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77439

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.77439August24,1989

DONALDDEEpetitioner,
vs.
COURTOFAPPEALSandAMELITOMUTUC,respondents.

Tanjuatco,Oreta&Tanjuatcoforpetitioner.

AmelitoR.Mutucforandinhisownbehalf

REGALADO,J.:

Petitionerassailstheresolutionofrespondentcourt,datedFebruary12,1987,reinstatingitsdecisionpromulgated
onMay9,1986inACG.R.CVNo.04242whereinitaffirmedthedecisionofthethatcourtholdingthattheservices
renderedbyprivaterespondentwasonaprofessional,andnotonagratisetamorebasisandorderingpetitionerto
payprivaterespondentthesumofP50,000.00asthebalanceofthelatter'slegalfeetherefor.

The records show that sometime in January, 1981, petitioner and his father went to the residence of private
respondent, accompanied by the latter's cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged
indebtednessofpetitioner'sbrother,DeweyDee,toCaesar'sPalace,awellknowngamblingcasinoatLasVegas,
Nevada, U.S.A. Petitioner's father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey, having heard of a link
betweenthemafiaandCaesar'sPalaceandthepossibilitythathissonmaybeharmedattheinstanceofthelatter.
1

Privaterespondentassuredpetitionerandhisfatherthathewouldinquireintothematter,afterwhichhisservices
were reportedly contracted for P100,000. 00. From his residence, private respondent called up Caesar's Palace
and,thereafter,severallongdistancetelephonecallsandtwotripstoLasVegasbyhimelicitedtheinformationthat
Dewey Dee's outstanding account was around $1,000,000.00. Further investigations, however, revealed that said
accounthadactuallybeenincurredbyRamonSy,withDeweyDeemerelysigningforthechits.Privaterespondent
communicated said information to petitioner's a father and also assured him that Caesar's Palace was not in any
waylinkedtothemafia.2

InJune,1981,privaterespondentpersonallytalkedwiththepresidentofCaesar'sPalaceatLasVegas,Nevada.He
advisedthepresidentthatforthesakeandintheinterestofthecasinoitwouldbebettertomakeRamonSyanswer
for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation,
Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private respondent's return to Manila, he
conferredwithRamonSyandthelatterwasconvincedtoacknowledgetheindebtedness.InAugust,1981,private
respondent brought to Caesar's Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a discount.
Thereafter,theaccountofDeweyDeewasclearedandthecasinoneverbotheredhim.3

Havingthussettledtheaccountofpetitioner'sbrother,privaterespondentsentseveraldemandletterstopetitioner
demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters. On October 4,
1982,privaterespondentfiledacomplaintagainstpetitionerintheRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,BranchCXXXVI,
forthecollectionofattorney'sfeesandrefundoftransportfareandotherexpenses.4

Private respondent claimed that petitioner formally engaged his services for a fee of P100,000.00 and that the
servicesherenderedwereprofessionalserviceswhichalawyerrenderstoaclient.Petitioner,however,deniedthe
existenceofanyprofessionalrelationshipofattorneyandclientbetweenhimandprivaterespondent.Headmitsthat
heandhisfathervisitedprivaterespondentforadviceonthematterofDeweyDee'sgamblingaccount.However,he
insiststhatsuchvisitwasmerelyaninformaloneandthatprivaterespondenthadnotbeenspecificallycontractedto
handle the problem. On the contrary, respondent Mutuc had allegedly volunteered his services "as a friend of
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defendant'sfamily"toseewhathecoulddoaboutthesituation.AsfortheP50,000.00inceptivelygiventoprivate
respondent,petitionerclaimsthatitwasnotinthenatureofattomey'sfeesbutmerely"pocketmoney"solicitedby
theformerforhistripstoLasVegasandthesaidamountofP50,000.00wasalreadysufficientremunerationforhis
strictlyvoluntaryservices.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of
P50,000.00withinterestthereonatthelegalratefromthefilingofthecomplaintonOctober4,1982andtopaythe
costs.Allotherclaimsthereinofprivaterespondentandthecounterclaimofpetitionerweredismissed. 5Onappeal,
saidjudgmentwasaffirmedbythethenIntermediateAppellateCourtonMay9,1986.6

Petitioner, in due time, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Appellate Court overlooked two
important and decisive factors, to wit: (1) At the time private respondent was ostensibly rendering services to
petitioner and his father, he was actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of Caesar's Palace of
whichhewasanagentandaconsultant,hencetheinterestsofthecasinoandprivaterespondentwereunitedin
theirobjectivetocollectfromthedebtorand(2)Privaterespondentisnotjustifiedinclaimingthatherenderedlegal
servicestopetitionerandhisfatherinviewoftheconflictinginterestsinvolved.

InitsresolutionofJuly31,1986,respondentcourtreconsidereditsdecisionandheldthatthesumofP50,000.00
alreadypaidbypetitionertoprivaterespondentwascommensuratetotheservicesherendered,consideringthatat
thetimehewasactingascounselforpetitionerhewasalsoactingasthecollectingagentandconsultantof,and
receivingcompensationfrom,Caesar'sPalace.7However,uponamotionforreconsiderationthereafterfiledbyprivate
respondent, the present respondent Court of Appeals issued another resolution, dated February 12, 1987, reinstating the
aforesaiddecisionofMay9,1986.8

Petitionerisnowbeforeusseekingawritofcertioraritooverturnthelatterresolution.

It is necessary, however, to first clear the air of the questions arising from the change of stand of the First Civil
Cases Division of the former Intermediate Appellate Court when, acting on the representations in petitioner's
undated motion for reconsideration supposedly filed on May 28,1986, it promulgated its July 31, 1986 resolution
reconsidering the decision it had rendered in ACG.R. CV No. 04242. Said resolution was, as earlier noted, set
asidebytheTwelfthDivisionofthereorganizedCourtofAppealswhich,atthesametime,reinstatedtheaforesaid
decision.

Becauseofitsclarificatoryrelevancetosomeissuesbelatedlyraisedbypetitioner,whichissuesshouldhavebeen
disregarded9butwereneverthelessauspiciouslydiscussedtherein,attheriskofseemingprolixitywequotehereunderthe
salientportionsoftheassailedresolutionwhichdemonstratethatitwasnotconceivedinerror.

The reason for then IAC's action is that it deemed the P50,000.00 plaintiffappellee had previously
received from defendantappellant as adequate compensation for the services rendered by am for
defendantappellant,consideringthatatthetimeplaintiffappelleewasactingascounselfordefendant
appellant, he was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving compensation
fromCaesar'sPalaceinLasVegas,Nevada,theentitywithwhomdefendantappellantwashavinga
problem and for which he had engaged the services of plaintiffappellee. The crux of the matter,
therefore,iswhetherornottheevidenceonrecordjustifiesthisfindingoftheIAC.

Plaintiffappellee maintains that his professional services to defendantappellant were rendered

between the months of July and September of 1981, while his employment as collection agent and
consultantofCaesar'sPalacecoveredtheperiodfromDecember1981toOctober1982.Thispositive
testimonyofplaintiffappellee,however,wasdisregardedbytheIACforthefollowingreasons:

1. In August l983, plaintiffappellee testified that he was a representative of Caesar's Palace in the
Philippines'abouttwoorthreeyearsago.'FromthistheIACconcludedthattheperiodcoversthetime
plaintiffappelleerenderedprofessionalservicestodefendantappellant.

We do not think that IAC's conclusion is necessarily correct. When plaintiffappellee gave the period
'about two or three years ago,' he was merely stating an approximation. Considering that plaintiff
appelleewastestifyinginAugust1983,andhisemploymentwithCaesar'sPalacebeganinDecember
1981,thestateddifferenceoftwoyearsisrelativelycorrect....

2. The plaintiff appellee had testified that he was working for the sake,' 'in the interest,' and 'to the
advantage' of Caesar's Palace. x x x "We detect nothing from the above which would support IAC's
conclusionthatplaintiffappelleewasthenintheemployofCaesar'sPalace.Whatisgatheredisthat
plaintiffappellee was simply fulfilling a condition which plaintiffappellee had proposed to, and was
acceptedby,Caesar'sPalace,forthereleaseofDeweyDeefromhisobligationtoCaesar'sPalace.

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3. Caesar's Palace would not have listened to, and acted upon, the advice of plaintiffappellee if he
werenolongeritsconsultantandalterego.

Why not? We are witnesses to many successful negotiations between contending parties whose
representing lawyers were not and were never in the employ of the opposite party. The art of
negotiationispreciselyoneoftheessentialtoolsofagoodpractitioner,andmasteryofthearttakes
intoaccountthecircumstancethatonemaybenegotiating,amongothers,withapersonwhomaynot
onlybeacompletestrangerbutantagonisticaswell.Thefactthatplaintiffappelleewasabletosecure
a favorable concession from Caesar's Palace for defendantappellant does not justify the conclusion
that it could have been secured only because of plaintiffappellee's professional relationship with
Caesar's Palace. It could have been attributable more to plaintiffappellee's stature as a former
ambassadorofthePhilippinestotheUnitedStates,hispersonality,andhisnegotiatingtechnique.

Assuming, however, that plaintiffappellee was employed by Caesar's Palace during the time that he
was rendering professional services for defendantappellant, this would not automatically mean the
denialofadditionalattorney'sfeestoplaintiffappellee.ThemainreasonwhytheIACdeniedplaintiff
appellee additional compensation was because the latter was allegedly receiving compensation from
Caesar's Palace, and, therefore, the amount of P50,000.00 plaintiffappellee had previously received
from defendantappellant is 'reasonable and commensurate. This conclusion, however, can only be
justifiedifthefactandamountofremunerationhadbeenestablished.Thesewerenotprovenatall.No
proofwaspresentedastothenatureofplaintiffappellee'sremuneration,andthemodeormannerin
whichitwaspaid....10

Both the lower court and the appellate court concur in their findings that there was a lawyerclient relationship
betweenpetitionerandprivaterespondentMutuc.Wefindnoreasontointerferewiththisfactualfinding.Theremay
beinstanceswhenthereisdoubtastowhetheranattorneyclientrelationshiphasbeencreated.Theissuemaybe
raised in the trial court, but once the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found that there was such a
relationshiptheSupremeCourtcannotdisturbsuchfindingoffact,11absentcogentreasonstherefor.

The puerile claim is advanced that there was no attorneyclient relationship between petitioner and private
respondentforlackofawrittencontracttothateffect.Theabsenceofawrittencontractwillnotprecludethefinding
that there was a professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered.
Documentaryformalismisnotanessentialelementintheemploymentofanattorneythecontractmaybeexpress
or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
receivedinanymatterpertinenttohisprofession.Anacceptanceoftherelationisimpliedonthepartoftheattorney
fromhisactingonbehalfofhisclientinpursuanceofarequestfromthelatter.12

Thereisnoquestionthatprofessionalserviceswereactuallyrenderedbyprivaterespondenttopetitionerandhis
family.Throughhisefforts,theaccountofpetitioner'sbrother,DeweyDee,withCaesar'sPalacewasassumedby
RamonSyandpetitionerandhisfamilywerefurtherfreedfromtheapprehensionthatDeweymightbeharmedor
even killed by the socalled mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a
reasonable compensation and this right cannot be concluded by petitioner's pretension that at the time private
respondent rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant of
Caesar'sPalace.

On the first aspect, the evidence of record shows that the services of respondent Mutuc were engaged by the
petitioner for the purposes hereinbefore discussed. The previous partial payments totalling P50,000.00 made by
petitionertorespondentMutucandthetenorofthedemandletterssentbysaidprivaterespondenttopetitioner,the
receiptthereofbeingacknowledgedbypetitioner,ineluctablyprovethreefacts,viz:thatpetitionerhiredtheservices
ofprivaterespondentMutucthattherewasaprioragreementastotheamountofattorney'sfeestobegiventothe
latterandtherewasstillabalancedueandpayableonsaidfees.Theduplicateoriginalcopyoftheinitialreceipt
issuedandsignedinthisconnectionbyprivaterespondentreads:

RECEIVEDfromMr.DonaldDee,forprofessionalservicesrendered,thesumofTHIRTYTHOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) as partial payment, leaving a balance of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P70,000.00),payableondemand.

Makati,MetroManila,July25,1981.13

Thereafter,severaldemandlettersforpaymentofhisfees,datedAugust6,1981,December2,1981,January29,
1982,March7,1982,andSeptember7,1982weresentbyprivaterespondenttopetitioner,14alltonoavail.

Onthesecondobjection,asidefromthefactsstatedintheaforequotedresolutionofrespondentCourtofAppeals,it
isalsonotcompletelyaccuratetojudgeprivaterespondent'spositionbypetitioner'sassumptionthattheinterestsof
Caesar's Palace were adverse to those of Dewey Dee. True, the casino was a creditor but that fact was not
contestedoropposedbyDeweyDee,sincethelatter,asverificationsrevealed,wasnotthedebtor.Hence,private
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respondent's representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the casino's claim but were actually
gearedtowardprovingthatfactbyestablishingtheliabilityofthetruedebtor,RamonSy,fromwhompaymentwas
ultimatelyandcorrectlyexacted.15

Evenassumingthattheimputedconflictofinterestsobtained,privaterespondent'srolethereinwasnotethicallyor
legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions.
However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting
interestswiththeconsentoftheparties.16Acommonrepresentationmayworktotheadvantageofsaidpartiessincea
mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may well be better
situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the
cooperationandconfidenceofsaidparties.

Here,evenindulgingpetitionerinhistheorythatprivaterespondentwasduringtheperiodinquestionanagentof
Caesar'sPalace,petitionerwasnotunawarethereof,henceheactuallyconsentedtoandcannotnowdecrythedual
representationthathepostulates.Thisknowledgeheadmits,thus:

It is a fair question to ask why, of all the lawyers in the land, it was the private respondent who was
singledoutbythepetitioner'sfatherforconsultationinregardtoanapparentproblem,thenpendingin
Caesar'sPalace.ThetestimonyofArthurAlejandrino,cousintoprivaterespondent,andtheadmission
oftheprivaterespondenthimselfsupplytheanswer.Alejandrinotestifiedthatprivate respondent was
the representative of Caesar's Palace in the Philippines (p. 23, t.s.n., Nov. 29, 1983). Private lwph1.t

respondent testified that he was such representative tasked by the casino to collect the gambling
lossesincurredbyFilipinosinLasVegas.(p.5,t.s.n.,Sept.21,1983).17

Alawyerisentitledtohaveandreceivethejustandreasonablecompensationforservicesrenderedatthespecial
instanceandrequestofhisclientandaslongasheishonestlyandingoodfaithtryingtoserveandrepresentthe
interestsofhisclient,thelatterisboundtopayhisjustfees.18

WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 12,1987, reinstating its original
decisionofMay9,1986isherebyAFFIRMED,withcostsagainstlpetitioner.

SOORDERED.

MelencioHerrera,(Chairperson),Paras,PadillaandSarmiento,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1Petition,4Rollo,9.

2Rollo,910,2122.

3Rollo,10.

4CivilCaseNo.1736(47992):OriginalRecord,14.

5JudgeRicardoJ.Francisco,presiding:OriginalRecord,127132.

6PennedbyPresidingJusticeRamonG.Gaviola,Jr.,JusticesMa.RosarioQuetulioLosaandLeonor
InesLucianoconcurringFirstCivilCasesDivision.

7Penned,likewise,byPresidingJusticeGaviola,Jr.,withtheconcurrenceofJusticesQuetulioLosa
andLucianoofthesameDivision.

8JusticeLuisA.Javellana,ponente,withwhomconcurredJusticesPedroA.RamirezandCecilioL.
PeTwelfthDivision.

9Sec.18,Rule46andSec.7,Rule51,RulesofCourtDelaSantavs.CourtofAppeals,etal.,140
SCRA44(1985)Dihiansanetal.vs.CourtofAppeals,etal..153SCRA712(1987).

10Rollo,5255.

11Vda.deReyesvs.CourtofAppealsetal.,116SCRA607(1982).

12SeeC.J.S.,848849,andHirachBros.&Co.vs.R.E.KenningtonCo.,88A.L.R1,ascitedinHilado
vs.GutierrezDavid,etal.,84Phil.569(1949).

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13ExhibitS,FolderofExhibits.Whileobjectedtoasselfserving(OriginalRecord,102),the
authenticityanddueexecutionofthisdocumentwasnotdefinitivelydeniedbypetitionerinhis
testimony(TSN,Nov.21,1983,2021).

14ExhibitsB,D,E,F,andG,Ibid.

15Canon6oftheCanonsofProfessionalEthics,theninforce,provides"Withinthemeaningofthis
canonalawyerrepresentsconflictinginterestswhen,inbehalfofoneclient,itishisdutytocontendfor
thatwhichdutytoanotherclientrequireshimtooppose."

16Canon6,Id.

17MemorandumofPetitioner,5Rollo,88.

18DeGuzmanvs.VisayanRapidTransitCo.,Inc.etal.,68Phil.643(1939).

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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