CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only
to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains
and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the

occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before
them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of
such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make
any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue.

SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in

which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a
reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in
controversy;

(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy;

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case
or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during
their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(e) The judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceedings;
SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the
proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such
disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judges participation, all agree
in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge
may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and
lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might
reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member
of their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal
profession to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial
interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests
of members of their family.

SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their
private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they
convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position
improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not
be used or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal
system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating
to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the
judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.

SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other
organizations representing the interests of judges.

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done
by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their
duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may
receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is
made, provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as
intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give
rise to an appearance of partiality.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15824 May 30, 1961

RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ARSENIO SANTOS, ETC. ET AL., respondents.
Mariano G. Bustos and Agripino S. Bustos for petitioner.
Quiambao, Galang & Beltran for respondent Benigno Musni.
Antonio R. Abagon for respondent Rogelio de la Rosa.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communication.

DIZON, J.:

On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and others filed a complaint with the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications against Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein, enter
alia, that the latter had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across
navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Barrio
San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2056, the said obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed. The
original complaint was subsequently amended by adding six more to the streams or
waterways mentioned therein.
On December 13, 1958 Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the proceedings to be held before Julian C. Cargullo, the investigator
appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, would be void
because Republic Act 2056 was unconstitutional as it conferred judicial powers to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications. This motion was denied and the
investigator set the case for hearing on December 19 and 20, 1958.
On December 15, 1958 Gutierrez filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a
petition for prohibition which was subsequently amended twice against the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Florencio Moreno, the Department
investigator, Julian C. Cargullo, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, Benigno Musni and his
complainants, to prevent the carrying out of the investigation referred to above. Main
contentions of petitioner were: firstly, that Act 2506 was unconstitutional because it
granted judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
secondly, that the nature and character of the streams and waterways subject of the
complaint lodged with the Department of Public Works and Communications was
already res judicata, having been the subject of an agreement between the Zobel
Family former owners of petitioner's fishponds and the Municipality of
Macabebe. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1520 and was assigned by lottery
to Branch I of said court, presided by the Hon. Arsenio Santos.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Department Investigator
filed their answer to the petition for prohibition alleging therein several affirmative
defenses. Respondent Rogelio de la Rosa adopted said answer in toto as his own, while
the other respondents filed a separate pleading invoking virtually the same defenses
pleaded by their co-parties.
On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon.
Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in
1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez, in an
administrative investigation in involving the same or at least similar issues and
properties, and had expressed views in the course of said investigation prejudicial or
adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner Gutierrez
objected to the motion aforesaid upon the ground that there was no legal ground upon
which Judge Santos could be disqualified under the provisions of Rule 125 of the Rules
of Court.
After the hearing on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 16,
1959 disqualifying himself and endorsing the case to the Second Branch of the court,
for reasons stated as follows:
Meanwhile, the new respondent, in his motion dated February 24, 1959, is seeking the
disqualification of the presiding judge from sitting in the instant case on the ground
that, before his appointment to the bench, he has been counsel for some fishpond
owners, "like petitioner herein", as evidenced by photostatic copies of two (2)
communications, annex A and annex B (par 2 of the motion); and that under section 1,
Rule 125 of the Rules of Court, "no judge shall sit in a case in which he has been a
counsel" (par. 4, some motion).
The motion is being objected to by the petitioner for reasons stated in his written
opposition dated March 14, 1959. A perusal of the legal provisions, invoked by said
respondent, does not show that the presiding judge is included in any of their
prohibitions, because he is not pecuniarily interested in the case; he is not related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity; he has not been an
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or counsel; neither has he presided in any
inferior court, whose ruling or decision being the subject of review (sec. 1, Rule 126,
supra).
It is true that while in the practice of law as a member of a law firm, the presiding
judge, in behalf of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman,
wrote the then Secretary of the Interior a letter dated June 1, 1948, annex A of the
motion, requesting that the proposed lease, in public bidding, of certain streams listed
in resolution No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga
be held in abeyance until after the Committee on Rivers and Streams, created under
Administrative Order No. 32 issued by the President of the Philippines, would have
determined their nature whether private or public.
But, nowhere in the letters, annex A and annex B, could be found any showing that the
presiding judge has ever appeared as counsel for Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein
petitioner; contrary to the contention of the respondent, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa.
Had he been his counsel, the presiding judge should have disqualified himself from
sitting in the present case even without motion, as he did in a case pending in the
second branch of this court, wherein Manuel Borja is the petitioner.
On the other hand, in the petition, annex 1 of the reamended petition, filed by Benigno
Musni and others on August 15, 1958, they stated that the respondents named therein,
one if them being Ricardo Gutierrez, "constructed dams, dikes and other works in
public navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds in the
Municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga"; and that such navigable waters, waterways,
rivers and communal fishing grounds are those specified in the list, annex A of the and
petition, annex 1 of the re-amended petition.
A reading of this list shows that some of the streams mentioned in resolution No. 26,
series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, included in the
fishponds of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman, were the
ones, which the presiding judge, then law practitioner, contended in his letter, annex A
of the motion, to be private and not public; and that the said streams, as shown by the
plan, Exhibit A - De la Rosa, were more or less similar to those included in the fishpond
or fishponds of the petitioner, Ricardo Gutierrez, which were being investigated by Mr.
Julian C. Cargullo, upon order of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Such being the case, the presiding judge is inclined to grant the motion, by
disqualifying himself to sit in this case, not because he has been a counsel for the
above-named petitioner, which is entirely false, neither because of "extremada
delicadeza", but because his opinion given in the aforesaid letter might, some way or
another, influence on his decision in the case at bar. While this would be a too remote
possibility, yet it is the duty of the court to administer justice without any suspicion of
bias and prejudice, otherwise a party-litigant might lose confidence in the judiciary that
must be avoided as much as possible for the purpose of preserving its dignity.
Petitioner Gutierrez filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order mentioned
above, but the respondent Judge denied said motion in his order of August 11, 1959
where the following is stated:
While it is true that presiding judge was not counsel for the petitioner, yet in his letter
dated June 1, 1949, attached to the record, as then a private law practitioner and as
counsel for Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman, he
informed the then Secretary of Interior that the streams and rivers, intended to be
leased at public caution by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, in its
Resolution No. 26. were private and not public.
In his same letter, the presiding judge even stated that copies of Resolution No. 26
were furnished the persons mentioned therein, one of them being Ricardo Gutierrez,
the herein petitioner, because the streams and rivers subject of the instant petition
were among those to be leased. In other words, the interests of Manuel Borja, Roman
Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman were identical to the interests of the herein
petitioner Ricardo Gutierrez, so much so that whatever may be the resolution of the
Secretary of the Interior then would benefit the interests of the said petitioner.
Under these circumstances, the presiding judge believes that he has no other recourse
but to disqualify himself from sitting in this case.
On August 22, 1959 Gutierrez commenced the present action for mandamus against
the Hon. Arsenio Santos, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the
Department Investigator and the parties who filed the complaint against him, for the
purpose of compelling the aforesaid Judge "to proceed, continue with the hearing and
take cognizance of Civil Case No. 1520 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga."
Petitioner invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues
that the case of the respondent judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for
the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming arguendo that a literal
interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a
certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal
provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the
disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an
impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due
process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and
that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just
decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its
fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention
of the law stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a case in which
he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra)
because
. . . However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to
do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion
formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he
may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not
be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of
the will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that
the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it knows, but
which it should forget in that process. . . . (Ann. Cas. 1917A, p. 1235) .
In the present case the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that the opinion
expressed by him in a letter dated June 1, 1948 addressed by him as counsel for
Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the Interior, attached to the motion
for disqualification as Annex A, "might, some way or another, influence (on) his
decision in the case at bar" (order of April 13, 1959). The fear he has thus expressed
of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment does not appear to be
capricious and whimsical, having in mind particularly that in his order of August 11,
1959 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, His Honor reiterated that in the
aforesaid letter he informed the Secretary of the Interior that the streams and rivers to
be auctioned, for lease purposes, by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga,
were private and not public streams and rivers; that the streams and rivers subject of
the petition for prohibition filed by herein petitioner were among those that he
considered as private in nature; that, therefore, the interests of Borja and his other
clients "were identical to the interest of the herein petitioner etc." In view of these
circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His Honor that the opinion thus
expressed by him years ago "might, some way or another, influence his decision" in the
case before him.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus under consideration is hereby denied, without
costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

March 12, 1923

In re impeachment of Honorable TOMAS FLORDELIZA, Judge of First Instance of the

Sixteenth Judicial District.
MALCOLM, J.:

Six members of the bar of Sorsogon who, together, make claim to at least 50 per cent
of the law practice of that province, have filed a verified petition in this court praying
for the removal from office of the Honorable Tomas Flordeliza, Judge of First Instance
of the Sixteenth Judicial District. The charges laid against the respondent Judge are, in
general: (1) That on different occasions the respondent certified falsely as to the status
of the cases pending decision before him, in violation of section 129 of the
Administrative Code; (2) that the respondent is guilty of delay and lack of diligence in
the disposition of the cases pending before him, in violation of section 165 of the
Administrative Code, and generally accepted principles which determine judicial
standards; and (3) that the respondents is guilty of partiality in the performance of his
official duties.
A copy of the above-mentioned complaint was, by order of the court, furnished the
respondent Judge, with instructions to answer the same. In response to this order,
Judge Flordeliza has filed a verified answer, denying each and every charge, and
suggesting the disbarment of the complainants. Certificates from the provincial
commander of the Philippine Constabulary, the provincial governor of Sorsogon, and
Attorney Robert E. Manly, as to the moral conduct, social standing, and integrity of the
respondent have been furnished. The records of the cases in question have also been
forwarded by the respondent.
We feel that we have before us all of the facts which are necessary for the disposition
of this matter. For this reason, therefore, we forego referring the charges to the
Attorney-General for investigation and proceed to dispose of them as justice requires.
For purposes of convenience, the order of the charges as found in the complaint will be
departed from.
One charge is that the respondent Judge has proceeded in many cases with manifest
and evident partiality. It is alleged that the Judge has deferred unduly to the accused
Father Casiano de Vera, the accused Fermin Barranechea, the justice of the peace
Gillego de Vera, the justice of the peace Felix Gallego, and Amado Gimenez, municipal
president of Bacu, Sorsogon. It is further alleged that the Judge has acted with
discourtesy toward the complainants, while showing a spirit of condescension to
attorneys Francisco Arellano and Federico Jimenez. The respondent, on the other hand,
proferred satisfactory explanation of these matters, mentioned in the complaint. At
best a charged of partiality is difficult to prove and is one which is to be expected from
disgruntled lawyers.
Under the subject of negligent performance of the duties of his office to the grave
prejudice of the public interest, complainants allege that there are to many cases
placed on the calendar for one day. Even without taking into consideration the
expected explanation of respondent, this, obviously, is a question which must rest in
the discretion of the presiding Judge.
Under the same subject, it is further alleged that court sessions are held only for three
hours and a half each day, while section 165 of the Administrative Code calls for not
less than five-hour sessions of courts of first instance except on Saturdays. The
respondent answers that he has held court for five hours each day as prescribed by the
law. We accept the statement of his Honor.
Under the same subject, attention is invited to the fact that only 11 civil cases and 107
criminal cases, making a total of 118 cases were decided by Judge Flordeliza during the
year 1921. The respondent Judge, on the contrary, states that 66 civil cases, 190
criminal cases, and 9 complaints against justices of the peace, or a total of 265 cases
were disposed of. The annual report of the clerk of court of Sorsogon for the year 1921
shows that 11 ordinary civil cases, 4 probate cases, 3 land registration cases, 9
administrative investigations, and 81 criminal cases were decided during the year. The
same report shows that 256 ordinary civil cases, 104 probate cases, 11 land registration
cases, 1 administrative investigation, and 266 criminal cases, or a total of 638 cases
were pending on December 31, 1921. As of September 30, 1922, according to data
furnished by the office of the Attorney-General, 236 criminal cases, 262 civil cases, 108
probate cases, and 8 land registration cases, making 614 cases in all were pending
decision in Sorsogon.
Under the same subject of negligence, the serious charge is made that there has been
great delay in the disposition of criminal cases in which the accused is without bail. The
time which has elapsed between the arrest of the defendant and the trial in these
cases is between four months and nine months. In response, the Judge contends: (1)
That he is not responsible for the accused before the complaint or information is filed;
(2) that the postponements have been due to the failure of Government witnesses to
appear; and (3) that where the complaint or information is filed in March or April, he
may set the case for trial when court reopens in July or August.
We postpone our comment on the last two phases of the complaint until we reach an
analysis of the case later on in the opinion.
The last and most serious charge presented, having a close relationship with the
congestion of cases on the docket of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the delay
in the disposition of these cases, especially criminal cases, and the lack of diligence in
catching up with the court work, concerns the alleged false certification of the
respondent under section 129 of the Administrative Code, in order to secure the
payment of his salary. Attention is invited to a number of cases which were decided
beyond the ninety-day period mentioned in the law, and, with certain qualifications,
these facts are admitted by the respondent. The latter, however, offers four reasons or,
more accurately speaking, excuses, for this state of affairs. He says in the first place
that the time taken by stenographers in transcribing their notes should not be counted
in the computation of the ninety-day period. He contends in the next place that the
vacation period should be excluded. He asserts in the next place that the period should
begin to run from the date the clerk reported the case for decision. And, lastly, his
construction of the law is, that an oral decision is sufficient.
The admitted facts required of us an interpretation and construction of section 129 of
the Administrative Code, not alone to set right the respondent Judge, but in order to lay
down a definite ruling for the benefit of all the members of the judiciary to whom the
law applies. Said section 129, derived from Act No. 1552, reads as follows:
Judges and auxiliary judges of first instance, judges of municipal courts, and justices of
the peace shall certify on their applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers
presented by them for payment, or upon the pay rolls upon which their salaries are
paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, demurrers, motions, and all
civil and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or
determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided
on or before the date of making the certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no
salary shall be paid without such certificate.
In the case any special proceeding, application, petition, demurrer, motion, civil or
criminal case is resubmitted upon the voluntarily application or consent in writing of all
the parties to the case, cause, or proceeding, and not otherwise, the ninety days herein
prescribed within which a decision should be made shall begin to run from the date of
such resubmission.
The law requires that before leave shall be granted or salary shall be paid to any judge
or auxiliary judge of first instance, he shall make a certificate that all cases and
proceedings which have been under submission for determination or decision for a
period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the
date of making the certificate. The key words, needing construction, are "determined
and decided."
The word "determined" is hardly the equivalent of "decided" and does not have quite
as far-reaching a meaning. "Determine," it has been said, does not mean more than
tried. (Goddard vs. Fullam [1865], 38 Vt., 75.) "Decided" or "decide," according to the
lexicographers, is defined as "to form a definite opinion," "to render judgment." (In re
Milford & M. R. R. [1895], 68 N. H., 570.) In this jurisdiction, upon the trial of a question
of fact, the decision of the court must be given in writing and filed with the clerk. (C. C.
P., sec. 133.)
The meaning given to section 129 of the Administrative Code by the respondent Judge
would result in qualifying the law where no such qualifications were intended. With
special reference to the answer of the respondent Judge, we state that the vacation
months should not be excluded in the computation of the ninety-day period prescribed
by law, that the time should begin to run from the submission of the case, without
awaiting notification from the clerk of court, and that an oral decision is not sufficient.
As to the point that the time taken by a stenographer to transcribe his notes should not
be taken into consideration, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The general rule
would be to conform with the intent of the law and thus not to permit decisions to be
delayed for this reason, but conceivably special circumstances may arise, which cannot
now be imagined, which would force the trial judge to await the transcription of the
stenographer's notes for long periods of time; when they do the judge should so state.
Sometimes, in the United States, judges are prohibited from drawing their salaries so
long as cases that have been submitted to them for decision for ninety days remain
undecided. California is an instance of a jurisdiction with such a provision appearing in
its Constitution. The law there is, however, somewhat more extensive and explicit than
in the Philippines, because applying to members of the Supreme Court as well as to
members of inferior courts, and because of this further provisions: "In the
determination of causes, all decisions of the Supreme Court and of the district courts
of appeal shall be given in writing and the grounds of the decision shall be stated." (23
Cyc., 528; 5 Henning, General Laws of California, lxxxv; Meyers vs. Kenfield [1881], 62
Cal., 512.)
The purpose of the Philippine Legislature in placing section 129 of the Administrative
Code and related provisions on the statute books is evident. With the judicial facts
before it, the Legislature must have had in mind a forceful method reaching the
pockets of the judges by which to spur them on to greater activity. This wise and
salutary legislation it is now for this Tribunal to vitalize by equally wise and salutary
interpretation and enforcement.
Much of the popular criticism of the courts which, it must be frankly admitted, is all too
often justified, is based on the laws' delay. Congested conditions of court dockets is
deplorable and intolerable. It can have no other result than the loss of evidence, the
abandonment of cases, and the denial and frequent defeat of justice. It lowers the
standards of the courts, and brings them into disrepute.
The statistics relating to the unsatisfactory condition of judicial business in the
Philippines are a matter of public knowledge. Said the report of the Special Mission to
the Philippines: "The judges in too many courts do not realize the necessity of reaching
early and prompt decisions and are too ready to postpone hearings and trials." It is
known, also, that His Excellency, the Governor-General, and the Secretary of Justice,
have given their attention to the subject, and have endeavored by all legitimate means
to aid in cleaning up the court dockets. The members of the Supreme Court in an effort
to do their part have cheerfully foregone vacations in order to catch up with
accumulated legal business. But for the best results to attain, there must be judicial
teamwork reaching from the capital to the most remote district, and from the highest
to the lowest judicial officer.
One of the proposed canons for a decalogue for the judiciary is this: "The judge must
cultivate a capacity for quick decision. Habits of indecision must be sedulously
overcome. He must not deny by slothfulness of mind or body the judgment to which a
party is entitled." We write down our conformity.
The provision of law which is authority for this decision is section 173 of the
Administrative Code, relating to the removal and suspension of Judges of First Instance.
The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance therein provided are two: (1)
Serious misconduct, and (2) inefficiency. In a recent decision on the general subject of
impeachment of judges of fist instance, it was said that for serious misconduct to exist,
there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules. Again, it was said that impeachment proceedings are in their
nature highly penal in character, and are governed by the rules of law applicable to
criminal cases. The charges must therefore be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (In
re Impeachment of Honorable Antonio Horrilleno [1922], 43 Phil., 212.)
At common law there was an offense known as extortion in office, which was the taking
by color of office, of money or other thing of value that is not due, before it is due, or
more than is due. It has been held that a judge is removable from office for demanding
and receiving compensation to which he is not entitled, and this is so notwithstanding
he acts in good faith and in an honest belief that he is entitled to such compensation.
The strict doctrine of these cases is: Here is one bad act; you ought not to have an
opportunity to commit another. (15 R. C. L., 551; Commonwealth vs. Chambers [1829],
1 J. J. Marsh., 108; State ex rel. Rowe vs. District Court [1911], 44 Mont., 318; 27 Ann,
Cas., 396, and note; Brackenridge vs. State [1889], 27 Tex. App., 513; 4 L. R. A., 360.)
That we do not adopt the rather harsh doctrines of these American cases is because
the statutes there in question differ from ours and because we are not prepared to say
that a judge should be separated from office where he apparently is acting in good
faith, under a misconception of the law.
In conclusion, therefore, we have decided to pay no particular attention to the general
charges of partiality and negligence which have been filed against Judge Flordeliza. We
do find, however, that he has not displayed that interest in his office which stops not at
the minimum of the day's labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of
official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and
even into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding
up the administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of
the people. The mountain of six or seven hundred pending cases in Sorsogon could be
removed by a judge of first instance of alert mind and quick decision, not afraid of
work, with the aid of a helpful bar and a sympathetic government.
As willful and intentional wrongdoing in receiving compensation has not been
demonstrated, we are not prepared to find that sufficient cause exists in our judgment
involving serious misconduct or inefficiency as warrants us in recommending the
removal of the respondent Judge to the Governor-General. We will take such a step if
future derelictions of duty of this character recur.
Correcting, therefore, Judge of First Instance Tomas Flordeliza in his wrong
construction of section 129 of the Administrative Code, and admonishing him to
proceed more assiduously in the performance of his judicial labors, it is our order that
these proceedings he filed without further action. Copies of this decision shall be
furnished the complainants, the respondent, and His Excellency, the Governor-General

SECOND DIVISION
JUVELYN D. KILAT, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1960
Complainant, (Formerly OCA-IPI No. 02-1547-RTJ)
Present:

PUNO, J.,
- versus - Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
JUDGE MARIANO S. MACIAS, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
RTC, Branch 28, Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 25, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint charging respondent Judge Mariano S. Macias,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte,
with immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape, and violation of the
Anti-Child Abuse Law.[1]

According to complainant, she was a sixteen (16) year-old working high school student
in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur when she met respondent in November 1999. One time,
respondent fetched her from her school and had dinner with her in a local restaurant.
After dinner, respondent brought her to his vehicle where he kissed and fondled her,
assuring her that he will take care of her, her studies, her expenses and her future.
Later, she was brought to a hotel. Despite her plea to be driven home, respondent
refused, telling her that he just wanted her company while he was resting. Complainant
tried to go out of the room but respondent caught up with her and threatened her with
a gun. Respondent removed her clothes and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her. Respondent asked complainant to be his live-in partner, but she did not reply.
Respondent threw at complainant P1,500.00 worth of bills and warned her not to tell
any person what had transpired.[2]

Because of the incident, complainant was forced to quit her job and stop with her
schooling. She went back to the house of her parents in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent still managed to find out her whereabouts and offered her a job in
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, which she accepted. However, while in Sindangan,
respondent brought her to his house where he again succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. Afterwards, he gave her money and threatened to have her killed
should she tell anyone what happened. From that time onwards, complainant became
respondents kept woman, spending Saturday nights with him and he gave her money
every time they had sexual intercourse. Complainant claims that she left respondent
when she found out that he was having another affair. She went back to her parents
and told them what respondent did to her. They sought the help of Salug officials to
seek justice for what respondent had done.[3]

For his part, respondent claims that complainant was just being used by his ex-wife,
Margie Corpus Macias, and several other personalities who he believed had selfish and
personal axes to grind[4] against him. He denies the accusation of raping and having
illicit relations with complainant whom he knew only as a passing acquaintance. He
claims that he had been in contact with complainant only once, when he bought her
cellular phone, and only because he pitied her. Respondent asserts that complainant
informed him that she was kidnapped and merely forced to sign the documents used
in the instant administrative complaint. To find out the veracity of complainants story,
respondent and his counsel asked her to narrate her plight in the presence of a pastor
of the Adventist Church, a lawyer, and a public prosecutorall respected members of the
community.[5] In support of his defense, respondent annexed the following
documents: (i) letter addressed to the Chief Justice signed by complainant withdrawing
the instant administrative complaint; (ii) letter to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto signed
by complainant, filing administrative charges against those who conspired to kidnap
her; (iii) Sinumpaang Pamamahayag[6] executed by complainant dated 21 August 2001;
(iv) Apas-Sumpay Nga Pamamahayag,[7] dated 23 August 2001among others.
Complainant confessed[8] that she was approached by Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia and
Mayor Jesus Siote Lim of Salug, Zamboanga del Norte and offered to help her prepare a
case for rape against respondent. She refused because respondent did not do anything
wrong to her. Later that day, Mrs. Margie Macias talked to complainant, telling her that
she was heaven-sent, because Mrs. Macias wanted respondent to be dismissed from
his work. Two days later, Vice Mayor Saldia promised her mother that he will give
complainants father a job in the municipal hall if they agree to the filing of a rape case
against respondent. When complainants mother refused, Vice Mayor Saldia threatened
her with a lawsuit. Reluctantly, complainant was left in the vice mayors house where
she was locked in one of the rooms. After two or three days, she was brought to the
house of Atty. Selda, where she was forced to sign the affidavit-complaint against
respondent. Afterwards, accompanied by the vice mayors daughter known to her as
Blanca, they had the affidavit notarized by a public prosecutor. Complainant claims
that she attempted to tell the public prosecutor about the untruthfulness of the
affidavit, but she was afraid of Blanca who was then glowering at her.[9]

After a few days, complainant was brought to Manila and made to stay in the house of
Atty. Reynaldo Llego in Cubao, Quezon City. She was locked up in the house for almost
three weeks and was provided with a guard. However, she was able to escape through
the help of her cousin, Carmen Manlangit, who was then working in Quezon City.[10]

On 5 August 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation[11] informing the Court of the

Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao which dismissed the criminal
complaint for rape filed by the complainant.

Meanwhile, complainant filed charges against those accused of kidnapping her, which
complaint was endorsed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte. The Provincial Prosecutor initially
suspended the resolution of the complaint, but the Department of Justice reversed the
resolution and ordered the filing of informations for grave coercion and serious illegal
detention against Mayor Jesus Lim, Vice Mayor Edgar Saldia, Atty. Alanixon Selda,
Margie Corpus-Macias, Ma. Blanca Urongan, Sidney Sy, Dolbert Panangitan, Victonie
Panangitan, Salque Bulado, Robert Abella, Atty. Reynaldo Llego, Tony Gallara, Rick Doe,
and Gingging Enriquez.[12] On 1 December 2003, the Provincial Prosecutor filed the
corresponding information and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. L-00727,
raffled to RTC Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte presided by respondent judge.
On 2 December 2003, respondent issued an order for the arrest of the persons named
in the information.[13] The next day, accused moved for the inhibition of respondent
from the criminal case on the ground that respondent is directly involved in the said
case. Respondent thus issued an order inhibiting himself from the criminal
proceedings and recommended to the Court that another judge be designated in his
place.[14]

The accused in Criminal Case No. L-00727 filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80984) with the Court of Appeals, questioning:
(i) the DOJ resolution ordering the filing of informations against them; (ii) the
information filed; and (iii) the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge. The Court
of Appeals granted the petition, nullifying the information and quashing the warrant of
arrest earlier issued. It also recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) a separate investigation into respondent judges administrative culpability for his
acts of coercion and harassment and in precipitously issuing the arrest warrant despite
being intimately involved in the criminal case.[15]

Meanwhile, on 8 March 2004, this Court granted respondents application for disability
retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended. However, payment of disability
benefits was held in abeyance pending resolution of the administrative complaints
against him.[16]

The OCA required respondent to file his comment on the matter,[17] and on 20 April
2004, respondent complied with the directive, denying any administrative culpability or
guilt for acts of coercion, harassment, or unlawful detention of complainant.[18] He
claimed that he was merely performing a ministerial function when he issued the
subject arrest warrants. Besides, said warrant had not been implemented and accused
could still resort to procedural remedies.[19]

On 14 May, 2004, the OCA submitted its findings and recommendation, to wit:

1. This matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint

against respondent Judge;
2. The charge of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape
and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law against the respondent be DISMISSED for
lack of sufficient evidence;
3. Respondent Judge be found GUILTY of bias and abuse of authority for
issuing the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. L-00727 and that he be meted with
the penalty of FINE in the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.000) pesos to be
deducted from his disability retirement benefits. [20]

The case was referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose Mendoza for
investigation, report and recommendation. However, Justice Mendoza prayed to be
excused from conducting the investigation since he was a member of the division
which decided CA-G.R. SP No. 80984. The case was then referred to Associate Justice
Remedios Salazar-Fernando, likewise asked that she be allowed to recuse herself since
she was the ponente in a case related to CA-G.R. SP No. 80984. The case was thus
referred to Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.

In his Report and Recommendation[21] dated 4 August 2005, Justice Villarama found
that complainants Sinumpaang Pamamahayag and Apas-Sumpay Nga Pamamahayag
created serious doubts as to whether respondent committed the acts complained of.
There was no evidence of compulsion or duress in the execution of her affidavits of
recantation. Her affidavits of retraction were executed in the presence of respected
members of the community, with corroborating sworn statements from other persons.
On the other hand, complainants counsel of record failed to present any satisfactory
explanation to support the charges. He was also unable to comment on complainants
affidavits of retraction. There being no substantial evidence to establish the
commission of the acts complained of, the Investigating Justice recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for immorality.[22]
On the charge of abuse of authority, the Investigating Justice opined that respondent
should be held administratively liable for issuing the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case
No. L-00727. According to him, respondent should have voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case, as per Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, his wife being one of the
accused therein. Moreover, the rest of the accused were the very same persons
implicated by herein complainant as those who instigated the present administrative
complaint. His belated inhibition, after he had issued the arrest warrant, is indicative of
the propensity to use his office to get back at those responsible for filing the
administrative charges against him. The Investigating Justice recommended the penalty
of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 in accordance with Secs. 9 and 11 (B), Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court.[23]

We express our concurrence with the findings and recommendation of the

Investigating Justice.

Administrative charges against members of the judiciary must be supported at least by

substantial evidence,[24] or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. In the present case, save for the Affidavit-
Complaint dated 24 July 2001, no other document or evidence was submitted to
substantiate the charges of immorality, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, rape,
and violation of the Anti-Child Abuse Law against respondent judge. More importantly,
complainant herself executed sworn statements recanting her charges against
respondent. As observed by the Investigating Justice, while the Complaint-Affidavit may
have been executed with great detail, the affidavits of retraction are equally detailed
and impressed with greater coherence and spontaneity, and supported by affidavits
from people who had knowledge of the events which actually transpired. Interestingly
also, even as complainant had already retracted her charges, her counsel of record,
Atty. Alexander Versoza, merely stated that when there is smoke, there is fire.[25]
Considering these, the complaint for immorality has no leg to stand on and should be
dismissed.

Now on the issue of abuse of authority. Rule 137 of the Rules of Court mandatorily
disqualifies a judge or judicial officer to sit in any case in which: (a) he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; (b) he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law; (c) he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; or (d) he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.[26]

There is no dispute that Mrs. Margie Corpus-Macias, accused in Criminal Case No. L-
00727, is the estranged wife of respondent judge. This circumstance makes it
mandatory for respondent to inhibit himself from the case, but this he unfortunately
did not do. He cannot exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself or not. It was a
clear case of violation of the Rules of Court.

As properly observed both by the OCA and the Investigating Justice, the issuance of a
warrant of arrest is not ministerial in nature, but rather requires the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.[27] The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the judges personal evaluation of the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information. Only when he finds probable cause should he issue a warrant of arrest or
a commitment order.[28] In Criminal Case No. L-00727, however, respondent judge
issued the warrant of arrest a mere day after the filing of the information charging
accused therein with grave coercion and serious illegal detention. Such undue alacrity
casts doubt on the motive of respondent, especially since the accused were known to
him to be the same people who instigated the present administrative case against him,
and against whom he filed a civil suit for damages. Moreover, these were the same
people whom respondent claims to have axes to grind against him. Respondents swift
issuance of the arrest warrant suspiciously smells of vengeance and vindication. He
might have been prejudiced by the malicious acts of the accused, but he should not
use his position in the

judiciary for his personal concerns. In order to avoid suspicions of wrongdoing, a

respect for traditional and prevailing rules must be observed and kept constantly in
mind. A judge should, in fine, administer his office with due regard to the integrity of
the judicial system. He must not be perceived as being a repository of arbitrary power
but as one dispensing justice under the sanction of the rule of law.[29] That he
inhibited himself after they moved for his inhibition cannot extenuate his culpability. At
the outset, he should have inhibited himself from the case if only to avoid any doubt or
suspicion of bias and partiality against the accused.

Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court[30] provides that a violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives or circulars is a less serious charge which

merits the penalty of either suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) month not more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.[31] Because of the clear violation by
respondent of the rule on mandatory inhibition, as well as the bias and abuse of
authority, the recommended fine of P20,000.00 is proper.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for immorality against respondent Judge

Mariano Joaquin S. Macias is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, he is
hereby held administratively liable for abuse of authority in issuing the warrant of
arrest in Criminal Case No. L-00727 and for violation of Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court, and FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), to be
deducted from his disability benefits.

SO ORDERED

RUBEN N. SALCEDO,
Complainant,
- versus -

JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS,

Respondent.

A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. NO. 09-3083-RTJ)

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

July 5, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N.
Salcedo (complainant), charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and
Ignorance of the Law in the handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled Jose
Tanmalack, Jr., represented by Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police
Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan De Oro City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus
and the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police
Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector
Wylen Rojo. The complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed
property) covered by Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and registered in the name
of Patricio Salcedo. The disputed property is about 126,112 square meters wide and is
situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his
niece Rebecca R. Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going
construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived
and forced themselves inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The
complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened to
kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack uttered defamatory statements
and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions occupied
the property and destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber and other
construction materials.

The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The
police promptly responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for
questioning. That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his
sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the petition[1] on his behalf while Tanmalack was
detained by the police for employing self-help in preventing squatters from putting up
improvements in their titled property.

Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances surrounding the
filing of the petition and how it came to be referred to the respondent judges sala, as
follows:

1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the
Office regarding the procedure in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the
information that the established procedure is to assign cases to the different branches
by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon proper motions. But since the
office has not received any case of that nature yet, and as the schedule of raffling will
still be in the afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to the Executive Judge for
instruction and or appropriate action;
2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice
Executive Judge Evelyn Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to
see 2nd Vice Executive Judge Ma. Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo;
3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be adopted under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);
4. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not
clearly stated in the Rule but if the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive
Judge, she will be willing to look at the petition;
5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct
from the chamber of Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was
filed at around 4:45 P.M. as stamped in the petition;
6. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy
Exclamador, referred the case to the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse
Lagamon;
7. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to whom I left the
information that I was going to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery was not able to
inform the Admin. Officer of my whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her to
refer the case to you [referring to the respondent judge];
8. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr. Exclamador and
Ms. Lagamon to explain why they referred the case to your sala without any instruction
from me;
9. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was no longer
around; that the lawyer was insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is
already 5:00 P.M. and considering the novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and
fearing that no judge will be left to act on the petition if they still discuss what to do,
Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the case to
you since your sala was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court;
10. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the handwritten petition
to Judge Lucagbo nor was there any instruction from her to any of the personnel to
have the petition conform to a form acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed
by Judge Lucagbo;
11. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and
was not motivated by any ill motive or malice.[2]

Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to

Tanmalacks representative and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a
Writ of Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing the police officers of Agora Police
Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but
not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty.
Francis V. Ku. The respondent judge also directed the police officers to file their verified
return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with supporting affidavits,
in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP
Chief Investigator. At six oclock in the evening of that same day, the police released
Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which
he claims had been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the
handwritten petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and
obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules and the rule of law when he
acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
complainant also alleges that the respondent judge accommodated the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) are members of
the Masonic fraternity.

The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March 30, 2009, in compliance with the
directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged:

(a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court, he had no
option but to exercise his judicial duty without any bias or partiality, nor did he
consider that the petitioners counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason);

(b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo and writ of
habeas corpus, he deemed it more in consonance with the [Rule on the Writ of
Amparo];

(c) [I]t was not improper even if the x x x petition was not raffled, and was
immediately assigned to his sala by the Office of the Clerk of Court, since Par. 2, Sec. 3
of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that any judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) can issue a
writ and the said Sec. 3 further states that it can be filed on any day and at any time;

(d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack who was detained
at the Agora Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City; that the issuance of the writ was a
matter of great urgency because the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in
the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, which was a Friday, and that if the Court would
not act on the petition, the detainee would certainly spend the night in jail;

(e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper because Section 5 of
the SC Circular (on the Writ of Amparo) only requires that the same be signed and
verified; that he found the petition sufficient in form and in substance;

(f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall immediately order the
issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue, he propounded clarificatory
questions on the petitioners representative and their counsel, thus, the following
information were elicited:

1) That the property of petitioners family, which is under their possession and
Tanmalack registered under TCT No. T-1627491, was intruded by some persons who
wanted to fence the area and put up improvements by constructing shanties thereon;

2) That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack prevented the intrusion it resulted to heated
arguments and altercations which prompted him to go to the police station to report
the incident and be blottered;

3) That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the police station in the late afternoon of
January 23, 2008 in order to air his complaint, the intruders came and introduced
themselves as the owners of the property;

4) That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard the version of these intruders and
despite the protestations of petitioner and his relatives, the police did not anymore
allow Mr. Tanmalack to leave the police station; and,

5) That petitioners counsel called up Rojo to secure the immediate release of his
client from police custody but to no avail;

(g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated facts, as well as the allegations in
the petition, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his judicial function, found that the
same warranted the issuance of the writ; the arrest of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful
because Rojo was not present in the area where the alleged incident happened, so that
the statements of the complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) would be hearsay;
(h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were directed to file a verified return
pursuant to the rules; during the summary hearing of the petition on 25 January 2008,
it was only Rojo who appeared, the alleged complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa)
who caused the detention of the petitioner were absent; P/Insp. Rojo, when asked by
the Court, gave the following answers:

1) That he would no longer file his Answer (which should be a verified return) on the
complaint considering that the petitioner was already released;
2) That he confirmed that it was the petitioner who came first to the police station to
complain, followed by the person who wanted to fence the property; the conflict
between the petitioner and the other persons is on a property dispute, of which it was
petitioner who is in possession; and

3) That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and neither did he detain him
but only he could not release the petitioner because of the complaint and for further
evaluation.

(i) [H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that petitioner brought heavily
armed men with him when he allegedly harassed the complainant.

[(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008, the petitioner as well as the
respondent Rojo have arrived into an agreement that the writ be considered
permanent.]

THE REPORT OF THE OCA

The OCA informed the Court that the case was already ripe for resolution in a Report
dated April 8, 2010, signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy
Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva. The Report likewise presented a brief
factual background of the case.

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent
judge be dismissed for lack of merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation
which reads:

EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, as in the instant case, or of a private
individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ covers only actual
violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life, liberty and
security because it covers both actual and threatened violations of such rights.

Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of
amparo was attended by irregularities. The detainees sister who filed the petition is
allowed under Section 2(b) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC).
Also, the petition was properly filed with the Regional Trial Court where the act or
omission was committed or where any of its elements occurred.

Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said petition was assigned is deemed to have
complied with his oath and judicial duty when he ordered the issuance of the writ of
amparo upon determination that the right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was being
violated or threatened to be violated. These is no showing that respondent Judge, in
granting the petition for a writ of amparo was motivated by bad faith, ignominy or ill
will, thus, herein complainants allegation that respondent Judges act was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and authority, bias and partiality, and grave disregard of the
rules, deserves scant consideration.

This Office agrees with respondent Judges observation that Rojos declaration not
anymore to contest the petition and that he (Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner,
but admitted that he could not release the latter for further evaluation because of the
complaint is an admission that he deprived [or threatened to deprive] Jose [Dy
Tanmalack] of his liberty.

OUR RULING

We concur with the OCAs recommendation that the

administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in
issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalacks favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the
writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.[3] The present case involves concerns that are purely property and
commercial in nature concerns that we have previously ruled are not covered by the
Writ of Amparo.[4] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[5] we held:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response
to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under
the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a
writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the
writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat
or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the
respondent judge since Tanmalacks petition is fatally defective in substance and
content, as it does not allege that he is a victim of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or the threats thereof. The petition merely states that he is under
threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he is not arrested but merely
in custody.[6]

Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he
committed in the present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the negative.

Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his
adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any of
his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only
judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that
errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
judicial remedies.[7]

In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be
raised as an issue in the present administrative case. The proper recourse for the
complainant should have been to file an appeal, from the final judgment or order of
the respondent judge, to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In Bello III v. Diaz,[8] we reiterated that
disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their
administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available
remedies have been settled. We laid down the rationale for the rule in Flores v.
Abesamis,[9] viz:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for,
these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of
these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of
the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only
after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals
have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.

Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a

substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law
from court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges orders had caused him
undue injury. This is impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled.
Law and logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative
nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the
result thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation,
the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and
dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not
generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith;
and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice
or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering
said judgment or order or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the
Civil Code.[10]

We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo,
we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the
complainants allegation that the issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality,
bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty.
Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or prove that the
former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and
must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be
inferred from respondent judges issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence
on record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The complainants allegation
of partiality will not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will
overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed justice according to
law and evidence, without fear or favor.[11]

Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is
adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable simply because he
erred in his judgment has never been the intent of the law; reasonable competence
and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility, are what the law requires.

The more significant issue in this case is the complainants charge of gross ignorance of
the law against the respondent judge.

A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross

ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it
properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and
great privilege vested in him.[12]

We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance
of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the
time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
has been effective for barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became
effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot be said to
have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo.
Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a
simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute
gross ignorance of the law.

More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only
be found to be erroneous; it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive.[13] In the present case, the
complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that the respondent judge was
motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He owes
to the public and to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is expected to
keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just,
correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner
free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are
men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in
accordance with law.[14] We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent
judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary
writs such as the Writ of Amparo.

We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden
of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.[15] We cannot give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. Hence, when the
complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his
claim, as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.
[16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the

administrative complaint against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG and MA. VICTORIA SUEGA-

LAGMAN,
Complainants,

- versus

JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA
CITY,

Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216

(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 08-
2788-RTJ)

Present:
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,*
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 26, 2012

x---------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by State Prosecutors Josef Albert
T. Comilang (State Prosecutor Comilang) and Ma. Victoria Suega-Lagman (State
Prosecutor Lagman) against respondent Judge Arnaldo Medel B. Belen (Judge Belen) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Branch 36, for manifest partiality and
bias, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Facts

State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP)
Order No. 05-07 dated February 7, 2005, was designated to assist the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. On February 16, 2005, he
appeared before Judge Belen of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, manifesting his
inability to appear on Thursdays because of his inquest duties in the Provincial
Prosecutors Office of Laguna. Thus, on February 21, 2005, he moved that all cases
scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be deferred because he
was set to appear for preliminary investigation in the Provincial Prosecutor's Office on
the same day.

Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in
Criminal Case No. 12654-2003-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jenelyn Estacio
(Estacio Case) requiring him to (1) explain why he did not inform the court of his
previously-scheduled preliminary investigation and (2) pay a fine of P500.00 for the
cancellation of all the scheduled hearings.
In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed his Explanation with Motion for
Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
with Early Resolution. On May 30, 2005, Judge Belen directed him to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt for the unsubstantiated, callous and reckless charges
extant in his Reiterative Supplemental Motion, and to pay the postponement fee in the
amount of P1,200.00 for the 12 postponed cases during the February 17, 2005 hearing.

In his comment/explanation, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the contents of

his Reiterative Supplemental Motion were based on his personal belief made in good
faith and with grain of truth. Nonetheless, Judge Belen rendered a Decision dated
December 12, 2005 finding State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt of court and
for payment of P20,000.00 as penalty. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied on February 16, 2006, he filed a motion to post a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution of the said Decision, which Judge Belen granted and fixed in the amount of
P20,000.00.

On April 12, 2006, State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94069 assailing Judge
Belens May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in the Estacio Case. On
April 24, 2006, the CA issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)[1] enjoining Judge
Belen from executing and enforcing his assailed Order and Decision for a period of 60
days, which was subsequently extended with the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.[2]

Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order[3] on September 6, 2007

requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond
and to appear on September 26, 2007 to explain why he should not be cited indirect
contempt of court. In his Compliance,[4] State Prosecutor Comilang cited the CAs
injunctive writ putting on hold all actions of the RTC relative to its May 30, 2005 Order
and December 12, 2005 Decision during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94069. He also
manifested[5] that he was waiving his appearance on the scheduled hearing for the
indirect contempt charge against him.

Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order[6] dated September 26, 2007 directing State
Prosecutor Comilang to explain his defiance of the subpoena and why he should not be
cited for indirect contempt. Judge Belen likewise ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to
issue a subpoena for him to appear in the October 1, 2007 hearing regarding his failure
to comply with previously-issued subpoenas on September 18, 2007, and on October 8,
2007 for the hearing on the non-filing of his supersedeas bond. State Prosecutor
Comilang moved[7] to quash the subpoenas for having been issued without jurisdiction
and in defiance to the lawful order of the CA, and for the inhibition of Judge Belen.

In an Order[8] dated October 1, 2007, Judge Belen denied the motion to quash
subpoenas, held State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of court for his
failure to obey a duly served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P30,000.00
and to suffer two days' imprisonment. He was also required to post a supersedeas
bond amounting to P30,000.00 to stay the execution of the December 12, 2005
Decision.[9]

Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit[10] on October 18,

2007 before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Belen with
manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and
gross ignorance of the law in issuing the show cause orders, subpoenas and contempt
citations, in grave defiance to the injunctive writ issued by the CA. State Prosecutor
Comilang alleged that Judge Belen's acts were intended to harass, oppress, persecute,
intimidate, annoy, vex and coerce him, and to place him in a disadvantageous and
compromising position, as he was prosecuting the libel case instituted by herein
complainant State Prosecutor Lagman against Judge Belen when he was still a
practicing lawyer, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15332-SP and pending before Branch
32 of the RTC of San Pablo City. This libel case eventually became the basis for
Administrative Case No. 6687 for disbarment against Judge Belen.

To further show Judge Belens flagrant violation of his oath of office, State Prosecutors
Comilang and Lagman jointly filed a letter-complaint[11] dated September 28, 2007
addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, which the OCA treated as a supplemental
complaint. They averred that State Prosecutor Jorge Baculi, who found probable cause
to indict Judge Belen with libel in Criminal Case No. 15332-SP, was also harassed and
oppressed by Judge Belen with his baseless and malicious citation for contempt and
with the use of foul, unethical and insulting statements.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

The OCA directed Judge Belen to comment on State Prosecutors Comilang and
Lagman's charges against him.

In his Joint Comment[12] dated March 7, 2008, Judge Belen claimed that the allegations
against him are factually misplaced and jurisprudentially unmeritorious, as his assailed
orders were issued in accordance with the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence. He
explained that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA only enjoined him
from enforcing, executing and implementing the May 30, 2005 Order and December
12, 2005 Decision, but it never prohibited him from asking State Prosecutor Comilang
to explain his failure to comply with the order requiring the posting of supersedeas
bond to defer the implementation of the mentioned judgment, in accordance with
Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the
instant administrative complaint, claiming to have discharged his judicial functions not
in a gross, deliberate and malicious manner.

In its Report[13] dated November 27, 2009, the OCA found Judge Belen to have violated
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by failing to separately docket or consolidate
with the principal case (the Estacio Case) the indirect contempt charge against State
Prosecutor Comilang. It also found Judge Belen to have blatantly violated the injunctive
writ of the CA when he issued the orders requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to
explain why he failed to post a supersedeas bond which, given the antecedents of his
administrative cases, showed manifest bias and partiality tantamount to bad faith and
grave abuse of authority.

Judge Belen was likewise found to have violated the following provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct:

Canon 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Canon 3 A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Rule 3.01 A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Thus, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that Judge Belen be adjudged guilty of
manifest bias and partiality, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law
and accordingly, be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and
controlled corporations and government financial institutions.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether Judge Belen's actuations showed
manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge of Branch 36,
Calamba City.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court concurs with the
findings and recommendations of the OCA, but only in part.

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of
or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and
the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a
verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.
[14] In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard
and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt charge,
which arose out of or related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main
action for joint hearing and decision.

In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but
by Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State
Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt.
As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be
docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action find
no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt
charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated
with the principal action, i.e., the Estacio Case.

However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining
the implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 94069.

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to

the latters outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the court
hears fully the merits of the case. Its primary purpose is not to correct a wrong already
consummated, or to redress an injury already sustained, or to punish wrongful acts
already committed, but to preserve and protect the rights of the litigants during the
pendency of the case.[15] The status quo should be that existing ante litem motam or
at the time of the filing of the case.[16]

The CA's Resolution[17] dated July 12, 2006 states in part:

In order not to render the issues in this case moot and academic, We had in our
Resolution of April 24, 2006 granted a Temporary Restraining Order for 60 days from
notice directing the respondent Judge to refrain from executing his order of May 30,
2005 and decision of December 12, 2005 declaring petitioner in contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a postponement fee of P1,200 and penalty of P20,000. Considering
that the TRO is about to expire, for the same reasons provided under Section 3(b) and
(c) Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue, to be
effective during the pendency of this case, ordering the respondent Judge to refrain
from enforcing his disputed issuances of May 30, 2005 and December 12, 2005. The
petitioner is exempted from posting the bond, since no private interests are affected in
this case.

As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the CA's disquisition is clear and categorical. In
complete disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to
issue (1) the September 6, 2007 Order[18] requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to
explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in court on
September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order[19] seeking State Prosecutor Comilang's
explanation for his defiance of the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of
even date, and directing, once again, his attendance at the next hearing on October 1,
2007 and to explain once more why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and
(3) the October 1, 2007 Order[20] finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect
contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days'
imprisonment.

Hence, in requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a

supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court
hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of
indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen
effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to
preserve.

In the case of Pesayco v. Layague,[21] the Court succinctly explained:

No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the
laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good
judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with
procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public
and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court
is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judges
hands.

Thus, this Court has consistently held that a judge is presumed to know the law and
when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a
judge.[22]
This is because judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly
in good faith as judicial competence requires no
less.[23] Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes
contempt,[24] as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the
injunctive order issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069, was found guilty of indirect
contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 101081.[25]

Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment

that can be easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of
law or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance of
the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt
notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction demonstrated his
vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for which he must be held
accountable and subjected to disciplinary action.

Accordingly, in imposing the proper penalty, the Court takes note of Judge Belens
previous administrative cases where he was penalized in the following manner:

Docket No.
Case Title
Charge
Penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
Mane v. Judge Belen[26]
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Reprimand, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall merit a
more serious penalty

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176

Baculi v. Judge Belen[27]

Gross Ignorance of the Law
Suspended for 6 months without salary and other benefits, with stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall merit a more serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242
Correa v. Judge Belen[28]
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
Fined for PhP10,000.00 with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall merit a more serious penalty
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139
Belen v. Judge Belen[29]
Violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
Fined for PhP11,000 with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall merit a more serious penalty

Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the
principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law.[30] Hence, with
the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belens previous infractions, which are all of
serious nature and for which he had been severely warned, the Court therefore adopts
the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against
Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can
no longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that
incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary.[31]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, having been found guilty of
grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, is DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to
reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations and government
financial institutions. He shall forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official
act or function appurtenant to his office upon service on him of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the records of Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
with the Court.

SO ORDERED

GEORGE P. MERCADO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, REBECCA ROYO-MERCADO, AND

CHILDREN, NAMELY, REBECCA GAY, KRISTINA EVITA, CRIS OLIVER AND MARIAN RICA,
ALL SURNAMED MERCADO),
Complainants,

- versus -

HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 31,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781
STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO,
Complainant,
- versus -

HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.) PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 31,
Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-03-1782

Present:

*PUNO, C.J.,
**QUISUMBING,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
***VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
****DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:
October 16, 2009
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

These are consolidated administrative cases filed against Judge Erasto D. Salcedo
(respondent judge), Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Tagum City, charging him with
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[1]

Administrative Matter No. RTJ-03-1781

In a series of letters-complaints dated January 2, 2001,[2] July 16, 2001,[3] August 28,
2001[4] and November 23, 2001[5] filed before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), George P. Mercado (complainant) charged respondent judge as summarized
below.

In the letter dated January 2, 2001, the respondent judge was accused of bias and gross
partiality in handling the investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge
Napy Agayan (Judge Agayan) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kapalong-Talaingod,
Davao del Norte. The complainant alleged that the respondent judge mishandled the
investigation and based his findings of facts on gossip and rumors[6] to aid a fellow
judge.

On January 16, 2001, the complainant formally charged the respondent judge of
committing these unethical infractions:

(1) Mishandling of, or rendering a false report to the Supreme Court on, his
investigation of Judge Agayan;

(2) Grave misconduct and impropriety in possessing and using a stolen Pajero vehicle
with knowledge, actually and constructively, that it was a subject of an Anti-Fencing
Law case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11728, which he had earlier dismissed; and

(3) Serious irregularities, dishonesty or grave misconduct relating to the handling and
improper execution of the final decision in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, entitled
Soriano Fruits Corporation and Others versus Department of Agrarian Reform and/or
Land Bank of the Philippines, where the respondent judge modified the final judgment
on the amount of just compensation from which the respondent judge benefited in the
amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).

The letter-complaint dated August 28, 2001 was filed by the complainant to
supplement his earlier allegations. The complainant alleged that in connection with the
stolen Pajero, the respondent judge was one of the respondents in a criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6539) and/or the
Anti-Fencing Law of 1973 (Presidential Decree [P.D.] 1612) filed by the Philippine
National Police. In Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, the respondent judge showed
partiality in hastily resolving the motions filed by the plaintiff, but not the motions filed
by the defendant.

Finally, the letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001 was a reinforcement of the
allegations in the earlier letters-complaints. The complainant additionally related that
the use by the respondent judge of the stolen Pajero became a subject of media
coverage.
The Office of the Chief Justice referred the letters-complaints dated January 2, 2001 and
July 16, 2001 to Hon. Zenaida N. Elepao as Acting Court Administrator.[7] Subsequently,
then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr., in an Indorsement dated January 21, 2002, required the respondent judge to file his
comment on the letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001.[8]
The respondent judge duly filed his Comment (dated February 22, 2002[9]), which the
OCA received on February 27, 2002. The OCA summarized the respondent judges
position as follows:

Re: Investigation of Judge Napy Agayan.

Judge Salcedo contends that he has already submitted his recommendation to this
Office and Mr. Mercado, through his complaint, would like to interfere and dictate what
his recommendation would be. x x x

Re: Stolen Pajero found in his possession.

Judge Salcedo contends that Criminal Case No. 11728 against Leopoldo Gonzaga was
dismissed in 1999 on motion of the prosecution because during the reinvestigation, the
witness of the prosecution did not appear. He adds that from this dismissal the Traffic
Management Group did not file any motion for reconsideration. Worse, the TMG
authorized the change of color of the vehicle and allowed the buyer to use it for years.

Judge Salcedo avers that in June 2001, the owner lent him the vehicle and he did not
know that it was the same vehicle subject of Criminal Case No. 11728, otherwise, he
would not have used it for reason of delicadeza. According to him, there was no way of
identifying the vehicle because the TMG authorized the change of color. The vehicle
was green during the pendency of the criminal case while it was dirty white.

Re: Irregularities in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99.

Judge Salcedo claims that he was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of the Special
Agrarian Court in July 2000. He maintains that when he took over the said cases, the
decision therein were already final and executory. Judge Salcedo asserts that he issued
an order for the execution of the judgment which function is purely ministerial. He
adds that if there was something wrong with the valuation of the land then the counsel
for Land Bank should have questioned the same. As for the accusation that he received
P3,000,000.00 for which he was able to construct a house in Tagum City, Judge Salcedo
contends that the said house was constructed through a bank loan and the proceeds
from the sale of a prime lot in Cagayan de Oro City.[10]

The complainant filed a Reply dated March 12, 2002.[11] He argued that the handling
of the reinvestigation of the Anti-Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga was hastily
concluded and resolved by Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan, who conducted the
reinvestigation merely two days after the order to reinvestigate was issued by the
respondent judge. The complainant further advanced the view that the respondent
judge merely relied on the prosecutors findings and dismissed the case with undue
haste. According to the complainant, Leopoldo Gonzaga also had three (3) pending
cases in the respondent judges sala at that time.

The complainant also pointed out that two (2) checks for P800,000.00 were drawn from
the payments made by Land Bank in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99. The proceeds
of one of these checks were given to the wife of the respondent judge.
Administrative Case No. RTJ-03-1782

On December 18, 2001, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor

Velasco) brought to the attention of then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the
indictment of the respondent judge for violation of P.D. No. 1612 and recommended
that appropriate administrative charges be initiated by the Supreme Court against him
for violations of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.[12] State Prosecutor Velasco stated:

undersigned finds no cogent reason why Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO chose to use a
vehicle which was the subject of a criminal case before his very own sala. There is no
proof or evidence whatsoever that the Respondent Judge forgot that the alleged owner
of the subject vehicle (Respondent LEOPOLDO GONZAGA) previously appeared before
him as respondent in a criminal case. He could never forget it because the authorities
apprehended him, Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO even showed them a copy of his very
own July 7, 1999 Decision exonerating GONZAGA from the crime of Anti-Fencing. His
contention that he did not know that he was using the very same vehicle (subject of the
previous criminal complaint before his court) because its color has been changed is
fallacious x x x Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO to be more cautious, out of delicadeza, in
his dealing with GONZAGA, assuming for the sake of argument that he acted in good
faith.[13]

In a Resolution dated April 10, 2002, we referred this administrative matter to the OCA
and the respondent judge filed his Answer on August 30, 2002.[14] In addition to the
arguments he had already raised, the respondent judge posited that the whole incident
was a smear campaign engineered against him by a carnapping syndicate operating in
Manila-Mindanao. The respondent judge also posited that there was no impropriety in
using the subject vehicle since it was no longer in custodia legis as Criminal Case No.
11728 had already been dismissed.

Thereafter, we referred the administrative cases to Justice Noel G. Tijam[15] (Justice

Tijam) of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation. The
referred cases involved:

(a) The respondent judges investigation of Judge Agayan, his possession of a stolen
Pajero and the alleged irregularities he committed in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-
99;

(b) The suspension of Judge Salcedo pending the outcome of the instant case;

(c) The dismissal of the complaint of George Mercado dated April 22, 2002 for grave
abuse of authority for being subjudice;[16] and

(d) The referral of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11728 to the Department of
Justice for its appropriate action on the possible administrative liability of Prosecutor
Matias Aquitan.

Pending investigation of these administrative cases before the CA, several significant
developments took place. First, the respondent judge retired from the Judiciary on
November 25, 2003. Second, the complainant was killed by unidentified men on April
14, 2004 and was substituted in the case by his wife and children.[17] Lastly, the
respondent judge himself was killed on July 26, 2009.

CA Report and Recommendation

Justice Tijam found the respondent judge guilty of dishonesty, inefficiency,

incompetency and violation of Rules 1.01, 2.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Justice Tijam reported:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION[18]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY

RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST THE LATE MTC JUDGE
NAPY AGAYAN AND HIS COURT PERSONNEL

The 1st Indorsement dated June 6, 2000 referring the complaint against Judge Agayan
and his staff to the Respondent Judge expressly directed the Respondent Judge to
investigate therein respondents irregular attendance in court. Hence, even if Minda
Amar was not specifically named by Complainant Mercado in his first letter-complaint,
the fact that the charges involved the alleged repeated absence not only of Judge
Agayan, but also of the personnel assigned in Judge Agayans court, Respondent Judges
investigation should have also included the court attendance of Minda Amar, the Clerk
of Court.
xxx

. . . In the course of his investigation, the Respondent Judge would have discovered the
fact of Minda Amars prolonged absences. However, Respondent Judge failed to make
any findings in this regard. Neither was there a statement that Clerk of Court Minda
Amar was absent during said period of investigation and/or that her absences were
authorized and approved by Judge Agayan. Instead, the Respondent Judge made a
sweeping declaration that Complainant Mercados charges of absenteeism against
Judge Agayans court personnel were unfounded.

There is no evidence that Respondent Judge examined the Court personnels daily time
records . . .
Indubitably, Respondent Judge was negligent and inefficient, if not dishonest, in his
investigation of the administrative complaint filed against Judge Agayan and his court
personnel. For this reason, the Respondent Judge must be held liable.
xxx
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

IN THE MATTER OF THE STOLEN PAJERO VEHICLE[19]

xxx

. . . although the criminal case against the Respondent Judge for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law was dismissed, the Respondent Judge could still be held liable for his
improper conduct pursuant to Rules 1.01[20] and 2.01[21] of the Code Judicial
Conduct . . . and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics[22] [Emphasis theirs]
xxx

In this case, Respondent Judge displayed conduct that fell short of the standards
expected of a magistrate of the law. Respondent Judge failed to be more circumspect in
his dealings with Leopoldo Gonzaga.
Leopoldo Gonzaga was once an accused before Respondent Judges sala in a criminal
case for violation of the anti-fencing law which was later dismissed by the Respondent
Judge. From this fact alone, any association which Respondent Judge may have with
Leopoldo Gonzaga would be a cause for suspicion. When Respondent Judge borrowed
the subject vehicle from the accused, he already displayed improper and reproachable
conduct.

The fact that the vehicle lent to Respondent Judge was the same Pajero vehicle which
was the subject of the dismissed criminal case makes the act more unethical.
Respondent tried to justify that it was only after Gonzaga assured him that the Pajero
was not a carnapped vehicle that he allowed himself to use it. This is inexcusable.

Respondent Judge was wrong when he borrowed from the accused the same vehicle
subject matter of the criminal case which was dismissed and decided in the accuseds
favor. Respondent Judge failed to comport himself in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public. x x x

xxx

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION[23]

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSOLIDATED AGRARIAN CASES

xxx
Complainant Mercado suggested that the Respondent Judge benefited from the
awarded commissioners fee. Complainant Mercado presented copies of the 3 cashiers
checks and the deposit purportedly showing how Respondent Judge profited from said
fees.

However, this claim is completely without factual basis. The complainant failed to
adduce any substantial, direct and convincing evidence to substantiate his allegation
that Respondent Judge materially benefited from the transaction. At most, such
allegation is a mere suspicion or conjecture.

xxx

. . . unless there is direct and convincing evidence which will prove Respondent Judge
materially benefited from the transaction, the Respondent judge cannot be held guilty
of said charge.

However, . . . Respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in according
and/or modifying a final and executory decision.

As settled, when the judges inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or is too vicious that
the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority.
xxx
Respondent Judge had clearly exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he amended
the already final decision He is therefore guilty of violating Rule 3.01[24] of the Code of
Judicial Ethics.

Justice Tijam recommended the imposition of the following penalties:

(a) First cause of action a fine of P40,000.00;

(b) Second cause of action a fine of P20,000.00;
(c) Third cause of action a fine in the amount of P20,000.00.

The Courts Ruling

After considering the CA Report and the entire records, we find the Report to be
substantially supported by the evidence on record, and by applicable law and
jurisprudence. We therefore adopt the findings and recommendations of the CA
Report, subject to the modifications indicated below.

Administrative cases against judges stem from the time-honored constitutional

principle that a public office is a public trust. This principle requires a judge, like any
other public servant and more so because of the sensitivity of his position, to exhibit at
all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity;[25] his high and exalted position
in the Judiciary requires him to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and
competence. As the visible representation of the law and given his task of dispensing
justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the
respect and confidence of the people.[26] He must conduct himself in a manner
characterized by propriety and decorum; like Ceasars wife, he must be above
suspicion.[27] As we held in Padua v. Paz:[28]

Court personnel charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, bear a heavy responsibility in insuring that their conduct is always
beyond reproach. The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process is of
paramount importance. All those occupying offices in the judiciary should at all times
be aware that they are accountable to the people. They must serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead
modest lives.

The records show that respondent judge failed to live up to these exacting standards.

Investigation of Judge Agayan and his court personnel

In his report dated August 2, 2002 (in compliance with the OCA directive to investigate
Judge Agayan), the respondent judge stated that the complaint against Judge Agayan
and his court staff for absenteeism and irregular attendance had no merit. The
respondent judge related that he went twice to the office of Judge Agayan to ascertain
the veracity of the complaint and found that Judge Agayan was really sickly because of
a heart condition that compelled him to take leaves of absence.[29] The respondent
judge claimed that since the complainant failed to specify the particular dates when
Judge Agayan failed to report to work, he could not ascertain whether his absences had
been authorized. The respondent judge also stated that he personally inquired from
other offices in the Municipality of Kapalong, Davao del Norte, from lawyers, and from
party-litigants with pending cases in the sala of Judge Agayan; he found that no
complaint from party-litigants in the Municipality of Kapalong had been made involving
the failure to attend to official transactions due to the absence of Court personnel.
Neither was there any complaint from lawyers about proceedings grinding to a halt.
Like party-litigants, local officials are more concerned in the speedy disposition of
cases when their constituents are involved. Yet, not a single local official made a
complaint.[30]

The respondent judge, in his Comment dated February 22, 2002, emphasized that the
present complaint was simply an undue interference by the complainant in his
recommendation in Judge Agayans case.

In its investigation, the CA found evidence refuting the statements made by the
respondent judge in his report to the OCA. One of these was the Certification dated
February 6, 2003 issued by Jaime Mondejar, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte, attesting that one Minda Amar, the Clerk
of Court in Judge Agayans sala, had not reported for work prior to and during the dates
the respondent judge reportedly conducted his investigation.[31] The CA investigation
also found no evidence that the respondent judge ever examined the daily time
records of Minda Amar and the court personnel assigned to Judge Agayans sala.

Justice Tijam noted that since the act complained of was absenteeism, the investigators
first course of action should have been to check and verify the daily time records of the
concerned personnel; from such examination the respondent judge would have known
of the prolonged absences of Minda Amar and others. Likewise, the respondent judge
would have noticed Minda Amars absence when he went to the sala of Judge Agayan
on two occasions. These incidents, however, were not mentioned in the respondent
judges report.

In addition to these findings, we note that the respondent judge was similarly remiss in
ascertaining Judge Agayans absences. The respondent judge merely relied on the leave
of absence filed by Judge Agayan for October 8, 1997, and did not at all consider the
latters absences, subject of the complaint, and the fact that the respondent judge
conducted his investigation only in February 2000. At the very least, the gap of more
than two (2) years between the leave of absence on record and the investigation of
Judge Agayans absences should have alerted the respondent judge to examine the
formers records in the intervening period, particularly the period immediately prior to
the complaint. The respondent judge failed to do this. We observe, too, that in the
course of his investigation, he did not appear to have asked Judge Agayan about his
absences in any formal inquiry or, at the very least, in an interview. No record appears
in the respondent judges report on Judge Agayans position on the matter under
investigation. A close scrutiny of the report in fact shows that the respondent judge,
instead of making an objective report on the results of his investigation, tried to
downplay and deflect the issue of absenteeism and irregular attendance by stating that
nobody complained of the delay in the disposition of cases due to the absence and
irregular attendance of Judge Agayan and his staff.[32]

From all these, what appears clear to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very
superficial investigation, if what he did can be labelled as an investigation at all. Based
on this shallow effort, he prepared a slanted report that could not but lead to the
exoneration of Judge Agayan. These actions tell us that the respondent judge
deliberately covered up Judge Agayans absences and irregular attendance. The
motivation for all these is not hard to discern as it can be read between the lines in the
respondent judges report, considered in light of the attendant facts. He did all these
under the mistaken notion of aiding a fellow judge, who was allegedly too sickly to fully
perform his judicial duties. In rendering this assistance, the respondent judge also
overlooked the absences and irregular attendance of the court staff of Judge Agayan.

The respondent judge apparently forgot that his first and foremost duty was to conduct
a thorough and objective investigation and to make a complete report of his findings
regardless of his personal sentiments and beliefs. The task assigned to him was an
assignment involving trust and the exercise of his functions as a judge. An
administrative investigation is an essential component in the judicial machinery for the
administrative supervision of courts and court personnel; it is a key process in
determining violations of the norms of conduct and standards of service in the
judiciary. The respondent judge, therefore, not only failed to do his duty, but violated
as well the trust reposed in him as a judge.

The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or their irregular attendance at

work is a serious charge that, if proven, may warrant the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal or suspension from service.[33] Unauthorized absence and irregular
attendance are detrimental to the dispensation of justice and, more often than not,
result in undue delay in the disposition of cases; they also translate to waste of public
funds when the absent officials and employees are nevertheless paid despite their
absence. As heretofore mentioned, the Supreme Court regulates the conduct of court
officials and employees and it acts through its subordinates, among them in this case,
the respondent judge. His responsibility in this administrative supervision is direct by
virtue of the delegation made by this Court. By conducting a superficial investigation
and by his slanted findings that caused the OCA to recommend the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against Judge Agayan and his court personnel, the Courts
administrative machinery failed; the respondent judges intent to shield another judge,
resulting in the lack of objectivity of his report, deprived the Court of the opportunity to
act properly on the reported violations of the norms of conduct of judges and court
employees.

For failing to faithfully perform the tasks assigned to him, the respondent committed
dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct in violation of Canon 3 and Rule 3.08
of Canon 3, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which state:

Canon 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 3.08 A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.

We also find that the respondent judge violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which states that [a] judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, in relation
to Canon 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that a judges conduct be
above reproach and that he administer justice according to law. This means that a
judge, in dispensing justice, should apply the law impartially, independently, honestly,
and in a manner perceived by the public to be impartial, independent and honest.[34]

Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.[35] It warrants dismissal from the service when the
judicial act is corrupt and inspired by an intention to violate the law, and when it
translates to wrongful intention rather than mere error of judgment.[36]

In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and personal feelings rather than
to the faithful discharge of his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted
dishonestly and inefficiently, coupled with a deliberate and wrongful intent to perform
his duties unfaithfully. This is no less a serious misconduct than a corrupt act
undertaken for monetary gains; one as well as the other eroded public confidence in a
judges ability to render justice.[37]

The Possession and Use of a Stolen Vehicle

In his defense on this issue, the respondent judge claimed that the case was filed by
the complainant merely to harass him. He also claimed good faith and lack of
knowledge that the vehicle he had borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was the same
vehicle involved in the Anti-Fencing case that he dismissed in 1999.

The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a
violation of judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing
is a legitimate and neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and
court employees by the nature of their functions and of the norms and standards
peculiar to their positions live their lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on
others; specifically, they cannot simply borrow in situations when this act may or can
affect the performance of their duties because of the nature of the thing borrowed or
the identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would involve ethical
questions under express rules. In this case, the complaint alleged that what the
respondent judge borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was the subject of a previous
litigation before his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too, from a lender who still
had cases before his sala.

We hold, based on our examination and analysis of the records, that the respondent
judge went over the dividing line that separates permissible from impermissible
borrowing.
First, during his cross-examination before the CA, the respondent judge admitted that
he knew that the vehicle he borrowed was owned by Leopoldo Gonzaga, who was the
accused in the Anti-Fencing case previously before him.[38] The respondent judge
could not have avoided this admission given the surrounding circumstances of the
case; the vehicle in the Anti-Fencing case was a Pajero, while the vehicle he borrowed
from Leopoldo Gonzaga was also a Pajero;[39] while the color of the vehicle had been
changed from green to dirty white, it was shown that the vehicle consistently carried
the same plate number UTN 571;[40] the respondent judge could not have missed the
identity of the vehicle considering his admission that the Pajero was under the courts
custody for several months.[41]

Second, the records show that the respondent judges initial claim of lack of knowledge
is not true. In the preliminary investigation conducted by State Prosecutor Velasco in
the Anti-Fencing case involving the Pajero, the respondent judge, when apprehended
by policemen, exhibited a court decision he penned in 1999 dismissing the Anti-
Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga for the same vehicle.[42] This incident, which
the respondent judge never refuted, clearly indicated that he knew that the vehicle he
possessed and used, despite its change of color, was the same vehicle involved in the
1999 Anti-Fencing case that came before him.

Third, the unrefuted statement of the complainant in his Affidavit

(Direct Examination)[43] filed before the CA states:

I know for a fact that Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had several cases pending in the two (2)
salas presided by Executive Judge Salcedo . . . Also, I know for a fact that before the
Criminal Case No. 11728 . . . was dismissed by Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo,
several cases of Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had been pending in the sala of Judge Salcedo. I
also know for a fact that Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo inhibited himself from the
cases of Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga when there was a question raised on the propriety of
his borrowing the Pajero from Mr. Gonzaga, a court litigant in his sala, during the
pendency of this Administrative case. [Emphasis theirs]

Thus, the respondent judge not only borrowed a vehicle that was the subject of an Anti-
Fencing case before him; he also borrowed it from a lender who had other pending
cases before him. In fact, he had to inhibit himself from hearing these cases because of
the pendency of the present administrative cases.

Under the circumstances, the respondent judge is liable for serious misconduct, given
his repeated and deliberate intention to disregard and violate the legal norms of
conduct governing his behavior and action as a judge. He committed serious
misconduct, first, in using and possessing a vehicle with the knowledge that it was the
subject of an anti-fencing case previously before him; and second, he borrowed this
vehicle from a litigant who had pending cases before his sala. Both the character of the
vehicle borrowed and the identity of the lender precluded him from borrowing and
using Leopoldo Gonzagas Pajero. While the criminal case filed against the respondent
judge by State Prosecutor Velasco was dismissed by the Department of Justice, we
agree with Justice Tijam that the respondent judges acts at least constitute
irresponsible and improper conduct whose effect is to erode public confidence in the
judiciary.[44] As aptly stated by Justice Tijam, the respondent judges act compromised
the image, integrity and uprightness of the courts of law;[45] it cast suspicion not only
in his own impartiality, but also in the impartiality and integrity of his judicial office,
thereby impairing public trust in the exercise of his judicial functions.

In several cases of the same import, the Court penalized a judge for highly improper
conduct.

In Cabreana v. Avelino,[46] the Court castigated the respondent judge who hitched a
ride in the car of a party-litigant in going to and from the place of the ocular inspection.
We ruled that the respondent judges act exposed him and his office to suspicion and
impaired the trust and faith of the people in the administration of justice.

In Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana,[47] we admonished the judge to be circumspect in his

conduct and dealings with lawyers who had pending cases before him. It was
established that the judge displayed before the public his close familiarity with one of
the lawyers who appeared before him and whose car the judge sometimes borrowed.

We explained in Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva that the duty to avoid improper conduct or the
appearance of impropriety becomes more crucial when one is a trial judge who has
constant dealings with the public:[48]
[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of
government especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are
those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the
judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the
administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon
him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice. x x x it is essential that judges, like Caesar's
wife, should be above suspicion.
The evidence adduced in this charge showed that the respondent judge violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 2.01, Canon 2, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in failing to
maintain the appearance of integrity and in failing to engage in conduct to promote
public confidence in the judiciary. Likewise, he violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics relating to the avoidance of
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the judges activities, official or
otherwise.

The Execution of a Final Judgment in

the Consolidated Agrarian Cases

The pertinent portion of the joint decision dated February 7, 2000 rendered by the
Special Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99 reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises duly considered, the Court hereby renders its
judgment fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just compensation for the
landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all these above-
captioned docketed agrarian cases, as follows:

First Hereby fixing, as determined, the just compensation of herein petitioners

aggregate landholdings of 123.4629 hectares hereby fixed and determined at
P25,405,553.55, plus the fixed and determined just compensation for the existing
improvements thereon of P32,800,000.00, or a total of P58,205,553.55; and proper-
computed adjustment to make such valuation at par with current true value of the
Philippine Peso vis--vis the US Dollar, said upgraded amount in its upgraded value
totals P89,547,005.46; and further adding thereto the computed interests pegged at 6%
per annum, which amounted to P21,986,680.68, the total amount of just compensation
which Respondent-DAR through LBP must pay, jointly and severally, to petitioners for
their landholdings and improvements would be, as it is hereby fixed in the aggregate
amount of P111,533,686.14;

xxx

The respondent judge contends that he merely acted on the motion filed by the
landowners who requested adjustments in enforcing the final judgment considering
the statement in the dispositive portion of the judgment that allowed adjustments
based on the current true value of the Philippine Peso vis--vis the US Dollar.

In his findings, Justice Tijam observed that the adjustment contemplated in the joint
decision was already included in the dispositive portion, making it unnecessary for the
respondent judge to make any additional adjustment. We also note that this joint
decision, after having become final and executory, was entered in the Book of Entries
of Judgment of the Special Agrarian Court on May 3, 2000.[49] It was not until October
26, 2000 that the respondent judge made further adjustment of the judgment amount
when he acted on the motion filed by the landowners.[50]

The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final
and executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This
legal reality, known as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle
of law and procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land.[51]
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or the making of
so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void.[52] To be sure, the respondent judges ground for modifying the joint
decision is not among these recognized exceptions.

For modifying a final and executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the
respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward
and its application to the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one
does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[53] The respondent judge
violated Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates
professional competence on the part of a judge. A judge owes the public and the court
the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence;[54] otherwise, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts.[55] Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.
[56]

The Penalty
The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both the complainant and the
respondent judge pending the investigation of these administrative cases are not
deterrents to the resolution on the merits of the complaints and to the imposition of
the sanctions demanded by the circumstances. Jurisprudence holds that the death of
the complainant does not warrant the withdrawal of the charges against the
respondent nor does this development render the complaint moot; the complainant is
treated only as a witness in this type of proceedings.[57] On the other hand, the death
of the respondent in an administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of
administrative liability. The recognized exceptions to this rule are: first, when the
respondent has not been heard and continuation of the proceedings would deny him
of his right to due process; second, where exceptional circumstances exist in the case
leading to equitable and humanitarian considerations; and third, when the kind of
penalty imposed or imposable would render the proceedings useless.[58] None of
these exceptional circumstances are present in the case.

Thus, despite the above supervening events, we can still impose the penalty of fine
against the respondent judge deductible from his retirement benefits. In this case, we
find that the infractions he committed all constitute serious charges warranting the
imposition of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 range.[59] Considering
the several violations he committed and the gravity and circumstances of these
infractions, we find that the maximum amount of fine should be imposed on each
charge. In so ruling, we note that this is not the first administrative infraction
committed by the respondent judge; he had previously been fined P10,000.00 for
undue delay in rendering decisions or orders.[60]

On the first charge (false investigation report on Judge Agayan), we find the respondent
judge guilty of dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct. He violated the
provisions of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2, Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Section 8, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, classifies dishonesty and gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. We impose a fine of
P40,000.00 on the respondent judge on this charge.[61]

On the second charge (use and possession of the vehicle of a litigant before his sala),
the respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and impropriety as provided in
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Considering the compounded
administrative offenses, he is meted the maximum fine of P40,000.00.[62]

For violation of Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (in the execution of
the decision of an agrarian case), the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of
the law for which the maximum fine of P40,000.00 is imposed. Gross ignorance of law
is considered a serious charge that warrants the imposition of the penalties provided
under Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[63]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Erasto D. Salcedo GUILTY of the

following administrative offenses:
1. Dishonesty, inefficiency and serious misconduct and violation of Rule 2.01 of
Canon 2 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3 and 31
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We impose a FINE of P40,000.00.

2. Serious misconduct and impropriety in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule
2.01of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. He is meted a FINE of P40,000.00.

3. Gross ignorance of the law under Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, for which a FINE of P40,000.00 is imposed.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby ordered to deduct the amount of One
Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00) from the retirement benefits due to
Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, and to proceed with the processing and release of these
benefits, unless there are other lawful causes for withholding them.

Finally, we refer to the Department of Justice for appropriate action the possible
administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan arising from the imputations
made by the complainant that he committed a hasty reinvestigation of Leopoldo
Gonzaga in Criminal Case No. 11728.

SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003]

JUDGE MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, petitioner, vs. MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS,

respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Due process is the very essence of justice itself. Where the rule of law is the bedrock of
our free society, justice is its very lifeblood. Denial of due process is thus no less than a
denial of justice.[1]
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[2] dated July 13, 2001 and the
Resolution[3] dated August 30, 2001, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 64733, Margie Corpus Macias vs. Hon. Wilfredo G. Ochotorena and Hon. Judge
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
On February 6, 2001, Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Margie Corpus Macias (herein respondent),
docketed as Civil Case No. S-695.
The sheriff exerted earnest efforts to personally serve copies of the summons and
complaint upon the respondent, but to no avail. Hence, the trial court, upon petitioners
motion, issued an Order dated March 7, 2001 directing that summons be effected by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zamboanga del
Norte and the twin cities of Dapitan and Dipolog and thereafter requiring the
respondent to file her answer within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
Subsequently, the summons and complaint were published in the March 11 to 17, 2001
issues of the Dipolog-based newspaper Tingog Peninsula.
Instead of filing an answer, respondent, through counsel, on April 10, 2001, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: (1) the cause of action is
barred by the statute of limitations; (2) the trial court has no jurisdiction because it is
not among those designated to act as a family court under Resolution A.M. No. 99-11-
07-SC; and (3) the parties failed to resort to barangay conciliation prior to the filing of
the petition.
On April 19, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondents motion to
dismiss. Incidentally, in the same Order, the trial court granted respondents request
(via long distance telephone call) to set the hearing on April 30, 2001.
The hearing set on April 30, 2001 was cancelled for failure of respondent and counsel
as well as the expert witness to appear. On the same day, the trial court issued an
Order setting the hearing anew on May 2 and 3, 2001. Respondent received a copy of
this Order only on May 8, 2001. Thus, when the case was called for hearing as
scheduled, respondent and counsel, not being duly notified, did not appear.
Surprisingly, the trial court allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
After the petitioner rested his case, the trial court issued an Order dated May 3, 2001
(1) directing the public prosecutor to submit a Certification containing his assent or
opposition to the petition; (2) directing the petitioner and the public prosecutor to
submit their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days;
and (3) declaring the case submitted for decision.
On May 5, 2001, respondent still unaware that the case had been submitted for
decision, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated April 19, 2001 denying
her motion to dismiss. The trial court merely noted the motion for reconsideration in
his Order dated May 16, 2001.
Consequently, on May 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction challenging the trial courts Order dated April 19, 2001 which
denied her motion to dismiss; and Order dated April 30, 2001 cancelling the April 30,
2001 hearing and resetting it on May 2 and 3, 2001.
Acting thereon, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated May 23, 2001, enjoined the
trial court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. S-695.
Meanwhile, on May 15, 2001 or barely twelve (12) days from submission of the case for
decision, the trial court rendered its Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage
between the parties on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of herein
respondent. Thereupon, she filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion has not
been acted upon.
Meantime, on July 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting
respondents petition for certiorari, thus:
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the Petitioner was deprived, by the
Respondent Court, of her right to due process enshrined in Article III, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution, via its Orders, Annexes L and O of the Petition, and its Decision.
xxxxxxxxx
In the present recourse, the hearings of the complaint of the Private Respondent, on its
merits, before the issues were joined was a farce, a blatant transgression by the
Respondents of the fundamental right of the Petitioner to due process. Taking stock of
the antecedental milieu in the present recourse, We are convinced, beyond cavil, that
either the Respondent Court was ignorant of the basic rudiments of Civil Procedure or
if he was aware of said Rules as he should, he simply ignored the same, ran roughshod
over the rights of the Petitioner, railroaded the hearing of the case and rendered
judgment even before the Petitioner had the opportunity to defend herself and adduce
her evidence.
xxxxxxxxx
There is no evidence on record when the Petitioner was served with the complaint and
summons by registered mail. However, the Petitioner learned of the complaint and
summons about the first week of April, 2001 on the basis of the March 11-17, 2001
issue of the Tingog Peninsula. Even if the thirty-day period fixed by the Respondent
Court was reckoned from the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the Tingog Peninsula, the
Petitioner had until April 16, 2001 within which to file a Motion to Dismiss under
Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an Answer to the
complaint. However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of
filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for
her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the
hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for
in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service
on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer
to the complaint:
xxxxxxxxx
The Petitioner may file a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order conformably with
Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
Until then, a hearing of the case on its merits is impermissible and a travesty. However,
even before the Petitioner could be served with a copy of the order of the Respondent
Court (Annex L of the Petition) denying her Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent Court
proceeded with the hearing of the case on its merits and received the evidence of the
Private Respondent on May 2 and 3, 2001. As it was, Petitioner, through counsel,
received only on May 3, 2001 the Order of the Respondent Court (Annex L of the
Petition) denying her Motion to Dismiss and, on May 5, 2001, the Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Respondent Court, dated April 19, 2001.
What is so trite is that the Respondent Court violated its own Order dated February 27,
2001, declaring that the hearing of the case on its merits will ensue only after the
Petitioner shall have filed her Answer to the complaint.
Equally worrisome is the fact that the Petitioner reminded the Respondent Court, in
her Manifestation and Motion, dated April 18, 2001, that the case was not ripe for
hearing on its merits and prayed that the hearing of the case on its merits be
suspended until after final resolution by the Respondent Court of her Motion to
Dismiss:
xxxxxxxxx
Even if the Petitioner failed to file her Answer to the complaint, after the period
therefor had lapsed, the Respondent Court was not authorized to conduct a hearing of
the case on its merits. This is so because Section 3 (e), Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure specifically provides that:
(c) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in an action for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (idem, supra.)
The Report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non to further proceedings
of the case on its merits. The Respondent Court ignored the aforequoted Rule. It bears
stressing that the Petitioner had already filed her Motion to Dismiss and, hence, can be
notified by the Public Prosecutor of his investigation.
xxxxxxxxx
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED.
The hearings of the case on the merits on May 2 and 3, 2001, including the Decision of
the Respondent Court, are NULLIFIED. The Respondent Court is hereby ordered to
resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of the Petitioner dated May 5, 2001, after the
Private Respondent shall have filed his Comment or Opposition to said motion and,
thereafter, to proceed with the case as provided for by the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
From the said Decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner vehemently asserts that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in holding that
the trial court deprived respondent of her right to due process; and in nullifying, not
only the May 2 and 3, 2001 hearings, but also the trial courts Decision dated May 15,
2001.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
This Court will not countenance a denial of ones fundamental right to due process,
which is a cornerstone of our legal system.[4]
In the case at bar, the trial court did not observe the rudimentary principle of due
process enshrined in our Constitution. Neither did it comply with pertinent procedural
rules.
More to the point, the trial court, without even waiting for respondents motion for
reconsideration of the April 19, 2001 Order denying her motion to dismiss, hurriedly
set the case for hearing. Also, without allowing the respondent to file her answer to the
petition and knowing there was no joinder of issues as yet, the trial court hastily
authorized petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte.
Pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
where the defending party fails to file his or her answer to the petition, the trial court
should order the prosecutor to intervene for the State by conducting an investigation
to determine whether or not there was collusion between the parties. Here, the trial
court disregarded such procedure. Obviously, the summary proceeding is a patent
nullity.
And assuming arguendo that there was an answer filed by the respondent, still, the
hearing of the case on May 2 and 3, 2001 is a procedural flaw. As stated at the outset,
respondent received the notice of hearing only on May 8, 2001. So how could she be
present in court on May 2 and 3?
We are convinced that respondents fundamental right to due process was blatantly
transgressed by the trial court. And resultantly, the proceedings conducted, including
the trial courts Decision, are void for lack of due process.
We have consistently held that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act
taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity. [5]
In Uy vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that (a) decision is void for lack of due process if,
as a result, a party (as in this case) is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A void
decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by
means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding
where it is invoked.[6]
Indeed, in depriving respondent her constitutional and procedural right to due process,
the trial court gravely abused its discretion. It is, therefore, imperative that the instant
case for declaration of nullity of marriage be litigated anew in accordance with the
Rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001 and
Resolution dated August 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SECOND DIVISION
PERLA BURIAS, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1689
Complainant, [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 07-1897-MTJ]
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
JUDGE MIRAFE B. VALENCIA, BRION, JJ.
MTC-Irosin, Sorsogon,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
March 13, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

In a verified complaint dated 19 August 2005, Perla Burias (complainant) charged Judge
Mirafe B. Valencia (respondent), then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Irosin, Sorsogon, of gross misconduct.

The undisputed facts follow.

On 4 and 25 August 2005, respondent borrowed money from complainant in the

amounts of P5,000.00 and P2,500.00, respectively. The loans were evidenced by
promissory notes.[1]

On 25 August 2005, complainant filed a verified complaint[2] for forcible entry and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
before the MTC of Bulan, Sorsogon, presided by Judge Marie Louise A. Guan-Aragon
(Judge Guan-Aragon). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 590 entitled Perla Burias
vs. Celima Morata.

On 7 November 2005, Judge Guan-Aragon inhibited herself from the civil case.[3]
On 16 June 2006, respondent took over Civil Case No. 590 and, as the new presiding
judge in the case, issued a pre-trial conference order.[4]

On 15 and 29 September 2006, the parties to the civil case submitted their position
papers in compliance with the order of respondent.

On 6 December 2006, respondent issued an order requiring the defendant in the civil
case to submit other documents to support her claim of prior physical possession.[5]

On 4 and 24 January 2007, respondent again borrowed from complainant the amounts
of P15,000.00 and P3,000.00, as evidenced by two (2) handwritten notes.[6]

On 23 March 2007, complainant filed an urgent motion for respondents inhibition on

the ground of delay in the resolution of the civil case and apparent bias against
complainant based on the Order of 6 December 2006.

Respondent denied the motion on 18 April 2007, citing the demise of her son as cause
for the delay.[7]

Complainant moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by respondent on
8 January 2008.[8]

In her administrative complaint, complainant alleged that on 12 October 2005,

respondent endorsed a check and thereafter exchanged the same for cash in the sum
of P5,000.00 that complainant provided. Said check however was dishonored when
presented for payment by complainant. She also averred that sometime in March 2007,
respondent verbally demanded from her the sum of P50,000.00 and that her
P30,500.000 indebtedness be written off in exchange for a favorable decision in Civil
Case No. 590. According to complainant, she refused to accede to the demands of
respondent. In April 2007, respondent reportedly called her up and threatened that
she would release any of the two (2) draft decisions she allegedly prepared favoring
respondent in the civil case. Complainant claimed that by reason of these threats, she
was constrained to file the instant administrative case.[9]

In a 1st Indorsement dated 21 May 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.[10]

On 21 June 2007, respondent submitted her comment. Anent the dishonored check,
respondent explained that she signed on the dorsal side of the check to accommodate
a troubled friend who issued said check in favor of complainant.[11] Respondent
admitted that she entered into several transactions with complainant involving copra
products from her plantation to complainants buying station. She was even allowed to
take small credits with the assurance of payment whenever the next copra produce is
delivered to complainants store.[12] Respondent denied that she had demanded
P50,000.00 from complainant and that the P30,500.00 indebtedness be written off for
being malicious, baseless and simply intended to destroy her standing as a member of
the bench.[13] She also denied flaunting the two (2) draft decisions. While she admitted
that the first eight (8) pages of the purported decisions are similar to her draft, the rest
of their pages differ.[14] She justified the 6 December 2006 Order as it was issued
consistently with the provision of Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which allows
the issuance of an order for the purpose of clarifying certain material facts.
In a Resolution dated 8 October 2007, the Court resolved to re-docket the case as a
regular administrative case and required the parties to manifest whether they are
willing submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.[15]

On 13 March 2008, respondent prayed that the administrative complaint be submitted

for resolution[16] while on 2 April 2008, complainant manifested the submission of the
case for resolution.[17]

In its Report dated 28 August 2007, the OCA recommended that respondent be found
guilty of misconduct and be meted a fine of P21,000.00 with a warning that the
commission of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.[18]

The OCA held respondent accountable for contracting loans of money from persons
with whom her office has official relations. It ruled that it was improper for respondent
to take a loan from a party-litigant. However, the OCA considered the proof inadequate
to support the allegation that the loan was extended on a promised favorable decision.
With respect to the charge of delay in the resolution of Civil Case No. 590, the OCA
sustained respondents Order dated 6 December 2006. It found nothing in the records
which show that clarificatory procedure was resorted to gain time for the rendition of
the judgment. Neither did OCA find any irregularity in the issuance of the Order
denying the motion for inhibition found by complainant.[19]

Complainants allegations were categorized by OCA into two issuesthe first relates to
the charge of borrowing money and the second deals with the apparent delay in the
resolution of Civil Case No. 590.

This Court shall proceed to resolve the issues in this order.

With respect to the charge of borrowing money in exchange for a favorable judgment,
Rule 5.02, Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain
from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so
manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases
giving grounds for disqualification.

Under Rule 5.04 of Canon 5, a judge may obtain a loan if no law prohibits such loan.
However, the law prohibits a judge from engaging in financial transactions with a party-
litigant. Respondent admitted borrowing money from complainant during the
pendency of the case. This act alone is patently inappropriate.[20] The impression that
respondent would rule in favor of complainant because the former is indebted to the
latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. A judges conduct should always be beyond
reproach.

This Court has time and again emphasized that no government position is more
demanding of moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the judiciary. Judges
as models of law and justice are mandated to avoid not only impropriety, but also the
appearance of impropriety, because their conduct affects the peoples faith and
confidence in the entire judicial system.[21]

Complainant also cites intentional delay on the part of respondent as a ground in her
motion for inhibition, which motion was denied by respondent. The OCA however
correctly disposed this issue as a judicial matter which should not be treated as
administrative in character, thus:

x x x hence, the party who alleges to be aggrieved may apply for the appropriate legal
remedy. In the absence of such a proceeding, the order either for or against inhibition
stands.[22]

However, we do not completely agree with OCAs finding on the propriety of the
issuance of 6 December 2006 order. Section 10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment.Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits
and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment.
However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may,
during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and
require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten
(10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15)
days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of
the judgment.

The above-quoted rule explicitly mandates that should the court find it necessary to
clarify certain material facts, it shall issue a clarificatory order during said period, which
is construed as within 30 days after receipt of the last affidavits or position papers, or
the expiration of the periods for filing the same. The last position paper was filed by
respondent in the civil case on 29 September 2006. Respondent should have issued the
assailed order within 30 days counted from the receipt of the position paper.

Be that as it may, all orders relating to a motion for inhibition should not be treated as
administrative in character.

Under Section 8 in relation to Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, borrowing
money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court
constitutes a serious charge punishable by any of the following sanctions:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00

Since respondent retired from service last 22 February 2008, the penalty of fine is
imposed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judge Mirafe B. Valencia of the MTC of Irosin,
Sorsogon is meted with a FINE of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED.