G.R. No.

L-13250 October 29, 1971

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..

On January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa).
At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She however left some personal
properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The designated administrator of her estate here is
Antonio Campos Rueda.

In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax amounting to about
P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the estate is exempt from the payment of said
taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which provides:
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of
his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of
any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if
the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption
from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country.

Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.

However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a state as
contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize Tangier as a foreign country.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.

HELD: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.

A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community independent of
outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,
politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and
maintaining its separate international personality.

Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De Lara) which provides
that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under the
exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was
proven that Tangier provides such exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines
honor the exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.
 G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose
and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The
Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter
VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged
violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance,
the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec
7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-
executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners
and concerned sectors of society.

3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a
state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State,
much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not
merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to
the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous
region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework
shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in
effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply
to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and
submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to
identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-
AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in
has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the
MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may
call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is
one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out
the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371.
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way
to independence.
 G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force
(USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission
to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie
Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this
transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at 17,912.34 and
that his income tax would be 2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund
because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in foreign soil since Clark Air Base, in
legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he,
by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.

ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?

HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There
is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its
laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction,
both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to
Reagans assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This countrys jurisdictional rights therein,
certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he
indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not
of US source hence taxable.
 Taada v. Angara G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al. Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization for
being violative of provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the
ground that it infringes legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on most favored nation and
national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries are placed in the same footing in terms of
products and services. However, the Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional.
Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be read in relation to Sections 1 and 13
(promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only to rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony but not every aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing
provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesnt rule out
foreign competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into treaties.

Facts:
This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade Organization,
particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the
said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global
economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International Trade Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It
was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give
preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
It is petitioners position that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place
nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!

In seeking to nullify the Senates act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. It
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute

Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and Section 10 & 12, Artilce XII
of the 1987 Constitution? NO!

Petitioners Contentions:
Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic nationalism are
violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in parts of WTO
Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related investment
measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual property rights), Trade in Services, and par. 4
of Article III of GATT 1994.
o shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin
Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos.
 Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

Ruling:
These provisions are not self-executing
o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is
whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in
the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in
weight.
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing 24% in 10
years
o Domestic subsidy developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing countries at
13% in 10 years
o Export subsidy developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 10 years
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse
of discretion

Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
Congress? NO!
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly,
as a member of the family of nations.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions
enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of membership in the family of nations & limitations
imposed by treaty stipulations.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO (43 Phil 887) Case Digest

Facts:

On September 7, 1920, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article in the newspaper La Nacionregarding the
disappearance of certain documents in the Office of Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate. The
article of Mr. Perfecto suggested that the difficulty in finding the perpetrators was due to an official concealment by the
Senate since the missing documents constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies. This resulted to a case being filed against Mr. Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code. He
was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mr. Perfecto filed an
appeal in the Supreme Court to dismiss the case on the ground that Article 256 was not in force anymore.

Issue:
Will a law be abrogated by the change of Spanish to American Sovereignty over the Philippines?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to
protect Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and
a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old laws. No longer is
there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only
in bated breath.

The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the
Crown have no place under the American flag.

Judgement is REVERED and the defendant and appellant ACQUITTED.

 Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola.
The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A
E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338
of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and
his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to
the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the
Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following
provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H
of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon
who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr.
Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders
dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.
Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of
Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because whenever
there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are
reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot partake
in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife
had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears
that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation
on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes against Canon 25.
 WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
75 Phil 285 | November 12, 1945
Ponente: Feria, J.

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and
penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is
based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a
political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE:
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.

HELD:
Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts
during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the
petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
 Laurel vs. Misa Digested
Laurel vs. Misa
77 Phil. 856

FACTS:

The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, theaccusedadhered to the enemy by giving the
latter aid and comfort. He claims that hecannot be tried fortreason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended
at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were
against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanentallegiance tohis government or
sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it ispresumed that thePhilippine government still had the
power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot besuspended; it is eithersubsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se
wasnt suspended; rather,it was theexercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspendedallegiance.
Regarding thechange of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipinopeople is still thesame.
What happened was a mere change of name of government, fromCommonwealth to theRepublic of the
Philippines.DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of thePhilippineswere
suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishablewhere the lawsof the land are
momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasnt sovereign at the time of
the Commonwealth since it was underthe United States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new
Republicwhere thePhilippines is now indeed sovereign.
 Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused
to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and
nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower
courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

The court resolved three issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and
remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue
hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and
valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may
be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror.
Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not
valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and
whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese
military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid
and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention
to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such
construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of
the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international
law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the
phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they
become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued
as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of
course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the
Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over
cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating
and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation
unless repealed.

2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because
such a construction would violate the law of nations.

3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force
or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in
the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection
against the parent state)
 G.R. No. L-1870 February 27, 1948
ANTONIO C. OGNIR, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

This is a petition for habeas corpus by the petitioner against the Director of Prisons.

The petitioner was convicted by the General Court Martial appointed or convened during the year 1943 in Lanao by
Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District of Mindanao, and sentenced to life
imprisonment, for violation of the 93rd Article of War of the Philippine Army. He now claims that his imprisonment is
null and void because the said General Court-Martial was not legally constituted, inasmuch as District Commander that
appointed or convened it had no authority to do so, and therefore the judgment of said court is null and void for want of
jurisdiction.

The only question to be determined in the present case is whether or not the General Court-Martial which sentenced the
petitioner to life imprisonment, was legally appointed or convened. For it is a well established rule that a judgment
rendered by a military court which is not legally constituted is treated not only as voidable but void and subject to
collateral attack, McClaughry vs. Deming, 186 U. S., 49; 46 Law. ed., 1049.

Article 8, Commonwealth Act. No. 408 which provides the following:.

General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, and,
when empowered by the President, the Provost Martial General, the Commanding Officer of a Division, the
District Commander, the Superintendent of the Military Academy, the Commanding Officer of a separate
brigade or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority,
and no officer shall be eligible to sit as a member of such court when he is the accuser or a witness for the
prosecution or for the defense.

There is nothing in the record or in the return filed by the respondent to show that Col. Wendel W. Fertig,
Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District of Mindanao had ever been empowered to appoint a General Court-
Martial, by the President of the Commonwealth, or by General McArthur, Supreme Commander of the U.S. Army in
Southwest Pacific Area, assuming that the military powers of the President of the Commonwealth as Commander in
Chief of the Philippine Army was ipso facto transferred to said Supreme Commander when the Commonwealth
Government of the Philippines evacuated to Australia and then to the United States. The appointment of Colonel Fertig
as Commander of the 10th Military District of Mindanao does not carry with it the power to convene the General
Court-Martial. According to the above-quoted provision of article 8, Commonwealth No. 408, the only officers who
have such inherent power by virtue of their position are the President of the Commonwealth and the Chief of Staff of
the Philippine Army. All other officers such as the Provost Marshall and Commanding Officer of a separate brigade or
body of troops, and Colonel Fertig may come within the latter category, can not appoint a General Court Martial unless
expressly empowered by the President to do so.

"While courts-martial, not being 'inferior courts' to the Supreme Court under the Constitution, cannot be appealed from
to any civil court, or controlled or directed by the decree or mandate of such a court, yet in our U.S. Courts, similarly as
in the English tribunals, the writ of habeas corpus may be availed of by a prisoner claiming to be illegally detained
under trial or sentence of court martial, and this proceeding the legality of the action of the court as whether it
was legally constituted, or had jurisdiction, or its sentence was authorized by the code--may be inquired into."
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d ed., Vols. 1 and 2, p. 52.)

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the judgment rendered by the General Court Martial
that sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment is null and void, because said court was not duly convened or
appointed in accordance with law and therefore, had no jurisdiction to render said sentence.

The petitioner being illegally detained, respondent is ordered to release him immediately. So ordered.
 Holy See vs Rosario
238 SCRA 524 December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was
contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the
Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose
responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy
See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be
returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against
Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos
moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion
on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in
Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts
and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of
nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be
granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a
duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction
and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However,
petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it
acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was
acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of
petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its
subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not
for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.
 G.R. No. 162230, August 12, 2014
Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration in Vinuya

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,2 praying that the Court
reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their petition for certiorari.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected
the Courts ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited; that under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and
international conventions of which the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the
prerogative whether to bring petitioners claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the
President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights;
that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international humanitarian law as incorporated
into the laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that the Court must re-visit its decisions in Yamashita v.
Styer3 and Kuroda v. Jalandoni4 which have been noted for their prescient articulation of the import of laws of
humanity; that in said decision, the Court ruled that the State was bound to observe the laws of war and humanity; that
in Yamashita, the Court expressly recognized rape as an international crime under international humanitarian law, and
in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if the Philippines had not acceded or signed the Hague Convention on Rules
and Regulations covering Land Warfare, the Rules and Regulations formed part of the law of the nation by virtue of
the Incorporation Clause; that such commitment to the laws of war and humanity has been enshrined in Section 2,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the Philippinesadopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.

The petitioners added that the status and applicability of the generally accepted principles of international law within
the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause implied that the
general international law forms part of Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings
in The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr.5 and U.S. v. Guinto6 the Court has said that international law is deemed part of the
Philippine law as a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu,7 the Court has declared that a treaty, though not
yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the
Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnes obligations arising from the jus
cogens norms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war
crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are proscribed under international human rights law as there were
undeniable violations of jus cogens norms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has long
become jus cogens norms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that the Courts
invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the Chief Executive has the constitutional
duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims of the comfort women system in the Philippines.8cralawred

Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader responsibility of states to
protect the human rights of their citizens, especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and
pertain to jus cogens norms; that the claims raised by petitioners are not simple private claims that are the usual subject
of diplomatic protection; that the crimes committed against petitioners are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and
that the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitioners are not subject to the statute of limitations
under international law.9cral

Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery,
torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity
and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with
Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse
the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to espouse the
claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology, legal compensation and other forms of reparation from
Japan.10cralawred

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was highly improper for the April 28, 2010
decision to lift commentaries from at least three sources without proper attribution an article published in 2009 in the
Yale Law Journal of International Law; a book published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and an article
published in 2006 in the Western Reserve Journal of International Law and make it appear that such commentaries
supported its arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized sources even made a strong case in
favour of petitioners claims.11cr

In their Comment,12 respondents disagree with petitioners, maintaining that aside from the statements on plagiarism,
the arguments raised by petitioners merely rehashed those made in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they already
refuted such arguments in their Memorandum of June 6, 2005 that the Court resolved through its April 28, 2010
decision, specifically as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The contentions pertaining to the alleged plagiarism were then already lodged with the Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards of the Court; hence, the matter of alleged plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved
herein.13cralawred

2. A writ of certiorari did not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the failure of petitioners to show any arbitrary or despotic act on the part of respondents,
the relief of the writ of certiorari was not warranted.14cralawred

3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, being valid, bound the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. The validity of the Treaty of Peace was
the result of the ratification by two mutually consenting parties. Consequently, the obligations embodied in the Treaty
of Peace must be carried out in accordance with the common and real intention of the parties at the time the treaty was
concluded.15cralawred

4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international remedies against any State that violated their
human rights except where such remedies are provided by an international agreement. Herein, neither of the Treaty of
Peace and the Reparations Agreement, the relevant agreements affecting herein petitioners, provided for the reparation
of petitioners claims. Respondents aver that the formal apology by the Government of Japan and the reparation the
Government of Japan has provided through the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) are sufficient to recompense petitioners
on their claims, specifically:cralawlawlibrary

a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over the next 10 years as welfare and medical
services;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women, the services would be provided through
organizations delegated by governmental bodies in the recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines, the Republic of
Korea, and Taiwan); andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like home helpers), housing, environmental
development, medical expenses, and medical goods.16

Ruling
The Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for being devoid of
merit.

1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing of the special civil action for certiorari was timely, i.e., within the 60-day
period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 4. When and where position filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final order
or resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required
or not. To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order
or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition; otherwise, the
petition for certiorari must be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine
the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge
Development Corporation:17cralawred

There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date
when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply
with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not
suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals:18cralawred

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of
determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41)
days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in
any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was
filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be
filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These
are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.19chanrobleslaw

The petition for certiorari contains the following averments, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the comfort women system, approached the Executive Department
through the Department of Justice in order to request for assistance to file a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused to file a claim against the said Japanese
officials and military officers;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turn approached the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice and Office
of the of the Solicitor General to file their claim against the responsible Japanese officials and military officers, but
their efforts were similarly and carelessly disregarded;20chanrobleslaw

The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners approached the Department of Justice for
assistance, but does not specifically state when they received the denial of their request for assistance by the Executive
Department of the Government. This alone warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.

Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for assistance in 1998, their filing of
the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way beyond the 60-day period. Only the most compelling reasons could
justify the Courts acts of disregarding and lifting the strictures of the rule on the period. As we pointed out in MTM
Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of Appeals:21cralawred

All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a
party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely: to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are
contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.

As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor an
essential element of due process; a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right,
and never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply
for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.

Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule and the requirements under current
jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw

2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial on the part of respondents.

Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorari that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial
in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires such showing, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

However, petitioners did not make such a showing.

3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.

The Court cannot grant petitioners prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the main case, and is subject to the latters
outcome. It is not a cause of action itself.22 It is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of
during the pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of
the main action.23 Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the writ of
injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued
independently of the principal action.24cralawred

In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act. Hence, it is an extreme remedy, 25 to
be granted only if the following requisites are attendant, namely:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; andChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and
adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.26

In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City,27 we expounded as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an
extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should
be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very
foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the
probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.
Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.28

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines.
Whether or not to espouse petitioners claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and
judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of
foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ
of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for
their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, C.J.:

[T]he phrase "comfort women" does not in the least reflect the suffering, such as multiple rapes on an veryday basis
and severe physical abuse, that women victims had to endure during their forced prostitution and sexual subjugation
and abuse in wartime. The Special Rapporteur, therefore, considers with conviction that the phrase "military sexual
slaves" represents a much more accurate and appropriate terminology.1

Ms. Radhika Coornaraswarny Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women

This Petition is a reminder to all public officials of the trust the Filipino people have reposed in them to ensure their
well-being, address their sufferings, and promote the rule of law within the national and international sphere. 2 Our
history as a nation and our brutal experiences at the hands of colonialists and authoritarians have impelled us to ensure,
through the Constitution, that every Filipino will attain justice and will be guaranteed full respect for human
rights.3 This is one of the core duties imposed by our organic law on public officials.

Nevertheless, I concur with the Resolution holding that there is basis to dismiss the petition on various technical
grounds. I also fully agree with this Court's Decision4 dated 28 April 2010, which ruled that the matter of exercising
diplomatic protection is within the sphere of discretion of the executive department.

I am of the opinion, however, that the statement in the 2010 ponencia - that the "wisdom of such decision [to waive
all claims for reparations] is not for the courts to question"5 - must be qualified. As party to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions,6 the Philippines has limited discretion to waive another state's reparations obligation arising from the
commission of grave breaches of the convention. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) expressly states the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE 147
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected
person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular
trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property,
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

ARTICLE 148
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability
incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding
Article. (Emphases supplied)

Legal commentators stress that Article 148 should be related to Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV7 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A belligerent Party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
(Emphases supplied)

It is said that the non-absolution clause under Article 148 is a logical consequence of the grave breaches under Article
147 of Geneva Convention IV. 8 A state is preclude from absolving other states from liability on the ground that the
individual persons who actually perpetrated the grave breach of the convention have already been punished.9 Indeed, it
would seem unjust for individuals to be punished while the state in whose name or on whose instructions they acted is
released from all liability.10 Article 148 was meant to prevent the defeated state from being forced into entering into an
armistice or peace treaty in which it would renounce all reparations for grave breaches committed by persons in the
service of the victorious state.11 Thus, pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, a state remains responsible - and
continues to be liable to pay compensation for the grave breaches committed against protected persons. 12cralawred

Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that respondents cannot be found entirely guilty of a whimsical or capricious exercise
of judgment, or a patent and gross abuse of discretion. Their reliance on the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951 Peace
Treaty) and the Reparations Agreement Between the Republic of the Philippines and Japan (1956 Reparations
Agreement) as bases for declining to espouse petitioners' claims against Japan was not without reason, especially if the
treaties are analyzed in the light of the events leading to their conclusion.

The subject of reparations for damages suffered during the war was discussed during the occupation of Japan by the
Allied Forces. At the time, the initial reparations policy that had been put forward by the U.S. was to utilize
reparations for rehabilitating the war-devastated countries, particularly countries in Asia and the Pacific.13 The plan
was also envisioned as a "vital integral means" for Japan's economic demilitarization. 14 The U.S. supported an "early
and just share of reparations" in favor of the Philippines and pledged that "Japan will be reduced to the level of a small
power and her people will not be permitted to have in the future a living standard higher than those nations which she
has overrun x x x."15 It is said that an interim reparations removal policy was also adopted with the objective of
transferring the industrial capacity of Japan to the Philippines.16 Under this policy, Japan's industrial plants and
facilities would be handed over to the Philippines as war reparations in order to aid its rehabilitation and agricultural
development needs.17 However, due to the opposition of the former Soviet Union, the proposals did not
materialize.18cralawred

American reparations policy shifted in 1947.19 As the Cold War developed, the U.S. initiated the drafting of a peace
treaty with Japan.20 On the issue of reparations, the U.S. negotiated for a complete waiver of all claims arising from
Japan's war acts.21 The alleged rationale for this "peace formula" rested on the U.S. assumption that if Japan were to be
lured into the communist influence, the strength of the Sino-Soviet camp would significantly increase, and the resulting
change in the power balance in Asia would be "dangerously formidable." 22 According to the U.S., Japan must be given
a chance to recover full economic self-sufficiency "by not placing upon her any heavy economic or financial burdens
or major commercial liabilities."23 The peace treaty was to be "brief, liberal, and non-punitive."24cralawred

The Philippines rejected the U.S. proposal of total waiver of reparations claims against Japan.25 While the Philippine
government had full appreciation of the international political reality of the spread of communism in Asia, 26 it
remained firm that Japan should "sufficiently x x x repair the injuries they inflicted in a war of aggression x x x."27 The
U.S. tried to persuade the Philippine government. It pointed out that the problem of reparations was "not merely a
matter of justice," but also a "matter of economics." 28 It argued that they could not see "any effective way" of
demanding reparations from an economically depressed Japan.29 In a last effort to convince the Philippines to accept a
no-reparations peace arrangement, the U.S. emphasized the usually "intimate" relations between both
countries.30cralawred

The U.S. was unsuccessful; the Philippines maintained an irrevocable stance on the matter of reparations. 31 Former
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Pelino Neri criticized the American peace policy and remarked: "Reparations is first
a matter of justice and the realities of economics are, in our view, a secondary consideration. In our case, reparations
from Japan is a matter of absolute necessity."32 The Philippines' condemnation of the American peace formula
intensified when the U.S. government made available its draft of the treaty, which provided for the absolute
abandonment of reparations claims on the ground that Japan lacked the "capacity to make payments" in any
form.33 The Philippines refused such claims.34 It repeatedly declared that Japan was solvent, and that the Philippines
would never withdraw its claims.35cralawred

At the height of the developing Cold War, the U.S. and the U.K. initiated a conference on the Japanese peace
treaty.36 During the discussions, the Philippines, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Carlos P. Romulo, expressed
that it had yet to be satisfied with the reparations provisions of the proposed treaty. 37 Secretary Romulo voiced out a
reservation on an "inflexible restriction" on the form of reparations payment, asserting that the Philippines could not
accept that reparations be made only through the "services" of the Japanese people in the processing of raw materials
that would be supplied by the injured countries.38 However, the reservation was neither accepted nor recorded.39 Faced
with the dilemma of supporting its allies in winning over Japan at the expense of fully satisfYing security and
reparations claims, the Philippines reluctantly signed the 1951 Peace Treaty. 40cralawred

The decision of the Philippine government to eventually sign the peace treaty was met with strong resistance. The
opposition insisted that the reparations issue was the foremost aspect of the country's peace settlement with
Japan.41 They also demanded the inclusion in the peace treaty of a more categorical statement of Japan's guilt and
reparations obligation.42 The government defended its decision to sign the peace treaty on the basis of its "security first
policy."43 It explained that security threats of the aggressive communist expansion impelled it to act swiftly in the
ratification of the peace treaty.44 The opposition countered that the Philippines was sufficiently safeguarded by its
Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S.45cralawred

The negotiations for reparations dragged on for almost five years after the signing of the 1951 Peace Treaty.46 From the
initial demand of USD 8 billion, the final reparations agreed upon amounted to a mere USD 550 million, 47 which was
to be paid in the form of capital goods, cash, and services.48 A note sent by President Magsaysay to the Senate reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Considering the losses and suffering the Philippines sustained as a result of the Pacific War, these terms do not come
up to the generally accepted concept of reparations as compensation for damage done and injury suffered.

Judged, however, from the point of view of the requirements of our national interest and viewed in the light of the
practical realities posed by the political and economic situation obtaining in both countries as well as in their part of the
world, I subscribe to the conclusion reached by the Philippine Panel of Negotiators that this settlement is the best that
can be obtained under the circumstances x x x.49
After a heated debate, the 1951 Peace Treaty and the 1956 Reparations Agreement were ratified on 16 July 1956. The
pertinent provision of the 1951 Peace Treaty is reproduced below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE 14
(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused
by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient if
it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparations for all such damage and suffering and at the same
time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were
occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries
for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in
production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the
imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is
called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange
burden upon Japan.

2. x x x x

"(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparation claims of the Allied
Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and
nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of
occupation. (Emphases supplied)

On the other hand, the relevant provisions of the 1956 Reparations Agreement are quoted as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ARTICLE 1
Japan, by way of reparations, shall supply the Republic of the Philippines with the services of the Japanese
people and the products of Japan in the form of capital goods, the total value of which will be so much in yen as
shall be equivalent to five hundred fifty million United States dollars ($550,000,000) at present computed at one
hundred ninetyeight billion yen (Y198,000,000,000), within the period and in the manner hereinafter prescribed.

ARTICLE2
The supply of the services and products referred to in the preceding Article shall be made on an annual average of so
much in yen as shall be equivalent to twenty-five million United States dollars ($25,000,000) at present computed at
nine billion yen (Y9,000,000,000), during the ten-year period from the date of coming into force of the present
Agreement; and on an annual average of so much in yen as shall be equivalent to thirty million United States dollars
($30,000,000) at present computed at ten billion eight hundred million yen (Y10,800,000,000), during the succeeding
ten-year period. However, by agreement between the two Governments, this latter period may be reduced to a period
shorter than ten years, provided the outstanding balance is settled in full within the remainder of the reduced period.

ARTICLE6
1. In the discharge of the reparations obligation under Article 1 of the present Agreement, the Government of Japan
shall, through procedures to be determined under Article 11, make payments to cover the obligations incurred by the
Mission under Reparations Contracts and the expenses for the supply of services and products referred to in Article 5,
paragraph 4 of the present Agreement. These payments shall be made in Japanese yen.

2. By and upon making a payment in yen under the preceding paragraph, Japan shall be deemed to have supplied
the Republic of the Philippines with the services and products thus paid for and shall be released from its
reparations obligation to the extent of the equivalent value in United States dollars of such yen payment in
accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the present Agreement. (Emphases supplied)

In the light of the foregoing context, I vote to dismiss the petition for failure to establish that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion in declining to espouse the claims of petitioners. The dismissal thereof should not, however,
be taken as a definitive ruling on the merits of the claims of petitioners, in the event that they bring the same to an
appropriate forum or through a proper recourse. Neither should it be taken to mean that we should forget the suffering
that our people, especially petitioners, bore in the Second World War, or the unfortunate story of our attempts to get
the reparation that was due us, and learn. From such understanding, we must forge the elements that will make the
Philippine state strong, able to protect its people and safeguard their well-being under the aegis of the Constitution.
Justice demands no less.
 G.R. No. L-22374 December 18, 1974
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EMILIO G. GUANZON, defendant-appellee.

A lower court decision, which on its face ignores the controlling statute as well as the applicable doctrines of this
Court, is appealed by the Republic of the Philippines. It filed an action for the foreclosure of certain real estate and
chattel mortgages executed by defendant Emilio G. Guanzon, now appellee, in favor of the former Bank of Taiwan,
Ltd., as security for the payment of the loans obtained by him from said bank. The amount involved is P3,722.13,
representing the principal and interest as of September 30, 1961, with an additional sum equivalent to ten percent of the
total indebtedness as attorney's fees. The loan transaction took place in 1943 during the period of Japanese occupation.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, the United States, through its Alien Property Custodian, acquired such
credit. Thereafter, by virtue of the Philippine Property Act of 1946, it was transferred to our government. With the
statute and the controlling judicial decisions, 1 clearly pointing to one direction, the lower court, in a hasty and
improvident exercise of judicial power, apparently oblivious of the law, took the other way. It held that the Republic of
the Philippines lacked legal interest over such mortgage loan and dismissed the case. We have no choice but to reverse.

The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the brief for appellant Republic of the Philippines: "On May and June, 1943,
the defendant obtained two (2) loans from the former Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., at its offices in Bacolod City, in the total
sum of P1,600.00, with interest at the rate of six per centum (6%) per annum, compounded quarterly, evidenced by two
(2) promissory notes ... executed, signed and delivered by him to said bank. To secure prompt and full payment of the
loans, the defendant executed a real estate mortgage ... on the two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 1848 and 1855 of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and a Chattel Mortgage on standing crops ...
growing on the same properties ... . By virtue of Vesting Order No. P-4, dated January 21, 1946, and under the
authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, the United States of America vested in the Government of
the United States the assets in the Philippines of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. Pursuant to the Philippine Property Act of
1946, these assets were subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines by the Attorney General of the
United States under Transfer Agreements dated July 20, 1954 and June 15, 1957, and are now administered by the
Board of Liquidators, a government agency created under Executive Order No. 372, dated November 24, 1950, and in
accordance with Republic Acts Nos. 477 and 8, and other pertinent laws." 2 According to the brief for appellee
Guanzon: "The statement of facts stated in appellant's brief is substantially correct so that this representation finds no
necessity in offering counter-statement of facts." 3

It is not easy to explain, and certainly there is no justification, in the light of the above facts and considering the state of
the law, why the lower court, in its decision, dismissed the case on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines lacks
legal interest. As noted, we have to reverse.

1. In the very able brief for appellant Republic of the Philippines, prepared by the then Solicitor General Arturo A.
Alafriz and the former Solicitor, later Assistant Solicitor General Camilo D. Quiason, it was made clear that while the
Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. was the original creditor of the loans thus secured, with defendant, now appellee, executing the
mortages in question, the United States, pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act 4 acquired such account, being
among the assets of a bank which was a declared national of an enemy country. This it did through a vesting
order, 5 the legal effect of which was to effectuate immediately the transfer of title by operation of law without any
necessity for any court action. Thus, title over such credit passed to the United States "as completely as if by
conveyance, transfer, or assignment, ... . " 6 The brief for the Republic continues: "In accordance with the Philippine
Property Act of 1946, the United States Government transferred, conveyed and assigned to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Transfer Agreements, dated July 20, 1954 and June 15, 1957, all its rights, title and
interest to the loans in question. As such transferee, the Republic of the Philippines acquired the title and interest
thereto ... . It follows, therefore, that plaintiff has a legal interest in the promissory notes and in the real and chattel
mortgages and has a cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, the defendant herein." 7

All that was set forth in the three-page brief of counsel for appellee Guanzon reads as follows: "There is no showing as
to how plaintiff-appellant was able to acquire the Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the defendant-appellee in
favor of the Bank of Taiwan Ltd. a private bank of Japan, and therefore has no legal interest in the subject matter. The
transfer of obligation in question cannot be taken Judicial Notice by our courts because the vesting order P-4 of the
Government of the United States, pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, of any and all property of
any nature whatsoever subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States affecting alien property in the Philippines cannot
be taken Judicial Notice in the light of Sec. 1 of Rule 129 of the New Rules of Court, inasmuch as the Trading with the
Enemy Act is a foreign law enacted by the U.S. Government which is not enumerated in the aforecited new Rules of
Court. Consequently, proof should have been introduced to show how the United States Government was able to
acquire the subject matter in litigation which was later transferred to the plaintiff-appellant."8

It thus appears obvious that counsel for appellee lacks awareness of the controlling doctrine announced in the leading
case of Brownell, Jr. v. Sun Life Assurance Company, 9 where Justice Labrador explicitly set forth: "This purpose of
conveying enemy properties to the Philippines after all claims against them shall have been settled is expressly
embodied in the Philippine Property Act of 1946," 10 A brief history of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is likewise
found in his opinion: "On July 3, 1946, the Congress of the United States passed Public Law 485-79th Congress,
known as the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Section 3 thereof provides that "The Trading with the Enemy Act of
October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 411), as amended, shall continue in force in the Philippines after July 4, 1946, ... ." To
implement the provisions of the act, the President of the United States on July 3, 1946, promulgated Executive Order
No. 9747, "continuing the functions of the Alien Property Custodian and the Department of the Treasury in the
Philippines." Prior to and preparatory to the approval of said Philippine Property Act of 1946, and agreement was
entered into between President Manuel Roxas of the Commonwealth and U.S. Commissioner Paul V. McNutt whereby
title to enemy agricultural lands and other properties was to be conveyed by the United States to the Philippines in
order to help the rehabilitation of the latter, but that in order to avoid complex legal problems in relation to said enemy
properties, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States was to continue operations in the Philippines even after
the latter's independence, that he may settle all claims that may exist or arise against the above-mentioned enemy
properties, in accordance with the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States." 11

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court grievously erred in failing to perceive that precisely the
Republic of the Philippines, contrary to its holding, possesses a legal interest over the subject matter of this
controversy.

2. Apparently, the lower court, perhaps taken in by the contention of appellee, could not see its way clear to applying
the Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the United States Congress as it was a foreign statute not susceptible to
judicial notice. Again, if it were cognizant of the leaning of the above Brownell decision, it would have realized how
erroneous such a view is. For, as was made clear in the above decision, there was "conformity to the enactment of the
Philippine Property Act of 1946 of the United States [as] announced by President Manuel Roxas in a joint statement
signed by him and by Commissioner McNutt Ambassador Romulo also formally expressed the conformity of the
Philippine Government to the approval of said act to the American Senate prior to its approval." 12It was further
stressed by Justice Labrador that after the grant of independence, the Congress of the Philippines approved Republic
Act No. 8, which authorized the President of the Philippines to enter into such contract or undertakings as may be
necessary to effectuate the transfer to the Republic of the Philippines under the Philippine Property Act of 1946 of any
property or property rights or the proceeds thereof authorized to be transferred thereunder. Then his opinion continues:
"The Congress of the Philippines also approved Republic Act No. 7, which established a Foreign Funds Control Office.
After the approval of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 of the United States, the Philippine Government also
formally expressed, through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs conformity thereto. ... The Congress of the Philippines
has also approved Republic Act No. 477, which provides for the administration and disposition of properties which
have been or may hereafter be transferred to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the Philippine Property
Act of 1946 of the United States." 13

From which, the above conclusion follows: "It is evident, therefore, that the consent of the Philippine Government to
the application of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 to the Philippines after independence was given, not only by the
Executive Department of the Philippine Government, but also by the Congress, which enacted the laws that would
implement or carry out the benefits accruing from the operation of the United States
law." 14 Under the circumstances, there is no question, as was pointed out by the same jurist, "that a foreign law may
have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin, provided the latter, in which it is sought to be
made operative, gives its consent thereto." 15 That is a sound legal proposition. It is a juridical norm that has found
acceptance in the Philippines at the close of the nineteenth century after its acquisition by the United States. Its origins
in American law can be traced back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 16 an
1812 decision. It was cited with approval in the recent case of Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 17 The
doctrine is not unknown to European law. So it was noted in Reagan, with a citation from Jellinek: "It is to be admitted
that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be
a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation,
which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity
of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence." 18

It is thus undoubted that the lower court misapplied the rule on judicial notice. 19 The lower court could not simply
have closed its eyes to the plain command of the Philippine Property Act of 1946, which is a part of Philippine law, as
was held so categorically by the above Brownell decision. To repeat, there is no justification for the appealed decision.

3. The tone of certitude with which the lower court summarily dismissed the claim of the Republic on the ground of
lack of legal interest is thus uncalled for. It could have been avoided by an acquaintance, even of the slightest, with the
doctrines enunciated by this Tribunal. An excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera 20 is of some relevance: "The delicate task
of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural
norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations
and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly , through the highest
judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the
lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit." 21

WHEREFORE, the decision of August 29, 1963 dismissing the complaint of the Republic of the Philippines is
reversed and set aside. Costs against defendant Guanzon.
 Razon, Jr. VS Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009

We review in this petition for review on certiorari the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009. This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N.
Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced
disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of
the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO,
Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent
SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their
superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security
of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and
to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor
the action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City,
both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of
operations, chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation
against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N.
Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin
Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a
seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him
a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was
no longer around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even
left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based
secretary who did not know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007,
Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with
the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-
Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch,
Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them
find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the
information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the
uniformed men. According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence
operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police
to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to
find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with another
woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely Police Headquarters in
Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon
City but her efforts produced no positive results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for
financial help from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the
illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subjects
human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January
7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or
knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not
constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to
investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.

THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the
CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the
disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of
overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program
ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police
theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondents
testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue"
at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for
ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance, since the respondent,
the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of
ransom the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the
CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and
Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to
protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA.
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander
Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 9, 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate
or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this
definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows
that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen
nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner, Tagitis colleagues and
even the police authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions
the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. 76 In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who
actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level
of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this
Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances,
while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component
parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis disappearance, the participation by
agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information
about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any
failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by Section
5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution
of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these
can be used as the affiants direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that
necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied
upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure
to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified
in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the
petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und
Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy,
was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to
Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy
prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, and 855 cases were recorded
during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and
127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were reported to have
disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97
were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos term when
only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases.
KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there
were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyos administration.
The Commission on Human Rights records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985
to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619
outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30,
2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof."We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither
defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules
(Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the
concept of enforced disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction
are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and
enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights,
the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural
standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional
rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation
when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold.
The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from
this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing
or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the
victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the
proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (in Paris, France
on February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate
or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for
human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order
and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families,
and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting
that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the State itself
the party whose involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions
show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no
witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the
disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of
evidence in an enforced disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance
ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven
disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine
legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly
recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a
child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to
certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure, made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally
point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard
investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of
concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the governments cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence,
already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN
Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded government denials and
haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law a situation that
will subsist unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties
when the government completely failed to exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through
hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
 LAUREL VS MISA
77 PHIL 856

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change of
sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same government and same
sovereign people.
 G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.

SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972,
People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned. It
is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated below. On
April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the petitions and
manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions
state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is
not merely a de factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn
to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power
by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted
by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
 Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769

Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk. She was
ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under the premise that the
transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that:
It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere
jokes if they existed at all. She added, instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result
and effect of management action would be a punitive one. She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company
didnt respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to meralcos omission of provding her with
details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for
disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.

Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasnt in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.

In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed

Ratio:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party

Its a forum for enforcing ones right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to killings
and enforceddisappearances.

Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.

Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one that can
be solvedin the NLRC.

There was no violation of respondents right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were mere jokes and even
conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to real intent of management.
 LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, et al. v. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN, et al.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, 184495, 187109, 31 May 2011, EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J)

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or
entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to
direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and
security of aggrieved individuals.
Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/may2011/184461-62.htm - _ftn56 In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the
best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to
life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision
thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights
that these writs seek to immediately protect.
Following the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino)
by armed men from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan (Spouses Cadapan)
and Concepcion Empeo (Empeo) filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court (habeas corpus case),
impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col.
Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of the Court, a
writ of habeas corpus was issued, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino
are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who
all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had inquired from their subordinates about the
reported abduction and disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition there being no strong evidence that the missing
persons are in the custody of the respondents.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. They also moved to present newly
discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino, Sherlyns mother-in-law who was allegedly
threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his
detention at a military camp.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeo filed before this Court a
Petition for Writ of Amparo (amparo case), with Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents. The
petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., (Gen. Esperon) then
Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and
Donald Caigas.
Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office.
By Resolution, the Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to appellate court, and ordered the consolidation
of the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.
In the habeas corpus case, the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the
immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the amparo case.
In reconsidering its earlier decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily on the
testimony of Manalo. It held that there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons, (Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino), are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not held for
a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention.
 In the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order or production
order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees right
to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The
appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as
indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the
abduction and detention of the three.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the Decision of the appellate court.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the amparo aspect is concerned.
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite
Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to comply
with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing persons. By Resolution, the appellate
court denied the motion, ratiocinating that while the Court, ordered the respondents to immediately RELEASE, or
cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, the decision is
not ipso facto executory. The use of the term immediately does not mean that that it is automatically
executory. Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the
Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court.
Via a petition for certiorari filed before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeo challenged the appellate
courts Resolution denying their motion to cite respondents in contempt.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of
Staff has command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three
aggrieved parties, Sherlyn, Karen and Merino

2. Whether or not there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an
Amparo case to cause the release of the aggrieved parties.

HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
There is no showing that Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino were even remotely accountable and
responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in
an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application insofar
as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine
of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible forcrimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
 It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive
rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or
entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to
direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and
security of aggrieved individuals.
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearancefor purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure
of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil
cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal
liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases
to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may
be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there
be any. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/may2011/184461-62.htm - _ftn56 In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best
position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851 (RA 9851) to include command responsibility
as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851
is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still
fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal
acts or to submit these matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
 The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to
be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it
appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col.
Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision
of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as there is
no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision.

Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for
an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the
proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since
any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.

The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is
misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen,
rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of
the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution
is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.

In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino
was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary
proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without
prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom..
 Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010

FACTS:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence
and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas.
During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were
harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed
that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information
for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages
and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.

The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against
them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.

By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD:

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved
in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of the petition to allege
ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and
harassment that followed.
 DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FR TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as GERMAN
AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ). VS
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS

FACTS:
- On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the
Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, capital of what
was then West Germany.
- The Agreement affirmed the countries "common interest in promoting the technical and economic
development of their States, and recogni[zed] the benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical
co-operation," and allowed for the conclusion of "arrangements concerning individual projects of technical co-
operation."
- While the Agreement provided for a limited term of effectivity of five (5) years, it nonetheless was stated that
"[t]he Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive periods of one year unless either of the two
Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry," and that even upon the
Agreements expiry, its provisions would "continue to apply to any projects agreed upon x x x until their
completion."

- On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon,
and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement.
- This Arrangement affirmed the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called,
Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to "enable Philippine
familiesespecially poor onesto maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality."
- It appears that SHINE had already been in existence even prior to the effectivity of the Arrangement, though
the record does not indicate when exactly SHINE was constituted.
- Nonetheless, the Arrangement stated the various obligations of the Filipino and German governments.

- In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for SHINE.
- The Philippines designated the Department of Health (DOH) and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth) with the implementation of SHINE.
- For their part, the German government "charge[d] the Deustche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit[]
(GTZ[]) GmbH, Eschborn, with the implementation of its contributions."

- Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE on various dates
between December of 1998 to September of 1999.

- In September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project
Manager.
- Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed salary
adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her
predecessors.
- The dispute culminated in a letter dated 8 June 2000, signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay,
and copies furnished officials of the DOH, Philheath, and the director of the Manila office of GTZ.
- The letter raised several issues which private respondents claim had been brought up several times in the past,
but have not been given appropriate response.
- It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its original purpose to facilitate the
development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening
local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and new initiatives on the premise that
community and local government unit schemes were not sustainablea philosophy that supposedly betrayed
Nicolays lack of understanding of the purpose of the project.
- Private respondents further alleged that as a result of Nicolays "new thrust, resources have been used
inappropriately;" that the new management style was "not congruent with the original goals of the project;"
 that Nicolay herself suffered from "cultural insensitivity" that consequently failed to sustain healthy relations
with SHINEs partners and staff.
The letter ended with these ominous words:
- The issues that we [the private respondents] have stated here are very crucial to us in working for the project.
We could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed
immediately and appropriately.
- In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter dated 21 June 2000, all similarly worded
except for their respective addressees. She informed private respondents that the "projects orientations and
evolution" were decided in consensus with partner institutions, Philhealth and the DOH, and thus no longer
subject to modifications. More pertinently, she stated:
- You have firmly and unequivocally stated in the last paragraph of your 8th June 2000 letter that you and the
five other staff "could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be
addressed immediately and appropriately." Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is now
imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible.
- Taken aback, private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their earlier letter was not
intended as a resignation letter, but one that merely intended to raise attention to what they perceived as vital
issues. Negotiations ensued between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught.
- Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-
termination of their contracts of employment on the grounds of "serious and gross insubordination, among
others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust."
- On 21 August 2000, the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Named as
respondents therein where GTZ, the Director of its Manila office Hans Peter Paulenz, its Assistant Project
Manager Christian Jahn, and Nicolay.
- On 25 October 2005, GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions
and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
- This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that
it was immune from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it was GTZ and not the German
government which had implemented the SHINE Project and entered into the contracts of employment.

- On 27 November 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss.
- The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment
contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status.

- GTZ filed with the Labor Arbiter a "Reiterating Motion to Dismiss," again praying that the Motion to Dismiss
be granted on the jurisdictional ground, and reprising the arguments for dismissal it had earlier raised
- No action was taken by the Labor Arbiter on this new motion.
- Instead, on 15 October 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision granting the complaint for illegal
dismissal. The Decision concluded that respondents were dismissed without lawful cause, there being "a total
lack of due process both substantive and procedural [sic]."
- GTZ was faulted for failing to observe the notice requirements in the labor law. The Decision likewise
proceeded from the premise that GTZ had treated the letter dated 8 June 2000 as a resignation letter, and
devoted some focus in debunking this theory.
- The Decision initially offered that it "need not discuss the jurisdictional aspect considering that the same had
already been lengthily discussed in the Order de[n]ying respondents Motion to Dismiss."

- Nonetheless, it proceeded to discuss the jurisdictional aspect, in this wise:

Under pain of being repetitious, the undersigned Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint on the
following grounds:
Firstly, under the employment contract entered into between complainants and respondents, specifically
Section 10 thereof, it provides that "contract partners agree that his contract shall be subject to the LAWS of
the jurisdiction of the locality in which the service is performed."
 Secondly, respondent having entered into contract, they can no longer invoke the sovereignty of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
Lastly, it is imperative to be immune from suit, respondents should have secured from the Department of
Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges
including immunity from suits. Having failed in this regard, respondents cannot escape liability from the
shelter of sovereign immunity.[sic]

Notably, GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the Labor Arbiters Decision or elevate said decision
for appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari
filed with the Court of Appeals. On 10 December 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution
dismissing GTZs petition, finding that "judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for[,] [t]he
appropriate remedy of the petitioners [being] an appeal to the NLRC x x x." A motion for reconsideration to
this Resolution proved fruitless for GTZ.

- Thus, the present petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the decision and resolutions of the Court of
Appeals and of the Labor Arbiter.
- GTZs arguments center on whether the Court of Appeals could have entertained its petition for certiorari
despite its not having undertaken an appeal before the NLRC; and
- whether the complaint for illegal dismissal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on account of
GTZs insistence that it enjoys immunity from suit.

- The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a Comment on the petition. In its
Comment dated 7 November 2005, the OSG took the side of GTZ, with the prayer that the petition be granted
on the ground that GTZ was immune from suit, citing in particular its assigned functions in implementing the
SHINE programa joint undertaking of the Philippine and German governments which was neither
proprietary nor commercial in nature.
- The Court of Appeals had premised the dismissal of GTZs petition on its procedural misstep in bypassing an
appeal to NLRC and challenging the Labor Arbiters Decision directly with the appellate court by way of a
Rule 65 petition. In dismissing the petition, the
- Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals is correct in pronouncing the general rule that the proper recourse from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter is to first appeal the same to the NLRC.
- GTZ goes as far as to "request" that the Court re-examine Air Services, a suggestion that is needlessly
improvident under the circumstances. Air Services affirms doctrines grounded in sound procedural rules that
have allowed for the considered and orderly disposition of labor cases.

main issuewhether GTZ enjoys immunity from suit.

The arguments raised by GTZ and the OSG are rooted in several indisputable facts.
- The SHINE project was implemented pursuant to the bilateral agreements between the Philippine and German
governments. GTZ was tasked, under the 1991 agreement, with the implementation of the contributions of the
German government.
- The activities performed by GTZ pertaining to the SHINE project are governmental in nature, related as they
are to the promotion of health insurance in the Philippines.
- The fact that GTZ entered into employment contracts with the private respondents did not disqualify it from
invoking immunity from suit, as held in cases such as Holy See v. Rosario, Jr., which set forth what remains
valid doctrine:

- Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
- Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry.
- The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business.
- If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature.
- If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

- Beyond dispute is the tenability of the comment points raised by GTZ and the OSG that GTZ was not
performing proprietary functions notwithstanding its entry into the particular employment contracts.
- Yet there is an equally fundamental premise which GTZ and the OSG fail to address, namely: Is GTZ, by
conception, able to enjoy the Federal Republics immunity from suit?

- The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9,
Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that "the State may not be sued without its consent."
- Who or what consists of "the State"? For one, the doctrine is available to foreign States insofar as they are
sought to be sued in the courts of the local State, necessary as it is to avoid "unduly vexing the peace of
nations."
- If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would be no doubt
that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said State had consented to be
sued.
- However, the present suit was brought against GTZ. It is necessary for us to understand what precisely are the
parameters of the legal personality of GTZ.

- Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as "the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic
of Germany," a depiction similarly adopted by the OSG.
- Assuming that characterization is correct, it does not automatically invest GTZ with the ability to invoke State
immunity from suit. The distinction lies in whether the agency is incorporated or unincorporated. The
following lucid discussion from Justice Isagani Cruz is pertinent:
- Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it must be
ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to
be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the government agency impleaded is
incorporated or unincorporated.
- If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter.
- State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the
original charter of the incorporated government agency.
- Jurisprudence is replete with examples of incorporated government agencies which were ruled not entitled to
invoke immunity from suit, owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued.

- We come now to the amendability of the SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts.
- To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a
personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic
act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court.
- These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that
the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of
the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived
immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability.
- That statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights.
- The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes
unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives,
such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract, and even for tort.

- It is useful to note that on the part of the Philippine government, it had designated two entities, the Department
of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), as the implementing agencies in behalf of
the Philippines.
- The PHIC was established under Republic Act No. 7875, Section 16(g) of which grants the corporation the
power "to sue and be sued in court." Applying the previously cited jurisprudence, PHIC would not enjoy
 immunity from suit even in the performance of its functions connected with SHINE, however, governmental in
nature as they may be.

- Is GTZ an incorporated agency of the German government? There is some mystery surrounding that question.
- Neither GTZ nor the OSG go beyond the claim that petitioner is "the implementing agency of the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany."
- On the other hand, private respondents asserted before the Labor Arbiter that GTZ was "a private corporation
engaged in the implementation of development projects."

- In truth, private respondents were unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that GTZ was a
"private corporation," and the Labor Arbiter acted rashly in accepting such claim without explanation.
- But neither has GTZ supplied any evidence defining its legal nature beyond that of the bare descriptive
"implementing agency."
- There is no doubt that the 1991 Agreement designated GTZ as the "implementing agency" in behalf of the
German government. Yet the catch is that such term has no precise definition that is responsive to our
concerns.
- Inherently, an agent acts in behalf of a principal, and the GTZ can be said to act in behalf of the German state.
But that is as far as "implementing agency" could take us.
- The term by itself does not supply whether GTZ is incorporated or unincorporated, whether it is owned by the
German state or by private interests, whether it has juridical personality independent of the German
government or none at all.

- GTZ itself provides a more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own official Internet website. In the
"Corporate Profile" section of the English language version of its site, GTZ describes itself as follows:

- GTZs own website elicits that petitioner is "federally owned," a "federal enterprise," and "founded in 1975 as
a company under private law." GTZ clearly has a very meaningful relationship with the Federal Republic of
Germany, which apparently owns it. At the same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through
a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine corporations can be
organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government.
- This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners
argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is "an implementing agency."
- The above-quoted statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an "implementing agency of the
Federal Republic of Germany," yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it has
a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany.

- The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website, also makes reference to GTZ and describes it in
this manner:
- Again, we are uncertain of the corresponding legal implications under German law surrounding "a private
company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany." Yet taking the description on face value, the apparent
equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by
the Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter. And it
bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that "[e]very corporation incorporated under this
Code has the power and capacity x x x to sue and be sued in its corporate name."
- It is entirely possible that under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly GTZ itself has not been
vested or has been specifically deprived the power and capacity to sue and/or be sued.
- Yet in the proceedings below and before this Court, GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has
not consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. We adhere to the rule
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same
as those of the Philippines, and following the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a
governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation
Code, has expressly consented to be sued.
 - At the very least, like the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, this Court has no basis in fact to conclude
or presume that GTZ enjoys immunity from suit.

- The principles enunciated in that case were derived from public international law. We stated then:
- In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court
that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

- It is to be recalled that the Labor Arbiter, in both of his rulings, noted that it was imperative for petitioners to
secure from the Department of Foreign Affairs "a certification of respondents diplomatic status and
entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits."
- The requirement might not necessarily be imperative.
- However, had GTZ obtained such certification from the DFA, it would have provided factual basis for its claim
of immunity that would, at the very least, establish a disputable evidentiary presumption that the foreign party
is indeed immune which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual evidence
- We do not see why GTZ could not have secured such certification or endorsement from the DFA for purposes
of this case.
- Certainly, it would have been highly prudential for GTZ to obtain the same after the Labor Arbiter had denied
the motion to dismiss. Still, even at this juncture, we do not see any evidence that the DFA, the office of the
executive branch in charge of our diplomatic relations, has indeed endorsed GTZs claim of immunity.
- It may be possible that GTZ tried, but failed to secure such certification, due to the same concerns that we
have discussed herein.

- The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it
enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
- Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when they refused
to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint against it.
- Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to properly appeal the Labor Arbiters decision
to the NLRC
- . As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have
been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiters decision been a "patent nullity." Since the Labor Arbiter acted
properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZs claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision
could have translated into a "patent nullity."

- As a result, there was no basis for petitioners in foregoing the appeal to the NLRC by filing directly with the
Court of Appeals the petition for certiorari.
- It then follows that the Court of Appeals acted correctly in dismissing the petition on that ground.
- As a further consequence, since petitioners failed to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision, the
same has long become final and executory. All other questions related to this case, such as whether or not
private respondents were illegally dismissed, are no longer susceptible to review, respecting as we do the
finality of the Labor Arbiters Decision.

- A final note. This decision should not be seen as deviation from the more common methodology employed in
ascertaining whether a party enjoys State immunity from suit, one which focuses on the particular functions
exercised by the party and determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in nature.
- The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for
testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply.
- At the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding
of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an
instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision,
is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency.

HELD: PETITION DENIED

 G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of
Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779M
of the defunct Court of First Instance of Rizal.

The factual background is as follows:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects

1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.

2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic;
and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company
received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United
States had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to
defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.) The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the
case has not reached the trial stage.]

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of
the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of
its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S.
Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties. In the abovementioned
Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins
and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to
allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to
order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over
the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has
not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the
writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain
perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The petition is highly impressed with merit.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the
United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International Law, pp.
207-209 [1984].)

The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the
defendants' (now petitioners) motion: " A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge
also said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is
certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by
plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court
quotes with approval, viz.:

It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be
sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has
given its consent to be sued under the contract. ...

We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through its agency at Subic
Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay
Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability
that that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this
case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)

The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following reasons:

In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to collect several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the
action. The court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give
its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order
of dismissal was elevated to this Court for review.

In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:

It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in Article XXI of the
contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or, stated differently, it has
failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against said Government, the lower court acted properly in
dismissing this case.(At p. 598.)

It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and,
therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal
nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment
buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession
of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the
apartments shall have been vacated.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction in
the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the Court of First
Instance, the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:

On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in
interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or Increased rentals or
damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said
U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have
already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is clear hat the
courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for
unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the
action. The U.S. Government has not , given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her,
though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government
without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The
principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary
to cite authorities in support thereof. (At p. 323.)

In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the States
was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure
imperii and not for jure gestionis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No.
is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
 Lasco vs UNRFNRE
Case Digest_Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund
for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The
UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in
Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that
respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that each specialized agency shall
makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private
character to which thespecialized agencyisa party. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in
thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited
Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland