The Illusion of Control, Superstitious

Belief, and Optimism

JEFFREY RUDSKI
Muhlenberg College
Two hundred and seventy five participants each filled out three questionnaires exam-
ining the illusion of control, optimism/pessimism, and paranormal belief. The illu-
sion of control was related to overall paranormal belief, an effect primarily due to the
superstition and precognition sub-scales on the PBS-R. Optimism was positively and
pessimism negatively related to religiosity on the PBS-R, and pessimism was also
positively related to the superstition sub-scale. No relationships between optimism
or pessimism and the illusion of control were observed. Results are discussed in terms
of superstition and the illusion of control both arising from circumstances that are
inherently random or uncontrollable, and how multiple definitions of optimism or
superstition could have effected the results.

Two seemingly opposite sets of results have been reliably observed when people are
faced with uncontrollable outcomes. On the one hand, there are reports of learned help-
lessness, characterized by decreased motivation and cognitive capacity (Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975). Conversely, Matute (1994,
1995) demonstrated that participants faced with an uncontrollable task tended to re-
spond according to superstitious behavior and generate an illusion of control (i.e., the
erroneous belief that one can influence outcomes in situations under which one has no
control, see Langer, 1975). Similar superstitious behavior in the face of uncontrollable
reinforcement has frequently been reported in the literature (e.g., Skinner, 1948; Ono,
1987; Wright, 1962; Rudski, Lischner, & Albert, 1999).
These two sets of results appear contradictory. Matute (1994) suspected that the dis-
crepant results (i.e., learned helplessness versus an illusion of control) arise from proce-
dural differences. For instance, in Hiroto and Seligman's study, participants were given
failure feedback in the form of turning on a light each time a response failed to produce
the desired outcome. Conversely, failure feedback was not part of the procedure in
studies where superstitious responding was observed. Matute suggested that the cogni-
tive deficits observed in Hiroto and Seligman's study could be due to alternative expla-
nations such as experimentally induced failure (e.g., Buchwald, 1978), egotism (Frankel
& Snyder, 1978), or even extinction due to never having responses followed by desired
outcomes. Finally, she suggested that learned helplessness and superstition (and the
illusion of control) might represent opposite ends of the same continuum, with various
factors and conditions determining which if either would be manifested following expo-
sure to uncontrollable outcomes.
Even under procedures conducive to its development, learned helplessness is usually
observed in only two-thirds of human participants (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
Current Psychology:Developmental,Learning, Personality,Social.Winter 2004, Vol.22, No. 4, pp. 306-
315.
Rudski 307

1978; Seligman, 1990; Thornton & Jacobs, 1978; and Hiroto, 1974). Moreover, for
some participants helplessness is only transitory, whereas it can be quite persistent in
others. To account for these individual differences, several personality factors have been
hypothesized to play a role in mediating helplessness.
First, the degree of a participants' belief in the paranormal may modify whether or
not learned helplessness develops. Dudley (1999) had participants attempt to solve ana-
grams following exposure to either solvable or unsolvable problems. Results showed
that following unsolvable problems, the number of anagrams solved was positively
related to level of paranormal beliefs. Moreover, paranormal beliefs increased follow-
ing exposure to unsolvable, but not solvable problems. Dudley concluded that the adop-
tion of paranormal beliefs can work to prevent the performance impairment often observed
after instances of uncontrollability and failure.
A second factor that might influence the development of helplessness is an individual's
explanatory or attributional style (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Attributional
style can be thought of as the beliefs that people carry to explain why certain
environmental events occur following their behaviors. Negative or pessimistic styles
are linked to increased susceptibility to learned helplessness and depression, whereas
positive or optimistic styles may provide "immunity" to helplessness or depression
(Seligman, 1990).
Several sets of studies suggest relationships between attributional style, optimism,
and perceived controllability. Alloy and Abramson (1979) reported that depressed people
(assumed to have a negative or pessimistic attributional style) were much less likely to
show an illusion of control in a task where there was no contingency between their
behavior and desired outcomes than were non-depressed participants. When combined
with reports linking helplessness to depression (e.g., Seligman, 1990), these findings
support the notion that learned helplessness and the illusion of control are in some way
opposites.
In studies examining relationships between optimism and controllability, optimistic
bias is typically examined by having people make judgments regarding the comparative
likelihood of future events. For example, participants might be asked about their chances
of getting into an automobile accident relative to the average person. Sample means
typically reveal above average estimates of positive outcomes (e.g., owning a large
house), and below average estimates of negative outcomes (e.g., having a heart attack),
particularly in instances where there is a high degree of perceived controllability (for
reviews see Harris, 1996; McKenna, 1993). Similar patterns of results have been inter-
preted as suggesting that people tend to be optimistically biased towards events believed
to be controllable (e.g., Harris, 1996; Hoorens, 1994). In terms of dispositional tenden-
cies, it might follow that there is a relationship between an illusion of control and
optimism.
The current study examined the interrelationships between perceived controllability,
optimism, pessimism, and superstition. It is hypothesized that the illusion of control,
superstition, and optimism will be positively related.
308 Current Psychology / Winter 2004

METHODS

Participants

Two hundred and seventy five undergraduate students (169 female and 106 male, age
range 18-25 years old) at an American liberal arts college participated in the study.
Participants were treated in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of Psychologists
and Code of Conduct" (American Psychological Association, 1992) and the institution's
Internal Review policy. Six participants did not fill out the Illusion of Control survey
(see below). Surveys were disseminated at the end of various classes. Approximately
half of the participants received course participation credits, while the other half filled
out the surveys on a voluntary basis (dependent upon the professor). A written debrief-
ing statement was disseminated to participants.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed a three-part survey in a group setting. The first part allowed
for the inference of the illusion of control. Participants were told to imagine that they
had three lottery tickets: Ticket "A" was selected with their "lucky numbers." Ticket
"B" was found blowing down the street. The numbers on Ticket "C" were selected by a
computer. They were then asked (1) which ticket they would be most likely to give
away, (2) which ticket they would be most likely to keep, and (3) whether or not they
would exchange Ticket "A" ("lucky numbers") for two Ticket "C's" (computer gener-
ated). For the first two questions, participants were given the option of responding "no
preference." This procedure is based on one of Langer's (1975) studies in her seminal
paper on the illusion of control. In her study, participants either chose their own lottery
ticket or were handed one by the experimenter. Langer's dependent measure was whether
or not a participant would be willing to exchange their ticket for another. She found that
participants who selected their own tickets attached higher value to them than did par-
ticipants who were handed their tickets by the experimenter despite the odds of winning
being identical in each condition, suggesting an illusion of control.
Optimism was assessed with the O/P instrument (Dember & Brooks, 1989; Dember,
Martin, Hummer, Howe, & Melton, 1989). This measure was selected because it has
been found to be both reliable and valid, and it provides separate scores for dispositional
optimism and pessimism, which have been shown to be partially independent (Hummer,
Dember, Melton, & Schefft, 1992). Thus, in addition to examining relationships be-
tween optimism, the illusion of control and superstition, examination of pessimism in
relation to these constructs was possible.
Superstitious belief was assessed with Tobacyk's Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(1988). Participants rate their level of agreement with 26 statements (anchors 1 = strongly
disagree to 7 = strongly agree) relating to various paranormal beliefs. The Revised
Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS-R) has seven sub-scales that include religiosity, psi-belief
(e.g., telekinesis), witchcraft, superstition (e.g., bad luck stemming from black cats or
broken mirrors), spiritualism (e.g., reincarnation), extraordinary life (e.g., the Loch
Rudski 309

Ness Monster), and precognition, as well as a composite score based on the sum of
responses on all the questions. Moreover, considerable evidence supports the reliability
and discriminant validity of the sub-scales (see Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b).

RESULTS

Illusion of Control. Summary data for responses to the lottery ticket questions are
presented in Table 1. Many participants demonstrated responses consistent with an illu-
sion of control. The computer-generated lottery ticket was the one most likely to be
given up, and the ticket chosen with "lucky numbers" was the one most likely to be kept.
Conversely, the ticket chosen with lucky numbers was the least likely to be given up
while the computer-generated ticket was the least likely to be kept. Finally the illusion
of control can be inferred in responses to the question dealing with exchanging a ticket
with numbers specifically selected by participants for two tickets with numbers selected
randomly by a computer. Forty-three percent of the participants reported that despite
doubling their odds of winning, they would not exchange the ticket. Several t-tests were
conducted to compare these two groups of participants (i.e., those who would and those
who would not exchange their tickets). These two groups did not differ in terms of
optimism or pessimism, but they did show differences on the PBS-R. Those who would
not exchange their ticket scored higher on the PBS-R composite (t (269) = 2.31, p =
0.02), as well as on the superstition and precognition sub-scales (t (269) = 4.07, p
=0.0001 and t (269) = 3.34, p =0.001, respectively).
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) compared various dependent measures with respect
to the ticket that participants would choose to give away or to keep. There were no
statistically significant differences between participants choosing to give away Ticket A,

Table 1
Summary of Responses on the Illusion of Control Questions.

Personal numbers Found ticket Computer Generated No difference

Question n % n % n % n %

Which ticket 22 8.2 79 29.4 | 19 43. l 52 19.3

would you
exchange?

Which ticket 136 50.6 61 22.7 27 10.0 45 16.7

would you
keep?

Yes No
n % n %

Would you 151 56.1 118 43.9

exchange your
ticket?
310 Current Psychology / Winter 2004

B, C, or having no preference in terms of optimism, pessimism, or any of the scales or

composite of the PBS-R (although religiosity and precognition approached significance
with p =0.056 and p =0.08, respectively). Several statistically significant differences
were obtained when comparing the tickets which participants would choose to keep.
These included the composite PBS-R score (F (3,263) = 3.71, p =0.01), precognition
(F (3,263) = 3.58, p =0.01) and spiritualism (F (3,263) = 3.44, p =0.01). Post hoc
analyses using Fisher's Least Squares Differences revealed that the difference in the
composite PBS-R and in pre-cognition scores were due to the participants who reported
no preference in which ticket they would keep scoring lower than the other three groups.
Participants choosing to keep a computer-generated ticket (C) or one found blowing
down the street (B) scored higher than other groups on the spiritualism sub-scale.

Optimism and Pessimism

Mean scores for optimism, pessimism, and paranormal belief are summarized in
Table 2. As would be expected, optimism and pessimism correlated negatively with each
other (r (275) = -.621, p <0.0001). Neither optimism nor pessimism showed significant
correlations with the composite score on the PBS-R. They did, however, correlate with
the religiosity sub-scale. In examining these correlations, one must be mindful of direc-
tionality since low scores on the optimism scale reveal an optimistic orientation, and
low scores on the pessimism scale reveal a pessimistic orientation. People tending to-
wards optimism also tended to have traditional religious beliefs (r (275) = - 0.276, p <
0.001). Conversely, people tending towards pessimism tended to score lower on tradi-
tional religiosity (r (275) = 0.226, p <0.001). Pessimism was also weakly correlated
with a higher degree of acceptance of superstitious beliefs (e.g., "breaking a mirror
brings seven years of bad luck") (r (275) = - 0.176, p = 0.003). Finally, optimism was
weakly associated with belief in precognition (r (275) = - 0.121, p =0.045). Correla-
tions are summarized in Table 3.
T-tests were conducted on median splits for optimism and pessimism (Table 4) scores.
Statistical significance pretty much mirrored that revealed by the correlational analyses.

Table 2
Mean Scores for Optimism, Pessimism, and Items on the PBS-R.

Measure M SD

Optimism 36.26 (6.59)

Pessimism 51.96 (7.11)
Religiosity 5.22 (1.39)
Psi-belief 3.46 (1.24)
Witchcraft 3.25 (1.46)
Superstition 2.26 (1.03)
Spiritualism 3.50 (1.40)
Extraordinarylife 3.00 ( 1.22)
Precognition 3.40 (1.36)
PBS-R (total) 91.08 (23.13)
Rudski 311

Table 3
Correlations between Optimism, Pessimism, and Paranormal Belief.

Measure Optimism Pessimism

Religiosity -.276 *** .226 ***

Psi-belief -.013 .081
Witchcraft .047 .035
Superstition .064 -.176 **
Spiritualism -.012 .051
Extraordinary life -.069 .083
Precognition -. 121" .055
PBS-R (total) -.088 .088

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p< 0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4
T-tests on the Median Splits for Optimism and for Pessimism.

Optimism Pessimism IOC

Measure t p t p t p

Religiosity 3.15 .002 -2.86 .005 .279 .780

Psi-belief 0.259 .796 -.362 .718 -1.17 .243
Witchcraft -. 124 .902 .084 .933 -.982 .327
Superstition -.912 .362 2.32 .021 -4.07 .0001
Spiritualism -.345 .730 -.864 .388 - 1.34 .181
Extraordinary life .083 .934 -.638 .524 -.370 .712
Precognition .531 .596 .127 .899 -3.34 .001
PBS-R (total) .663 .508 -.608 .544 -2,31 .022

People reporting more optimism scored higher on religiosity than people reporting less
optimism (t (275) = 3.15, p =0.002). People reporting more pessimism scored lower on
religiosity (t (275 = -2.86, p =0.005) and higher on superstition (t (275) = 2.32, p
=0.02) than those reporting less pessimism.

DISCUSSION

People demonstrating an illusion of control showed greater levels of overall paranor-

mal beliefs. This increase was due primarily to two of the seven sub-scales on the PBS-
R. Illusion of control was related to belief in socially shared superstitions (e.g., black
cats, the number "13" and breaking mirrors being unlucky) and precognition, but not to
religiosity, psi-belief, witchcraft, spiritualism, or belief in extraordinary life forms.
Moreover, people who exhibited an illusion of control were not likely to be more or less
optimistic or pessimistic than people who did not exhibit such an illusion.
The relationships between the illusion of control and superstition and precognition
are not surprising. Vyse (1997) sums up their relationship by writing that "if there is a
universal truth about superstition, it is that superstitious behavior emerges as a result of
312 Current Psychology / Winter 2004

uncertainty--to circumstances that are inherently random or uncontrollable" (p. 201).

Random and uncontrollable circumstances are also the antecedent conditions for the
display of the illusion of control. The adoption of an illusion of control or of supersti-
tious beliefs or behaviors may simply be some people's way of dealing with uncertainty.
Furthermore, belief in precognition also adds a degree of predetermined certainty to an
otherwise unknowable future, and may be an additional part of this coping mechanism.
It is interesting to note that participants who revealed no bias in terms of which
lottery ticket they would choose to keep also had the lowest group mean on the compos-
ite PBS-R score. Thus, the individuals whose responses mirrored the actual statistical
probability were also the least likely to embrace paranormal beliefs.
The illusion of control is frequently presented as a demonstration of unwarranted
optimism in controlling the uncontrollable (e.g., Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989). At first
glance, the current results seem to contradict these relationships; the illusion of control
was in no way related to scores on the O/P instrument. These results also appear contrary
to literature showing links between perceived controllability and optimistic bias. As was
mentioned in the Introduction, people frequently underestimate the likelihood of expe-
riencing negative events and overestimate the likelihood of experiencing positive events--
an effect which generally increases with perceived controllability (McKenna, 1993).
One possible accounting of these discrepancies may be that they reflect differences
between different types of optimism. One possible distinction is Peterson's (2000) con-
cepts of little and big optimism. For example, Peterson writes that "little optimism
subsumes specific expectations and positive outcomes: for example ... I will find a
convenient parking space this evening. Big optimism refers to----obviously--larger and
less specific expectations: for example ... Our nation is on the verge of something great"
(p. 49). He points out that these two types of optimism may actually function differ-
ently. Big optimism may be a dispositional tendency filled in by culture that produces a
general state of well-being and energy. Conversely, little optimism may result from an
individual's learning history, and may influence behavior in a much more specific man-
ner. The illusion of control questions in the current study are more likely to be related to
little optimism, as winning a lottery is an instance of a specific expectation of a positive
outcome. Dember's O/P instrument may be more likely to measure big optimism thus
making correlations with the illusion of control fairly moot, or at the very least be non-
discriminatory between the two types and thus adding extra variability to the data. The
development of scales measuring little and big optimism will allow these hypotheses to
be addressed.
Types of optimism may also be differentiated with regard the degree of perceived
control that one has over a positive outcome. Literature on the optimistic bias often
deals with responses on questions that are all in some way (or to some degree) related to
personal control (e.g., catching a disease, having a heart attack, owning a house). On the
other hand, optimism may be more generally concerned with an expectancy of positive
outcomes, independent of the source of those outcomes (McKenna, 1993). For example,
consider the O/P item "Every cloud has a silver lining." Such an item is independent of
personal control, but is related to positive expectations. McKenna (1993) argues that the
optimistic bias as assessed by studies examining unrealistic optimism may be looking at
Rudski 313

a specific type of optimism--namely that associated with events containing some modi-
cum of perceived controllability--as opposed to a more general form of optimism. The
same distinction can be made between the different types of optimism involved in the
illusion of control literature. In those studies, participants were actively engaged in
specific tasks in which they were asked to assess how much control they had over
illuminating a light--clearly a task involving some degree of perceived controllability.
Future studies should address how agency-related and agency-independent optimism
relate to superstition or the illusion of control.
The current results are consistent with those reported by McKenna (1993) who ar-
gued for a distinction between optimistic bias and the illusion of control. In a series of
studies, McKenna demonstrated an illusion of control with no evidence on unrealistic
optimism. For example, people reported decreased probabilities relative to others of
being in automobile accidents if they were driving a car, but probabilities of being in an
accident equal to that of others if they were the hypothetical passengers. Our results
show that the illusion of control is uncorrelated with our measure of optimism or pessi-
mism. Thus, like McKenna, the illusion of control may be evident without accompany-
ing optimism.
This study also failed to find an expected relationship between optimism and super-
stitious belief. If anything, this study revealed a small but significant correlation be-
tween pessimism and superstitious belief. The expected relationship was based upon
prior research that showed a positive correlation between participants' superstitious pat-
terns of responding on an operant task and the belief that they could improve their
performance if allowed to repeat the task (Rudski, 2001). It is possible that the hypoth-
esis was not borne out because of two different definitions of optimism are at work. If
one has adopted a superstitious response or belief during the operant task, the notion that
the task is controllable is a likely assumption and as such the belief that one's perfor-
mance can improve with experience can be expected. This belief in better future perfor-
mance on a specific task is more akin to little optimism than big optimism. It is also
possible that the lack of an observed correlation between superstition and optimism
may be because of different definitions of superstition. If superstition is defined as
engaging in superstitious behaviors such as those observed in unnecessary patterns
of stereotyped behavior observed in operant studies, then superstition would be
closely linked to an illusion of control since the people engaging in these patterns
may actually believe that they are controlling an outcome. Indeed, they may not
even see their behavior as superstitious. Conversely, if we define superstition as a
belief in external forces outside our control, then it would be the more passive (and
likely more pessimistic) people who would develop superstition. Research hinting
towards a relationship between "passive" superstitious beliefs and pessimism is
suggested by reports of positive correlations between degree of external locus of
control and self-oriented superstitions, paranormal and irrational beliefs (e.g., Peterson,
1978; Tobacyk, Nagot, & Miller, 1988; Tobacyk & Tobacyk, 1992). Moreover, opti-
mism has been associated with an internal locus of control and pessimism with an exter-
nal locus of control (e.g., Dember et al, 1989). It is possible that pessimistic individuals
(who are likely more "external") may often find themselves in situations that are per-
314 Current Psychology / Winter 2004

ceived to be beyond their control, allowing for some types of superstitious beliefs pro-
viding a sense of controllability.
Optimism and Pessimism were related to some of the sub-scales of paranormal be-
lief. Optimists tended to report higher degrees of religiosity, and pessimists tended to
report lower levels of religiosity. Previous relationships between optimism and religios-
ity have been reported (e.g., Sethi and Seligman, 1993, 1994; Dember et al., 1989;
Dember & Brooks, 1989). One can easily speculate that religiosity offers an attractive
answer to finding meaning in an often-confusing existence (see Dember, 1974), and that
such answers are often optimistic in nature with promises of eternal life. Unlike the
current results, prior examinations of the relationship between pessimism and religiosity
reported non-significant correlations (e.g., Dember & Brooks, 1989; Dember et. al,
1989). The disparate results between the current and prior studies on the relationship
between religiosity and pessimism need to be further elucidated.
In sum, paranormal beliefs such as precognition and socially shared superstitions are
associated with the illusion of control. Superstition is also associated with a general
form of pessimism, possibly due to some superstitions providing a sense of controllabil-
ity in people who frequently exhibit an external locus of control. Future relationships
between these constructs should address how different types of optimism and different
types of superstition might relate to each other and to the illusion of control.

NOTES

Accepted for publication: October 20, 2002

Address for correspondence: Dr. Jeffrey Rudski, Department of Psychology, Muhlenberg
College, 2400 Chew Street, Allentown, PA 18104. E-mail: rudski@muhlenberg.edu

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