Caroline King 1

Place Matters: Neighborhoods and Crime in Denver, Colorado

Introduction

Place matters. As sociologist Robert Sampson (2012) states in the thesis of his book on

crime in Chicago, it matters, because differentiation by neighborhood is not only everywhere to

be seen, but it has durable propertieswith cultural and social mechanisms of reproduction

and with effects that span a wide variety of social phenomena (p. 11). In other words,

neighborhoods are not random, and there is an intriguing and problematic correlation between

them and with social and cultural outcomes. This paper uses theories about communities and

crime discussed by Sampson and others to assess the degree to which they apply to the capital

city of ColoradoDenver. The data suggests that, as in Chicago, certain neighborhoods in

Denver have durable properties, as Sampson calls them, that together create concentrated

disadvantage. This paper will look at how and why disadvantage is concentrated, how that

pertains to crime, and the measures taken in Denver to reduce crime.

I. Community Profile

Consistent with many studies of other cities, African American and Hispanic populations

are racially isolated in Denver. Figure 1 compares areas with a high percentage of African

American people (left) with those with high percentages of Hispanic and Latino people (right) in

2014. This map indicates that the Northwest corner of Denver contains a high percentage of

African-American people, and the upper portion of this same region contains a high percentage

of Hispanic and Latino people. Towards the center of the city, near Aurora, there is another

highly concentrated cluster of Hispanic and Latino people, along with a few isolated areas

containing high percentages of African-Americans. These segregation patterns are consistent

with Shaw and McKays (1969) finding cited by Sampson in The Community that African

Americans are often racially isolated. What is interesting to notice about this map is that the
tracts with high concentrations of Hispanic and Latino people and African Americans are in the

same general regions of the city: the Northwest corner and central Denver. In contrast, the

Southwest corner, along with portions of central Denver, is predominantly white. The two main

minority groups of Denvers population occupy the same general regions of the city.

Figure 1: Race and Ethnicity in 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014)

These same isolated areas previously discussed have the most concentrated rates of

poverty. Figure 2 reveals that poverty permeates a sadly large proportion of Denver.

Figure 2: Children Living in Poverty vs. Female-Headed Households in 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014)

Only two relatively small areas have low percentages of children living in poverty; these two

isolated and barely affected areas are the areas with almost entirely white populations. The

remainder of the city is marked by poverty. The map on the right shows the number of female-

headed households in Denver. There are much fewer female-headed households than children

King 2
living in poverty, however, the areas more affected by poverty also contain more female-headed

households. The most definite cluster seems to be the Northwest corner of the city in which there

are also high concentrations of African-American and Hispanic people, indicating concentrated

disadvantage in this region.

Figure 3 again highlights the Northwest region, which has the highest percentage of

people with less than a high school degree. The map on the right concerning renter occupied

units indicates that the majority of Denver locals rent their homes and does not seem to be

stratified as other variables are. This is probably due to rising housing costs in the city.

Figure 3: High School Educated vs. Renter Occupied Homes in 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014)

It is critical to consider how the trends described above from the census data have either

fluctuated or remained stable over time. Figure 4, comparing the African American populations

in Denver in 1990 with 2014, indicates that the patterns of segregation have remained stable over

time. In his book Sampson (2012) cites William Julius Wilsons theory of concentration effects

that argues that, with changes in the economy from goods producing to service producing in the

70s and 80s, racial stratification increased even more, perhaps explaining one reason for this

stability. Additionally, Figure 4 indicates that there are generally less African-American people

living in these segregated communities today than there were in 1990.

King 3
 Figure 4: African American Populations in 1990 vs. 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014)

Figures 5 and 6 on the following page compare children living in poverty and people with

less than a high school degree from 1990 and 2014. Poverty has increased over time despite

more children graduating from high school. Despite the spreading of poverty since 1990, some

areas still remain unaffected. These unaffected areas are the ones with little racial diversity, and

there is evidence to suggest this is in no way a natural occurrence (Sampson 2012). Sampson and

others have studied the effects of structural factors like government subsidized development in

the private sector, blockbusting, and red-lining to trace the roots of these stable patterns of

segregation and disadvantage (Sampson 2012). Cities have arbitrary boundaries held in place by

institutional discrimination. While practices like red-lining, in which banks mark off high-risk

areas for loans, are now illegal, institutional discrimination still persists in subtler forms. For

example, block busting is where realtors decrease the cost of houses in a neighborhood once a

family of color moves in, often generating a white flight response (Sampson 2012).

King 4
 Figure 5: Children in Poverty in 1990 vs. 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014)

Figure 6: Less Than High School Education in 1990 vs. 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau 2014)

Familiarity with these demographical trends will heighten our understanding of crime

rates and trends in Denver. The isolation of minority groups paired with the high rates of poverty

in those areas undoubtedly correlates to crime. Before understanding how they correlate, it is

important to know the general rates of violent and property crime in Denver. Overall, the violent

crime rate in Denver has been on the decline since the early 90s. There was sharp increase

around 2002, as shown by the graph in Figure 7, but it began to decline again around 2004 and

has remained stable since. The violent crime in Denver with the highest rate is aggravated

assault, with 364.5 (US Department of Justice 2012). Murder is the least often committed violent

crime with 6.2 (US Department of Justice 2012). The violent crime rate in Denver is significantly

King 5
higher than the national average of 386.9 at a heartbreaking 615.9 per 100,000 (US Department

of Justice 2012).

Denver, CO Violent Crime Rate, 1990-2012

Figure 7: Violent Crime Rate

Property crimes in Denver are also more frequent than in other cities. The national

average is 2,859.2 while Denvers is 3,713.8 (US Department of Justice 2012). The most

frequent property crime is larceny-theft with 2,313.9, accounting for 62% of the average property

thefts in the city. The least-occurring property crime is motor vehicle theft.

The violent crime rate in Denver was the highest from 1991-1993 with around 1,000

crimes per 100,000 people each of those three years until it began to decline steadily in the early

2000s (US Department of Justice 2012). These three years in the 90s also had the highest rate

for murder Denver has since seen. After 1993, the violent crime rate began to decline fairly

steadily, especially the murder rate.

However, 2004 saw an increase in violent crime, though the rates were still lower than

they were in the early 90s. In 2004, the murder rate was 15.4, the highest it had been since 1995

(US Department of Justice 2012). For the most part, crime has decreased since the early 90s,

King 6
with the exception of the years of 2004 to 2006. Property crimes have also decreased steadily

since 1990. In 1990, the property crime rate was 6,857.0, the second worst year to 1993 (US

Department of Justice 2012). The same time that the violent crime rate began to decline, the

property crime rate did as well. It increased slightly around 2001 but saw a huge decline in 2005

from 6,004.6 to 4,615.8. Since then, the property crime rate has been on the decline.

The areas with the most reported crime coincide with the Northwest corner of Denver in

which there is also concentrated disadvantage. According to the Denver Police department crime

data based on the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), the areas with the most

reported crimes in 2012 were, in descending order, CBD, Union Station, Capitol Hill, North

Capitol Hill, the Civic Center, and Five Points (Denver Police Department 2012). Figure 8

provides a visual of these areas; the more darkly shaded areas comprise the most crime-ridden

neighborhoods. This area is east of interstate 25 and north of highway 70, which corresponds to

the Northwest part of Denver in which there is a higher concentration of African-American and

Hispanic populations as well as children living in poverty.

Figure 8: Crime Density (Denver Police Department 2012)

To explain why concentrated poverty leads to violence, sociologists have often utilized

Shaw and McKays social disorganization theory (Sampson 2011). Their theory attributes the

cause of crime in highly impoverished communities to residential instability, perhaps indicating

King 7
why rates of delinquency persist over time in areas with a large amount of social disorder

(Sampson 2011). Sampsons research looks more closely at social disorder. Social disorder,

Sampson argues, is more about the perception of it than the reality (2012). For example, a large

amount of trash after a football game does not carry the same stigma as a polluted neighborhood

in a bad part of town. The damaging result is that the people in these neighborhoods are

stigmatized as being bad as well. Sampson terms this stigmatization related to perception

ecological contamination (2012: 133).

Since Shaw and McKays social disorganization theory, more research has refocused the

attention from social disorder to the socially structured dimensions of disadvantage, especially

the geographic isolation of the poor, and, in the United States, the racial isolation of African

Americans in concentrated poverty areas (Sampson 2011: 212). It is the social structure of

disadvantaged communities, according to Sampson, that contributes the most to crime. He argues

that neighborhoods that lack collective efficacy consequently are characterized by a lack of trust

and weak organization ties (Sampson 2012). Collective efficacy is defined simply as social

cohesion among neighbors (Sampson 2012). This cohesion means that neighbors are more likely

to help and trust each other (Sampson 2012). People in neighborhoods that lack collective

efficacy, often the neighborhoods also lacking resources, are often morally cynical and believe

that moral laws are not binding (Sampson 2012). African Americans remain in isolated

communities, often impoverished ones, because of institutional discrimination, a stable trend in

Denver. Because these isolated communities have a lack of resources, lower property taxes and

thus poorly funded schools, a lack of both community organizations and strong ties, and a fear of

crime, the disadvantage is compounded so severely in these places that a general lack of trust

festers and breeds crime. Sampsons research explains possible reasons beyond the dated theory

King 8
of social disorganization for why the neighborhoods in Northwest Denver, where many African

Americans and some Hispanic and Latino people reside, have the most crime in the entire city.

These areas experience compounded disadvantage due to socially structured dimensions not

being adequately addressed by our government. In Denver, the police department has responded

to the obvious but complicated issue of concentrated crime by creating a community-level

intervention focused on gang violence.

II. Intervention and Analysis

Law enforcement officials in Denver, Colorado have identified 78 gangs operating within

the city (Cordona 2011). Because the most frequently committed crime in Denver is aggravated

assault, often as a result of gang activity, many of the citys crime intervention programs within

the past few decades have focused on the prevention of gang and gun violence (Cordona 2011).

Gang Reduction Initiative of Denver or GRID was started by the city in 2010 with a 2.2-million-

dollar federal grant but has undergone many crucial changes since its foundation (Phillips 2015).

GRID aims to educate young people about gang violence to prevent their entry into gangs as well

as to help existing gang members become law-abiding members of their communities without

increasing rates of incarceration (Denver Department of Safety 2016). GRID has four main

goals: reducing recidivism rates for the target population, reducing violent gang crime in targeted

neighborhoods, positive behavior changes in target population, and increased collaboration

capacities among project stakeholders (Denver Department of Safety 2016). It is a long-term

approach to gang violence that is focused on the targeted strategic planning and assessment of

the community in which multi-level system change is key (Denver Department of Safety 2016).

In response to a spike in crime after GRID was implemented, a program called Ceasefire was

added to enhance the program.

King 9
 GRID has three categories of targeted populations, each with a specific subgroup for

juveniles: prevention, intervention, and re-entry (Denver Department of Safety 2016). The

targeted population of the prevention group is the general population, the targeted population of

the intervention group is active gang members, and the targeted population of the re-entry group

is offenders returning from prison or detention facilities (Denver Department of Safety 2016).

For the general population of non-gang members, the goal of GRID is to educate. The program

focuses in particular on young students. Under GRIDs funding, officers visit elementary schools

in targeted neighborhoods to discuss neighborhood safety and the importance of education. For

existing gang members and their families, GRID assists by providing access to job placement,

appropriate mental health services, and outreach mentoring. Finally, for re-entering offenders,

GRID offers various programs to help gang members with the often difficult transition of

returning to their communities (Denver Department of Safety 2016). Its program director, Paul

Callanan, stated that he wants to help offenders get housing when they return to the community

from jail (Cordona 2011).

Figure 1 (Denver Department of Safety 2016) summarizes the overall strategy of GRID

in reducing gang activity and promoting healthy communities.

Figure 9: GRID Healthy Community Pyramid (Denver Department of Safety 2016).

King 10
It shows the different targeted populations and the strategy associated with each group. One

common denominator of all groups is education. The main aim of GRID is to be proactive rather

than reactive when it comes to gang violence through education and increased collective

efficacy.

Recently, however, Denver saw a spike in violent crime, and in response the city added a

new intervention program to be a part of GRID called Ceasefire or Group Violence Intervention

program; the aim of this offshoot of GRID is to narrow the focus to people who are the most

violent (Phillips 2015). This program is based on an approach that helped Boston to decrease its

homicides by 70 percent in the mid-90s (Gurman 2012). Several other large cities, including

Oakland and Chicago, have also implemented Ceasefire. Under Ceasefire, community leaders,

clergymen, and law enforcement officials gather gang members in closed-door meetings where

they demand that the violence end (Gurman 2012) and where social workers offer an

alternative path through job placement programs. Another key part of Ceasefire is Gang

Resistance Education and Training programs in schools. Participating probation officer Garcia-

Sandoval said, If we can stop something before it happens, isnt that the best approach?

(Phillips 2015). Because the program is dependent on the devotion of its participants, it has

proven difficult to sustain. Where Bostons program failed was in sustainability, because the

program faced a lot of setbacks largely due to budget cuts (Gurman 2012). Ceasefire is a more

recent addition to GRID in Denver, so it is difficult to evaluate its success. However, it definitely

appears to be helping. The total number of gang related crimes reported in 2014 was 334, down

from 367 in 2010 (Phillips 2015). The leaders of this effort say they are committed to making

this approach work (Gurman 2012), hoping to make the effects of Ceasefire last longer in

King 11
Denver than those in Boston or Oakland. Several sociological theories further validate the

potential effectiveness of this initiative.

GRID and Ceasefire are examples of community-level interventions. Sociologist Robert

Sampson advocates for these types of interventions over moving people out of troubled

neighborhoods, because community-level interventions, he argues, are more cost effective over

the long-term (2011). Because GRID is a self-identified long-term program, its focus on the role

of both gang members and the general population in their communities is in line with Sampsons

idea of the long-term effectiveness of community-level intervention. GRID does not focus on

individuals but on the role of groups in targeted communities, as the pyramid indicates. It

promotes collective efficacy through education programs and meetings with city officials via

Ceasefire.

Sampson identifies nine broad types of community-level interventions. The GRID

initiative applies a strategic overlapping of a few of these types. One such type is identifying

neighborhood hot spots. Because GRID focuses on gang violence, its initiatives apply only to

areas in which gangs are most prominent. Officials have stated that its domain will widen in the

years to come. As of present, the focus is on Denvers high-risk areas. Sampson also argues that

identifying neighborhood hot spots is most effective when it is paired with informal social

control (2011). Ceasefire is a program that does just that. It provides informal social control to

targeted neighborhoods by allowing a space for gang members to work with and talk to

community leaders and social workers. It also gives them opportunities at employment via

Ceasefire meetings. Offering gang members employment could likely keep them out of prison,

protecting them from what Contreras calls the mark of a record (2013). A prison record

extremely restricts job opportunities and typically enforces a wage penalty (Contreras 2013).

King 12
Ceasefire helps gang members avoid this penalty with its meetings aimed at offering an

alterative, law-abiding lifestyle. Ideally, these opportunities available at Ceasefire meetings will

help to promote good relations between the citizens and the police in taking the prevention focus

away from incarceration. Sampson argues that community policing is an effective option when it

also helps to build networks of collective efficacy (2011).

Another type of community-level intervention applied by GRID is community justice and

re-entry. GRID has a specific strategy for this population; it comprises the top tier of the pyramid

in Figure 1. As the pyramid indicates, the focus for these individuals is on job training and

education in order to reduce recidivism. This goal will likely be the most difficult to reach,

because, as discussed, it is more difficult for men and women with criminal records to get

decently paying jobs, which would be their greatest incentive not to recidivate.

While Ceasefire nobly attempts to build collective efficacy networks between gang

members and leaders in their communities, its major downfall is that it relies too heavily on the

willingness and motivation of gang members to attend the meetings. An average of 30 people

attended the meetings held in 2012 (Gurman 2012). One attendee told the Denver Post the

meetings were a bunch of bull (Gurman 2012) meant simply to scare people. Perhaps the

meetings work better in theory, with many important factors being disregarded. The long-term

effectiveness of the closed-door meetings is unproven. Despite Ceasefire having worked well in

some cities like Boston and Chicago, it has also been difficult to sustain the success over periods

longer than a few years. To improve its long-term sustainability, some practical changes could

help GRID and Ceasefire.

One beneficial change that could be made to GRID is reorganization. The meetings as

outlined in Ceasefire need to be more regularly held, and they need to be incentivized. Perhaps

King 13
the numbers of attendees are so low, because many gang members do not believe their city can

do anything to help them. If the meetings were held regularly, word would spread. If there were

incentive to attend, perhaps meals, more people would be compelled to attend. The type of

collective efficacy network Sampson describes can only be built over time. Gang members

would first need to trust the leaders of their community before turning from the only life they

know. Once trust is built, hopefully more attendees would take advantage of the opportunities

GRID offers. For this to happen, GRID would need a realistic and carefully planned budget and

persistent and dedicated enactors who are invested and involved in the communities which the

programs aim to help. Ceasefire is theoretically in line with both Sampsons and Contreras

findings about effective forms of intervention. In practice, it could use some structural changes,

but the potential is encouraging and hopeful.

Conclusion

Denver is unfortunately no exception when it comes to concentrated disadvantage. The

areas with isolated groups of African American and Hispanic people are the same areas facing

the most issues and with the highest crime rates. Sampson and others have advocated for a

second look at the mechanisms behind this concentrated disadvantage, pointing to things like

lack of resources and low collective efficacy. GRID aims to reduce gang activity that occurs

most often in these areas of disadvantage. However, in addition to more community-level

interventions, Sampsons research also calls for a radical change in our perception of social

disorder and crime in neighborhoods. Acknowledging the mechanisms responsible for

perpetuating disadvantage and criminal behavior is key to moving towards a solution. These

mechanisms are not the fault of the people residing in bad neighborhoods. Changing the ways

we think about these problems is equally important as policy change.

King 14
 References

Denver Department of Safety. 2016. Gang Reduction Initiative of Denver. City and County of
Denver. Retrieved March 28, 2016
(https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/department-of-safety/intervention-
prevention/gang-reduction-initiatives.html).

Denver Police Department. 2012. Crime Information. Retrieved February 2016

(https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/police-department/crime-
information/crime-map.html).

Contreras, Randol. 2013. The Stickup Kids: Race, Drugs, Violence, and the American Dream.
Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cordona, Felisa. 2011. Anti-gang program in Denver draws Justice Departments attention.
The Denver Post, October 26. Retrieved March 28, 2016
(http://www.denverpost.com/ci_19193960).

Gurman, Sadie. 2012. Denver anti-gang-violence plan successful, challenging in other cities.
The Denver Post, December 23. Retrieved March 28, 2016
(http://www.denverpost.com/ci_22248205/denver-anti-gang-violence-plan-successful-
challenging-other?IADID=Search-www.denverpost.com-www.denverpost.com).

Phillips, Noelle. 2015. Denver shifting focus on gang violence amid spike in violence. The
Denver Post, March 5. Retrieved March 28, 2016
(http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_27646575/denver-shifting-focus-gang-intervention-
amid-spike-violence).

Sampson, Robert. 2012. Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sampson, Robert. 2011. The Community. Pp. 221-236 in Crime and Public Policy, edited by
Pertersilia, Joan, and James Q. Wilson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shaw, Clifford R., and Henry D. McKay. 1969. Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2014. Social Explorer. (http://www.socialexplorer.com).

U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime in Denver, CO, 1990-2012:
Uniform Crime Reports. Retrieved February 2016
(http://www.bjs.gov/ucrdata/Search/Crime/Local/RunCrimeJurisbyJuris.cfm).

King 15