Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted
only in self-defense.
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's
claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's
bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the
shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office
and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on
duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence
and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter
instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted
of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to
proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and
severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that
Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of
persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but
also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully
complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA
issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s
civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the
applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising
from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been
found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to
be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under
the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no
other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the
extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from
which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil
liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father
of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable
and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for
the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard
Security is subsidiary
HELD:
YES. Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its
liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has
established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed
the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the
crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and
serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained
of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these
liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.
A reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their
right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility
for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline
under Article 2176, Civil Code. The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to
acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional.
In Elcano vs Hill, the court ruled that: Article 2176, where it refers to "fault
or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal
liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or
quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from crime. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil
case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING
SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC ENOC, WARLITO
MONTEBON,* and CIO LIMAMA, Accused,
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING
SUMILHIG, and PASOT SALOLI, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon
and Cio Limama, were charged with double murder and double frustrated
murder in an Amended Information,3 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan,
Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill with
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, simultaneously strafe the house of Eugenio
Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and RollySantander and
seriously wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which would
have caused their death had there been no timely and able medical
assistance rendered to them, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
parties.
ISSUE:

Since the civil liability was founded on a quasi-delict and not from the
WON: the crime committed is a complex crime
crime of homicide. The liability of Safeguard Security must be Solidary and
not Subsidiary.
Rulings:
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder
and double frustrated murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
death. It further ordered them to indemnify, jointlyand severally, the heirs of
Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the
surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of P50,000.00
and P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the
RTC. However, it found merit in appellants argument that the crime
committed could not have been a complex crime since the death and
injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and
distinct acts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended
Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should be
convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA
disposed ofthe case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig,
Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as follows
ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note, however, that the
Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli,
are found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of:
a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x
x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4)
months and [ten] (10) days of prision mayoras minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporalas maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the
shooting of Micel Santander and x x x are sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalas maximum. All
accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of
Crisjoy Santander and Rolly Santander the sum of P100,000.00
and the surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel
Santander P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
The appeal has no merit.
Appellants conviction was based on
their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.
True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of
Jojo for committing the crime as well as Pasots incredulous claim of
said court neither based the appellants conviction on the existence of such
motive nor on Pasots weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the
prosecution witnesses identification of appellants as the assailants, viz:
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we see
a less than glaring hint of vendetta. As part of his defense, the accused Jojo
Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred by Jerry Santander, brother
of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting the crime,
Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against
Jerry and Carlos Santander but also against their family. Thus a clear motive
for killing the Santander family has been established giving credence to
prosecution witnesses allegation that after the strafing Jojo Sumilhig
shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to wipe out the
said family became even more apparent.
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his
family, he did not file any case against them. It was only after he was
arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and Carlos Santander.
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even
as Dr. Quirapas appeared determined to rule out the possibility that he could
walk without crutches five months after his discharge, the same was based
on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain
exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself
that the healing period may vary depending on the age and physical
condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was then 23 years old.
What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang
and Remegio Santander of all of the accused.
The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig
claimed total ignorance of almost anything only served to arouse
incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write, tell time, day,
month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand
Visayan, which is of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost
every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did not know what day [it] was
when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed they
did not know the complainants or of the massacre that took place.
xxxx
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the
evasiveness by which all three accused answered in obvious effort to avoid
criminal responsibility. Behind the faade of ignorance and lack of
education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe
innocence to the accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness
characterize their testimonies.
All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the
positive and spontaneous identification of the assailants/accused by credible
witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio Santander.15
There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Marios identification of the
appellants considering that (1) Jerry was just six meters away from
them;16 (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all the accused
as most of them are his relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he
was small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive
assertions of prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the
accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more credence and [are] entitled
to greater evidentiary weight."19
Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that
"[a]libi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible
witness."20
There was conspiracy among the accused.
"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."21 It is not
necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a
crime.22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated,
or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such leadto a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest."23
Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there
is a series of events that clearly established conspiracy among them. First,
they were all armed with firearms. Second, they surreptitiously approached
the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of the intended
victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased
firing at the same time and fled together. Undoubtedly, their acts before,
during and immediately after strafing the house of Eugenio evince their
unanimity in design, intent and execution.24 Treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods orforms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself
arising from [any] defense which the offended party might make."25
Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of
the assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any
defense of their persons. This is considering that the victims were unaware
that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their
firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack,
without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x x in such
a position that they could not have defended themselvesfrom the aggression
x x x."26
The crime committed is two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated
murder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN
GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants,
or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender
to the victim.23 All the elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim,
was killed by accused-appellant, his own son.
The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties
of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, namely,
voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant was proper.
FACTS:
The said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to
kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside
their residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and
unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner
and form in the execution thereof which tender directly and specially to
insure its commission without danger to the person of said accused, the
result of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on
his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-
appellant guilty of Parricide based on his verbal admission that he killed his
father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-appellant's admission was
inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still
able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken
collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the brutal
killing of his father.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged despite the prosecution's failure to overthrow the constitutional
presumption of innocence in his favor.