1.
MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of
Inc.
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent
received from petitioner a notice
requesting the former to open its private
road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular
traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the
same day, respondent was apprised that
the perimeter separating the subdivision
from Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for
injunction against petitioner, praying for
the issuance of a TRO and preliminary
injunction enjoining the opening of
Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open
Neptune Street to public traffic as an
agent of the state endowed with police
power.
HELD:
A local government is a political
subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs. It is a body
politic and corporate one endowed
with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to
the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It
empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to
enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the [province, city or
municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant
to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers]
provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Unlike the legislative
authority in RA 7924 that allows the
MMDA to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is
merely a development authority and
not a political unit of government since it
is neither an LGU or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. The
MMDA Chairman is not an elective
official, but is merely appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of
a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the LGUs, acting through
their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police
power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
City did not pass any ordinance or
resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by the MMDA is illegal.
2. Cordillera Broad Coalition v
Commission on Audit
Facts:
Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed
on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and the
Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed
that the Cordillera people shall not
undertake their demands through armed
and violent struggle but by peaceful
means, such as political negotiations.
A subsequent joint agreement was then
arrived at by the two parties. Such
agreement states that they are to:
Par. 2. Work together in drafting an
Executive Order to create a preparatory
body that could perform policy-making
and administrative functions and
undertake consultations and studies
leading to a draft organic act for the
Cordilleras.
Par. 3. Have representatives from
the Cordillera panel join the study group
of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive passed and the autonomous region
Order. created. At this time, the President was
Pursuant to the above joint still exercising legislative powers as the
agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a First Congress had not yet convened.
panel of the Philippine government and
of the representatives of the Cordillera Based on Article X Section 18 of the
people. This was then signed into law by Constitution (providing the basic
President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise structure of government inthe
of her legislative powers, creating the autonomous region), the Supreme
Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], Court finds that E. O. No. 220 did not
which covers the provinces of Abra, establish anautonomous regional
Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and government. The bodies created by E. O.
Mountain Province and the City of No. 220 do not supplant theexisting local
Baguio. governmental structure; nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of merely constitute the mechanism
E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by for an "umbrella" that brings
issuing the said order, the President, together the existing
in the exercise of her legislative localgovernments, the agencies of the
powers, had virtually pre-empted National Government, the ethno-
Congress from its mandated task of linguistic groups or tribesand non-
enacting an organic act and created an governmental organizations in a
autonomous region in the Cordilleras concerted effort to spur
development in theCordilleras.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional In fact, it was Republic Act No. 6766, the
organic act for the Cordillera autonomous
Ruling: region signed into law on October 23,
The Supreme Court has come to the 1989, and the plebiscite for the approval
conclusion that petitioners are of the act which completed the
unfounded. autonomous region-creating process
outlined in the Constitution.
E.O. 220 does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. Therefore, E.O. 220 is constitutional.
It merely provides for transitory Petition is dismissed for lack of merit
measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the 3. Ganzon v CA
creation of an autonomous region. In Facts: Furthermore, we may already take
short, it prepares the ground for judicial notice of the recently-approved
autonomy. This does not necessarily Local Government Code of 1991 (recently
conflict with the provisions of the signed into law by the President) 18
Constitution on autonomous regions. which provides (as to imposition of
preventive suspensions) as follows:
The Constitution outlines a complex Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension
procedure for the creation of an xxx xxx xxx
autonomous region in the Cordilleras. b) . . . that, any single preventive
Since such process will undoubtedly take suspension of local elective official shall
time, the President saw it fit to provide not extend beyond sixty (60) days:
for some measures to address the urgent Provided, further that in the event that
needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime several administrative cases are filed
that the organic act had not yet been against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than
ninety (90) days within a single year on
the same ground or grounds existing and
known at the time of the first suspension.
(emphasis supplied)
The main decision refers to the three (3)
suspension orders the first, the second
and the third. As shown earlier, the first
and the third orders have already been
served. It is only the second order which
seems to have been unserved. If we
follow the decision which states that the
three (3) suspensions are affirmed, there
appears to be no reason why the second
order should not be served for another
60-day period. However, there is no
cogent reason why, under the bizarre
circumstances of this case where the
respondent Secretary has chosen to
impose preventive suspensions
piecemeal, instead of consolidating the
several administrative cases of similar
nature and close vintage we cannot
allow the concept of simultaneous
service to apply to the second order (as
we did in the third order). It would follow
then that the second order is also fully
served to this date for the service of said
second order would have started on 5
August 1991 (when the main decision
was rendered as this was the time when
this Court found and affirmed the validity
of the three (3) suspension orders,
including the second order). The 60-day
period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4
October 1991.
It appears that as to the second
preventive suspension, petitioner
manifested that there is still an existing
preliminary injunction issued by the RTC
of Iloilo City, Branch 33 in Special Civil
Action No. 18312, entitled Ganzon vs.
Santos, et al. 20
One may ask as to the status of the case
pending with the RTC, Iloilo City, Branch
33 insofar as the said case involves the
issue on the validity of the second
preventive suspension order. Under the
main decision of this Court, dated 5
August 1991, second preventive
suspension has been affirmed; under the
present resolution, said second
preventive suspension has been served.
Consequently, Special Civil Action No.
18312 before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City has been rendered moot and
academic, insofar as the second
preventive suspension order is
concerned.
Issue: When will petitioner Ganzon may
be allowed to re-assume his position and
duties as mayor of Iloilo City. Is it only
after 19 October 1991 as claimed by
respondents, or at some earlier date?
The answer to this question would
depend on how petitioner has served the
preventive suspension orders issued
against him.
Decision: As to the petition (docketed CA-
G. R. SP No. 25840) filed with the Court
of Appeals, which involves the question
of the validity of the fourth order, and
which has clearly been served, petitioner
admitted that he filed it, on the belief
that it was the proper remedy for his
reinstatement to office; thinking that his
suspensions have been served and
ended. 21 As we have ruled that
petitioner has served the suspension
orders decreed in the main decision and
in the light of the finding of this Court
that the fourth preventive suspension
order has been served, the issues raised
in CA-G.R. SP No. 25840; have also
become moot and academic, warranting
dismissal thereof.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion of
petitioner, dated 7 September 1991 is
hereby GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order dated 5 September
1991 is hereby LIFTED. Respondents are
ordered to allow petitioner to re-assume
his office as elected Mayor of Iloilo City
effective immediately.
The Court of Appeal is directed to dismiss
CA-G.R. SP No. 25840 for having become
moot and academic. The Region Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 before
which petitioner's action for prohibition
(Special Civil Action No. 18312) is
pending is also ordered to dismiss the
said case for having become moot and
academic insofar as petitioner prays
therein to enjoin his (second) preventive
suspension.
This resolution is without prejudice to the
administrative cases (where the first,
second, third and fourth preventive
suspension orders were issued)
proceeding on the merits thereof. Also, as
decreed in the main decision of 5 August
1991.
. . . petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon,
may not be made to serve future
suspensions on account of any of the
remaining administrative charges
pending against him for acts committed
prior to August 11, 1988. . . .
4. LIMBONA V MANGELIN
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar
Limbona, was elected Speaker of the
Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly). On October 21, 1987
Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives,
invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in
a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted
the invitation and informed the Assembly
members through the Assembly
Secretary that there shall be no session
in November as his presence was needed
in the house committee hearing of
Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where
he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void
and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further
proceedings of the case, the SC received
a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership
therefrom. Respondents argue that
petitioner had "filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of
the Assembly on a question which should
have been resolved within the confines of
the Assembly," for which the respondents
now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic" because its
resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the courts of law
have jurisdiction over the autonomous
governments or regions. What is the
extent of self-government given to the
autonomous governments of Region XII?
Held: Autonomy is either decentralization
of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central
government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order
to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only
to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments
with his own. Decentralization of power,
on the other hand, involves an abdication
of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart
its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central
authorities.
An autonomous government that enjoys
autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone
to the decree of the organic act creating
it and accepted principles on the effects
and limits of "autonomy." On the other
hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense,
its acts are, debatably beyond the
domain of this Court in perhaps the same
way that the internal acts, say, of the
Congress of the Philippines are beyond
our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in
the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential
Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us
that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense
(decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,
in the first place, mandates that "[t]he
President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with
more reason can we review the
petitioner's removal as Speaker.
This case involves the application of a
most
important constitutional policy and
principle, that of local autonomy. We
have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of
centralized power in Malacaang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of
autonomy.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that
the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions
were invalid. It is true that under Section
31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
"[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook". But while this
opinion is in accord with the respondents'
own, we still invalidate the twin sessions
in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not
a settled matter whether or not he could
do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives
provided a plausible reason for the
intermission sought. Also, assuming that
a valid recess could not be called, it does
not appear that the respondents called
his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in
an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side.
For this reason, we uphold the "recess"
called on the ground of good faith.
5. Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued
EO No. 48 establishing the Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization
to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005,
OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were
approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6,
1999. The guidelines formulated by the
Oversight Committee required the LGUs
to identify the projects eligible for
funding under the portion of LGSEF and
submit the project proposals and other
requirements to the DILG for appraisal
before the Committee serves notice to
the DBM for the subsequent release of
the corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of
Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999,
2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each
corresponding year the amount of
P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government
Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release
thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution
and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a withholding of
a portion of the IRA they effectively
encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the
Constitution, the State shall ensure the
local autonomy of local governments.
Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, the Constitution confines the
Presidents power over the LGUs to one
of general supervision, which has been
interpreted to exclude the power of
control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes
supervision from control: control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act
the officer has the discretion to order his
subordinate to do or redo the act, or
decide to do it himself; supervision
merely sees to it that the rules are
followed but has no authority to set down
the rules or the discretion to
modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the
distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF
is part of the IRA or just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of
the Constitution mandates that the just
share shall be automatically released to
the LGUs. Since the release is automatic,
the LGUs arent required to perform any
act to receive the just share it shall autonomy they enjoy. Our national
be released to them without need of
further action. To subject its distribution
& release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules & regulations as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this
constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the
mandatory automatic release of the LGUs
IRA is if the national internal revenue
collections for the current fiscal year is
less than 40% of the collections of the
3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception
does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is
limited to the implementation of the LGC
of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the
same, and neither can it exercise control
over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the
provisions of the LGC but only through a
separate law and not through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress
cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in a separate
legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special
type of legislation, whose content is
limited to specified sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a
separate fiscal unit any provision
therein which is intended to amend
another law is considered an
inappropriate provision.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs
fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of
general & substantive law. To permit the
Congress to undertake these
amendments through the GAAs would
unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of
the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of
democracy is measured by the degree of
officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local
autonomy but should also appreciate the
spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.
6. Mathay vs CA
FACTS:
In November 1972, Presidential Decree
No. 51 was signed into law. PD 51
created a Civil Service Unit (CSU) office
in cities. Pursuant to said law, then
Quezon City mayor Brigido Simon
appointed officers in the QC-CSU.
Meanwhile, an ordinance in QC was
passed providing, among others, that the
personnel of the CSU shall be
automatically absorbed into the QC
Department of Public Order and Safety
(QC-DPOS). During the term of the next
mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., it was
determined that PD 51 never became a
law because it was never published.
Mathay then did not renew the contracts
of the QC-CSU personnel, at the same
time, they were not reappointed to the
QC-DPOS. Mathay was then sued by the
QC-CSU personnel before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). Eventually,
the CSC Commissioner ruled that based
on the QC ordinance, Mathay should
reinstate the CSU-personnel to QC-DPOS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the CSC
Commissioner is correct
HELD:
No. The ordinance is invalid for when it
provided for automatic absorption of the
QC-CSU personnel to the QC-DPOS, it
divested the mayor the power to choose
as to who should fill said office. Just like
in the national government, the local
sanggunian can only create an office, it
cannot choose the personnel who should
fill such office that is a power vested in
the local chief executive (mayor). This is
also clearly provided for in the Local
Government Code. The power to appoint
is vested in the local chief executive. The
power of the city council or sanggunian,
on the other hand, is limited to creating,
consolidating and reorganizing city
officers and positions supported by local
funds. The city council has no power to
appoint. Had Congress intended to grant
the power to appoint to both the city
council and the local chief executive, it
would have said so in no uncertain terms.
On the other hand, the CSC
Commissioner cannot order the mayor to
reinstate the QC-CSU personnel to the
QC-DPOS. Such would be an
encroachment of the mayors right to
choose as to who should be appointed.
Further, the CSU never came into
existence for it has no legal basis to
speak of. It created no right hence the
QC-CSU cannot invoke any. It is axiomatic
that the right to hold public office is not a
natural right. The right exists only by
virtue of a law expressly or impliedly
creating and conferring it.
7. Basco vs PAGCOR
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR
charter PD 1869 for being allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and
order, monopolistic & tends toward
crony economy, waiving the Manila
City governments right to impose taxes
& license fees, and violating the equal
protection clause, local autonomy and
other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear & unequivocal breach of
the Constitution. The grounds for nullity
must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is
a wise legislation is up for Congress to
determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling
through the grant of franchises, licenses
or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and
is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to
demand/collect license fees is no longer
vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government
instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a
GOCC, is therefore exempt from local
taxes. The National Government is
supreme over local governments. As
such, mere creatures of the State cannot
defeat national policies using the power
to tax as a tool for regulation. The
power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat
an instrumentality of the very entity
which has the inherent power to wield it.
The power of LGUs to impose taxes &
fees is always subject to limitation
provided by Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not
make LGUs sovereign within a state, it
simply means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal
force on all persons/things. The equal
protection clause doesnt preclude
classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the
law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact
that some gambling activities are
legalized under certain conditions, while
others are prohibited, does not render
the applicable laws unconstitutional.
8. Ordillo vs COMELEC
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of
the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
The official Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) results of the plebiscite
showed that the creation of the Region
was approved by a majority of 5,889
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676
votes in the rest of the provinces and city
above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February
14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the
Region has been approved and/or ratified
by majority of the votes cast only in the
province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with
COMELEC to declare the non-ratification
of the Organic Act for the Region. The
petitioners maintain that there can be no
valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in
only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than
one constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition
is whether or not the province of Ifugao,
being the only province which voted
favorably for the creation of the
Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone,
legally and validly constitute such
Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot
validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the
1987 Constitution. The keywords
provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that region
is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term region used
in its ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. This is supported by the fact
that the thirteen (13) regions into which
the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of
contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a
province by itself. To become part of a
region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their
common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this
case.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic
Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is to be administered
by the Cordillera government consisting
of the Regional Government and local
government units. It further provides
that:
SECTION 2. The Regional Government
shall exercise powers and functions
necessary for the proper governance and
development of all provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangay or ili within
the Autonomous Region . . .
From these sections, it can be gleaned
that Congress never intended that a
single province may constitute the
autonomous region. Otherwise, we would
be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of
regional officials exercising their
executive and legislative powers over
exactly the same small area.
9. Abbas vs COMELEC
Facts: The arguments against R.A. 6734
raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof,
violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No.
6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No.
6734 unconditionally creates an
autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary
to the aforequoted provisions of the
Constitution on the autonomous region
which make the creation of such region
dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner
cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No.
6734 which declares that [t]here is
hereby created the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in
the plebiscite called for the purpose, in
accordance with Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution. Petitioner contends
that the tenor of the above provision
makes the creation of an autonomous
region absolute, such that even if only
two provinces vote in favor of autonomy,
an autonomous region would still be
created composed of the two provinces
where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the
autonomous region and its composition
needs to be clarified.
Held: Thus, under the Constitution and
R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only
when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and
cities where a majority vote in favor of
the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and
cities wherein such a majority is not
attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even
if an autonomous region is created, not
all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1
(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite
contemplated by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall
be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and (2) which provinces and
cities, among those enumerated in R.A.
No. 6734, shall compromise it.
It will readily be seen that the creation of
the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in
the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units
and the proviso underscores this. for if
the intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to get the majority of
the totality of the votes cast, they could
have simply adopted the same
phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. the
creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by
the Constitution is a simple majority of
votes approving the organic Act in
individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all
constituent units put together, as well as
in the individual constituent units.
More importantly, because of its
categorical language, this is also the
sense in which the vote requirement in
the plebiscite provided under Article X,
section 18 must have been understood
by the people when they ratified the
Constitution