Trustees of Boston University

The 1937 Somaliland Camel Corps Mutiny: A Contrapuntal Reading

Author(s): Jama Mohamed
Source: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2000), pp. 615-
634
Published by: Boston University African Studies Center
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3097437
Accessed: 13-11-2015 07:33 UTC

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 International Journal ofAfrican Historical Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2000) 615

CAMELCORPS MUTINY:
THE 1937 SOMALILAND
READING
A CONTRAPUNTAL
By Jama Mohamed
In late November 1936, LieutenantVaux took commandof Company"C" of the
SomalilandCamelCorps,the main colonial securityforce in the SomalilandPro-
tectorate.The company,then stationedin Borama,used horses as means of trans-
portation.LieutenantVaux broughtthreewoodenscraperswithhimfromBurao(army
headquarters)for the cleaningof horsedungfromthe stables.Duringhis firstday in
command,he orderedthe stableguard"touse the scrapersin orderto keep the lines
clean duringthe night."Thatnight,therewas a "commotionin the lines about9.00
p.m. or 9.30 p.m."NeitherLieutenantVaux nor his second in command,Lieutenant
Brooke,worriedaboutthe eventsof the night.In the morningthey learned"that the
Companyhad,to all practicalpurposes,mutinied.The stableguardhad refusedto use
the scrapers,or cleanthe dungaway,andthe whole Companywere saidto have spent
the night in the bush."1LieutenantVaux dealtwith the disturbanceas "slacknessof
duty"and decided to punish those who failed to clean up the dung. But the whole
company was "ready to walk out" if those accused of slackness of duty were
punished.2Vaux decidedto ignorethe whole issue for fear of an outrightrebellion.
Instead,he talkedto the companyaboutdiscipline,andtheneed to obey all orders.The
following day, the companyreceivedan orderof transferto Hargeysa,which put the
"use of scrapers,of necessity,temporarilyin abeyance."At Hargeysa,the company
interpreterinformedLieutenantVauxthattheorderto use the scrapershouldlapse, as
"troublewas to be expectedon its insistence."LieutenantVauxagreed,andthereafter
the scraperswere not used but "lay in frontof the guardroom."3
The SomalilandCamelCorpshadbeenformedin 1912.4The menrecruitedto the
force were mostly ruralpaupers."When pre-colonialeconomic systems remained
largely intact,"wroteTimothyParsons,"mostAfricansocieties had little interestin
militaryservice."5Most of the new laborersrecruitedto the colonial economy were

1 PRO,C.O.820/27,LieutenantO. G. Brooks,Hargeysa,to Commander of the Somaliland

CamelCorps[hereafter,SCC],Burao,19 March1937.Lieutenant Vaux'sview on the mutinyand
on companydisciplineareunknown;he committed afterhistransfertoHargeysa.
suicideimmediately
2 PRO, C.0.820/27, E. N. Park,DistrictCommissioner,Hargeysa,to Secretaryto the
Government,20 March1937.
3 PRO,C.O.820/27,LieutenantO. G. Brooke,Hargeysa,to Commander of theCamelCorps,
Burao,19/3/1937.
4 JamaMohamed,"The1944Somaliland CamelCorpsMutinyandPopularPolitics,"History
WorkshopJournal 50 (Autumn 2000).
5 Timothy Parsons, The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military
Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmouth,NH, 1999), 59.

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616 JAMA MOHAMED

essentiallymigrantlaborers,andtheaskarisin colonialarmiesmustbe viewedas such.6

Similarly,as rurallife declinedin Somaliland,Somalisjoinedthe colonialforces.7The
pacificationwar waged by the governmentagainstthe nationalistmovementled by
SayyidMuhammadAbdullaHassan(1900-1920) hadcreatedpoliticalinstabilityand
insecurity,facilitatedthe spread of epidemic diseases, and weakened the rural
economy.8As the ruraleconomydeclined,more and more Somalis were drawninto
colonialarmiesas well as the colonialeconomy.Indeed,they wererecruitednot only
to the CamelCorps,but also to East Africanforces. In 1927, for instance,Somalis
constitutednearly20 percentof the askarisin the Kenya King's AfricanRifles.9
Somaliswere favoredto some extentbecausethey were considereda "martialrace,"
andbecause they were "outsiders"and mainlyMuslim.As Parsonsnoted,up to the
late 1920s the greatmajorityof askarisin East Africa"were recruitedfrom Muslim
communitiesinvolvedin the EastAfricancaravantrade,"includingthe Swahili,Yao,
andSomali,as well as Egyptians,Sudanese,andEthiopians.10
The askariswere differentiatedin termsof territorialorigin,ethnicity,and spe-
cialization.In Somaliland,askarisconsistedof differentethnicgroups,primarilySomali
andYao. In 1931,therewere 134Yao askarisand 134Yao females(familymembers),
accordingto a brief surveyof the non-Somalipopulation.1'TheYaoaskaris,however,
were not membersof the SomalilandCamelCorps,but of the King's AfricanRifles.
The askarisof the corps were Somali from all the different"tribal" groups:Isaaq
(HabrYounis,HabrAwal,and HabrJeclo), Darod (Majerteen,Dhulba Hante, and
Ogaden),andHawiye.The greatmajority,however,wereIsaaqandDarod.12Though
differentiatedin "tribal" origin and specialization,askaris nonetheless formed a
privileged"laboraristocracy"'3in termsof theiraccess to the means of violence,as
well as salary;soldieringwas one of the most lucrativeforms of wage labor for
migrants.And so theydevelopeda distinctgroupconsciousness,identity,andinterests,
becausetheirprivilegedpositionas well as theirformalsegregationfrom the society
throughformalrules andresidencein the barracksweakened"theirties to mainstream

6 Ibid., 4. Askari is a widely used Swahili term for soldier or guard.

7 See Abdi Ismail Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia,
1884-1986 (Madison, 1989); Jama Mohamed, "Epidemics and Public Health in Early Colonial
Somaliland," Social Science and Medicine 48 (1999), 507-521.
8 Mohamed, "Epidemicsand Public Health."
9 Parsons, African Rank-and-File, 58, Table 3.1.
10 Ibid., 61.
11 R. R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire (London, 1949), II,
642.
12 PRO, W.0.32/10863, Details of SCC Askaris Absent 7/6/44.
13 Parsons, African Rank-and-File, 5. For critiques of the concept of labor aristocracy,see
Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class (Cambridge, 1983), 62-63, and Frederick Cooper,
Decolonization and African Society (Cambridge, 1996), 461-63.

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 617

society."14Yet, as Parsonsput it, "theuncertaintyover the extent of these privileges

also producedmost of the tensionsandcontradictionsof colonialmilitaryservice."15
Theirgreatestconcernsas a groupweresalary,homeleave,pensions,foodservices,and
punishment,particularlyflogging. Parsonsdiscussesnumerouscases of individualand
groupresistance.16 In general,resistance
by askarishad no overtpoliticalaims.'7
It was
mainly "concernedwith issues relatingto pay and workingconditionsthanpolitical
sovereignty."18The 1937 Somaliland Camel Corps mutiny provides a good
illustrationof this point.The argumentof this articleis thatthe askaris' demandfor
higher wages was the main cause of the mutiny.The Italianconquest of Ethiopia
stimulatedthe economy of the region and createdthe social conditionsthatmade it
possible for the askaris to demand higher wages. As E. N. Parker, district
commissionerof Hargeysa,wrotein the epigraphquotedabove, 'The dungbusiness
was all bunk,whatthey [askaris]wantis better[working]conditions":higherwages
andallowances,a fair systemfor thepaymentof gratuity,andimprovedquarters.19 He
addedthatthescraperissue "precipitated,'20 but was not thecauseof, themutiny.The
askarisused it as an"excuse for outwarddemonstration" for theirdemandsfor better
working conditions. This reads
articlecontrapuntally askari politicsandregionalmarket
changesin the outbreakof the revolt.21

Mutiny
On 24 December1936,CaptainC. G. Hendleytookovercommandof Company"C ".
LieutenantVaux informedHendleyaboutthe problemscreatedby the introductionof
scrapersand advisedhim not to reintroducethem. He also told Hendley about the
general disciplinaryproblems in the company. CaptainHendley decided not to
reintroducethe scrapersandto learnmoreaboutthe company.He addressedthe issue
of disciplinein his first meetingwith the NCOs. The gist of his message was that
unless disciplinein the companyimproved,BritishNCOs would replacethe Somali
NCOs. The NCOs nominateda spokesperson,Sgt. FarahHersi,to presenttheirside

14 Parson,AfricanRank-and-File, 5. The development

of groupconsciousnessamongthe
askarisin Somalilandis discussedin Mohamed,'The 1944SomalilandCamelCorpsMutiny."
15Ibid.
16 Ibid.,Ch. 6.
17Thereareexceptionssuch as the 1944 SomalilandCamelCorpsmutinyandthe postwar
mutinyof the tirailleurssenegalais:see MyronEchenberg,"'MortsPourLa France':The African
Soldierin FranceDuringtheSecondWorldWar,"Journalof AfricanHistory26 (1985), 363-80;
Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa,
1857-1960 (Portsmouth,
NH., 1991).
18 Parsons,
African Rank-and-File, 184.
19PRO,C.0.820/27, Appendix3: E. N. Parkto Secretaryto theGovernment,
25 March1937.
Parkwas thedistrictcommissioner
of Hargeysa.
20PRO,C.0.820/27, E. N. Parkto Secretaryto the Government,20 March1937.
21 Edward Said, Cultureand Imperialism(New York, 1993).

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618 JAMA MOHAMED

of theissue. Sgt. Hersi agreedthatdisciplineneededto be improved.He also addressed

the askaris'grievances,whichcenteredon demandsfor higherwages,improvementin
workingconditions,andanextensionof thenumberof years soldiersenlistedfrom six
to twelveyearsso thatthey couldreceivegratuityandretirementfunds.Therest of the
NCOs supportedthe grievances.22CaptainHendley agreed to convey the NCO
demandsto the commanderof the corps.23
CaptainHendleyrealizedthattherewere deepriftsamongthe NCOs, and thata
mutinywas possible.24He wantedto addressbothproblemsslowly,but his gradualist
approachwas interrupted by a telegramof 16 March1937 fromthe commanderof the
CamelCorps,Lt. ColonelC. I. Bennett,who inquiredwhetherthe stablescraperswere
in use. Why the scraperswere so importantto the commanderof the corps, or to the
governor(see below), was nevermadeclear.Afterall, the askarishad hithertobeen
content to clean up the dung in the horse shed with sticks of grass, as Hendley
explainedin his reply.Anothertelegram thatsameday instructedhim to enforcetheuse
of scraperswithoutfail, andto reporton the issue at 9.00 o'clock the next morning.
The issue was to be discussedon the morningof the 17"with the governor.
As Hendleyputit, theurgencyof the commandfromheadquarters "gaveme little
time to feel my way."He calledLieutenantBrookeandthe seniorNCOs, referredto
the telegramhe hadreceived,andtoldthemthatthe scrapersmust be used thatnight
(the 16")in cleaningthe horseshed.All agreedto enforcethe command.Thatnight
only one personrefusedto use the scrapers.On the morningof the 17", he reported
to the commanderthatthe scraperswas "unpopularbut in use." CaptainHendley
receiveda telegramof congratulationsfor resolvingthe issue. The following night
(17") nothing happened,except that one soldier "did not comply [with] a very
unnecessaryorderfrom Sgt. Ali Hussein."Onthe thirdnight,March18",thesoldiers
orchestrated a "thought-out,planned,and timed"mutinyat 8:00p.m.At thatmoment,
"Signals were given by whistling,clappingandthrowingstonesinsiderthe square,on
to a roof. Simultaneously twostablesentriesrefusedto touchthescrapers.Laterstones
werethrownatthe CompanySergeantMajor."25The two stablesentrieswho refused
to touchthe scraperswere arrestedandtakento the guardroom,but a "partyof some
9 Askariscame out of the darkness... andrescuedthem."The protestlastedfor one
hour.No weaponswereused andno one was injured.Theprotestdiedoutat 9:00p.m.,
when the askarisattendeda roll call. Six of the "mutinousmen"were identifiedand
arrested.No furtherprotesttook place duringthe night.26
Hithertothe "town[hadbeen] apatheticto anythingwhich had occurredin the
Camel Corps,"and the districtcommissionerof Hargeysa,CaptainPark,wantedto

22 PRO, C.0.820/27, CaptainC. G. Hendley to the District Commissioner [DC] of Hargeysa,

19 March 1937.
23
Captain C. G. Hendley to DC Hargeysa, 19 March 1937.
24 Ibid..
25Ibid.
26 Ibid.

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 619

keep it thatway. He inquiredwhether"there were any bazaarrumoursabout the

affair,"but learnednothing.27The askarishopedto changethe indifferentattitudeof
the townspeople.On March20, RegimentSergeantMajorAwalehFarah,Company
SergeantMajorElmi Yusuf, andInterpreters MohamedNurandDeriaAdan went to
town to interviewthe priestsin orderto "obtaina certificatefrom one [priest]to say
that the matterof dung was 'haram' [prohibited]."28The NCOs hoped to win
religiouslegitimacyfor the mutiny,andthe supportof the popularfolk in the town.
Religious legitimacywas importantbecause of the role that religion and religious
figuresplayedin the mobilizationof popularresentmentagainst,andthe legitimization
of resistanceto, colonialrulein Somaliland.29
Ali Dualeh,the companyinterpreter, met the NCOs on theirway to town. They
told him abouttheirplanto obtaina certificatefroma priestin the townand suggested
thathe join them.He declinedtheirinvitation,andtold themthat"theywerefoolish to
bringup a matterwhich had been the custom in the CamelCorps ever since it was
formed."He sent word to the priests"notto interfere,"and passed the information
to the districtcommissioner.30
For the districtcommissioner,this was the worst-casescenario.He wantedto
"look after the peace of the town and the Districtand see thatthe disturbancewas
confined strictlyto the Corps."He was particularlyafraidthat"somehot head in the
Companymightlet off a rifle, andalthoughthe townhaveshownindifference,thereis
alwaysa considerablenumberof idleyouthin thistownwhomightbecomeinvolved."
And so he kept a wearyeye on the "feelingof the town by day and night." In order
to undercutthe mission of the soldiersto the priests,he went to town early the next
morning(the 21t) andaskedAli Dualehwhetherthepriestshadtakenany action.Ali
Dualehtold him thatthe deputationwas instructedto returnat 7 a.m on the 21st.The
commissionersent wordto thepriestsandthe kadi (or religiousjudge) not to discuss
the matterwiththe soldiers.Whenthesoldiersarrivedto meetthe priestsat 7 a.m, they
weretoldto go andsee thekadi.Whentheyvisitedthekadi,theyweretoldhe couldnot
discuss the issue unless they had writtenpermissionfromtheircommander.31
The DC's attemptto outmaneuver the askariswas frustrated
by CaptainHendley,
who gave the askarispermissionto choose a priestwho would adjudicateon whether

27E. N. Parkto Secretaryto theGovernment,

30 March1937.
28PRO,C.O.820/27,DistrictCommissioner,Hargeysa,to Secretaryto the Government,
30
March1937.
29 Said Samatar,Oral Poetry and Nationalism (Cambridge, 1982); Ray Beachy, The Warrior
Mullah(London,1990);RobertHess, 'The Poor Manof God:Muhammad AbdullaHassan,"in
NormanBennett,ed., Leadershipin EastAfrica,BostonUniversityAfricanResearchSeries,No. 9
(Boston, 1974); Abdi Sheikh Abdi, Divine Madness: MuhammedAbulle Hassan (London, 1993);
I. M. Lewis, A Modem History of Somaliland (New York, 1965); I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral
Democracy(London,1961).
30DistrictCommissioner,
Hargeysa,to Secretaryto theGovernment,
30 March1937.
31Ibid.

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620 JAMA MOHAMED

the cleaningof dungwithscraperswas "haram"ornot.Lt.ColonelBennettsupported

this decision,whichinfuriatedthe districtcommissioner.He visitedCaptainHendley
and told him that "formanyyearsI hadtroublein this Districtwith Wadads[priests]
interferingwith GovernmentmattersandI hopedthatI had succeededin eradicating
this danger,butif once theywere allowedto enterintothe matter,the interestsof the
town would be aroused and the whole question of Mullah interferencerevived."
CaptainHendley's permissioncould not be changed,however.And so the district
commissionerinsistedthatonly the kadicould speakto the soldiersandadjudicatethe
matter.He informedthekadiabouthis decision,althoughthe latterwas reluctantto get
involved. Since he had no sympathyfor the soldiers,he "feareda demonstrationand
abuse."His fearwas confirmedon the 22nd.The districtcommissionerand the kadi
learnedthat the soldiers "had no intentionof acceptingthe Kadi's decision if
unfavourableto themandthathe wouldbe abused."The districtcommissionerthen
visitedthe companycommandertodiscusstheissue. Theydecidedthatthe commander
would see each soldierandremindhim of the termsof his enlistment.He essentially
readthemthe riotact.Moreover,theydecidedthatthewholegroupwouldinterviewthe
kadiin the base.32
The interviewbetweenthe soldiersandthekaditookplace on the 23rd.The kadi's
decisionwas thatthe clearingof the dung was not "haram."The soldiers knew the
decisionwould go againstthem,for the clearingof the dunghadbeenpracticedsince
the formationof the corps.Oncethe decisionwas read,some of the soldiersverbally
abusedthe kadi, and "a demonstrationwas made againsthim by the CamelCorps
askaris' womenfolk when he went out to pray" in the town.33 Despite the
demonstration,the soldiers failed to mobilize public opinion. The demonstration
involvedonly the askaris'womenfolk.Not even the prieststook sides.

"Intrigue from Above"

All the key official figuresagreedthatthe mutinyhadbeen organizedby the NCOs.
But theydisagreedon thepoliticsbehindthe mutinyitself.CaptainHendleyviewedthe
whole issue in termsof theintrigueandconflictwithinthegroupof NCOs. Themutiny
was the resultof personalanimositiesamongthe NCOs, orchestrated by SergeantAli
Husseinin orderto underminethe companysergeantmajor,Elmi Yusuf.The stoning
of the companysergeantmajoron the nightof the mutinyprovedthis. The company
sergeantmajorwas consideredto be at fault,since for a long time he had taken"the
line of least resistance"in dealingwith the soldiers,and consequently had "lost all
grip over his men."And so a "rotwhichmusthavestarteda long waybackhad gone
too far for him to re-establishhimself in a hurry."34This rot was exposed by his
conflictwith SergeantAli HusseinandSergeantYasinGulaidin earlyJanuary1937.

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34Captain C. G. Hendley to DC, Hargeysa, 19 March 1937.

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 621

In earlyJanuary,Sgt. Ali Hussein-of whom CaptainHendleyhad "a very low

opinion"-made a false chargeagainstanothersoldier.The chargewas not supported
by thecompanysergeantmajor,whichled withintendaysto a conflictbetweenhimand
SergeantYasin Gulaid,an ally of Sgt. Ali Hussein.SergeantYasinGulaidrefusedto
obey the companysergeantmajor,andas a resultwas reducedin rank.35Most of the
NCOs consequentlyturnedagainst,andconspiredto undermine,the CSM. Hendley
was convincedthatmostof theNCOs were awareof, andsupportedthe"planto create
[the] disturbance"on March 18t, and thatit was designedto "spite the Company
Sergent Major." The key person who helped "engineer it" was Sergent Ali
Hussein.36ForHendleythe cause of the mutinywas the internalrivalrybetweenthe
NCOs, who did not pulltogetheras a team.The rankandfile,in Hendley'sestimation,
were merelypawnsin the strugglebetweenthe NCOs.
of the mutinywas madeby CaptainE. N. Park,
The most originalinterpretation
districtcommissionerof Hargeysa.Parkwas censoredby the governorfor failing to
informhim aboutthe lack of disciplinein the company.He insistedthatuntil March
18t thatthe problemsof the companywere a departmental issue:
The matterup to thattimewas purelya departmental one ... if I had expressed
my views to the over
Secretary the Headof the Department, I shouldhave had
no grounds for complaintif I had been told thatHis Excellency had every
confidencein ColonelBennettandcriticismof one Departmentby anotherdid
not lead to thatgood feeling and co-operationwhich should exist between
departments.37
Parkbelievedthatthemutinyhadbeen organizedbythe NCOsthrough"intrigue
from above."38He disagreedwith CaptainHendleyaboutthe aims and the form of
such organization,however,rejectingthe argumentthatthemutinyhadbeen organized
to spite the CSM.He concededthattherewererivalrieswithinthe ranksof the NCOs.
Parkalso stressedthe role of the strugglebetweenR.S.M. AwalehFarahandC.S.M.
Elmi Yusuf-a conflictwhich,by the by, CaptainHendleyignored.Accordingto Park,
R.S.M. AwalehFarahwas antagonisticto C.S.M. Elmi Yusuf,because the R.S.M.
Awaleh Farahwas expectedto retirein 1936 andhis position takenby C.S.M. Elmi
Yusuf. This was based on rumor,"But the rumourhas not died." The R.S.M.
subsequentlydecidedagainstretirement,andhadbeen holdingonto his positionever
since. In lateryears,consequently,the R.S.M.hadnot been using his "influence for
the good of the Corps."Ratherhe had been using his influence to promotehis own
interests.He wouldhavefelt triumphant, accordingto Park,if the R.S.M."could cause
troublein 'C' Companyandtherebyget the CompanySergeantMajorremovedand
outwardlysettle the affair in the hope that he might be retainedlonger in his

35Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 E. N. Park to Secretary to the Government, 30 March 1937.
38 Ibid.

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622 JAMA MOHAMED

position."39Personalanimositieswere not the determiningfactorin the revolt,how-

ever. It was ratherthe unityof the NCOs thatwas the key factorin the revolt.Despite
theirrivalry,R.S.M. AwlehFarahandC.S.M.ElmiYusuftravelled togetherto town on
the nightof 20 March,as pointedout above,in orderto persuadepriests to support
theircause.Moreover,allthe NCOs,adamantly opposedthe kadi'sdecision.(Eventhe
askaris'"womenfolk"rejectedit.)Theircommoninterestsin improvingtheirworking
conditionstranscendedpersonalanimosity.As lateas March24, Parkreportedthatthe
NCOs were unitedand "in a very rebelliousmood."40
The mutinywas neithercausedby the dissensionwithinthe ranksof the NCOs,
norby the scrapers.Parkwho was a memberof the corpsbeforehe becamea district
commissionerstatedquiteclearlythat"in my time,andas faras I knowsincemy time,
in the CamelCorps,the men have alwaysremoveddungfromthe ponies standingby
scrapingit awaywith... a piece of grass.'41The scraperissue was "bunk"-merely
used by the NCOsto mobilizethe supportof the rankandfile. Parkwrotethat "some
mischievousperson"had probablysaid"thatthey hadbeen turnedinto sweepersand
these were theirbrooms."42As such they deployedit as "an excuse for outward
demonstration" in orderto bringto the open otherissues thatconcernedthe askaris.
The issue hadbeenblownoutof proportionfirstby Lt.Vauxandthenby the telegrams
of March 16" and 17"sent to CaptainHendley by the Corps commander.The wire
fromthe commandingofficer "tellingthe CompanyCommanderto congratulatethe
NCOs on arrangingthe matterof the scrapersgave the Companya false idea of the
importanceplaced upon this small matterand decided them to make a further
demonstrationto bringthe matterto a head."43
The soldiers wantedmore pay, reflectingthe marketratein Somalilandand in
Ethiopia.(See following section).The pay scale in the corps was low in comparison
withthe rateof wages otherworkersin Ethiopiaand Somaliland.Therewere other
grievancesthatthe soldiersused as a justificationfor the revolt,such as the gratuity
system. The soldiers "didnot like servingfor six years in the corps and then three
yearsin theReserve,whichdeprivedthemof theirgratuity."Theywantedto makesure
thatthe time of theirserviceallowedthemto get theirgratuity,whichbecamepossible
only if they servedfor at leasttwelve years.Theyfelt the governmentfrustratedtheir
desiresby limitingtheiractiveserviceto six years,andthenby puttingthemon reserve
for threeyears.In addition,they railedagainstthe reductionof meatallowancesfrom
Rs.2/4 to Rs.2/-. Finally,theywanted"improvedquartersandwatersupplies,etc."44
In anotherdocument,Parkmade the same point. First, the soldiers "wanted more
pay." Second, theywantedthe lengthof theirserviceto be extendedto twelveyears so

39 PRO, C.0.820/27, E. N. Park to Secretary to the Government, 20 March 1937.

40 PRO, C.O.820/27, Appendix 1: E. N. Park to CommanderSCC, 24 March 1937.
41 E. N. Park to
Secretary to the Government,30 March 1937.
42 Ibid.
43 E. N. Park to Secretary to the Government,20 March 1937.
44 Appendix 3: E. N. Park to Secretaryto the Government,25 March 1937.

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 623

they could qualify for gratuity.Third,they wantedbetterquartersand supplies.45

Moreover,R. Smith,thedistrictcommissionerofBurao,agreedwithsuchanalysis.For
him the grievancesof Company"C"were similarto grievancesexpressedby other
companies:first,thereductionof allowances;thetransferenceof soldiersto thereserve
afternine years "whichpreventsthem from qualifyingfor a gratuity";the "menial
task of using scraperswhichdrawsattentionto the effectthey areexpectedto perform
menial tasks";andtheissue of salary.He statedthatthere"area lot of rumoursto the
effect thattroublemaybe experiencedin Burao"instigatedby othercompaniesfor the
same reasons.46
The demandsfor higherwages andbetterworkingconditionswere organizedby
"intriguefrom above,"thatis, by theNCOs, by R.S.M.AwalehFarahin particular.47
Farahand otherssuch as Sgt. Ali Husseinwere "partof the cause"of the mutiny.48
Specifically it was Sgt. Ali HusseinandR.S.M. AwalehFarah-a "suspected'bush
lawyer"'-who organizedand led the mutiny.Accordingto Park,R.S.M. Awaleh
Farahwas "an attendantin a Burao coffee-shop" before he joined the corps. No
evidence was found against him. It was nonetheless assumed that he supported
SergeantAli Hussein in organizingthe protest"by undergroundmethods."49The
NCOs used the hierarchyof the armyto articulatetheirdemandsfor betterworking
conditions.Recall, for instance,the first meetingbetween the NCOs and Captain
Hendley.The spokesmanfor the askaris,Sgt. FarahHersi,raised severalgrievances,
which centeredon improvingwages and working conditions. The grievances,as
Colonel Bennett put it, had been heard "for many years."50 Since neither the
commanderof the corps nor the commanderof "C" Companyrespondedto their
grievances,the soldiersdecidedto forcethe government'shand.
Colonel Bennettproceededto Hargeysaon the 20thand quickly "dealt with the
men in arrest"for the mutiny,punishingthe two sentrieswho had refused to obey
ordersandthreeother men "forencouragingthemto escapefrom arrest."The others
who were underarrestwere released,as therewas no case provedagainstthem. He
addressedthe company and remindedthe askaristhat they had taken an oath on
enlistmentthat"includedobeying all ordersandthis oathhad to be kept."The order
to use the scraperswas not prohibitedby Islam and "by disobeyingit disgracehad
been broughtto the Corps."He pointedoutthat"Althoughalot of peoplein Hargeisa
were making money and high wages were being paid elsewhere this was only
temporaryandthey shouldrememberthey hadpermanentemploymentwhich would
continuewhen otheremploymentavailableatpresenton highratesof payhad ceased."
Finallyhe appointeda committeeof NCOs to representthe askarisand reportto the

45 E. N. Park to Secretary to the Government, 30 March 1937.

46 PRO, C.O.820/27, DC Burao, to Secretary to the Government, 5 April 1937.
47 E. N. Park to Secretary to the Government, 30 March 1937.
48 PRO, C.0.820/27,
Appendix 3: E. N. Park to the CommanderSCC, 25 March 1937.
49 E. N. Park to Secretary to the Government,20 March 1937.
50 PRO, C.O.820/27, Commander SCC to Secretary to the Government, 9
April 1937.

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624 JAMA MOHAMED

commanderon the causesof themutiny.On March21, thecommitteereportedthatthe

mainproblemwas the use of scrapersandthatthe "menstill consideredthe using of
scraperswas againsttheirreligion,thoughsome were doubtfulon this point and that
therewere no otherreasonsfor discontent."None of the officials took the argument
seriously.Yetthey entertained it withthe vainhopethatit mightthe settletheissue. Lt.
ColonelBennett,MajorHendley,and CaptainParkthen decidedto let the issue be
mediatedby the kadi.The askarisinterviewedthe kadi"privatelybut the majorityof
themwere quitemadeupin theirmindwhattheyweregoing to do anddisregardedhis
advice."On April4t, the commanderdischargedthe leadersof the mutiny:6 NCOs
and 44 askaris. The discharged men "handed in their kits, equipment,arms,
ammunitionandsaddleryandreceivedtheirpay in perfectlygood order,therewas not
the slightest sign of any incident."They then sat "outside the Corps lines and ...
dressedin mufti,theystoodup andsalutedsmartly.The impressiontheygavewas that
they were thoroughlypleasedto be free andthey dispersedquicklyto their karias."51
In a reportdated9 AprilBennettinsistedthatthe mutinyhadbeen causedby the
issue of scrapers:"thereis a genuineobjectionto cleaningup stablemanure,whichis,
thatit lowersthe prestigeof the troops in the eyes of the rest of the population."52
Aside fromthe issue of prestige,theaskarisgave a religiousreasonforobjectingto the
use of scrapersbut "thiswas a false reasonalthoughI believea certainnumberof men
eventuallybelievedit wasreligious."Thescraperissue was important, butin realitythe
"only genuinereasonsfor discontentaretherepercussionsfromthe Italianoccupation
of Ethiopia."53In emphasisingexternalfactors, he incorporatedCaptainPark's
interpretation into his own report.In his 14"Aprilreport,repeatedthe same view: the
mutinywas "precipitatedby my instructionsto use the scrapers,"but the key cause
was the repercussionsfrom the Italianoccupationof Ethiopia.These repercussions
were felt as earlyas 1936, andwere as suchcentralto the 1936and 1937 mutinies.At
Borama,the askarisfelt threedifferent"disturbinginfluences." First,the "cost of
living was very high,"whichreducedthe purchasingpower of the askaris' income.
Meanwhile,townsfolkwho "werenobody"were becomingwealthyin comparisonto
the troops.Hithertotheaskarishadthrown"theirweightabout"in thecommunity,but
now they were the poorergroupwith decliningprestige.Second,the Italianconquest
had political as well as economic implications.The Italianswere encroachingon
pastoralistgrazingareasin the Haud,andimposingstrictcontrolson theirmovement.
They were alsorecruitinglaborersandsoldiers.The Italianbanda ("nativesoldiers")
werepaidmorethanthe askarisandwageda propagandacampaignof recruitment. One
man on leavefromthecorpsin Ethiopia,for instance,wasenlistedby the Italians,"thus
desertingfromthe Corps."Third,therewere "disturbinginfluenceswhich cropped
up"within the ranksof the corps such as "anfortunaterumour,which has only just

51 PRO, C.0.820/1, Lt. Colonel C. V. Bennett, Commanding, SCC, to Secretary to the

Government, 14 April 1937.
52 PRO, C.0.820/27/1, Lt. Colonel C. V. Bennett, CommanderSCC, to Secretaryto the
Government, 9 April 1937.
53 Ibid.

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 625

come to light,thatmen were only going to be allowedto servefor 6 or 9 years when

they wouldbe dischargedwithout gratuity"as therewas "no gratuityfor serviceunder
12 years." The grievancesof the askarisand the mutiny had been articulatedand
organizedby theNCOs. Like Park,Bennettstatedthattherewere "internaldisturbing
influences,"mainlythe conflictwithintheranksof the NCOs, that"sowedthe seeds
of discontent." He emphasizedthe rivalrybetween the R.S.M. and the company
sergeantmajor.Dissensionwithinthe ranksof the NCOs,however,wasless significant
thanthe unity of the NCOs.A small "cliqueof discontentedmen"led the mutinyby
"settinga bad example,"which the rankandfile followed.54
The commanderof the corpsandthe governorwere embarrassed by theeventsof
MarchandNovember1936. The commanderstated, forinstance,thathe hadneverbeen
informedaboutthe 1936 mutiny:"A gravemistakeappearsto havebeen madewhen
the original incident at Borama was not reported to me immediately."55His
explanationwas somewhatdisingenuous,since the armywas too professionalnot to
reportto its commanderanissue as profoundas a mutiny.He blamedthefailureon Lt.
Vaux, a man who, since he was dead, could not respond to the accusation:"as
LieutenantVaux is deceasedit is impossibletoascertainthereasonof this." The death
of Lt. Vaux was essentiallyhis alibi.Yet, in a Freudianslip, he wroteabouthis regrets
for not reportingthe incidentto the governor."I feel I madea mistakein notreporting
moredetailsof theincidentto His Excellencybut as it hadoccurredso long ago I had
presumedhe knew them,andwhen the subjectwas mentioned,the presumptionwas
correct."He continued:"I did not knowthatthe incidentwas of such a seriousnature
till the 20" Marchwhen I readLieutenantBrook's reportdatedthe 19th."56
For the governortoo the mutinywas "a very painfulsurprise."He did not hear
aboutthe 1936 mutinyuntil 9 February1937.57He also heardlate aboutthe 1937
mutiny.On 18 March,the day of the mutiny,he met Lt. ColonelBennettandwas told
that "all was well with "C" Company. On 19 March, he again met with the
commanderofficer andwas told that"therehadbeen a few serious breachesof dis-
ciplinein the Companyvery recently."He was upsetthatneitherE. N. Parknor E. P.
S. Shirley,assistantdistrictofficer,Hargeysa,hadinformedhim aboutthe eventsof 18
Marchor the earliermutinyin 1936.58Both,he insisted, "shouldhavereportedto me
what they had heard and what they knew of the unsettledstate of affairs in 'C'
Company."59He had heardrumorsin January1937 about"some unhappinessin the
Companybut theserumourswerein no way relatedto the use of scrapersor to any of

54 PRO,C.0.820/27/1, C. V. Bennett,Commander
SCC,to Secretaryto the Government,14
April 1937.
55Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 PRO, C.O.820/1, A. S. Lawrance
to Ormsby-Gore, Secretaryof Statefor the Colonies
[hereafter,SSC], 16 April1937.
58PRO,C.O.820/27/1,A. S. Lawranceto DistrictOfficer,Hargeysa,22 March1937.
59PRO,C.O.820/1,A. S. Lawranceto Ormsby-Gore, SSC, 10 April 1937.

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626 JAMA MOHAMED

the five opinions(demandforhigherwages)mentionedby CaptainParkin his minute

of the 30t of March."The governortoo acceptedCaptainPark'sinterpretation about
the roleof the scrapersin sparking,andthe NCOsin organizing,therevolt.The scraper
issue was used "purelyas an excuse to createtrouble,"whereasthe real cause of the
askaris'ill humorwas "conditionsprevailinglocallyandoverthe frontierconsequent
on the Italianoccupationof Ethiopia."The Italianoccupationhada decisiveinfluence
on the askaris:"Italianinsidouspropaganda, mainlyconductedlocallythroughbanda
and the like; the unprecedentedheavy demandat high wages for labour over the
frontier;the big pay given to the bandaandsoldiersin ItalianSomalilandandEthiopia
(some thousandsofBritishSomalisarenowin theemployof theItaliansandreceiving
these high ratesof pay),... and the lavish expenditureby the Italianson works and
roads,have upsetthe balanceof some of ourtribesmen."
The Somalicharacterwas believedto transcendthematerialconditionsthatformed
the basisof themutiny.Somaliswere"fanatical,excitable,ignorant, childish,butwithal
veryloveable,people, who can never be induced to remember the pastor thinkof the
future,andwho areonlycontentto livein thepresent."As such,the "grievances,small
in any case, of these men, are imaginedratherthanreal,but the imaginationof the
Somali does so oftenleadhiminto troubleandhis reasoningpoweris such thathe can
only see advantagein somethinghe does not possess." The bad exampleset by the
NCOs, and the Somalis' overheatedimagination,led to the mutiny.60 Since such
irrationalbehaviourwas to be expectedfromthe Somali,the gravestmistakemadeby
the districtcommissioner,his assistant,and the commanderof the corps was their
failure to inform the governorabout problemsin the company. As for his own
responsibilities,the governorwas smug:"onmy side, I feel that,with my unrivalled
knowledgeof the people, I shouldhave 'sensed'the unsettledfeeling andill-humour
in the Corps."61 His concludingstatementon the mutiny was ratherwishful: it
"appearsto me thatthe ill-humourin the Corpsis disappearing and I do most sincerely
hope that we shall hear nothing more about it."62 This attitude explains why the
governor never an the
convened inquiryinto mutiny.63 He insistedin a letterin which
the districtcommissionerwas censoredthatan inquirywouldbe heldimmediatelyinto
the mutiny.But he neverconvenedthe inquiry.Therewas no needfor such a process,
since the whole fiasco was the resultof the inherentirrationalityof the "native."His
essentializingandstereotypingrepresentationof the Somalirepresented anauthoritative
valuejudgementthatdisplacedthe need for sociologicalanalysisor the conveningof
a commissionof inquiry.64

60Ibid.
61 PRO, C.O.820/1, A. S. Lawrance to
Ormsby-Gore, SSC, 16 April 1937.
62Ibid.
63 C.0.820/271.1, Governorto District Officer,
Hargeysa, 22 March 1937.
64 EdwardSaid, Orientalism (New York, 1978); V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention
of Africa
(Bloomington, 1988).

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 627

ColonelBennettwas more willing thanthe governorto considerthe mutinyin

termsof its social andpoliticalbackground.ForBennett,as for Park,the mutinywas
organizedfrom above. And its causes were the "new factors"-developments in
Ethiopia,therise in thecost of living,andtheincreaseddemandfor labor-over which
they had "no control." Bennett admittedthat "labour troubles" and "further
discontentwill occur in the corps and throughoutthe protectorate."65Alreadythe
problemsof "C"Companywere spreadingto othercompanies.The governornoted
reportsaboutunrestin "A"Company.66 The mutinyhadbeen confinedto Company
"C," but it hada "profoundeffectupontherest of the Somalitroops"67in Buraoand
elsewhere.In 25 March,for instance,it was reportedthat disaffectionhad spread
throughthe Corpsin Buraoover pay andconditionsof service.68Therewas a report
of "discontentedtalk"in 'A' Companyat Widh-Widh,where the "menwere going
to takeno actiontilltheyreturnedto Burao"on 20 April.As earlyas 9 Apriltherewere
reportsof "slighttrouble"with some membersof CompanyA who were alreadyin
Burao. The grievancesof CompanyA were similarto those of Company C. They
complainedabout the reductionin their meat allowancefrom Rs.2/4 to Rs.2, the
transferof men to the reserveafternine years'service,andthe use of scrapers.69The
majorityof the membersof CompanyB, whichconsistedprimarilyof specialists,were
eagerto taketheirdischargeand seekemploymentin Ethiopiaor in the territory.70 The
commanderof the corps "considered the Somalis in the corps have become
unreliable."71Parkalso statedthatthe "trouble... throughoutthe Corps is so deep
rooted thatunless some satisfactorysteps can be takento eradicateit, instead of a
protectionto the communitythe CamelCorpsis a menace."72
Strike Methods

ItalyconqueredEthiopiain 1935,73andpursueddouble-prongedpolicies.
Theruthless
destructionof the opposition,particularlyduringunder GeneralRodolfo Graziani

65Commander of the SCCto Secretaryto theGovernment,9 April1937.

66A. S. Lawranceto Ormsby-Gore,SSC, 10 April1937.
67PRO,C.O.820/27,DC, Burao,to Secretaryto the Government,5 April1937.
68. Appendix3: E. N. Parkto Commander SCC,25 March1937.
69 DistrictCommissioner, Burao,to Secretaryto the Government, 5 April1937.
70 Commander SCCto Secretaryto the Government, 9 April1937.
71 ColonelBennett,Commander of the CorpsandtheKing'sAfricanRifles,to Secretaryto the
Government, 9 April1937.
72 E. N. Parkto Secretaryto the Government, 20 March1937.
73 Theliteratureon theItalianconquestof Ethiopiais vast. It mostly dealswith the warof
conquest,andits international
implications, whileignoringtheregionalandlocalimpactof thewar
as recentlypointedout in AlessandroTruilzi'sreviewarticle,"ItalianColonialismin Ethiopia,"
Journal of African History 23 (1982), 273-74; Esmonde M. Robertson, Mussolini as Empire-
Builder; Europe and Africa, 1932-1936 (London, 1977); Renato Mori, Mussolini e la conquista
dell'Etiopia (Florence, 1978); Alberto Sbacchi, n Colonialismo italiano in Etiopia, 1936-1940

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628 JAMA MOHAMED

(from May 1936 to December 1937) was accompaniedby the developmentof the
economy.74Since the Italiansassumedthat"Ethiopiawas theirsfor good," they set
aboutprovidingthe"empirewithwhatit lacked...:roads,railways,factories,hospitals,
schools, hotels,post offices, telephoneexchanges,etc."75 Both the Italianimperial
governmentandprivateinterestsinvested"hugeamountof capital"76in Ethiopiain
all sortsof enterprises.Mussoliniwaswillingto undertake such investmentbecausehe
was convincedthat"Ethiopiais so vast,its resourcesof mineralwealthhavebeenlittle
exploredthatit is quiteimpossibleto say how long we shallhaveto waitbeforeit pays
dividends."He was surethatwould take at least "severaldecades."77
The Italianconquestof, andinvestmentin, Ethiopia,hada dramaticimpacton the
economy of Somaliland.78It was partlyinstrumental in whatCharlesGeshektercalls
"class formation"in the country.79Since Geshekter,Abdi Samatar,and Ahmed
Samatarhave alreadydiscussed the issue in detail,I will briefly relatesome of the
First,it "createda largeif temporary
salientfeaturesof theimpactof Italianinvestment.
marketfor all the main classes of goods regularlyimportedinto the [Somaliland]
protectoratewhich became a channel of supply for the frontierareas in which
considerableshortageof most goods was being felt."80Tradersrespondedquicklyto
the shortageanddemandfor goods in Ethiopia.They importedgoods, and then re-
exportedthem to Ethiopia.Importedgoods into Somalilandin the flag ports, for
instance,increasedfrom ?325,491 in 1935 to ?728,050 in 1938.81 Second, the
improvement growthandeconomyof thetowns,
in the tradeenvironmentstimulatedthe

(Milan, 1980); George W. Baer,The Comingofthe Italiam-EthiopianWar (Cambridge,Mass., 1967);

Frank Hardie, The Abyssinian Crisis (Hamden, Conn., 1974); Anthony Mockler, Haile Selassie's
War (Oxford, 1984); FranklinD. Laurens,France and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936 (The
Hague, 1967); George Steer, Caesar in Abyssinia (Boston, 1937); Daniel Waley, British Public
Opinionand theAbyssinian War,1935-6 (London, 1975); A. J. Barker,The CivilizingMission: The
Italo-Ethiopian War, 19356 (London, 1968); Angelo Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, 1935-1941
transl D. Cumins (Chicago, 1969); Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiano in Africa orientale: II. La
conquista dell' Impero (Bari, 1979).
74 Del Boca, The Ethiopian War.
75 Ibid., 232.
76 Ibid., 237.
77 Benito Missolini, Scriti e discorsi dell'Impero, cited in Angelo Del Boca, Ethiopian War,
237.
78 Charles L. Geshekter, "Anti-Colonialismand Class Formation:The EasternHorn of Africa
Before 1950,"InternationalJournalofAfrican Historical Studies 18, 1 (1985), 1-32; Abdi Samatar,
The State and Rural Transformationin Northern Somalia, 1884-1996 (Madison, 1989); Ahmed
Samatar,Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality (London, 1988).
79 Geshekter, " Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation."
80 Great Britain. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the
People of Somaliland, 1937 (London, 1939), 24.
81 PRO, C.0.607/38, Blue Books, 1938, "StatementShowing PrincipleArticles Importedand
Exported, 1934-1938."

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 629

andhence was instrumentalin the emergenceof a new "middlingsortof people."82

As one reportput it:
When Jig-Jigawas firstoccupied[bythe Italians]everysmalltraderwho could
obtaingoods andthe wherewithalto transportthem,rushedto Jigjigaand sold
them to the troops at enormous profits.... there is still a great deal being
exportedandsmalltraders,who werepoorbefore,arenow comparatively rich.
Manypeople, who never of
thought tradingpreviously, are now takingcaravans
over the borderanddoingvery well.83
A "sign of prosperity"was the "brisk demandfor buildingplots in Hargeisa."84
Most of the profitsof the new "comparativelywealthy"traderswerereinvestedin real
estatein the towns.Therewas also a briskinvestmentin motorvehicles,becausethey
reduceddistancesandthe cost of trade,increasedthevolume,andenhancedprofits.In
1931 therewere only 36 commercialcars in the country.By 1936, the numberof
commercialcarshadjumpedto 312; andin 1937 alone,247 commercialmotor vehicles
were imported.85The largenumberof motorvehicles "openedup the remotepartsof
the districts" and Ethiopiafor commerce.86Third,the increasein tradecreateda
dynamicmarketfor laborersin Somaliland,andEthiopia.As the 1937 ColonialOffice
reportput it, "The introductionof organisedtransittraffic between Berbera and
Ethiopiahas resultedin increaseddemandfor labour."87
The economicboom,however,coincidedwitha periodof laborshortage.Not even
the increasein the movementof young men fromthe ruralareasto the urbancenters
fulfilledthe demandfor laborpowerin the new economy.The shortageof laboreven
hit livestockownerswho were "realizingthattheirsons areno longercontentto stay
at home andlook afterthe stock,andit is verydifficulttofindservants(dhoobi)to take
their place.'88In general,therewas a widespreadshortageof laborin the protectorate,
duringthe firsttwo decades of the twentiethcenturyas a resultof the demographic
impact of diseases and the pacificationwars against the nationalistmovement.89
Salariedgroupswere quickto takeadvantageof the new opportunitiesof employment.
As one reportput it, the "localcoolies" who were "quickto appreciatethe situation,
not only demandedincreasedrates of pay from time to time, but also displayed a
tendency to resent reprimandfor criticism of indifferentwork, and occasionally

82 J.
Barry and C. Brooks, eds., The Middling Sort of People (Basingstoke, 1994).
83 Great Britain. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the
People of Somaliland [hereafter,Annual Report], 1936 (London, 1937), 28.
84Ibid.
85Annual Report, 1937, 17.
86 Ibid., 29. See also Geshekter, "Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation,"24-25.
87Annual Repor, 1937, 28.
88 Ibid.
89Mohamed,"Epidemics
andPublicHealth,"511.

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630 JAMA MOHAMED

resortedto 'strike' methods."90Therewas only was one unionin the countryin the
1930s:the SomaliOfficialsUnion,theorgani7ation forcivil servants,mainlylow-level
clerks.91Thestrikeswere thusorganizedthroughinformalmeansP2The 1937mutiny
mustbe seen withinthiswiderframework. It waspartof the "strike"methodsof first-
generationmigrantworkersfor whomwage laborwas increasinglybecominga central
aspectof theirexperiences,life, andconsciousness.
To a greatextentthe workers'"strikemethods"weremadenecessarynotmerely
by the increasingopportunitiesin the protectorateand in Ethiopia,but also by the
depressed wages in the protectorate.Workers' grievancesdid not reflect mere
opportunism.For instance,the rate of wages for carpenters,masons, blacksmiths,
porters,casualworkers,domesticservants,cooks,butlers,forexample,hardlychanged
in the 1930s.As the tableillustrates,therewas only a slight increasein the wages of
skilledcarpenters,skilled masons,blacksmiths,and casual laborersin Berbera.The
most strikingdisparityis betweenwages in Berberaandupcountry.Berberawas the
largesturbancenter,andattractedmanyunemployedpeople.Consequently,the labor
reservein townwas higherthanupcountry.Butevenso, wages slightlyincreasedin the
town for porterandothercasuallaborers,mainlyas a resultof the increasingdemand
for laborpowerandthe strikemethodsof the workers.The askaris'wages were also
depressedandhad barelychangedsince the formationof the corpsin 1913.
There was a specialistallowance,but it was meager (See Table 3 below). As
income,the specialists'allowancewasnegligible.Evenwhenthemeatallowance,G.C.
duty allowance,and extra-dutyallowanceare calculated,a police corporalreceived
higherwages thana sergeantin the army.
The inspectorgeneral stated that the "main effect of the Italianconquest of
Abyssiniahas been to increasethe demandfor labour,with a consequentrise in the
wages paid...." But the"soldiers'pay hasnotrisenwiththerisein thecost of living,"
and so therehas beena "feelingof hardshipamongtherankandfile of the corps,who
were,formerly,well off in comparisonwith the rest of the population."In orderto
createan efficientandreliablearmy,the inspectorgeneralsuggestedanincreasein the
soldiers' pay. He pointedto the fact that"a Sergeantcommandinga troopof 40 men
and40 animals,withalltheirequipment,onlydrawstwo rupeesa monthmorepay and
allowancesthana privatesoldierwho is a hospitaldresser,andis actuallyin receiptof
less pay andallowancesthana police corporal,[S.C.C.],a drillinstructorcorporal,or
a bugle corporal."(See Table4.) The inspectorgeneralsuggested across-the-board
pay and allowanceincreasesfor all the ranks.93The commanderof the corps also

90Annual Report, 1937, 28.

91 Unfortunately,there are no studies on the union.
92 As John Higginson and FrederickCooper point out, salariedgroups relied on traditional
networksin organizing strikes andresistanceparticularlyin the earlycolonial period.John Higginson,
WorkingClass in the Making: Belgian Colonial Labor Policy, Private Enterprise, and the African
Mineworker, 1907-1951 (Madison, 1989), 11; FrederickCooper, Decolonization and African
Society (Cambridge, 1996), 58.
93 PRO, C.O.820/30/5, Inspector General's Report on the SCC, 16 November 1937.

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 631

suggestedthattheaskaris'wagesbe increased,gratuitiesbe paidafternineyearsrather

thantwelve,andallowances-particularlythe meatallowance-be improvedy4But the
governorrejectedthe proposalfor increasedwagesin his 16"Aprilreport:"if the pay
of the corps is raised,the pay of the Police would also have to be increased,since I
could not agreethatthereshouldbe differentratesof pay in these two forces."95
The issue was raisedin a discussionin Londonin whichrepresentatives fromthe
ColonialOffice andthe WarOffice met thegovernorof Somaliland.The WarOffice
supportedpay increasesfor the army.Mr. Boyd agreedwith the War Office, and
suggested thatthe increasesbe put into effect "as early as possible"but "subjectto
Sir A. Lawrance's view." The governor "disagreed entirely ... that there was
discontentin the CamelCorpsowing to the pay anomalies,"insistingthat "Service
with the CamelCorpswas popular."96 Since the Treasurywasunwillingto acceptpay
increasesfor the police, the governorwon, andthe pay increaserecommendedfor the
askariswas rejected.Thefailureto increasethe askaris'wageshauntedthearmy:their
demandwas the basis of the 1944 CamelCorpsmutiny.

Table 1: Wage Rates in 1931 and 1938 Compared

Occupation Daily wages, 1931 Daily wages, 1938

Carpenters:skilled s.d. 2/7 to 4/6 s.d. 2/7 to 5/7.5

Carpenters:unskilled s.d. 1/1 to 4/- s.d. 1/1 to 4/-

Masons:skilled s.d. 1/1 to 4/1 s.d. 1/6 to 5/3
Masons:unskilled s.d. 1/1 to 4/1 s.d. 1/1 to 4/-

Blacksmiths,skilled& unskilled s.d. 1/6 to 3/1 s.d. 1/6 to 4/6

Porters+ casuallaborat Berbera s.d. 44 1/2 to -/11 -/11 1/4 to 1/3 _
Porters+ casual laborupcountry s.d. 6/- to 15/- 6/- to 15/-
Cook ?12 to ?36 ?12 to ?36
Butler ?12 to ?40 ?12 to ?40

Source:PRO, C.0.607/31 andPRO, C.0.607/38: Blue Books.

94 C.0.820/1, Lt. Colonel C. V. Bennett, CommanderSCC, to Secretary to the Government,

14 April 1937.
95 C.0.820/1, A. S. Lawrance to Ormsby-Gore, SSC, 16 April 1937.
96 PRO, C.0.820/30/5, "Extractfrom a Note of a
Meeting Held in Mr. Boyd's Room on
Tuesday,13 December,1938."

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632 JAMA MOHAMED

Table 2: Basic Pay Rate, 1/1/1938

Rank PresentEstablishment Pay Rate in Rupees

RegimentalSergeantMajor 1 50

CompanySergeantMajor 2 35-1-40

Sergeants 10 27

Corporals 12 20
LanceCorporals 29 17
Privates 263 15

Source:PRO,C.0.820/30/5, "Revisionof SomalilandCamelCorpsEstablishment

and Rates of Pay, 11/3/1938."

Table 3: Specialist Allowance, in Rupees

Position Allowance Position Allowance

HeadSalutri Rs.20 Seven Saddlersvice five 5
Schoolmaster 15 EightBuglers vice seven 2
Two CompanySalutris 1() Nine vice fourHospitalOrderlies5
FourAssistantSalutris 5 HeadTomal 10
One Bugle Major 5 ThreeTomals 5
CorpsDrill Instructor
vice Drill Sergeant 5 ProvostSergeant 5
Quartermaster Sergeant 7--8 EightMilitaryPolice 2
FourRationCorporals 3 Twelve WirelessOperators 20
FourVickersGun Sergeants
vice three 4
Two VickersGunCorporals 3
Two VickersGunL/Corporals 2
FourRangeTakers 2
Twelve VickersGunPrivates 1
Lewis Gun Corporals 3
EightLewis GunL/Corporals 2
Twenty-fourLewis GunPrivates 1
Source:PRO,C.0.820/30/5, InspectorGeneral'sReporton the SomalilandCamelCorps,
AppendixB, 16 November1937.

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 THE 1937 SOMALILAND CAMEL CORPS MUTINY 633

Table 4: Comparative Rates of Pay and Allowances

of Rank and File

Pay G.C. Pay ExtraDuty Meat Total

Allowance Allowance
Duty Sergeant Rs.27 Rs.- Rs.- Rs.2 Rs.29
(troopleader)
Police Corporal 20 4 5 2 31
Drill InstructorCorporal 20 6 2 2 30
Bugle Cpl. 20 3 5 2 30
Vickers GunCpl. 20 4 3 2 29
Coy. RationCpl. 20 4 3 2 29
Duty Cpl./TroopCpl. 20 2 - 2 24
Duty L/Cpl. (Section 17 - - 2 19
Leader)
Coy. Hospt. Dresser 15 5 5 3 27
(Pte.)

Source:PRO, C.O. 820/30/5, InspectorGeneral'sReporton the SomalilandCamel

Corps,AppendixA, 16 November1937.

In conclusion,the 1937 mutinyhadnotbeen shapedby nationalistambitions.The

askarisattemptedto win popularsupportfor theirdemandsbut had failed to gain
supporteitherfromreligiousleadersor the popularclasses. And so duringthe 1944
mutiny,97the askaris were anxious to win popular support and articulatedtheir
demandsfor higherwages in a way thatdovetailedwith popularinterests.
The 1937 mutinywas notspontaneousbut organizedby theNCOs, who used the
theirgrievancesandto coordinatethe
structuresandhierarchyof the armyto articulate
rebellion.In a recentarticle,JeremyKrikleranalyzedhow 20,000 whiteworkersused
militarydisciplinethey had gainedduringthe FirstWorldWarto organizethe 1922
strikeon the SouthAfricanRand.The disciplinecreatedthroughmilitarymetaphors
andthe militancyof the workerswere so extraordinarythat"theywere able to offer a
revolutionarythreatto the governmentof the day."98Organizedlaborin generalis

97Mohamed,"The1944SomalilandCamelCorpsMutiny."
98 JeremyKrikler,"Commandos:
The Armyof WhiteLabourin South Africa,"Past and
Present163 (May 1999),204.

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634 JAMA MOHAMED

The Somaliaskaris,however,used military

"given to the use of militarymetaphors.""99
metaphorsinsidethe army,to organizethe mutiny,butnot outside.
The cause of the 1937 mutiny,whicheven the governorcould not ignoredespite
emphasizingthe wild characterof the "native,"was clearlythe askaris' demandfor
higherwages andbetterworkingconditions.The scarcityof laborin the Protectorate,
alongwithpoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentsin Ethiopiaas a resultof the Italian
occupation,stimulatedthe demandfor laborin both Somalilandand Ethiopia.The
askariswere willing to takea risk,becausetheywere surethatthey wouldeithergain
higher wages within the army or find employmentin Ethiopiaor Somaliland.In
Somaliland,theybelievedthatthe transittradewould providethem with highly paid
employmentor thepossibilityof going intobusinesson theirown.100 The askariswere
jealous of the "largesums of moneymadeby Somalisin the Protectorate tradingwith
ItalianoccupiedEthiopia."101 They were awarethatthe prosperitywouldnot last for
long: "Localmerchantsareof the opinionthatthe trans-frontier tradewill gradually
decline,andthatconditionswillrevertto normal,"as theItaliansgraduallybecameable
to obtainsufficientsupplies from theirown country.102Thus both merchantsand
workerswereeagerto takeadvantageof theneweconomybeforeit driedup. Localand
regional developmentsin the market,in short, must be read contrapuntallyin
understandingthe causes andcourseof the mutiny.

99 Ibid., 243.
100C.0.820/27/1, Lt. Colonel C. V. Bennett, to Secretary to the Government, 9 April 1937.
101 Annual Report, 1937, 28.
102Ibid., 27 and 28,
respectively.

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