Bhaamimasa and Nyaya On Veda and Trad

ELISA FRESCHI, ALESSANDRO GRAHELI
Bhamms and Nyya on Veda and Tradition*
Introduction
This paper deals with the development of two philosophical tradi-

tions (i.e. successions of thinkers), namely Nyya and Bhamms.
Our attempt is to juxtapose the two schools on a specific philosophical
problem, to highlight points of contact and departure, and possibly to
get a better picture of the evolution of their thought by underlining
inherited concepts and mutual influences. In doing so we will show
how the representatives of the two streams further explained the orig-
inal arguments of the stras, added new perspectives, and replied to
issues raised by opponent schools.
Particularly, our focus is on the defense of the validity (prmya)
of Veda. The reason for this choice is that Veda is held as an
autonomous source of information about religious matters by the two
schools under exam1 and is widely accepted in their social context as
a source of knowledge. In this sense it constitutes the tradition (i.e. the
cultural horizon) of both.
In their bid to defend Vedas validity, Nyya and Mms have
also a further purpose (for Nyya, arguably, the main purpose): justi-
fying the epistemic role of tradition (i.e. word-conveyed knowledge).
* This paper is the product of discussions, mutual advise and criticism shared by the
two authors. Specifically, the introduction, chapters 2, 4, and 6 must be ascribed to
Alessandro Graheli; the conclusions, chapters 1, 3, and 5 to Elisa Freschi. To facilitate the
distinction between our comments and the original sources, all direct quotations from
Sanskrit texts are given as set-off block quotations in smaller type. Our experiment has
been, as far as possible, to let the authors speak.
1 And, as George Chemparathy states, [] les Mmsakas [] sont les partenaires
les plus acharns des Nyya-Vaieikas dans leur controverses sur la source de lautorit du
Veda (Chemparathy 1983: 7).
Federico Squarcini (ed.), Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction of Traditions in South Asia
ISBN 88-8453-261-2, 2005 Firenze University Press
288 BOUNDARIES, DYNAMICS AND CONSTRUCTION OF TRADITIONS IN SOUTH ASIA
In the following pages the different acceptations of the word

tradition respectively employed, from the strictly grammatical
point of view, as a class-noun, a noun denoting a state of affairs, and
an action noun will clearly surface: we are going to talk of traditions
that, within the horizon of a cultural tradition, discuss the epistemic
role of tradition. That is, our subject matter concerns (1) the
development and interaction of two philosophical schools, (2) the
cultural horizon partially departing and partially overlapping
surrounding the two schools, (3) the epistemic function attributed by
them to linguistic communication.
We will treat the authors concerned in a chronological order. In
the Mms camp we will deal with Jaimini (II century B.C.), abara
(IV-V century A.D.?), and Kumrila Bhaa (VII century A.D.). In the
Nyya camp we will examine the positions of Gautama (II century
A.D.?), Vtsyyana (V century A.D.?), Uddyotakara (VI century A.D.),
and finally Jayanta Bhaa (IX century A.D.).2 The order of the para-
graphs respects the chronology of the authors, thus alternating
Mmsakas and Naiyyikas, to underline the mutual interaction of
the two schools.
To get a better view of the inner development of each school,
however, the reader might choose to read first the Mmsaka
paragraphs in a sequence, and then the Naiyyika ones (or vice
versa). Our goal is to assess the degree of continuity, or discontinu-
ity, in each of the two schools, rather than extensively present the
thought of each author involved. Hence, within the borders of epis-
temic issues related to Vedas validity, we selected a few themes
which were kept alive by the two traditions throughout the cen-
turies; their development is schematized in each Mms and
Nyya paragraph through a symmetric articulation of sub-para-
graphs (e.g. 1.1, 3.1, 5.1). This linearity becomes less evident with
the latest authors examined in the paper, Kumrila and, even more
so, Jayanta. In fact, their works cover a wider range of philosophical
issues and are clearly more indebted to the mutual influences of the
two traditions.
1. Jaimini
Although Jaiminis time and role in the Mms school are

still a matter of debate (see Parpola 1981; 1994), it can be safely
said that the Mmsstra (MS) attributed to him is the most an-
cient text of Mms and is most probably older than the root-
texts of the other philosophical systems; despite its antiquity, how-
2 In order to treat the issue with sufficient depth we decided to examine a limited
number of authors and to narrow down the covered period, leaving necessarily out many
important sources. Other schools which said much on these topics especially
Prbhkaramms, Buddhist Epistemology, and Vednta were left out. The aim of
the paper is obviously not at exhaustiveness, so we hope the specialists will bear with us.
III. How to Produce, Construct and Legitimate a Tradition 289
ever, it mentions former authors and views. This suggests an early

existence of different opinions in the larger picture of an already
developed Mms system.
The MS does not problematize the Vedas validity, which rather is
the implicit assumption behind its teachings. Nevertheless, embed-
ded in the text are already present the chief components of the
defense of Vedas validity. First of all there is a restriction of the scope
of Veda: Veda is accepted as instrument of knowledge only within the
sphere of dharma and, among Vedic statements, only the prescriptive
ones are considered means of knowledge. Then, MS sets the ground
for the assertion of an authorless Veda by stating the beginningless-
ness of Vedas transmission, and for the foundation of Vedas validity
by postulating the intrinsic relation of word and meaning.
Here and in all the next Mms paragraphs ( 3 and 5) I shall
follow the development of these arguments according to the order in
which they are found in MS and MSs commentaries.
1.1. The word-meaning relation is not human-made
The MS opens with a declaration of its goal: the examination of

dharma. Which are the means for this inquiry? Sense perception, says
Jaimini, is not fit since it can only reach present objects. The right
instrument to know dharma is instead Vedic word (abda). MS 1.1.5
insulates the sphere of dharma from that of present objects, and states
the intimate relationship of word (abda) and meaning (artha):3
But the relation of word and meaning4 is originary (autpattika).5 Its

(dharmas)6 knowledge is the Instruction (i.e. Veda) and it is infallible
as far as unknown entities. It is an instrument of knowledge [to know
dharma], according to Bdaryaa, because it is independent.7
Noticeably, word is here treated as a given datum. Its possible

author and etiology are secondary problems, unessential for its actual
reality, that is the relationship with a (mental or concrete) meaning.
3 I render artha with meaning, in want of a better option. Meaning, in fact, lacks
the ontological commitment often present in artha and can be ambiguous because of the
ending -ing, suggesting an active role as if it were a vcaka and not a vcya.
4 Francis X. Clooney maintains that here artha means also purpose because of the
ritual background of the MS, where objects are all viewed in the framework of (ritual)
action (Clooney 1990: 104).
5 On autpattika see 3.1, and Frauwallner 1961: 119ff; Clooney 1990: 67 n. 29;
Bilimoria 1994: 190ff.

6 What does its (tasya) refer to? The Bh understands it as connected with the pre-
vious stras and glosses it as of the dharma (dharmasya). See also Francis X. Clooney
(1990: 136). On the other hand, Peter M. Scharf links it to the immediately preceeding
relation (sambandha) (Scharf 1996: 269). In any case, this does not invalidate the connec-
tion of MS 1.1.5 with dharma.
7 autpattikas tu abdasyrthena sambandhas tasya jnam upadeo vyatireka crthe
nupalabdhe tat pramam bdaryaasynapekatvt (MS 1.1.5).

Epistemological independence is needed because an instrument of

knowledge, according to Mmsakas, must provide fresh informa-
tion, i.e. it must cause to know a referent not previously known through
other means of knowledge.
By stating at the outset the nexus with dharma, Jaimini focuses on
abda as Vedic word; abda as acoustic entity and as ordinary language
is dealt with in the following stras (1.1.6-23). No matter if composed
by Jaimini or not,8 these look like a more recent layer of the MS,
where Vaieika and Naiyyika objections are presented and refuted.
The proposal that abda is a product (karman) is discarded as follows:9
On the contrary [words] must be permanent (nitya)[in their relation
to their meaning], because [their] appearance10 is for the purpose of
[communicating with] someone else.11
In Jaiminis view, if words were ephemeral, how could we recog-

nize them and hence understand their meaning? Their relationship
with meant entities must be understood as fixed, in order to explain
communication. Common linguistic communication, however, is
rather neglected in MS, which chiefly discusses dharma-related issues.
1.2. Veda is an instrument of knowledge only in relation to dharma
Although most Mmsaka justifications of (Vedic) word as an

instrument of knowledge (abdaprama) will later be based on this as-
sumption, an explicit restriction appears only in the sixth book of MS:
It is only in the case of what cannot be known [by ordinary means of
knowledge] that the sacred text (stra) can serve a useful purpose.12
1.3. Only prescriptions are means of knowledge
MS 1.2 deals with the epistemic status of non prescriptive passages

(mantras and arthavdas). These Vedic portions, says an opponent,
cannot be considered means of knowledge because they contradict
real experience, are inconsistent, etc. (MS 1.2.2-5). Jaiminis solution
is to separate mantras and arthavdas (which may be read as eulogies,
figurative descriptions, and so on) from prescriptions (vidhis), which
are genuine means of knowledge. Nonetheless, mantras and arthav-
das may still serve an ancillary role to prescriptions.13
8 On this issue, see Frauwallner 1961; Frauwallner 1968: 17; DSa 1980: 113ff;
Clooney 1990: 77ff.

9 Similar Mmsaka objections and Naiyyika replies are, vice versa, quoted in NS
2.2.13-39. According to Arthur Berriedale Keith (1921: 37) the MS version is older.
10 Bh ad 1.1.18 glosses: appearance means utterance (daranam uccraam).
11 nityas tu syd daranasya parrthatvt (MS 1.1.18).
12 [] aprpte v stram arthavat (MS 6.2.18).
13 vidhin tv ekavkyatvt stutyarthena vidhn sy (MS 1.2.7).
1.4. Transmission as beginningless succession
In answer to the criticism against mantras and arthavdas, Jaimini

says that they cannot be simply cut out from the Veda, because they
have been handed down to us along with prescriptions by the same
teacher-pupil tradition.
And it is equally transmitted in a tradition.14
This argument displays the typical Mmsaka commitment to

the empirical state of things we have to deal with the Veda as it is,
the refusal to postulate whatever contradicts todays reality (e.g. an
arthavda-free Veda), and the acceptance of the teacher-pupil trans-
mission. Since he does not contemplate the option of an originally dif-
ferent Veda which was later corrupted, Jaimini seems to regard
transmission as a dynamic but everlasting reality.
In the next Mms paragraphs ( 3 and 5) these very argu-
ments will be unfolded, albeit in a background where the obviousness
of Vedas validity cannot anymore be taken as undoubtedly granted.
2. Gautama
The date and historicity of Gautama, or Akapda, are by no

means settled. The current version of the Nyyastra (NS) could
probably trace back to 200 A.D. This dating is tentative, because there
are no external evidences for it. It is inferred from the assumed cross-
relation of Ngrjunas writings and NS, although there is no consen-
sus on the relative chronology of the two authors.
Whatever its date and no matter if the work of a single author or
the sum of many layers, however, the NS is the unquestioned root-
text of the Nyya tradition and its earliest known authority.
NS, with a typical structure that will be adopted in most successive
Naiyyika writings, treats every subject in three phases: enumeration of
the items, definition, and examination of the definition. I will follow a
shortened version of the same pattern, by discussing in 2.1, 4.1, 6.1
the definition of abda, and in 2.2, 4.2-3, 6.2-3 its examination.
2.1. abda as testimony.
In NS 1.1.3 the four instruments of knowledge admitted by Nai-

yyikas are enumerated as sense perception, inference, analogy and
testimony. Testimony15 (abda) is defined as follows:
14
tulya ca smpradyikam (MS 1.2.8).
15
It seems to me that the epistemic value of abda in older Nyya is quite akin to the
Western concept of testimony. With Jayanta the analysis becomes less speaker-centered,
and the same term, abda, is more often used in linguistic, psychological, and lay contexts,
Testimony is the statement (upadea) of a reliable speaker. / It is of two

kinds, for it can have a perceivable or an unperceivable object.16
The principle of the speakers reliability concerns human word

in general, leaving unspecified the distinction between common and
Vedic speech. On the other hand, this distinction is implicitly sug-
gested by the division according to the type of object, perceivable
and unperceivable.
2.2. Reasons for the validity of testimony
NS 2.1.49-67 examines the definition given in NS 1.1.7, quoted

above. Firstly, Gautama measures himself with a Vaieika opponent:
[O.] Testimony is [reducible to] inference, because it has an inferable
object which is not [directly] perceived. For, since [both their objects
are inferentially] perceived, there is no different performance of the
two (testimony and inference).
And also because of the relation [functional both in testimony and
inference].
[R.] Thorough knowledge of the object derives from testimony because
of the efficacy of a reliable speakers statement.
And [in testimony] there is not such a [word-meaning] relation
because there is no perception of filling, burning, splitting [upon utter-
ing food, fire, sword].
[O.] [The word-meaning relation] is indisputable, because of the fixed
word-meaning structure.17
This last sentence, if taken in context, is to be ascribed to a

Vaieika opponent, according to whom the word-meaning fixedness
is akin to the invariable concomitance in inferential processes. But it
can also be taken as an argumentative bridge that, as interpreted by
Vtsyyana, conceptually evokes the Mmsaka position (see 4.2),
although the term for fixedness is vyavasth and not nityat.
The Naiyyika answer is that the apparently fixed structure is just
based on a commonly shared convention, and that the tenet of a fixed
word-meaning relation bears unwanted consequences:
No, [there is no fixed word-meaning structure] because the proper
knowledge of a meaning from its word is due to a convention.
in which cases testimony is not anymore a suitable translation. Therefore in the Nyya
environment I will render abdaprama with testimony when the context is clearly epis-
temological. In linguistic occurrences, I will render abda with speech when a broad lin-
guistic category, and with word when justaposed to meaning. For intriguing inputs on
translating abdaprama, see Mohanty (2001: 5-18), who believes that the concept of
prama does not imply a principle of authority, but is rather a critical norm, and especial-
ly denies the interpretation of abdaprama as revelation.
16 ptopadea abda. sa dvividho, drdrrthatvt (NS 1.1.7-8).
17 abdo numnam arthasynupalabdher anumeyatvt. upalabdher advipravrttatvt. sam-
bandhc ca. ptopadeasmarthc chabdd arthasampratyaya. praapradhapannupal-

abdhe ca sambandhbhva. abdrthavyavasthnd apratiedha (NS 2.1.49-54).
And because, being [any word-meaning relation valid for] specific

classes of people, there is no limitation [of word-meaning relations].18
The next argument is of particular interest because, according

to later commentators, it is here that Gautama shifts from the con-
text of testimony in general to Vedic testimony, beginning with the
stock objection already tackled by Jaimini (see 1.3):
It (Veda) is not an instrument of knowledge because of the defects of

falsity, inconsistency, and tautology.19
NS 2.1.58-68 replies to this objection by an array of Mmsaka

arguments (see 1.3), mainly stating the need of distinguishing Vedic
prescriptions (vidhi) from other statements such as descriptive state-
ments (arthavda) and reiterations (anuvda), and contextualizing the
above-mentioned three defects in this perspective. Eventually Gautama
states the only positive argument in favor of Vedaprmya given in NS:
And that [Veda] is a valid source of knowledge because its reliable speak-
er is a valid source, like with the validity of incantations and Ayurveda.20
The question of impermanence of sound (abda, as a broader

physical class) is dealt with in NS 2.2.13-39 (see 1.1). Gautama
affirms three reasons why sound must be considered impermanent
(a-nitya):
Because it has a beginning, because it is sensible matter, because it is

considered artificial.21
These justifications of the definition of abda (NS 1.1.7) were here

given in a nutshell, in adherence to the stra style. They will be fur-
ther clarified in the next Nyya sections ( 4.1-3).
3. abara and the Vttikra
abara is the author of the first extant commentary on MS, the

barabhya (Bh). Quite different hypothesis have been formulat-
ed on his date, ranging from II century B.C. (Devasthali 1942) to VI
century A.D. (Taber 1998). For the present purpose, enough to say
that he did not directly precede Kumrila.
An older commentator, the Vrttikra (the author of the gloss),
is extensively quoted by abara in his commentary on MS 1.1.5. Since
these quotations are embedded in abaras text, it is not always easy
18 na smayikatvc chabdrthasampratyayasya. jtiviee cniyamt (NS 2.1.55-56).

19 tadaprmyam anrtavyghtapunaruktadoebhya (NS 2.1.57).
20 mantryurvedaprmyavac ca tatprmyam ptaprmyt (NS 2.1.68).
21 dimatvd aindriyakatvt krtakavadupacrc ca (NS 2.2.13).
to distinguish abaras views from the Vrttikras. But since abara

did not dispute the Vrttikras views, we can assume that he did not
disagree with them.
Basically, abaras arguments are the same found in MS, but more
philosophically developed. As in MS, also in the Bh the main focus
is on ritual application, rather than on theoretical analysis; hence
Vedas validity is only discussed in the relatively short tarkapda (one
chapter out of sixty). abara also hints at the intrinsic validity theo-
ry which will be later elaborated by Kumrila, and assumes that no
clearly understood Vedic notion can turn to be false (Kumrila will
reject this thesis; see 5.1).
3.1. The word-meaning relation is not human-made
abara glosses originary (autpattika, see 1.1) with nitya. This

term can be interpreted in at least three senses: eternal, continu-
al, and fixed.
An eternal relation between word and meaning would imply that
words and meant entities are themselves metaphysically and ontolog-
ically eternal, i.e. existing in time but without beginning or end.
A continual relation would refer to the diachronic continuity of
words and meant entities from the point of view of speakers, who
never think of a word independently of its meaning; conversely,22
every time a person thought, created, conceived, touched an object,
there had always been word for it.
A fixed relation would entail that it cannot be changed by the
speakers.
The second and third options are treated in Bh ad 1.1.5 ( 3.4).
As to the first option, in my view the strictly temporal aspect of nitya
is discarded by abara:
The relation is the non-separate existence of word and meaning. The

relation does not take place afterwards, when they (word and mean-
ing) have been [already] originated.23
This means that it is impossible to conceive a separate existence

of word and meaning. The relationship of word and meaning is
originary in the sense of mutually inborn, as they can never exist
independently.
As for common language, in MS, words (abda) were said to be
nitya because otherwise there could be no intercommunication (see
22 abda and artha, however, are not exactly symmetrical, and at least in Kumrila
the external world is logically independent of the language which describes it.
23 aviyukta abdrthayor bhva sambandho. notpannayo pact sambandha (Bh ad
MS 1.1.5, F 24.4). Although most editions and manuscripts agree on this reading, F prefers
bhva sambandhena and translates it accordingly:Das Wesen von Wort und Gegenstand
ist also von der Verknpfung nicht getrennt. Yet the meaning does not change.
1.1). abara elaborates further: we recognize (pratyabhij) words

and do not think that a new word is uttered every time we hear a rep-
etition of the same word:
We say: the word cow has been uttered eight times and not eight
words cow have been uttered [] And, like us, other people recog-
nize [it] too, [hence] we can safely assert that it is not another [word].24
Going back to Vedic word, the objection might be raised that the
Veda cannot be an instrument to know dharma, because it is fallible, like
any human word. Accordingly, the Vrttikra glosses MS 1.1.5 as follows:
The word but counteracts this opinion (namely, that Veda is fallible like
human words). The relation between word and meaning is not human.25
The Vrttikra believes that Jaiminis intention is to dispel the view

that every word is fallible. Vedic and human words, instead, have alto-
gether different natures. Accordingly, the Vrttikra glosses autpatti-
ka with non-human (apaurueya).
The idea of the non-human relation is attacked by Naiyyikas.
The Vrttikra quotes a Naiyyika objection, which echoes the argu-
ment given in NS 2.1.53 (see 2.2). This cross-reference with NS gives
further justification to the identification of the NS opponent as a
Mmsaka (see 2.2).
[O.] There is no relation whatsoever between word and meaning [].

If there were a relation with the meaning, upon uttering the word
razor or sweetmeat there would be splitting or filling of the mouth,
provided the relation is meant as a conjunction (salea). And [other
kinds of] relations cause-effect, condition-conditioned, support-sup-
ported, etc., do not apply to words.
[R.] You fail to mention the only relation which applies to the case, the
relation between knowledge and cause of knowledge, characterized as
denoter-denoted.26
Vedic words convey knowledge of dharma, i.e. knowledge related to

sacrifices. This is why the Vrttikra (see Bh ad 1.1.5, F 34. 15-17) stress-
24 aakrtvo goabda uccarita iti vadanti, nau goabd iti. [] pratyabhijnn
vayam ivnye pi nnya iti vaktum arhanti (Bh ad 1.1.20).

25 tuabda paka vyvartayati. apaurueya abdasyrthena sambandha [...] (Bh ad
1.1.5, F 34.13-15).
26 naiva abdasyrthena asti sambandha [] syc ced arthena sambandha, kuramoda-
kaabdoccrae mukhasya panaprae sytm, yadi salealakaa sambandham

abhipretya ucyate. kryakraanimittanaimittikrayrayibhvdayas tu sambandh
abdasya anupapann eva iti. ucyate: yo tra vyapadeya sambandha, tam eka na
vyapadiati bhavn, pratyyyasya pratyyakasya ca, ya sajsajilakaa sambandhas
tam iti (Bh ad 1.1.5, F 36.6-14).
es an important feature of Vedic knowledge: it must refer to something

not accessible through other instruments of knowledge, such as sense
perception or inference. Hence Vedic knowledge can never be contra-
dicted because it is the only source to know dharma. Consequently,
objections based on human experience cannot challenge the Veda:
[O.] [Vedic] word is not the cause [of knowledge of dharma]. It is not
an instrument of knowledge because at the time of sacrifice we do not
see any result [of that sacrifice] and in a successive time [when the
result is there] sacrifice is not [anymore] extant.
[R.] [...] An instrument of knowledge is that through which one acquires
knowledge, and one acquires knowledge also through [Vedic] words.
Thus, also [Vedic] words are means of knowledge, just like sense percep-
tion. And if something is known by an instrument of knowledge and not
known by another, this does not mean that it is not known. Nor does the
Veda say that once the sacrifice is done the result has to immediately
accrue. It is instead said that a result is achieved by means of sacrifice.27
Thus, Mmsakas deny the need and even the possibility of

testing Veda-originated knowledge through other instruments of
knowledge.
But one may object that also Vedic utterances like human
utterances can be false. Thus, a clear differentiation between
human and Vedic words is an important premise for the validity of
the latter. By themselves, human words are not a source of knowledge
and, when based on an erroneous cognition, they are erroneous, too.
Vedic words, instead, are never conditioned by someones cognition.
Commenting on MS 1.1.2,28 abara stresses their different status:
[O.] [Here] an inference based on similarity is possible. Human utter-

ance is perceived to be incorrect. Vedic word is also inferred to be false
because it shares [with human utterance] the same character of being
an utterance.
[R.] No, because it is different. If one is incorrect, indeed, it is not that
also the other has to be so.29
Rejecting the similarity of human utterance and Vedic word,

abara instead proposes the equation of Vedic word and sense per-
ception. In connection to the extra-sensorial sphere, the Veda has the
27 atha yad uktam animitta abda; karmakle phaldarant klntare ca karmbhvt
prama nsti iti. [...] yena yena hi pramyate tat tat pramam. abdenpi pramyate. tata
abdo pi pramam, yathaiva pratyakam. na ca pramenvagata pramntarenava-
gatam ity etvatnavagata bhavati. na caiva ryate krte karmai tvaty eva phala bha-
vati, ki tu karma phala prpyata iti (Bh ad 1.1.5, F 48.16-23).
28 dharma is the purpose designated by prescriptions (codanlakanrtho dharma).
Different translations of this stra have been given, see Frauwallner 1968: 16; DSa 1980:
49-54, especially p. 50; Taber 1983.
29 nanu smnyato dra bhaviyati. paurueya vacana vitatham upalabhya
vacanasmnyd vedavacana mithyeti anumyate. na, anyatvt. na hy anyasya vitathab-

hve nyasya vaitathya bhavitum arhati. (Bh ad 1.1.2, F 18.16-18).
function of directly showing its referents, just like perception does in

the realm of perceivable objects. The evidence of meaning strikes the
knower with the same immediate strength of the image of an exter-
nal object before his eyes. When someone clearly perceives an exter-
nal object through sense perception, he cannot avoid believing in it.
A similar process occurs when someone grasps the meaning of a
Vedic prescription.
For Vedic statements, the cognition is a direct one.30
Of course, a necessary condition for the direct impact of a Vedic

statement is the clear understanding of what is said:
Nor can that which is clearly understood be false.31
3.3. Only prescriptions are means of knowledge
Jaimini explained ( 1.3) that prescriptions (vidhis)32 are the only

Vedic sentences which yield knowledge. The absence of a human
author and the prescriptive character of Vedic statements jointly
invalidate the charge of falsity. On one side, the ignorance, or the will
to mislead, of an author could jeopardize the validity of Veda. On the
other, a prescriptive statement does not stand in need of an external
verification, at least not in the same sense of a descriptive one. In fact
the predominant aspect in a prescription is the direct link established
with the hearer, rather than a description of truth about the world.
Asks the Vrttikra: On the other hand, [unlike human words,] if the
[Vedic] word speaks, how [can it] be false? [In fact,] in that case we
do not seek for a cognition coming from another person. It speaks
means it causes to know, it is the cause of a persons knowing. With
the word as cause, he knows33 by himself [].34 As the Bh admits (
3.2), it is possible for a prescription not to be understood, but it is
quite far-fetched to claim it is false.
30 pratyakas tu vedavacane pratyaya (Bh ad 1.1.2, F 20.1-2).

31 na ca nicitam avagamyamnam ida mithy syt (Bh ad 1.1.2, F 16. 25-26).
32 Interestingly, a strenuous opponent of verbal communication as a separate source
of knowledge, J.N. Mohanty, agrees that [] abda alone gives us knowledge of moral
rules, of what one ought to or ought not to do, of vidhi and niedha [prohibition]. I am not
only saying that ought-sentences cannot be derived from is-sentences (so that perception
and inferences are incapable of yielding knowledge of moral rules), but much more. [...]
What I am saying, rather, is that we learn the rules only from hearing (or reading) verbal
or written instructions. There is no other means of knowing them (Mohanty 1992: 256-7).
33 budhyamnasya and avabudhyate could be read also as passive voices and translated
accordingly. See Jhs translation: [] it makes that thing known, i.e. it becomes the
means of that thing becoming known, [] it becomes known by itself (Jh 1933: 17). See
also DSa 1980: 67.
34 atha abde bruvati katha mithy iti? na hi tadnm anyata purud avagma.
bravti ity ucyate avabodhayati, budhyamnasya nimittam bhavati iti. abde cen nimittabhte
svayam avabudhyate (Bh ad 1.1.5 F 34.19-21). On the views ascribed here to abara and the
The Naiyyikas try to establish the validity of Veda in a different

way. Their view is quoted in Bh ad 1.1.5:
[O.] What is the [word-meaning] relation? The fact that, once the word
is known, the meaning is known. This [relation], however, is artificial
[]. Therefore we believe that Vedas have been composed by the same
person who, before that, made the relation between words and meant
entities for the sake of communication.35
The Vrttikra replies that nobody remembers such a person,

and that all we know from our ancestors is that a tradition of speak-
ers always existed:36
[R.] It is commonly seen that juniors, hearing seniors talking to each

other for their own purposes, understand a directly perceivable mean-
ing. Even those seniors, when they were children, [understood] it from
other seniors, and these from others. So there is no beginning. []
There is actually nothing incongruous in what we see. What we see is
that juniors learn from seniors [].37
Thus, the Vrttikra denies the possibility of justifying a conven-

tion-maker through presumption (arthpatti).38 There is, he main-
tains, nothing incongruous in the data we have, and we do not need
anything extra to account for them.
The problem of the origin of Veda is similarly discussed. There
are no living people who have ever seen an author of the Veda, nor
has tradition recorded such a person.
[O.] But since [the convention-maker did it] a long time ago, he ought
not be object of sense perception for todays people.
Vttikra a few words of caution are due. abara often paraphrases prescriptive statements
with descriptive ones, and this suggests an unclear prescriptive/descriptive distinction on
his part ( see Kataoka 1995).
35 atha sabandha ka iti? yat abde vijte rtho vijyate. sa tu krtaka []. tasmn
manymahe kenpi puruea abdnm arthai saha sambandha krtv savyavahartu

ved prat iti (Bh ad 1.1.5, F 42. 12-15).
36 This argument based on tradition, or succession (parampar), is one of the bases of
Mms and is linked with its commitment to empiricism. As often stressed by many
scholars (e.g. Taber 1992: 205ff), this commitment is among the main characteristics of
Mms. As empiricists, Mmsakas deny creationism as well as the hypothesis of a con-
vention-maker in the sphere of language.
37 vrddhn svrthena vyavaharamnnm uparvanto bl pratyakam artha
pratipadyamn dryante. te pi vrddh yad bl sas, tadnyebhyo vrddhebhyas, te py anyeb-

hya iti nsty dir ity [...] na hi dre nupapanna nma. dr hi bl vrddhebhya prati-
padyamn (Bh ad 1.1.5, F 46. 2-2; 47. 3-4).
38 The instrument of knowledge (not reducible to inference, according to
Mmsakas) through which one knows that if Devadatta is alive and is not at home, he
must be outside. The gist of the reasoning is that an apparent inconsistency leads to the
only other possible solution (anyathnupapatti).
[R.] Just because he [lived] a long time ago, it is not that he should not
be remembered. Nor this type of forgetfulness can be likened to that of
a well or garden in the Himlaya; in fact in such [cases] a separation of
people [from them] has occurred because of remoteness of the area or
disappearance of the community. But a separation of people from the
usage of words and meanings never occurs.
[O.] It may be so: those who only use the relation and do not care for
the useless recollection of the maker [of the relation] could well for-
get him.
[R.] It is not so. Indeed, if a person created a relation and caused [peo-
ple] to communicate, he would be doubtlessly remembered at the time
of communication. As a matter of fact, a meaning is settled [only] when
there is agreement between the doer and the user [of the relation], not
when there is disagreement. Indeed, daic (i.e. , ai and au)39 would
not be understood through the word vrddhi by someone who commu-
nicates without [knowing] Pini or by someone who does not accept
Pinis terminology.40
In this passage, the Vrttikra maintains that people learn the

Veda from teachers who themselves previously learnt it from other
teachers, and so on (Taber 1992: 205). There is no evidence of the
opposite; both personal and collective memories show that Veda has
always been there and language has never been created. Thus, in the
Vrttikras view, there is no point in postulating something that goes
against common experience without gaining any advantage to
account for Veda and language.
Moreover, the uniformity of usage among native speakers would
be difficult to justify, if language were a convention. This argument
may be countering (or countered by) the one expressed in NS 2.1.56:
a justification of differences among languages is as problematic as
that of uniformity within a single language.
Like in this region the word cow [refers to] an [animal] endowed with
dew-lap, etc., so it is in every [region], even the most remote. How could
have many relation-makers met [to establish that]? A single one could
not [have spread the same relation in such a huge area]. Therefore
there is no relation-maker.41
39 The Vrttikra here refers to Pinis stra vrddhir daic (dhyy, 1.1.1), which
could not be understood if we would not know Pinis rules. Hence, wherever there is a
convention, the convention-doer must be remembered, otherwise it cannot be deciphered.
40 nanu ciravrttatvt pratyakasya aviayo bhaved idnntannm. na hi ciravrtta san
na smaryeta. na ca hmavaddiu kprmdivad asmaraa bhavitum arhati. puruaviyogo

hi teu bhavati deotsdena kulotsdena v. na tu abdrthavyavahraviyoga purum asti.
syd etat: sabandhamtravyavahrio niprayojana kartrsmaraam andriyam vis-
mareyur iti. tan na. yadi hi purua krtv sabandham vyavahrayet, vyavahrakle
vaya smartavyo bhavet. sapratipattau hi kartrvyavahartror artha sidhyati, na vipratipat-
tau. na hi vrddhiabdena apiner vyavahrata daica pratiyeran pinikrtim ananu-
manyamnasya v (Bh ad 1.1.5, F 42.20-44.6).
41 yath asmin dee ssndimati goabda, eva sarveu durgamev api. bahava sam-
bandhrah katha sagasyante. eko pi na aknuyt. ato nsti sambandh (Bh ad 1.1.5, F
46.12-14).
Finally, the Vrttikra reports an alternative argument against the

convention theory. Interestingly enough, it is based on the interpre-
tation of autpattika as fixed:
Indeed, there was no time when a relation was not there, when some
words were not connected with a meaning. Why? Because relation-
making just does not make sense. Surely whoever made the relation
must have done it by means of words. Who made [the relation] of those
[words] through which [that relation] was made? Was it [also] made by
someone else through [words]? And that by whom? There would be no
end. Thus, beyond any doubt, we must admit some words whose rela-
tion has not been made by a relation-maker and which are established
through seniors usage. [But] if there are [words] established through
seniors usage, then a relation-maker is not needed.42
To sum up, abara confirms that Vedas validity is limited to pre-

scriptions and to the sphere of dharma. He defines the word-mean-
ing relation as fixed (nitya) and stresses its independence from
human convention. Through this relation, abda directly conveys
the knowledge of its meaning, and a beginningless succession of lan-
guage users and Veda reciters corroborates this fact.
4. Vtsyyana and Uddyotakara
Vtsyyana (Pakilasvmin) is the author of the oldest extant

commentary on NS, the Nyyabhya (NBh). Some (Ingalls) propose
a collocation as early as in the III century A.D., while Oberhammer
and others argue for the V century A.D. The latter view is currently
more popular (see Potter 1977: 239), so in the present paper we
abide by it and put Vtsyyana after abara.
Uddyotakara, the author of the Nyyavrttika (NV), is unani-
mously assigned to the VI century.
4.1. abda as testimony
Vtsyyana defines the reliable speaker as follows:
Reliable is the speaker (upade) who has directly experienced the

essential quality (dharma) [of things], and is moved by the desire to
describe [things] as they are or they are not. [] The definition applies
all the same to seers (ri), people of ryavarta and barbarians.43
42 na hi sabandhavyatirikta kacit klo sti, yasmin na kacid api abda kenacid arthena
sabaddha st. katham? sabandhakriyaiva hi nopapadyate. avayam anena saband-

ha kurvat kenacic chabdena kartavya. yena kriyeta, tasya kena krta? athnyena kenacit
krta, tasya keneti, tasya keneti naivvatihate. tasmd avayam anena sabandha kurvat
akrtasabandh kecana abd vrddhavyavahrasiddh abhyupagantavy. asti ced
vyavahrasiddhi, na niyogata sabandhr bhavitavyam (Bh ad 1.1.5, F 46.17-47.2).
43 pta khalu sktkrtadharm yathdrasydrasya cikhypayiay prayukta upade
[...] ryryamlecchn samna lakaam (NBh ad 1.1.7).

As for the subdivision of speech speech related to perceivable

and unperceivable objects, Vtsyyana says that this subdivision
entails a partition between common language and language of the
seers.44 According to him, the two types of objects are explicitly men-
tioned by Gautama because one should not think that the statement of
a reliable person is valid only for perceivable objects, which the speak-
er perceives through sense perception, but also for unperceivable
objects, which he knows through inference. Admitting inference as a
root source of reliability in the speaker is necessary to account for the
reliability in common speakers like us, adds Vcaspati. In fact, divine
seers can directly perceive also objects not directly perceivable by us.
4.2. Reasons for the validity of testimony.
The Vaieikas dispute the distinct character of inference and tes-

timony (see 2.2). Vtsyyana explicitly points at the speakers relia-
bility as the distinguishing factor:
Heaven, celestial nymphs, [mythical regions such as] the Northern
Kurus, the Seven Islands, the Ocean, etc.: the knowledge of such direct-
ly unperceivable objects does not come from words alone. From what,
then? Thorough knowledge comes from words uttered by reliable
speakers: otherwise there is no thorough knowledge. On the contrary
this does not apply to inference.45
Vaieikas maintain that inference and testimony share the indis-

tinct character of being based upon a relation. Introducing a princi-
ple which will come of use in the debate with Mmsakas,
Vtsyyana explains Gautamas denial of a relation:
Again, as for because of relation (NS 2.1.51), there is one word-mean-
ing relation which we accept, and another which we reject. [] The rela-
tion among word and meaning as a relation of contact46 is rejected.47
As far as rejection of the naive idea of a word-meaning relation

of contact, Vtsyyana and the Vrttikra ( 3.1) show no differences
of sort. As we shall see, however, they disagree on the type of relation
to be accepted.
Uddyotakara rephrases the word-meaning relation accepted by
Naiyyikas, and criticizes the tenet of a natural (svabhvika) relation,
thus entering the Naiyyika vs Mmsaka debate:
44 [] evam rilaukikavkyn vibhga iti (NBh ad 1.1.8).

45 svarga apsarasa uttar kurava sapta dvp samudra ity evam der
apratyakasyrthasya na abdamtrt pratyaya, ki tarhi? ptair ayam ukta abda ity ata
sampratyaya viparyayea sampratyaybhvt. na tv evam anumnam iti (NBh ad 2.1.52).
46 I render prpti with contact following Vcaspati Miras commentary; Chattopad-
hyaya and Gangopadhyaya (1968) translate it as natural relation.

47 yat punar ida sambandhc ceti, asti ca abdrthayo sambandho nujta, asti ca
pratiiddha. [] prptilakaas tu abdrthayo sambandha pratiiddha (NBh ad 2.1.52).

We agree on the signified-signifier relation: this word has this signified

meaning. But we refute that word-meaning relation which is accepted
by someone as natural.48
One of the main Mmsaka arguments is the commonly felt

fixedness of the word-meaning relation, without which mutual under-
standing among speakers could not be secured. Vtsyyana explains
the Mmsaka position, hinted at in NS 2.1.54, as follows:
Since we witness a fixed pattern in comprehension of a [given] mean-

ing from a [given] word, we infer that the word-meaning relation is the
cause of this fixed pattern. In fact, if there were no relation, there would
be the consequence of comprehending any meaning from any word.
Therefore the relation cannot be ruled out.49
The Naiyyika answer is that the only existing relation is a conven-

tional one. Vtsyyana explains what convention means:
The fixed pattern of word and meaning is not produced by a [natural]

relation. From what then? It is produced by convention. [] But what is
this convention? It is the mandate of a restriction of signifier and signi-
fied: by this word this meaning is to be signified. When this [mandate]
is respected the understanding of a meaning from a word takes place.
Otherwise, indeed, even upon hearing a word there is no understand-
ing. Also the supporters of [a natural] relation50 cannot deny this [fact].
And common people use convention by taking it from other users; to
preserve this convention there is grammar.51
Noticeably, Naiyyikas agree with Mmsakas on the role of a

tradition of language users (vrddhavyavahra) in the transmission of
linguistic competence, but conceive a prime cause behind it which
Mmakas do not.
There is another argument against a natural word-meaning rela-
tion: differences of idiom according to social belonging (see NS
2.1.55-6, 2.2). Vtsyyana states:
The understanding of meaning from words is conventional and not nat-

urally intrinsic (svbhvika). The arbitrary use of words to convey mean-
48 vcyavcakabhvalakaa sambandho nujta. asya abdasyyam artho vcya iti.
ya punar aya svbhvika abdrthayo sambandha iti kaicid abhyupagamyate sa pratiid-

dha iti (NV ad 2.1.52).
49 abdd arthapratyayasya vyavasthdarand anumyate asti abdrthasambandho
vyavasthkraam. asambandhe hi abdamtrd arthamtre pratyayaprasaga. tasmd

apratiedha sambandhasyeti (NBh ad 2.1.54).
50 Vcaspati glosses supporters of relation (sambandhavdina) with Mmsakas or
Vaiykaraas (NVT ad NS 2.1.55).

51 na sambandhakrita abdrthavyavasthnam. ki tarhi? samayakritam. [] ka
punar aya samaya? asya abdasyedam arthajtam abhidheyam iti abhidhnbhidheyaniya-

maniyoga. tasminn upayukte abdd arthasampratyayo bhavati. viparyaye hi abdaravae pi
pratyaybhva. sambandhavdino pi cyam avarjanya iti. [...] prayujyamnagrahac ca
samayopayogo laukiknm. samayapariplanrtha ceda [...] vykaraam. (NBh ad 2.1.55).
ings applies to seers, inhabitants of ryavarta, or barbarians. Indeed if a

word naturally conveyed its meaning, there would be no arbitrariness,
just like the cognition of a form, produced by bright light, does not vary
according to specific classes of people.52
Uddyotakara makes clear that the difference hinted at in NS

2.1.56 has a geographical value:
By the expression specific classes of people the region is denoted.53
4.3. Reasons for the validity of Veda
In NS 2.1.68 the validity of Veda was inferentially established. The

inferential mark (hetu) given there was the reliability of the speaker,
and the illustration (drnta) was the validity of incantations and
yurveda. But are these hetu and dnta solidly grounded?
Vtsyyana, with a soteriological flavor, enumerates three qualities of
a reliable speaker: direct experience of the essence (dharma) of
things; compassion towards living beings; desire to speak of things for
what they are.54 As for the validity of incantations and yurveda,
whatever is taught by yurveda by doing so and so you can achieve

the desirable outcomes, by giving up that and that you can avoid the
undesirable outcomes is consistent, truthful and infallible for one
who follows it. And in the usage of the words of incantations meant to
contrast poison, ghosts and thunderbolt there is consistency with the
outcomes, and this proves [their] validity.55
The inference, as expressed by Gautama, is that Veda is an instru-

ment of knowledge, because it has reliable speakers, just like yurve-
da is a means of knowledge because it has reliable speakers.
Vtsyyana seems to understand Gautamas argument as an
implicitly larger argument, akin to an hypothetical syllogism (if p then
q; if q then r; therefore, if p then r) which he develops accordingly:
(p) The yurveda, which deals with perceivable objects, is an instru-

ment of knowledge; because it is the statement of a reliable speaker.
52 samayika abdd arthasampratyayo na svbhvika. ryryamlecchn yathkma
abdaviniyogo rthpratyyanya pravartate. svbhvike hi abdasyrthapratyyakatve

yathkma na syd, yath taijasasya prakasya rpapratyayahetutva na jtiviee vyab-
hicaratti (NBh ad 2.1.56).
53 jtivieaabdena punar deo bhidhyata iti (NV ad 2.1.56); here, according to
Vacaspati, Uddyotakara means that, for instance, a stranger living in ryavarta would con-
form to the usage of the ryas.
54 ki punar ptn prmyam? sktkrtadharmat bhtaday yathbhtrthacikhy-
payieti [...] evam ptopadea pramam evam pt pramam (NBh ad 2.1.68).

55 yat tad yurvedenopadiyate ida krtveam adhigacchati ida varjayitvnia jahti,
tasynuhyamnasya tathbhva satyrthatviparyaya. mantrapadn ca viabht-

anipratiedhrthn prayoge rthasya tathbhva, etat prmyam (NBh ad 2.1.68).
(q) The portion of the Veda which deals with perceivable objects is an
instrument of knowledge; because it is the statement of a reliable speak-
er; like the yurveda.
(r) The portion of the Veda which deals with unperceivable objects is
an instrument of knowledge; because it is the statement of a reliable
speaker; like the portion of the Veda which deals with perceiveable
objects56
(p) and (q) share the common character of dealing with visible
objects; (q) and (r) share the character of belonging to the same
work, i.e. the Veda. The kinship of yurveda and Veda is further
stressed by the character of being both spoken by reliable seers:
And the [validity of the] inference owes to the sameness of seers and
speakers [of Veda and yurveda]. Indeed the reliable seers and speak-
ers of Vedic matter are also those of yurveda, etc.; thus the validity
of Veda should be inferred in the same fashion of the validity of
yurveda.57
The whole passage also shows that Vtsyyana had in mind, as

Uddyotakara confirms, sections of the Veda which deal with perceived
objects and others which deal with unperceived ones. Interestingly
enough, in (p), (q), (r) the inferential mark remains the reliability of
the speaker, which in (p) and (q) can be cross-checked by dint of per-
ceivable outcomes.
Vtsyyana raises some Mmsaka objections, which point to
the inconsistency of speakers reliability and to the permanence of
Veda:
[O.] Being the validity of Vedic statements based on [their] perma-

nence (nitya), it is not correct to say that their validity is based on reli-
ability of the speakers.
[R.] This is wrong. The validity in the knowledge of meanings depends
on the signifying capacity of words, not on [their] permanence. []
[O. ] Without permanence there cannot be signification [see 1.1, MS
1.1.18].
[R.] No, it is not so, because there is no evidence of this [permanence]
in common language.
[O.] That (common language) is also permanent.
[R.] No, because if this were the case, it would be uncongrous to say
that wrong meanings are understood from unreliable speakers (being
all words permanent, these should invariably produce valid knowl-
edge). In day-to-day language, wherever a word is assigned to an object,
it becomes a factor of knowledge owing to the power of its mandate, not
because of permanence. Permanence of Vedas is the unbroken conti-
56 See NBh ad 2.1.68: drrthenptopadeeyurvedendrrtho vedabhgo numtavya
pramam iti ptaprmyasya heto samnatvd iti. asypti caikadeo grmakmo yajeta ity
evam dir drrtha, tennumtavyam iti.
57 drarpravaktrsmnyc cnumnam. ya evpt vedrthn drara pravaktra
ca ta evyurvedaprabhrtn ity yurvedaprmyavad vedaprmyam anumtavyam iti

(NBh ad 2.1.68).
nuity of tradition in sequential past and future ages, and [their] validi-
ty is due to the worthiness of a reliable speaker. And this applies also to
day-to-day language.58
If Veda is not permanent it must be the product of an author. But

the Mmsaka might ask: where is the proof of the existence of such
a person? Uddyotakara retorts that, whatever the case, this is certain-
ly not an evidence in favor of permanence: in fact, proofs of perma-
nence are also hardly available.59 Nonetheless, the eternity of Veda is
a wide-spread and commonly accepted concept. How can this fact be
accounted for?
[O.] What about the common conviction that Vedas are eternal?
[R.] The reason [behind it] is the non-interruption of tradition. These
very Vedic statements were handed down throughout the ages without
interruption of tradition, and in reference to this [fact] people use
words such as Vedas are permanent, similar to [commonly used
expressions such as] permanent mountains, permanent rivers, etc.
This applies all the same to statements such as those of Manu [for which
there is record of an author].
[O.] Why talking of permanence that depends on non-interruption of
tradition, and not just of permanence?
[R.] Because of non-falsity of the above-said evidences in favor of
impermanence: the evidences by me implemented in relation to
impermanence are not disproved, and since they are not false, being
there impermanence, permanence is figuratively used in the sense of
continuity of tradition.60
Noticeably, in these last lines of Vtsyyana and Uddyotakara the

Mmsaka objector closely mirrors the thesis of the Vrttikra, who
argued in favor of a beginningless tradition (see 3.4).
5. Kumrila
Kumrila Bhaa, the upholder of the Bha school of Mms,

can be assigned with relative certainty to the VII century, as proven by
several passages found in the works of Dharmakrti, akara,
Maana Mira, etc.
58 nityatvd vedavkyn pramatve tatprmyam ptaprmyd ity ayuktam.
abdasya vcakatvd arthapratipattau pramatva na nityatvt. [] nnityatve vcakatvam

iti cen na, laukikev adarant. te pi nity iti cen na, anptopaded arthavisavdo nupapan-
na [...] yatrrthe nmadheyaabdo niyujyate loke tasya niyogasmarthyt pratyyako bhavati, na
nityatvt. manvantarayugntareu cttngateu sampradybhysaprayogvicchedo vedn
nityatvam, ptaprmyc ca prmyam. laukikeu abdeu caitat samnam iti (NBh ad 2.1.68).
59 paurueyatvam asiddha, nityatvd iti cet, atha manyase nityni vedavkyni nityatvc
cai prmyam tasmt paurueyatvam asiddham, na, asiddhatvt (NV ad 2.1.68).

60 atha yo yam abhilpo nity ved iti, sa katham? sampradyasyvicchedt. tany eva
vedavkyni manvantaracaturyugntareu sampradybhysvicchedena pravartante, tada-

pekay laukik abdn prayujate nity ved iti, yath nity parvat nity sarita iti, tan
manvdivkyeu samnam. kuta eva sampradyvicchedt nityatva na punar nityatvd eva?
anityatvoktapramvightt. yni maynityatve pramny upanyastni tni na vihanyante,
tem avightd anityatve sati sampradyvicchedt nityatvopacra iti (NV ad 2.1.68).
Concerning Vedas validity, Kumrila follows in the footsteps of

Jaimini and abara. Nevertheless one should keep in mind that also
the antagonistic school of Prbhkarams, whose interpreta-
tion of the tradition sharply diverges from Kumrilas, claims faithful-
ness to MS and Bh.
We have seen how the Vrttikra put emphasis on the non-human61
(apaurueya) character of the word-meaning relation. Kumrila fur-
ther develops the issue, discarding the very possibility of an extra-ordi-
nary human being who could have created language and known
dharma. Even the beginningless transmission argument (see 1.4,
3.4) is not directly employed to establish Vedas validity but only to
prove the absence of its author. The main positive argument adopted
by Kumrila in favor of Vedas validity, instead, is the intrinsic validi-
ty theory of knowledge.
5.1. Veda is not human-made (apaurueyatva)62
In his systematizing effort, Kumrila dismisses abaras main argu-

ment on the infallibility of Vedic knowledge as ineffective (jti).63 In
fact propositions like if the word speaks, how [can it] be false? ( 3.3)
or It is contradictory to say spoken and false,64 could justify, if con-
sistently applied, even Buddhas words:
There (in the Bh) the contradiction [between spoken and false]
would apply to Buddhas statements as well; because also from those
[statements] cognitions do arise.65
Therefore, if on one side he develops a more sophisticated justifi-

cation of the Vedas validity, on the other he rejects the possibility of an
omniscient human being.
61 a-paurueya means non-human, non-personal and may refer to both human
beings and personal, though superhuman, beings, e.g. Gods.

62 On how should authorlessness of the Veda be understood, views diverge. J. N.
Mohanty (1992: 259) states that the concept of apaurueyatva [] is [] the concept of
the primacy and autonomy of the eminent text over the subjective intentions of the
author. It is also the concept of the role the eminent texts such as the ruti play in delim-
iting the horizon within which our tradition has understood itself and, within the
tradition, we have understood ourselves and (1992: 258): The words are prior to experi-
ences [] The implication is that the same [mystical] experiences would be made to tell
a different story, in another tradition, where a different set of words fulfil that foundation-
al role. Somehow similar is V.K. Charis argument: Apaurueyatva [] can only mean
that because of the self-explanatory character of the verbal sign itself, the meaning of the
text is not dependent upon its author (Chari 1992: 104). Finally, Puruottama Bilimoria
(1989: 149) lists seven possible meanings of apaurueyatva. On the other side, J.
Bronkhorst (especially Bronkhorst 1998) argues for apaurueya as meaning literally with-
out author and relates it to the claim of the Veda being literally beginningless.
63 This weak point was already noticed by Vtsyyana (see 4.3).
64 vipratiiddham idam abhidhyate bravti ca vitatha ca (Bh ad 1.1.2, F 16.18).
65 tatra vipratiiddhatva buddhavkye pi yujyate tato pi pratyayotpattes (V codan
32a-c).
Following the Bhya arguments ( 3.2, Bh ad 1.1.2, F 18. 3-15.),

he asserts that the Veda cannot be proven to be false because of an
authors defects, as there is no author:66
Therefore in the case of [statements of individuals such as Buddha,

etc.], the falsity is justified by their human origin. This character [of fal-
sity] does not apply to the Veda, because [in its case] there is no author.
Since it is not hampered by any authors notion, the meaning [of a
Vedic sentence] is comprehended directly through the meanings [of its
words]; consequently it does not depend on [any authors] cognition
nor can it be false.67
But what is the evidence that an author of the Veda never exist-
ed? Kumrilas answer can be reduced to three main arguments:
1. there is no need to postulate anything unseen (see 1.4; n. 34);
2. there is no need to postulate the existence, in the past or in the
future, of something different from what we experience today
(this point is developed from an analogous argumentation of
the Vrttikra; see 3.4, 5.2);
3. as the Vrttikra asserted ( 3.4), if there were an author of the
Veda, we would have heard about such an illustrious personality.
Hence, the non-existence of an author is proven by absence
(abhvaprama), considered an independent instrument of knowl-
edge by Bhammsakas.68 The basic idea behind the concept of
abhva is that the absence of something is the positive content of a
distinct type of cognition, there is absence of x in y.
Finally, as far as words in common language are concerned,
Kumrila maintains69 that they are permanent (nitya) on the basis of
presumption (arthpatti), since communication would otherwise be
unexplainable (see 1.1, 3.1).
66 What Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960: 299) called the Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit (the
presupposal of perfection), once applied to the Veda (and it is applied to it by almost the
whole Indian community), can never be doubted, since no chances of an historical (Veda
is said to be timeless) or personal (since it has no author) understanding are left.
67 ato tra punimittatvd upapann mrrthat na tu syt tatsvabhvatva vede vaktur
abhvata tadbuddhyantarayo nstty artho rthai ca pratyate ato na jnaprvatvam

apekya nyathrthat (V codan 169-170). I adopted the reading of Uveka Bhaa, the
earliest commentator, instead of tadbuddhyantarayor (perhaps a scribal error due to the
infrequent term antaraya, changed into the dual antarayor) found in the published versions
of V. Despite this difficulty, the meaning of the verse is quite clear thanks to both the V
context and the comments, who all seem to have read tadbuddhyantarayo. Uveka Bhaa
(VV): ato vaktur abhvena ca vaktrjnaparatvbhvt padrthapratipdanadvrea bh-
vanyam eva ttparyam ity ha tatbuddhyantaraya iti. Prthasrathimira (NR): vaktrbud-
dhyantarybhvt padarthair eva skd vkyrtha pratyata iti. Sucaritamira (K):
vaktrbuddhyantarayor vyavadhnam api vede nstti padrthair eva kevalair nityanirdoair
vkyrtha pratyata ity ha tadbuddhti.
68 The Bhammsakas accept six instruments of knowledge: sense perception
(pratyaka), inference (anumna), verbal communication (abda), analogy (upamna),

presumption (arthpatti), absence (abhva). For the means of knowledge accepted by
Naiyyikas see n. 82.
69 V abdanityat, especially 236-7.
Like Jaimini, abara and the Vrttikra, also Kumrila believes that
Veda is an instrument of knowledge only for objects beyond human
faculties, e.g. dharma. No cognition based on sense perception could
ever be invalidated by Vedic utterances. He even declares that
for objects beyond its sphere of concern, even the Veda [can] be false.70
In other words, whenever the empirical reality is at stake,

Kumrila rejects the possibility of a conflict between Veda and the
other sources of knowledge. Only the Veda, vice versa, can bestow
knowledge of dharma, so both the likelihood of inference playing a
role in the ascertainment of unperceivable objects and the idea that
human beings can intellectually perceive dharma are ruled out (see
4.1). In order to exclude the possibility of different conditions for
human beings in the past or in the future, he says:
A class of objects which is presently known through its [specific] instru-
ment of knowledge was known through that same instrument of knowl-
edge also in the past. []
As far as future objects [such as dharma] are concerned, there is not the
slightest room for sense perception, nor for inference, for want of an
inferential mark.71
5.3. An omniscient author does not exist
The Naiyyika and Buddhist ideas72 that the validity of sacred

texts has to be founded on their authors reliability is criticized by
Kumrila. He rejects the inference
(a) the authors assertions in the matter of dharma are true; because
they are his assertions, like his true assertions in many matters of ordi-
nary perception (see 4.3).
Such an argument is logically vulnerable, as it could be easily used

against its propounder. In fact,
a disputant would argue at once, having undoubtedly the same grounds
[at his disposal] against you: My assertion that Buddha is not omnis-
cient is true; because it is my assertion, like my [true] assertion fire is
hot and bright.73
70 svavyprtirikte rthe vedasypi mrrthat (V codan 173ab).

71 yajjtyai pramais tu yajjtyrthadaranam bhaved idn lokasya tath klntare
py abht [] bhaviyati na dra ca pratyakasya mang api smarthyam nnumnder

ligdirahite kvacit (V codan 113, 115).
72 Eli Franco highlights the link between the Naiyyika and the Buddhist theses
(Franco 1997: first chapter).

73 vaded eva ca yo nma vd prathamasagata tasypi hetu syd ea bhavanta praty
asaayam buddhdnm asrvajam iti satya vaco mama maduktatvd yathaivgnir uo

bhsvara ity api (V codan 129-130).
Kumrilas sarcasm, however, would miss the mark if in (a) the

author were qualified as omniscient. In fact, Buddhists and later
Naiyyikas such as Jayanta ( 6.1) claim that the one who said such true
things (e.g. the four noble truths, or the yurveda) could not but be
omniscient, hence his words are to be held true even for unperceivable
matters. Therefore, Kumrila aims at disproving the logical possibility
of an omniscient human being, and consequently he proposes many
circumstantial criticisms which presuppose a fundamental reduction:
the theorization of an omniscient being is the theorization of some-
thing unseen. According to Kumrila the proposal of an omniscient
author is nothing more than fiction, an appeal to imaginary entities.
As for an omniscient person, at present we do not see him; nor it is possi-
ble to hypothesize while it is easy to disprove that [he] ever existed.74
Moreover any human statement could be invalidated whenever

defects are found to be present, or qualities found to be lacking, in
the speaker, and in such cases it would not yield knowledge anymore.
Any human being (including Buddha and seers) who speaks about
supernatural subjects like dharma, which cannot be known through
human faculties, cannot be reliable. Hence, on extra-sensorial mat-
ters only an autonomous instrument of knowledge, i.e. Veda, can
serve the purpose.
In sum, Kumrila aims at securing the autonomy ( 1.1) of Veda
from other means of knowledge. As a matter of fact, if the validity of
Veda were in need of an external justification (be it an author or an
empirical test), it would depend on it and become only a second-
order instrument of knowledge:
just as the validity [of assertions regarding ordinary matters] is due to
sense-discrimination, etc., so also [the validity of assertions] in the case
of matters of faith [would depend on sense discrimination, etc.] and
it would never be autonomous.75
Kumrila dismisses also the possibility of founding the reliability of

an omniscient author on the sacred text itself, which would end up in
a petitio principii:
Nor can an omniscient being [be known] through the sacred text
(gama); for in that case there would be mutual interdependence.76
If instead we assume the autonomous validity of Veda, then the

postulation of an author becomes unnecessary.
74 sarvajo dryate tvan nednm asmaddibhi nirkaraavac chaky na csd iti
kalpan (V codan 117).

75 yathaivtrendriydibhya paricchedt pramat raddheye pi tathaiva syn na sv-
tantryea labhyate (V codan 123).

76 na cgamena sarvaja tadye nyonyasarayt (V codan 118ab).
Thus, Naiyyikas77 are criticized because, by resorting to an

author, they implicitly state that Veda is not an autonomous instru-
ment of knowledge:
therefore, since validity [of the Veda] does not depend on an author,
the worship of its [author] is wrong. Because one could address him
only with prayers if he assumes that the Veda is [in itself] devoid of epis-
temic validity.78
As abara, also Kumrila maintains that every epistemic enter-

prise must be based on the world as it is actually experienced, and
that an alternative state of affairs needs not to be imagined:
every [students] learning of the Veda was preceded by the learning of
the Veda by his teacher, because it is called learning of the Veda [which
is necessarily done under a teacher], like todays learning [of the Veda].79
Therefore the postulate of a time when the Veda was not trans-
mitted by a teacher but composed ex nihilo is unwarranted. An objec-
tor may say that the teacher-student transmission applies also to
authored compositions such as the Mahbhrata. But in that case,
replies Kumrila, the existence of an author is well recorded, while an
author of the Veda is not remembered. Neither do arthavdas refer-
ring to Prajpati may be said to prove his authorship of the Veda,
since they are arthavdas and hence ineffective cognitive tools.
Therefore, a tradition based on them is nothing but a tradition of
blind people transmitting to each other opinions about colors.
This shows that for Kumrila tradition is not necessarily a value,
because when the foundation of a tradition turns out to be flawed, it is
not anymore valuable. In this connection it is worth mentioning that
Kumrila rejects (TV ad 1.3.4., v. 269) the argument based on consen-
sus of many/great people80 (mahjanaparigraha, akin to consensus gen-
tium), that is the deduction of the validity of Veda etc. from its accept-
ance by many people. The validity of sacred texts, he maintains, must
be independently established, in order to avoid the risk of relativism.
5.5. Validity is intrinsic
Kumrilas positive argument for Veda as an instrument of knowl-

edge is the intrinsic validity (svata prmnya) theory.81 This is most
77Explicitely identified by Prthasrathi in NR ad V codan 69.

78ato vaktranadhnatvt prmye tadupsanam na yuktam apramatve kalpye tat-
prrthan bhavet (V codan 69).
79 vedasydhyayana sarva gurvadhyayanaprvakam veddhyayanavcyatvd
adhundhyayana yath (V vkya 366).

80 The two aspects are mostly intertwined, see Chemparathy 1983: 59-63.
81 Exemplarily discussed by Taber 1992 and (following Taber) by Arnold 2001.
likely a development of abaras concept of Veda-originated cognition

as self-evident, just like sense perception (see 3.2). The theory is
defended by Kumrila from the attacks of Buddhists and Naiyyikas.
The basic tenet is that a cognition can be denied only if and when
defeated by a subsequent one, but unless that happens, and until
then, it must be regarded as wholly valid. This position is most likely
rooted in the Mmsaka commitment to common experience, in
which no one waits for further justification before acting (this would
lead to a complete paralysis).
Moreover, if no cognition were admitted as valid without the
verification of a second one, also this latter verifying cognition, qua
cognition, would need a verification, and so on. This regressus ad
infinitum could be stopped, as Buddhists and Naiyyikas claim, by
postulating that some cognitions, e.g. empirical tests, do not need
further verification. But if a limit in the infinite series of verifica-
tions must be anyway postulated, why not accepting the very first
cognition as valid? According to Kumrila, every cognition must be
assumed as valid, and can be invalidated only if, thereafter, its caus-
es are found to be defective or the piece of information produced is
proven to be false.
As far as Veda is concerned, it has no author and should be consid-
ered an instrument of knowledge only in relation to dharma and other
extra-sensorial matters. The absence of an author precludes the possi-
bility of finding any defect in the Veda and, since no other instrument
of knowledge could invalidate knowledge of dharma achieved through
the Veda, its intrinsic validity can never be overthrown.
6. Jayanta Bhaa
The magnum opus of Jayanta (IX century) is the encyclopedic

Nyyamajar (NM), in which three books out of twelve are devoted
to abdaprama.82
6.1. abda as testimony
The third book of NM comments on NS 1.1.7. Unlike previous

commentaries on the word upadea (statement, see 2.1, 4.1) Jayanta,
probably influenced by Mms, also brings into the picture the
receptive hearers side of the coin, and not just the productive speak-
ers as previous Naiyyikas did:
What is the meaning of stating? It is doing an act of denotation. []

An act of denotation implies that a meaning produced by a hearable enti-
82 Naiyyikas accept four instruments of knowledge: sense perception (pratyaka),
inference (anumna), verbal communication (abda), analogy (upamna). For the instru-
ments of knowledge accepted by the Bhttas, see n. 68.
ty is understood. Commonly a said or denoted meaning is called that

which conveys the content (viayat)83 of a corresponding cognition.84
As said above ( 4.1), experience of the essential quality of things

is the foundation of reliability. Jayanta confirms that the reliable
speaker does not necessarily rely only on direct perception, but also
on inference and other instruments.85 This is consistent with
Jayantas tenet of the possibility of more instruments of knowledge
concurring (pramasamplava) to the cognition of a same object,86
and it opposes the Mmsaka principle of autonomous instruments
of knowledge (see 3.2, 5.3).
The most significant innovation in Jayantas justification of the
validity of Vedas is that he brings into the picture God (vara), apply-
ing to him the three characteristics of reliability mentioned by
Vtsyyana ( 4.1) and reading dharma in a moral sense:
This same definition, as we heard it [from Vtsyyana], applies to God,

the reliable propounder of sacred traditions (gama). Because, like
someone who experiences directly the essential quality of things (dhar-
ma), God perceives directly [the universal] dharma; as to the desire to
communicate things, it will be explained how God is compassionate;
and he is a teacher (upade) because, as we will establish, he is the pro-
pounder of Vedic tradition, etc.87
The introduction of God in the epistemological discussion at

Jayantas time is open to further social and historical research.
Jayanta and the coeval Naiyyika Bhsarvaja, who developed the
discussion on similar lines, were both hailing from Kmr and affili-
ated to aiva circles. As a direct consequence, Jayanta generalizes
the scriptural validity also to other extra-Vedic traditions such as
aiva gamas and Pacartras.
In this connection, a few words on consensus of many/great peo-
ple (mahjanaparigraha) are due (see also 5.4). Jayanta discards the
83 In Matilals words,the hearers knowledge or the cognitive episode arising in the
hearer from the utterance of a sentence is said to grasp the meaning (artha) of the sen-
tence uttered. [] What this episode grasps has a structured content (viayat) which we
can make more intelligible by calling it the structure of a thought. When we say that a par-
ticular hearer a understands the meaning, we mean thereby that a particular hearer a has
a particular structured thought (Matilal 1985: 417).
84 upadiyate iti ko rtha? abhidhnakriy kriyate [] rotragrhyavastukaraik
tadarthaprattir abhidhnakriy, ittha loke vyavahrt. ukto bhihita ca sa evrtho loke vya-
padiyate yas tu tathvidhaprattiviayat pratipanna. (NM 3, vol. 1, p. 218).
85 na tu pratyakeaiva grahaam iti niyama, anumndinicitrthopadeino py ptatv-
napyt (ibidem p. 219).

86 On pramasamplava, see NM 1, vol. 1, pp. 48-52. Against this concept, see 1.1
and 3.2.
87 tatpraetur ptasyevarasya yathrutam eveda lakaam sktkrtadharmeva dhar-
masyevarapratyakagocaratvt, cikhypayiay prayukta iti kruika eva bhagavn iti

vakyate. upade ca veddygamn tatpratatvasya samarthayiyamatvd iti (NM 3,
vol. 1, pp. 219-220).
possibility of including Buddhist scriptures among genuine sacred

texts by appealing to the fact that many/great people do not accept
them. Many/great people are defined as those who live in the coun-
try of the ryas and who abide by the system of four social classes and
four stages of life (cturvarya cturramyam). The validity of aiva
gamas and Vaiava Pacartras is accepted by them because these
scriptures belong to the greater Vedic tradition. Buddhist texts, how-
ever, are out of this sphere and therefore not considered instruments
of knowledge.88
6.2. Reasons for the validity of testimony
6.2.1. Validity: intrinsic or extrinsic?
Before an analysis of the reasons that lead to believe in Gods exis-

tence, Jayanta discusses the Mmsaka concept of intrinsic valida-
tion/extrinsic invalidation. In reference to NS 1.1.8, he begins with a
fundamental distinction of two main classes of knowledge, according
to the kind of object (perceivable/unperceivable) involved, confining
the issue of intrinsic/extrinsic validation to religious knowledge alone:
Regarding instruments of knowledge such as direct perception, which
have perceivable objects, normal activities are carried on without ascer-
taining the validity of knowledge. [] But in relation to unperceiveable
objects, without the ascertainment of the validity of Vedic rituals
whose difficult goals are achieved [only] with the employment of
enormous wealth, etc. it would be improper for a wise person to
undertake them. Thus, the ascertainment of its (of the Veda) validity
must necessarily be done.89
He maintains that validity cannot be intrinsic because it is com-

monly experienced as a development of a previous condition of
doubt.90 Doubt effectively explains the knowing process of everybody,
despite the bad image it sometimes has in the eyes of tradition.91
However, Jayanta clarifies that Naiyyikas are not obsessed with
the concept of doubt. Their position, instead, is that it is not possible
to determinate the validity of knowledge at the time of its production,
and with doubt they mean the state of epoch deriving from that inca-
pacity to validate knowledge.92
88 See NM 4, vol. 1, pp. 379-382. Chemparathy 1983: 59-72 treats the subject at length.
89 pratyakdiu drrtheu prameu prmyanicayam antareaiva vyavahrasid-
dhes [] adre tu viaye vaidikev agaitadraviavitaradikleasdhyeu karmasu tat-
prmyvadhraam antarea prekvat pravarttanam anucitam iti tasya
prmyanicayo vayakarttavya (NM 3, vol. 1, p. 240).
90 Doubt is an important concept already in NS (1.1.1), where it is listed among the
sixteen categories.
91 Such as the doubtful one meets with destruction (saaytm vinayati) in
Bhagavadgt, 4.20, comments Cakradhara (NM 3, vol. 1, p. 243).

92 Ibidem, p. 241-243.
Jayanta explains that we can talk of knowledge in two senses:

operational (vypra) and resulting (phala). The ascertainment of
validity never occurs during the operational stage, but only later,
when the practical efficacy (pravrttismarthya) of the resulting knowl-
edge can be appreciated.93
Kumrilas charge of uselessness and of regressus ad infinitum
(see 5.4) may stand for common knowledge related to perceivable
objects, but Jayanta makes clear that this is not always the case. In
fact validation of knowledge has a role in the yurveda argument
( 2.2, 4.3) even when the context pertains to perceivable objects.
In response to Kumrila, who argued that the authors qualities
cannot secure the validity of Vedas (see 5.3), Jayanta says that the
negative argument of the absence of defects does not suffice, unless we
are ready to accept the validity of every passage of the Vedas, includ-
ing those which appear to be fictional. In such cases also, being the
object unperceivable, their truth or falsity cannot be determined.
Moreover, it is wrong to claim: the Veda must be autonomous
because only in absence of an author there can be absence of defects.
In fact this argument can be reversed to say that
if there were no author, due to the absence of his qualities the validity
of the Veda would also be absent.94
Then, the Mmsakas may ask: Tell us who is the author of the
Veda. Jayanta answers:
The author of the Veda, indeed, is not an ordinary person, but the
supreme lord, skilful in the craft of universal creation.95
Some Mmsakas may accept Gods existence, as this does not

undermine their theory. But what evidences are there that God
authored the Veda? In fact, they say, in the context of words, word-
meaning relations, or Veda itself, the hypothesis of an author is equal-
ly far-fetched. This is how Jayanta sums up the Mmsaka position:
We call word a group of phonemic sounds manifested in sequence
and, if these sounds are indestructible, how is it possible that they were
created by God? And also the [word-meaning] relation is not his pro-
duction; indeed it has its own natural power. And the signifying power
of words is fixed (nitya), just like heat in fire. Furthermore, Vedic com-
positions are not made by a person, because they are altogether differ-
ent from compositions such as poetry.96
93Ibidem, p. 244-45.
94 asati vaktari prmyahetn gunm apy abhvena tatprmyasypy abhvt
(ibidem, p. 267).
95 vedasya purua kart na hi ydratdra. kintu trailokyanirmanipua
paramevara (ibidem, p. 267).

96 varari kramavyakta padam ity abhidhyate
varn cvinitvt katham
varakryat sambandho pi na tatkrya sa hi aktisvabhvaka abde vcakaakti ca
6.2.2. Words are a creation
According to Jayanta, Bhammsakas maintain that perma-

nence (nityat) of phonemes is proven through recognition (pratyab-
hij) and through presumption (arthpatti), because signification
could not be explained otherwise (see 1.1, 3.1, 5.1).
However, the two arguments collapse if we can establish a univer-
sal property for each phoneme. When a speaker says gagana (sky),
how is a difference between the two g-s produced?97 If we say that
there is one single g we end up with a Bhartrhari-type of linguistic
monism, which is not acceptable to Naiyyikas and Mmsakas. If
we say that they are two different g-s we must admit that they have a
same property, and that property is g-ness, the universal of the
phoneme g. In summary, says Jayanta,
this is the real matter: either notions of universal and particular are neg-
lected in all instances, or, just like in the case of the universal cow-ness,
the universal g-ness which is present in all the different [phonemes] g-s
is to be accepted.98
Jayantas conclusion is that phonemes are a product, and if they

are a product we must admit a creator behind them.99 If phonemes
are created, also words and sentences, which are made of phonemes,
cannot be considered eternal. Not only that:
Even if words are maintained to have fixed (nitya) meanings, sentences
are composed of words. Being there consistency with authorship of a
person, why should the Veda be not authored?.100
6.3. Reasons for the validity of Veda: vedic words are a creation
More particularly, to prove that Vedic words have an author the

following inference is formulated by Jayanta:
(a) Vedic compositions have an author, because they are compositions,
like common compositions.101
Kumrila ( 5.4) built a symmetrical argument which proves

exactly the opposite, i.e. that the Veda is permanent, and therefore it
has no author. But Jayanta replies that his inference has an inconclu-
nityaivgnv ivoat racan api vaidikyo nait puruanirmit kavipratakvydira-

canbhyo vilaka (ibidem, p. 287).
97 vaktrekatve tu gagandau kutas tatkrto bheda? (ibidem, p. 306).
98 tad aya vastusakepa, upekyat v sarvatra smnyavieavyavahra, iyat
v gotvdivad gakrabhedavrtti gatvasmnyam (ibidem, p. 310).

99 sati ca krtakabhve tasya kart pura (ibidem, p. 326).
100 padanityatvapake pi vkye tadracantmake. kartrtvasambhavt puso veda katham
akrtrima (NM 4, vol. 1, p. 327).

101 vaidikyo racan kartrprvik, racantvt, laukikaracanvat (ibidem, p. 327).
sive (anaikntika) inferential mark which fails to prove the begin-

ninglessness of the Veda, since we can apply it also to compositions
which Mmsakas do not deem permanent, for instance to the
Mahbhrata:
Every learning of the Mahbhrata implies the learning of the

Mahbhrata by the teacher, because it is called learning of the
Mahbhrata, like todays learning of the Mahbhrata.102
In this connection, Kumrila ( 5.4) retorted that for the

Mahbhrata the situation is altogether different, because the
record of its author is quite settled. On the other hand, there is no
record of an author of the Veda in the Vedic tradition of studies.
The only record occurs in arthavda passages, which cannot be
taken as evidences.
Now, asks Jayanta, is this new argument of the unrecorded
author devised as a positive and autonomous evidence, or as a refu-
tation of (a)? If the latter is the case, the refutation is ineffective, for
a valid inference cannot be refuted by another inference. So, says
Jayanta, the issue is which of the two arguments is less cogent:
But which of the two inferential marks is less consequential (prayoja-

ka),103 the composition or the unrecorded author one? Only the
composition mark is [always] consequential; in fact without a person
nowhere there is evidence of literary compositions.104
But even if we accept compositions in general as artificial, we may

still hold that Vedas have the peculiar character of being naturally
and permanently existing, may say the Mmsakas. Answers
Jayanta:
Respected gentlemen, where is it seen or heard in this world that com-

position of words into sentences is a natural one? If in the Veda the
composition of words had a natural character, then why is it not natu-
ral also [the composition] of threads in a cloth?105
In other words, what is this distinction that makes you think that
Vedas have the peculiar character of not being authored? Mmsakas
may easily answer:
102 anaikntika cya hetur bhrate py evam abhidhtu akyatvt, bhratdhyayana
sarva gurvadhyayanaprvakam, bhratdhyayanavcyatvd, idnntanabhratd-

hyayanavad iti (ibidem, p. 328).
103 For possible meanings of the word prayojaka, see NK, s.v.
104 nanu katarad anayo sdhanayor aprayojaka racantvd asmaryamakartrkatvd
iti ca. ucyate. racantvam eva prayojaka na hi puruam antarea kvacid akaravinyso dra
(NM 4, vol. 1, p. 330).
105 bho bhagavanta sabhy kveda dra kva v ruta loke yad vkyeu padnm
racan naisargik bhavati. yadi svbhvik vede padn racan bhavet. pae hi hanta tan-
tn katha naisargik na s (ibidem, p. 330).
The Vedic composition appears clearly different from compositions such

as Klidsas which have an author. [] Peculiar uses of nouns, verbs,
verbal prefixes; praising formulas, warnings on wrong acts, prescriptions
relating to past events or other people;106 description of items refuted in
relation to other Vedic branches. These and others are not seen in com-
mon compositions. Therefore all scholars believe Veda to have no author
because of its form. Mmsakas have drunk glory in this world. Morons
like you [Naiyyikas] who did not study Vedas, however, talk of produc-
tion, being confused by the resemblance to [ordinary] compositions.107
This may be, answers Jayanta, but it does not affect the Naiyyika
stance; the composition argument still stands:
This is our verdict: no matter what Mmsakas may drink glory, or

milk, or Bram-ghee to improve their dull minds, Vedas are com-
posed by a person and here there is no confusion. Like the status of
mountains, etc., depends on a creator although different from the sta-
tus of a jar, so it is for the composition of the Veda.108
Enough, says Jayanta, with the composition argument. What

about the cogency of the unrecorded author argument? It is incon-
sequential, as it implies a false cause fallacy, because the forgetful-
ness of the author could be just caused by the long time elapsed since
the composition of the Veda (see also 3.4). Moreover, Jayanta shows
his skepticism for the unduly universalization of subjective belief
attempted by the Mmsakas:
How do you know that every person does not remember the author of
the Veda? Indeed you do not have experience of everyones heart, oth-
erwise you would be omniscient.109
And even the validity of the Veda is undermined if no author is

recognized for it. Can there be an instruction without an author? And
even if there can be one, will there be anyone who develops faith in
such abstract teachings?
On the word-meaning relation held high by the Mmsakas,
Jayanta says that the understanding of a meaning from a word is not
106 The translation abides the gloss of Cakradhara, who follows an opponent quoted
in MS, see MS 6.7.26-30.

107 nanu y klidsdiracan kartrprvik tbhyo vilakaaiveya racan bhti
vaidik [] nmkhytopasargdiprayogagatayo nav stutinindpurkalpaparakrtydin-

taya khntaroktaspekavikiptrthopavaranam ity dayo na dryante laukike sanni-
bandhane tendhyetrga sarve rpd vedam akrtrimam manyante eva loke tu pta
mmsakair yaa ved na pahit yais tu tvdrai kuhabuddhibhi kryatva bruvate
te sya racansmyamohit (NM 4, vol. 1, pp. 331f).
108 ucyate. mmsak yaa pibantu payo va pibantu buddhijypanayanya
brmghrta v pibantu vedas tu puruaprata eva ntra bhrnti. yath ghadisasthnd

bhinnam apy acaldiu sasthna kartrmat siddha vede pi racan tath (ibidem, p. 332).
109 sarve pumsa karttra vedasya na smarantti katha jnti bhavn? na hi tava
sakalalokahrdayni pratyaki, sarvajatvaprasagt (ibidem, p. 333).

justifiable without a conventional relation established by a person.

What is convention?
Convention is the prescribed restriction of signifier and signified.110
A fixed word-meaning relation is not admissible, because with

sense perception and the other instruments of knowledge we cannot
cognize it.
But when is this convention made? At every utterance? By every
person? Or once for all by God? Jayantas position is that it is made
once at the beginning of creation by God. Therefore a whimsical use
of words is not admissible. Jayanta leaves room, however, for neolo-
gisms which are created by modern convention, and he calls such
usages optional, extemporary (yadrcch).
Finally, the Mmsakas wittily object ( 3.4) that whoever estab-
lished the convention also needed words for that purpose. Who estab-
lished the convention of those words? This leads to an infinite regress.
Answers Jayanta:
You have the weapon but you did not hit the target. This fault applies to
us but not to God. Who can fathom his skill, if with his might he creates
at will such a universe, a place of multifarious actions and results?.111
In conclusion, the Veda is a valid instrument of knowledge

because it is spoken by a reliable source and not because it is begin-
ningless. Reliability of the author,112 says Jayanta, is the inferential
reason behind the statement of validity of any piece of verbal knowl-
edge, and religious matters are not excluded. There is an invariable
relation of concomitance between reliability of the author and valid-
ity of a sacred text.
Conclusion
In the Introduction three possible meanings of the word tradition

were mentioned: cultural horizon, succession of thinkers, word-con-
veyed knowledge. Let us briefly review the issues examined in this
paper in the perspective of this paradigm.
Tradition as cultural horizon. Nyya and Mms become aware of
the Vedic cultural horizon and explicitly problematize it in their sys-
110 abhidhnbhidheyaniyamaniyoga samaya ucyate (ibidem, p. 339).

111 astram yumat jta viayas tu na lakita asmaddiu doo yam vare tu na yujy-
ate nnkarmaphalasthnam icchayaivedra jagat srau prabhavatas tasya kauala ko

vikalpayet (ibidem, p. 345).
112 According to George Chemparathy, author of the only book on vedaprmya in
Nyya, Jayanta stresses the importance of the agreement among mahjana (many/impor-
tant people) to prove the validity of the Veda (Chemparathy 1983: 58-72). However, this
argument has little space in NM and is only used in his skirmishes with Buddhists. On the
other hand, Kumrila defeats it in TV ad 1.3.4., v. 269 (see 5.4).
tems firstly as an epistemic tool. This does not mean that social or reli-
gious reasons have no role in the defense of the Veda, but these influ-
ences are not expressed, at least not in the period examined herewith.
Both traditions agree that knowledge of dharma (moral authority)
exceeds the precincts of human knowledge. But Mmsakas (see also
MS 1.3.4-9) maintain that the Veda is the source of knowledge of dhar-
ma. Naiyyikas, instead, believe that the root-source of information
about dharma and Veda is an extra-ordinary human being (such as
divine seers, or God himself).
Nyyas and Mmss horizons of acceptance of the Veda, how-
ever, does not exactly coincide. As Wilhelm Halbfass113 said, unlike
Mms, which has in the Veda its very raison dtre, Nyya faced the
problem of its justification as an already well-developed system.
Moreover, for Mmsakas only Vedic prescriptions, i.e. the bulk
of the Brhmaas, are genuine means of knowledge. On the contrary,
Naiyyikas refer to Vedic passages celebrating Prajpati, i.e. parts of
the Sahits which would be regarded by Mmsakas as arthavdas,
as internal evidence for the existence of an author of the Veda.
Noticeably, it is only with Jayanta that this difference becomes evi-
dent (see Daya Krishna 2001: 74-79).
Tradition as succession of thinkers. These different motives deter-
mined a separate development of the two schools in the matter of jus-
tification of Vedas validity. Nyya tries to demonstrate that language
and Veda must have a beginning and therefore an author. Mms
argues that without and until contrary evidence one must adhere to
the present state of things: the Veda is universally recognized as valid;
no Vedas author is recorded; a beginning in the use of language and
in the transmission of Veda just contradicts the very premises of our
understanding of the world.
The mutual comprehension of the two schools is sometimes
threatened by different assumptions and linguistic ambiguities, such
as the use of the same technical terms (abda, veda, artha, prmya,
etc.) in a different acceptation. For instance, a major difficulty
derives from the interpretation of the nityatva of Veda and language,
explicitly criticized by Uddyotakara as referring to a temporal eterni-
113 The Nyya does not try to compete with the Mms in the technical field of
Vedic exegesis [] [Naiyyikas] teachings which are not inherently affiliated with the
Vedic or Vedicizing traditions, and are at least potentially neutral, serve an increasing-
ly apologetic function. In the history of Mms, the development seems to have been
the reverse. A genuinely and originally exegetic and text-oriented tradition opens itself
increasingly to epistemology and logic, and to inherently neutral and universal methods
of thought and argumentation (Halbfass 1992: 31). And: Der Nyya behauptet seine
eigene Relevanz fr die Verteidigung des Veda, indem er sich eine von der Mms nicht
voll wahrgenommene Funktion zuweist [] Er tritt sozusagen von aussen an den Veda
heran, stellt die von ihm entwickelten, ursprnglich aus anderen Quellen stammenden
und auch fr andere Zwecke eingestzten Mittel des Denkens und Argumentierens in den
Dienst der Verteidigung des Veda. Er bernimmt die Aufgabe, die bermenschliche
Offenbarung des Veda mit den Mitteln menschlicher, nicht ihrerseits aus der
Offenbarung stammender Einsicht zu klren und zu sichern (Halbfass 1991: 130).
ty. But for Mmsakas nitya means primarily fixed, permanent

(and not eternal), and it firstly qualifies the relation between word
and meaning, rather than words as such.114
Tradition as word-conveyed knowledge. As a consequence of their
inner link with Veda, Mmsakas never shift their focus from Vedic
to common language. So human testimony, if it is at all considered to
be an instrument of knowledge,115 does not play a role in the discus-
sion on Vedas validity. Naiyyikas, on the other hand, are primarily
interested in justifying human testimony, and as far as Vedic state-
ments are concerned they just apply to them the same criteria.116
Similarly, Mms discusses language as a general theme departing
from the crucial specimen of Vedic language, while Nyya discusses
Veda as an instance of ordinary language. From this different
approach many misunderstandings originate, such as the one about
the role of a speaker/author.117
Another meaningful difference is that Mmsakas perspective
is on the side of the hearer, and hence they do not really care for the
origin or production of words. Conversely, Naiyyikas, at least until
Jayanta, mainly deal with the production of words, both as a linguis-
tic and as an epistemic instrument.
114 Jaiminis system requires not a demonstration of the eternity of the word, but
simply the certainty that the word-meaning relationship exists prior to the action of any
speaker (Clooney 1990: 78).
115 Prabhkara, for instance, considers it as a kind of inference.
116 Quite appropriately, I think, Jonardon Ganeri compares the Naiyyika discussion
on abdaprama to Humes one on miracles and states: The Nyya quite sensibly restrict
the domain of testimony to natural extensions of our already existing beliefs. They are
interested in the role of testimony in everyday life, not in the special epistemological prob-
lems posed by religious witnesses (Ganeri 1999: 80).
117 As synthesized by Arindam Chakrabarti: There are two ways in which [] the
essentiality of commitment to the tradition as a necessary condition for rationality can be

brought about. The first way can be called the Nyya-Dummett way and the second the
Mms-Gadamer way. By emphasizing the irreducible role of knowledge from words
(abda prama) in the acquisition and use of language, Nyya epistemology exposes a fun-
damental error of Lockean individualistic epistemology. [] [T]he other way, adopted by
Kumrila Bhaa [] turns on an underlying distrust of individual speakers and treats a
speaker-less body of received tradition to be the only possible source of moral knowledge
(Chakrabarti 1997: 266-267).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbreviations and Sources
F All quotations preceded by F refer to page and line in

Frauwallner 1968.
MS Jaimini, Mmsstra, in Frauwallner 1968.
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NM Jayanta Bhaa, Nyyamajar with the comentary of Granthib-
haga by Cakradhara, edited by Gaurinath Sastri, ivaku-
mrastri-granthaml, Varanasi 1982.
NS Gautama, Nyyastra, in Nyyadaranam, edited by Tara-
natha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Munshiram Manoharlal, Calcutta
1985 [first ed. 1936-1944].
NV Uddyotakara, Nyyavrttika, see NS.
NVT Vcaspati, Nyyavrttikattparyak, see NS.
NK Nyyakoa, edited by Bhmcrya Jhalakkar, Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute, Pune 1996.
NR Prthasrathimira, Nyyaratnkara, see V.
Bh abara, barabhya, I.1.1-5 in Frauwallner 1968. I.1.6-32 in
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K Sucaritamira, Kik, edited by K. Smbaiva str, Tri-
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TV Kumrila Bhaa, Tantravrttika, in Mmsdaranam,
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ELISA FRESCHI, ALESSANDRO GRAHELI

Bhamms and Nyya on Veda and Tradition*

This paper deals with the development of two philosophical tradi-

In the following pages the different acceptations of the word

Although Jaiminis time and role in the Mms school are

ever, it mentions former authors and views. This suggests an early

1.1. The word-meaning relation is not human-made

The MS opens with a declaration of its goal: the examination of

But the relation of word and meaning4 is originary (autpattika).5 Its

Noticeably, word is here treated as a given datum. Its possible

Bilimoria 1994: 190ff.

nupalabdhe tat pramam bdaryaasynapekatvt (MS 1.1.5).

Epistemological independence is needed because an instrument of

In Jaiminis view, if words were ephemeral, how could we recog-

1.2. Veda is an instrument of knowledge only in relation to dharma

Although most Mmsaka justifications of (Vedic) word as an

1.3. Only prescriptions are means of knowledge

MS 1.2 deals with the epistemic status of non prescriptive passages

Clooney 1990: 77ff.

1.4. Transmission as beginningless succession

In answer to the criticism against mantras and arthavdas, Jaimini

And it is equally transmitted in a tradition.14

This argument displays the typical Mmsaka commitment to

The date and historicity of Gautama, or Akapda, are by no

2.1. abda as testimony.

In NS 1.1.3 the four instruments of knowledge admitted by Nai-

Testimony is the statement (upadea) of a reliable speaker. / It is of two

The principle of the speakers reliability concerns human word

2.2. Reasons for the validity of testimony

NS 2.1.49-67 examines the definition given in NS 1.1.7, quoted

This last sentence, if taken in context, is to be ascribed to a

bandhc ca. ptopadeasmarthc chabdd arthasampratyaya. praapradhapannupal-

And because, being [any word-meaning relation valid for] specific

The next argument is of particular interest because, according

It (Veda) is not an instrument of knowledge because of the defects of

NS 2.1.58-68 replies to this objection by an array of Mmsaka

The question of impermanence of sound (abda, as a broader

Because it has a beginning, because it is sensible matter, because it is

These justifications of the definition of abda (NS 1.1.7) were here

3. abara and the Vttikra

abara is the author of the first extant commentary on MS, the

18 na smayikatvc chabdrthasampratyayasya. jtiviee cniyamt (NS 2.1.55-56).

to distinguish abaras views from the Vrttikras. But since abara

3.1. The word-meaning relation is not human-made

abara glosses originary (autpattika, see 1.1) with nitya. This

The relation is the non-separate existence of word and meaning. The

This means that it is impossible to conceive a separate existence

1.1). abara elaborates further: we recognize (pratyabhij) words

The Vrttikra believes that Jaiminis intention is to dispel the view

[O.] There is no relation whatsoever between word and meaning [].

3.2. Veda is an instrument of knowledge only in relation to dharma

Vedic words convey knowledge of dharma, i.e. knowledge related to

24 aakrtvo goabda uccarita iti vadanti, nau goabd iti. [] pratyabhijnn

vayam ivnye pi nnya iti vaktum arhanti (Bh ad 1.1.20).

kaabdoccrae mukhasya panaprae sytm, yadi salealakaa sambandham

es an important feature of Vedic knowledge: it must refer to something

Thus, Mmsakas deny the need and even the possibility of

[O.] [Here] an inference based on similarity is possible. Human utter-

Rejecting the similarity of human utterance and Vedic word,

27 atha yad uktam animitta abda; karmakle phaldarant klntare ca karmbhvt

vacanasmnyd vedavacana mithyeti anumyate. na, anyatvt. na hy anyasya vitathab-

function of directly showing its referents, just like perception does in

For Vedic statements, the cognition is a direct one.30