G.R. No.

90625 May 23, 1991PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN,accused.FACTS:
The information was filed against accused-appellant and his co-accused. When
arraigned with the assistance of counsel
de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty.
At the scheduled hearing, new counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that
the accused had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense
The court issued an order acknowledging the manifestation of the de oficio
counsel and noted there are two mitigating circumstances that maybe applied. The
Prosecuting Fiscal made no objection but also manifested that he has to look into
the penalty applicable. The hearing was reset to another date.
Upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected
settlement of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was reset again. However,
counsel de oficio for the accused did not appear, hence "a report on the projected
settlement of the civil aspect of the case cannot be made" and the hearing was
reset again which schedule was later on cancelled due to the compulsory retirement
of the presiding judge.
In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court.
The initial reception of evidence took place on 4/24/1987 with the accused-
appellant represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon. Thereafter, hearings were had until
the parties completed the presentation of their evidence.

TRIAL COURT:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
The accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. However, Judge Cipriano de
Roma erroneously directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. The
CA transmitted to this Court on the records which were erroneously transmitted to
it.
The accused is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and
conclusion of facts by the trial court. But that, the trial court erred in not applying
the indeterminate sentence law.
Accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty of reclusion
temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without
due process of law or is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
prohibited by the Constitution" and he submits that "the righteous and humane
punishment that should have been meted out should be indeterminate sentence"
with "all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the
accused . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and humanitarian
reasons."
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was denied?
RULING:
There was no denial of due process.
REQUISITES:
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a
court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the
defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
People vs. Castillo: If an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then
he has had due process.
All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The
records further disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and
unhampered opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel the hearing of
2/10/1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him and to present
his own evidence
If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have
faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
but definitely for more.
Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To
make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC or
of any other provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for
specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294,
par. 1 of the RPC has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the
1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the
1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases.
The same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel degrading and inhuman
punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua. Thus: Sec. 19(l). Excessive
fines shall not beimposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua
As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We agree with the Solicitor
General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the
RPC is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in
view of theabolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the
first paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC shallapply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua
must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.