Plato's 'Ideal' State

Author(s): R. S. Bluck
Source: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Nov., 1959), pp. 166-168
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637646
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 PLATO'S 'IDEAL' STATE

IN C.Q. N.S. vii (I957), 164 ff. Professor Demos raise

sense, if at all, the state which Plato describes in the Rep
ideal, if the warrior-class and the masses are 'deprived
imperfect. The ideal state, he thinks, appears at first s
un-ideal individuals. But 'the problem is resolved by
from the political-technical areas of control. In so far as
in the ideal city will indeed represent one part of the so
As persons, however, they remain whole and self-order
possess reason and be in full control of themselves, even
a body politic they have a role which may be equated wit
alone. Professor Demos finds that each of the three part
two phases, one specialized and one generalized, so that
sopher-kings have the special ability to plan for the
have the 'generalized' reason that will enable them to g
'the lack of intelligence in the warrior and the worker i
technical pursuit of governing' (p. 171, n. 2). Similarly
'generalized' courage (or moral strength), and the 'ne
individual is limited only with respect to his civic func
It would seem that this explanation is useful so far
does not go far enough. It shows how the members of
a balanced soul, though Professor Demos is probably dr
tinction between the private and the political life; as
(p. 173, n. i), Plato in a number of passages, instead of
civic functions, includes matters of private life within th
case a balanced soul will hardly be enough to make a
clear that for the highest virtue direct apprehension of
and only philosophers can achieve that. The fact is,
pointed out long ago,' that the Rulers whom Plato ha
not just the KaAo' KacyaOo of Book 2, men with a harmon
ness and spiritedness, but metaphysicians with a high d
tic; and the conception of goodness has changed accordi
is not simply a matter of having each 'part' of the s
propriate function, but the result of apprehension o
faculty required to apprehend truth simply a AoyuOTuKd
then, that Plato begins by describing ordinary goodnes
and then passes on to something higher-the philosophic
the philosopher-king for the state; and this will explain
justice in Book 4 does not put an end to the discussion.2
'The Modification of Plan in Plato's exactly to it? The answer is No: we should
Republic', in C.Q. vii (1913), 265 ff.: thinkannone
im-the worse of a painter who
portant article which has not, I think, painted an ideally beautiful figure but
received much attention. could not show that a person as beautiful as
that could exist. Here, of course, we are
2 In Book 5 Socrates still speaks as though
concerned with an ideal of perfection-the
the nature of justice has not yet been found.
Suppose, he says, we do find out what ideal of the philosopher who has knowledge,
justice is, are we to demand that every just which may be acquired after the lengthy
person must have a share which corresponds education described in Book 7.

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 PLATO'S 'IDEAL' STATE 167

class and the artisans do not possess the high

perfect individuals, whether they have a bala
It is sometimes doubted' whether the Ruler
on the ground that restraints appear to be im
is in fact no unbalance, but rather a canalizin
single stream. 'When a man's desires are firm
that his desire for everything else is corr
stream has been diverted into another cou
desire is set towards knowledge and all that so
only with the pleasure that the soul enjoy
pleasures of the body' (485 d-e). This is not s
tion. But we need not, in any case, ask how suc
for example, described in the early part of th
inferior to the aw?pouvv4j which arises from
distinguishes the ideal man.
If the warrior-class and the artisans are wit
Good, which is as important for personal vir
state, they will not be ideal men. Is the state
fect'? The answer must be No. Professor Dem
it at 529 b (cf. 500 e) as a pattern laid up in h
'ideal', but also, apparently, a Form ; but t
expression so far. Again, because Plato tells u
(A'yoLS) may not be realizable in fact (473 a;
the Republic is 'written in words', Demos con
the ideal state (p. I66). He quotes from 529
that has been described can be found nowhere on earth.4 But there is still no
need to suppose that Plato is dealing with what he regards as perfect, at any
rate; and there is therefore no inconsistency. Demos finds it an objection to this
sort of view that it makes Plato 'guilty' of thinking in terms both of the actual
world and of the world of Forms at the same time, and he suggests that Plato,
if talking within the framework of 'the' heavenly patterns, could have found
ideal citizens no less than ideal rulers (p. 166). Perhaps he could have; but this
only goes to show that Plato was concerned with the best constitution that
could possibly come into being; to hope that all men would become philoso-
phers would be absurd; but he might well treat as a 'model' constitution-
ideal in the sense that it is not known to exist at present except in Ao'yot, though not in the
sense of being perfect-a state in which there were some philosophers, with power
to mould the community as a whole.5 Indeed, that Plato is not thinking of all
I e.g. by M. B. Foster, The Political 3 'Plato populates his heaven with the
Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, quoted by forms of just individuals no less than with
Demos (p. 164). Demos himself has doubts that of the just state' (p. 164).
(p. I68), supposing that the Rulers' duty to 4 Demos (p. I66, n. i) says that Plato
the state will come into conflict with private'vacillates' on the question whether his
desire. 'ideal' state is capable of realization, be-
cause while at 502 c he says that it is difficult
2 'Crwapoarvvr can find no place in the
souls of the rulers' (Foster, op. cit., p. 99).
of realization, but not impossible, he says at
But the subordination of appetite to reason 529 a-b that it can be found nowhere on
and the fulfilment of the proper function of
earth. But he does not say that it never could
appetite may both be regarded as achieved
be-and I therefore find no vacillation.
par excellence when appetite has as its object s To borrow wording from Demos (p.
the same end as reason. In any case there is165), such a state might be called ideal
no unbalance. under the circumstances-not, so to say,

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 168 R. S. BLUCK

his citizens as perfect is cl

argues in Book 3 that hi
realized 'how much better it is so to order one's life as never to stand in need of
a drowsy judge', yet he allows that there should be judges in his common-
wealth, and, moreover, judges who know what wickedness is. He says that it is
useful for a doctor to know about diseases from personal experience of them,
but that for obvious reasons a judge's knowledge of wickedness is best derived
by other means-by, he says, observing over a long period its evil effects in the
souls of others. So Plato's state is not a perfect state; there will be at least some
wickedness in it. Socrates adds, indeed, that the judges are intended for those
whose souls are constitutionally sound, since those who are incurably corrupt
will be put to death; but it is clear that even the former class are not expected
to be morally perfect as the Rulers are. They may be tolerably just, having
their reasoning faculty in the ascendant, and manifest virtue of a kind; but this
virtue will only be what Plato elsewhere describes as political or civic virtue,
based on habit and opinion and subject to corruption through persuasion.
As Demos remarks (p. 168), a just city is a product of the justice of its
members. Citizens with harmonious souls will no doubt create a harmonious
city, and Demos maintains that citizens with harmonious souls are not in-
compatible with Plato's 'just' city based on division of functions. The picture
that Plato provides of this city reveals that the counterpart in the individual of
the 'justice' of this city must be a kind of balance or harmony of parts. But it
also reveals that there is a higher kind of virtue, known in Plato's common-
wealth to the Rulers alone;' in the perfect state it would presumably be known to
all citizens; and Plato has succeeded in showing, at least by implication, that
the perfect individual, he who is to have the highest kind ofjustice, must have
achieved apprehension of the Form. For this reason we cannot be meant to
regard Plato's commonwealth as a perfect state, and it seems that Cornford's
view (which Demos discusses but rejects), that Plato's state is ideal, if at all, in
the sense that it is the best possible (attainable), not the best conceivable, con-
tinues to deserve acceptance.
University of Manchester R. S. BLUCK

I regard
ideally ideal. I cannot see that Plato's
it is 'im- Rulers as akin to the
proper' for Plato to call it aHigh
pattern laid
Priests of up
a theocracy (Phil.Q. [9551],
in heaven. 69 f.).

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