Ramon Galang The case is one of the consolidated cases Whether or not Galang Yes.
t Galang Yes. Under Rule 127, Sec 2 every
in In re Lanuevo.
Ramon E. Galang passed the 1971 bar
examination but his exam papers were
subjected to unauthorized re-correction
and re-evaluation by 5 examiners.
An investigation by the NBI revealed
o that Ramon (Roman/Romy) was
a student of School of Law of
MLQU;
o that in Sept 8, 1959, he was
charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries(SPI) of another
student of the same university;
o that in a 1973 hearing, he was
confronted with this information
but declared he does not
remember being charged with
the same
Victim was summoned and narrated the
case and identified Galang as the very
same person charged with SPI in that
case
An administrative proceeding was filed for
his disbarment along with Bar Confidant
Lanuevo.
must be stricken off in the
roll of attorneys for
concealing his case of SPI.
applicant is duty bound to lay
before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case,
pending or otherwise terminated,
to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's
moral character.
As to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme
Court to determine. Hence, the
necessity of laying before or
informing the Court of one's
personal record whether he
was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed
or is still pending becomes
more compelling.
In 1963 and 1964, when Galang
took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the
Court for use of applicants
already required the applicant to
declare under oath that "he has
not been accused of, indicted for
or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving
moral turpitude; and that there is
no pending case of that nature
against him."
By 1966, when Galang took the
Bar examinations for the fourth
time, the application form
prepared by the Court for use of
applicants required the applicant
to reveal all his criminal cases
whether involving moral turpitude
or not. Yet, Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his criminal case
of slight physical injuries which
was then and until now is pending
in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to
make mention of the same in his

Diao vs. Martinez After successfully passing the
corresponding examinations held in 1953,
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez
charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar
examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications:
o (a) Diao did not complete his
high school training; and
o (b) Diao never attended
Quisumbing College, and never
obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom which contradicts
the credentials he had
submitted in support of his
application for examination, and
of his allegation therein of
successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and
complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically
admits the first charge: but he claims that
although he had left high school in his
third year, he entered the service of the
U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
Lilian F. Villasanta The complaint seeks to disqualify the
respondent, a 1954 successful bar
Whether or not Diaos claim
would prosper?
Whether or not the
respondent is immoral
applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and
1971.
That the concealment of an
attorney in his application to take
the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a
ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well
settled.
No. Diao was not qualified to take
the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed
it, and was thereafter admitted to
the Bar. Such admission having
been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled
the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the
only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally
essential
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to
strike from the roll of attorneys,
the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return
his lawyer's diploma within thirty
days.
This Court is of the opinion that
the respondent is immoral. He
 candidate, from being admitted to the bar. made mockery of marriage which
On April 16, 1939, the respondent was is a sacred institution demanding
married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal, respect and dignity. His conviction
Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, in the criminal case involves
he courted the complainant who fell in moral turpitude. The act of
love with him. To have carnal knowledge respondent in contracting the
of her, the respondent procured the second marriage (even his act in
preparation of a fake marriage contract making love to another woman
which was then a blank document. He while his first wife is still alive and
made her sign it on March 8, 1951. A their marriage still valid and
week after, the document was brought existing) is contrary to honesty,
back by the respondent to the justice, decency, and morality.
complainant, signed by the Justice of the Thus lacking the good moral
Peace and the Civil Registrar of San character required by the Rules of
Manuel, Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Court, the respondent is hereby
Since then the complainant and the declared disqualified from being
respondent lived together as husband and admitted to the bar.
wife. Sometime later, the complainant
insisted on a religious ratification of their
marriage and on July 7, 1951, the
corresponding ceremony was performed
in Aparri by the parish priest of said
municipality. The priest no longer required
the production of a marriage license
because of the civil marriage contract
shown to him.
After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple
returned to Manila as husband and wife
and lived with some friends. The
complainant then discovered that the
respondent was previously married to
someone else; whereupon, she filed the
criminal action for a violation of Article 350
of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of
First Instance of Cagayan and the present
complaint for immorality in this court.
Re: Petition to take Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., passed the 1996 Whether or not petitioner Petitioner is allowed to take the
Lawyers Oath by Arthur Bar Examinations. Cuevas has the moral LAWYERS OATH and sign the
Cuevas His oath-taking was held in abeyance in fitness required to take the ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
view of the Court's resolution which lawyers oath? The Court shares the sentiment
permitted him to take the Bar of Atty. Camaligan, father of
Examinations "subject to the condition that hazing victim Raul Camaligan,
should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not and condoles with the untimely
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath death of a son who is expected to
pending approval of the Court . . ." due to become a lawyer and succeed his
his previous conviction for Reckless father.
 Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The conviction stemmed from petitioner's
participation in the initiation rites of the
LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a
fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF
LAW, sometime in September 1991,
where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte,
died as a result of the personal violence
inflicted upon him.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was
granted probation. On May 10, 1995, he
was discharged from probation and his
case considered closed and terminated.
Samaniego vs. Ferrer Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego
against respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer
for immorality, abandonment and willful
refusal to give support to their daughter,
filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was
referred to Atty. Ferrer as a potential
client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle her
cases and soon their lawyer-client
relationship became intimate.
Ms. Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted
her and she fell in love with him. He said
she flirted with him and he succumbed to
her temptations. Thereafter, they lived
Whether or not Atty. Ferrer
is guilty of gross immorality
In his comment submitted to the
Court, Atty. Camaligan submits
petitioners plea to be admitted to
the membershop to the Philippine
Bar, to the sound and judicious
discretion of the Court.
The deliberate participation of
Cuevas in the senseless beating
of a helpless neophyte which
resulted to his death indicates
that petitioner does not possess
the moral fitness required for
admission to the Bar.
However, petitioner was
discharged from probation without
any infraction thereafter of the
conditions of the probation and
the various certifications attesting
to his righteous, peaceful and
civic-oriented character prove that
he has taken decisive steps to
purge himself of his deficiency in
moral character and atone for the
unfortunate death of Camaligan.
The Court then decides to give
petitioner a chance in the same
manner that it allowed AL
ARGOSINO, petitioners co-
accused to take the lawyers
oath.
Yes. The Court reminded Atty.
Ferrer of Canon 1 and Canon 7.
Needless to state, respondent
ought always to keep in mind the
responsibilities of a father to all
his children. If there be a resultant
hardship on them because of this
case, let it be impressed on all
concerned that the direct cause
thereof was his own misconduct.
Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer GUILTY of
gross immorality and, as
recommended by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar
 together as "husband and wife" from 1996 Confidant, SUSPEND him from
to 1997, and on March 12, 1997, their the practice of law for six (6)
daughter was born. months effective upon notice
The affair ended in 2000 and since then hereof, with WARNING that the
he failed to give support to their daughter. same or similar act in the future
Before the IBP Commission on Bar will be dealt with more severely.
Discipline, Ms. Samaniego presented their
daughter's birth and baptismal certificates,
and the photographs taken during the
baptism.
She testified that she knew that Atty.
Ferrer was in a relationship but did not
think he was already married. She also
testified that she was willing to
compromise, but he failed to pay for their
daughter's education as agreed upon.
Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the
hearing since he did not want to see Ms.
Samaniego.
In his position paper, Atty. Ferrer
manifested his willingness to support their
daughter. He also admitted his
indiscretion; however, he prayed that the
IBP consider Ms. Samaniego's complicity
as she was acquainted with his wife and
children. He further reasoned that he
found it unconscionable to abandon his
wife and 10 children to cohabit with Ms.
Samaniego.
Arnobit vs. Arnobit Rebecca B. Arnobit, filed an affidavit- Whether or not leaving the Yes. As officers of the court,
complaint, praying that the Court exercise conjugal home and lawyers must not only in fact be of
its disciplinary power over her husband, cohabiting with a married good moral character but must
respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the woman a ground for also be seen to be of good moral
grounds of Immorality and Abandonment. disbarment character and leading lives in
Complainant and respondent were accordance with the highest
married with 12 children. Several years moral standards of the
after passing the bar, respondent left the community. A member of the bar
conjugal dwelling and cohabited with and an officer of the court is not
Benita Buenafe, a married woman, who only required to refrain from
bore him 4 more children. Rebecca filed a adulterous relationships or
complaint for legal separation and keeping a mistress but must also
support. A criminal case of adultery so behave himself as to avoid
against respondent and Benita later scandalizing the public by
followed. creating the impression that he is
Respondent denied the allegation that he flouting those moral standards.
 cohabited with Benita. Instead, he alleged
that it was Rebecca who was the cause of
their separation due to her frequent travels
around the country without his consent
and thereby neglecting her obligations
toward her family.
St. Louis Univ vs. Dela A disbarment case filed by the Faculty
Cruz members and Staff of the Saint Louis
University-Laboratory High School (SLU-
LHS) against Atty. Rolando C. Dela Cruz,
principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the
following grounds:
o Gross misconduct- he has
pending case of child abuse,
administrative case and labor
case.
o Grossly immoral conduct
contracting a second marriage
despite the existence of his first
marriage.
o Malpractice- notarizing
documents despite the
expiration of his commission.
May a pending case
constitutes facts that
determines the existence of
gross misconduct by the
respondent?
Undoubtedly, respondents act of
leaving his wife and 12 children to
cohabit and have children with
another woman constitutes
grossly immoral conduct. And to
add insult to injury, there seems
to be little attempt on the part of
respondent to be discreet about
his liaison with the other
woman.As we have already ruled,
disbarment is warranted against a
lawyer who abandons his lawful
wife to maintain an illicit
relationship with another woman
who had borne him a child.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P.
Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED
Practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State
on those who show that they
possess the qualifications
required by law. The purpose of
suspending or disbarring an
attorney is to remove from the
profession those unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities
thereby protecting the public
and those charged with the
administration of justice, rather
than to punish an attorney.
Contracting a second marriage
despite existence of first marriage
is a violation of the continuous
possession of good moral
character as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice.
The Court has characterized a
lawyers act of notarizing
documents without the requisite
commission to do so as
reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but
also the crime of falsification of
public documents. Notarization
 of a private document converts
the document into a public one
making it admissible in court
without further proof of its
authenticity.
A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face and, for this reason,
notaries public must observe with
the utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance
of their duties.
Pending case does not constitute
facts that determines the
existence of gross misconduct by
the respondent as these are still
pending before the proper
forums. At such stages, the
presumption of innocence still
prevails in favor of the
respondent.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Whether or not The Legal Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged
Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according Clinic is engaged in the in the practice of law however,
to Nogales was to move toward practice of law; whether such practice is not allowed. The
specialization and to cater to clients who such is allowed; whether or Legal Clinic is composed mainly
cannot afford the services of big law firms. not its advertisement may of paralegals. The services it
Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint be allowed. offered include various legal
against The Legal Clinic because of the problems wherein a client may
latters advertisements which contain the avail of legal services from simple
following: documentation to complex
SECRET MARRIAGE? litigation and corporate
P560.00 for a valid marriage. undertakings. Most of these
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA. services are undoubtedly beyond
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. the domain of paralegals, but
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041 rather, are exclusive functions of
8:30am 6:00pm lawyers engaged in the practice
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila of law. Under Philippine
GUAM DIVORCE jurisdiction however, the services
DON PARKINSON being offered by Legal Clinic
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on which constitute practice of law
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning cannot be performed by
Monday to Friday during office hours. paralegals. Only a person duly
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration admitted as a member of the bar
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & and who is in good and regular
Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. standing, is entitled to practice
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. law.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US
Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic
published an article entitled Rx for Legal
Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star
wherein Nogales stated that they The
Legal Clinic is composed of specialists
that can take care of a clients problem no
matter how complicated it is even if it is as
complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion situation.
He said that he and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors, are specialists in
various fields, can take care of it.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it
should be allowed in view of the
jurisprudence in the US which now allows
it (John Bates vs The State Bar of
Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to
the public the services that The Legal
Clinic offers.
Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement
of facts. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the
lawyers advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents
or skills as in a manner similar to
a merchant advertising his
goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic
seem to promote divorce, secret
marriage, bigamous marriage,
and other circumventions of law
which their experts can facilitate.
Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted
which forms of advertisement are
allowed. The best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity
to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to
the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper.
A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the
unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court
also enumerated the following as
allowed forms of advertisement:

Guballa vs. Caguioa Petitioner is an operator of a public utility
vehicle which was involved, on October 1,
1971, in an accident resulting to injuries
sustained by private respondent Domingo
Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a
complaint for damages was filed by
Forteza against petitioner with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan
Because petitioner and counsel failed to
appear at the pretrial conference on April
6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was
treated as in default and private
respondent was allowed to present his
evidence ex parte. A decision was
thereafter rendered by the trial court in
favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A
Motion for Reconsideration was then filed
by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order
of default, the reopening of the case for
the presentation of his evidence and the
setting aside of the decision.
Said Motion for Reconsideration was
signed by Ponciano Mercado, another
member of the law firm. The same was
denied by the lower Court and petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following alleged errors, to
wit:
o a. That the Hon. Court erred in
denying defendant Jose Guballa
his day in Court by declaring
him in default, it being contrary
to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter;
o b. That this Hon. Court has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case;
Whether or not a non-
member of the Bar
representing the petitioner
would amount to a denial of
petitioners day in court.
o Advertisement in a
reputable law list
o Use of ordinary simple
professional card
o Listing in a phone
directory but without
designation as to his
specialization
No. The alleged fact that the
person who represented
petitioner at the initial stage of the
litigation, i.e., the filing of an
Answer and the pretrial
proceedings, turned out to be not
a member of the Bar did not
amount to a denial of petitioner's
day in court.
It should be noted that in the
subsequent stages of the
proceedings, after the rendition of
the judgment by default,
petitioner was duly represented
by bona fide members of the Bar
in seeking a reversal of the
judgment for being contrary to law
and jurisprudence and the
existence of valid, legal and
justifiable defenses.
In other words, petitioner's rights
had been amply protected in the
proceedings before the trial and
appellate courts as he was
subsequently assisted by
counsel.
Moreover, petitioner himself was
at fault as the order of treatment
as in default was predicated, not
only on the alleged counsel's
failure to attend the pretrial
conference on April 6, 1972, but
likewise on his own failure to
attend the same, without
justifiable reason.
 o c. Award of damages in favor of
plaintiff, more particularly award
of moral damages is contrary to
law; and
o d. Defendant has valid, legal
and justiciable defenses.
Motion for reconsideration was filed but
was denied.
Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging
his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who
prepared his Answer to the Complaint is
not a member of the Philippine Bar and
that consequently, his rights had not been
adequately protected and his properties
are in danger of being confiscated and/or
levied upon without due process of law.
respondent Judge denied the Petition and
directed the issuance of a writ of
execution for the reasons that said
Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic
on the part of counsel for defendant-
appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that
the grounds relied upon ". . . could have
been ventilated in the appeal before the
Court of Appeals ... "
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of
the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory
maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition
must be denied for lack of merit. The
alleged fact that the person who
represented petitioner at the initial stage
of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer
and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to
be not a member of the Bar
PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of May a non-lawyer recover No. The award of 10% to Quintin
Isabela Sugar Co. Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of attorney's fees for legal Muning who is not a lawyer
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the services rendered? according to the order, is sought
total backwages. to be voided in the present
Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation petition.
indicating their non-objection to an award Lawyer-client relationship is only
of attorney's fees for 25% of their possible if one is a lawyer. Since
backwages respondent Muning is not one, he
Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the cannot establish an attorney-
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent client relationship with Enrique
 to 20% of the backwages. Entila and Victorino Tenezas or
Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the with PAFLU, and he cannot,
ground that he is not a lawyer. therefore, recover attorney's fees.
Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% Public policy demands that legal
of the backwages as compensation for work in representation of parties
professional services rendered in the litigant should be entrusted only
case, apportioned as follows: to those possessing tested
o i. Cipriano 10% qualifications, for the ethics of the
o ii. Quintin Muning 10% profession and for the protection
o iii. Atanacio Pacis 5% of courts, clients and the public.

Five J Taxi vs. NLRC Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Whether or not Pulia is No. While it may be true that
Armamento filed this special civil action entitled to attorney fees. Guillermo H. Pulia was the
for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of authorized representative of
respondent National Labor Relations private respondents, he was a
Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners non-lawyer who did not fall in
to pay private respondents Domingo either of the foregoing categories.
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their Hence, by clear mandate of the
accumulated deposits and car wash law, he is not entitled to attorney's
payments, plus interest thereon at the fees.
legal rate from the date of promulgation of the statutory rule that an attorney
judgment to the date of actual payment, shall be entitled to have and
and 10% of the total amount as and for recover from his client a
attorney's fees. reasonable compensation for his
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan services necessarily imports the
and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the existence of an attorney-client
petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, relationship as a condition for the
they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24- recovery of attorney's fees, and
hour shifting schedule. Aside from the such relationship cannot exist
daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air- unless the client's representative
conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air- is a lawyer.
conditioned taxi, they were also required
to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to
further make a P15.00 deposit to answer
for any deficiency in their "boundary," for
every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was
hired as an extra driver by the petitioners,
he already failed to report for work for
unknown reasons. Later, petitioners
learned that he was working for "Mine of
Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to
Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was
held up by his armed passenger who took
 all his money and thereafter stabbed him.
He was hospitalized and after his
discharge, he went to his home province
to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-
admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver
under the same terms and conditions as
when he was first employed, but his
working schedule was made on an
"alternative basis," that is, he drove only
every other day. However, on several
occasions, he failed to report for work
during his schedule.
Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of
P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he
abandoned his taxicab in Makati without
fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated
requests of petitioners for him to report for
work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it
was revealed that he was driving a taxi for
"Bulaklak Company."
in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners
for the reimbursement of his daily cash
deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners
told him that not a single centavo was left
of his deposits as these were not even
enough to cover the amount spent for the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was
allegedly the practice adopted by
petitioners to recoup the expenses
incurred in the repair of their taxicab units.
When Maldigan insisted on the refund of
his deposit, petitioners terminated his
services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed
that his termination from employment was
effected when he refused to pay for the
washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private
respondents filed a complaint with the
Manila Arbitration Office of the National
Labor Relations Commission charging
petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal
deductions. That complaint was
dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it
took private respondents two years to file
the same and such unreasonable delay

Cambaliza vs. Cristobal-
Tenorio
Beltran Jr vs. Abad
was not consistent with the natural
reaction of a person who claimed to be
unjustly treated, hence the filing of the
case could be interpreted as a mere
afterthought.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or
service fees for private respondents'
authorized representative, Article 222 of
the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3
of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states
that non-lawyers may appear before the
NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they
represent themselves, or (2) if they
represent their organization or the
members thereof.
Complainant is the former employee of the
respondent in her law office.
The former charged the latter for
malpractice or other gross misconduct in
the office for cooperating in the illegal
practice of law by her husband.
The complainant submitted the following
evidences:
o 1) the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office where the
name of Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.,
husband of the respondent, is
listed as a senior partner; and
o 2.) a Sagip Communication
Radios Group identification
card signed by the respondent
where her husband is identified
as Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr..
She added that respondents husband
even appeared in court hearings. During
the investigation of the IBP, complainant
filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
Respondent now moved for the dismissal
of the case for failure of the complainant
to appear in the said case.
In the En Banc decision of March 28,
1983 in the above-entitled case, the Court
found respondent Elmo S. Abad, who
passed the 1978 Bar examinations but
Whether or not respondent
is guilty of assisting in the
unauthorized practice of
law.
Whether or not the
respondent is guilty of
contempt of court.
YES. A lawyer who allows a non-
member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer
and to practice law is guilty of
violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in
education and character.
The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and
the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to
the disciplinary control of the
Court.
It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained,
otherwise, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Yes. Respondent should know
that the circumstances which he
narrated do not constitute his
admission to the Philippine Bar
and the right (or privilege) to
 practice law thereafter. He should
know that two essential requisites
has not been admitted to the Philippine
for becoming a lawyer still had to
Bar, in contempt of Court for illegal
be performed, namely: his
practice of law, and imposed upon him a
lawyers oath to be administered
fine of P500.00. Respondent paid the fine
by this Court and his signature in
on May 2, 1983
the Roll of Attorneys.
The complainant on March 14, 1984
reiterated his motion to circularize to all
Metro Manila courts that respondent is not
authorized to practice law, with prayer that
the latter be punished with greater
severity. He stated that "Mr. Abad is still
practicing law as evidenced by the fact
that last December 8, 1983 at about 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Abad
appeared before the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
100 located at the 11th Floor, City Hall,
Quezon City presided by the Honorable
Judge Jorge C. Macli-ing that Mr. Abad
appeared as counsel for a certain Caroline
T. Velez in Criminal Case Nos. 26084,
26085 and 26086 entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Maravilla, et al. Mr. Abad
even cited in the pleading his Professional
Tax Receipt to prove that he is a licensed
legal practitioner which is utterly false. Mr.
Abad gave his address as Ruben A.
Jacobe & Associates, Ground Floor, ADC
Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila."
Respondent filed an "Opposition to
Motion" denying the complainant's
allegation, to wit:
o respondent is not presenting
himself to the general public as
a Practicing Lawyer like what
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran insists
to the Honorable Court;
o that this motion is motivated by
Atty. Beltran's personal desire to
inflict malice and oppression
upon the respondent who even
until now does not accede to the
terms and conditions of the
 former in connection with
several cases filed against him
by the said Atty. Beltran;
o respondent respectfully submits
that Atty. Beltran is trying his
very best to harass the
respondent under the guise of
conducting a Crusade
personally with the end in view
that respondent submit to his ill-
desires and veiled threats and
finally come into terms with him.
complainant presented the records in
Criminal Cases Nos. 26084, 26085
and 26086, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Antonio S. Maravilla,
Jr., et al." of Branch 100, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, were under
Atty. Elmo Babad
Complainant also testified that on
December 8, 1983 he was at the
11th floor of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court NCJR, Branch
100, Quezon City and saw
respondent Abad pass by in coat and
tie and because he knew that Mr.
Abad is a respondent in a case
before the Supreme Court and had
been declared as a non-lawyer in its
decision of March 28, 1983, he
(complainant) got curious and
followed respondent and saw the
latter enter the sala of Branch 100 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City; that he saw him there and after
about twenty minutes when he went
back to the same sala, he saw
respondent in the place of the said
court where the lawyers were
supposed to be seated; that some
days after, he went back to the said
sala and inspected the records of the
criminal cases numbered 26084,
26085 and 26086,* which are the
 subject matters of the certification of
the Clerk of Court, Atty. Domingo,
before the Investigator
Mrs. Eufrocina B. Ison the Court
Reporter who took down and
transcribed the stenographic notes of
the proceedings in the afternoon of
December 8, 1983 in the said
criminal cases in the aforesaid trial
court, appeared before the
undersigned Investigator and
positively Identified respondent Elmo
Abad as the Atty. Elmo Abad who
appeared as counsel for Juan del
Gallego III in the aforesaid
proceedings that afternoon of
December 8, 1983
The aforesaid documentary and
testimonial evidence, as well as the
above report of the NBI, have clearly
proved that respondent Abad is still
practicing law despite the decision of
this Court of March 28, 1983.

Aguirre vs. Rana Rana was among those who passed the
2000 Bar Examinations. before the
scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant
Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his
oath. Respondent took the lawyers oath
on the scheduled date but has not signed
the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent,
while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law,
complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent
is not allowed by law to act as counsel for
a client in any court or administrative
Whether or not respondent No. The Court held that practice
engaged in the of law means any activity, in or
unauthorized practice of out of court, which requires the
law application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a
natural or constitutional right but
is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character
with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege
 body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and
misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice
mayoralty candidate George Bunan
without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning
vice mayoralty candidate.
Judge Laquindanum vs. This administrative case against Atty.
Quintana Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana)
stemmed from a letter addressed to the
Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia
A. Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of
the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap,
Cotabato requesting that proper
disciplinary action be imposed on him for
performing notarial functions in Midsayap,
Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court that
issued his notarial commission, and for
allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his
absence.
Whether or not Atty.
Quintana violated the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice
and Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
when he let his wife
notarize documents in his
absence
presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even
public trust since a lawyer is an
officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the
right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced
law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the
2000 Bar Examinations and took
the lawyers oath. However, it is
the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a
full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming
a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyers oath to be
administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Atty. Quintana is personally
accountable for the documents
that he admitted were signed by
his wife. He cannot relieve
himself of liability by passing the
blame to his wife. He is, thus,
guilty of violating Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires
lawyers not to directly or indirectly
assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.
 In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged
that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,
executive judges are required to closely
monitor the activities of notaries public
within the territorial bounds of their
jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries
public shall not extend notarial functions
beyond the limits of their authority.
Hence, she wrote a letter to Atty. Quintana
directing him to stop notarizing documents
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Midsayap,
Cotabato (which is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court that
issued his notarial commission for
Cotabato City and the Province of
Maguindanao) since certain
documents notarized by him had been
reaching her office.
However, despite such directive,
respondent continuously performed
notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato
as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss
of ATM Card executed by Kristine C. Guro;
and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Drivers
License executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that,
upon further investigation of the matter, it
was discovered that it was Atty. Quintanas
wife who performed notarial acts
whenever he was out of the office as
attested to by the Joint Affidavit executed
by Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D.
Ballentes.
In his Response, Atty. Quintana alleged
that he filed a petition for notarial
commission before Branch 18, Regional
Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato.However,
the same was not acted upon by Judge
Laquindanum for three weeks. He alleged
that the reason for Judge Laquindanums
inaction was that she questioned his
affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City Chapter,
and required him to be a member of IBP
Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
 Certification of Payments from the latter
chapter. Because of this, he opted to
withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his
petition, he claimed that Judge
Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office
to ask him to return his petition, but he did
not oblige because at that time he already
had a Commission for Notary Public[
issued by Executive Judge Reno E.
Concha of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cotabato City.
Atty. Quintana lamented that he was
singled out by Judge Laquindanum,
because the latter immediately issued
notarial commissions to other lawyers
without asking for so many
requirements. However, when it came to
him, Judge Laquindanum even tracked
down all his pleadings; communicated
with his clients; and disseminated
information through letters,
pronouncements, and directives to court
clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him
and be ostracized by fellow lawyers.
Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed
documents in his office at Midsayap,
Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of
the Province of Cotabato. He contended
that he did not violate any provision of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because
he was equipped with a notarial
commission. He maintained that he did
not act outside
the province of Cotabato since Midsayap,
Cotabato, where he practices his legal
profession and subscribes documents, is
part of the province of Cotabato. He
claimed that as a lawyer of good moral
standing, he could practice his legal
profession in the entire Philippines.
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge
Laquindanum had no authority to issue
such directive, because only Executive
Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his
notarial commission, and the Supreme
Court could prohibit him from notarizing in
 the Province of Cotabato.
before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma.
Crisitina B. Layusa (Hearing Officer),
Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of
Donation, which was notarized by Atty.
Quintana in 2004. Honorata Rosil appears
as one of the signatories of the document
as the donors wife.However, Honorata
Rosil died on March 12, 2003, as shown
by the Certificate of Death issued by the
Civil Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty.
Quintana continued to notarize documents
in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact
that his commission as notary public for
and in
the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabat
o City had already expired on December
31, 2005, and he had not renewed the
same.
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that
all the signatures appearing in the
documents marked as exhibits of Judge
Laquindanum were his except for the
following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card
executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2)
Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License
executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3)
Affidavit of Loss executed by Santos V.
Magbanua. He explained that those
documents were signed by his wife and
were the result of an entrapment operation
of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody
bring and have them notarized by his wife,
when they knew that his wife is not a
lawyer. He also denied the he authorized
his wife to notarize documents. According
to him, he slapped his wife and told her to
stop doing it as it would ruin his
profession.
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge
Laquindanum did not act on his petition,
because he did not comply with her
requirements for him to transfer his
membership to the Kidapawan Chapter,
wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP
 President.
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum
explained that she was only performing
her responsibility and had nothing against
Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did
not act on his petition was that he had not
paid his IBP dues, which is a requirement
before a notarial commission may be
granted. She told his wife to secure a
certification of payment from the IBP, but
she did not return.
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for
forgiveness for what he had done and
promised not to repeat the same. He also
asked that he be given another chance
and not be divested of his privilege to
notarize, as it was the only bread and
butter of his family.
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana
submitted to the OBC the documents
issued by the IBP Cotabato City Chapter
to prove that he had paid his IBP dues.
Judge Laquindanum submitted a
Certification and its entries show that Atty.
Quintana paid his IBP dues for the year
2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official
Receipt (O.R.) No. 610381. Likewise, the
arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993,
1995, 1996, and 1998 to 2003 were also
paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No.
610387.Hence, when he filed his petition
for notarial commission in 2004, he had
not yet completely paid his IBP dues.
Amalgamated Laborers Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal Whether or not the fees are No. The stipulated 30% attorneys'
Association vs. Court of services rendered in CIR Case No. 70- reasonable fee is excessive and
Industrial Relations ULP-Cebu. unconscionable. With the
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 exception of Arsenio Reyes who
others together with their union, receives a monthly salary of
Amalgamated Laborers' Association, P175, the other successful
and/or Felisberto Javier, general president complainants were mere wage
of said union, lodged a complaint in the earners paid a daily rate of P4.20
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for to P5.00. 13 Considering the long
unfair labor practices period of time that they were
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the illegally and arbitrarily deprived of
complaint (motions to dismiss dated June their just pay, these laborers
looked up to the favorable money
 30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), 2respondents
Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9,
1957, answered and counterclaimed.
Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and
Poli also filed their answer dated July 12,
1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the
merits was heard before a trial
commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight
complainant laborers appeared and
testified. Two of these ten were permanent
(regular) employees of respondent
company; the remaining eight were
seasonal workers. The regular employees
were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo.
Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy,
Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio
Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador
Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and Brigido
Casas.
CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez, rendered judgment, which
provides, inter alia, that the two regular
employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be
reinstated "to their former positions,
without loss of seniority and other benefits
which should have accrued to them had
they not been illegally dismissed, with full
back wages from the time of their said
dismissals up to the time of their actual
reinstatements, minus what they have
earned elsewhere in the meantime" and
that the eight seasonal workers "be
readmitted to their positions as seasonal
workers of respondent company (Biscom),
with back wages as seasonal workers
from the time they were not rehired at the
start of the 1955-1956 milling season on
October 1, 1955 up to the time they are
actually reinstated, less the amount
earned elsewhere during the period of
their lay-off."
Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a
respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963
in the same case CIR Case No. 70-
judgment as a serum to their
pitiful economic malaise. A thirty
per cent (30%) slice therefrom
immensely dilutes the palliative
ingredient of this judicial antidote.
the real objective of the CIR
judgment in CIR Case No. 70-
ULP-Cebu is to benefit the
complaint laborers who were
unjustifiedly dismissed from the
service. While it is true that
laborers should not be allowed to
develop that atavistic proclivity to
bite the hands that fed them, still
lawyers should not be permitted
to get a lion's share of the
benefits due by reason of a
worker's labor. What is to be paid
to the laborers is not windfall but
a product of the sweat of their
brow. Contracts for legal services
between laborer and attorney
should then be zealously
scrutinized to the end that a fair
share of the benefits be not
denied the former.
The ten complainants involved
herein are mere laborers. It is not
far-fetched to assume that they
have not reached an educational
attainment comparable to that of
petitioner Carbonell or
respondent Fernandez who, on
the other hand, are lawyers.
Because of the inequality of the
situation between laborers and
lawyers, courts should go slow in
awarding huge sums by way of
attorneys' fees based solely on
contracts.
An examination of the record of
the case will readily show that an
award of twenty-five per cent
(25%) attorneys' fees reasonably
compensates the whole of the
legal services rendered in CIR
 ULP-Cebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien."
He alleged therein that he had been the
attorney of record for the laborers in CIR
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the
inception of the preliminary hearings of
said case up to the Supreme Court on
appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he
"had actually rendered legal services to
the laborers who are subject of this
present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-
Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less";
that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed
to give [him], representing his attorney's
fees on contingent basis such amounts
equivalent to 25% thereof which
agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and
that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted
is "reasonable and proper taking into
consideration the length of services he
rendered and the nature of the work
actually performed by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez
filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's
Lien," which in part reads:
o 3. That the laborers, subject of
this present litigation, sometime
on February 3, 1956, had
initially voluntarily agreed to
give Undersigned Counsel
herein, representing his
Attorney's fees on contingent
basis, such amounts as
equivalent to Thirty Per Cent
(30%) of whatever money
claims that may be adjudicated
by this Honorable Court, copy of
said Agreement, in the local
Visayan dialect and a
translation of the same in the
English language are hereto
attached as annexes "A" "A-1"
hereof;
o 4. That subsequently thereafter,
when the above-entitled Case
was already decided in their
favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee
must be shared by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell and respondent Atty.
Fernandez. For, after all, they are
the counsel of record of the
complainants. Respondent Atty.
Fernandez cannot deny this fact.
The pleadings filed even at the
early stages of the proceedings
reveal the existence of an
association between said
attorneys. The pleadings were
filed under the name of
"Fernandez & Carbonell." This
imports a common effort of the
two.
A contingent fee contract
specifying the percentage of
recovery an attorney is to receive
in a suit "should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the
case, including the risk and
uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonableness."
Since then this Court has
invariably fixed counsel fees on
a quantum meruit basis whenever
the fees stipulated appear
excessive, unconscionable, or
unreasonable, because a lawyer
is primarily a court officer charged
with the duty of assisting the court
in administering impartial justice
between the parties, and hence,
the fees should be subject to
judicial control. Nor should it be
ignored that sound public policy
demands that courts disregard
stipulations for counsel fees,
whenever they appear to be a
source of speculative profit at the
expense of the debtor or
mortgagor.
 of his co-laborers who are also
Complainants in this Case
begged from the Undersigned
Counsel herein that he reduce
his attorney's fees to Twenty-
Five Per Cent (25%) only for the
reason that they have to share
and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the equivalent
amount of Five Per Cent (5%)
although the latter's actual
services rendered was so
insignificant thereof;
o 5. That because of the
pleadings of said Arsenio
Reyes, who is the President of
said Union, the Undersigned
Counsel herein finally agreed
and consented that his
attorney's fees be reduced to
only Twenty-Five Per Cent
(25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent
(30%) as originally agreed upon
in 1956.
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur.
Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in
court a document labelled "Discharge"
informing CIR of the discharge, release
and dismissal thru a union board
resolution (attached thereto as Annex A
thereof) of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez
as one of the lawyers of the complainants
in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective
February 28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez
replied. He averred that the grounds for
his discharge specified in the board
resolution were "malicious and motivated
by greed and ungratefulness" and that the
unjustifiable discharge did not affect the
already stipulated contract for attorneys'
fees.
Petitioners press upon this Court the view
that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate
contractual disputes over attorneys' fees.
Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from
 contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor
dispute and is not one among the cases
ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2)
to consider such a dispute to be a mere
incident to a case over which CIR may
validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard
the special and limited nature of said
court's jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys'
fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end
feature of the main case, CIR No. 70-ULP-
Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's
jurisdiction. And, it has been held that
"once the Court of Industrial Relations has
acquired jurisdiction over a case under the
law of its creation, it retains that
jurisdiction until the case is completely
decided, including all the incidents related
thereto."
Director of Lands vs. Adorable files a land claim before the WON the conduct of Atty. Yes. The conduct of Atty. Zamora
Adorable Director of Lands. The case went to the Zamora is proper. is proper.
CA for appeal. However, the war broke The Court in this case praised
out. Atty. Zamoras conduct as the
After the war, Adorable files a highest standard of truthfulness,
reconstitution case before the SC fair play and nobility as becomes
believing that the CA did not resolve the of the deserving member of the
case. bar.
Atty. Zamora, counsel of the appellee of Hence, the act of Atty. Zamora is
the case informed the Court that the CA in proper.
favor of Adorable already settled the case.

Carlet vs. Court of Appeals
Carlet who is the Special Administrator of
the Estate of Sevillo through Atty. Jimenez
files before the Trial Court an action for
reconvenyance of property of Sevillo.
Zarate then moved to dismiss such action
invoking res judicata since it was the
same facts that had been settled by the
trial court, CA and SC.
The action was then dismissed by the Trial
Court and ordered Atty. Jimenez regarding
forum-shopping. Atty. Jimenez then
appealed it before the CA, but to no avail.
WON the action of Atty.
Jimenez is proper.
No. The action of Atty. Jimenez is
not proper.
Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
provides that A lawyer owes
candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.
In the case at bar, the action of
Atty Jimenez of filing a
reconveyance case despite his
knowledge that there is finality of
the case shows that he does not
have good faith towards the court.

The Insurance Life The Employees Assoc. Files before the
Assurance vs. Cloribel CIR a complaint for unfair labor practice
against the Company.
The CIR then dismissed such complaint.
In its decision, CIR Judge Martinez
misquoted a SC decision in the case of
Lopez Sr v. Chronicle Publication
Employees Assn:
o (1) 60 words of the paragraph
quoted by Martinez do NOT
appear in the original;
o (2) Martinez used For it is
settled that...; the original
reads, For it must be
remembered...
o (3) Last sentence in the quoted
paragraph of Martinez is
actually part of the immediately
succeeding paragraph in the SC
decision.
In the respondents brief, counsels for
respondents quoted the CIRs decision
Del Rosario vs. The CAR rendered a decision evicting Del
Chingcuanco Rosario from the land which he leases
from Imperio.
However, the former refused to vacate the
land since the latter does not want to
refund him of the improvement he had
done to the property.
Del Rosario, further, filed a motion before
the SC to stay such execution. Due this,
Imperio filed a petition to cite Del
Rosarios counsel in contempt since said
counsel quoted a non-existing SC
decision.
However, it was discovered that such
belief was brought by a mere
typographical error.
Whether or not the Judge No. The Judge and the
and the respondents
counsel are liable for
contempt.
WON the conduct of Del No. The conduct of Del Rosarios
Rosarios counsel deserves
a disciplinary action.
Hence, his conduct is not proper.
forum shopping is the practice
adopted by some litigants of
having their legal case heard in
the court thought most likely to
provide a favorable judgment.
respondents counsel are not
liable for contempt.
In citing SCs decisions and
rulings, it is the bounden duty of
courts, judges and lawyers to
reproduce or copy the same
word-for-word and punctuation
mark-for-punctuation mark.
This is because only the
decisions of this Honorable Court
establish jurisprudence or
doctrines in this jurisdiction.
(Miranda v. Imperial).
However, there was good faith in
both the Judge and the
respondents counsel, hence their
action is not liable for contempt.
counsel does not deserve a
disciplinary action.
In this case, the Court ruled that
the name of the case was given
correctly and there was clearly no
deception on the part of the
counsel.
Hence, the conduct of said
counsel does not deserve a
disciplinary action.
 Surigao Mineral
Reservation vs. Cloribel
Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the
memoranda personally signed by Atty.
Jose Beltran Sotto:
o a. They (petitioners, including
the Executive Secretary) have
made these false, ridiculous and
wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International.
Such efforts could be accurately
called "scattershot desperation"
(Memorandum for Respondents
dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-
14, three lines from the bottom
of page 13 and first line page
14).
o b. Such a proposition is corrupt
on its face and it lays bare the
immoral and arrogant attitude of
the petitioners. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum
and Reply to Petitioner's
Memorandum Brief, dated April
13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on
bottom of the page).
o c. The herein petitioners ...
opportunistically change their
claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading
to pleading in the same case.
(Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth,
seventh and eighth lines from
bottom of the page).
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board issued
an Invitation to Bid for the exploration and
development of mineral deposits in a
certain portion in the Province of Surigao.
It was joined by two (2) bidders.
After evaluation, both were disqualified
and their subsequent motions denied.
One of the (failed) bidder filed a petition at
the Court of First Instance of Manila
seeking relief.
After the petitioners here (respondents in
WON the attorneys are On the first contempt charge, Atty.
liable for contempt. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty.
Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of
contempt of court, and fines Atty.
Santiago in the sum of P1,000,
and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds
Attys. Graciano C. Regala and
Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy
not guilty of contempt of court;
and
It is true that Santiago voluntarily
deleted paragraph 6 which
contained language that is as
disrespectful. But we cannot
erase the fact that it has been
made. He explained that, he
deleted this paragraph in his
rough draft, which paragraph was
included in the motion filed in this
Court only because of mere
inadvertence. This explanation
does not make much of a
distinguishing difference; it erects
no shield.
lawyer is an officer of the courts;
he is, "like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice."1
His duty is to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the
administration of justice."2
Faith in the courts a lawyer
should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people."3
Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper
 the said case) answered the petition,
Judge Gaudencio Cloribel of CFI issued a
restraining order to petitioners here
(respondent in the petition to Judge
Cloribel) to avert from their action in the
bidding process.
Petitioners here seek a writ of preliminary
injunction to the Supreme Court on the
assailed action of Judge Cloribel due to
his alleged grave abuse of discretion on
the subject matter.
Muoz vs. CA and Delia Sutton made some misrepresentations in
Sutton the facts of the case where she seeks a
review before the SC.
The law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint
Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on
December 1, 1971, signed jointly by
Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Delia Sutton, did
seek to make amends
Delia T. Sutton had no intention to
misrepresent any question of fact before
this Honorable Court for her personal gain
or benefit, and that it was her lack of
adequate extensive experience in
preparing petitions for certiorari which may
have caused the inaccurate statements in
the said petition
The "Joint Apology" thus offered did
mitigate to some extent the liability of
respondent Sutton. Some members of the
Court feel, however, that it does not go far
enough. While expressing regret and
offering apology, there was lacking that
free admission that what was done by her
should not characterized merely as
"errors" consisting as they do of
"inaccurate statements."
Adez Realty Inc vs CA Atty. Dacanay made some intercalation in
the decision of the Court of Appeals when
he appealed before the SC.
Due this, the Court had suspended him
indefinitely.
Dacanay argued that it was his client who
made the intercalation and later on he
admitted that his secretary made the
administration of justice."
On the second contempt charge,
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton
F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M.
Caling guilty of contempt of court,
and fines Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, an additional P1,000,
Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and
Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
WON such conduct Yes. The conduct of Atty. Sutton
deserves disciplinary deserves disciplinary action.
action. Under the Canon 10 of the CPR,
a lawyer shall owes candor and
honesty to the court.
In the case at bar, the fact that
Atty. Sutton made false facts in
her pleading for review in SC is a
clear manifestation that she lacks
candor for the court.
Hence, her conduct warrants a
disciplinary action.
WON the conduct of Yes. The conduct of Dacanay
Dacanay warrants a warrants suspension.
suspension. Rule 10.01 of the CPR provides
that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the
contents of the paper, language
or the argument of opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision
 intercalation on the document.
He manifested that he would not risk
committing the act for which he was found
guilty considering that he was a nominee
of the Judicial and Bar Council to the
President for appointment as regional trial
judge.
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M.
Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite
apparently, given him sufficient time and
occasion to soul-search and reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself and
prove once more that he is worthy to
practice law and be capable of upholding
the dignity of the legal profession. His
admission of guilt and repeated pleas for
compassion and reinstatement show that
he is ready once more to meet the
exacting standards the legal profession
demands from its practitioners.
Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo
Canlas vs. CA
Eternal Gardens vs. CA The case started on May 18, 1981 when
private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin
and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint
against Central Dyeing & Finishing
Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity)
for quieting of title and for declaration of
nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT
No. 205942) issued in the name of said
corporation, docketed as Civil Case No.
C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City.
Judgment is null and void.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an
or authority.
In the case at bar, the fact that
Atty. Dacanay made the
intercalation on the CA decision
makes him liable under such rule.
Hence, his conduct warrants a
disciplinary action.
Whenever a party to a pending
case dies, becomes incapacitated
or incompetent, it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the
court promptly of such death,
incapacity or incompetency, and
to give the name and residence
of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal
representative.
We note that while lawyers owe
entire devotion to the interest of
their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client's right, they
should not forget that they are
officers of the court, bound to
exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They
should not, therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justice or unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a
 Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an
Immediate Writ of Possession/Break Open
Order. The motion was opposed by herein
petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not
submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial
court; that it is completely unaware of the
suit between private respondents and
Central Dyeing; that it is the true and
registered owner of the lot having bought
the same from Central Dyeing; and that it
was a buyer in good faith.
Re: Sotto
Re: Almacen
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He
was charged before the Sandiganbayan
for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Gonzales was the then
Tanodbayan who was investigating the
case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus assailing the authority of
the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court, acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Whether or not Gonzalez is
guilty of contempt.
judgment or misuse court
processes.
As officers of the court, lawyers
have a responsibility to assist in
the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge
this duty by filing pointless
petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary,
especially this Court, which is
burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and
the law should advise them when
a case such as this, should not be
permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested
judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their
clients by commencing litigations
that for sheer lack of merit do not
deserve the attention of the
courts.
It is a settled rule that once a
court renders a final judgment, all
the issues between or among the
parties before it are deemed
resolved and its judicial functions
with respect to any matter related
to the controversy litigated comes
to an end.
Yes. The statements made by
respondent Gonzalez clearly
constitute contempt and call for
the exercise of the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court.
His statements necessarily imply
that the justices of the Supreme
Court betrayed their oath of
office. Such statements constitute
the grossest kind of disrespect for
the Supreme Court. Such
statements very clearly debase
 Gonzalez directing him to temporarily
restrain from investigating and filing
informations against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the
investigation and he filed criminal
informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez
even had a newspaper interview where he
proudly claims that he scored one on the
Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts
issuance of the TRO is a manifestation
theta the rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due
course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt
against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court
then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side.
Gonzalez stated that the statements in the
newspapers were true; that he was only
exercising his freedom of speech; that he
is entitled to criticize the rulings of the
Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. He also
said, even attaching notes, that not less
than six justices of the Supreme Court
have approached him to ask him to go
slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass
the Supreme Court.
and degrade the Supreme Court
and, through the Court, the entire
system of administration of justice
in the country.
Gonzalez is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free
speech. What Gonzalez seems
unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to
be adjusted to and
accommodated with the
requirements of equally important
public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is
no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a
lawyer and an officer of the court,
is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect
to the Republic and to the
Supreme Court as the
embodiment and the repository of
the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The
responsibility of Gonzalez to
uphold the dignity and authority of
the Supreme Court and not to
promote distrust in the
administration of justice is heavier
than that of a private practicing
lawyer.
Gonzalez is also entitled to
criticize the rulings of the court
but his criticisms must be bona
fide. In the case at bar, his
statements, particularly the one
where he alleged that members
of the Supreme Court

Wicker vs. Arcangel This is a petition for certiorari , assailing
the orders of respondent Judge Paul T.
Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court,
nding petitioners guilty of direct contempt
and sentencing each of them to suer
imprisonment for ve (5) days and to pay
a ne of P100.00.
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe
and the Tectonics Asia Architects and
Engineering Co., brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati against the
LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the
annulment of certain deeds by which a
house and lot at Forbes Park, which the
plaintis claimed they had purchased,
was allegedly fraudulently titled in the
name of the defendant LFS Enterprises
and later sold by the latter to co-defendant
Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch
134 formerly presided over by Judge
Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced
by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On November 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel,
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, led a motion
seeking the inhibition of the respondent
judge from the consideration of the case.
The motion alleged in pertinent part:
o Meantime, Judge [Ignacio]
Capulong who had full grasp of
this case was eased out of his
station. In one hearing, the
Acting Presiding Judge had not
yet reported to his station and in
that set hearing, counsel for
defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc.
who must have known that His
Honor was not reporting did not
likewise appear while other
counsels were present;
Whether or not respondent
judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in
holding petitioners liable for
direct contempt
approached him, are of no
relation to the Zaldivar case.
The Supreme Court suspended
Gonzalez indefinitely from the
practice of law.
What is involved in this case is an
instance of direct contempt, since
it involves a pleading allegedly
containing derogatory, oensive
or malicious statements
submitted to the court or judge in
which the proceedings are
pending. It is equivalent to
"misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the
proceedings before the same"
within the meaning of Rule 71,
1 of the Rules of Court and,
therefore, direct contempt.
In case of indirect or constructive
contempt, the contemnor may be
punished only "[a]fter charge in
writing has been led, and an
opportunity given to the accused
to be heard by himself or
counsel," whereas in case of
direct contempt, the respondent
may be summarily adjudged in
contempt. The judgment in cases
of indirect contempt is
appealable, whereas in cases of
direct contempt only judgments of
contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and
MeTCs are appealable.
The Court sustains Judge
Arcangel's nding that petitioners
are guilty of contempt. A reading
of the allegations in petitioners'
motion for inhibition leads to no
other conclusion than that
respondent judge was beholden
to the opposing counsel in the
case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to
whom or to whose wife, the judge
owed his transfer to the RTC of
 o Plaintis have information that
the Acting Presiding Judge was
personally recruited from the
south by Atty. Benjamin Santos
and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia
Calcetas-Santos, one time
member of the Judicial and Bar
Council, against whom plainti
Kelly R. Wicker led
Administrative Case No. 3796,
and although said case was
dismissed, nevertheless,
plaintis feel that it was the
reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-
Santos' relief;
o Plaintis have reason to doubt
the partiality and integrity of His
Honor and to give a ghting
chance for plaintis to prove
their case, since this will be the
last case to recover the
partnership property, plaintis
feel that His Honor inhibit
himself and set this case for re-
raffle;
o This move nds support in the
Rules of Court and
jurisprudence that in the rst
instance that a litigant doubts
the partiality and integrity of the
Presiding Judge, he should
immediately move for his
inhibition.
Considering the allegations to be
"malicious, derogatory and
contemptuous," respondent judge ordered
both counsel and client to appear before
him on November 26, 1993 and to show
cause why they should not be cited for
contempt of court."
In a pleading entitled "Opposition to
and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for
Direct Contempt Directed Against Plainti
Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel," Atty.
Rayos claimed that the allegations in the
Makati, which necessitated
"easing out" the former judge to
make room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory
to the integrity and honor of
respondent judge and constitute
an unwarranted criticism of the
administration of justice in this
country. They suggest that
lawyers, if they are well
connected, can manipulate the
assignment of judges to their
advantage
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot
evade responsibility for the
allegations in question. As a
lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. Based on
Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Rayos bears as much
responsibility for the
contemptuous allegations in the
motion for inhibition as his client
Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is
not secondary to that of his client.
The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to
"observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and
to judicial ocers and [t o]
insist on similar conduct by
others "and" not [t o] attribute
to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or
have materiality to the case."
After the respondent judge had
favorably responded to
petitioners' "profuse apologies"
and indicated that he would let
them o with a ne, without any
jail sentence, petitioners served
on respondent judge a copy of
their instant petition which prayed
in part that "Respondent Judge
 motion did not necessarily express his
views because he merely signed the
motion "in a representative capacity, in
other words, just lawyering," for Kelly
Wicker, who said in a note to him that a
"young man possibly employed by the
Court" had advised him to have the case
re-raed, when the opposing counsel
Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge
both failed to come for a hearing, because
their absence was an indication that Atty.
Santos knew who "the judge may be and
when he would appear".
Finding petitioners' explanation
unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an
order dated December 3, 1993, held them
guilty of direct contempt and sentenced
each to suffer imprisonment for five (5)
days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Montecillo vs. Gica Jorge Montecillo was accused by
Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del
Mar represented Montecillo and he
successfully defended Monteceillo in the
lower court. Del Mar was even able to win
their counterclaim thus the lower court
ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the
adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to
the Court of Appeals where the latter court
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed
a motion for reconsideration where he
made a veiled threat against the Court of
Appeals judges intimating that he thinks
the CA justices knowingly rendered an
unjust decision and judgment has been
Whether or not Atty. Del
Mar should be suspended.
Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED
to his former station. He simply
cannot do in the RTC of Makati
where more complex cases are
heared (sic) unlike in Davao City."
If nothing else, this personal
attack on the judge only serves to
conrm the "contumacious
attitude, a outing or arrogant
belligerence" rst evident in
petitioners' motion for inhibition
belying their protestations of good
faith.
Be that as it may, the Court
believes that consistent with the
rule that the power to cite for
contempt must be exercised for
preservative rather than vindictive
principle we think that the jail
sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating
the dignity of the court.
WHEREFORE, the order of
December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED
by DELETING the sentence of
imprisonment for ve (5) days
and INCREASING the ne from
P100.00 to P200.00 for each of
the petitioners.
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his
contemptuous acts is in violation
of his duties to the courts. As an
officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help
build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high
esteem and regard towards the
court so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has
scant respect for the two highest
Courts of the land when on the
flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to
challenge the integrity of both
 rendered through negligence and that the Courts by claiming that they
CA allowed itself to be deceived. knowingly rendered unjust
The CA denied the MFR and it judgment. In short, his allegation
admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such is that they acted with intent and
tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a malice, if not with gross ignorance
second MFR where he again made of the law, in disposing of the
threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to case of his client.
show cause as to why he should not be Del Mar was then suspended
punished for contempt. indefinitely.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA
justices a copy of a letter which he sent to
the President of the Philippines asking the
said justices to consider the CA judgment.
But the CA did not reverse its judgment.
Del Mar then filed a civil case against the
three justices of the CA before a Cebu
lower court but the civil case was
eventually dismissed by reason of a
compromise agreement where del Mar
agreed to pay damages to the justices.
Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del
Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court.
Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his
suspension as well as the CA decision as
to the Montecillo case. The SC denied
both and this earned the ire of del Mar as
he demanded from the Clerk of the
Supreme Court as to who were the judges
who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar
to submit an explanation as to why he
should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his
explanation instead tried to justify his
actions even stating that had he not been
convinced that human efforts in [pursuing
the case] will be fruitless he would have
continued with the civil case against the
CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar
also intimated that even the Supreme
Court is part among the corrupt, the
grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against
some Supreme Court justices but the
judge who handled the case dismissed the
 same.
Sangalang vs. IAC The incident before the Court refers to
charges for contempt against Atty. J.
Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners
Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang.
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a
Resolution, requiring, among other things,
Atty. Sangco to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt "for
using intemperate and accusatory
language." On March 2, 1989, Atty.
Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in
his motion for reconsideration, particularly,
. . . The Court not only put to serious
question its own integrity and competence
but also jeopardized its own campaign
against graft and corruption undeniably
pervading the judiciary . . . disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for. His
suggestions that the Court might have
been guilty of graft and corruption in
acting on these cases are not only
unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an
open assault upon the Court's honor and
integrity.
Paragas vs. Cruz In asking for reconsideration of the Courts
dismissal of his petition for certiorari in the
present case, counsel for the petitioner,
Atty. Jeremias Sebastian, used derogatory
Whether or not the
counsels act constitutes
malpractice in violation of
the Codes (CPR) provision
on the use of scandalous
offensive or menacing
language or behavior
before the courts.
Whether or not Atty. Yes. The expressions contained
Sebastian is
administratively liable for
his actions or language.
In rendering its judgment, the
Court yielded to the records
before it, and to the records
alone, and not to outside
influences, much less, the
influence of any of the parties.
Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of
an inferior court, should know
better that in any litigation, one
party prevails, but his success will
not justify indictments of bribery
by the other party. He should be
aware that because of his
accusations, he has done an
enormous disservice to the
integrity of the highest tribunal
and to the stability of the
administration of justice in
general.
Atty. Sangco is entitled to his
opinion, but not to a license to
insult the Court with derogatory
statements and recourses to
argumenta ad hominem . In that
event, it is the Court's duty "to act
to preserve the honor and
dignity . . . and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal
profession."
The Court in their "show-cause"
Resolution, they sought to hold
Atty. Sangco in contempt,
specifically, for resort to insulting
language amounting to disrespect
toward the Court within the
meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71,
of the Rules of Court. Clearly,
however, his act also constitutes
malpractice as the term is defined
by Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
in the motion for reconsideration
penned by the counsel of the
petitioner are plainly
 expressions against the dignity of the
Court in the language of his motion for
reconsideration.
That such threats and disrespectful
language contained in a pleading filed in
Courts are constitutive of direct contempt
has been repeatedly decided
People vs. Carillo
Re: Aguas
Maceda vs. Ombudsman Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda,
(Vasquez) Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the
review of the following orders of the Office
of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated
September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte
motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed
by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated
November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and directing
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and
other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18,
1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A.
Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office
alleged that petitioner had falsified his
Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6,
As remarked in People vs. Carillo:
Whether the Office of the A judge who falsifies his
Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal
complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's
certification submitted to
the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can,
whether a referral should
be made first to the
Supreme Court
contemptuous and disrespectful
and he is hereby guilty of direct
contempt of court.
Counsel should conduct himself
towards the judges who try his
cases with that courtesy all have
a right to expect. As an officer of
the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is right and plausible that an
attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy
of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so, for him
to exercise said right by resorting
to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts
require.
certificate of service is
administratively liable to the SC
for serious misconduct and under
Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the
State under the Revised Penal
Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any
administrative action taken
against him by the Court with
regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Courts
power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the
 1989, by certifying "that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted
for decision or determination for a period
of 90 days have been determined and
decided on or before January 31, 1998,"
when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew
that no decision had been rendered in five
(5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that
have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that
petitioner similarly falsified his certificates
of service for the months of February,
April, May, June, July and August, all in
1989; and the months beginning January
up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends
that he had been granted by this Court an
extension of ninety (90) days to decide the
aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said
case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs.
Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense
charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is
under the control and supervision of the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman
constitutes an encroachment into the
Supreme Court's constitutional duty of
supervision over all inferior courts.
doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
exclusively vests in the SC
administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the CA
down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk.
o By virtue of this power,
it is only the SC that
can oversee the judges
and court personnels
compliance with all
laws, and take the
proper administrative
action against them if
they commit any
violation thereof. No
other branch of
government may
intrude into this power,
without running afoul of
the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint
against a judge or other court
employee arises from their
administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action
on said complaint and refer the
same to the SC for determination
whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative
duties.
Petitioner also contends that the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction
over said cases despite this
Court's ruling in Orap vs.
Sandiganbayan, since the offense
charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties,
which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court
The Court disagrees with the first
part of petitioner's basic

Fernandez vs. De Ramos- Palacios, in his Complaint in Civil Case
Villalon No. 05-1017, alleged that he was the
owner of a lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 178587
located in Barangay San
Lorenzo, Makati City.
He allegedly inherited the lot from his
mother. Sometime in June 2004, he
became aware that a land-grabbing
syndicate was eyeing his lot.
The syndicate attempted to obtain a copy
Whether or not respondent
should be disbarred
argument. There is nothing in the
decision in Orap that would
restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated
to his official duties.
Court agrees with petitioner that
in the absence of any
administrative action taken
against him by this Court with
regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Ombudsman should first refer the
matter of petitioner's certificates
of service to this Court for
determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load,
as the Court has the necessary
records to make such a
determination
The Ombudsman cannot compel
this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its
personnel to testify on this matter,
as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint.
No. Court agrees with the
recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Funa. The charges
against the respondent do not
constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment.
A lawyer, as an officer of the
court, has a duty to be truthful in
all his dealings. However, this
duty does not require that the
lawyer advance matters of
defense on behalf of his or her
 of TCT No. 178587 by pretending to be
Carlos Palacios, Jr., and by filing a
Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of Lost
Owners Duplicate Original Copy of TCT
No. 178587. The petition was docketed as
LRC Case No. M-4524.
Palacios received information that
Fernandez could help him oppose the
syndicates petition. Thus, Palacios
approached Fernandez, and they
eventually succeeded in causing the
withdrawal of LRC Case No. M-4524, with
the assistance of a certain Atty. Augusto P.
Jimenez, Jr.
Palacios allegedly agreed to pay
Fernandez P2,000,000.00 for the services
he rendered in LRC Case No. M-4524.
On September 27, 2005, when Palacios
visited the Village Administrator of the San
Lorenzo Village Association, he bumped
into Mrs. Jocelyn Lirio who expressed her
interest in Palacios San Lazaro property.
She had heard Fernandez was selling
it. Palacios was surprised by Mrs. Lirios
story, as he had no intention of selling the
property.
Upon investigation, he discovered that
Fernandez had falsified a Deed of
Donation that he (Palacios) purportedly
executed in Fernandez favor. This Deed
was duly registered, and on the strength
of the purported donation, TCT No.
178587 in Palacios name was cancelled,
and a new TCT (TCT No. 220869) was
issued in Fernandez name.
Palacios then employed the services of
respondent Atty. Villalon to file a
Complaint for the declaration of nullity of
the Deed of Donation that became the
basis for the issuance of a title in
Fernandez name. This complaint was
subsequently amended to implead Romeo
Castro, Atty. Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr., Levy
R. De Dios, and Rosario T. Abobo.
In his Answer, Fernandez claimed that the
clients opponent. A lawyer is his
or her clients advocate; while
duty-bound to utter no falsehood,
an advocate is not obliged to
build the case for his or her
clients opponent.
The respondents former client,
Palacios, approached her to file a
complaint for the annulment of
the Deed of Donation. This was
the cause of action chosen by her
client. Assuming arguendo that
the respondent knew of the
presence of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, its existence, is, indeed, a
matter of defense for Fernandez.
We cannot fault the respondent
for choosing not to pursue the
nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale. The respondent
alleged that her former client,
Palacios, informed her that the
Deed of Absolute Sale was void
for lack of consideration.
Furthermore, unlike the Deed of
Donation, the Deed of Absolute
Sale was not registered in the
Registry of Deeds and was not
the basis for the transfer of title
of Palacios property to
Fernandez. Under the
circumstances, it was not
unreasonable for a lawyer to
conclude, whether correctly or
incorrectly, that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was immaterial in
achieving the ultimate goal the
recovery of Palacios property.
 transfer of title in his name was proper on
account of an existing Deed of Absolute
Sale dated January 12, 2005 between him
and Palacios.
He also alleged that it was Palacios who
falsified a Deed of Donation by forging
their signatures and having it notarized;
Palacios did this in order to cheat the
government by paying only the donors tax,
which was lower than the capital gains tax
he would have paid had the transaction
been represented as a sale.
He additionally alleged that Palacios
intended to falsify the Deed of Donation in
order to have a ground for the annulment
of the new TCT issued in favor of
Fernandez and, ultimately, to recover the
property.
On March 2, 2006, Fernandez filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01, Rule
7.03, Rule 10.01, Rule 10.02, and Rule
10.03 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility. Fernandez alleged that
Atty. Villalon, acting as Palacios counsel,
deceitfully:
o suppressed and excluded in the
Original and Amended
Complaint her knowledge about
the existence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January
12, 2005;
o used the fake and spurious
Deed of Donation to deceive the
court into trying Civil Case No.
05-1071, the action for the
annulment of TCT No. 220869,
despite her knowledge of the
existence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale;
o committed misrepresentations
as follows: to verify whether the
attached Deed of Absolute Sale
was properly notarized, the
respondent Villalon personally
inquired before the notarial
 section of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City thru
a letter-request, whether a
record of the deed existed in the
said office; in the letter-request,
the respondent misrepresented
that there was already a
pending case in the RTC of
Makati before November 9,
2005;
o refused to receive the
complainants Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim so
that she could file on behalf of
her client an Amended
Complaint without leave of court
and without presenting the
Deed of Absolute Sale;
o induced her witness Agnes
Heredia (Heredia) to sign a
false Affidavit by telling her that
it would only be for purposes of
compelling Fernandez to pay
additional sums to her client;
however, Atty. Villalon used it as
evidence to frame the
complainant Fernandez for her
own personal gain;
o only submitted the Deed of
Donation for signature
examination and certification by
the NBI and intentionally failed
to submit the Deed of Absolute
Sale.
Rivera vs. Corral On September 1, 1990, Jose A. Rivera Whether or not Atty. Corral No. While the prevailing facts of
instituted a Complaint for Disbarment should be disbarred the case do not warrant so severe
charging Atty. Napoleon Corral with a penalty as disbarment, the
Malpractice and Conduct Unbecoming a inherent power of the Court to
Member of the Philippine Bar. The discipline an errant member of
complaint alleges, inter alia - the Bar must, nonetheless, be
o That on February 12, 1990, a exercised because it can not be
Decision was penned by the denied that respondent has
Honorable Presiding Judge violated his solemn oath as a
Gorgonio Y. Ybaez on Civil lawyer not to engage in unlawful,
Case No. 17473 for Ejectment dishonest or deceitful conduct.
o That such decision was Atty. Napoleon Corral is
 received by Annaliza Superio,
Secretary of Atty. Napoleon
Corral, on February 23, 1990
o That on March 13, 1990, a
NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed
in court by Atty. Napoleon
Corral, a copy of which was
served on plaintiffs counsel
o That on March 14, 1990, [at]
about 1:50 p.m. Atty. Napoleon
Corral came to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Branch 7,
Bacolod City and changed the
date February 23, 1990 to
February 29, 1990. Realizing
later that there is no 29th in
February 1990, he filed a
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS
MANIFESTATION claiming
therein that he received the
Decision not on the 29th
in (sic) February 1990 but on
the 28th of February 1990
o That Atty. Napoleon Corral
violated the proper norms/ethics
as a lawyer by tampering with
particularly by personally and
manually changing entries in the
courts record without the Courts
prior knowledge and
permission, conduct
unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar much more so
because in so doing he was
found to have been motivated
by the desire of suppressing the
truth.
o That on July 13, 1990 Atty.
Napoleon Corral filed a
MOTION TO DISMISS, among
other things he stated that the
court is without jurisdiction to try
and decide the case at issue.
In his defense, respondent claimed that
the correction of the date was done on the
paper prepared by him. He also alleged
SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR and
STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more
severely.
The ethics of the legal profession
rightly enjoin lawyers to act with
the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the course of his practice of
law. A lawyer may be disciplined
or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or
private capacity. Public
confidence in the law and lawyers
may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the Bar.
Thus, every lawyer should act
and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession.
The primary objective of
administrative cases against
lawyers is not only to punish and
discipline the erring individual
lawyers but also to safeguard the
administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the
public from the misconduct of
lawyers, and to remove from the
legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyers
oath has proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of
the bar. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the
 that the correction was initiated and done court.
in the presence and with the approval of
the Clerk of Court and the other court
employees.
According to respondent, the correction
was made because of typographical error
he committed. He denied that Annaliza
Superio, who received the decision in his
behalf, is his secretary.
In a Resolution dated January 20, 1993,
the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Thereafter, Investigating Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez submitted his report
on August 21, 1997 finding respondent
guilty as charged and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for six
(6) months.
On October 25, 1997, the IBP Board of
Governors passed a Resolution approving
and adopting the report and
recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration of the IBP Boards
decision. The Board, however,
subsequently issued a Resolution on
March 28, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration and further pointed out
that the pleading is improper because his
remedy was to file the same with this
Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on May, 19, 1999, respondent filed
with the Court a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging -
o That there was no due process
or hearing which have been
requested by respondent from
the beginning;
o Complainant rivera committed
perjury when he claimed that
respondent altered the court
records;
 o That the municipal trial court in
Bacolod city, under Judge
Ibaez, committed
misrepresentation of facts.
Respondents claim that he was not
afforded due process deserves scant
consideration. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
In fact a respondent in an administrative
proceeding is not entitled to be informed
of the findings and recommendations of
any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He
is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence
made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against him during the
hearings of the investigating committee.
Johnny Ng vs. Alar Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for the Is a lawyers misbehavior The MRMI contains insults and
complainants in a labor case filed with the before the NLRC diatribes against the NLRC,
Labor Arbiter that dismissed the susceptible of the attacking both its moral and
complaint. provisions of the Code of intellectual integrity, replete with
On appeal, NLRCs First Division upheld Professional Conduct? implied accusations of partiality,
the dismissal. impropriety and lack of diligence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration with Respondent used improper and
Motion to Inhibit (MRMI), Atty. Alar used offensive language in his
improper and abusive language full of pleadings that does not admit any
diatribes castigating the Labor Arbiter and justification.
the ponente of the NLRC decision. The assertion that the NLRC not
Johnny Ng, one of the respondents, filed a being a court, its commissioners,
disbarment case against Alar before the not being judges or justices and
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for therefore not part of the judiciary
such misbehavior. and that consequently, the Code
Alar contended, inter alia, that the Rules of Judicial Conduct does not
of Court/Code of Professional apply to them is unavailing.
Responsibility applies only suppletorily at In Lubiano v. Gordolla, the Court
the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of held that respondent became
Procedure has no provision on disciplinary unmindful of the fact that in
matters for litigants and lawyers appearing addressing the NLRC, he
before it and that Rule X of the NLRC nonetheless remained a member
of the Bar, an oath-bound servant
 Rules of Procedure provides for adequate
sanctions against misbehaving lawyers
and litigants appearing in cases before it.
Finally he asserted that the Rules of
Court/Code of Professional Responsibility
does not apply to lawyers practicing at the
NLRC, the latter not being a court and that
LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not
judges nor justices and the Code of
Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to
them, not being part of the judiciary.
Fudot vs. Cattleya Land De La Serna a requested for the inhibition
of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
claiming that Justice Tinga, who was the
ponente of the decision, received P10
Million from Mr. Johnny Chan in exchange
for a favorable decision. De la serna
alleges JOHNNY CHAN curtly told him
that Chan already given out 10M to
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA in exchange
for a favorable Decision in the case
between Fudot and Catltleya land(Mr.
Chan is a representative of Cattleya land).
Atty. De La Serna said that Justice Tinga
abandoned the doctrine in the case Lim v,
Jorge to accommodate Mr. Chan. He also
said that the case was prioritized for
resolution and that Mr. Chan had prior
knowledge of the outcome of the case
before the decision was promulgated.
However, Mr. Chan related that he
approached De La Serna for the purpose
of amicably settling their case with
Cattleya, and offered him to be their
retainer in Bohol. However, he denied
having said to De La Serna that he had
already spent so much money for the
Supreme Court
W/N Atty. De La Serna is
guilty of indirect contempt.
of the law, whose first duty is not
to his client but to the
administration of justice and
whose conduct ought to be and
must be scrupulously observant
of law and ethics.
Respondent has clearly violated
Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His
actions erode the publics
perception of the legal profession.
Atty. De La Serna is guilty of
indirect contempt.
Contempt is defined as a
disobedience to the Court by
setting up an opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the
court's orders but such conduct
that tends to bring the authority of
the court and the administration
of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due
administration of justice. Indirect
contempt is one committed out of
or not in the presence of the court
that tends to belittle, degrade,
obstruct or embarrass the court
and justice. Any improper
conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of
justice has also been considered
to constitute indirect contempt.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an
officer of the court. Corollary to
his duty to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers is to support the
courts against "unjust criticism
and clamor." His duty is to uphold
the dignity and the authority of
the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice, as it
 is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem
and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper
administration of justice
As part of the machinery for the
administration of justice, a lawyer
is expected to bring to the fore
irregular and questionable
practices of those sitting in court
which tend to corrode the judicial
machinery. Thus, if he acquired
reliable information that
anomalies are perpetrated by
judicial officers, it is incumbent
upon him to report the matter to
the Court so that it may be
properly acted upon. An omission
or even a delay in reporting may
tend to erode the dignity of, and
the public's trust in, the judicial
system.
This is not to say, however, that
as an officer of the court, he
cannot criticize the court. It is a
long recognized and respected
right of a lawyer, or any person,
for that matter, to be critical of
courts and magistrates as long as
they are made in properly
respectful terms and through
legitimate channels. But it is the
cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona
fide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action.
In this case, Atty. De La Serna's
statements bear the badges of
falsehood while the common
version of the witnesses who

Bondoc vs. Judge Simbulan
This is a case filed by former
Representative Bondoc charging Judge
Aquino-Simbulan with partiality, gross
ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct in the handling of Criminal
case entitled People v Totaan.
Complainant bewailed:
o (1) the respondents attempt to
have the cases settled in an
off-the-record huddle with the
parties lawyers because she
did not want the accused to be
administratively suspended;
o (2) the respondents order to
fast track the cases because
the accused had been
suspended upon the motion of
the private prosecutors.
The complainant then narrated the
instances when his lawyers were alleged
given a hard time and subjected to
indignities by the respondent in her desire
to fast track the criminal case.
On the other hand, the respondent pointed
out that an examination of the complaint
would readily show that the private
prosecutors, Attys Setephan David and
Lanee David, prepared it.
Stephen David and Lanee David, who
wove a tale lies and distortions regarding
the proceedings to cover up their own
shortcomings as lawyers; had they
performed their duty as officers of the
court and members of the bar, they would
disputed his statements is imbued
with the hallmarks of truth. De La
Serna's declarations were
maliciously and irresponsibly
made. They exceeded the
boundaries of decency and
propriety. The libelous attack on
the integrity and credibility of
Justice Tinga tend to degrade the
dignity of the Court and erode
public confidence that should be
accorded to it.
WON Attys. Stephen and The SC dismissed the
Lanee David guilty of administrative complaint filed
contempt. against the respondent and
resolved the liability of the two
Attorneys.
The complainant (Bondoc) never
appeared in court, it is reasonable
to conclude that the two lawyers
crafted the complaint and
incorporated therein all the
unfounded accusations against
the respondent in order to
conceal their inadequacies in the
handling of their clients case.
To say the least, the complaint
was most unfair to the
respondent who, as the record
shows, was simply keeping faith
with her avowed objective of
expediting the proceedings in her
court by, among other measures,
requiring lawyers to be prepared
at all times and to be fair and
candid in their dealings with the
court.
As the court held in Racines v
Judge Morallos, et al., a clients
cause does not permit an
attorney to cross the line between
liberty and license. Lawyers must
always keep in perspective that
since they are administrators of
justice, oath-bound servants of
society, their first duty is not to
 have informed the complainant that they
lost because of their blunders in the
prosecution cases.
In the manifestation and motion
respondent prayed for the permanent
dismissal of the present administrative
matter and requested that her complaint
against Attys. Stephen David and Lanee
David be acted upon and given due
course.
The court resolved to dismiss the
administrative complaint against the
respondent and required Attys. Stephen
and Lanee David to show cause why they
should not be disciplined or held in
contempt.
their clients, as many suppose,
but to the administration of
justice. As a lawyer, he is an
officer of the court with the duty to
uphold its dignity and authority
and not promote distrust in the
administration of justice.
Attys. Stephen and Lanee David
miserably failed to come up to the
standards of these rulings. They
are liable and was held in indirect
contempt under Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court.